Grenades of the former German army and its allies. Supply of weapons and ammunition during the Great Patriotic War Ground artillery ammunition

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to military factories in the south of the country stopped. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative impact on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. The GAU did not always know exactly the state of the supply of troops at the fronts, since strict reporting on this service was not established before the war. The urgent report card for ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and for weapons - in April

Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Department of Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored, with the GAU subordinate to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close interaction was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Transport.

The heroic work of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at military enterprises in the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations, and the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76 mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand are 82 mm caliber and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these supplies of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of troops in the field The army's supply of weapons and ammunition continued to remain strained. It took enormous effort from the military industry, the work of the central logistics agencies, and the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.

During the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was constantly growing in the eastern regions of the country, weapons were primarily provided by the reserve association of the Supreme High Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counter-offensive near Moscow were also met.

During this difficult period for our country, Moscow factories carried out a lot of work on the production of various types of weapons. As a result, the number of weapons on the Western Front by December 1941 for its individual types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. There was also a significant increase in armament among the troops of other fronts.

During the counteroffensive near Moscow, massive repairs of failed weapons and military equipment were organized in military repair shops and at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the supply of troops during this period was so difficult that Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.

As military factories came into operation, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, over 100 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), and many millions of shells and mines.

In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide support for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad area, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.

The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts expended: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.

Due to the enormous congestion of the railways with operational transportation, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaysatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front was allocated two automobile battalions, which in an extremely limited time managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous enemy bombing of crossings across the Volga. Due to enemy air raids and shelling, artillery depots of the front and armies were forced to frequently change locations. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse the supply trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in batches, 5-10 cars each, and then to the troops in small automobile convoys (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time it took to deliver it to the troops.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complex and labor-intensive. During the defensive battle of Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand 217 guns.

Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle of Stalingrad accumulated weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).

Table 19

Supply of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218

Much work was done to provide the troops with ammunition during this period by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A.I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N.M. Bocharov, South-Western - Colonel S.G. Algasov, as well as a special group of the GAU led by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.

Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, and Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long distance of transport transport with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of cargo from railway to water transport and back, or from railway to road and mountain-pack transport, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such enormous distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During the six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2 thousand wagons of ammunition 219.

The delivery of ammunition from front-line and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. The 20th Guards Rifle Division, defending the Belorechensk direction, received shells from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to the regimental combat supply points by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered to almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

The working people of Transcaucasia provided great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the production of shells for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they produced 1.3 million hand grenade casings, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shell casings. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced 4,294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, and 46,492 220 machine guns in 1942.

The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to a besieged city was extremely difficult, so producing them on site was often crucial. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city’s industry supplied the front with 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.

Leningrad also supplied weapons to other fronts. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. The disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery workshop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. During the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.

Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tanks, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 222 thousand rockets. This made it possible to completely compensate for combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.

Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm and above 223 caliber, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU during the entire time of the counteroffensive and the liquidation of the encircled enemy group was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, 1095 wagons of ammunition were supplied to the Stalingrad Front, 1460 wagons to the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and to the South-Western Front (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943). January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3,923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts during the period November 1942 - January 1943.

The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting on July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and was unmatched in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and was twice as high as the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied in the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.

Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, and the heroic work of the working class, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly in 1942. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared to 1942 is shown in table. 20,225.

Table 20

The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and ongoing supply of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition.

The volume of supplies of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, over half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons 226.

In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army. It was carried out as follows. Every month the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which order, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what time it should be sent. Based on these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their requests, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at NPO bases and warehouses, production capabilities during the month, supply and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was reviewed and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, Colonel General, then the chief marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy - the head of the GAU, General N. D. Yakovlev, and was presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for approval.

Based on this plan, the organizational planning department of the GAU (chief General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports within a period of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their departure. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from central bases and NPO warehouses remained until the end of the war.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns 227.

The large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge and the intensity of combat operations in the planned offensive operations required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76 mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 rounds of ammunition; 122-mm howitzer rounds - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition sets 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, the named fronts were supplied with 4,781 cars (over 119 full-fledged trains) of various types of ammunition from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 cars, to Voronezh - 72 cars and to Bryansk - 31 cars 229.

The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. During the period July 5–12, 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling fierce enemy tank attacks, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days consumed 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts consumed about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of small arms ammunition, 70 wagons of anti-tank rifle ammunition, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons anti-aircraft artillery rounds and 5950 wagons of ground artillery rounds 230.

Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the heads of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - engineer-colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.

In the third period of the war, the provision of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Significant reserves of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created at GAU bases and warehouses. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns decreased slightly. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 versus 24 thousand in 1943).

At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain strained, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and higher, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122 mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152 mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203 mm shells - by 172 thousand 231

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely scarce ammunition on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially those in short supply.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide front troops with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand 233 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts 234. There were no interruptions in the supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to troops and to artillery firing positions. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases involve soldiers and local residents on impassable sections of roads to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.

Po-2 aircraft were used to provide ammunition to tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing in the operational depths of enemy defenses. On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield they delivered 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76-mm mines to the settlements of Baranye Pole and Druzhintsy. and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights per day. In total, over 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by plane to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Despite great difficulties with supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.

The supply of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, the following were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and 236 machine guns. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 ,3 ammunition loads of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition loads of 152-mm shells.

Such a high supply of ammunition to front troops has never been seen in any of the previously conducted offensive operations of a strategic scale. To ship weapons and ammunition to the fronts, NPO bases, warehouses and arsenals worked at maximum capacity. Personnel at all levels of the rear and railway workers did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.

However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from their bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high pace of restoration of railway communications severely destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Road transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.

Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to the troops advancing in wooded and swampy areas, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition reserves along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation existed in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the ammunition reserves accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of vehicles to collect and transport the remaining ammunition to the troops in the rear. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the chief of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front allocated 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, ammunition reserves were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by plane 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial positions lines, artillery firing positions and along the route of advance of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered with the fronts and armies.

The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But based on the large availability of weapons, it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) of small arms ammunition, 2,832 thousand (1,700 wagons) of mines, 478 thousand (115 wagons) of anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3,434.6 thousand (3656 wagons) of ground artillery rounds were consumed. artillery 238.

The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baykov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - engineer-colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - major general of the engineering and technical service V. I. Shebanin.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front consumed 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belarusian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high rate of advance of troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.

A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly among the troops. But during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops quickly advanced and took with them only the ammunition that their vehicles could carry. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great extent of military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and front rear services, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing troops with weapons and ammunition. The total reserves of ammunition on January 1, 1945 compared to 1944 increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery shots - by 35, for ground artillery shots - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany not only fully provided for the needs of the troops of the active army, but also managed to create additional reserves of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their preparation, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.

The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition during the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5,382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).

After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the river line. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces itself well provided the troops with everything necessary to deliver the final crushing blow to Nazi Germany. In preparation for the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million rounds of ammunition and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million were supplied to the fronts. (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account reserves) fully covered the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve by the end of the operation.

In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and mines, 392 million rounds of ammunition and almost 3 million hand grenades were used - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were expended. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported via Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of the Union and Western European gauge railways, the transshipment of ammunition in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was quite labor-intensive and complex work.

In general, the supply of ammunition to front-line troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in the four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure we must add the supply of ammunition to the country’s air defense forces, as well as to marine units. Taking this into account, the total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the active army for four months of 1945 amounted to 1327 trains 242.

The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying front-line troops and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.

The active army spent over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As is known, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate food and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.

Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support for the Armed Forces was industry, which during the war years supplied the active army with several million small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions shells and mines, tens of billions of rounds. Along with the steady growth in mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms, as well as sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were developed. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in essence, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to Soviet weapons. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems received as imports in the third period of the war were only partially used by the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at GAU bases until the end of the war.

The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war was largely ensured by the wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Of no small importance in the timely supply of troops in the field army with weapons and ammunition was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and support. Since 1942, establishing a system for recording and reporting weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service has continuously improved and improved the organizational forms, methods and methods of working to supply the troops of the army. Strict centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with rear headquarters and the military communications service, hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide troops of the fronts and new formations of Headquarters Supreme High Command of Armaments and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and targeted provision of troops with weapons and ammunition was developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of conducting combat operations. This system completely justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted supply of weapons and ammunition to the active army was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the efficient work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, workers of the defense people's commissariats and all levels of the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .

BRIEF FOREWORD TO THE MEMO ON EXPLOSIVE OBJECTS IN THE FIELDS OF RUSSIA

There are a lot of special instructions on sapper work. Each of them describes in detail all the necessary actions of performers during mining and demining, and presents tools and equipment. The purpose of these notes is only to warn search engines against incorrect actions when carrying out search work. It does not pretend to provide comprehensive coverage of the specifics of sapper work.

Ammunition encountered in the search area poses a significant threat to the life of the searcher. Disrespect for any type of ammunition often leads to the absurd death of a person. The tragedy of the situation is aggravated by the fact that most of the bombers are children and... experienced professional search engines. The latter is apparently betrayed by a sense of danger, and that same bravado of a professional works negatively.

The main rule of a search engine should be caution, raised to a power and expressed in the words: “IF YOU DON’T KNOW, DON’T TOUCH, AND YOU KNOW, DON’T TOUCH EVEN MORE. DON’T TAKE THE AMMUNITION IN YOUR HANDS AND DON’T RISK YOUR LIFE AND THE LIFE OF YOUR COMRADES!” No matter how interesting and exciting the search may be, if you are not a specialist and there is no experienced specialist nearby who can competently determine the type of ammunition and neutralize it, then it is difficult to suggest a better course of action than marking the object with a pole (sign) and calling a sapper. That is why the presence of several sappers is mandatory in a search expedition. Only in exceptional cases is it permissible to use a “cat” to check ammunition for non-removal, so that you still call a sapper and do not forget the location of the ammunition. Under no circumstances should an inexperienced person neutralize ammunition on his own, nor, indeed, should such exceptional cases of using a “cat” be made commonplace and common. Everyone must take care of their own life. Naturally, the found ammunition must be supervised until the sapper arrives.

In areas of former military operations, the soil is littered with unexploded shells, mines, bombs, grenades, etc. Their safety varies, especially for ammunition that has passed through the bore and air bombs dropped from aircraft. They are in a combat position, which is risky for transportation and subsequent disposal due to deformation at the moment of impact with the ground. Such ammunition is detonated on the spot.

When a mine detector detects a metal object that gives a high-intensity signal in the headphones, you should determine the center of its location and mark it with a pole. Then, using a probe, you need to try to make several injections of the soil at an angle so that the tip of the probe slides obliquely along the contour of the object. After determining its depth, size, and contours, you can begin to remove a thin layer of soil above the object, as well as around the circumference with a knife or shovel. After this, in fact, the find can be identified. If this is ammunition of any type, then you need to immediately call a sapper.

In practice, there are often cases of search engines independently destroying discovered explosive objects by fire, namely by lighting a large fire over the ammunition.

It also happens: first a powerful fire is built, and then ammunition is thrown into it! There is nothing more dangerous than such, so to speak, “methods,” although many search engines sometimes even boast of their composure, undermining wartime “gifts.” Above, we have already touched on a feature that is so common among search engines, which, alas, leads precisely to accidents, and God forbid that neither one nor the other is among us.

Moreover, it is completely reckless to melt explosives from shells, mines and bombs. The “motivation” here is simple: you come across ammunition that has been well preserved in the mud of a crater (by the way, the preservation of ammunition in the silt and clay of craters is almost perfect; once washed from the dirt, they can be used for their intended purpose) in the factory paint and with readable markings; therefore, not dangerous, since time has spared him. This is where the guys make a mistake, and a mistake often pays at the highest price - life. Here both the sapper and the search engine are united in their destiny: BOTH ARE WRONG ONLY ONE TIME - THE LAST!

The most dangerous ammunition is that which has already been fired from the weapon in question or has been prepared for use. Here are their signs:
a) when fired from a gun, grooves of the barrel rifling remain on the protruding metal belt around the circumference of the projectile, therefore, the projectile is in the cocked firing position;
b) when fired from a mortar, the capsule of the expelling charge at the base of the mine is pierced, and if the mine does not rupture, then random reasons were involved;
c) any dropped bomb is deformed as a result of hitting the ground and is therefore extremely dangerous;
d) with the detonator inserted, any (cocked or not) wartime grenade can explode even with the visible presence of a safety ring;
e) do not try to pull any anti-tank mine from its place; in exceptional cases, use a “cat” and stay in cover no closer than 50 m;
f) anti-personnel mines are also dangerous if they have a fuze inserted into them;

Shooting ammunition (cartridges)

Ammunition for small arms

Cartridges are probably the most common find. They come across in clips and in zinc, in pouches, and simply in bulk. Cartridges, in most cases, do not pose an immediate danger to life, although they contain a propellant - gunpowder. Why? The reason is simple, despite the fact that the troops and laboratories are conducting various experiments on the long-term preservation of ammunition and their combat readiness, rules for storage and shelf life have been developed, but it must be remembered that almost 60 years have passed since the war, the ammunition was stored in distant from ideal conditions, besides, nature tends to heal the wounds inflicted on it by people. Water, time, frost and sun, together with an acidic or alkaline environment, have done a lot to human labor: the cartridges have rotted, the gunpowder has decomposed, and most importantly, it has become damp. Therefore, the usual safety rules apply to cartridges: do not disassemble and do not give to children, and do not heat them.

Chuck device

In the USSR, bimetallic sleeves, as well as brass ones, were mainly used.
In Germany: primarily brass. In places where there were heavy battles, there are machine gun cells filled with cartridges. I saw it myself - 60 cm, and brass, by the way, is a valuable non-ferrous metal.
In the USSR, VT gunpowder was used in 7.62 mm rifle cartridges. It has the shape of a cylinder with one channel. Sometimes you can find gunpowder from the first releases - in the form of squares.
In Germany, in the 7.92 mm cartridge there is gunpowder with the designation
N.Z. Gew. Bl. P.I. (2.2.0.45) - squares with a side of 2mm.

Cartridge designation
Let's look at an example:
Russian rifle cartridge (for the “three-line”) 7.62x54R, where 7.62 is the cartridge caliber mm. What is a caliber? This is the distance between the fields of the rifling in the barrel - that is, the minimum diameter of the barrel bore.
Well, 54 is the length of the sleeve in mm. But the letter “R” is the first letter of the German word RAND, which in translation means rim, the same cap on the back of the Russian sleeve. But German cartridge cases do not have such a cap; its function is performed by a special groove, so there is no letter in its designation. The German cartridge for the Mauser rifle is designated as 7.92x57

There is also another notation system, it is adopted in England and the USA.
For example, 38 and 45 calibers are nothing more than hundredths of an inch. (1 inch - 25.4 mm). That is, you should read .38 and .45 inches and translating into Russian 9 and 11.45 mm, respectively.

The cartridge is quite rare. The found cartridges are poorly preserved due to poor sealing.

7.62 mm pistol cartridge mod. 1930 (7.62x25 TT).

The length of the cartridge is 34.85 mm, the length of the sleeve is 24.7 mm. The sleeve is bottle-shaped, without a rim, with a groove for the ejector. Ogival-shaped bullet, jacketed with a lead core. The sleeve is brass or steel sleeves, clad with tombak, brass, varnished or even without coating at all. The bullet jacket is steel, clad with tombak or brass; there are bullets with a jacket without coating. The bullet in the case is secured by punching and crimping the barrel. Very often you come across cartridge cases and cartridges without stamps on the bottom; the rest are marked with the manufacturer and year of manufacture.
In addition to the “P” lead jacket bullet, there were “P-41” and “PT” bullets. The “P-41” bullet is an armor-piercing incendiary bullet, with a steel core and an incendiary composition in the head, the top of the bullet is painted black with a red belt. The “PT” bullet is a tracer, the top is painted green.

It comes up frequently when searching. The found cartridges are poorly preserved due to poor sealing; in addition, military-issue cartridges were delivered directly to the front and were not intended for long-term storage.

9 mm pistol cartridge 08 (9x19Pair.)

The bullet core is lead. During the war, cartridges were produced in which scarce materials (copper, lead) were replaced with surrogates. There are bullets with a steel core. At the end of the war, steel-cased cartridges were produced (St. mark). On the bottom of the cartridges there is a stamp S*, a marking indicating the batch and year of manufacture of the cartridges. Ammo comes across quite rarely. The found cartridges are poorly preserved - the thin steel casing of the bullet rots almost completely, and the tightness of the cartridges is broken.

Cartridges caliber 7.62 mm 7.62X54R (USSR)

Cartridges of this type are widespread and are one of the most common finds. The cartridge was also used in the ground army, for all types of rifles and machine guns, as well as in aviation, for the ShKAS machine gun. It was produced both in the USSR and in other countries, in particular in Finland and the USA.

Bottle-shaped sleeve with rim. Until the mid-30s, cartridges were produced with a brass sleeve, and later with a bimetallic sleeve clad with tombac or copper. The bullet is secured in the case by rolling or punching. On the bottom of the sleeve there is a designation: year of manufacture and factory code. For ShKAS cartridges there is also the letter “SH”, these cartridges have a stronger fastening of the primer - around it there is a ring groove left over from the ring punching. The presence of this groove, as well as the letter “Ш”, is a sign that the bullet in the cartridge is special.

The cartridge case is usually poorly preserved, so its contents - gunpowder - are usually wet. But the capsule, oddly enough, is sometimes preserved. Of course, it won’t work from the striker, but from heat, it very well may, so you shouldn’t even throw shell casings into the fire.
But the biggest “interest” is the bullets.

Regular bullets.
Model 1891 bullet (blunt-headed). Well, we still need to find it, because... very, very rare. Has a cupronickel silver shell. The core is lead. Doesn't pose any danger.
Model 1908 bullet (light). There is no marking. Consists of a steel shell coated with tombac, cupronickel or copper. Lead core. It has a conical recess in the bottom. Ballistics were improved due to the pointed nose. On the sight of the rifle mod. 1891 there were even 2 scales for light and heavy bullets, because... the 1908 model bullet flew further. Safe.
Model 1930 bullet. (heavy) The nose of the bullet is yellow. Heavier and longer than the 1908 bullet, it has a conical tail. It should be noted that in this case, the yellow marking in no way classifies this bullet as a chemical bullet. Doesn't pose any danger. Safe.

Special bullets

As you can see from the composition, this is an ordinary magnesium bomb, and the steel shell produces very good fragments. Conclusion - it’s better not to throw her into the fire
poke, unless of course you want to pull out small pieces of metal from various parts of the body using tweezers...

B-30 and B-32 are virtually indistinguishable in appearance because The color of the nose is usually not preserved. What distinguishes them from ordinary bullets is their greater length and one characteristic feature: if you take a knife and pick the bottom of the bullet, then the armor-piercing incendiary bullet will have a solid core, while other bullets will have lead. I note that the B-32 was produced throughout the war, and the B-30 for only 2 years, so virtually all armor-piercing bullets were B-32.

Tracer bullet T-30 and T-46. Green nose. Produced since 1932 and 1938, respectively. Contains lead core and tracer. Composition of the White Fire tracer: Barium Nitrate 67% Magnesium 23% Shellac 10%
Difference from ordinary bullets: in appearance - it is the back part of a cylindrical shape and the presence of a tracer - it is visible.
As follows from the composition, the incendiary substance for the B-32 and T-30(46) is almost the same, but in the B-32 the composition is covered with a shell and, as a rule, is preserved, while in the T-30(46) it usually rots. Because of this feature, they do not pose a great danger and even in a normal state they simply burn out in a fire... This applies only to Russian tracers.

Well, now about the most dangerous representative of the 7.62X54R family

How to distinguish an explosive bullet from others? First of all, this is the longest bullet the Russians have, its length is 4 cm. And if there are no 3 grooves on it, and there is lead on the bottom side, have no doubt, this is a sighting-incendiary bullet. Under no circumstances should you disassemble this bullet or shake it while listening to the firing pin dangling inside - problems may arise. This applies to both fired bullets and bullets in the cartridge.

Well, of course, don’t heat it up, because... for example, an armor-piercing incendiary bullet in a fire will work or not, because... it has a different principle of operation from compression upon impact with the armor, and the explosive one has a normal fuse.

The bullets described here are not the only representatives of the 7.62X54R. There were several more modifications, but they did not have significant differences from those described, they were not in service for long, and the likelihood of their discovery is close to zero.

7.92 mm cartridges

Bullet with increased armor penetration (SmK H). Red primer (sometimes the paint fades and the color can be almost orange), the bullet is all black. Contains a tungsten carbide core. The cartridge contains a special (powerful) gunpowder, round in shape, unusual for the Germans. Doesn't pose any danger.

Now about bullets that pose a real danger.
The bullets listed below, except for the armor-piercing incendiary phosphorus bullet, are classified as explosive and therefore officially shooting at people is prohibited. Therefore, the main type of occurrence: debris of Luftwaffe aircraft. But sometimes they are caught on the ground.
In response to the creation of a sighting bullet by Stalin’s designers, or perhaps for their own fascist reasons, Hitler’s designers created a similar one, and then went into a rage and came up with an incendiary bullet on a different principle. White phosphorus! This is what came to their mind. For those who didn’t study chemistry at school, let me remind you once again: white phosphorus is a yellowish, waxy substance that instantly ignites upon contact with air.

Fortunately for the living, and therefore for the searchers, such cartridges with phosphorus are a rare find, and all this is said so that you are not too surprised when the cartridges piled up in a heap light up with a beautiful, droplet-splashing flame, and such cases do happen. It is impossible to distinguish them from the others; in appearance they look like an Ss bullet, maybe only a little longer.
Therefore, the general rule for handling German cartridges is. Found: there is no green or red ring - throw it far away and better into the water. Well, now about them.

In general, the Czechs are an interesting nation. Throughout the war they supplied the Germans with weapons, then they pulled out of the war in time and took part in the division of the German inheritance.

The Poles produced incendiary bullets based on phosphorus. These bullets are marked with a yellow ring around the primer, sometimes also with a yellow nose (not to be confused with our weighted bullets).

12.7 mm cartridges

Armor-piercing incendiary tracer BZT-44. The nose is purple and underneath is a red ring.
The bullet consists of a jacket, a short, armor-piercing core, a lead jacket and a tracer. It is similar to the 7.62 caliber BZT, only it does not have 3 belts, and the tracer is inserted into a special steel cup. The tracer of an unfired bullet is preserved better than that of 7.62 because It is large in size and the steel cup can produce good shards. That's all the differences.
The bullets listed above, if they can cause damage to a person, are only due to his own stupidity. But there are 2 more types of 12.7 mm bullets that can cause damage to a person simply if handled carelessly, hit with a shovel, for example.

Phosphorus armor-piercing incendiary bullet BZF-46. Yellow nose, under it - a black ring. Consists of a shell and an armor-piercing core. There is no incendiary substance between the armor-piercing core and the shell; it is located in a special cup behind the core. And in the glass there is white phosphorus. For those who got a C in chemistry, let me remind you that phosphorus is a white, waxy substance that spontaneously ignites upon contact with air. Unlike German phosphorus cartridges, where phosphorus is separated from the air only by a thin shell, which usually rots, the cup is preserved better. Therefore, the probability that the cartridge will ignite on its own is small, but with a strong impact or disassembly, the phosphorus will immediately ignite, forming many severe burns because it is very difficult to extinguish. Well, remember Vietnam, where the Americans used white phosphorus as a universal “fat burner” for the Vietnamese.

How to distinguish a phosphorus bullet from other 12.7 mm bullets when the markings are not visible? Firstly: when the jacket rots, there is a copper cap under it on the nose of the bullet. If for some reason it is not there, then there is always an annular chamfer on the spout, which is usually clearly visible. Secondly, as I already said, there were no ordinary bullets in the 12.7 mm caliber, so if you pick at the bottom of the bullet with a knife and there is lead there, then the bullet is most likely phosphorus.

Instant bullet MDZ-3. It is essentially a small projectile containing a fuse and filled with a folk explosive - hexogen.

It is easy to distinguish it from others; all bullets have a sharp nose, but this one has a cut off nose, covered with a membrane; if there is none, there is just a hole.

Heating it, let alone disassembling it, is strictly prohibited. Hexogen explodes with great force, in addition, from time to time it can explode without a fuse, from mechanical impact.

It should be remembered that fired 12.7 mm caliber bullets, as a rule, were not destroyed when they hit the ground, and the MDZ did not always work, so there is a possibility of finding bullets that passed through the bore.

Cartridge caliber 14.5 mm (14.5x114).
The cartridge was used for firing from anti-tank rifles of the Degtyarev PTRD system (single-shot) and the Simonov PTRS system (five-shot with automatic reloading). The cartridge is in service to this day.

The length of the cartridge is 156 mm, the length of the sleeve is 114 mm, the gunpowder is a cylinder with 7 channels. The wartime cartridge case is brass. The bullet casing is steel, clad with tombac. The main bullets are B-32 and BS-41, similar in design to the B-32 bullet of 7.62 mm caliber (B-32 with a steel core, and BS-41 with a metal-ceramic core). The bullet is secured into the case by pressing the neck of the case into a groove or protrusion on the bullet. On the bottom of the cartridges there is a marking indicating the factory and year of manufacture of the cartridges. The cartridge is quite rare. Sometimes found in armor-piercing positions.

Cartridges for signal pistols (rocket launchers)
Both the Red and former German armies widely used 26 mm flare guns. They were used for signaling, launching flares, and also by the Germans for combat purposes. The main ammunition was signal cartridges for night or day use. When searching, they often come across. Night-action cartridges have an expelling charge of black powder and a signal star that lights up at an altitude of 60-70 m with a red, green, yellow or white flame. Daytime cartridges have a colored smoke bomb instead of a star. The main difference between domestic and German rocket launcher cartridges is the material of the cartridge case. Domestic cartridges have a cardboard (folder) sleeve with a metal cap, while German cartridges have a sleeve made entirely of thin aluminum, on which markings are applied in multi-colored paint. In addition to signal cartridges, there are German parachute lighting cartridges. They have a long sleeve, marked on the sleeve "Fallschirleuchtpatrone". Inside the main sleeve there is a second, inner sleeve, a lighting star and a silk parachute. Rocket launcher cartridges do not pose much danger. Explosive charges and sprockets are usually wet, but if they hit a fire, the sprocket may shoot off or ignite. To make colored smoke bombs in daytime cartridges, dyes were used that are difficult to wash off the skin of the hands.

Hand grenade mod. 1914/30

RGD-33 hand grenade

Tactical and technical characteristics of the RGD-33 grenade:

They were equipped with pressed TNT; during the war they were often equipped with various surrogates (ammatol).
A grenade without a fuse poses no practical danger. With a fuse inserted into a grenade, it poses a danger when the grenade is shaken, moved, or heated. Attempts to knock the fuse out of a grenade are unacceptable - the fuse is equipped with mercury fulminate, which is sensitive to shock and friction, and the fuse usually sours tightly in the ignition tube.

If you find a grenade, hold it only by the body, avoiding loading the handle. You can determine the presence of an igniter by carefully sliding the ignition tube cover. Grenades with an inserted fuse are cocked (the fuse is not inserted into an uncocked grenade) and require careful handling. A characteristic sign of a grenade being cocked is a certain distance between the grenade body and the outer tube of the handle. For grenades with an inserted fuse, you cannot try to unscrew or pull back the handle, move the safety slide, you cannot break off the handle, you cannot hit the grenade and handle, you cannot drop or throw the grenade.

Quite often you come across fuses from RGD-33, colloquially called “pencil” due to their external similarity. The fuse is equipped with a sensitive and powerful explosive and poses a serious danger when struck, heated, or carried in pockets. When it hits a fire, it explodes violently, producing many small fragments.

Handmade F1 fan

Tactical and technical characteristics of the F-1 grenade:

F-1 grenades were filled with powdered, pressed, or flaked TNT; military-made grenades were used, filled with various surrogates and even black powder. In the initial period of the war, F-1 grenades were used with fuses of the Koveshnikov system, and in 1942 UZRG fuses began to be used. Koveshnikov's fuse was made of brass on lathes. It has a spring-loaded cap secured with a pin and a ring. A lever of a characteristic shape was soldered to the cap. The igniter is triggered when the cap is moved upward by a spring. In this case, the cap releases the ball that holds the firing pin in the cocked state. The firing pin is released and punctures the retarder capsule. The UZRG fuse is much simpler, cheaper and more technologically advanced than the Koveshnikov fuse; it is produced by stamping. In a somewhat modernized state, the UZRG fuse has survived to this day and is well known. The firing pin is held in it by a safety lever after the safety pin is removed. When the lever is released, the striker punctures the retarder capsule.

F-1 grenades are often found with both a fuse and a plastic plug inserted instead of the fuse. Grenades with a plug do not pose any practical danger, but can explode when heated. If you find an F-1 grenade with a fuse, you should pay attention to the presence and condition of the safety pin. You should not try to unscrew the fuse, since dried grenades have a yellow or greenish coating on the detonator capsule that is sensitive to friction. In addition, the fuses, especially the UZRGs, are tightly bound with rust in the threaded neck of the grenade. And in case of emergency, when removing from an excavation, you should hold the grenade with the Koveshnikov fuse, pressing the fuse cap on top with your finger, and with the UZRG fuse, pressing the lever to the body. When transporting found grenades to a safe place, it is necessary to secure the safety lever (if any) to the grenade body with wire or cord.

In addition to standard F-1 grenades, at the battlefields near Leningrad there are so-called “blockade grenades” with a body without a notch, made from 50-mm mines without a shank. Fuses - Koveshnikov and UZRG, inserted through a plastic adapter ring. In terms of combat properties and handling, they are similar to the standard F-1.

RG-42 hand grenade

RPG-40 anti-tank hand grenade

The safety mechanism is a folding bar with a wire needle, which fixes the striking mechanism in the stowed position. The folding bar is fixed on the handle with a safety pin with a tongue made of braid. Before throwing a grenade, the safety pin is pulled out by the braid and the folding bar on the handle is held by hand. When throwing a grenade, the hinged bar separates, removes the needle and releases the firing mechanism. When a grenade hits an obstacle, an inertial load moves in the handle, which releases the firing pin. The grenade explodes regardless of where it hits the obstacle. To trigger a grenade without a safety needle, simply drop the grenade on the ground. Failures in operation occurred due to contamination, freezing and deformation of the impact mechanism located in the handle. It is prohibited to touch a grenade that is thrown but does not go off - the impact mechanism can be triggered even by moving the grenade.

Weight RPG-40-1200 g.
They were equipped with cast TNT.
During search operations, RGD-33 is found much less frequently. They were used on all fronts, especially in the initial period of the war. Quite often you come across separate cases without handles. When you find an RPG-40 with a handle, you should first of all look for the presence of a folding bar with a safety needle. After this, carefully open the cover of the ignition socket and make sure that there is no detonator. A grenade without a detonator poses no practical danger. If a grenade with an inserted detonator, and even more so a thrown and unexploded grenade with a missing flap and safety needle, poses a danger when shaken, struck, and even when moved from the place of discovery. Such a grenade should not be removed from the place of discovery, and the location of the grenade should be marked with a noticeable sign.

RPG-41 anti-tank hand grenade
With the advent of tanks with armor thicker than 20 mm at the front in 1941, the RPG-40 grenade ceased to satisfy the troops and the RPG-41 grenade was developed. The grenade differed from the RPG-40 in its increased explosive mass and larger body diameter. The remaining parts of the grenade are similar to the RPG-40. Handling the RPG-41 grenade is similar to handling the RPG-40.
In addition to the officially adopted RPG-41, a grenade was developed on the Leningrad Front, also under the designation RPG-41, colloquially called the “Voroshilov kilogram” (“VK”). It was an enlarged RGD-33, from which the handle, the fuse valve, its tube, extended by 50 mm, the lower part of the body (flange) and the fuse itself were used. The grenade was developed and used during the initial period of the war and was manufactured only at that time. The mass of explosive in a grenade is 1 kg. The grenade is rare and has not been officially adopted for service. These grenades are found in the area of ​​Nevsky Piglet, Pulkovo, Mga, Lyuban, Luga. The "Voroshilov kilogram" should be dealt with in the same way as with the RGD-33 with an inserted fuse.

RPG-43 anti-tank hand grenade

If an RPG-43 is discovered during search operations, pay attention to the presence of a safety pin in the form of a ring and a cotter pin,
locking lever. Trying to unscrew the handle to remove the fuse is unacceptable. It is impossible to determine from the appearance of a grenade whether a fuse is inserted into it. Therefore, it should be treated like a grenade with a fuse. An RPG-43 with a fuse is dangerous. Particular care should be taken with grenades in which the handle has rotted and the stabilizer cap has fallen off. Such grenades should be left at the place of discovery, marked with a clearly visible sign. Avoid blows along the body.

Grenades of the former German army and its allies

German hand grenade M 24

M-24s were equipped with cast, flake, granular TNT, picric acid, ammatol and other surrogate explosives. Grenades loaded with picric acid usually have a wide gray stripe on the bottom of the body.
The M24s encountered during the search are, as a rule, completely rusted, with rotten handles. It is impossible to determine visually without disassembling whether there is a detonator capsule in a grenade. Attempts to unscrew the grenade and remove the detonator may result in an explosion. The main danger of an M 24 grenade with an inserted detonator is when disassembled or when it falls into a fire. You should also be careful with garnets loaded with picric acid - in the presence of moisture, it can form friction-sensitive compounds with metals.
In addition to high-explosive fragmentation grenades, the German army was armed with smoke grenades (Stielhandgranate 24 Nb.), which differed in appearance from the M 24 by smoke exit holes in the lower part of the body located along the perimeter of the collar, a white stripe and the letters “Nb.” on the body.

German hand grenade M 39

Performance characteristics:

M 39 grenades were filled with powdered and flaked TNT, ammatol and various surrogate explosives.

Incendiary bottles

The bottle with the KS mixture was an ordinary bottle with a yellow-green or dark brown liquid, on top of which a small layer of water or kerosene was poured to protect it from air. The bottle is sealed with a rubber stopper and the stopper is wrapped with wire and insulating tape. Mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 are a viscous yellowish liquid. It is poured into ordinary bottles with a capacity of 0.5-0.75 liters and sealed with a cork stopper. To ignite the mixture, an igniter ampoule (or a special igniter) is placed inside the bottle or attached to the outside.
Of the incendiary bottles, the most dangerous are bottles with a mixture of COP. If such a bottle is damaged, the mixture will spontaneously ignite in air. A rupture may occur with scattering of burning liquid droplets. It is quite difficult to put it out.

The CS liquid is extinguished with sand, earth, and water. If the liquid is not sufficiently covered with soil, or after the water has dried, it can spontaneously ignite again. Drops of CS that get on the skin cause severe, poorly healing burns. In addition, the COP mixture is poisonous. If you suspect that the found bottle contains a mixture of KS, in case of emergency, very carefully, so as not to break the bottle or break the tightness of the cork, remove the bottle from the excavation. Move the removed bottle to a safe place and bury it in the ground. This is best done with rubber gloves. It is necessary to ensure that there are no flammable materials or ammunition near the place where the bottle is buried.
Bottles containing mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 may pose a hazard if the bottles and igniter ampoules break at the same time. Mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 may cause skin irritation.

In addition to incendiary bottles, there were AJ ampoules - glass or tin balls for throwing from ampoules or for dropping from airplanes. They are very rare. They were filled with a mixture of KS. Tin ampoules usually have a rotten shell and the mixture has long leaked out. Such ampoules do not pose any danger. Handling glass ampoules is similar to handling bottles of CS mixture.

Gun grenades

Grenades, thrown with the help of the main weapon of fighters, were widespread during the First World War. Then these grenades were improved, the tactics of their use were worked out. By the beginning of World War II, the leadership of the Red Army considered rifle grenades to be ineffective and their production was greatly reduced. In the German army, rifle grenades were quite widespread, they were used throughout the Second World War, and there was a large range of ammunition.

Domestic ammunition

Dyakonov rifle grenade launcher and ammunition for it

The radius of scattering of fragments is up to 300 m. During search operations, it is very rare in battlefields during the initial period of the war. The grenade is dangerous when heated and when trying to rotate the spacer ring.
The VPG-40 anti-tank grenade is practically never encountered during search operations. The grenade launcher was fired using a special blank cartridge. It has a shaped charge and a bottom inertial fuse. If there is a suspicion that the grenade has been fired, then moving it from its place is very dangerous. It should be left at the place of discovery, marked with a clearly visible sign.

VPGS-41

There are no additional devices for shooting (mortars). required. Used during the initial period of the war. Rarely encountered during search operations.

It is a cylindrical body with stiffening ribs. There is a ballistic cap at the front of the body, a fuse and a cleaning rod are screwed into the back. A stabilizer shank is attached to the cleaning rod. It had a shaped charge and a simple inertial fuse. In the stowed position, the fuse is fixed with a pin (like a hand grenade), the stabilizer is in the forward position (near the fuse), and the detonator cap is usually absent. It is impossible to determine by appearance whether a detonator cap is inserted. To fire, a detonator cap was inserted into the grenade, the grenade was inserted into the barrel of the rifle with a ramrod, the rifle was loaded with a blank cartridge, the safety pin was removed and the shot was fired. When fired, the stabilizer shank slid down the ramrod and was fixed on it in the rear position. The grenade was discontinued due to insufficient accuracy and firing range and a large number of accidents. A spent grenade or a grenade without a safety pin is dangerous. You cannot remove it from the excavation by the tail (ramrod).

30 mm rifle grenade launcher and ammunition for it

The “cigarette” of the head fuse protrudes from the front of the grenade. The grenade body is made of steel, the head fuse of early releases is made of aluminum alloy, and of later releases is made of steel with a plastic “cigarette”. The bottom fuse of early releases is made of aluminum alloy, later releases are made of plastic. The grenade can be used as a rifle and as a hand grenade. It is equipped with two fuses - a head, instant action, and a bottom, remote action. When using the grenade as a hand grenade, the bottom of the grenade is unscrewed and the lanyard is pulled out.

The remote retarder is ignited by a grating igniter and the grenade explodes after 4-4.5 seconds. When firing a grenade from a rifle grenade launcher, the main fuse is the AZ 5075 type head fuse. The bottom fuse works as a self-destructor. The AZ 5075 fuse is an instantaneous, non-safety type, used for 30-mm rifle-hand fragmentation grenades and over-caliber cumulative mines for 37-mm anti-tank guns. It has small dimensions and a strongly protruding drummer (“cigarette”). When a shot is fired, the inertial safety catch is lowered, the elastic steel band unwinds and releases the firing pin, which is held in flight by a counter-safety spring. When hitting an obstacle, the firing pin pierces the detonator cap and the ammunition explodes.

The fuse, which is cocked, has a very high sensitivity even to pressure on the “cigarette” of the fuse.
It occurs quite often during search operations. The main danger of this ammunition is that it is impossible to determine by its appearance whether it has been fired (with the fuse cocked) or not. A cocked grenade is very sensitive to the impact of the fuses on the firing pin. If a grenade is found, in case of emergency, you can carefully remove it from the excavation, being careful not to hit or press the firing pin of the head fuses and carefully move it to a safe place. The grenade should not be shaken or thrown on the ground.

Small and large armor-piercing rifle grenades G. Pzgr. and gr. G. Pzgr.

Armor-piercing rifle grenade mod. 1943 - in purpose and principle of operation it is the same type as a large armor-piercing grenade, differing from it in the shape of the body and the design of the fuse. The length of the grenade is about 195 mm. The body is made of steel. Handling found grenades is similar to handling other armor-piercing grenades for a rifle grenade launcher.

Artillery (mortar) mines

Domestic ammunition

Fragmentation mines for the domestic 82-mm battalion mortar (models 36, 37, 41, 43) are quite common. Six- and ten-fin mines with a screw-on shank were used. They were painted green (protective) color. In addition to fragmentation mines, smoke mines were used, which are marked with a black stripe on the body under the centering thickening. M-1, MP-82, M-2 fuses were used.

M-1 fuse - instant action, non-safety type. In addition to 82-mm mines, 50-mm mines were also used for four-fin mines. It has a safety cap under which there is a protruding aluminum cylinder (“cigarette”) - an instant action striker. The safety cap was only allowed to be screwed before lowering the mine into the mortar barrel. When the fuse is cocked, a red stripe appears on the “cigarette”. Mines discovered during a search without a safety cap (with an exposed “cigarette”) are dangerous - the striker is very sensitive to even light pressure.

Domestic mines for the 37 mm spade mortar, 107 mm mountain pack mortar, and 160 mm mortar are extremely rare. According to the principle of operation, these mines are similar to those described above and are equipped with the same fuses.

Ammunition of the former German army

Ground artillery ammunition

Domestic ammunition

37 mm shells (shots) for anti-aircraft guns. They are rare. They have a cylindrical brass sleeve with a rim and a groove for the ejector.

45 mm shells (shots) for anti-tank and tank guns. Very common. Cylindrical brass sleeve with rim.

The shells are high-explosive and armor-piercing incendiary tracer. A high-explosive fragmentation projectile is a steel cylinder with a fuse screwed into the head. The copper guide band is located approximately in the middle of the projectile. Equipped with cast TNT. Fuzes of the KTM type (team makers, membrane) - head impact fuses with two settings for instantaneous and inertial action, semi-safety type. When released from the factory, the fuse was set to inertial action (with the mounting cap screwed on); to set the fuse to instantaneous action, the mounting cap was screwed off before firing. A fired projectile (with traces of rifling on the driving belt) can pose a danger when the projectile is moved from the place of discovery.

An armor-piercing incendiary tracer projectile is a heavy bullet-shaped projectile of small size. There is a ballistic cap on the warhead, which usually rots and the projectile is usually found with the warhead, as it were, “chopped off.” The leading belt is located at the rear of the projectile. Filled with high-power explosives. A fuze is screwed into the bottom of the projectile with a tracer screwed into the back in a conical aluminum casing. MD-5 fuses were used - bottom fuses of inertial action with a delay, of a non-safety type. The fuse is simple in design and has a high sensitivity to impact. It is screwed into the bottom of the projectile, sealed with a lead gasket and non-drying mastic based on red lead. It has a fixed firing pin (needle) and a movable firing pin with an igniter primer, which is held until fired by a fuse made of a split brass tube. When fired, the safety is lowered, the firing pin is released and the igniter primer becomes accessible to the firing pin, while the firing pin is not held in place by anything and simply dangles inside, so a cocked fuse is especially dangerous and explodes even when shaken. The fuse is made of sufficient quality, the internal parts are made of non-ferrous metals, nickel-plated and do not become corroded after being in the ground for half a century. Before the start of the war and during its initial period, a huge number of shells equipped with MD-5 were manufactured. During the war, due to the dangers of handling, this fuze was withdrawn from production, but not removed from service.

45-mm armor-piercing incendiary-tracer shells pose the greatest danger, especially if there are rifling marks on the leading belt. The fuse of an unexploded spent shell is extremely sensitive to any movement and can explode even if the ammunition is tilted. The projectiles have thick walls and are made of alloy hardened steel, so they explode with great force and fragments. If you find a spent shell, you should not even take it out of the excavation, but should mark its location with a clearly visible sign.

57 mm shells (shots) for anti-tank guns. They are rare. The design, types of fuses and handling are similar to 45 mm rounds. After the MD-5 fuse was removed from production, the MD-7 fuse was used instead for armor-piercing shells. It differs from the MD-5 in the presence of a counter-safety spring, a counter-safety circle made of foil on the igniter capsule and an inertial circle for adjusting the deceleration when hitting an obstacle. All armor-piercing shells should be treated with extreme caution.

Ammunition of the former German army

In addition to the armor-piercing shell, fragmentation tracer shells with an AZ39 fuse were used - a head-type, impact-action, non-safety type. The fuse is designed for 37 and 50 mm fragmentation shells for tank and anti-tank guns. It has centrifugal cocking - when the projectile rotates, centrifugal stops release the fuse, and the fuse, under the influence of centrifugal force, releases the firing pin. Cocking occurs a few meters from the muzzle. The shells are filled with high-power explosives. The found shells are dangerous.

47 mm and 50 mm shells (shots). They are very rare. The design and handling are similar to 37 mm shells.

Artillery shells and shots of medium and large calibers.

Domestic ammunition

Ammunition of the former German army

Handling unfired and unexploded spent German shells is similar to handling domestic ammunition.

Missiles (PC)

Missiles were actively used by both Wehrmacht and Soviet Army units.

The fundamental difference between rockets and other types of weapons is in the method of movement - reactive. Therefore, rockets contain a jet engine.

An entire PC is a very rare find, and the number of types of PCs in service is in the dozens, so this article will only cover the most basic ones.

USSR
The Red Army had two main types of PCs in service: RS-82, also known as M-8, and PC-132, also known as M-13.

M-8
It is a classic rocket: the warhead is in front. It contains 375-581 tons of explosive. In early PC releases, the warhead had notches to improve fragmentation, but these notches were later abandoned. Behind the warhead there is a jet engine, fuel: 7 cylindrical, single-channel bombs on the first modifications, and 5 bombs, but larger, on later ones. Caps with black powder are installed in front and behind the combustion chamber to improve ignition. Ignition occurs using a special device, through a nozzle. M-8s were launched from the BM-8-48 installation. You can release 48 PCs at a time.
The first modifications of the PC had 4 guide pins, but later they abandoned 2. By the way, it was this modification (with 4 pins) that the Germans copied in 1943 and used them against the Soviet troops.

Aviation RS-82/132 were equipped with remote tubes AGDT-a, TM-49, TM-24a. When firing at ground targets, use GVMZ and AM contact fuses.

Germany.

At different times, the Wehrmacht had several types of PCs in service. In 1941, a 158.5 mm chemical projectile was adopted for service; later, a 280 mm high-explosive and 320 mm incendiary mine were developed, although in 1942 they were withdrawn from service. In 1942, the 210 mm high-explosive mine was adopted. The latter was rarely used in the European part of the USSR and will not be considered.

The mine was originally created as a means of chemical warfare. The use of the chemical part entailed the adoption of an unusual layout. Just in case there was no chemical war, a fragmentation mine was also created.
The main difference between “NbWrf-41” and the domestic PC was a different method of stabilization. If the M-8/13 was stabilized in flight using a stabilizer, then the NbWrf -41 was stabilized by rotation like a projectile. This was achieved by the fact that the gases driving the PC were released at an angle to the axis from a special turbine in the middle of the projectile. The fuel was 7 bombs of diglycol gunpowder.
Well, the unusual layout was that the warhead, containing 2 kg of explosives, was located behind the missile part, this achieved better spraying of toxic substances. Because of this, the shells had little high-explosive effect. According to the recollections of veterans, one could hide from a volley of these PCs in any trench, which cannot be said about our “Katyusha”: it was hit, it was hit.
You need to remember this thing. The warhead is at the back, and the fuse is also at the back. Fuse - Bd.Z.Dov. Unfortunately, there is not a lot of data on it, but it is known that it still had a fuse, but it is better not to check it.

These PCs were launched from a setup consisting of 6 tubular guides mounted on a carriage. Hence the name - 6-barreled mortar.

280\32О rocket mines.

The warhead body was stamped from thin steel. If the mine was a high-explosive design, then its caliber was 280 mm, the warhead contained 50 kg of explosives. If it was incendiary, then its caliber was 320mm and the mine carried 50 kg of oil.

The engine was installed the same as in the NbWrf -41, only it was located in the classic place - at the rear. Because the caliber of the warhead was larger than the caliber of the missile unit, the mine resembled a huge amphora with a long neck.
The 320-mm incendiary mine had a Wgr 50 or 427 fuse. The firing pin was held in it only by a pin, which was removed before launch.
The 280-mm high-explosive mine had a WgrZ 50 fuse; it contained a simple centrifugal fuse.
Mines were launched from wooden caps installed in a row on a special stand.

Despite the fact that the mines had a good high-explosive and incendiary effect, due to the fact that they had an engine unified with the NbWrf-41, the mines had a short range (about 2 km). This made them vulnerable to ground fire , which was the reason for its removal from service in 1942...
Well, just for reference: fancy roses left from rocket chambers during an explosion. PCs have probably come across to everyone.
Our PCs had the thread inside the chamber, while the “Germans” had it outside; in addition, the “Germans” sometimes have a front bottom left. These features can help in determining “who and whom on this earth”

Anti-personnel mines

Domestic mines

Simplified mine fuse (MUF) - tension (with a P-shaped pin) or push (with a T-shaped pin) action. Used in anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, improvised explosive devices, and booby traps. Simple in design and manufacture. It consists of a body (metal or plastic), a firing pin, a mainspring and a P or T-shaped pin. In the firing position, the pin is inserted into the lower hole of the firing pin. The spring is in a compressed state. When the pin is pulled, the firing pin is released and, under the action of a spring, pierces the igniter primer, which causes the detonator primer to explode. The fuse body was made of painted, galvanized or tombac-clad steel, from solid-drawn tubes with a diameter of 12 mm and stamped from sheets, from rifle casings, from black or brown bakelite. To detonate the explosive charge, an MD-2 fuse is screwed into the MUV - detonator cap No. 8 combined with an igniter primer. The fuse is inserted into the mine socket, and a tension wire is tied to the MUV pin. When the wire touches the pin, it is pulled out of the fuse and the mine explodes. Actuation force 0.5-1 kg. The destructive radius of POMZ-2 is 25 m, the radius of dispersion of lethal fragments is up to 200 m. It could be installed with one or two branches of guy wires.

OZM UVK
Universal ejector chamber. Used in combination with any domestic or captured artillery ammunition. Very rare. Used as part of controlled minefields. It is a steel cylindrical chamber with a diameter of 132 mm and a height of 75 mm, inside which there is an expelling charge, an electric igniter, a moderator and a detonator. An ordinary artillery mine or shell is screwed to the chamber. The mine is installed in the ground with the camera facing down. When an electric current is applied to the contacts of the electric igniter, an expelling charge is triggered, throwing the artillery ammunition upward. After the moderator burns out, the ammunition explodes at a height of about 1-5 m. The radius of dispersion of fragments depends on the artillery ammunition used in the mine. It occurs very rarely during prospecting operations. Poses a danger when impacted by UVK or when heated. If discovered, if absolutely necessary, the mine can be dug up and carefully moved to a safe place. Don't pull the wire.

Mines of the former German army

The mine is a massive smooth cylinder with a diameter of 102 mm, a height of 128 mm, painted gray-green. The top cover of the mine has a central neck for attaching a fuse and four screws. Three small screws close the sockets for detonator caps, the fourth screw (larger) closes the neck for filling the mine with explosive. The mine is made with high quality and is sealed against moisture. The mine consists of an outer cup and the mine itself. Inside there is an explosive charge (500 g of TNT), along the walls of the mine there are ready-made fragments - 340 steel balls (shrapnel) with a diameter of 9 mm. Inside the explosive bomb there are three channels for placing detonator caps No. 8. The mine itself is inserted into the outer cup, from which it is fired using an expelling charge. A tube runs through the center of the mine, which serves to hold all parts of the mine together and transfer fire from the fuse to the expelling charge. When the fuse is triggered, it, through the moderator, transfers the fire impulse to the expelling charge. The expulsion charge fires the mine upward into their outer shell and ignites the retardants. After the moderator burns out, the fire is transferred to the detonator caps and at a height of about 2-5 m a mine explodes with scattering of balls. Due to the mine being triggered at a certain height, it has a large radius of destruction - 80 m. The mine could be installed with a push and pull action, depending on the fuse used. There were modifications of the “spring mine” with the ability to be installed as non-removable. In addition to the upper one, such mines also had a lower socket for an additional fuse.

German mine fuses are made of high quality from non-ferrous metals. They are little susceptible to corrosion and therefore the fuses operate reliably even after half a century from the moment of installation. Fortunately, S-mine has powder retarders, which are most likely damp by now and the likelihood of the mine triggering normally is low, but there are exceptions to every rule and you shouldn’t tempt fate by trying to disassemble the mine. When discovering German mines with fuses inserted, special care must be taken. If the fuse is screwed into a mine and does not have a safety pin, you should insert a nail or a piece of wire with a diameter of 2.5 mm into the hole for the safety pin and secure it. After this, you need to check whether the mine has an additional lower fuse for non-removability. If there is no additional fuse, in case of emergency, you can remove the mine from the ground and carefully, without jolts or impacts, move it to a safe place. If there is an additional fuse, do not remove the mine from the ground, but mark its location with a clearly visible sign.

Anti-tank mines

Domestic mines

During search operations, a mine is very rarely encountered. Do not attempt to unscrew the plug and remove the fuse. The found mine must be carefully moved to a safe place without hitting the top cover and without turning the mine upside down.

During search operations, the mine is found more often than all other domestic anti-tank mines, but not because of its mass use, but due to the good preservation of the metal casing. If a mine is detected, you should not open the valve and look to see if the fuse is inserted into the mine. Such a mine should be treated as if it had a fuse. Do not attempt to remove the fuse or open the body of the mine. If absolutely necessary, carefully move the found mine to a safe place, avoiding any blows to the body.

Mines of the former German army

TMi-42 and TMi-35

TMi-42 differs from TMi-35 (in a steel case) in the smaller size of the pressure cover. The main fuse is inserted into the central hole in the pressure cap and closed with a screw plug. The mine has lower and side sockets for additional fuses when set to non-removable. Mine weight 10 kg, charge weight 5 kg. TMi-43 differs from TMi-42 in the design and shape of the pressure cover. The pressure cap is corrugated and is screwed onto the central neck of the mine after installing the fuse.

Found in battlefields after 1942. Handling mines is similar to handling TMi-35 - make sure that the mine is not set to non-removable and, in case of emergency, move it to a safe place, avoiding hitting the pressure cover. Do not attempt to unscrew the fuse plug or pressure cap.

During search operations, a mine is very rarely encountered. The wooden casing of the mines found usually rots. What remains are explosive checkers and a checker with an inserted fuse or simply with a detonator sticking out. Do not attempt to remove the fuse or detonator from the bomb. If absolutely necessary, carefully move such a checker, without touching the fuse, to a safe place.

During search operations, a mine is encountered very rarely. If found, special attention should be paid to the integrity of the shear checks (wires). If the shear wires are not twisted on the mine cover or are severely damaged by corrosion, the mine should not be touched, its location should be marked with a visible sign. If the pins are in good condition and are twisted onto the mine cover, in case of emergency, you can carefully, avoiding shocks and blows, remove the mine from the ground and turn it upside down and move it to a safe place. Attempts to dismantle the mine are unacceptable.

In addition to standard anti-personnel and anti-tank weapons, homemade mines and field mines made by the troops were quite widely used. The simplest mine or landmine was a demolition bomb or a standard charge with a standard fuse attached. Handling such mines is similar to handling standard mines with a similar fuse.

Domestic field land mines were used with MUV or VPF fuses. The field landmine fuse (HFF) is used to construct homemade mines, booby traps, etc. It consists of a body with a clamp for attaching the fuse to various objects, a firing pin, a mainspring, and a collet for holding the firing pin in the cocked position (using a swivel joint with the firing pin head ), a safety cotter pin (after installing the landmine, the cotter pin is pulled out of the shelter with a cord), a fuse with an igniter primer and a detonator. Triggered when the collet is pulled up or tilted in any direction. The force required to pull the collet up is 4-6.5 kg, for tilting in any direction is 1-1.5 kg.

Quite rarely, delayed-action mines with time, chemical or electrical fuses were used. They were usually used to undermine any buildings or structures, bridges, roads. They usually have a significant explosive charge (from 3-5 kg ​​to 500-1000 kg) and several different fuses for reliable operation. During search operations, such mines are practically never encountered, but if there is a suspicion of the presence of such a mine, then search operations should be stopped and sappers called.

I I - period before 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition remaining from the World War had already been exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then it was occupied by Krasnov’s White Guard army.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 pounds of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as some finished cartridges.
So Ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC Rus.-Balt plant acc. association of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Revel, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet times the Taganrog Combine Plant.) and by November 1918, the productivity of this plant increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N E. "How the Revolution Fought")

“On January 3 (1919), the allies saw the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog already revived and put into operation, where they made cartridges, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel silver shell, filled cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full operation. (Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov “The All-Great Don Army”) In the Krasnodar Territory and in the Urals, cartridges marked D.Z.
Most likely this marking means “Donskoy Plant” in Taganrog

Simbirsk, which was under construction, was under threat of capture. In the spring of 1918 The evacuation of the St. Petersburg Cartridge Plant to Simbirsk began. To establish the production of cartridges, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk in July 1919.
In 1919, the plant began production, and in 1922, the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed “Plant named after Volodarsky.”

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. A part of the shell plant, located in the premises of the former Singer plant, was allocated for it. The remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. Since the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to remake foreign cartridges, and in November 1920 the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 The production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association “Main Directorate of Military Industry of the USSR”, which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, except Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new workshops were built south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and from 1940 the Klimovsky plant No. 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It included the following plants: Ulyanovsk No. 3, Podolsk No. 17, Tula No. 38, Experienced Patr. plant (Maryina Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red Equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

The markings of Soviet-made cartridges remain mainly with a protruding imprint.

At the top is the number or name of the plant, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

Cartridges from the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were manufactured. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919 -30 puts the name of the plant (S, U, ZV) below.

In 1930, the spherical bottom of the sleeve was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing the Maxim machine gun. The protruding marking is located along the edge of the bottom of the cartridge case. It was only in the 1970s that cartridges began to be marked with an embossed imprint on a flat surface closer to the center.

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

It is very rare to find shells from the Lugansk plant with the additional designation +. Most likely, these are technological designations and the cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges marked No. 50, but it is more likely that this is a vague mark No. 60

Perhaps, at the end of the thirties, cartridges or cartridges were produced at the Moscow Shot Foundry No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The case for the ShKAS machine gun, unlike an ordinary rifle case, has, in addition to the factory number and year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS case and a red primer were used for firing only from synchronized aircraft machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a supermachine gun Kalashnikov Magazine No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased from the USA and other countries 7.62x54 cartridges, which are found on the battlefields of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 and the Second World War. It is likely that pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

In the 1920-30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, producing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940

During World War I, Germany used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

During the civil war, Spain received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that at first Soviet-made cartridges were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

The English company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994." Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12g.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The 7.62x54 cartridge was produced in the 20-40s in other countries for commercial purposes:

It is possible that some of the foreign ammunition listed above could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the “people's militia” in the initial period of the Second World War. Also now often found during archaeological research of WWII battle sites in Soviet positions are casings and cartridges produced in the USA and England, ordered by Russia for World War I. The order was not completed on time and was already supplied to the White Army during the Civil War. After the end of the civil war, the remains of this ammunition ended up in warehouses, probably used by security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but they turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes, at battlefields, cartridge cases of a 7.7mm English rifle cartridge (.303 British) are found, which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked V - Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production were supplied under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old factory numbers were retained in the new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-established. The numbering of all cartridge production is given, since there is no accurate data on the range of products they produce.

According to B. Davydov, during the war, rifle cartridges were produced in factories 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This mark is probably a product produced by the Podolsk plant during the period of its resumption of work.
There may be other designations. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the poorly readable mark of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it has been possible to designate the month of manufacture of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has this marking.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in cartridge production remained in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzan-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze -No. 60.

The markings of rifle cartridges from this period of production remain primarily with a raised imprint. At the top is the plant number, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

G = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, I = 1955, K = 1956.

After WWII, the 7.62 caliber cartridge was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries. Designation options are possible

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting versions.

Modern names and some of the commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

The designs and characteristics of various bullets for 7.62 caliber cartridges are quite well presented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only the color designations of bullets are given according to the “Handbook of Cartridges...” of 1946.

Most of the above information was provided by the director of the local history museum of the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , who has been studying the history of small arms and ammunition for many years.
The museum contains a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the area, military operations in the area during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and anyone interested. T museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, I provide the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for the Krnka, Baranova rifle
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation of the third year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations before 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Made by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.

We often find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will look at the markings of cartridges, which are located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Let's look at some types and markings of Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges from 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts using dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left and right cells are the year of production, the top is the month, and the bottom is the plant designation.

• In Fig. 1. – G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig. 2. – Bello and Selye, Prague.
• Figure 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
• Figure 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Fig. 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.

Later Hungarian ones from the 1930s and 40s have some differences. Figure 6. - Chapel Arsenal, year of manufacture below. Fig. 7. – Budapest. Fig. 8. – Veszprem military plant.

Germany, imperialist war.

The German marking of cartridge cases from the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conditional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is extruded; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the capsule.

At the top there is the marking S 67, in different versions: together, separately, with a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are reversed, or the arrangement of all divisions is completely reversed.

Fascist Germany.

Cases and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many variations, because cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Fig. 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top is the letter P with numbers, at the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In Figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Fig. 18 we see capsules presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top – Z, at the bottom the month of manufacture, on the left and right – the year. There is an option where “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber at the bottom is 7.92.

• In Fig. 19-23 German cartridges G. Genshov and Co. in Durlya;
• Fig. 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Figure 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.

More options for Polish-made cartridges.

• Fig. 27 - Skarzysko-Kamienna;
• Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.

The marks on the Mosin rifle cartridges are not depressed, but convex. At the top there is usually the letter of the manufacturer, at the bottom - the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 – Lugansk plant;
• Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
• Figure 32 – Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Figure 33 – Tula plant;
• Figure 34 – Russian plant;
• Fig 35 – Moscow;
• Rice 36 – Russian-Belgian;
• Figure 37 – Riga;
• Figure 38 – Leningradsky;
• Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 – different factories in Russia.

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass-produced small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is a machine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it was not created by Hugo Schmeisser. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip.” And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone except those who were in the war. According to movies, the “Schmeissers” could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our soldiers. In addition, when watching these films, the viewer got the impression that all the personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War were armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass-produced small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from the hip, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, carrying out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunner unit, in which there are soldiers armed with repeating rifles, is clearly suicide, since simply no one would reach the trenches.

Dispelling the myth: MP-40 automatic pistol

This Wehrmacht small weapon in WWII is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. Why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly attached to him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned the patent for the magazine that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of the MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the magazine receiver. When these machine guns ended up as trophies among the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly believed that the author of this model of small arms was, naturally, Schmeisser. This is how this nickname stuck to the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. Thus, in infantry units, only battalion, company and squad commanders were supposed to have MP-40s. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Nobody armed the infantry with them en masse, either in 1941 or after. According to archives, in 1941 the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass-produced weapon of World War II. In general, during the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were conscripted into the Wehrmacht units.

Why weren't the infantry armed with MP-40s?

Despite the fact that experts subsequently recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of World War II, very few of the Wehrmacht infantry units had it. This is explained simply: the sighting range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This is despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), the sighting range of which was 800 m for group targets. targets and 400 m for singles. If the Germans had fought with such weapons as they showed in Russian films, they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would have simply been shot, as if in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the move "from the hip"

The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, having first unfolded the butt. In addition, long bursts were never fired from this machine gun, since it quickly heated up. Most often they fired in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single fire. Despite the fact that the tactical and technical characteristics indicate that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute, in practice this result has never been achieved.

Advantages of MP-40

This cannot be said that this small arms weapon was bad; on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts in our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular among criminals, and the price of such a machine gun is very high. And they are supplied there by “black archaeologists” who carry out excavations in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can you say about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its target range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, these Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with them. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

At the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht infantry units received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems for military testing. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army had more than one and a half million similar systems in service: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to Soviet soldiers, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized as the best and adopted. The rifle is equipped with a hammer-type impact mechanism. Designed to fire only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for targeted shooting at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to contamination, it was produced in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in quantities of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.

Now let's return to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have happened.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the “Schmeisser” familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a forend trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, it was heavier and had a long barrel. However, these Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine gun due to a lawsuit from ERMA, which claimed illegal copying of its patented design. The MP-41 small arms were used by Waffen SS units. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

Schmeisser developed the next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means “assault rifle” (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle in appearance, and in some technical characteristics, resembles (which appeared later) and is significantly different from the MP-40. Its aimed fire range was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even had the ability to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher. To fire from cover, the designer developed a special attachment that was placed on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon went into mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of the German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were supplied to elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, these Wehrmacht weapons were used in

Automatic rifles FG-42

These copies were intended for paratroopers. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The development of weapons was undertaken by the Rheinmetall company already during the war, when, after assessing the results of airborne operations carried out by the Wehrmacht, it became clear that the MP-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, disadvantages associated with low strength and stability during automatic shooting also emerged. In 1944, a modernized FG-42 rifle (model 2) was released, and model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when shooting, a bipod is attached under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed to fire at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now let's look at what types of pistols were in service with the German army. “Luger”, its second name “Parabellum”, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then they were replaced by the more reliable Walter.

This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9-mm cartridges; the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. The target range of the "Walter" is 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.

Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, there were about 80 thousand units of this weapon in the Wehrmacht. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous fire. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you press the top one, the shooting was carried out in single shots, and when you press the bottom one - in bursts. It was intended for 7.92x57 mm Mauser rifle cartridges, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and the tactics of their use was the Second World War.

The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have significantly simplified and reduced the cost of production of these weapons. Thus, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes had a negative impact on the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The aimed fire range was two kilometers. Work to improve this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These weapons of the Second World War were used with relative success at the initial stage to combat wedges, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, English Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank rifles “Panzerschrek”, “Ofenror”, as well as the famous “Faustpatrons”. The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to “pierce” 35 mm armor.

"Panzerschrek". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket gun. German designers equipped it with a shield that protected the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Rocket guns were extremely powerful weapons. “Panzerschreks” were weapons for group use and had a maintenance crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades for them were produced in 1943-1944.

Grenade launchers: “Faustpatron” and “Panzerfaust”

The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles were not up to the task, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could be used to equip the infantryman, operating on the “fire and throw” principle. The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered service in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (a smooth-bore seamless tube) and an over-caliber grenade. The impact mechanism and sighting device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

The Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, which houses the trigger mechanism; the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the grenade's flight speed. In total, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses to Soviet tanks. Thus, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of small arms units is not diminishing. The accumulated experience in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.