How it started. Grozny: bloody snow of New Year's Eve 129th motorized rifle regiment

November 1994

I am a colonel, serving the Fatherland, surviving on food rations and doing private driving on a “penny”, bought for $200 from a colleague who was in the Western Group of Forces. Every evening, after the service - from 22.00 to 03.00. I am in the position of senior officer of the educational work department of the Leningrad Military District, due to my official duties, dealing with personnel issues and studying the mood in the troops.

I have just returned from the Caucasus, where I was on a business trip as part of the Russian peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and law and order in South Ossetia. The armed conflict had already subsided; our units suffered virtually no losses. Apparently, the combat training of the Soviet army had an effect; the actions were of a well-coordinated, organized nature, and platoons, companies and battalions were commanded by officers who had served in Afghanistan.

The troops openly express dissatisfaction with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. Uniforms, food, fuel and ammunition are being stolen from army warehouses. Cases of attacks on sentries in order to seize weapons have become more frequent. In many units and formations, officers stopped going out for service, preferring to earn a living from businessmen. The armored vehicles remained motionless, the planes took to the skies only on combat duty.

Under these conditions, in the 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was located in the village of Kamenka near St. Petersburg, on the basis of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the formation of a unit began to be sent to the future war in Chechnya. There are not enough human resources, the platoon-company link is being supplemented from other parts of the Leningrad Military District. With difficulty, only one trained full-time motorized rifle battalion is recruited. We need snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, drivers, but they are not there.

Finally, the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment with a separate tank battalion and an artillery battalion attached to it was formed. The drill review of a unit ready to be sent to war is personally conducted by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel General S.P. Seleznev, an experienced and talented military leader. He knows well what lies ahead for these soldiers and officers, does not utter loud words, only asks if everything was received according to wartime norms. Two days later, the regiment leaves for Chechnya. There is no longer time for combat coordination. They went to Afghanistan after training, and even during the Great Patriotic War, formed units were given a month to prepare for combat before being sent to the front line. And here... yesterday a cook - today a grenade launcher. There is an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It's disgusting...

KamAZ of the district song and dance ensemble of the Leningrad Military District, by order of the educational work department, travels around small entrepreneurs, collecting donations to collect parcels to the Caucasus.

December 1994

An operational group of the combat control center for Leningrad Military District units located in the combat zone in Chechnya has been created at the headquarters. Composition of the group

12 people, divided into three shifts, daily. The combat control center is located next to the commander's office. Documents (with the exception of the working map of combat operations) are kept one day and are destroyed when handed over from one shift to another immediately after the report to Colonel General S.P. Seleznev.

Dudayev's army, without offering significant resistance, retreats

to Grozny. The set of parts of the Leningrad Military District is approaching New Year's Eve 1995.

Then the few surviving officers of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment will tell you that the regiment quickly entered the Chechen defense line on the outskirts of Grozny. The enemy offered no resistance and retreated to the city. Ours did not have ground spotters to communicate with aviation, and the pilots failed to report that the 129th infantry regiment reached the Chechen line ahead of the established time... As a result, aviation worked out the combat mission partially against its own troops, which, having withstood an air strike, were in armored combat formations entered Grozny. Our armored personnel carriers and tanks instantly burst into flames.

January 1995

The 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment spent the entire New Year's Eve in street battles. At dawn, the commander (Colonel Borisov) decided to gather the remaining forces into a single fist and stop the offensive. On January 1, the Central Bureau of the Leningrad Military District was feverishly looking for contact with parts of the district in Chechnya. The map showed the situation without changes when the regiment was stationed at the walls of Grozny.

He no longer stood - he crawled through the streets, littering them with the bodies of the dead and wounded. It was possible to contact the regiment only in the middle of the next day. The captain responded in a hoarse voice. I introduced myself and asked to report on the situation. In response, a three-story curse was heard, the captain began to shout that he had not seen anything like this in Afghanistan... I abruptly cut him off, saying that it was not the time to find out who fought and where.

An hour later, the regiment commander got in touch and reported that he had been gathering those who were alive for 24 hours, and the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment was not combat-ready due to the complete absence of command personnel at the platoon-company level and the massive death of soldiers. Losses in killed and wounded amounted to more than 50 percent; those remaining in the ranks took up defensive positions and are fighting in street battles.

After the commander’s report to Moscow about the losses suffered, an order came from there no later than January 7 to supplement the regiment with wartime specialists and bring them into battle. To Colonel General Seleznev’s objections that there were no trained specialists in the district, Moscow replied: find them. And again they started recruiting cooks and plumbers, retraining them to be machine gunners and snipers within a day... They hired everyone...

I decided to retire from the Armed Forces after 25 years of service. I wrote a report and began a different, non-military life. Behind were the best years of my life and bitter regret for what my army had been turned into. And unbearable pain for the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which has gone into eternity.

Episodes

At the end of January 2005, the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District summoned one of the staff colonels. “I can’t give orders,” the general began, “so I need to go on a business trip to Chechnya as a volunteer... Or find one of my other colleagues...” There were four colleagues, all of the same rank. Everyone, like the colonel himself, had either war experience behind them or liquidated the Chernobyl accident. Except for one officer who never traveled further than the outskirts of St. Petersburg and shone only on the headquarters floor.

It looked like he was going to Chechnya. But the “parquet” colonel balked, demanding that everyone draw lots. The one who was talking with the general took five pieces of paper, drew a cross on one and put it in his earflaps (hats were abolished at that time). Each of his colleagues drew his own fate. The cross went to the “parquet” guy, who changed his face and forced everyone to show their piece of paper: what if somewhere else the Chechen mark would be found... Before going to the deputy commander, they advised him to ask for a “warm” position upon his return from a business trip.

“Parquetny” flew to Mozdok, and stayed there for three months, without going to Chechnya itself, and called his subordinates to report to him even a hundred kilometers away. And everything worked out wonderfully for him. And he received an order for his courage, and took up the position of deputy in one of the military schools. And when the time came to say goodbye to the army, the necessary page in the biography allowed the hero to take a high position as a civil servant. True, for some reason he avoids his former colleagues...

Major Yuri Saulyak died from a mine. It would seem that with his considerable combat experience, any tripwire is visible from afar. But I didn’t notice this one, I was very tired - from battle to battle. Only they took Grozny... And the mine did not tear off the major’s leg or arm, nor ripped open his stomach - it hit him right in the head. Therefore, when they brought his headless body to Rostov, they identified the major from the documents that were in his pocket. But this was not enough to send him home. We contacted the commander of Saulyak, saying that his wife needed to fly in: what if someone else with the major’s documents stepped on a mine...

Friends decided differently. Saulyak's relatives were carefully questioned about whether he had a scar or a tattoo on his body. It turned out that the major’s appendicitis was cut out long before he was sent to Chechnya. “Come on,” they answered on the phone from Rostov, “even if not the wife, but someone who knew the deceased well will fly in for identification, then we’ll register the cargo-200.” One of the officers had to go from St. Petersburg to document the scar from appendicitis... Only after that did Major Saulyak return to his homeland in a closed zinc. But I could have spent who knows how long in the morgue...

In January 1995, a teacher from the Omsk Tank School called the CBU. This happened a few days after the New Year's assault on Grozny. So, they say, and so. My son, a tank driver, is serving in Chechnya... And opposite the son’s last name at the headquarters it says “Missing in Action”... The officer on duty in distant Omsk answered that there is no accurate information about the fate of the tanker. We only know that he did not leave the battle. Maybe the wounded man is lying somewhere. Or he makes his way to his own people. If only he didn't get captured...

And a week and a half later the call rang again at headquarters. “Thank you,” the teacher from Omsk said to the same officer, “I found my son. You’ll have to transport him there, he’s dead...”

After the first conversation, the teacher took leave for family reasons and went to Grozny. In the thick of the street fighting, he managed to get to his son’s comrades, who reported that the tanker had burned down along with the tank. But my father crawled to that tank. In the house that was nearby, an old Chechen woman said that she pulled out a burnt guy and buried him in her garden... The tankman’s father dug him up and went home with him to Omsk, literally dragging him on himself. There he lowered his son into the ground for the second time. And the staff reports remained “Missing in action.”

On the second day after the storming of Grozny, January 2, 1995, the commander of the Leningrad Military District received an order from the Minister of Defense: together with the commander of the division stationed in Kamenka, personally appear at each family of the officer and warrant officer who had just died, and give the children a New Year's gift - tangerines and sweets on behalf of the defense department...

Colonel General Sergei Seleznev, who was the deputy commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, shuddered at such blasphemy. He imagined how he would walk around Kamenka, completely dressed in mourning, and hand out tangerines “for the dead dad”... And for the first time, the general did not carry out the order. And instead of dozens of congratulatory packages, he ordered a memorial ceremony to be organized in the village. With all the necessary honors.

Soon, a commission was sent from the ministry to St. Petersburg, which confirmed not only the failure to comply with the order, but also the fact of misuse of money at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where tangerines were replaced with a farewell ceremony for fallen officers and warrant officers.

They did not have time to impose penalties on Colonel General Sergei Seleznev; in December 1996, he and his wife died in a plane crash.

A month after the start of the first Chechen campaign, St. Petersburg journalists learned that a combat control center had been created at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where all information about the course of hostilities was quickly flowed. And, accordingly, about the losses the army is suffering. After complex approvals, press representatives were allowed into the office, where journalists were shown a list of dead and wounded military personnel. On one sheet of paper.

Are our losses really that small?” - correspondents doubted.

“That’s how we fight well,” the senior officers answered instructively.

And the journalists had no idea that such reports were compiled periodically at headquarters and then destroyed. Previous data were not taken into account and were not summarized, so as not to sow panic.

No classification of secrecy was assigned to such lists. A report on the real state of affairs was sent every day to Moscow, where the final calculations were carried out. Those officers who were allowed to know about the dead and wounded were given their word of honor about non-disclosure, without any instructions or orders. The editors of Our Version on the Neva had at their disposal a miraculously preserved list for January 30, 1995.

From the description of the battle: “At 20:45, the corps combat control center received information about the actions of the Eastern group:<...>ran into rubble made of reinforced concrete blocks and, having met strong enemy resistance, moved to a perimeter defense in the area of ​​the Rodina [Russia] cinema. Engineering equipment to clear the rubble never arrived. The units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were supposed to ensure the installation of checkpoints in the rear of the group, also got lost somewhere. And the units of the 104th Airborne Division, which were supposed to support the offensive of the 129th regiment if its actions were successful, remained in the same area. The 129th Regiment had 15 killed and 55 wounded. 18 units of equipment were burned."2

From the description of the battle: “The defensive battle lasted up to 2-3 hours [until 22:00-23:00]. From a neighboring building, an RPG shot from the militants hit the transmission of a tank of the 1st tank company in the RSA (adjustable nozzle apparatus), the tank did not "3

According to official data (perhaps we are talking about Khankala): “During the fighting on the outskirts of the city of Grozny, wounded Russian men and women were picked up by personnel of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment. According to them, they, along with other civilians, were forcibly rounded up to be used as human shield. They were placed in front of the Chechen fighters and ordered to run towards the positions of the Russian troops. The fighters walked behind them. Those who refused to obey were shot in the soft tissue so that they could slowly but move forward. Those who could not to walk - they were shot. In those cases when it was necessary to hold the line, the militants broke the tendons of the legs of civilians, so that people could not move. The wounded were sent to the hospital."4

On the scene

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “Along the front [near the Rossiya cinema], to the right of a hundred meters, there was a Chechen pillbox - like a brick house [transformer booth?], from where there was continuous fire from a large-caliber machine gun . It was impossible to raise our heads. Our column entered chaotically. Therefore, even on our farm, it was extremely difficult to immediately find an unused grenade launcher or flamethrower. I set this task. They found it. And periodically they fired from grenade launchers at this Chechen pillbox. Take a knee or take aim lying down was very dangerous. After all, fire was coming at us not only from the pillbox, but also from those burnt-out armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. We were deprived of the opportunity to conduct aimed fire. We had to crawl out of cover, crawl to small hills, so that, escaping behind them, at least somehow: lying down or shooting from the side, destroy a Chechen machine gunner holed up in a pillbox, or rather in a dugout - very, very small, which was extremely difficult to get into."5

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “My reconnaissance sergeant crawled up. He asked me for permission to fire a grenade launcher, got down on his knee, under the fire of the Chechens aimed the grenade launcher at the target and, handsome, hit the pillbox directly in the embrasure ". He tore it down like a house of cards. At that time, from the Chechen positions, from the burnt-out armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, about twenty to twenty-five militants in camouflage white coats were coming towards us. They were coming, like Germans, into a psychic attack. They were about fifty meters away from us. They walked in dashes. When the pillbox was destroyed, they found themselves in an open field without cover. We concentrated the fire only on them. Eighty percent of the advancing Chechens were destroyed. Those who had time left... Bright, red flashes, torn robes, screams, screams... .
Darkness fell. On New Year’s Day, when they remembered about it, the tank crews came crawling to us and brought alcohol. Spilled. They tell. Chechens contacted them through communications. On their tank wave they said: “Well, Ivan, celebrate the New Year for ten minutes. And then again...” At ten minutes to twelve on December 31, 1994, until five minutes on January 1, 1995, there was a respite. They knocked back a little alcohol. After this, a massive mortar attack began. You can hide from other types of weapons. From falling mines - no. All that remained was to trust in fate.
The shelling lasted two hours [until 02:00]. Completely demoralized, we still held our positions. The Chechens could not get through to us, even showering us with mines. We brought all the equipment to direct fire. And she shot in directions, without targets. Two hours of such confrontation! The mortars stopped firing. There were shootouts. Apparently, there was a regrouping of Chechen forces and assets. Our and Chechen snipers began to work. So until the morning."6

Aviation actions

From the description of the battle: “On the morning of January 1, 1995, the Vostok group planned to conduct reconnaissance and continue the combat mission to reach the Minutka Square area, but at 8:20 a.m. - 8:30 a.m. the ZSU-23-4M Shilka RPK spotted a pair of aircraft (presumably Su-24) flying at low altitude. The interrogator of the friend-or-foe identification system on the ZSU-25-4M identified two aircraft as friendly. It was decided not to open fire on air targets. People on the ground heard the sound of jets the engines in the sky and the planes themselves were not visible due to cloudy weather and low, continuous clouds."7

On January 1, “at 8:30, the Minister of Defense (according to other sources - General Kvashnin) ordered the commander of this group, General Nikolai Staskov, to retreat to the initial area. And forty-five minutes later [approximately 09:15] the units of this group were struck by federal aviation . Two Su-25 attack aircraft fired their entire supply of unguided rockets at the moment when the soldiers took seats in the vehicles. About fifty people were killed and wounded. Most were officers of the 129th regiment, who supervised the landing of personnel on the vehicles.<...>During an air raid on the Eastern group, the group’s intelligence chief, Colonel Vladimir Selivanov, was also killed.”8

This is how Sergei Valerievich Tolkonnikov, sergeant 1st rv 129th motorized rifle regiment, describes the shelling in the story “New Year”: “Unexpectedly (a stupid word, it’s always unexpected, even if you’re waiting) several explosions are heard in a row, explosions of such force that the multi-ton colossus of the armored personnel carrier bounces like a ball.” 9

From the description of the battle: “After the planes flew along the perimeter of the area where the regiment and tank battalion were located, fragmentation bombs began exploding (presumably containers of small cargo or disposable bomb clusters were used).
According to the recollections of the commander of the 1st tank company, Captain S. Kachkovsky, the personnel rushed to hide under the tanks and armored personnel carriers. The commander of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel I. Turchenyuk, the battalion chief of staff, Captain S. Kurnosenko, the commander of the 2nd tank company, Lieutenant S. Kisel, and the deputy chief of staff of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, Major A. [Alexander Viktorovich10] Semerenko stood opposite cinema "Russia" when bombs exploded next to them. The bombs were filled with fragmentation lethal elements, reminiscent of 5-7 mm wire, cut into segments five to seven mm long. For Lieutenant Colonel I. Turchenyuk, one fragment hit the handle of the PM pistol in the breast pocket of the tank overalls opposite the heart, turning it around, entered the chest along the rib, the second fragment hit the shin. Captain S. Kurnosenko had both hips broken (he died of blood loss in the regiment's first aid station). Lieutenant S. Kisel received two fragments in the scalp on the top of his head, and another fragment hit the pistol in his breast pocket and remained in his wallet in the adjacent pocket. The deputy chief of staff of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, Major Semerenko, received a penetrating wound to the head and died on the spot. There, as a result of this raid, the commander of a tank platoon of the 1st tank company, Lieutenant D. Goryunov, received a shrapnel wound to the head and was killed. In total, about 25-50 people died at that moment and many were injured. After the raid, all on-board vehicles and armored personnel carriers were loaded with dead and wounded."11

Commander of the Vostok group, Major General Nikolai Viktorovich Staskov: “In heavy cloud conditions, visibility was only 50-70 meters - they bombed unobserved targets, including our group. In war, of course, everything happens, but when they die from their own..."12

According to the Commander of the Air Force, Colonel General Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov, “the vanguard of five vehicles of the 104th Airborne Division was destroyed by aviation.”13 Unfortunately, there is no other information about this.

Leaving the city

From the description of the battle: “At about 9 o’clock an order was received from the commander of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment - in view of the danger of a second massive air raid, to urgently leave Grozny for the Khankala airfield.
The exit from the city was chaotic and more like an escape. The last to go and cover the retreat was the 3rd tank company with the 3rd motorized rifle company of the 1st motorized rifle battalion. When leaving the city, the columns were fired upon with RPGs and small arms. The tanks were towing faulty BTR-70s."14

Andrey, a participant in the assault: “Aviation struck us, that is, there was panic, especially among the infantry there was severe panic. Only the special forces took their dead and wounded... they only took the reconnaissance officers. They took their dead and wounded, the infantry abandoned your guys<...>When we were leaving with the tank crews of the 126th regiment, on the road I simply jumped off and collected the dead - soldiers, officers with a broken head. A soldier with such frightened eyes sits straight, like from the movie “Iron Stream”: “Where is my company?” They don’t know what, where, where. Let's kick him onto the tank... come on, we loaded one, the other, drove on - they're still lying there! Still loaded. Those. It wasn’t a tank, but some kind of corpse transporter. There is an armored personnel carrier, there is also a whole squad, they don’t know what to do. The wheels of the BTR-70 are punctured. They hooked him. Then we went - another armored personnel carrier of the same type. Also killed, wounded, they were also hooked again. Those. it turned out... The T-80 tank is a powerful thing - like a locomotive it pulled two armored personnel carriers, 15 people dead and 30 people wounded. One tank was dragging."15

From the description of the battle: “The deputy commander of the 3rd tank company for armament, Lieutenant P. Laptiev, who was on the armor of the tank, was mortally wounded in the head by a sniper on the bridge over the railway tracks. The T-80BV (board number 542) stalled while the column was moving, the engine could not be started succeeded, the crew, having received injuries, left the car (the tank was captured by militants, there was no information on the further fate of the car.) The commander of tank No. 561, Sergeant Vereshchagin, when leaving Grozny, on the morning of January 1, 1995, despite heavy fire, returned and, hooking it up, dragged to Khankala the stalled tank of the 1st tank company, which had run out of fuel (board No. 520 or No. 521)."16

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “We left Grozny again in a column. We walked like a snake. I don’t know where, what kind of command there was. Nobody set a mission. We just circled around Grozny. We struck - there, there. And they fired at us. The column acted as if in separate flashes. The column could shoot at some passenger car driving three hundred meters from us. No one, by the way, could hit this car - the people were so overworked.
And so the column began to fold and leave. The infantry came out lumpy, chaotically. On this day, we paratroopers did not receive any mission. But I understood that no one but us would cover the motorized riflemen. Everyone else was simply unable to. Some of my people were loading, the other was firing in the directions to cover the retreat. We were the last to leave.
When we left the city and crossed that damned bridge again, the column stopped. My machine gun jammed due to the dirt that had accumulated in the magazines with cartridges. And then a voice: “Take mine.” I lowered my eyes into the open hatch of the armored vehicle - there lay a seriously wounded warrant officer, my friend. He handed me the machine gun as best he could. I took it and lowered mine inside the hatch. Another shelling of our units began from several directions. We sat pressed against the armor, shooting back as best we could...
The bleeding ensign filled empty magazines with cartridges and handed them to me. I gave orders and shot. The ensign remained in service. He was turning white from great loss of blood, but he still loaded up his magazines and kept whispering: “We’ll get out, we’ll get out anyway”... At that moment I really didn’t want to die. It seemed that a few hundred meters more, and we would escape from this fiery cauldron, but the column stood like a long, large target, which was torn to pieces by bullets and shells from Chechen guns."17

In Khankala

From the description of the battle: “The first two armored personnel carriers (BTR-60s) arrived at the Khankala airfield at 11:30 a.m. (one of them contained the wounded Lieutenant Colonel I. Turchenyuk), then the 1st and 2nd tank companies of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion and unit 129 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. Armored personnel carriers and vehicles were littered with wounded. At about 12:30 a.m. the closing column came out. On the armor of one armored personnel carrier-70, with broken wheels, towed by a T-80 tank of the 1st tank company, he was unconscious, but still alive wounded captain S. Kurnosenko. On a BMP-1KSh he was immediately transported to the regiment's first aid station, but he died without regaining consciousness, from pain shock and loss of blood."18

According to a resident of Grozny from the street. Tukhachevsky, the wounded and killed were “along the entire length of Tukhachevsky Street, and especially many near the Yubileiny store, near the then destroyed Rossiya cinema, and most of all in the field where the state technical school, research institute, and tram park were located.”19

Senior lieutenant of one of the reconnaissance units of the 98th Airborne Division (or 45th OrpSpN Airborne Forces): “We left on January 1st. There was some kind of chaotic gathering of desperate people. There was no such thing for everyone to gather at the gathering place. We walked, wandered. They set the task. They began to collect the wounded. They quickly set up a field hospital.
Before my eyes, some kind of armored personnel carrier broke out of the encirclement. He just broke free and rushed towards our column. Unmarked. Without anything. He was shot at point-blank range by our tank crews. About a hundred, one hundred and fifty meters away. Ours shot our own. Apart. Three tanks destroyed the armored personnel carrier.
There were so many corpses and wounded that the doctors at the deployed field hospital [MOSN No. 660] had neither the strength nor the time for organ-preserving actions!”20

From the description of the battle: “The request for emergency removal of the wounded by helicopter was refused. Near the regiment’s medical post, a column with the dead and wounded was hastily formed in Tolstoy-Yurt, where the 660th MOSN (special purpose medical detachment) was deployed. The dead were loaded on stretchers into the bodies of cars in stacks of three or four rows. After the column left, there were no stretchers left in the regiment.
After leaving the city, the units carried out personnel checks, replenishment of tank crews with crews of damaged vehicles, refueling, loading of power supplies, evacuation and restoration of tanks that were blown up by mines (the vehicle of the 2nd company was restored and transferred to the 1st tank company)." 21

From the description of the battle: “On January 2, 1995, the 3rd tank company of the 133rd Guards separate tank battalion moved to the area of ​​the airfield in Khankala in the morning to accompany a detachment of paratroopers to Grozny to collect the wounded and killed. A reconnaissance in force was carried out in the suburbs of Grozny, two people were wounded. Individuals who had fallen behind their columns on January 1 continued to reach the units' location. They said that the militants were finishing off the wounded; one paratrooper said that he saw a woman in a camouflage finish finishing off the wounded. In the city, the cannonade of the battle in the northern direction was clearly heard "22

Losses

From the description of the battle: “During the day of fighting in the city, the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion irretrievably lost 3 T-80BBs (1st tank company - board No. 515, 516, 3rd tank company board - No. 551).”23

From the description of the battle: “The losses of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion in the New Year’s assault on Grozny amounted to: five tanks irretrievably (on January 1, 1995, sides No. 541 and 542 were lost from the 2nd Tank Company, the numbers and ownership of the other three vehicles are unknown) , five dead (including four officers), 14 wounded (including five officers and three warrant officers).
The losses of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment were about 25-35 people killed and 50 wounded."24

128 people were admitted to MOSN No. 660 out of 129 small and medium-sized enterprises.25

From the description of the battle: “During the battles from December 31 to January 1, the Vostok group lost about 200 people and half of the available armored vehicles. The staffing level of the 133rd Guards Separate Tank Battalion as of January 3, 1995 was 85% (including 76% officers ), serviceable tanks 43%, a similar result was in the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The units were recognized as having limited combat readiness."26

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1 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 37.
2 Antipov A. Lev Rokhlin. The life and death of a general. M., 1998. P. 147.
3 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 37.
4 Criminal regime. Chechnya, 1991-95 M., 1995. P. 72.
5 Noskov V. Confession of an officer // Stories about the Chechen war. M., 2004. pp. 149-150. (http://www.sibogni.ru/archive/9/150/)
6 Noskov V. Confession of an officer // Stories about the Chechen war. M., 2004. pp. 151-152. (http://www.sibogni.ru/archive/9/150/)
7 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 45-46.
8 Antipov A. Lev Rokhlin. The life and death of a general. M., 1998. pp. 151-152.
9 Tolkonnikov S. New Year. (http://artofwar.ru/t/tolkonnikow_s_w/text_0080-3.shtml)
10 Website "Heroes of the Country". Semerenko Alexander Viktorovich. (http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=8360)
11 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 46-47.
12 Staskov N. There was a deception // Newspaper. 2004. December 13. (http://www.gzt.ru/world/2004/12/13/112333.html)
13 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002. P. 275. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
14 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 47.
15 On the other side of the war. Episode 3.
16 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. pp. 47-48.
17 Noskov V. Confession of an officer // Stories about the Chechen war. M., 2004. pp. 152-154. (http://www.sibogni.ru/archive/9/150/)
18 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 48.
19 Kondratiev Yu. Letter from my mother // Website Yu.M. Kondratieva. (http://conrad2001.narod.ru/russian/moms_letter.htm)
20 Noskov V. Confession of an officer // Stories about the Chechen war. M., 2004. pp. 152-154. (http://www.sibogni.ru/archive/9/150/)
21 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 48.
22 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 48.
23 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 37.
24 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 48.
25 Safonov D. Military tale // Lenizdat.ru. 2005. November 28. (http://www.lenizdat.ru/cgi-bin/redir?l=ru&b=1&i=1035741)
26 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 50.

Russian Federation reflects the events of January 1995 on the territory of the Chechen Republic in its capital Grozny. The plan to storm the capital, where Dudayev’s troops were concentrated, was developed in haste, but this did not bother military officials. Pavel Grachev's famous phrase that Grozny could be taken in two hours turned out to be refuted by two months of bloody battles.

Four groups were to enter Grozny, codenamed “North”, “West”, “East” and “North-East”. As Potapov, the chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District, said in his report, long-term battles for Grozny are not expected. The plan, developed just days before the outbreak of hostilities, had many significant flaws, and the commanders of the groups, consisting of a huge number of recruits with no relevant experience, unanimously argued that the assault should be postponed for additional training. The main miscalculation of the strategists was the almost complete ignorance of the ability of the Dudayevites to repel federal troops. However, the groupings included a few assault detachments, consisting mainly of battalions of paratroopers or motorized rifle troops, reinforced by a tank company or anti-aircraft guns. The plan had absolutely no indications in case of militant resistance in the form of fire, and the command was strictly forbidden to occupy residential buildings and open fire on them. The Dudayevites dispersed in such buildings. The groups were given a goal: to take administrative buildings, including the Presidential Palace and government building, radio, and railway station. However, the maps that were not issued to everyone the day before turned out to be outdated, and the aerial photography was of poor quality. The assault troops were intended to blockade neighborhoods and organize safe corridors along which the main forces would follow.

The Western group under the command of Major General Valery Petruk was supposed to head to the railway station, and after the building was occupied by federal troops, go to the Presidential Palace and block it from the south. During the assault, tasks were transferred to the North unit. The western group included 6 thousand people, 75 guns, 43 tanks, 50 infantry fighting vehicles and 160 infantry fighting vehicles. Federal troops "West" entered Grozny at 7:30 a.m., but during the operation the task of capturing the station was canceled, and the forces were sent to the Presidential Palace. Until 12 noon, the Dudayevites did not show resistance, as subsequent events showed, it was not by chance. Aslan Maskhadov's plan was to allow federal forces through and blockade them in the city center. Each of the columns came under heavy fire, and snipers worked professionally. The Dudayevites tried to block the escape routes in order to completely destroy the attackers.

At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the 693rd infantry regiment was suddenly attacked, the column stood near the city market, and a fierce battle ensued. By 6 p.m., the motorized riflemen tried to retreat, but were surrounded in a tight circle near Leninsky Park, and radio contact with them was lost. In the Andreevskaya Valley, militants opened fire on the combined 76th airborne division and the 21st airborne brigade. Unprepared for such fierce resistance, the western units were forced to gain a foothold in the southern regions of the city and go on the defensive by 1 p.m. The group's offensive plan was completely disrupted.

“Sever”, under the command of Major General Pulikovsky, consisted of 4,100 people, had 210 infantry fighting vehicles, 80 tanks, as well as 65 mortars and guns. His main task according to the assault plan was to prevent reinforcements from approaching the militants from Katayama, as well as to advance along a pre-designated strip of the city and block the Presidential Palace from the northern part. The group entered the city from its direction exactly at 6 o’clock in the morning. The soldiers were greeted by frightening signs: “Welcome to HELL!”, which was not far from the truth. The 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade almost unhindered advanced to the railway station, where they positioned themselves without taking into account a possible attack. As a result, the enemy managed to concentrate more than 3 thousand people at this point and encircle federal troops. The battle began at 7 pm and lasted all night. The station was not surrendered, but at the end of the defense only eight people remained in the building. Part of the detachment tried to make its way along the railway, but was almost completely destroyed by the militants.

The northeastern group, consisting of 2,200 military personnel, 125 armored vehicles and 7 tanks, 25 guns, as well as mortars, was led by Lieutenant General Rokhlin. According to the plan, the group was supposed to advance along the Petropavlovskoye Highway, but reconnaissance literally the day before the start of the assault notified Rokhlin that the road was mined with landmines, so the route was changed. In order to mislead the Dudayevites, it was decided to imitate an attack along the highway and throw the main forces on the bypass road. Back on December 30, the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, under the leadership of Colonel Vereshchagin, occupied the bridge on the Neftyanka River, drawing off a significant part of the Dudayevites. The main offensive began at 6:30 a.m., and by 9:00 a.m. the 33rd SMR had reached the cannery, providing a safe corridor for the advance of the assault companies. By 10.00, the city cemetery was taken, occupied by militants who did not expect an artillery strike on the shrine.

Kornienko's assault group occupied the cannery and left some people for its defense. The main forces advanced deep into Grozny. At Krugovaya and Mayakovsky, the 255th united with the 81st motorized rifle division. The task of 68 orbs was to occupy a position in the hospital complex. The hospital complex was located on Ordzhonikidze Square; in order to occupy it, the detachment had to break the resistance of the Dudayevites at the crossing of the Sunzha, and then wage a fierce battle on the square itself. As a result, the building was taken and the detachment went on the defensive. During the battle, the northeastern group came under fire not only from the Chechens, but also from other federal troops, there was no clear radio communication, sometimes it completely disappeared, and there were no accurate maps.

The group did not advance further, since Rokhlin understood that further movements could deprive the forces entrusted to him of a relatively quiet rear, reinforcements and supplies of food and ammunition. Soon the militants managed to encircle the troops of the northeastern group, but Rokhlin did not think of retreating, and contact with the rear was maintained. On January 7, the northern group also came under his command. Two days later, Rokhlin launched an offensive, as a result of which the city airport was taken, as well as a petrochemical plant. Only on the 19th, after long battles, was it possible to occupy the Presidential Palace. After more than two weeks of fighting, federal forces were able to capture only a little more than a third of the city, and the situation in some positions was characterized as very tense and unstable.

The eastern group was initially supposed to act under the command of Rokhlin, but a few days before the assault, Major General Stasko was appointed instead. There were no more than two days left to prepare the operation, and the group consisted of disparate detachments, most of which took part in hostilities for the first time. The task in this direction was as follows: to capture the eastern districts of the city along the borders of the Sunzha River and Leninsky Prospekt and, without placing checkpoints, or placing them at extremely important points, move to Minutka Square. In fact, the Eastern group was entrusted with the function of depicting the main attack of federal troops on the city; it was supposed to cover the maximum territory and then leave Grozny.

Vostok troops moved out at 11 o'clock in the afternoon from Khankala airport. The movement was carried out in two columns, and their trajectory followed a bypass road. Having passed the suburbs, the assault troops were ambushed on a road bridge. The actions in the column were extremely poorly coordinated, and communication was constantly interrupted. The fire on the militant convoy caused panic and confusion, so the assault groups became targets for the attackers for some time. The main forces of the group were scattered, and Stasko decided to retreat; the Vostok group did not enter into hostilities until January 2.

Reinforcements came to the encircled groups, which were successfully blocked by Dudayev’s troops, largely due to the lack of maps, and the inexperience of the armored vehicle drivers also played a role. Losses in the first days of fighting were significant, and the lightning assault failed. However, the federal troops soon recovered and launched not only defensive, but also offensive activities. As a result, by February 6, the resistance of the Dudayevites was broken, and on the 26th of the same month, fighting on an organized scale stopped. On March 6, the last district of the rebellious city, Chernorechye, was occupied.

However, contrary to the forecasts of the Russian leadership, the war did not end there; the bloodshed continued for a long time. The militants used guerrilla warfare tactics, hiding in difficult mountainous terrain.

Paratroopers. Assault on Grozny 1995 in detail (Russia, Grozny) 1995

The video was apparently made by soldiers of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, but it is possible that it was also made by the 98th, 104th or 106th.
It tells well about the formation of the column, how the paratroopers entered the city, the first battles, the events of the first days of the battles for Grozny.

The video recording is also unique in that for the first time several fighters are involved in its creation - quite clearly and intelligibly telling what happened and how it happened in early January 1995. In particular, battles in the area of ​​the railway station, battles for individual buildings, movement of a column and other curious incidents on the streets and on the outskirts of the city.

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Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter

Mironov Andrey Anatolyevich, born in 1975, native of the city of Opochka. Russian. Before the army, he worked in the limited liability partnership “1000 little things” in Opochka as a laborer. He was drafted into the army on December 14, 1993 by the Opochetsky United District Military Commissariat. He took part in hostilities in Chechnya, being a deputy platoon commander in military unit 67636 129 MRR. Lance Sergeant. Died on January 3, 1995. He was buried in the city of Opochka at the Maslovskoye cemetery. There is an obelisk on the grave. ­

Everyone with whom I managed to meet and talk about Andrei involuntarily stumbled over the word “was”. And Olga Nikolaeva, his classmate, managed to express in one phrase the thoughts of all Andrei’s relatives, friends and acquaintances: “People like that shouldn’t die!”

In the photograph of the 1992 graduates of school No. 4, Andrei immediately attracts attention - a very handsome guy. He was taciturn and very reserved, but somehow he attracted people to him. He knew how to make friends and valued true friendship. He drew well. He knew how to cook and, without waiting for a holiday, he could please his parents who came home from work with delicious baked goods. Naturally clean, neat, always smart, helpful, respectful, cheerful - this is how Andrey’s teachers, classmates, and everyone who knew him remembered him.

There were fewer boys in the class than girls, so the girls considered it an honor to sit at the same desk with a guy like Andrei Mironov. In grades 8 and 9, Olga Nikolaeva received this honor.

“I was really lucky,” she says. - Many were not indifferent to Andrey. I wasn't in love with him, but I liked him very much. At times he was simply amazing with his accuracy. The suit and shirt were perfectly ironed, but he, like everyone else, did not walk the line, and was also naughty. In his life, he would never throw a textbook on his desk or throw away a notebook. And my mother always set him as an example for me. On the other hand, he is an athlete, very well read, and this was also attractive. And in class we used to play tic-tac-toe
were playing. Although he is the only son of his parents, he is his mother's
was not a son. Once, on the cover of my diary, Andrei used a razor to cut out my name. I felt sorry for the cover and had to throw it away. I saved the letters and pasted them into an album. Classmates often compared Andrei with the actor A. Mironov and, probably, not only because of the name, but because he had a certain artistry...

Valentina Vasilyevna Markova, Andrey’s class teacher:

You feel terrible injustice when yesterday’s students of yours pass away... How do you remember Andrei? Always collected and extremely neat. He was very respectful of his parents, especially his mother. In relation to girls he was always on top. I didn’t allow myself any vulgarities. It was natural for him to let the girl through the door first. He was not a leader, but he enjoyed the well-deserved respect of his classmates. Always had my own opinion. Sometimes little things remain in the memory. I remember how the kids in the 7th grade were preparing a play for the New Year. Andrey played Vodyanoy. He did great. As it is now before my eyes...

Viktor Valentinovich Alexandrov, Andrey’s coach at the sports school:

In terms of sports, Andrei grew up before my eyes. And as a person, I got to know him quite well over four years. Respectful, responsive, fair. He was distinguished by his ability to work independently and enviable perseverance. He was involved in athletics in a training group. He had the third adult rank. We traveled a lot in those years. More than fifty starts a year took place. It was necessary to combine training, study, and competitions. Only concentration, endurance and a clear daily routine made it possible to achieve good results. There was no time to relax. In the morning, training began early. After school there are two more hours of training. Such loads strengthened not only physically, but also mentally.

The group was very strong: multiple regional champions, winners of various competitions. There was someone to look up to and someone to follow. Andrey also became a prize-winner of regional competitions and match meetings of cities of the Soviet Union several times. I often compare today's boys with those, and the comparison, believe me, is not in favor of today's boys. Times change, people change, but it’s a pity that because of money problems, traditions are lost, ideals are erased, and there is no longer the same enthusiasm when it really is “one for all and all for one”...

Boys grow up and choose their own path in life. And sometimes this choice is very difficult. Few could imagine that Andrei Mironov would enter the pedagogical institute, and even study physics and mathematics. According to his class teacher, in high school he preferred the humanities. Friends gathered in all sorts of places: military schools, polytechnic and pedagogical institutes... Andrei, it would seem, had made up his mind, but soon realized that pedagogy was not his calling. Returned home, worked... And then the army...

What can a mother do when she loses her only son? As it is accurately said in the poems of Alexandra Frolova:

What does the mother have left of her son?

There is a boy's portrait on the table,

Lectures on physics, reisshina,

Bought a moped on the cheap.

A formal tie, a fashionable shirt.

From childhood he was a guy with taste.

Yes, that line of official paper.

The military commissar handed it to me.

It seems that this is said about Andrey. But the last lines do not correspond to the truth, because the parents did not receive a funeral for their son. The result of a long and painful search for the truth was a short letter from the unit commander, consisting of routine phrases appropriate to the situation, a more detailed letter from the political officer and explanatory notes from Andrei’s colleagues who participated in the identification. Several versions of the death have been put forward, and the parents still don’t know what to believe. Not a single personal item from Andrei was brought to his grief-stricken parents. Andrei was awarded the medal "For Distinction", as is known from the above sources. A. Mironov was awarded the Order of Courage posthumously.