BM 13 history of creation. Katyusha is a unique combat vehicle of the USSR (interesting). Katyusha MLRS launcher

The barrelless field rocket artillery system, which received the affectionate feminine name “Katyusha” in the Red Army, without exaggeration, became probably one of the most popular types of military equipment of the Second World War. In any case, neither our enemies nor our allies had anything like this.

Initially, barrelless rocket artillery systems in the Red Army were not intended for ground battles. They literally descended from heaven to earth.

The 82 mm caliber rocket was adopted by the Red Army Air Force back in 1933. They were installed on fighters designed by Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153. In 1939, they underwent baptism of fire during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, where they performed well when shooting at groups of enemy aircraft.

In the same year, employees of the Jet Research Institute began work on a mobile ground launcher that could fire rockets at ground targets. At the same time, the caliber of the rockets was increased to 132 mm.
In March 1941, field tests of the new weapon system were successfully carried out, and the decision to mass produce combat vehicles with RS-132 rockets, called BM-13, was made the day before the start of the war - June 21, 1941.

How was it structured?

The BM-13 combat vehicle was a chassis of a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle, on which a rotary truss with a package of guides and a guidance mechanism was installed. For aiming, a rotating and lifting mechanism and an artillery sight were provided. At the rear of the combat vehicle there were two jacks, which ensured its greater stability when firing.
The missiles were launched using a hand-held electric coil connected to a battery and contacts on the guides. When the handle was turned, the contacts closed in turn, and the starting squib was fired in the next projectile.
The explosive material in the warhead of the projectile was detonated from both sides (the length of the detonator was only slightly less than the length of the explosive cavity). And when two waves of detonation met, the gas pressure of the explosion at the meeting point increased sharply. As a result, the hull fragments had a significantly higher acceleration, heated up to 600-800 ° C and had a good ignition effect. In addition to the body, part of the rocket chamber also burst, which was heated from the gunpowder burning inside; this increased the fragmentation effect by 1.5-2 times compared to artillery shells of the same caliber. That is why the legend arose that Katyusha rockets were equipped with a “thermite charge.” The “thermite” charge was indeed tested in besieged Leningrad in 1942, but it turned out to be unnecessary - after the Katyusha salvo, everything around was burning. And the joint use of dozens of missiles at the same time also created interference of blast waves, which further enhanced the damaging effect.

Baptism of fire near Orsha

The first salvo of a battery of Soviet rocket-propelled mortars (this is how the new type of military equipment began to be called for greater secrecy) consisting of seven BM-13 combat installations was fired in mid-July 1941. This happened near Orsha. An experienced battery under the command of Captain Flerov launched a fire strike at the Orsha railway station, where a concentration of enemy military equipment and manpower was noticed.
At 15:15 on July 14, 1941, heavy fire was opened on enemy trains. The entire station instantly turned into a huge cloud of fire. On the same day, the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, wrote in his diary: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used weapons unknown until that time. A fiery barrage of shells burned the Orsha railway station and all the trains with personnel and military equipment of the arriving military units. The metal was melting, the earth was burning.”

The morale effect of the use of rocket mortars was stunning. The enemy lost more than an infantry battalion and a huge amount of military equipment and weapons at the Orsha station. And Captain Flerov’s battery dealt another blow on the same day - this time at the enemy crossing over the Orshitsa River.
The Wehrmacht command, having studied the information received from eyewitnesses of the use of new Russian weapons, was forced to issue a special instruction to its troops, which stated: “ There are reports from the front about the Russians using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds. Any appearance of these weapons must be reported on the same day to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command." A real hunt began for Captain Flerov's battery. In October 1941, she found herself in the Spas-Demensky “cauldron” and was ambushed. Of the 160 people, only 46 managed to reach their own. The battery commander himself died, having first made sure that all the combat vehicles were blown up and would not fall into enemy hands intact.

On land and sea...

In addition to the BM-13, in the SKB of the Voronezh plant. The Comintern, which produced these combat installations, developed new options for placing missiles. For example, taking into account the extremely low cross-country ability of the ZIS-6 vehicle, an option was developed for installing guides for missiles on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tracked tractor. In addition, an 82 mm caliber rocket has also found use. Guides were developed and manufactured for it, which were later installed on the chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle (36 guides) and on the chassis of the T-40 and T-60 light tanks (24 guides).

A 16-charging installation for RS-132 shells and a 48-charging installation for RS-82 shells for armored trains were developed. In the fall of 1942, during the fighting in the Caucasus, 8-round mining pack launchers for RS-82 shells were manufactured for use in mountain conditions.

Later they were installed on American Willys all-terrain vehicles, which came to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
Special launchers for 82 mm and 132 mm caliber missiles were manufactured for their subsequent installation on warships - torpedo boats and armored boats.

The launchers themselves received the popular nickname “Katyusha”, under which they entered the history of the Great Patriotic War. Why Katyusha? There are many versions on this matter. The most reliable - due to the fact that the first BM-13 had the letter “K” - as information that the product was produced at the plant named after. Comintern in Voronezh. By the way, the cruising boats of the Soviet Navy, which had the letter index “K,” received the same nickname. In total, 36 launcher designs were developed and produced during the war.

And the Wehrmacht soldiers nicknamed the BM-13 “Stalin's organs.” Apparently, the roar of the rockets reminded the Germans of the sounds of a church organ. This “music” clearly made them feel uncomfortable.
And from the spring of 1942, guides with missiles began to be installed on British and American all-wheel drive chassis imported into the USSR under Lend-Lease. Still, the ZIS-6 turned out to be a vehicle with low cross-country ability and payload capacity. The three-axle all-wheel drive American truck Studebakker US6 turned out to be most suitable for installing rocket launchers. Combat vehicles began to be produced on its chassis. At the same time, they received the name BM-13N (“normalized”).

During the entire Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry produced more than ten thousand rocket artillery combat vehicles.

Relatives of the Katyusha

For all their advantages, high-explosive fragmentation rockets RS-82 and RS-132 had one drawback - large dispersion and low efficiency when affecting enemy personnel located in field shelters and trenches. To correct this shortcoming, special 300 mm caliber rockets were manufactured.
They received the nickname “Andryusha” among the people. They were launched from a launching machine (“frame”) made of wood. The launch was carried out using a sapper blasting machine.
“Andryushas” were first used in Stalingrad. The new weapons were easy to manufacture, but installing them in position and aiming at the target required a lot of time. In addition, the short range of the M-30 rockets made them dangerous for their own crews.

Therefore, in 1943, the troops began to receive an improved missile, which, with the same power, had a greater firing range. An M-31 shell could hit manpower over an area of ​​2 thousand square meters or create a crater 2-2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter. But the time to prepare a salvo with new shells was significant - one and a half to two hours.
Such shells were used in 1944-1945 during the assault on enemy fortifications and during street battles. One hit from an M-31 missile was enough to destroy an enemy bunker or a firing point located in a residential building.

Fire sword of the "god of war"

By May 1945, rocket artillery units had about three thousand combat vehicles of various types and many “frames” with M-31 shells. Not a single Soviet offensive, since the Battle of Stalingrad, began without artillery preparation using Katyusha rockets. Salvos from combat installations became the “fiery sword” with which our infantry and tanks made their way through enemy fortified positions.
During the war, BM-13 installations were sometimes used for direct fire at enemy tanks and firing points. To do this, the combat vehicle drove its rear wheels onto some elevation so that its guides assumed a horizontal position. Of course, the accuracy of such shooting was quite low, but a direct hit from a 132-mm rocket would blow any enemy tank to pieces, a close explosion would knock over enemy military equipment, and heavy hot fragments would reliably put it out of action.

After the war, Soviet designers of combat vehicles continued to work on Katyushas and Andryushas. Only now they began to be called not guards mortars, but multiple launch rocket systems. In the USSR, such powerful SZOs as “Grad”, “Hurricane” and “Smerch” were designed and built. At the same time, the losses of an enemy caught in a salvo from a battery of Hurricanes or Smerchs are comparable to losses from the use of tactical nuclear weapons with a yield of up to 20 kilotons, that is, with the explosion of an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

BM-13 combat vehicle on a three-axle vehicle chassis

The caliber of the projectile is 132 mm.
Projectile weight - 42.5 kg.
The mass of the warhead is 21.3 kg.
The maximum projectile flight speed is 355 m/s.
The number of guides is 16.
The maximum firing range is 8470 m.
Charging time of the installation is 3-5 minutes.
The duration of a full salvo is 7-10 seconds.

Guards mortar BM-13 Katyusha

1. Launcher
2. Missiles
3. The car on which the installation was mounted

Guide package
Cabin armor shields
Hiking support
Lifting frame
Launcher battery
Sight bracket
Swivel frame
Lifting handle

The launchers were mounted on the chassis of ZIS-6, Ford Marmont, International Jiemsi, Austin vehicles and on STZ-5 tracked tractors. The largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker vehicles.

M-13 projectile

01. Fuse retaining ring
02. GVMZ fuze
03. Detonator checker
04. Bursting charge
05. Head part
06. Igniter
07. Bottom of the chamber
08. Guide pin
09. Powder rocket charge
10. Missile part
11. Grate
12. Critical section of the nozzle
13. Nozzle
14. Stabilizer

Few survived

The effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas during an attack on an enemy fortified unit can be illustrated by the example of the defeat of the Tolkachev defensive unit during our counteroffensive near Kursk in July 1943.
The village of Tolkachevo was turned by the Germans into a heavily fortified resistance center with a large number of dugouts and bunkers of 5-12 roll-ups, with a developed network of trenches and communication passages. The approaches to the village were heavily mined and covered with wire fences.
Salvos of rocket artillery destroyed a significant part of the bunkers, the trenches, along with the enemy infantry in them, were filled up, and the fire system was completely suppressed. Of the entire garrison of the junction, numbering 450-500 people, only 28 survived. The Tolkachev junction was taken by our units without any resistance.

Supreme High Command Reserve

By decision of the Headquarters, in January 1945, the formation of twenty guards mortar regiments began - this is how the units armed with the BM-13 began to be called.
The Guards Mortar Regiment (Gv.MP) of the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) consisted of a command and three divisions of three batteries. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, a salvo of only one division of 12 BM-13-16 PIP vehicles (Staff Directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of rocket artillery in quantities less than a division) could be compared in strength to a salvo of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 152 mm howitzers per regiment ) or 18 heavy howitzer brigades of the RVGK (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).

Victor Sergeev

The Soviet Katyusha multiple launch rocket system is one of the most recognizable symbols of the Great Patriotic War. In terms of popularity, the legendary Katyusha is not much inferior to the T-34 tank or the PPSh assault rifle. It is still not known for certain where this name came from (there are numerous versions), but the Germans called these installations “Stalinist organs” and were terribly afraid of them.

“Katyusha” is the collective name for several rocket launchers from the Great Patriotic War. Soviet propaganda presented them as exclusively domestic “know-how,” which was not true. Work in this direction was carried out in many countries, and the famous German six-barreled mortars are also MLRS, albeit of a slightly different design. The Americans and the British also used rocket artillery.

However, the Katyusha became the most effective and most mass-produced vehicle of its class during World War II. BM-13 is a real weapon of Victory. She took part in all significant battles on the Eastern Front, clearing the way for infantry formations. The first Katyusha salvo was fired in the summer of 1941, and four years later the BM-13 installations were already shelling besieged Berlin.

A little history of the BM-13 Katyusha

Several reasons contributed to the revival of interest in rocket weapons: firstly, more advanced types of gunpowder were invented, which made it possible to significantly increase the flight range of rockets; secondly, the missiles were perfect as weapons for combat aircraft; and thirdly, rockets could be used to deliver toxic substances.

The last reason was the most important: based on the experience of the First World War, the military had little doubt that the next conflict would definitely not happen without military gases.

In the USSR, the creation of rocket weapons began with the experiments of two enthusiasts - Artemyev and Tikhomirov. In 1927, smokeless pyroxylin-TNT gunpowder was created, and in 1928, the first rocket was developed that managed to fly 1,300 meters. At the same time, the targeted development of missile weapons for aviation began.

In 1933, experimental samples of aircraft rockets of two calibers appeared: RS-82 and RS-132. The main drawback of the new weapons, which the military did not like at all, was their low accuracy. The shells had a small tail that did not exceed its caliber, and a pipe was used as a guide, which was very convenient. However, to improve the accuracy of the missiles, their empennage had to be increased and new guides had to be developed.

In addition, pyroxylin-TNT gunpowder was not very suitable for mass production of this type of weapon, so it was decided to use tubular nitroglycerin gunpowder.

In 1937, new missiles with enlarged tails and new open rail-type guides were tested. Innovations significantly improved the accuracy of fire and increased the missile's flight range. In 1938, the RS-82 and RS-132 missiles were put into service and began to be mass-produced.

In the same year, the designers were given a new task: to create a rocket system for the ground forces, using a 132 mm caliber rocket as a basis.

In 1939, the 132-mm M-13 high-explosive fragmentation projectile was ready; it had a more powerful warhead and an increased flight range. Such results were achieved by lengthening the ammunition.

In the same year, the first MU-1 rocket launcher was manufactured. Eight short guides were installed across the truck, and sixteen missiles were attached to them in pairs. This design turned out to be very unsuccessful; during the salvo, the vehicle swayed strongly, which led to a significant decrease in the accuracy of the battle.

In September 1939, testing began on a new rocket launcher, the MU-2. The basis for it was the three-axle ZiS-6 truck; this vehicle provided the combat complex with high maneuverability and allowed it to quickly change positions after each salvo. Now the guides for the missiles were located along the car. In one salvo (about 10 seconds), the MU-2 fired sixteen shells, the weight of the installation with ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range exceeded eight kilometers.

With this design of the guides, the rocking of the car during a salvo became minimal, in addition, two jacks were installed in the rear of the car.

In 1940, state tests of the MU-2 were carried out, and it was put into service under the designation “BM-13 rocket mortar”.

The day before the start of the war (June 21, 1941), the USSR government decided to mass produce BM-13 combat systems, ammunition for them, and form special units for their use.

The first experience of using the BM-13 at the front showed their high efficiency and contributed to the active production of this type of weapon. During the war, “Katyusha” was produced by several factories, and mass production of ammunition for them was established.

Artillery units armed with BM-13 installations were considered elite, and immediately after their formation they received the name Guards. The BM-8, BM-13 and other rocket systems were officially called “Guards mortars.”

Application of BM-13 "Katyusha"

The first combat use of rocket launchers took place in mid-July 1941. The Germans occupied Orsha, a large junction station in Belarus. A large amount of enemy military equipment and manpower had accumulated on it. It was for this purpose that the battery of rocket launchers (seven units) of Captain Flerov fired two salvos.

As a result of the actions of the artillerymen, the railway junction was practically wiped off the face of the earth, and the Nazis suffered severe losses in people and equipment.

"Katyusha" was also used in other sectors of the front. The new Soviet weapon was a very unpleasant surprise for the German command. The pyrotechnic effect of the use of shells had a particularly strong psychological impact on Wehrmacht soldiers: after a Katyusha salvo, literally everything that could burn burned. This effect was achieved through the use of TNT blocks in the shells, which upon explosion formed thousands of burning fragments.

Rocket artillery was actively used in the battle of Moscow, Katyushas destroyed the enemy at Stalingrad, and they were tried to be used as anti-tank weapons on the Kursk Bulge. To do this, special recesses were made under the front wheels of the vehicle, so the Katyusha could fire directly. However, the use of the BM-13 against tanks was less effective, since the M-13 rocket was a high-explosive fragmentation projectile, and not armor-piercing. In addition, "Katyusha" has never been distinguished by high accuracy of fire. But if its shell hit a tank, all the vehicle’s attachments were destroyed, the turret often jammed, and the crew received severe concussion.

Rocket launchers were used with great success until the Victory; they took part in the storming of Berlin and other operations in the final stage of the war.

In addition to the famous BM-13 MLRS, there was also a BM-8 rocket launcher, which used 82 mm caliber rockets, and over time, heavy rocket systems appeared that launched 310 mm caliber rockets.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers actively used the experience of street fighting they gained during the capture of Poznan and Königsberg. It consisted of firing single heavy rockets M-31, M-13 and M-20 direct fire. Special assault groups were created, which included an electrical engineer. The rocket was launched from machine guns, wooden caps, or simply from any flat surface. A hit from such a shell could easily destroy a house or be guaranteed to suppress an enemy firing point.

During the war years, about 1,400 BM-8, 3,400 BM-13 and 100 BM-31 units were lost.

However, the story of the BM-13 did not end there: in the early 60s, the USSR supplied these installations to Afghanistan, where they were actively used by government troops.

Device BM-13 "Katyusha"

The main advantage of the BM-13 rocket launcher is its extreme simplicity both in production and in use. The artillery part of the installation consists of eight guides, the frame on which they are located, rotating and lifting mechanisms, sighting devices and electrical equipment.

The guides were a five-meter I-beam with special overlays. A locking device and an electric igniter were installed in the breech of each of the guides, with the help of which the shot was fired.

The guides were mounted on a rotating frame, which, using simple lifting and rotating mechanisms, provided vertical and horizontal guidance.

Each Katyusha was equipped with an artillery sight.

The crew of the vehicle (BM-13) consisted of 5-7 people.

The M-13 rocket consisted of two parts: a combat and a jet powder engine. The warhead, which contained an explosive and a contact fuse, is very reminiscent of the warhead of a conventional high-explosive fragmentation artillery projectile.

The powder engine of the M-13 projectile consisted of a chamber with a powder charge, a nozzle, a special grille, stabilizers and a fuse.

The main problem faced by the developers of missile systems (and not only in the USSR) was the low accuracy of the missiles’ accuracy. To stabilize their flight, the designers took two paths. German six-barreled mortar rockets rotated in flight due to obliquely located nozzles, and flat stabilizers were installed on Soviet RSakhs. To give the projectile greater accuracy, it was necessary to increase its initial speed; for this, the guides on the BM-13 were longer.

The German stabilization method made it possible to reduce the size of both the projectile itself and the weapon from which it was fired. However, this significantly reduced the firing range. Although, it should be said that the German six-barreled mortars were more accurate than the Katyushas.

The Soviet system was simpler and allowed shooting over considerable distances. Later, installations began to use spiral guides, which further increased accuracy.

Modifications of "Katyusha"

During the war, numerous modifications of both rocket launchers and ammunition were created. Here are just a few of them:

BM-13-SN - this installation had spiral guides that imparted a rotational movement to the projectile, which significantly increased its accuracy.

BM-8-48 - this rocket launcher used 82 mm caliber projectiles and had 48 guides.

BM-31-12 - this rocket launcher used 310 mm caliber shells for firing.

310 mm caliber rockets were initially used for firing from the ground, only then self-propelled guns appeared.

The first systems were created on the basis of the ZiS-6 car, then they were most often installed on vehicles received under Lend-Lease. It must be said that with the beginning of Lend-Lease, only foreign cars were used to create rocket launchers.

In addition, rocket launchers (from M-8 shells) were installed on motorcycles, snowmobiles, and armored boats. The guides were installed on railway platforms, T-40, T-60, KV-1 tanks.

To understand how widespread the Katyusha weapons were, it is enough to cite two figures: from 1941 to the end of 1944, Soviet industry produced 30 thousand launchers of various types and 12 million shells for them.

During the war years, several types of 132 mm caliber rockets were developed. The main directions of modernization were to increase the accuracy of fire, increase the range of the projectile and its power.

Advantages and disadvantages of the BM-13 Katyusha missile launcher

The main advantage of rocket launchers was the large number of projectiles they fired in one salvo. If several MLRS were operating in one area at once, the destructive effect was increased due to the interference of shock waves.

Easy to use. “Katyushas” were distinguished by an extremely simple design, and the sighting devices of this installation were also uncomplicated.

Low cost and easy to manufacture. During the war, the production of rocket launchers was established in dozens of factories. The production of ammunition for these complexes did not present any particular difficulties. Particularly eloquent is the comparison between the cost of the BM-13 and a conventional artillery gun of a similar caliber.

Installation mobility. The time of one BM-13 salvo is approximately 10 seconds; after the salvo, the vehicle left the firing line without exposing itself to enemy return fire.

However, this weapon also had disadvantages, the main one being low shooting accuracy due to the large dispersion of projectiles. This problem was partially solved by the BM-13SN, but it has not been completely resolved for modern MLRS.

Insufficient high-explosive effect of M-13 shells. "Katyusha" was not very effective against long-term defensive fortifications and armored vehicles.

Short firing range compared to cannon artillery.

Large consumption of gunpowder in the manufacture of rockets.

There was heavy smoke during the salvo, which served as an unmasking factor.

The high center of gravity of the BM-13 installations led to frequent rollovers of the vehicle during the march.

Technical characteristics of "Katyusha"

Characteristics of the combat vehicle

Characteristics of the M-13 missile

Video about MLRS "Katyusha"

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Weapon of Victory - “Katyusha”

The first combat use of Katyushas is now quite well known: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland, on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large amount of military equipment accumulated in the market square of the town.

At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, a battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a direction unexpected for the enemy in the west, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa.

On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how rocket launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov’s fulfillment of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said:

“Katyusha sang perfectly.”

In the photo: Commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery Captain Flerov. Died on October 7, 1941. But historians differ on who was the first to use Katyusha against tanks - too often in the initial period of the war, the situation forced such desperate decisions to be made.

The systematic use of the BM-13 to destroy tanks is associated with the name of the commander of the 14th separate guards mortar division, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin. This unit, made up of naval sailors, was originally called the 200th OAS Division and was armed with 130 mm fixed naval guns. Both guns and artillerymen performed well in the fight against tanks, but on October 9, 1941, by written order from the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General Vishnevsky, the 200th Artillery Division, having blown up stationary guns and ammunition for them, retreated to the east, but On October 12, he ended up in the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Having emerged from encirclement on October 26, the division was sent for reorganization, during which it was rearmed with Katyushas. The division was headed by the former commander of one of his batteries, Senior Lieutenant Moskvin, who was immediately awarded the rank of lieutenant commander. The 14th Separate Guards Mortar Division was included in the 1st Moscow Separate Detachment of Sailors, which took part in the Counter-Offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. At the end of May - beginning of June 1942, during a period of relative calm, Moskvin summed up the experience of fighting enemy armored vehicles and found a new way to destroy them. He was supported by the GMCH inspector, Colonel Alexey Ivanovich Nesterenko. Test firing was carried out. To give the guides a minimum elevation angle, the Katyushas drove their front wheels into dug recesses, and the shells, leaving parallel to the ground, smashed plywood mock-ups of tanks. So what if you break plywood? – skeptics doubted. – You still can’t defeat real tanks!

In the photo: shortly before death. There was some truth in these doubts, because the warhead of the M-13 shells was high-explosive fragmentation, and not armor-piercing. However, it turned out that when their fragments get into the engine part or gas tanks, a fire occurs, the tracks are interrupted, the turrets jam, and sometimes they are torn off the shoulder strap. An explosion of a 4.95-kilogram charge, even if it occurred behind the armor, incapacitates the crew due to severe concussion.

On July 22, 1942, in a battle north of Novocherkassk, Moskvin’s division, which by that time had been transferred to the Southern Front and included in the 3rd Rifle Corps, destroyed 11 tanks with two direct fire salvoes - 1.1 per installation, while a good result for the anti-tank division out of 18 guns, it was believed that two or three enemy tanks were destroyed.

Often, the mortar guards were considered the only force capable of providing organized resistance to the enemy. This forced front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky to create on July 25, 1942, on the basis of such units, a Mobile Mechanized Group (PMG) led by the commander of the GMC A.I. Nesterenko. It included three regiments and a BM-13 division, the 176th Infantry Division mounted on vehicles, a combined tank battalion, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery divisions. There were no such units before or since.

At the end of July, near the village of Mechetinskaya, the PMG encountered the main forces of the 1st German Tank Army, Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving,” Moskvin reported. “We chose a position near the road so that the batteries could fire at the same time. Motorcyclists appeared, followed by cars and tanks. Battery salvoes covered the entire depth of the column, damaged and smoking vehicles stopped, tanks flew at them like blind people and caught fire. The enemy's advance along this road stopped.

Several such attacks forced the Germans to change tactics. They left supplies of fuel and ammunition in the rear and moved in small groups: 15–20 tanks in front, followed by trucks with infantry. This slowed down the pace of the offensive, but created the threat of our PMG being bypassed from the flanks. In response to this threat, ours created their own small groups, each of which included a Katyusha division, a company of motorized rifles, anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries. One of these groups, Captain Puzik’s group, created on the basis of the 269th division of the 49th GMP, using the Moskvin method, destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 vehicles in two days of fighting near Peschanokopskaya and Belaya Glina.

The advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry was stopped. The regiments of the 176th Infantry Division took up defense along the ridge of the hills at the Belaya Glina, Razvilnoe line. The front has temporarily stabilized.

A method of observation invented Captain-Lieutenant Moskvin. Not a single frontal attack by enemy tanks, much less motorized infantry, against the salvo fire of guards mortar units reached the target. Only flank detours and attacks forced the mobile group to retreat to other lines. Therefore, German tanks and motorized infantry began to accumulate in the folds of the terrain, provoked a BM-13 salvo with a false attack, and while they were reloading, which took five to six minutes, they made a rush. If the division did not respond to a false attack or fired with one installation, the Germans did not leave the shelters, waiting for the Katyushas to use up their ammunition. In response to this, Lieutenant Commander Moskvin used his own method of adjusting the fire. Having climbed to the top of the guide trusses, Moskvin monitored the area from this height.

The adjustment method proposed by Moskvin was recommended to other units, and soon the schedule for the German offensive in the Caucasus was disrupted. A few more days of fighting - and the word “tank” could be removed from the name of the 1st Tank Army. The losses of the mortar guards were minimal.

At first, the guards fired at tanks from the slopes of the hills facing the enemy, but when our troops retreated to the Salsky steppes during the Battle of the Caucasus, the hills ended, and on the plain the Katyusha could not fire direct fire, and dig a corresponding hole under fire approaching enemy tanks was not always possible.

A way out of this situation was found on August 3 in a battle fought by the battery of Senior Lieutenant Koifman from the 271st Division of Captain Kashkin. She took up firing positions south of the farmstead. Soon observers noticed that enemy tanks and motorized infantry approached the village of Nikolaevskaya. The combat vehicles were aimed at a target that was clearly visible and within reach. A few minutes later, groups of tanks began to emerge from the village and descend into the ravine. Obviously, the Germans decided to covertly approach the battery and attack it. This roundabout maneuver was first noticed by the guard, Private Levin. The battery commander ordered the flank unit to be deployed towards the tanks. However, the tanks had already entered the dead zone, and even at the lowest angle of inclination of the RS-132 guide trusses they would have flown over them. And then, to reduce the aiming angle, Lieutenant Alexey Bartenyev ordered driver Fomin to drive his front wheels into the trench trench.

When there were about two hundred meters left to the nearest tank, guardsmen Arzhanov, Kuznetsov, Suprunov and Khilich opened direct fire. Sixteen shells exploded. The tanks were filled with smoke. Two of them stopped, the rest quickly turned around and retreated into the gully at high speed. There were no new attacks. 19-year-old Lieutenant Bartenyev, who invented this method of firing, died in the same battle, but since then the mortar guards began to use infantry trenches to give the guides a position parallel to the ground.

In early August, the movement of Army Group A slowed down, posing a threat to the right flank of Army Group B, which was marching on Stalingrad. Therefore, in Berlin, the 40th Tank Corps of Group B was redirected to the Caucasus, which should have broken into Stalingrad from the south. He turned to Kuban, made a raid on the Rural steppes (bypassing the PMG coverage area) and found himself on the approaches to Armavir and Stavropol.

Because of this, the commander of the North Caucasus Front, Budyonny, was forced to divide the PMG in two: one part of it was thrown into the Armaviro-Stavropol direction, the other covered Krasnodar and Maykop. For the battles near Maikop (but not for victories in the steppes), Moskvin was awarded the Order of Lenin. A year later he would be mortally wounded near the village of Krymskaya. Now this is the same Krymsk that suffered from the recent flood.

After the death of Moskvin, under the impression of his experience in fighting enemy tanks with the help of Katyushas, ​​cumulative shells RSB-8 and RSB-13 were created. Such shells took the armor of any of the tanks of that time. However, they rarely found their way into Katyusha regiments - they were originally used to supply the Il-2 attack aircraft with rocket launchers.

THE LEGENDARY KATYUSHA IS 75 YEARS OLD!

June 30, 2016 will mark 75 years since the day when, by decision of the State Defense Committee, a design bureau for the production of the legendary Katyushas was created at the Moscow Kompressor plant. This rocket launcher terrified the enemy with its powerful salvoes and decided the outcome of many battles of the Great Patriotic War, including the battle for Moscow in October - December 1941. At that time, BM-13 combat vehicles went to defensive lines directly from the Moscow factory workshops.

Multiple launch rocket systems fought on different fronts, from Stalingrad to Berlin. At the same time, “Katyusha” is a weapon with a distinctly Moscow “pedigree”, rooted in pre-revolutionary times. Back in 1915, a graduate of the Faculty of Chemistry of Moscow University, engineer and inventor Nikolai Tikhomirov patented a “self-propelled rocket mine,” i.e. rocket-projectile, usable in water and in the air. The conclusion on the security certificate was signed by the famous N.E. Zhukovsky, at that time chairman of the invention department of the Moscow Military-Industrial Committee.

While the examinations were underway, the October Revolution happened. The new government, however, recognized Tikhomirov’s missile as having great defensive significance. To develop self-propelled mines, a Gas Dynamics Laboratory was created in Moscow in 1921, which Tikhomirov headed: for the first six years it worked in the capital, then moved to Leningrad and was located, by the way, in one of the ravelins of the Peter and Paul Fortress.

Nikolai Tikhomirov died in 1931 and was buried in Moscow at the Vagankovskoye cemetery. An interesting fact: in his other, “civilian” life, Nikolai Ivanovich designed equipment for sugar refineries, distilleries and oil mills.

The next stage of work on the future Katyusha also took place in the capital. On September 21, 1933, the Jet Research Institute was created in Moscow. Friedrich Zander was at the origins of the institute, and S.P. was the deputy director. Korolev. RNII maintained close contact with K.E. Tsiolkovsky. As we can see, the fathers of the Guards mortar were almost all the pioneers of domestic rocket technology of the 20th century.

One of the prominent names on this list is Vladimir Barmin. At the time when his work on new jet weapons began, the future academician and professor was a little over 30 years old. Shortly before the war he was appointed chief designer.

Who could have foreseen in 1940 that this young refrigeration engineer would become one of the creators of the world-famous weapons of World War II?

Vladimir Barmin retrained as a rocket scientist on June 30, 1941. On this day, a special design bureau was created at the plant, which became the main “think tank” for the production of Katyushas. Let us remember: work on the rocket launcher continued throughout the pre-war years and was completed literally on the eve of Hitler’s invasion. The People's Commissariat of Defense was looking forward to this miracle weapon, but not everything went smoothly.

In 1939, the first samples of aircraft rockets were successfully used during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In March 1941, successful field tests of the BM-13 installations (with the M-13 high-explosive fragmentation projectile of 132 mm caliber) were carried out, and already on June 21, literally a few hours before the war, a decree on their mass production was signed. Already on the eighth day of the war, production of Katyushas for the front began at Kompressor.

On July 14, 1941, the first Separate experimental battery of field rocket artillery of the Red Army was formed, led by Captain Ivan Flerov, armed with seven combat installations. On July 14, 1941, the battery fired a salvo at the railway junction of the city of Orsha, captured by fascist troops. Soon she successfully fought in the battles of Rudnya, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl and Spas-Demensk.

At the beginning of October 1941, while moving to the front line from the rear, Flerov's battery was ambushed by the enemy near the village of Bogatyr (Smolensk region). Having shot all the ammunition and blown up the combat vehicles, most of the fighters and their commander Ivan Flerov died.

219 Katyusha divisions took part in the battles for Berlin. Since the fall of 1941, these units were given the title of Guards upon formation. Since the Battle of Moscow, not a single major offensive operation of the Red Army could have been carried out without fire support from Katyusha rockets. The first batches of them were completely manufactured at the capital's enterprises in those days when the enemy stood at the city walls. According to production veterans and historians, this was a real labor feat.

When the war began, it was the Kompressor specialists who were tasked with launching the production of Katyushas as soon as possible. Previously it was planned that these combat vehicles would be produced by the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern, however, the difficult situation at the fronts forced adjustments to this plan.

At the front, Katyusha represented a significant fighting force and was capable of single-handedly determining the outcome of an entire battle. 16 conventional heavy guns from the times of the Great Patriotic War could fire 16 high-power shells in 2 - 3 minutes. In addition, moving such a number of conventional guns from one firing position to another requires a lot of time. “Katyusha” mounted on a truck requires just a few minutes. So the uniqueness of the installations was in their high firepower and mobility. The noise effect also played a certain psychological role: it was not for nothing that the Germans, because of the strong roar that accompanied the Katyusha salvos, nicknamed it the “Stalinist organ.”

The work was complicated by the fact that in the fall of 1941 many Moscow enterprises were being evacuated. Some of the workshops and the Compressor itself were relocated to the Urals. But all the Katyusha production facilities remained in the capital. There were not enough qualified workers (they went to the front and the militia), equipment, and materials.

Many Moscow enterprises in those days worked in close cooperation with Kompressor, producing everything necessary for Katyushas. Machine-building plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich made rocket shells. Car repair plant named after. Voitovicha and the Krasnaya Presnya plant manufactured parts for the launchers. Precise mechanisms were supplied by the 1st watch factory.

All of Moscow united in difficult times to create a unique weapon capable of bringing Victory closer. And the role of “Katyusha” in the defense of the capital has not been forgotten by the descendants of the victors: monuments to the legendary guards mortar have been erected near several museums in Moscow and on the territory of the Kompressor plant. And many of its creators were awarded high state awards during the war.

The history of the creation of "Katyusha"

In the list of contractual work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final payment for which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618с dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered a proven fact that the idea of ​​​​creating a mechanized multiple-charging installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of this period. Confirmation of the idea of ​​using cars to fire missiles in general was also found in the book “Rockets, their design and use,” authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the conclusion of this book, in particular, the following is written: “The main area of ​​application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, such as airplanes, small ships, vehicles of all kinds, and finally escort artillery.”

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, commissioned by the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical shells. It was necessary to make non-rapid-firing machines (such as a pipe). According to the agreement with the Artillery Directorate, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a stand and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was manufactured, which was then recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized multiple rocket launcher mounted on a modified ZIS-5 truck chassis with 24 rounds of ammunition. According to other data from the archives of the State Scientific Center FSUE “Keldysh Center” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations on vehicles were manufactured. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artillery Ground and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." Based on factory tests, it could be stated: the flight range of the RHS (depending on the specific gravity of the explosive agent) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000 m, Vd = (1/100)X and Vb = (1/70)X, useful volume of the explosive agent in a projectile - 6.5 liters, metal consumption per 1 liter of explosive agent - 3.4 kg/l, radius of dispersion of explosive agent when a projectile explodes on the ground is 15-20 liters, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle is 3-4 seconds.

The mechanized rocket launcher was intended to provide a chemical attack with chemical rocket projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire across areas with both single shots and a salvo of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. “The installations, combined into batteries of 4–6 vehicles, represent a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers.”

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of toxic substance passed successful field and state tests; its adoption was planned in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of chemical missile projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, illuminating and other missile projectiles. Option I without a guidance device - the number of shells in one salvo is 24, the total weight of the toxic substance released in one salvo is 168 kg, 6 vehicle installations replace one hundred twenty howitzers of 152 mm caliber, the vehicle reload speed is 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery Regiments. II-version with control device. Data not provided.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, tests were carried out on unguided 132 mm caliber rockets and an automatic launcher. However, the installation was submitted for testing unfinished and did not withstand them: a large number of failures were discovered when the missiles were discharged due to the imperfections of the corresponding installation components; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time-consuming; the rotating and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sighting devices did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See the gallery Tests of an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Test time: from 12/8/38 to 02/04/39).

The letter about the bonus for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for chemical attack (out. Scientific Research Institute No. 3, number 733c dated May 25, 1939 from the director of Scientific Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Ammunition comrade I.P. Sergeev) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gwai I.I. – leading designer; Popov A. A. – design technician; Isachenkov – installation mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. – prof. advised the subject; Luzhin V. – engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 rounds.

In a letter dated 14.II.1939 to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Council of the S.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer 1st rank Kostikov, says: “For ground forces, use the experience of a chemical mechanized installation for:

• the use of high-explosive fragmentation missiles to create massive fire in areas;
• the use of incendiary, illuminating and propaganda projectiles;
• development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the firing range compared to existing chemicals.”

In 1939, Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. The installation of sample II differed from the installation of sample I in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 missile shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to fire a salvo of 16 missiles is 3.5 – 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes with a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the design load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Test Site (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see photos taken at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the first model cannot be allowed for military testing due to technical imperfections. The installation of model II, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the conclusion of the commission members, could be allowed for military testing after making significant design changes. Tests have shown that when firing, the installation of sample II sways and the elevation angle reaches 15″30′, which increases the dispersion of projectiles; when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is further development of the II sample installation in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the II sample installation. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“upgraded installation for RS” in the terminology of documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, provided for: constructive improvements to the lifting and rotating device, increasing the horizontal guidance angle, and simplifying the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even to 7000 mm. The delivery date for the drawings was set for October 1941. Nevertheless, to conduct various types of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for RS were manufactured. The total number is indicated differently in different sources: in some - six, in others - seven. The data from the archive of Research Institute No. 3 as of January 10, 1941 contains data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See letter from UANA GAU No. 668059) Based on available documents, the source states that there were eight installations, but at different times. On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the Red Army AU - of six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of experimental orders in production for the month of November 1940 by Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB indicates that with the delivery batch of six installations to the customer by November 1940, the quality control department accepted 5 units, and the military representative accepted 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was tasked with developing a powerful rocket and rocket launcher in a short period of time to carry out the tasks of destroying the enemy’s long-term defensive structures on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute's team was a finned missile with a flight range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosives and an installation with four guides on a T-34 tank or on a sled towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and missiles were sent to the combat area, but a decision was soon made to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad Scientific Testing Artillery Range. The war with Finland soon ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further work on the installation and projectile was stopped.

In 1940, the department of 2n Research Institute No. 3 was asked to carry out work on the following objects:

• Object 213 – Electrified installation on a ZIS for firing lighting and signal signals. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 field rocket system).
• Object 214 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (remodeling and adaptation of object 204)
• Object 215 – Electrified installation on a ZIS-6 with a transportable reserve of R.S. and with a large range of aiming angles.
• Object 216 – Charging box for PC on trailer
• Object 217 – Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
• Object 218 – Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
• Object 219 – Anti-aircraft stationary installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
• Object 220 – Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with an electric current generator, aiming and firing control panel
• Object 221 – Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible range shooting of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
• Object 222 – Mechanized unit for tank escort
• Object 223 – Introduction of mass production of mechanized installations into industry.

In the letter to the acting Director of Research Institute No. 3 Kostikov A.G. about the possibility of submitting to K.V.Sh. with the USSR Council of People's Commissars for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

• rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate GB PR No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 dated February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvai Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilievich.
• tactical and technical justification for the scheme and design of the automatic installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
• testing of high-explosive fragmentation chemical rocket projectiles of 132 mm caliber. – Schwartz Leonid Emilievich, Artemyev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich.

The basis for nominating Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 of the NKB dated December 26, 1940.

№1923

scheme 1, scheme 2

galleries

On April 25, 1941, tactical and technical requirements No. 1923 were approved for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to urgently launch the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see. Scheme 1, Scheme 2). The production of M-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow Kompressor plant. One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from mass production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation in the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly , other). It was necessary to organize a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war, see our gallery website (follow the links below).

According to various sources, the formation of Guards mortar units began at the end of July - beginning of August (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had information about the new Soviet weapons (see:).

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Armament Directorate of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the STZ-5 NATI tractor chassis modified for installation. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant “Compressor”. SKB carried out the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, SKB, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, for the defense of the city of Moscow, a 16-round installation on an armored railway platform. The installation was a missile launcher of the serial M-13 installation on a modified ZIS-6 truck chassis with a modified base. (for more information about other works of this period and the war period in general, see: and).

At a technical meeting at SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The goal of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes previously made to various modifications of the M-13 installation and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and, when assembled, installed and assembled on a chassis cars of any brand without extensive processing of technical documentation, as was the case previously. The goal was achieved by dividing the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

When testing components and parts for the normalized combat installation BM-13N, the following were obtained:

• increase in the firing sector by 20%
• reduction of forces on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;
• doubling the vertical aiming speed;
• increasing the survivability of the combat installation by armoring the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas lines;
• increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;
• increasing the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;
• significant reduction in the volume of welding work, machining, elimination of bending of truss rods;
• reducing the weight of the unit by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cabin and the gas tank;
• reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation due to the assembly of the artillery part separately from the vehicle chassis and installation of the installation on the vehicle chassis using fastening clamps, which made it possible to eliminate the drilling of holes in the side members;
• reducing by several times the idle time of the chassis of vehicles arriving at the plant for installation of the unit;
• reduction in the number of standard sizes of fasteners from 206 to 96, as well as the number of part names: in the rotary frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to use a high-performance in-line method for assembling and installing the installation.

The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebaker series truck (see photo) with a 6x6 wheel arrangement, which was supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N mount was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified chassis of foreign-made trucks were also used.

At the end of 1942 V.V. Aborenkov proposed adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial M-13 installation, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on an edge, each of them had a groove cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work to create installations with a normalized propellant installation for the M-13 installation on modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was manufactured on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the availability of sufficient quantities of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, SKB specialists developed the M-13 installation on an armored chassis of the ZIS-6 vehicle, modified for installation of a missile launcher, for launching M-13 projectiles. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” type guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made of shortened pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, and served mainly as a support for fastening the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cockpit using handwheels and the cardan shaft of the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, SKB specialists and rocket projectile developers were faced with the question of improving the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber projectiles. To impart rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the projectile design along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the standard M-31 projectile, and was proposed for the M-8 projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the flight range indicator. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, designated M-13UK, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

During the same period, NII-1 specialists (Lead Designer V.G. Bessonov) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy, but it could not be fired from the standard M-13 mounts, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from the usual standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the linings from them. To a lesser extent, this also occurred when launching M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began exploratory design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of fire of M-13 and M-8 rockets by testing the guides. It was based on a new principle of launching rockets and ensuring they were strong enough to fire M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since imparting rotation to finned unguided rocket projectiles at the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born of imparting rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide took the form of a barrel formed by four spiral rods, three of which were smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, was made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped cross-section profile. The rods were welded to the legs of the ring clips. In the breech there was a lock for holding the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. Special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting and welding of guide barrels along their length. Initially, the installation had 12 guides, rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of the 12-round M-13-CH installation were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the vehicle chassis was overloaded, and a decision was made to remove two guides from the upper cassettes. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of guides, a truss, a rotating frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. Except for the cassettes with guides and the truss, all other components were unified with the corresponding components of the M-13N normalized combat installation. Using the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD projectiles of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better indicators were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK projectiles from M-13 installations that had “beam” type guides. There was no longer a need to manufacture M-13UK projectiles, which were complicated by drilling in the engine casing. Installation of the M-13-SN was simpler, less labor-intensive and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine tools have been eliminated: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to the guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and cutting threads of spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. The prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow Kompressor plant (No. 733) and were subjected to field and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation passed military tests in 1945 with good results. Due to the fact that the M-13 type projectiles had to be modernized, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of NCOM order No. 27 of October 24, 1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN combat vehicle was published

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions in the development of rocket artillery was the use of missile launchers developed during the war for installation on modified types of domestically produced chassis. Several variants were created based on the installation of the M-13N on modified chassis of the ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) trucks. .

M-13 type installations were exported to different countries after the war. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion of National Day 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing).

In 1959, while working on a projectile for the future M-21 Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in the letter to the deputy director for scientific affairs of NII-147 (now FSUE SNPP Splav (Tula), signed by the chief engineer of plant No. 63 SSNH Toporov (State plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959с): “In response to your request No. 3265 dated 3/UII-59 about sending technical documentation on the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, and the security classification has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopying machine, the album of technical processes will be blueprinted and sent to you no earlier than in a month.”

Compound:

Main cast:

• M-13 installations (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
• The main missiles are M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.

• Machines for transporting ammunition (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the rocket part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The projectile's jet powder engine consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering bulges with guide pins screwed into them. Guide pins held the projectile on the combat vehicle's guide before firing and directed its movement along the guide. The chamber contained a powder charge of nitroglycerin powder, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel bombs. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on a grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of black gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. The gunpowder was placed in a special case. Stabilization of the M-13 projectile in flight was carried out using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escapes, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. In addition, the M-13-UK projectile has a nozzle critical section diameter that is slightly smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Performance characteristics:

Characteristic	M-13	BM-13N	BM-13NM	BM-13NMM
Chassis	ZIS-6	ZIS-151,ZIL-151	ZIL-157	ZIL-131
Number of guides	8	8	8	8
Elevation angle, degrees: - minimal — maximum	+7 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45	8±1 +45
Angle of horizontal fire, degrees: - to the right of the chassis - to the left of the chassis	10 10	10 10	10 10	10 10
Handle force, kg: - lifting mechanism - rotary mechanism	8-10 8-10	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8	up to 13 up to 8
Dimensions in stowed position, mm: - length - width - height	6700 2300 2800	7200 2300 2900	7200 2330 3000	7200 2500 3200
Weight, kg: - package of guides - artillery unit - installations in combat position — installations in stowed position (without calculations)	815 2200 6200 —	815 2350 7890 7210	815 2350 7770 7090	815 2350 9030 8350
	2-3
	5-10
Full salvo time, s	7-10

Basic tactical and technical data of the BM-13 combat vehicle (on Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides	16
Projectile used	M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 shells
Guide length, m	5
Guide type	straight
Minimum elevation angle, °	+7
Maximum elevation angle, °	+45
Horizontal guidance angle, °	20
	8
Also, on a rotating mechanism, kg	10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length	6780
height	2880
width	2270
Guide set weight, kg	790
Weight of artillery unit without shells and without chassis, kg	2250
The weight of a combat vehicle without shells, without crews, with a full tank of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg	5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK	680 (16 rounds)
M20	480 (8 shells)
Weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people. (2 in the cabin, 2 on the rear wings and 1 on the gas tank) with full refueling, tools, snow chains, spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg	6770
Axle loads from the weight of a combat vehicle with a crew of 5 people, fully loaded with spare parts and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front	1890
to the back	4880

Basic data of BM-13 combat vehicles
Characteristic	BM-13N on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified ZIL-151 truck chassis	BM-13N on a modified Studebaker truck chassis	BM-13 on a modified Studebaker truck chassis
Number of guides*	16	16	16	16
Guide length, m	5	5	5	5
Maximum elevation angle, degrees	45	45	45	45
Minimum elevation angle, degrees	8±1°	4±30 ‘	7	7
Horizontal aiming angle, degrees	±10	±10	±10	±10
Force on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg	up to 12	up to 13	to 10	8-10
Force on the rotating mechanism handle, kg	up to 8	up to 8	8-10	8-10
Guide package weight, kg	815	815	815	815
Artillery unit weight, kg	2350	2350	2200	2200
Weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg	7210	7210	5520	5520
Weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg	7890	7890	6200	6200
Length in stowed position, m	7,2	7,2	6,7	6,7
Width in stowed position, m	2,3	2,3	2,3	2,3
Height in stowed position, m	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,8
Time to transfer from traveling to combat position, min	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Time required to fire a salvo, sec	7-10	7-10	7-10	7-10
Combat vehicle index	52-U-9416	8U34	52-U-9411	52-TR-492B

NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index	TS-13
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type	GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm	132
Total projectile length, mm	1465
Stabilizer blade span, mm	300
Weight, kg: - finally equipped projectile - equipped warhead — explosive charge of the warhead - powder rocket charge - equipped jet engine	42.36 21.3 4.9 7.05-7.13 20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3	18.48
Head filling coefficient, %	23
Current required to ignite the squib, A	2.5-3
	0.7
Average reactive force, kgf	2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s	70
	125
Maximum projectile flight speed, m/s	355
Tabular maximum projectile range, m	8195
Deviation at maximum range, m: - by range - lateral	135 300
Powder charge burning time, s	0.7
Average reaction force, kg	2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s	70
Length of the active trajectory section, m	125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Highest projectile flight speed, m/s	335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile flight range, m	8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section of Egypt, in the mid-90s of the 20th century due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type Arab Organization for Industrialization was engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets. Analysis of the data presented below allows us to conclude that we are talking about a projectile of the M-13UK type.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with the majority of production facilities located in Egypt and with major funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three Gulf states withdrew their funds earmarked for the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and at that time (Jane's Armor and Artillery catalog data 1982-1983) Egypt received other aid in projects.

Characteristics of the Sakr 132 mm caliber missile (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm	132
Length, mm
full shell	1500
head part	483
rocket engine	1000
Weight, kg:
starting	42
head part	21
fuse	0,5
rocket engine	21
fuel (charge)	7
Maximum tail span, mm	305
Head type	high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type	inertial cocked, contact
Fuel type (charge)	dibasic
Maximum range (at an elevation angle of 45º), m	8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s	340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s	0,5
Projectile speed when meeting an obstacle, m/s	235-320
Minimum fuse arming speed, m/s	300
Distance from the combat vehicle for arming the fuse, m	100-200
Number of oblique holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs.	12

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941 year, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German trains with troops and military equipment located on it.

The exceptional efficiency of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 three-battery divisions with four launchers per battery operated at the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1,414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The regiment's salvo amounted to 576 132mm shells. At the same time, enemy manpower and military equipment were destroyed over an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of the Reserve Artillery of the Supreme High Command. Unofficially, the rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeniy Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), who was a child during the war, in Tula at first they were called infernal machines. Let us note on our own that multi-charge machines were also called infernal machines in the 19th century.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory.8. Inv.227. LL.55,58,61.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory.8. Inv.227. LL.94,96,98.

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State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory.13. Inv.273. L.231.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 14. Inv. 291.LL.134-135.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 14. Inv. 291.LL.53,60-64.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 22. Inv. 388. L.145.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 14. Inv. 291.LL.124,134.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 16. Inv. 376. L.44.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 24. Inv. 375. L.103.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 119120ss. D. 27. L. 99, 101.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 119120ss. D. 28. L. 118-119.

Missile launchers in the Great Patriotic War. About the work of the SKB at the Moscow Kompressor plant during the war. // A.N. Vasiliev, V.P. Mikhailov. – M.: Nauka, 1991. – P. 11–12.

"Modelist-Constructor" 1985, No. 4

M-13 combat vehicle. Quick service guide. M.: Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. Military publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 1945. - P. 9.

Brief history of SKB-GSKB Spetsmash-KBOM. Book 1. Creation of tactical missile weapons 1941-1956, edited by V.P. Barmin - M.: Design Bureau of General Mechanical Engineering. — P. 26, 38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 51, 53.

Combat vehicle BM-13N. Service manual. Ed. 2nd. Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense. M. 1966. - P. 3,76,118-119.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. A-93895. D. 1. L. 10.

Shirokorad A.B. Domestic mortars and rocket artillery.// Under the general editorship of A.E. Taras. – Mn.: Harvest, M.: LLC “AST Publishing House”, 2000. – P.299-303.

http://velikvoy.narod.ru/vooruzhenie/vooruzhcccp/artilleriya/reaktiv/bm-13-sn.htm

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 14. Inv. 291. L. 106.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 19. Inv. 348. L. 227,228.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 19. Inv. 348. L. 21. Copy.

TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 160820. D. 5. L. 18-19.

Combat vehicle BM-13-SN. Quick guide. Military Ministry of the USSR. — 1950.

http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-08/26/content_8619566_2.htm

GAU TO "GA". F. R3428. Op. 1. D. 449. L. 49.

Konstantinov. About combat missiles. Saint Petersburg. Printing house of Eduard Weimar, 1864. – pp. 226-228.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to inventory 14. Inv. 291. L. 62.64.

State Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Keldysh Center”. Op. 1. Storage unit according to the description. 2. Inv. 103. L. 93.

Langemak G.E., Glushko V.P. Rockets, their design and use. ONTI NKTP USSR. Main editorial office of aviation literature. Moscow-Leningrad, 1935. - Conclusion.

Ivashkevich E.P., Mudragelya A.S. Development of jet weapons and missile forces. Tutorial. Edited by Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor S.M. Barmasa. - M.: Ministry of Defense of the USSR. — P. 41.

Combat vehicle BM-13N. Service manual. M.: Military Publishing House. - 1957. - Appendix 1.2.

Combat vehicles BM-13N, BM-13NM, BM-13NMM. Service manual. Third edition, revised. M.: Military Publishing House, - 1974. - Appendix 2.

Jane's Armor and Artillery 1982-1983. - R. 666.

Jane's Armor and Artillery 1995-96. - R. 723.

“ Katyusha“

"Katyusha" Guards rocket mortar

After the adoption of 82-mm air-to-air missiles RS-82 (1937) and 132-mm air-to-ground missiles RS-132 (1938) into aviation service, the Main Artillery Directorate set the projectile developer - The Jet Research Institute is tasked with creating a multiple launch rocket system based on RS-132 projectiles. The updated tactical and technical specifications were issued to the institute in June 1938.

In Moscow, under the Central Council of Osoaviakhim, a Group for the Study of Jet Propulsion (GIRD) was created in August 1931, and in October of the same year, the same group was formed in Leningrad. They made significant contributions to the development of rocket technology.

At the end of 1933, the Jet Research Institute (RNII) was created on the basis of GDL and GIRD. The initiator of the merger of the two teams was the chief of armaments of the Red Army, M.N. Tukhachevsky. In his opinion, the RNII was supposed to solve problems of rocket technology in relation to military affairs, primarily in aviation and artillery. I.T. was appointed director of the institute. Kleimenov, and his deputy - G.E. Langemak. S.P. Korolev As an aviation designer, he was appointed head of the 5th Aviation Department of the Institute, which was entrusted with the development of rocket planes and cruise missiles.

1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - head part, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part , 11 — grate, 12 — critical section of the nozzle, 13 — nozzle, 14 — stabilizer, 15 — remote fuse pin, 16 — AGDT remote fuse, 17 — igniter.

In accordance with this task, by the summer of 1939 the institute had developed a new 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which later received the official name M-13. Compared to the aircraft RS-132, this projectile had a longer flight range and a significantly more powerful warhead. The increase in flight range was achieved by increasing the amount of rocket fuel; this required lengthening the rocket and warhead parts of the rocket by 48 cm. The M-13 projectile had slightly better aerodynamic characteristics than the RS-132, which made it possible to obtain higher accuracy.

A self-propelled multi-charge launcher was also developed for the projectile. Its first version was created on the basis of the ZIS-5 truck and was designated MU-1 (mechanized unit, first sample). Field tests of the installation carried out between December 1938 and February 1939 showed that it did not fully meet the requirements. Taking into account the test results, the Jet Research Institute developed a new MU-2 launcher, which was accepted by the Main Artillery Directorate for field testing in September 1939. Based on the results of field tests completed in November 1939, the institute was ordered five launchers for military testing. Another installation was ordered by the Ordnance Department of the Navy for use in the coastal defense system.

Mu-2 installation

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made to urgently launch mass production of M-13 missiles and a launcher, which received the official name BM-13 (combat vehicle 13).

BM-13 on ZIS-6 chassis

Now no one can say for sure under what circumstances the multiple rocket launcher received a female name, and even in a diminutive form - “Katyusha”. One thing is known: not all types of weapons received nicknames at the front. And these names were often not at all flattering. For example, the Il-2 attack aircraft of early modifications, which saved the lives of more than one infantryman and was the most welcome “guest” in any battle, received the nickname “humpback” among the soldiers for its cockpit protruding above the fuselage. And the small I-16 fighter, which bore the brunt of the first air battles on its wings, was called the “donkey.” There were, however, formidable nicknames - the heavy Su-152 self-propelled artillery mount, which was capable of knocking down the turret of a Tiger with one shot, was respectfully called the “St. one-story house - "sledgehammer". In any case, the names most often given were stern and strict. And here is such unexpected tenderness, if not love...

However, if you read the memories of veterans, especially those who, in their military profession, depended on the actions of mortars - infantrymen, tank crews, signalmen, then it becomes clear why the soldiers loved these combat vehicles so much. In terms of its combat power, "Katyusha" had no equal.

From behind, suddenly there was a grinding noise, a rumble, and fiery arrows flew through us to the heights... At the heights, everything was covered with fire, smoke and dust. In the midst of this chaos, fiery candles flared from individual explosions. A terrible roar reached us. When all this calmed down and the command “Forward” was heard, we took the height, meeting almost no resistance, we “played the Katyushas” so cleanly... At the height, when we got up there, we saw that everything had been plowed up. There are almost no traces left of the trenches in which the Germans were located. There were many corpses of enemy soldiers. The wounded fascists were bandaged by our nurses and, together with a small number of survivors, sent to the rear. There was fear on the faces of the Germans. They had not yet understood what had happened to them, and had not recovered from the Katyusha salvo.

From the memoirs of war veteran Vladimir Yakovlevich Ilyashenko (published on the website Iremember.ru)

The production of BM-13 units was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant named after. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of launchers was urgently launched at several enterprises with different production capabilities, and in connection with this, more or less significant changes were made to the design of the installation. Thus, the troops used up to ten varieties of the BM-13 launcher, which made it difficult to train personnel and had a negative impact on the operation of military equipment. For these reasons, a unified (normalized) launcher BM-13N was developed and put into service in April 1943, during the creation of which the designers critically analyzed all parts and components in order to increase the manufacturability of their production and reduce cost, as a result of which all components received independent indexes and became universal.

BM-13N

Composition: The BM-13 "Katyusha" includes the following combat weapons:
. Combat vehicle (BM) MU-2 (MU-1); . Missiles. M-13 rocket:

The M-13 projectile consists of a warhead and a powder jet engine. The design of the warhead resembles a high-explosive fragmentation artillery shell and is equipped with an explosive charge, which is detonated using a contact fuse and an additional detonator. A jet engine has a combustion chamber in which a propellant propellant charge is placed in the form of cylindrical blocks with an axial channel. Pyro-igniters are used to ignite the powder charge. The gases formed during the combustion of powder bombs flow through the nozzle, in front of which there is a diaphragm that prevents the bombs from being ejected through the nozzle. Stabilization of the projectile in flight is ensured by a tail stabilizer with four feathers welded from stamped steel halves. (This method of stabilization provides lower accuracy compared to stabilization by rotation around the longitudinal axis, but allows for a greater range of projectile flight. In addition, the use of a feathered stabilizer greatly simplifies the technology for producing rockets).

1 — fuse retaining ring, 2 — GVMZ fuse, 3 — detonator block, 4 — explosive charge, 5 — warhead, 6 — igniter, 7 — chamber bottom, 8 — guide pin, 9 — propellant rocket charge, 10 — rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse pin, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was very significant dispersion. According to the shooting tables of 1942, with a firing range of 3000 m, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and at the range - 257 m.

In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, designated M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13-UK projectile has 12 tangentially located holes in the front centering thickening of the rocket part, through which, during operation of the rocket engine, part of the powder gases escapes, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile’s flight range decreased somewhat (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and an increase in fire density by 3 times compared to M-13 projectiles. The adoption of the M-13-UK projectile into service in April 1944 contributed to a sharp increase in the fire capabilities of rocket artillery.

MLRS "Katyusha" launcher:

A self-propelled multi-charge launcher has been developed for the projectile. Its first version, MU-1, based on the ZIS-5 truck, had 24 guides mounted on a special frame in a transverse position relative to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Its design made it possible to launch rockets only perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, and jets of hot gases damaged the elements of the installation and the body of the ZIS-5. Safety was also not ensured when controlling fire from the driver's cabin. The launcher swayed strongly, which worsened the accuracy of the rockets. Loading the launcher from the front of the rails was inconvenient and time-consuming. The ZIS-5 vehicle had limited cross-country ability.

The more advanced MU-2 launcher based on the ZIS-6 off-road truck had 16 guides located along the axis of the vehicle. Every two guides were connected, forming a single structure called a “spark”. A new unit was introduced into the design of the installation - a subframe. The subframe made it possible to assemble the entire artillery part of the launcher (as a single unit) on it, and not on the chassis, as was previously the case. Once assembled, the artillery unit was relatively easily mounted on the chassis of any make of car with minimal modification to the latter. The created design made it possible to reduce the labor intensity, manufacturing time and cost of launchers. The weight of the artillery unit was reduced by 250 kg, the cost by more than 20 percent. The combat and operational qualities of the installation were significantly increased. Due to the introduction of armor for the gas tank, gas pipeline, side and rear walls of the driver's cabin, the survivability of the launchers in combat was increased. The firing sector was increased, the stability of the launcher in the traveling position was increased, and improved lifting and turning mechanisms made it possible to increase the speed of pointing the installation at the target. Before launch, the MU-2 combat vehicle was jacked up similarly to the MU-1. The forces rocking the launcher, thanks to the location of the guides along the chassis of the vehicle, were applied along its axis to two jacks located near the center of gravity, so the rocking became minimal. Loading in the installation was carried out from the breech, that is, from the rear end of the guides. This was more convenient and made it possible to significantly speed up the operation. The MU-2 installation had a rotating and lifting mechanism of the simplest design, a bracket for mounting a sight with a conventional artillery panorama, and a large metal fuel tank mounted at the rear of the cabin. The cockpit windows were covered with armored folding shields. Opposite the seat of the commander of the combat vehicle, on the front panel there was mounted a small rectangular box with a turntable, reminiscent of a telephone dial, and a handle for turning the dial. This device was called the “fire control panel” (FCP). From it went a wiring harness to a special battery and to each guide.

With one turn of the launcher handle, the electrical circuit closed, the squib placed in the front part of the projectile’s rocket chamber was triggered, the reactive charge was ignited and a shot was fired. The rate of fire was determined by the rate of rotation of the PUO handle. All 16 shells could be fired in 7-10 seconds. The time it took to transfer the MU-2 launcher from traveling to combat position was 2-3 minutes, the vertical firing angle ranged from 4° to 45°, and the horizontal firing angle was 20°.

The design of the launcher allowed it to move in a charged state at a fairly high speed (up to 40 km/h) and quickly deploy to a firing position, which facilitated the delivery of surprise attacks on the enemy.

After the war, Katyushas began to be installed on pedestals - the combat vehicles turned into monuments. Surely many have seen such monuments throughout the country. They are all more or less similar to each other and almost do not correspond to those vehicles that fought in the Great Patriotic War. The fact is that these monuments almost always feature a rocket launcher based on the ZiS-6 vehicle. Indeed, at the very beginning of the war, rocket launchers were installed on ZiSs, but as soon as American Studebaker trucks began to arrive in the USSR under Lend-Lease, they were turned into the most common base for Katyushas. ZiS, as well as Lend-Lease Chevrolets, were too weak to carry a heavy installation with guides for missiles off-road. It's not just the relatively low-power engine - the frames on these trucks couldn't support the weight of the unit. Actually, the Studebakers also tried not to overload with missiles - if they had to travel to a position from afar, then the missiles were loaded immediately before the salvo.

"Studebaker US 6x6", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. This car had increased cross-country ability, provided by a powerful engine, three drive axles (6x6 wheel arrangement), a range multiplier, a winch for self-pulling, and a high location of all parts and mechanisms sensitive to water. The development of the BM-13 serial combat vehicle was finally completed with the creation of this launcher. In this form she fought until the end of the war.

based on the STZ-NATI-5 tractor

on the boat

In addition to ZiSovs, Chevrolets and the most common Studebakers among Katyushas, ​​the Red Army used tractors and T-70 tanks as chassis for rocket launchers, but they were quickly abandoned - the tank’s engine and its transmission turned out to be too weak for so that the installation can continuously cruise along the front line. At first, the rocketeers did without a chassis at all - the M-30 launch frames were transported in the backs of trucks, unloading them directly to their positions.

Installation M-30

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1–2, 1941, under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations manufactured by the Jet Research Institute. With its first salvo at 15:15 on July 14, 1941, the battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction along with the German trains with troops and military equipment located on it.

The exceptional efficiency of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 three-battery divisions with four launchers per battery operated at the fronts. For their armament, 593 BM-13 installations were manufactured in 1941. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with BM-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1,414 personnel, 36 BM-13 launchers and 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The regiment's salvo amounted to 576 132mm shells. At the same time, enemy manpower and military equipment were destroyed over an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of the Reserve Artillery of the Supreme High Command.

Each projectile was approximately equal in power to a howitzer, but the installation itself could almost simultaneously fire, depending on the model and size of the ammunition, from eight to 32 missiles. "Katyushas" operated in divisions, regiments or brigades. Moreover, in each division, equipped, for example, with BM-13 installations, there were five such vehicles, each of which had 16 guides for launching 132-mm M-13 projectiles, each weighing 42 kilograms with a flight range of 8470 meters. Accordingly, only one division could fire 80 shells at the enemy. If the division was equipped with BM-8 launchers with 32 82-mm shells, then one salvo would already amount to 160 missiles. What are 160 rockets that fall on a small village or fortified height in a few seconds - imagine for yourself. But in many operations during the war, artillery preparation was carried out by regiments and even Katyusha brigades, and this is more than a hundred vehicles, or more than three thousand shells in one salvo. Probably no one can imagine what three thousand shells are that plow up trenches and fortifications in half a minute...

During the offensive, the Soviet command tried to concentrate as much artillery as possible at the forefront of the main attack. Super-massive artillery preparation, which preceded the breakthrough of the enemy front, was the trump card of the Red Army. Not a single army in that war was able to provide such fire. In 1945, during the offensive, the Soviet command concentrated up to 230-260 cannon artillery guns along one kilometer of the front. In addition to them, for every kilometer there were, on average, 15-20 rocket artillery combat vehicles, not counting the stationary launchers - M-30 frames. Traditionally, Katyushas completed an artillery attack: rocket launchers fired a salvo when the infantry was already attacking. Often, after several volleys of Katyusha rockets, the infantrymen entered an empty settlement or enemy positions without encountering any resistance.

Of course, such a raid could not destroy all enemy soldiers - Katyusha rockets could operate in fragmentation or high-explosive mode, depending on how the fuse was configured. When set to fragmentation action, the rocket exploded immediately after it reached the ground; in the case of a “high-explosive” installation, the fuse fired with a slight delay, allowing the projectile to go deeper into the ground or other obstacle. However, in both cases, if the enemy soldiers were in well-fortified trenches, then the losses from the shelling were small. Therefore, Katyushas were often used at the beginning of an artillery attack in order to prevent enemy soldiers from having time to hide in the trenches. It was thanks to the surprise and power of one salvo that the use of rocket mortars brought success.

Already on the slope of the height, just a short distance from reaching the battalion, we unexpectedly came under a salvo from our native Katyusha - a multi-barreled rocket mortar. It was terrible: large-caliber mines exploded around us within a minute, one after another. It took them a while to catch their breath and come to their senses. Now newspaper reports about cases in which German soldiers who were under fire from Katyusha rockets went crazy seemed quite plausible. From the memoirs of war veterans (published on the website Iremember.ru) “If you attract an artillery regiment, the regiment commander will definitely say: “I don’t have this data, I have to shoot the guns.” If he starts shooting, but they shoot with one gun, taking target in the fork - this is a signal to the enemy: what to do? Take cover. Usually 15-20 seconds are given for cover. During this time, the artillery barrel will fire one or two shells. And with my division, in 15-20 seconds I will fire 120 missiles, all of which go at once." , says the commander of the rocket mortar regiment, Alexander Filippovich Panuev.

The only people in the Red Army who were not comfortable with the Katyusha were the artillerymen. The fact is that mobile installations of rocket mortars usually moved into positions immediately before the salvo and just as quickly tried to leave. At the same time, the Germans, for obvious reasons, tried to destroy the Katyushas first. Therefore, immediately after a salvo of rocket mortars, their positions, as a rule, began to be intensively attacked by German artillery and aviation. And given that the positions of cannon artillery and rocket mortars were often located not far from each other, the raid covered the artillerymen who remained where the rocket men were firing from.

“We select firing positions. They tell us: “There is a firing position in such and such a place, you will wait for soldiers or placed beacons.” We take the firing position at night. At this time the Katyusha battalion is approaching. If I had time, I would immediately remove from there their position. The Katyushas fired a salvo at the vehicles and left. And the Germans raised nine Junkers to bomb the division, and the division ran away. They went to the battery. There was a commotion! It was an open place, they were hiding under the cannon carriages. They bombed anyone at random, those who didn’t get it and left,” says former artilleryman Ivan Trofimovich Salnitsky.

According to former Soviet missilemen who fought on Katyushas, ​​most often the divisions operated within several tens of kilometers of front, appearing where their support was needed. First, officers entered the positions and made the appropriate calculations. These calculations, by the way, were quite complex.

- they took into account not only the distance to the target, the speed and direction of the wind, but even the air temperature, which influenced the trajectory of the missiles. After all the calculations were done, the machines moved out

position, fired several salvos (most often no more than five) and urgently went to the rear. Delay in this case was indeed like death - the Germans immediately covered the place from which the rocket mortars were fired with artillery fire.

During the offensive, the tactics of using Katyushas, ​​which were finally perfected by 1943 and were used everywhere until the end of the war, were different. At the very beginning of the offensive, when it was necessary to break through the enemy’s deeply layered defenses, artillery (barrel and rocket) formed the so-called “barrage of fire.” At the beginning of the shelling, all howitzers (often even heavy self-propelled guns) and rocket-propelled mortars “processed” the first line of defense. Then the fire was transferred to the fortifications of the second line, and the infantry occupied the trenches and dugouts of the first. After this, the fire was transferred inland to the third line, while the infantrymen occupied the second line. Moreover, the further the infantry went, the less cannon artillery could support it - towed guns could not accompany it throughout the entire offensive. This task was assigned to self-propelled guns and Katyushas. It was they who, together with the tanks, followed the infantry, supporting them with fire. According to those who participated in such offensives, after the “barrage” of Katyusha rockets, the infantry walked along a scorched strip of land several kilometers wide, on which there were no traces of carefully prepared defenses.

Performance characteristics

M-13 missile Caliber, mm 132 Projectile weight, kg 42.3 Warhead weight, kg 21.3
Mass of explosive, kg 4.9
Maximum firing range, km 8.47 Salvo production time, sec 7-10

MU-2 combat vehicle Base ZiS-6 (6x4) Vehicle weight, t 4.3 Maximum speed, km/h 40
Number of guides 16
Vertical firing angle, degrees from +4 to +45 Horizontal firing angle, degrees 20
Calculation, pers. 10-12 Year of adoption 1941

It is difficult to imagine what it would be like to be hit by Katyusha missiles. According to those who survived such shelling (both Germans and Soviet soldiers), it was one of the most terrible experiences of the entire war. Everyone describes the sound that the rockets made during the flight differently - grinding, howling, roaring. Be that as it may, in combination with subsequent explosions, during which for several seconds over an area of ​​​​several hectares the earth, mixed with pieces of buildings, equipment, and people, flew into the air, this gave a strong psychological effect. When the soldiers occupied enemy positions, they were not met with fire, not because everyone was killed - it was just that the rocket fire drove the survivors crazy.

The psychological component of any weapon should not be underestimated. The German Ju-87 bomber was equipped with a siren that howled during a dive, also suppressing the psyche of those who were on the ground at that moment. And during attacks by German Tiger tanks, anti-tank gun crews sometimes left their positions in fear of the steel monsters. "Katyushas" had the same psychological effect. For this terrible howl, by the way, they received the nickname “Stalin’s organs” from the Germans.

The decision to mass produce Katyushas in the USSR was made 12 hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, on June 21, 1941. Only then they were still called not “Katyushas”, but BM-13 installations.

Just 10 days later, on July 2, 1941, the first battery of seven BM-13s under the command of Captain I. A. Flerov moved to the front. And two days later she fired the first salvo at the Nazis who occupied the Orsha station.

The commander of one of the guns, Valentin Ovsov, recalled: “The earth shook and lit up.” “The effect of a one-time explosion of 112 mines within a matter of seconds exceeded all expectations,” wrote Marshal A. I. Eremenko, commander of the Western Front. “The enemy soldiers began to run in panic. Our soldiers, who were on the front line, near the explosions, also retreated back (in In order to maintain secrecy, no one was warned about the tests)."

After the salvo, the German General Staff received a telegram from the Eastern Front:

“The Russians used a battery with an unprecedented number of guns. Shells of unusual action. The troops fired at by the Russians testify: the fire raid is like a hurricane. The shells explode simultaneously.

The loss of life is significant."

Destruction of the first installations

After the first salvos, Nazi aircraft began hunting for Captain Flerov’s battery and intensively bombed its supposed base areas. To capture at least one Katyusha, several sabotage groups were sent to our rear and a large reward was announced for the one who would obtain the Russian secret weapon.

As a result of large-scale operations undertaken by the Germans in October 1941, Flerov’s battery found itself surrounded near the Smolensk village of Bogatyr. On October 7, a salvo of the remaining shells was fired. After this, the installations had to be blown up.

Thus the first page of the legendary Katyusha battery was turned.

Chassis search

The deadly BM-13 is actually a frame of eight guide rails connected to each other by welded spars. Rocket mines, each weighing 42.5 kg, launched from the frame, emitting wild grinding sounds. There were 16 of them attached to the frame. You can’t carry such a setup by hand. Therefore, the question of what to carry the Katyusha with arose immediately.

Before the war, only one truck was produced in the USSR - the famous lorry in various modifications. The ZIS-5 truck turned out to be rather weak for the Katyusha, and this became clear almost immediately. 73 hp motor could reach a speed of only 60 km/h, and only on asphalt, while consuming 33 liters of gasoline for every 100 km. But the truck did not have the strength to plow the front-line off-road terrain with a heavy installation.

In addition, the BM-13 from its body only fired in a transverse position; there was no other way. The transverse location of the installation during a salvo rocked the vehicle so much that there was no need to talk about the accuracy of the hit.

Therefore, it was decided to install a rocket launcher on the improved three-axle ZIS-6.

ZIS did not improve the situation

It is interesting that many “one and a half” have survived to this day; you can find them in almost every military museum and in private collections, but the ZIS-6 is a rarity.

The ZIS-6 crew consisted of 5-7 people, and with full ammunition the vehicle weighed more than eight tons. The three-axle truck provided much greater maneuverability. Unlike its two-axle counterpart, the ZIS-6 had a reinforced frame, a larger radiator and a gas tank of up to 105 liters. The car was equipped with brakes with a vacuum booster and a compressor for inflating the tires. Thanks to two rear drive axles, the ZIS-6 was no longer so afraid of wet roads and snow drifts. True, its maximum speed turned out to be lower than that of the ZIS-5: 55 km/h on asphalt and 10 km/h off-road. This is not surprising, because the engine remains the same - 73 hp. Fuel consumption on the highway reached 40 liters per 100 km, on a country road - up to 70.

The ZIS-6 was assembled until October 1941, and in total a little more than 20 thousand of them came off the assembly line.

Studebaker for the Russian miracle

During the war years, the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebakers. No matter how unpatriotic it may sound, it was thanks to powerful and reliable American trucks that our rocket launch batteries received the desired mobility.

The first three-axle army vehicles, designated US-6, rolled off the Studebaker assembly line at the end of 1941. It was then decided to send them to the Allied armies, mainly to the USSR. As a result, most of the 197 thousand trucks produced were delivered to us. They arrived in the USSR mainly in disassembled form. The assembly and installation of rocket launchers was carried out at the evacuated ZIS plant.

The Americans produced a dozen different modifications of the US-6 - some of them were equipped with a driven front axle (6x6), some with a conventional one (6x4). The Red Army preferred vehicles with a 6x6 wheel arrangement. Their six-cylinder carburetor engine developed a power of 95 hp, and the maximum speed of the car with a full load reached 70 km/h on the highway.

In front-line conditions, “Studebakers” (or, as they were also called, “students”) proved themselves to be reliable vehicles, which could easily be loaded with up to five tons of cargo, compared with the three tons recommended by the American manufacturer.

This is how this couple fought until the end of the war: our Katyusha on American wheels.

Armed tractors

History in pictures

In general, in addition to American trucks, since 1942, the Katyusha, as a very respected “woman,” was transported on any suitable vehicle.