The fronts that took part in Operation Uranium. Soviet Operation Uranus. The balance of power between the USSR and Germany before the operation

Alexey Zakvasin, Svyatoslav Petrov

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops launched Operation Uranus to encircle the Stalingrad Wehrmacht group. As a result, 300 thousand German troops ended up in the cauldron. Despite desperate attempts by Nazi troops to break out of the encirclement, they failed to do so. The Germans capitulated, more than 90 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. At Stalingrad, Nazi Germany suffered a crushing defeat. This battle changed the course of World War II. Read about how the Red Army managed to achieve strategic success in the material from RT.

• Nazi prisoners on the streets of Stalingrad
• RIA News

“People were just falling from the sky. They fell to the ground from above and again found themselves in the Stalingrad hell,” 94-year-old Hans-Erdmann Schönbeck, who was surrounded by the Red Army at the end of 1942, told Der Spiegel. A former Wehrmacht soldier recalled how his fellow soldiers tried to climb aboard a plane flying away from the battlefield.

German soldiers and officers called the battle for Stalingrad hell on Earth and the Red Verdun (meaning the unsuccessful offensive of the Kaiser's troops on the French positions in 1916 ). The Nazi soldiers, who had not known serious defeats, were amazed at the capabilities demonstrated by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA).

Soviet troops defeated the invaders during Operation Uranus. Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in his book “The Work of a Whole Life” argued that the code names for all strategic operations of the Red Army were personally invented by the People’s Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with successful attacks on Romanian positions located on the flanks of the Stalingrad group. On November 23, 1942, the most combat-ready German units fell into the Red Army cauldron, and on February 2, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, capitulated.

• The commander of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, captured by Soviet troops
• RIA News
• Georgy Lipskerov

"No step back!"

The Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17, 1942 after Wehrmacht troops crossed the Chir River. The 6th Army of General Friedrich Paulus was supposed to cover the left flank of the Nazi troops operating in the North Caucasus from counterattacks. The capture of Stalingrad as an important transport hub was intended to ensure German success in the south of the USSR.

Having lost industrially rich Ukraine, in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation. On July 28, 1942, Joseph Stalin signed the famous order No. 227, which prohibited even forced retreat and was popularly called “Not a Step Back.”

Initially, in the Stalingrad direction, the Wehrmacht concentrated 14 divisions numbering about 270 thousand people from Army Group B. Subsequently, the group for the capture of Stalingrad was increased to 1 million.

In the second half of July, about 160 thousand Soviet troops resisted the Nazis. The Red Army was inferior to the enemy troops in tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a result of the regrouping in November, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) increased the number of troops in the Stalingrad area to 800 thousand people.

Thus, before the start of Operation Uranus, the Red Army was unable to concentrate forces superior to the enemy on the front, the length of which was up to 850 km. Moscow was still under threat of attack, and the Supreme Command decided not to risk a massive transfer of troops from Central Russia.

• Joseph Stalin
• globallookpress.com

In conditions of a lack of human and material resources, non-standard actions were required to defeat the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, one of the main keys to the success of Uran was brilliantly conducted reconnaissance operations to disinformation the Nazi command.

Red herring

Back in March 1942, Headquarters were aware that Hitler had given his generals the task of occupying the southern part of the USSR, masking preparations for the next attack on Moscow. At the same time, the Soviet leadership realized that the Wehrmacht had enough forces to launch an attack on the capital if the positions of the Red Army in Central Russia weakened.

Also on topic

On the eve of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian Ministry of Defense declassified archival materials...

As General Sergei Shtemenko recalled, in the summer of 1942, “the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive action to defeat the advancing enemy group in a short time.”

The reason for the lack of reserves, as the Russian Ministry of Defense explains, was not only the need to defend Moscow, but also the frequent offensive operations initiated by Stalin.

The situation at Stalingrad was largely saved by Soviet intelligence. In 1942, the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) received a lot of disinformation information of an operational-strategic nature. The headquarters sought to hide from the Nazis the fact of the concentration of Red Army units in the Stalingrad area.

For this purpose, a diversionary operation called “Mars” was carried out. Soviet intelligence officers had to convince the German generals that the Red Army under the command of Georgy Zhukov would launch a large-scale counteroffensive in the Rzhev area (200 km west of Moscow), and not near Stalingrad.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, if the disinformation activities had not achieved their goal, Operation Uranus could have ended in failure. A Nazi victory in the Battle of Stalingrad would have led to Turkey and Japan entering the war against the USSR and the inevitable defeat of the Soviet Union.

Intelligence officers and analysts of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces knew that the Germans were monitoring Zhukov’s movements. Its appearance on certain sectors of the front was interpreted as a sign of intensified actions of the Red Army. The famous commander skillfully fulfilled his assigned role, and this helped to confuse the Nazi command.

“Zhukov was appointed by Stalin to manage the Central Front in order to mislead the Germans about the real plans of the USSR,” explained Mikhail Myagkov, chairman of the scientific council of the Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO), in a conversation with RT. “The Wehrmacht knew about the authority of Marshal Zhukov and, of course, had to assume that since such a strong commander was placed at the head of the Central Front, it meant that the main forces of the Red Army would be located there.”

• Army General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (left)
• RIA News
• Peter Bernstein

The operation near Rzhev under the leadership of Zhukov really began in the second half of November 1942. However, it was not as large-scale as the Abwehr expected, and pursued the same strategic plan as Uranus.

The fact that the Headquarters managed to outwit the Germans is evidenced by the erroneous forecasts of the Wehrmacht commanders. In particular, the head of the “Foreign Armies of the East” department of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Reinhard Gehlen, was confident that the Red Army would deliver the main blow in the fall to the 9th Army of the “Center” group, which was located just near Rzhev.

“On the German Eastern Front it is becoming more and more convincingly confirmed that the point of application of the main efforts of the upcoming operation is in the sector of Army Group Center.<…>The enemy’s preparations for the offensive in the south are not being carried out so intensively as to believe that a major operation in the south in the near future will begin simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center, Gehlen reported on November 6, 1942.

The head of intelligence of the 9th Army, Colonel Georg Buntrock, reported in a report received by the headquarters of Army Group Center: “The enemy is preparing for a major offensive against the 9th Army, intending to strike from the eastern and western sides of the (Rzhevsky) trapezoid...”

Buntrock believed that the Red Army was going to “encircle the troops located in it (the trapezoid), destroy the 9th Army, break through the front line, eliminate Army Group Center and consolidate the victory with a triumphant advance to Smolensk and taking it by storm.”

Classified "Uranus"

In a conversation with RT, Mikhail Myagkov noted that the Soviet command made every effort to classify Operation Uranus. According to the expert, the cost of defeating the Red Army at Stalingrad was too high. The Soviet army had to deliver a powerful and completely unexpected blow.

“A radio silence regime was introduced, troop movements were carried out at night, documents about the start of the counteroffensive were written by hand, and not dictated by the drivers. It was also decided to make a diversionary maneuver in the form of an offensive operation on the Central Front. The Wehrmacht was misinformed about the Red Army’s offensive plans and did not expect a serious blow on the Southern Front,” said Myagkov.

The expert believes that the Headquarters came to the right conclusion, deciding that it was at Stalingrad that a radical turning point in the war with Germany would be made. Success directly on the battlefields of the Red Army was achieved thanks to the improvement of the military training system. The German group was surrounded by trained and well-armed soldiers.

“The experience gained by the Soviet army during two years of war also played a role, and, importantly, the army learned to interact between different branches and types of troops,” Myagkov explained.

According to the expert, due to the fact that the Soviet army held back the enemy’s onslaught for quite a long time, the rear was significantly strengthened, weapons production was established, and new formations were formed.

• Soviet soldiers storm a house in Stalingrad, February 1943
• RIA News
• Georgy Zelma

“Enough forces were accumulated for a decisive counter-offensive, when Soviet soldiers and officers, remembering the shed blood of their comrades, broke the enemy and reached from Stalingrad to Berlin itself. The bet of the Soviet leadership turned out to be correct, and victory on the southern front really brought success in the war as a whole,” Myagkov concluded.

In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht launched a series of attacks that shook the Soviet-German front. The defeats suffered by the Red Army were not as devastating as in 1941, but too much had already been lost and another retreat could have catastrophic consequences. For some time it seemed that only a miracle could save the world from Nazi rule. There are no miracles, so the world was saved by the Soviet 62nd Army. She managed to retreat into the streets of Stalingrad in an organized manner, and instead of the 10 days planned for the assault, the Wehrmacht was stuck for two months, fighting for the ruins. The strongest of the German field armies, the 6th under the command of General Paulus, was drawn into the battle. However, the desperate defense of the 62nd in the city could have become useless if the Headquarters had not taken advantage of the weeks given to it.

Members of the military council of the Stalingrad Front: Khrushchev, Kirichenko, Chuyanov and the front commander Eremenko, December 1942. Photo: © RIA Novosti/Oleg Knorring

While a battle that defies any description was going on in the city, in Moscow they were racking their brains over how to turn its tide in their favor. The Germans very slowly, with heavy losses, but confidently drove its defenders out of Stalingrad. The bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga became smaller and smaller. Of course, the constant introduction of reserves made it possible to slow down the retreat and prevent the Germans from throwing the army into the river, but more and more new neighborhoods passed into the hands of the Germans.

Already in September, counterattacks followed on the steppe, designed to break through a corridor to Stalingrad from the north, near the Kotluban station. These attacks remained almost unknown, and yet the Red Army suffered severe losses in them, trying to ease the fate of the city’s defenders. The blows failed one after another. The Germans bombed the trains approaching from the north, tank brigades and rifle battalions were burned out in attacks in a matter of days. The Germans were so far superior to the Soviet troops in their ability to conduct positional combat. The same thing happened over and over again. The infantry was cut off by fire, the tanks left without cover were burning, and the lying riflemen were mowed down by machine guns and mortars. There was less and less hope of saving Stalingrad with a direct blow. One could only guess how the battle in the city would turn out next. The first attacks failed due to lack of time to prepare them. It seemed that with more careful preparations a better result would be achieved. However, the Wehrmacht withstood all the blows.

Another solution

Street fight. A nurse bandages a wounded man. Photo: © RIA Novosti/Georgy Zelma

In September, a landmark meeting took place at Headquarters. Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, in the presence of Stalin, discussed the search for some “other solution” to the Stalingrad problem. Stalin, who heard this, asked what “other” solution was in mind, and offered to report on it the next day. Both generals were of the same opinion. Since it is not possible to break through the German defenses in the Kotluban area, it is necessary to increase the swing, embrace Paulus’ army attacking Stalingrad from the flanks and encircle it, advancing through the positions of Germany’s weak Romanian allies.

When looking at the map, this idea seems obvious. As Stalingrad magnetically attracted the infantry and tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the Romanians began to cover the increasingly long front to the left and right of Paulus’s troops. They did not have the discipline, tactical training and excellent weapons that distinguished the Germans. However, in reality it was a much more difficult plan to implement than it might seem.

General Andrey Eremenko

The fact is that the Germans perfectly understood the real combat value of the Romanians. They assigned to the allies those sections of the front that passed through the wild, almost uninhabited, and most importantly, roadless steppe. An offensive requires ammunition, fuel, medicine, food, spare parts - these are thousands and thousands of tons of cargo. If you drive numerous armies into the wasteland and begin to advance, after a while they will simply stop: they will run out of consumables, and new ones will not be brought across the steppe in sufficient quantities. And if you use small forces, then even the Romanians will be able to withstand the blow and push back the attackers. It is interesting that two opposing plans were considered as an alternative to the actually adopted plan.

Konstantin Rokossovsky proposed, since the terrain far to the west and south of Stalingrad was inconvenient, to still try to break through to Stalingrad via a short route and cut off the nearest German divisions in a small pocket. General Andrei Eremenko proposed something different: his plan included an attack on the Romanians with small forces and a giant raid on their rear with the help of cavalry and small mechanized units. Both of these plans contained sound ideas, but both had huge flaws. Rokossovsky proposed to break the Germans with a brutal onslaught where they were strong and expected a blow. It is not a fact that this could be done. Eremenko's plan would have helped stop the Germans for a few days, but it did not solve the problem. Of course, the Wehrmacht would quickly clear its rear of weak raiding groups.

Konstantin Rokossovsky

Thus, the most ambitious plan was adopted. This meant that it was necessary to be able to carry out an offensive with large forces in an inconvenient terrain, and to complete all preparations before the Germans finally defeated the Stalingrad garrison. This required truly nerves of steel. Stalingrad was in a desperate situation, emotions demanded to take all the divisions in reserve and immediately throw them into Stalingrad itself or near Kotluban - to cut a corridor along the shortest route. However, Headquarters held out and did not follow the lead of emotions.

Over the next few weeks, a number of problems had to be solved. While battles raged in the streets, railway lines stretched into the steppes blown by the autumn winds. Enormous reserves of fuel and ammunition were transported to their original positions. From the north, a completely new formation was advancing to the front - a tank army. The Germans detected activity on their flanks, but did not attach much importance to it. The Romanians were slightly reinforced by separate German units. However, an offensive in these wastelands, which were recently devoid of roads, was considered unrealistic. Well, a fresh tank division, sent to help Paulus from the west, was prosaically late.

The general offensive was coordinated by Vasilevsky. The operation was codenamed "Uranus". A strike on Romanian troops from both sides was scheduled for November 19. At this moment, the Germans were already extremely weakened by the fighting in the city. The German 6th Army remained a powerful, cyclopean-sized army, but many wounded had accumulated in the rear, combat units had been seriously worn down in battle, and reserves had been drained to the bottom. It took her very little time to regain her strength before the final push to the Volga - literally two to three weeks. It was at this moment that the Headquarters threw its accumulated reserves onto the scales. It is difficult to imagine what feelings Vasilevsky experienced during more and more assaults on Stalingrad, when Headquarters drip-dropped the reserves that supported the defenders. Now all doubts were cast aside.

Punch in the gut

A still from the film directed by Vladimir Petrov "Battle of Stalingrad". Film studio "Mosfilm". Photo: © RIA Novosti

Heavy snowfall hampered aviation operations, but it also kept the Luftwaffe confined to the airfields. The first to go on the offensive was the northern “claw” - the front of General Nikolai Vatutin, which included a tank army. Hurricane artillery fire and an avalanche of several hundred tanks made the attack irresistible. This offensive was in no way reminiscent of the hopeless attacks on German positions at Kotlubani. Soviet troops passed through Romanian positions like a knife through butter. The Romanian front line was swept away, and in some places tanks immediately drove into division command posts and even corps headquarters.

Nikolay Vatutin

It is interesting that on the first day Paulus did not yet believe that any significant events were taking place. He had no idea about the state of the Romanian troops and did not know that the allies were throwing down their weapons in droves and surrendering. He considered an offensive with large forces west of Stalingrad impossible and on the first day he sent his only reserve - one German and one Romanian tank divisions. There is a curious incident associated with German tank crews. The bulk of the equipment of this mobile reserve was unable to move. According to the official version, the wiring in the tanks... was chewed by mice.

The joke about the mouse saboteurs became known throughout the army, but the tankers themselves were not amused at all. It is difficult to explain this miraculous phenomenon, but the fact is that approximately two-thirds of the division’s tanks never went anywhere. However, the fact that the remaining third still started was of little use. Much to the amazement of the Wehrmacht commanders, all the circumstances that played a fatal role in the fate of the Soviet troops in 1941 now turned against them. In the chaos, the German and Romanian divisions were unable to establish communication with each other, fought discordantly, came under attack in marching columns, could not orient themselves, and were defeated in a couple of days.

The corps commander who united Paulus's armored reserves lost his position and then his freedom: Hitler ordered him to be imprisoned. In reality, the general simply experienced all the delights of commanding a counterattack in the midst of general collapse. The remnants of the two divisions made their way to the southwest in agony. They lost almost all their equipment, their soldiers - especially the Romanians - were demoralized, so the two divisions posed no threat for the next few days.

December 1942. A wounded man is carried out. Photo: © RIA Novosti/Georgy Zelma

Bad weather continued to linger over the battlefield, so the formidable German aircraft could not participate in the battle. Moreover, Soviet units began to capture airfields with planes chained to the ground. Due to the defeat of the Romanian units on the front line, their remnants fled into the zone of the German 6th Army.

In the rear of the Germans themselves, a tremendous disorder reigned. The modern army is not only front-line units, but also hundreds of rear units. Now they were all rushing along the icy roads. Some went south, away from the tanks with red stars on board, others went east, into the emerging cauldron, many went straight into captivity. Paulus's only success was the rapid collapse of the flank. The German group across the Don was able to retreat into the cauldron in an organized manner and build a new line of defense. However, most of the rear units turned into an unmanageable mess.

The offensive took even those units that were not supposed to be here by surprise. For example, an Estonian police battalion came under attack while marching on the road to Donetsk. Paulus simply did not have reliable information about what was happening in his own rear. The advancing tankers and riflemen walked through complete chaos. Abandoned horses were running along the roads, somewhere there was a car with an empty gas tank, and just a few kilometers away there was an abandoned fuel warehouse. The military police could not regulate traffic, and kilometer-long traffic jams arose on the roads. Fights broke out near river crossings and road junctions, sometimes with shooting. Some even drowned trying to escape west across the Don on the ice. German field hospitals were filled with patients, but due to constant marches they could not even open dugouts there. The infirmaries were more like meat processing plants.

Friedrich Paulus

At this time, the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army were dying near the village of Raspopinskaya. Its main forces were commanded by the division commander, General Laskar. All higher-ups either had no contact with the troops or were already in captivity. Laskar tried to act like his German colleagues and organize a breakthrough to the west. However, on November 22, he was captured after an unexpected attack by the Russians and did not participate in the events anymore, and by the 25th, the remnants of the Romanian army - 27 thousand hungry and frozen people - laid down their arms.

Only a small group led by General Sion escaped from the encirclement, but it did not go far. The Romanians met with the German unit, but literally a few hours later the Germans transferred their guns to another area. The Romanians settled down for the night in a village. For the first time in several days, the soldiers, who had found themselves warm and had eaten, went to sleep in full force, not excluding the sentries. At night, Soviet units entered the village and killed or captured everyone they found.

On November 20, the southern “claw” went on the offensive. Here things were even worse with roads and landmarks than in the north. Therefore, there were fewer troops overall, but the share of mobile units was greater. The condition of the Romanian troops was no better than in the north. The first day was spent fighting the positional defense of the Romanians. Over the long weeks of standing, they managed to create an impressive line of field fortifications, but it quickly turned out that on its own it was not capable of holding back a powerful blow.

The German motorized division that came out to meet them was met on the march and driven inside the planned encirclement ring - to the north. A huge problem for the Soviet troops was the complete lack of landmarks. Due to the snowstorm in the first days, it was impossible to conduct aerial reconnaissance; there were no residents in rare villages. Therefore, the two mechanized corps in the vanguard rushed for some time in the void, vaguely imagining where the enemy was. Even communication with the command had to be done through couriers on motorcycles.

However, the very next day an excellent landmark was found - the railway to Stalingrad. The pliable rear of the German 6th Army was also discovered there. Within two days, only one of the vanguard mechanized corps took seven thousand prisoners at the cost of losing only 16 people.

This phenomenon should be discussed separately. The huge number of captured Soviet soldiers in the 1941 campaign is often explained by reluctance to fight, mass cowardice and similar unimportant reasons. In fact, as we see, in a similar situation, the Germans began to surrender in droves, offering almost no resistance.

This did not happen because the Germans, until recently terrible opponents, suddenly became unwilling to fight. However, during deep breakthroughs, a huge number of logisticians find themselves on the front line: builders, drivers, repairmen, signalmen, doctors, loaders in warehouses, etc. and so on. They almost never have tactical training for proper combat, and often even weapons. Moreover, the Germans constantly lost contact, and in addition to the infantry, tanks fell on them. Vasily Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, even sent headquarters guards on motorcycles and armored cars to collect a bountiful harvest of prisoners and trophies.

On November 21, one mechanized wedge was driven into the positions of the Germans and Romanians from the north, another from the east. Between them remained the armada of the German 6th Army. The culmination of Operation Uranus was the capture of the bridge across the Don near the town of Kalach. The crossing was captured by the brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Filippov, advancing from the north. Filippov acted with considerable impudence. In the darkness of the night, a small column with headlights on moved forward. In addition to Soviet ones, it also consisted of several captured German vehicles, so the bridge guards saw familiar silhouettes and were not worried. The Thirty-fours were mistaken for German trophies. When the imaginary Germans jumped from the tanks and opened fire, it was already too late. Soon Kalach himself was busy. On November 23 at four in the afternoon, Soviet groups met near Kalach. The largest army of the Wehrmacht, 284 thousand soldiers and officers, was surrounded.

The pictures of the defeat of the German and Romanian rear areas were inspiring. In the terrible summer of 1942, even the most steadfast soldiers hesitated. Now fear and humiliation have become the lot of the opposite side. The crowds of exhausted prisoners, many of whom were wounded or frostbitten, aroused pity rather than hatred. Mountains of broken and abandoned equipment rose along the roadsides like monuments to victory. True, here and there there were constant outbursts of rage.

The retreating Wehrmacht units mercilessly shot prisoners captured in the summer and autumn, whom they could not take with them. In one of the camps they found a mountain of frozen corpses and only a few emaciated living people. Now that most of the prisoners were Germans and Romanians, such a spectacle could easily cost the lives of soldiers captured nearby. And yet the moral upsurge of Soviet soldiers and officers was unprecedented. The taste of victory was intoxicating. Some of the fighters later said that they did not experience such strong feelings even after the capture of Berlin.

Operation Uranus- code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). Counter-offensive of troops of three fronts: Southwestern (general N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area city ​​of Stalingrad.

Military situation before the operation

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general advance of German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went on the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of areas in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the German troops became more complicated. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched over 2,300 km, the flanks of the strike groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not able to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until the spring of 1943, and then go on the offensive again.

Balance of forces on the fronts

Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aircraft and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the “History of the Second World War, 1939-1945” was as follows:

Operation plan

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began developing a counteroffensive plan in September. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of J.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of delivering deep attacks from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas (offensive depth of about 120 km); The strike group of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, with part of the forces, these same fronts ensured the creation of an external front of encirclement. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th Air Armies, carried out two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided: to direct the main attacks against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups use terrain favorable to the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough sectors, by weakening the secondary sectors, create a 2.8 - 3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved in the concentration of forces, strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

Progress of the operation

Start of the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began on the morning of November 19 after powerful artillery bombardment. Troops of the 5th Tank Army broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army. German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into the battle, the advanced units of which reached the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike group of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Tank Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group between the Volga and Don rivers. The 6th and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of 330 thousand people. By this time, most of the external front of the encirclement had been created, the distance of which from the internal one was 40-100 km.

On November 24, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having defeated the Romanian troops surrounded in the Raspopinskaya area, took 30 thousand prisoners and a lot of equipment. On November 24 - 30, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, waging fierce battles with the encircled enemy troops, reduced the area they occupied by half, trapping it in an area of ​​70-80 km from west to east and 30-40 km from north to south.

In the first half of December, the actions of these fronts to eliminate the encircled enemy developed slowly, since due to the reduction of the front in the cauldron, it condensed its battle formations and organized defense in equipped positions occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1942. A significant (more than 3-fold) underestimation of the number of encircled German troops played a significant role in slowing down the offensive.

On November 24, Hitler, having rejected the proposal of the commander of the 6th Army F. Paulus to break through in a south-eastern direction, ordered Stalingrad to be held while awaiting outside help. The German troops operating against the outer front of the encirclement were united at the end of November into Army Group Don (commanded by Field Marshal E. Manstein), which included the encircled group.

Developments

In the areas of Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin, the Wehrmacht created two strike groups. On December 12, the Goth strike force, according to Soviet data, which had 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions, 125 thousand people, 650 tanks, which, however, is not confirmed by German sources, went on the offensive from Kotelnikovsky along the railway to Stalingrad, not waiting for the concentration of the Tormosinsk group in order to release the encircled troops. Using, according to the Soviet version, which is not confirmed by German sources, a significant superiority in forces over the 51st Army, the enemy pushed it beyond the river. Aksai, where his advance was stopped on December 15. On December 19, the enemy resumed the offensive, but was stopped by troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies on the river. Myshkova, 40 km from the encircled troops. On December 16, the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front began on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka in order to defeat the enemy in the Middle Don region and reach the rear of the Tormosinsk group. During three days of fierce fighting, the enemy's defenses were broken through in five directions. By December 31, the Italian 8th Army and the German Task Force Hollidt were completely defeated. The 2nd Guards Army, during the counteroffensive on December 24-31, inflicted a complete defeat on the Goth group, which suffered heavy losses, including 5,200 prisoners, and threw it back to Zimovniki, pushing back the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km. 57th, 64th I and the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the Don Front to eliminate the encircled troops. On January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front and received the task of attacking in the Rostov direction. By the beginning of January, the situation of the encircled troops worsened. The space they occupied was shelled by artillery, and material supplies were depleted.

Elimination of German resistance

On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented the command of the encircled troops with an ultimatum to surrender, but, on Hitler’s orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad pocket by the forces of the Don Front began (Operation “Ring”). At this time, the number of surrounded troops was still approx. 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of ​​​​the tractor plant and the Barricades plant. On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

Results of the operation

During the Stalingrad offensive operation, two German armies were destroyed, two Romanian and one Italian armies were defeated. 32 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, 16 divisions were defeated. The enemy lost more than 800 thousand people, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to 485 thousand people, including irrevocable ones - 155. The conditions for conducting an outstanding operation were created by Soviet troops during the Stalingrad defensive operation starting in September 1942. “Before the Battle of Stalingrad, history did not know a battle , when such a large group of troops was surrounded and would have been completely destroyed. The defeat of the enemy on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole, the expulsion of enemy troops from Soviet territory began.” - G. K. Zhukov. It should be noted that, of course, it is difficult to talk about the complete defeat of the encircled group - after all, a significant part of it was evacuated by air. The encircled group, which made no attempt to break through the internal front of the encirclement, was completely destroyed, down to the last unit. A significant number of wounded (from the diary of F. Paulus - 42 thousand) were evacuated from the cauldron by air, but Paulus does not say how many of the wounded managed to reach the “mainland”. It should be noted, however, that the word “evacuation” itself implies removal to the rear, that is, if Paulus used this word correctly, then he meant that all 42 thousand people reached the “mainland.”

additional information

Only during Operation Ring, according to Soviet data, 10.01. - 02.02. 1943 91,545 were captured and over 140 thousand (up to 147,200) enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. According to various sources, from 30 to 42 thousand wounded were taken out of the cauldron by air. He lost 16,800 people in prisoners alone before the start of Operation Ring.

The Soviet command estimated the size of the group that was to be encircled in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80 - 90 thousand. The initial version had a more modest scale. The underestimation did not have a significant impact on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but it greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a major underestimation with a brilliant final result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The continued presence of a huge cauldron, which attracted all the forces and attention of the enemy and sharply limited the possible options for his actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly develop the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.

Memory

At the site of the junction of the troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts (the modern village of Pyatimorsk), the monument “Union of Fronts” was erected in 1955. Author E. V. Vuchetich, architects L. Polyakov and L. Dyatlov.

From November 19 to November 23, every year we remember the glorious pages of Russian military history. These days of the Don, South-Western and Stalingrad fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Stalingrad. November 19 became the Day of Rocket Forces and Artillery: amid the thunder of thousands of guns and guards mortars, the Red Army began the turning point of the Great Patriotic War, Operation Uranus. As a result, the enemy was forever forced to abandon plans to capture the south of the USSR and the Caucasian oil fields.

The Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO) pays great attention to preserving the memory of the Battle of Stalingrad. Under the auspices of the Russian Military Historical Society, a reconstruction of the memorial complex “Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad” was carried out and a major overhaul of the objects of the Memorial-architectural complex of the museum-panorama “Battle of Stalingrad” will be carried out. RVIO regularly holds round tables on the topic of the Battle of Stalingrad within the framework of the discussion club “Guchkov House” and various scientific and practical conferences, including international ones. In the Battle of Stalingrad Museum itself, under the auspices of the Russian Military Military Society, a military-patriotic summer camp has been created and operates for students of cadet classes, members of youth military-patriotic clubs and all concerned schoolchildren and students.

How did the Red Army manage to carry out a complex operation to encircle an enemy force of many thousands in unfavorable weather conditions? What losses did the Nazi allies suffer, and how did this affect their morale? And how did the Nazis try to respond? The correspondent of the portal “History.RF” met with military historian, candidate of historical sciences, associate professor of the department of modern national history of the Russian State University for the Humanities Sergei Yuryevich Kondratenko.

“Leningrad and Rzhev suffered, but delayed the Nazi forces”

- What was the situation by November 1942 on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front in general, and what happened at Stalingrad in particular?

Many fans of military history know that the situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War as a whole was difficult. I don’t want to say that it was as critical as in the summer-autumn of 1941, but there was a fair amount of drama present. This is the ongoing blockade of Leningrad, and heavy battles for the Rzhev salient in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, and the successful German offensive in the spring-autumn of 1942 in the southern direction, and the loss of Crimea... However, if at first glance it may seem that the overall situation was completely bleak, in reality, each of the listed episodes imposed not only negative, but also positive effects on the main theater of military operations. Leningrad and Rzhev drew upon themselves sufficiently large Wehrmacht forces that he could use in the south, and most importantly, German reserves were always required near Rzhev. There is a known situation when the commander of the German troops near Rzhev, Model, actually blackmailed headquarters, asking for reserves, and if they were not received, he threatened to retreat. Thus, the Central and Northern Fronts “ate up” a large number of German forces, thereby helping our defenders of the Volga and Caucasus.

- But let's move to the south - how difficult was the situation there?

Difficult, but in reality not as catastrophic as in the previous year. Having picked up a good pace in the spring, summer and early autumn, the German offensive was already running out of steam by November. The enemy's 11th Army was tightly stuck in the Crimea, the heroic defenders of Sevastopol and the soldiers on the Kerch bridgehead tied up an entire field army in battle, which could help in the assault on Stalingrad or at least cover the flanks of the German groups. When Sevastopol fell and the Germans managed to capture all of Crimea, it was already too late.

By dividing Army Group South into groups A and B, the enemy hoped to carry out two tasks at once during Operation Blau, as the Germans called the 1942 offensive. Army Group A was supposed to capture the Caucasus with access to Baku, thereby depriving the USSR of its main oil fields. Group “B”, having occupied Stalingrad, cut the Volga as the main water transport artery and secured the flank of the Caucasian Wehrmacht group. Looking ahead, I would like to note that the enemy did not complete both tasks. Moreover, the Germans dangerously extended their fronts by more than 2 thousand kilometers, thereby making themselves vulnerable to counterattacks. The command of the Red Army, having fought for more than a year, took into account its mistakes, much-needed experience appeared, which we were able to take advantage of when planning Operation Uranus. It should be understood that our counteroffensive was prepared in the conditions of continuous heavy fighting in Stalingrad and the Caucasus. There was an urgent need to turn the situation around. And a solution was found.

- A few words about the planning of Uranus. Many consider this some kind of spontaneous operation or a great success for our troops...

This is wrong. The first outlines of the operation were outlined to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, their idea was supported by A.I. Eremenko, who then headed the Stalingrad Front. This is mid-September 1942. Street fighting continues, and in the Caucasus the enemy is already near Mozdok and is trying to break through further. According to archival documents, the Soviet command actually worked on different options for a strike at Stalingrad. And it certainly was not and could not be a spontaneous or simply successful operation. One of the main developers of the operation, Colonel GOU General Staff Potapov, is also known. In difficult conditions, I repeat, there were battles all over the southern direction, and in Stalingrad the enemy was already able to break through to the Volga. Our troops held only three small bridgeheads. There was planning and development of the strike. It was necessary to maintain maximum secrecy, accumulating reserves and assembling strike groups on the flanks of the German 6th Army, covered by weak Italian-Romanian armies. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy had stretched his flanks and entrusted their defense to the allied formations, it was possible to create a classic pincer, closing them west of the enemy’s Stalingrad group.

Three fronts were involved in the operation: the Southwestern Front, commander N.F. Vatutin, had the task of delivering deep attacks from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovichi and Kletskaya areas; shock group of the Stalingrad Front, commander - A.I. Eremenko, advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces at Stalingrad. At the same time, with part of their forces, these same fronts ensured the creation of an external front of encirclement. Don Front, commander - K.K. Rokossovsky, launched two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinskaya area along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided for the main attacks to be directed against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s defense, against the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups use terrain favorable to the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough sectors, by weakening the secondary sectors, create a threefold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved in the concentration of forces, strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

- How did the operation develop?

Despite the bad weather and heavy snowfalls, on November 19, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern Front with tank units dealt a powerful blow to the enemy, breaking through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army, which offered almost no resistance. Belated German counterattacks brought no results. On November 20, such units of the Stalingrad Front also went on the offensive, and after 3 days, on November 23, fighters of the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts united in the Kalach area, thereby closing a pincer around the 6th and parts of the 4th German armies in the Stalingrad area . By the way, at the junction there is a monument, which is called “Union of Fronts”.

“Even the most zealous Nazis began to understand everything...”

- A few words about the Wehrmacht's allies. Why were their units destroyed so quickly?

As I already said, as a result of operations in the South of Russia, the already very long eastern front of the Germans was significantly lengthened. There were no longer enough German units to create the necessary defensive densities. Significant sections of the front were occupied by troops of Germany's allies - the Romanian 3rd and emerging 4th armies, the 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian armies. It was these armies that turned out to be the Wehrmacht's Achilles heel in the autumn-winter campaign that soon followed. To make up for the total losses of over a million people suffered at the previous stage of military operations against the USSR, Hitler attracted fresh forces from the German allies. By the spring of 1942, there were at least 52 Allied divisions in the southern direction of the theater of operations in the USSR. As for their combat effectiveness, this is a really interesting point: technically worse equipped than German divisions, often weaker morally, less motivated units, in the opinion of the Germans themselves, were suitable only for occupation and rear service, with rare exceptions. The same Manstein notes their low morale in his memoirs. But, in my opinion, by the autumn of 1942 the German command had no choice; it was necessary to “plug the holes” in the increasingly lengthening front. Moreover, the prevailing opinion was that the Red Army would not be able to advance until spring, which means that, having held out in positions until 1943, the Germans themselves wanted to continue to advance. It is interesting that there was also an underestimation of the enemy’s forces and capabilities on our part.

- Did our command really not have intelligence data?

There was intelligence data, of course, but with the start of Operation Uranus, it gradually became clear that our command had underestimated the German forces by almost 3 times! This did not prevent a rapid operation to encircle the enemy’s Stalingrad group, but it narrowed the possibilities for carrying out Operation Saturn (a strike in the direction of Rostov-on-Don and to cover the flank of the Southwestern Front), turning it into “Little Saturn”. Which, however, also pretty much battered the German allies, mainly the same Romanians and Italians. So both the Germans underestimated our capabilities and we underestimated theirs... However, this did not prevent the conduct of two more significant operations, “Winter Thunderstorm” - on the enemy’s side, and “Ring” - on our side.

- Do we mean the enemy’s attempt to release his troops and then the liquidation of the pocket by our troops?

Absolutely right. The enemy planned to strike from outside the encirclement ring along the railway towards Stalingrad in order to release his units and ensure their supply by land. By the way, the famous air bridge promised by Goering was very expensive for German aviation, and most importantly, did not bring the expected results. The demand of a more than three hundred thousand strong group for fuel, ammunition and food supplies was significantly greater than what transport aviation provided.

On December 12, from the area of ​​Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin, the enemy struck with the forces of a hastily assembled group towards Stalingrad. With heavy losses, the Germans managed to get closer to 35-40 km. to the positions of the troops surrounded at Stalingrad, but the commander of the 6th Army, Friedrich Paulus, did not decide to launch a counter strike, and by December 31, the offensive impulse of the “Winter Storm” fizzled out without reaching the goal.

- From that moment on, did the operation to eliminate German troops in the cauldron begin?

Yes, already on January 8, Paulus received an offer to surrender, but rejected it at Hitler’s request. Operation Ring began. Let me remind you that by this time the German troops numbered at least 260 thousand soldiers and officers, and this is a serious number even for the encircled troops. The fighting continued until January 26, when it was possible to cut the encircled German group into two parts, Southern and Northern. On January 31, the Southern Group led by Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus surrendered. February 2 - Northern group. At this point the Battle of Stalingrad was over. A truly major, significant victory was won.

- In conclusion, a few words about the significance of this victory and its influence on further operations of the Great Patriotic War...

The Battle of Stalingrad and Operation Uranus themselves became a huge military-political achievement of the USSR. This victory became one of the turning points during the Great Patriotic War. The fame of Soviet weapons thundered throughout the world. The Western allies, and above all their leaders Roosevelt and Churchill, were convinced that the Soviet Union would wage the war until victory and the complete defeat of the enemy, and its forces were not only not broken, but, on the contrary, were only gaining strength. Thus, during negotiations at the Tehran Conference on November 29, 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said: “Stalingrad itself has become a symbol of courage, fortitude of the Russian people and at the same time a symbol of the greatest human suffering. This symbol will remain for centuries. It is necessary that future generations can see and feel with their own eyes all the greatness of the victory won at the Volga and all the horrors of the war of extermination that raged there. It would be nice to leave the terrible ruins of this legendary city untouched, and build a new, modern city nearby. The ruins of Stalingrad, like the ruins of Carthage, would forever remain a unique monument to human resilience and suffering. They would attract pilgrims from all over the earth and would serve as a warning to future generations...” And US President F. Roosevelt sent a letter to Stalingrad, the text of which read: “On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I present this letter to the city of Stalingrad to mark our admiration for him valiant defenders whose courage, fortitude and dedication during the siege from September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 will forever inspire the hearts of all free people. Their glorious victory stopped the tide of invasion and became a turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression."

In turn, Germany, and especially its allies, suffered a strong moral blow, not counting the huge losses - over a million people were lost by the Axis countries in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front. Units of Army Group B began to quickly roll back from the Caucasus, trying to avoid repeating the fate of the encirclement at Stalingrad. Never again will the enemy carry out such operations on Soviet soil. Units and headquarters of the German 6th field and 4th tank armies were defeated, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies (22 divisions), the 8th Italian army and the Italian Alpine corps (10 divisions), the 2nd Hungarian army (10 divisions), Croatian regiment. The medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad” was awarded to over 700 thousand Soviet military personnel. But most importantly, the morale of the people and the army was raised. In Germany, on the contrary, mourning was declared. Even the most zealous Nazis began to understand that the war would be lost...

On November 19, 1942, Operation Uranus began - the Red Army's offensive against Stalingrad captured by German troops. The headquarters assigned the soldiers the task of encircling and destroying enemy troops. Within a few days, the army managed to close the ring around the 6th Army of Friedrich von Paulus.

The defense of Stalingrad lasted 200 days. Fights were fought for every house, for every meter of land. German aviation carried out about two thousand sorties, literally wiping the city off the face of the earth, burning the center and its inhabitants to the ground with incendiary bombs.

The date of the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad is officially considered July 17, 1942. On this day, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies met with the vanguards of the 6th German Army. By the beginning of the battle, German troops had superiority over Soviet troops in tanks and artillery - 1.3, in aircraft - more than 2 times. The troops of the Stalingrad Front were twice as numerous as the enemy.

By the end of July, the enemy pushed Soviet troops behind the Don. The defense line stretched for hundreds of kilometers along the river. By September 13, Wehrmacht strike forces pushed back Soviet troops in the direction of the main attacks and broke into the center of Stalingrad. Fierce battles took place for every house. Strategic positions such as Mamayev Kurgan, the railway station, Pavlov's House and others changed hands repeatedly. By November 11, after difficult and bloody battles, the Germans managed to break through to the Volga in an area 500 meters wide. The Soviet 62nd Army suffered huge losses, some divisions numbered only 300-500 soldiers. By that time, Headquarters already had a plan for a counterattack on Stalingrad. The operation was called "Uranus". The plan was to use blows from the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts to defeat the troops covering the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group, and, developing an offensive in converging directions, to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces near Stalingrad.

The Red Army's counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942. On the first day, the 1st and 26th tank corps advanced 18 kilometers, and on the second day - 40 kilometers. On November 23, in the area of ​​Kalach-on-Don, the encirclement ring around the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht closed.

On January 10, 1943, the troops of the Don Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky began carrying out Operation Ring to defeat the group of Nazi troops surrounded near Stalingrad. The plan provided for the gradual destruction of the enemy and the dismemberment of the 6th Army.

By the end of the day, Soviet troops, with the support of artillery, managed to advance 6-8 km. The offensive developed rapidly. The enemy offered fierce resistance. The advance towards Stalingrad had to be temporarily stopped on January 17 to regroup troops. The command of the 6th Army was again asked to capitulate, which was refused. On January 22, Soviet troops resumed the offensive along the entire encirclement front, and on the evening of the 26th, a historic meeting of the 21st and 62nd armies took place in the area of ​​the village of Krasny Oktyabr and on Mamayev Kurgan.

On January 31, 1943, the southern group of Wehrmacht forces ceased resistance. The command led by Colonel General Friedrich von Paulus was captured. The day before, by order, Hitler promoted him to field marshal. In the radiogram, he indicated to the army commander that “not a single German field marshal has ever been captured.” On February 2, the northern group of the 6th Army was liquidated. Thus, the battle for Stalingrad was completed.

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By that time, Headquarters already had a plan for a counterattack on Stalingrad. The operation was called "Uranus". The plan was to use the forces of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, developing an offensive in converging directions, to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. The Red Army's offensive began early in the morning of November 19, 1942. Immediately after a powerful artillery barrage, troops from the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front struck the enemy.

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On the first day of the offensive, the 1st and 26th tank corps advanced 18 kilometers, and on the second day - 40 kilometers. On November 23, in the area of ​​Kalach-on-Don, the encirclement ring around the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht closed. On January 10, 1943, the troops of the Don Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky began carrying out Operation Ring to defeat the group of Nazi troops surrounded near Stalingrad. The plan provided for the gradual destruction of the enemy and the dismemberment of the 6th Army

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