American nuclear missiles. Nuclear weapons of the United States - Nuclear weapons of the United States. production complex Weapons

Military operations in Europe had barely ended when the United States was the first in the world to test an atomic bomb. This happened on July 16, 1945. However, the US nuclear program began much earlier.

US development program atomic weapons launched in October 1941 - the Americans feared that Nazi Germany would receive superweapons earlier and be able to launch a preemptive strike. This program went down in history as the Manhattan Project. The project was led by the American physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who was constantly under surveillance because he actively sympathized with the leftist movement. However, the latter fact did not prevent him from taking part in the development of deadly weapons - the physicist was very worried about the events in Europe.

Researchers developed the Fat Man bomb, which operated on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosion detonation scheme. In addition, Oppenheimer commissioned a separate group to develop a bomb of simple design, which was supposed to work only on uranium-235 and was called “Baby”. It was this bomb that the Americans dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.

It was decided to detonate first an implosion-type plutonium bomb, the explosion of which is directed inward. In fact, it was an analogue of the “Fat Man”, which did not have an outer shell.

Due to the top secrecy of the development, it was decided to conduct the tests in the south of New Mexico at a test site located approximately 100 km from Alamogordo.

The Trinity atomic bomb was installed on a steel tower two days before the test, on different distances from which seismographs, cameras, and instruments recording radiation levels and pressure were located.

The first nuclear explosion in the history of mankind occurred on July 16, 1945 at 5.30 local time, and the power of the explosion was 15-20 thousand tons of explosives in TNT equivalent. At the same time, the light from the explosion was visible at a distance of 290 km from the test site, and the sound spread over a distance of about 160 km.

“My first impression was a feeling of a very bright light that flooded everything around, and when I turned around, I saw the now familiar picture of a fireball... Soon, literally 50 seconds after the explosion, a shock wave reached us. I was surprised at its comparative weakness. In fact, the shock wave was not that weak. It’s just that the flash of light was so strong and so unexpected that the reaction to it temporarily reduced our sensitivity,” military director of the Manhattan Project Leslie Groves.

In addition, in the center of the explosion, in a circle with a radius of 370 m, all vegetation was destroyed and a crater appeared, and the metal and concrete structures located there were completely evaporated. The cloud formed during the explosion rose to a height of 12.5 km - while traces of radioactive contamination were observed even at a distance of 160 km from the test site, and the contamination zone was about 50 km.

“We knew that the world would never be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried. Most were silent. I remembered a line from holy book Hinduism, Bhagavad Gita - Vishnu tries to persuade the Prince that he must fulfill his duty, and, in order to impress him, takes on his many-armed form and says: “I am Death, the great destroyer of worlds.” I believe that all of us, one way or another, have thought about something similar,” remembered later the “father” of the bomb, Oppenheimer.

The American president told Joseph Stalin about the successful testing of the bomb on July 17, when the Potsdam Conference, which allowed the United States to conduct a dialogue with the USSR from a position of strength. But the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place only after four years, on August 29, 1949.

A secret system from the Cold War that, in the event of a nuclear attack, was supposed to automatically launch in response soviet missiles and was known as “The Dead Hand”, now it is returning again, writes The National Interest. However, now Russia is openly talking about this system, which has become even more deadly, and this gives every reason for concern in the West, the article emphasizes.

Russian "weapon nuclear apocalypse» the Cold War is returning, and this may herald a new dangerous nuclear race, warns Michael Peck in The National Interest. If the United States starts deploying missiles medium range in Europe, Russia may adopt the doctrine of a preemptive nuclear strike, the author explains. Today this is openly discussed in public, so the West has every reason to be concerned, the article notes.

Russia knows how to design and create weapons that "terrifying": for example, cruise missiles with nuclear engines or unmanned submarines with 100 megaton warheads, writes The National Interest. But "the most terrible", according to the author, became a system from the Cold War, which in the event of a nuclear attack was supposed to automatically launch missiles in response without human intervention. Now this automated Russian system, known as "Perimeter" or "Dead Hand", is back in service, and it has become "even more deadly", is emphasized in the article.

This is due to President Donald Trump’s decision to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated huge arsenals of American and Russian intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the author explains. Trump's claims that Russia "violates" this treaty, developing and adopting new "prohibited" missiles, infuriates Moscow, which seriously fears that America will again begin deploying nuclear missiles in Europe, the article says. After all, if American missiles will be located, for example, in Germany or Poland, then they are able to fly to Russian territory, even if they do not belong to the extended range category. While Russia can strike the continental United States only with the help of intercontinental ballistic missiles due to its geographical location, notes The National Interest.

General Viktor Esin, who commanded Russian forces in the 1990s missile forces strategic purpose, in a recent interview confirmed that the legendary Perimeter system still exists. According to him, if the United States begins to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe and thereby reduce the flight time to Russian borders to two or three minutes, then Moscow in response will consider switching to the doctrine of a preemptive nuclear strike. " The Perimeter system is functioning, it has even been improved. But when it works, we will have few resources left - we will be able to launch only those missiles that will survive the first strike of the aggressor.",” The National Interest quotes excerpts from Esin’s interview.

Although it is not entirely clear what the Russian general meant when he said that the system "functioning" And "improved" noted in the article. According to available data, Perimeter launches modified UR-100 ICBMs, which transmit the command to launch conventional nuclear-capable ICBMs hidden in silos.

The author of the book dedicated to “Perimeter”, David Hoffman, who called this system “Dead Hand”, describes the mechanism of its action as follows: “In the event of a likely nuclear attack, the political leadership had to give 'consent to access.' In this case, the officers on duty should have gone down to the “balls” ( underground bunkers) deep underground. If clearance was given on time, if the system received seismic confirmation of nuclear explosions on the ground, and if communication with the center was lost, the bunker guards would fire command missiles. They would take off, transmitting the order to the ballistic missiles. And they would carry out the mission of retaliation.”

Periodically they came to light "implicit signs" that the Perimeter system still exists, the article says. “This points to the oddities of the Soviet government, which kept the existence of the Perimeter a secret even from the American enemy, whom this system was supposed to restrain and intimidate,”- notes the author. In his opinion, the main operating principle of the “Dead Hand” is initially based on fear: "On the fear of American first a blow that will decapitate Russian leadership before it orders a retaliatory strike. And also on the fear that some Russian leader will become cowardly and not give this order.”

But the fact that today in Russia they began to discuss “Perimeter” openly also gives the West "every reason for concern" concludes The National Interest.

The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of “possibility of possibilities”. This concept is based on the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts in relation to the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will concentrate its attention on military field on how it is necessary to fight, and not on who and when the enemy will be. Accordingly, the US military is tasked with having the power to not only counter the wide range of military threats and military capabilities that any potential adversary may possess, but also to ensure victory in any military conflict. Based on this goal, the United States is taking measures to long-term maintain its nuclear forces in combat-ready condition and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, nuclear weapons are available in two branches of the US armed forces - the Air Force and Navy(Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), heavy bombers(TB) B-52N and B-2A with air-launched cruise missiles long range(ALCM) and free-fall nuclear bombs, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​equipped with MIRVs and cruise missiles sea-based(SLCM) long range.

To equip these carriers, the US nuclear arsenal has nuclear munitions (NFM), produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (updated) during the refurbishment process in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

– four types of multiple warheads: for ICBMs – Mk-12A (with a W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with a W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs – Mk-4 (with a W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with W76-1 nuclear charge) and Mk-5 (with W88 nuclear charge);
- two types of warheads of air-launched strategic cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a W80-1 nuclear charge and one type of sea-launched Tomahawk non-strategic cruise missiles with a W80-0 nuclear warhead (KR ground-based BGM-109G eliminated by INF Treaty, their YaZ W84 is being mothballed);
– two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical air bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with W62 nuclear weapons that were in the active arsenal were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the B61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts, due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground, consider as a third generation nuclear warhead.

The modern US nuclear arsenal is divided into categories according to the state of readiness for use of its nuclear warheads:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities at air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called “operational deployed”.

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in “operational storage” mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) to missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as “operational reserve” and are intended for “operational additional deployment.” Essentially they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is backup nuclear warheads placed in “long-term storage” mode. They are stored (mainly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with limited service life - the tritium containing components and neutron generators have been removed. Therefore, transferring these nuclear warheads into the “active arsenal” is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace the nuclear warheads of the active arsenal (of similar, similar types) in the event that massive failures (defects) are suddenly discovered in them; this is a kind of “safety reserve”.

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second thermal cascade nuclear charges and etc.).

An analysis of publicly published data on the types of nuclear warheads included in the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear warheads B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear warhead W76 - as binary charges with gas (thermonuclear ) boost (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). In this case, the nuclear weapons of aircraft bombs and cruise missiles belong to charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of similar nuclear weapons having different powers (DV).

American scientific and technical sources provide the following: possible ways power changes:

– dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when feeding it into the primary unit;
– change in the release time (in relation to the time process of compression of the fissile material) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
– mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node to the secondary node compartment (in fact, exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of aircraft bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In other types of nuclear weapons (W76, W78 and W88), for reasons related to the need to ensure low mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining sufficient high power, explosives with more high speed detonation and explosion energy.

Currently, a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices are used in the US nuclear warhead. various types, ensuring their safety and excluding unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various types of emergency situations which can occur with aircraft, submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles, aerial bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code locking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, having letter designations A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes into PAL installed inside the nuclear power supply, special electronic remote controls are used. PAL enclosures have increased protection from mechanical influences and are located in the nuclear power supply in such a way as to make them difficult to access.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with W80 nuclear warheads, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed, which allows arming and (or) switching of nuclear warhead power upon command from the aircraft in flight.

In nuclear aerial bombs Aircraft monitoring and control (AMAC) systems are used, which include equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber) capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to activate the control unit (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft immediately before dropping the bomb.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first variants of the SHS were devices that were capable of disabling individual internal components of the nuclear warhead upon command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the nuclear warhead maintenance personnel who had the appropriate authority and were located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it became clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that are automatically triggered when there is an attempt of unauthorized actions with a nuclear warhead, primarily upon penetration into it or penetration into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with an SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that make it possible to ensure partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads upon command from the outside, partial decommissioning by means of explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure safety and security from unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant pit shells (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitive high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), devices to prevent unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, general level safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, as some believe American experts, does not yet fully comply with modern technical capabilities, seven out of eight types of nuclear charges in the existing US arsenal are not fully provided with all of the above set of safety and protection measures.

In the absence nuclear tests The most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the initially determined warranty periods. In the United States, this problem is solved with the help of the nuclear arsenal support program (Stockpile Stewardship Program - SSP), which has been in force since 1994. An integral part This program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), in which the nuclear components of the nuclear warhead requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical characteristics and specifications, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those components of the nuclear warhead. whose warranty period has expired.

Nuclear safety equipment is tested for signs of actual or suspected aging by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five Engineering Campaign companies. The company regularly monitors the arsenal's nuclear warheads by carefully inspecting 11 nuclear warheads of each type each year, looking for corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type, selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely disassembled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and return to the arsenal. Using data obtained from regular monitoring through the SSP program, UD problems are identified and addressed through LEP programs. In this case, the main goal is to “increase the lifespan of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components in the arsenal by at least 20 years, with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the original expected service life. These terms are determined based on an analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental research on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of components and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained during the implementation of the SSP program for the main components of the nuclear power supply by determining the so-called failure function, which characterizes the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of the nuclear power supply.

The possible service life of nuclear charges is determined primarily by the service life of plutonium initiators (pits). In the USA, in order to resolve the issue regarding the possible lifespan of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads included in the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and used to assess changes in the properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during full-scale testing and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of accelerated aging experiments and computer modeling of processes , occurring during its aging.

Based on the results of the research, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear reactors remain operational for 45-60 years from the date of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to retain in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time the types of nuclear warheads discussed above, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which have subsequently undergone modernization, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing .

Donald Trump Doctrine

You may have once thought that America's nuclear arsenal, with its thousands of thermoelectric nuclear warheads, which can destroy the entire population of the Earth, can convince any enemy not to use theirs against the United States.

You were wrong.

The Pentagon expressed dissatisfaction that American nuclear weapons are inappropriately powerful. It's old, unreliable, and has such destructive potential that even President Trump might be reluctant to use it if an adversary were using smaller nuclear bombs on a hypothetical battlefield.

American military experts and weapons developers decided to start creating something more suitable for warfare, so that the president would have more options if something happened. According to their plan, this will become an even more convincing deterrent for opponents. But it may be that such new bombs could increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in armed conflict, with catastrophic consequences.

That Trump would be all for improving America's nuclear arsenal would not surprise anyone, given his penchant for boasting about his country's unrivaled military might. He was delighted when, in April 2017, one of his generals ordered the first drop of the most powerful conventional bomb available on Afghanistan.

Under existing nuclear doctrine, the Obama administration intended the United States to resort to nuclear weapons only “as a last resort” to protect the vital interests of the country or its allies. Then it was forbidden to use it as a political tool to rein in weaker states.

However, Trump, who had already threatened to bring down North Korea“fire and fury like the world has never seen,” this approach seems too harsh. He and his advisers seem to want nuclear weapons to be used in high-power conflicts of any severity and brandished like the cudgel of the apocalypse to intimidate those who won't listen.

Making the US arsenal more sophisticated requires two types of changes in nuclear policy. Modification of existing doctrine to remove restrictions on the deployment of such weapons in war time, and permission to develop and manufacture new generations of nuclear weapons, including for tactical strikes.

All this will be spelled out in the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which will be formed by the end of this year or early next year.

Until this moment, its exact contents will remain unknown, but even after that, Americans will have access to an extremely stripped-down version of the document. most of which is secret. However, some general provisions of the Review are already clear from the statements of the President and the generals.

And one more obvious fact. The review would lift restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction of any kind, regardless of their level of destructiveness, making the planet's most powerful nuclear arsenal even more formidable.

Let's change our view of nuclear weapons

The strategic guidance in the new Review is likely to have far-reaching implications. As a former director of the Council said national security US Arms Control and Nonproliferation Commissioner John Wolfsthal wrote in a recent release of Arms Control that the document will influence "the image of America, the President, and nuclear capabilities in the eyes of allies and adversaries." More importantly, the review sets the direction for decisions that shape the management, maintenance and modernization of the nuclear arsenal and influence how Congress views and funds nuclear forces.”

With that in mind, consider the recommendations outlined in the Obama-era Review. It comes as the White House seeks to restore America's prestige in the world following international condemnation of President Bush's handling of Iraq and just six months after Barack Obama received Nobel Prize for his intention to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation was a priority.

As a result, the use of nuclear weapons was limited under almost any circumstances on any battlefield imaginable. The Review's primary goal was to reduce "the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security."

As noted in the document, America only once considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against Soviet tank formations, for example, in a major European conflict. It was assumed that in such a situation the USSR would have an advantage in traditional types weapons.

In the military-political situation of 2010, of course, little remains from those times, as well as from the Soviet Union. Washington, as noted in the Review, is now the undisputed leader in the traditional sense of defense. “Accordingly, the United States will continue to strengthen traditional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional attacks.”

A nuclear strategy aimed solely at deterring a first strike against the United States or its allies is unlikely to require a huge stockpile of weapons. As a result, this approach opened up the possibility of further reductions in the size of the nuclear arsenal and led to the signing of a new treaty with Russia in 2010, which ordered significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems for both countries.

Each side was to be limited to 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

However, this approach never satisfied representatives of the defense department and conservative research institutes. Critics of this sort have often pointed to possible changes in Russian military doctrine that would make it more likely that nuclear weapons would be used in a large-scale war with NATO if Russia's position in the war began to deteriorate.

Such “strategic deterrence” is a phrase that for Russia and the West has different meaning, could lead to the use of low-yield "tactical" nuclear weapons against enemy strongholds if Russian forces in Europe were on the verge of defeat.

To what extent this version corresponds to Russian reality, no one really knows. However, something similar is often associated in the West by those who believe that Obama's nuclear strategy is hopelessly outdated and gives Moscow a reason to increase the importance of nuclear weapons in its doctrine.

Such complaints were often voiced in the Seven Defense Priorities new administration" - in a report by the US Department of Defense Science Board (December 2016), which is a Pentagon-funded advisory group that regularly reports to the Secretary of Defense. “We remain unsure that if we reduce the importance of nuclear weapons to our nation, other countries will do the same.”

According to the report, Russian strategy involves the use of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes to deter a NATO attack. While many Western analysts question the accuracy of such claims, the Pentagon's Science Board insists that the United States must develop such weapons and be prepared to use them.

The report says Washington needs "more flexible system nuclear species weapons that could, if necessary, produce fast and accurate nuclear attack over a limited affected area if existing non-nuclear and nuclear weapons options turn out to be ineffective.”

This approach is now inspiring the Trump administration to new achievements in this area, which is clearly visible in some of the president's Twitter posts. “The United States must strengthen and expand its nuclear capabilities so that the whole world will once again remember the size of our weapons,” Donald Trump wrote on December 22, 2016.

Although he did not write specifically (because it was a short post on Twitter), his thought is an accurate reflection of the opinion of the Science Council and Trump's advisers.

Upon assuming the position of Commander in Chief, Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the Secretary of Defense to review the nuclear weapons situation and ensure that "the means nuclear deterrence The US is modern, reliable, ready and can meet the challenges of the 21st century and be credible to its allies."

Details of the Survey that will emerge in the Trump era are not yet known. However, he will certainly undo all of Obama's achievements and put nuclear weapons on a pedestal.

Arsenal Expansion

The Trump Review will promote the creation of new nuclear weapons systems that will become major players with an expanded range of strike options. In particular, the administration is believed to favor the acquisition of “low-yield tactical nuclear weapons” and even more delivery systems, including air- and ground-launched cruise missiles. The justification for this, of course, will be the thesis that ammunition of this kind is necessary to comply with Russian achievements in this area.

According to internal sources, the development of tactical munitions that could, for example, destroy major port or a military base, and not immediately the whole city, as it was in Hiroshima. As one anonymous government official put it in Politico, “Having this capability is critical.”

Another policymaker added that "the Review needs to poll the military on what they need to deter their enemies" and whether current weapons "will be useful in all the scenarios we envision."
It must be borne in mind that during the Obama administration plans and initial multi-million dollar design work to “modernize” America’s nuclear arsenal for many decades to come. From this perspective, Trump's nuclear era was already well underway at the time of his inauguration.

And, of course, the United States already possesses several types of nuclear weapons, including the B61 "gravity bomb" and the W80 missile warhead, the yield of which can be adjusted down to several kilotons.

A typical delivery system will be weapons used outside the air defense zone - modern cruise missile long range that could be carried by the B-2 bomber, its big brother the B-52 or the B-21 under development.

A world ready for nuclear winter

The publication of the new Review will undoubtedly spark debate about whether the country is truly nuclear arsenal, which is enough to destroy several planets the size of Earth, new nuclear weapons are needed, and will this lead to another global arms race.

In November 2017 Budget management Congress has released a report showing that the cost of replacing all three legs of the US nuclear triad over 30 years would be at least $1.2 billion, not including inflation and additional costs that could push that figure to $1.7 billion or more.

The problem of the justification of all these new types of weapons and their cosmic cost is extremely relevant today. One thing is clear: any decision to purchase such weapons will mean long-term budget cuts in other sectors - health care, education, infrastructure or the fight against the opioid epidemic.

Yet questions of cost and adequacy are the easiest part of the new nuclear puzzle. It is based on the very idea of ​​“applicability”. When Obama insisted that nuclear weapons should never be used on the battlefield, he was talking not just about America, but about all countries. “To end Cold War thinking,” he said in Prague in April 2009, “we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and encourage others to do the same.”

If the Trump White House supports a doctrine that would blur the distinction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, turning them into equivalent instruments of coercion and war, this would make an escalation to complete thermonuclear annihilation of the planet the most likely in decades.
For example, there is no doubt that this position has prompted other countries with nuclear weapons, including Russia, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, to consider using them in future conflicts. It might even encourage countries that don't currently have nuclear weapons to consider producing them.

Obama's views on nuclear weapons were fundamentally different from those of the Cold War, when the possibility of a thermonuclear holocaust between the planet's two superpowers was an everyday reality and millions of people turned out in antinuclear demonstrations.

With the threat of Armageddon gone, the fear of nuclear weapons gradually evaporated and the protests ended. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons themselves and the companies that created them are alive and well. Now that the peaceful period of the post-nuclear era is coming to an end, the zone, the idea of ​​using nuclear weapons, which during the Cold War was hardly even contemplated, may no longer be something special.

Or at least it will be if, once again, the citizens of this planet do not take to the streets to protest against a future in which cities lie in smoldering ruins and millions of people die of hunger and radiation sickness.