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Peasant partisan detachments 1812. Start in science. Partisan detachments of Cossacks and regular army

Patriotic War of 1812. Guerrilla movement

Introduction

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having broken out after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, consisting of performances by small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of national heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle emerged.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landowners, rise up to fight against their seemingly “liberator”? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their powerless situation. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs and there was even talk about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which is what he feared most. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when joining Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution to Russia.”

The purpose of the work is to consider Denis Davydov as a hero of the partisan war and a poet. Work objectives to consider:

Reasons for the emergence of partisan movements

Partisan movement of D. Davydov

Denis Davydov as a poet

1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan detachments

The beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, residents fled into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they had been in before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants acquired the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the movement of the population to forests and areas remote from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This immediately affected the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers began to starve, and looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

The actions of peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive in nature. In the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasant partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced to remind the chief of staff Berthier more and more often about the large losses in people and strictly ordered the allocation of an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.

2. Partisan detachment of Denis Davydov

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war. The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Wintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina.

After the invasion of Napoleonic troops, peasants began to go into the forests, partisan heroes began to create peasant detachments and attack individual French teams. The struggle of the partisan detachments unfolded with particular force after the fall of Smolensk and Moscow. The partisan troops boldly attacked the enemy and captured the French. Kutuzov allocated a detachment to operate behind enemy lines under the leadership of D. Davydov, whose detachment disrupted the enemy’s communication routes, freed prisoners, and inspired the local population to fight the invaders. Following the example of Denisov’s detachment, by October 1812, 36 Cossacks, 7 cavalry, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and other units, including artillery, were operating.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several mounted and foot partisan detachments, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many partisan detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga and provided significant assistance to the army partisans of Denis Davydov’s detachment.

The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration’s army to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” He was strengthened in this intention by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest and poor rear protection in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for flying peasant detachments to fight without a coordinated plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and -1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first there were many difficulties. Even residents of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to dress in peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift. To swoop down out of the blue and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov’s detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev-Zamishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zamishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost burst into the village together with them. The convoy and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

Denis Davydov was a wonderful romantic poet. He belonged to the genre of romanticism.

It should be noted that almost always in human history, a nation that has been subjected to aggression creates a powerful layer of patriotic literature. This was the case, for example, during the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. And only some time later, having recovered from the blow, having overcome pain and hatred, thinkers and poets think about all the horrors of the war for both sides, about its cruelty and senselessness. This is very clearly reflected in the poems of Denis Davydov.

In my opinion, Davydov’s poem is one of the outbursts of patriotic militancy caused by the invasion of the enemy.

What did this unshakable strength of the Russians consist of?

This strength was made up of patriotism not in words, but in deeds of the best people from the nobility, poets and simply the Russian people.

This strength consisted of the heroism of the soldiers and best officers of the Russian army.

This invincible force was formed from the heroism and patriotism of Muscovites who leave their hometown, no matter how sorry they are to leave their property to destruction.

The invincible strength of the Russians consisted of the actions of partisan detachments. This is Denisov’s detachment, where the most needed person is Tikhon Shcherbaty, the people’s avenger. Partisan detachments destroyed Napoleonic army piece by piece.

So, Denis Davydov in his works depicts the war of 1812 as a people’s war, a Patriotic War, when the entire people rose to defend the Motherland. And the poet did this with enormous artistic power, creating a grandiose poem - an epic that has no equal in the world.

The work of Denis Davydov can be illustrated as follows:

Dream

Who could cheer you up so much, my friend?

You can hardly speak from laughter.

What joys delight your mind, Or do they lend you money without a bill?

Or a happy waist has come to you

And did the pair of trantels take the endurance test?

What happened to you that you don’t answer?

Ay! give me a rest, you know nothing!

I'm really beside myself, I almost went crazy:

Today I found Petersburg completely different!

I thought that the whole world had completely changed:

Imagine - Nn paid off his debt;

There are no more pedants and fools to be seen,

And even Zoey and Sov got smarter!

There is no courage in the unfortunate rhymers of old,

And our dear Marin does not stain papers,

And, deepening into the service, he works with his head:

How, when starting a platoon, shout at the right time: stop!

But what I was more delighted by was:

Koev, who pretended to be Lycurgus,

For our happiness he wrote laws for us,

Suddenly, fortunately for us, he stopped writing them.

A happy change has appeared in everything,

Theft, robbery, treason have disappeared,

No more complaints or grievances are visible,

Well, in a word, the city took on a completely disgusting appearance.

Nature gave beauty to the ugly,

And Lll himself stopped looking askance at nature,

Bna's nose has become shorter,

And Ditch scared people with his beauty,

Yes, I, who myself, from the beginning of my century,

It was a stretch to bear the name of a person,

I look, I’m happy, I don’t recognize myself:

Where the beauty comes from, where the growth comes from - I look;

Every word is bon mot, every look is passion,

I’m amazed how I manage to change my intrigues!

Suddenly, oh the wrath of heaven! suddenly fate struck me:

Among the blissful days Andryushka woke up,

And everything I saw, what I had so much fun with -

I saw everything in a dream, and lost everything in the dream.

Burtsov

In a smoky field, on a bivouac

By the blazing fires

In the beneficial arak

I see the savior of people.

Gather in a circle

Orthodox is all to blame!

Give me the golden tub,

Where fun lives!

Pour out vast cups

In the noise of joyful speeches,

How our ancestors drank

Among spears and swords.

Burtsev, you are a hussar of hussars!

You're on a crazy horse

The cruelest of frenzy

And a rider in war!

Let's hit cup and cup together!

Today it’s still too late to drink;

Tomorrow the trumpets will sound,

Tomorrow there will be thunder.

Let's drink and swear

That we indulge in a curse,

If we ever

Let's give way, turn pale,

Let's pity our breasts

And in misfortune we become timid;

If we ever give

Left side on the flank,

Or we'll rein in the horse,

Or a cute little cheat

Let's give our hearts for free!

Let it not be with a saber strike

My life will be cut short!

Let me be a general

How many I have seen!

Let among the bloody battles

I will be pale, fearful,

And in the meeting of heroes

Sharp, brave, talkative!

Let my mustache, the beauty of nature,

Black-brown, in curls,

Will be cut off in youth

And it will disappear like dust!

Let fortune be for vexation,

To multiply all troubles,

He will give me a rank for shift parades

And "Georgia" for the advice!

Let... But chu! This is not the time to walk!

To the horses, brother, and your foot in the stirrup,

Saber out - and cut!

Here is another feast God gives us,

And noisier and more fun...

Come on, put your shako on one side,

And - hurray! Happy day!

V. A. Zhukovsky

Zhukovsky, dear friend! Debt is rewarded by payment:

I read the poems you dedicated to me;

Now read mine, you are smoked in the bivouac

And sprinkled with wine!

It's been a long time since I chatted with either the muse or you,

Did I care about my feet?..

.........................................
But even in the thunderstorms of war, still on the battlefield,

When the Russian camp went out,

I greeted you with a huge glass

An impudent partisan wandering in the steppes!

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Bertha, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for their Motherland... ". Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.

During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolenskaya-10 road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” wrote Kutuzov, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemies in large numbers, and deliver those captured to the army.” The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand French.

And yet, one of the most heroic actions of 1812 remains the feat of Denis Davydov and his squad.

Bibliography

Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1974. History of France, vol. 2. M., 2001.-687p.

History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina, Moscow: INFRA, 2002.-569 p.

Orlik O.V. Thunderstorm of the twelfth year.... M.: INFRA, 2003.-429p.

Platonov S.F. Textbook of Russian history for secondary school M., 2004.-735p.

Reader on the History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina - Moscow: DROFA, 2000.-644 p.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, Napoleon's tattered and frozen army was brutally beaten by Russian flying and peasant partisan detachments.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The greatly extended Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile units to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive them of food and fodder.

During the Patriotic War, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of partisan peasants, uniting spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to actual acts of sabotage, flying detachments also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces mainly repelled the enemy from their villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, and beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. Davydov’s cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.

Over time, Denis Davydov’s detachment increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, which sometimes had a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking convoys and freeing prisoners, and sometimes even captured enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. These were mainly Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. United partisan groups could resist large military formations of Napoleon's army. Thus, at the end of October, during a battle in the area of the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat turned out to be a terrible blow. This success, on the contrary, encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.

Peasant initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of French units was made by peasants who self-organized into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov’s instructions. While willingly helping flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the men at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, and often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a crowd of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many acts of sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy convoys with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov’s unit included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by career military men and noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of Napoleonic troops were not isolated.

Partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Abstract on the history of an 11th grade student, 505 school Elena Afitova

Partisan movement in the War of 1812

Guerrilla movement, the armed struggle of the masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformation, waged in territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Units of regular troops operating behind enemy lines can also take part in the Partisan movement.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with forage and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the region into Smolensk, and then into Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement assumed a particularly wide scope. At the end of July-August, in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other districts, peasants united into foot and horse partisan detachments, armed with pikes, sabers and guns, attacked separate groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and convoys, and disrupted the communications of the French army. The partisans were a serious fighting force. The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. The partisan detachments of G.M. Kurin, S. Emelyanov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina and others became widely known. Tsarist law treated the Partisan movement with distrust. But in an atmosphere of patriotic upsurge, some landowners and progressive-minded generals (P.I. Bagration, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Ermolov and others). The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal M.I., attached especially great importance to the people's partisan struggle. Kutuzov. He saw in it a tremendous force, capable of causing significant damage to the enemy, and he contributed in every possible way to the organization of new detachments, giving instructions on their weapons and instructions on guerrilla warfare tactics. After leaving Moscow, the front of the Partisan movement was significantly expanded, and Kutuzov, in his plans, gave it an organized character. This was greatly facilitated by the formation of special detachments from regular troops operating by guerrilla methods. The first such detachment, numbering 130 people, was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydova. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions operated as part of the army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S. Dorokhov, M.A. Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments that arose spontaneously later joined the army or closely interacted with them. Individual detachments of the people's formation were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its widest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, captured convoys, and provided the Russian command with valuable information about the ship. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set broader tasks for the Partisan Movement to interact with the army and strike at individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. Thus, on September 28 (October 10), by order of Kutuzov, General Dorokhov’s detachment, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino, 1812 pr-k lost over 30 thousand people as a result of partisan attacks. Along the entire retreat route of the French army, partisan detachments assisted Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking their convoys and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating Napoleonic troops and expelling them from Russia.

Causes of guerrilla warfare

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs and in defense of the feudal landowners. The temporary Lithuanian “government”, subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first resolutions obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landowners, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, attracting for this purpose , if circumstances require it, military force.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, residents fled into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

Peasants' War

French foragers sent to villages for food faced more than just passive resistance. After the war, one French general wrote in his memoirs: “The army could only feed on what the marauders, organized in entire detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants killed many of our people every day who dared to go in search.” In the villages there were clashes, including shooting, between French soldiers sent for food and peasants. Such clashes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance arose - partisan warfare.

The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired its widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in the Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in the Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be brought to justice.

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, partisan detachments attacked French parties making their way towards them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychev partisans, police officer Boguslavskaya and retired major Emelyanov, armed their detachments with guns taken from the French and established proper order and discipline. Sychevsky partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

The largest Gzhat partisan detachment operated successfully. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad regiment Fedor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovery, immediately began organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2 thousand people (according to other sources, 3 thousand). His striking force was a cavalry group of 200 people, armed and dressed in armor of French cuirassiers. The Samusya detachment had its own organization and strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system of warning the population about the approach of the enemy through the ringing of bells and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages became empty; according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes communicated when and in what numbers, on horseback or on foot, one should go into battle. In one of the battles, members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. Samusya's detachment caused significant damage to the French troops. In the Smolensk province he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.

Another partisan detachment, created from peasants, was also active in the Gzhatsk district, headed by Ermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. He was wounded in the battle near Tsarevo-Zamishche and taken prisoner, but he managed to escape. From the peasants of the villages of Basmany and Zadnovo, he organized a partisan detachment, which initially numbered 40 people, but soon grew to 300 people. Chetvertakov’s detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him. In Sychevsky district, partisan Vasilisa Kozhina became famous for her brave actions.

There are many facts and evidence that the partisan peasant detachments of Gzhatsk and other areas located along the main road to Moscow caused great trouble to the French troops.

The actions of partisan detachments became especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Not a day passed without the partisans, in one place or another, raiding a moving enemy convoy with food, or defeating a French detachment, or, finally, suddenly attacking the French soldiers and officers stationed in the village.

In Zvenigorod district, peasant partisan detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district, partisan detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant partisan detachments united up to 2 thousand people. They repeatedly attacked large enemy parties and defeated them. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants - partisans from the Bronnitsy district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev.

The largest peasant partisan detachment in the Moscow region was the Bogorodsk partisan detachment. It numbered about 6 thousand people in its ranks. The talented leader of this detachment was the serf Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops. So, on October 1, partisans under the leadership of Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov entered into battle with two enemy squadrons and, acting skillfully, defeated them.

Peasant partisan detachments received assistance from the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, M. I. Kutuzov. With satisfaction and pride, Kutuzov wrote to St. Petersburg:

The peasants, burning with love for the Motherland, organize militias among themselves... Every day they come to the Main Apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and ammunition for protection from enemies. The requests of these respectable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with rifles, pistols and cartridges."

During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

In addition to direct military operations, it should be noted the participation of militias and peasants in reconnaissance.

Army partisan units

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separated forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this purpose, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving up important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk."

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons and suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to obtain food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Staff Russian army. The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action, and were informed of the areas of operation of neighboring detachments in the event of joint operations.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Sometimes, knowing the location of the enemy in advance, the partisans launched a surprise raid. Thus, General Vintsengerod, having established that in the village of Sokolov there was an outpost of two cavalry squadrons and three infantry companies, allocated 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly burst into the village, destroyed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers , 83 soldiers.

Colonel Kudashev's detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.

Most often, partisan detachments ambushed and attacked enemy transport on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of General Dorokhov's detachment, operating along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 captured two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 16, Colonel Efremov’s detachment, encountering an enemy column heading towards Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people.

Captain Figner's detachment, which was always close to the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up an artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, killed up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers.

Later, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, took the city of Vereya on September 28, 1812, destroying part of the French garrison.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for their Motherland... ".

Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.

Bibliography

P.A. Zhilin The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1968.

History of France, vol.2. M., 1973.

O.V. Orlik "The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year...". M., 1987.

The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally all of Russia rose up to fight the occupiers. The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unanimously, in a single impulse of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.

The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally all of Russia rose up to fight the occupiers. Napoleon miscalculated when, trying to attract the peasants to his side, he announced to them that he would abolish serfdom. No! The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unanimously, in a single impulse of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.

Immediately after the appearance of the enemy army in Lithuania and Belarus, a spontaneous partisan movement of local peasants arose. The partisans inflicted significant damage on foreigners, destroyed enemy soldiers, and upset the rear. At the very beginning of the war, the French army experienced a shortage of food and fodder. Due to the death of horses, the French were forced to abandon 100 cannons in Belarus.

A people's militia was actively created in Ukraine. 19 Cossack regiments were formed here. Most of them were armed and supported by peasants at their own expense.

Peasant partisan detachments arose in the Smolensk region and in other occupied regions of Russia. A powerful partisan movement also operated in the Moscow province. Such national heroes as Gerasim Kurin and Ivan Chushkin distinguished themselves here. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, Gerasim Kurin’s detachment consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Ermolai Chetvertakov, Fyodor Potapov, and Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.

The actions of the partisans caused great human and material losses to the enemy and disrupted their communications with the rear. In just six autumn weeks, the partisans destroyed about 30,000 enemy soldiers. This is what is said in the report about the actions of peasant partisan detachments in the territory of only one Moscow province (written by the Governor General of Moscow F.V. Rastopchin):

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PEASANT GUERILLA UNITS

AGAINST NAPOLEON'S ARMY IN MOSCOW PROVINCE

In fulfillment of his highest and. V. will, the news of the brave and commendable deeds of the villagers of the Moscow province, who unanimously and courageously took up arms in entire villages against the parties sent from the enemy to rob and incite parties, is presented here for everyone's attention, with the names and deeds of those merchants, townspeople and peasants who in this time were the most distinguished.

In Bogorodsky district Vokhon economic volost head Egor Stulov, Sotsky Ivan Chushkin and peasant Gerasim Kurin and Amerev volost head Emelya and Vasilyev, having gathered the peasants under their jurisdiction and also inviting neighboring ones, courageously defended themselves from the enemy and not only did not allow him to ruin and plunder their villages, but, repelling and driving away the enemies, the Vokhon peasants beat and captured up to fifty people, while the Amerev peasants killed up to three hundred people. Such courageous actions were witnessed and approved in writing by the commander of the Vladimir militia, Mr. Lieutenant General Prince Golitsyn.

In Bronnitsky district peasants of the villages: Shubina, Veshnyakov, Konstantinov, Voskresensky and Pochinok; villages: Salvacheva, Zhiroshkina, Rogacheva, Ganusova, Zalesye, Golushina and Zhdanskaya, following appeals from the zemstvo police, up to 2 thousand armed people on horseback and on foot repeatedly gathered on the road leading to the city of Podol, where, under cover in the forest, they waited with the Cossacks of the enemy, who, passing from Bronnitsy to the designated city, ravaged entire villages. Finally, they saw a detached enemy detachment, containing up to 700 people, which they courageously attacked with the help of the Cossacks and, having killed 30 people on the spot, forced the rest to drop their weapons and captured them with their carts and booty. These prisoners were escorted by the Cossacks to our Main Army. During this incident, those who most distinguished themselves by bravery and courage, encouraging others to defend themselves against enemies: the village headman Semyon Tikhonov of the village of Konstantinov, the headman of the village of Salvachevoy Egor Vasiliev and the village headman Yakov Petrov of Pochinok.

The peasants of the village of Zalesye, noticing that the man who called himself a Russian native served the French, immediately seized him and handed him over to the Cossacks who were in their village for presentation to where he should be.

From the village of Ganusov, the peasant Pavel Prokhorov, seeing 5 French people riding towards him, rode towards them on horseback in Cossack dress and, not having any firearms with him, took them prisoner with just a lance and delivered them to the Cossacks to be sent away on command.

In the villages of Velin, Krivtsy and Sofyino, the peasants, armed against the French, who arrived in sufficient numbers to plunder the holy churches and to seduce those living in these places, not only did not allow them to do so, but, having overcome them, destroyed them. In this case, 62 households with all buildings and property were burned due to shots from the enemy in the village of Sofyino.

In the villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda and Yaganov, the villages of Durnikha, Chulkova, Kulakova and Kakuzeva, peasants every day up to 2 thousand people gathered for the Borovsky transportation of the Moscow River to the mountain, having the strictest supervision over the crossing of enemy detachments. Some of them, to further intimidate their enemies, dressed in Cossack dress and armed themselves with clans. -They repeatedly struck and drove away the enemy; and on September 22, seeing that the enemy detachment, quite numerous, stretched along the other side of the river to the village of Myachkova, many of them, together with the Cossacks, forded the river and, quickly attacking the enemies, killed 11 people on the spot and took 46 people prisoner with weapons, horses and two carts; the rest, being scattered, fled.

In the Bronnitsky district, during the defeat and scattering of an enemy detachment that was seeking to plunder the village of Myachkova, the peasants of the village of Durnikhi showed the greatest courage: Mikhailo Andreev., Vasily Kirillov and Ivan Ivanov; villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda: Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev and Vladimir Afanasyev; village of Yaganova: headman Vasily Leontyev and peasant Fedul Dmitriev, who encouraged others to cross the river and attack the enemy. In the village of Vokhrin and the villages of Lubnin and Lytkarin, the inhabitants, armed against small enemy detachments, often exterminated them, and the Vokhrin residents lost 84 households with all their buildings and property from the burning, and in Lubnin two master’s households were burned - a horse farm and a cattle farm. Two Frenchmen came to the village of Khripav and, taking a horse harnessed to a cart standing behind the courtyards, sat on it and rode into the forest. The peasant of that village, Yegor Ivanov, who was guarding the village, saw this, chased after them with an ax and threatened to chop them up if they did not leave the horse. The robbers, seeing that they could not get away from him, got scared, abandoned the cart and horse and ran; but the said peasant, unharnessing his horse from the cart, chased after them on horseback and first chopped up one of them, and then caught up and killed the other.

In Volokolamsk district. The peasants of this district, who were constantly armed until the enemies left there, courageously repelled all their attacks, taking many captives and exterminating others on the spot. When the captain-policeman, who was in charge of these peasants, was absent to carry out other assignments, then the order and power over them was entrusted to the city of the actual privy councilor and senator Alyabyev to the steward Gavril Ankudinov, who, as well as the courtyard people who were with him, Mr. Alyabyev : Dmitry Ivanov, Fedor Feopemptov, Nikolai Mikhailov, also the economic Seredinskaya volost, the village of Sereda volost head Boris Borisov and his son Vasily Borisov, the village of Burtseva volost headman Ivan Ermolaev, volost clerk Mikhailo Fedorov, peasant Philip Mikhailov, village Podsukhina peasants Kozma Kozmin and Gerasim Semenov, acted excellently against the enemy and were always the first to attack him, setting an example for others with their fearlessness.

In Zvenigorod district. When almost the entire district was already occupied by the enemy, except for a small part of the villages lying towards the provincial town of Voskresensk, which the enemy troops did not have time to occupy, then the city and surrounding residents, even from the places occupied by the enemy, united and unanimously decided to defend the city of Voskresensk. They armed themselves with everything they could, established a guard and agreed among themselves that when the bell rang from it, everyone would immediately gather there on horseback and on foot. According to this conventional sign, they always flocked in considerable numbers, armed with guns, pikes, axes, pitchforks, scythes, and repeatedly drove away enemy parties approaching Voskresensk from the side of Zvenigorod and Ruza. They often fought near the city itself and far from it, sometimes alone, sometimes with the Cossacks, they killed many, captured them and delivered them to the Cossack teams, so that in one Zvenigorod district, more than 2 thousand people were exterminated by the enemies alone. In this way, the city of Voskresensk, some villages and the monastery, called New Jerusalem, were saved from the invasion and destruction of the enemy. At the same time, they distinguished themselves: the head of the economic Velyaminovskaya volost, Ivan Andreev, who, in addition to being involved in outfitting and disposing of people, rode out on horseback to battle and instilled courage in others by his example; of the village of Luchinsky, Mr. Golokhvastov, Sotsky Pavel Ivanov, who also not only dressed up people, but always himself and his children were in battles, in which he was wounded with one of his sons; Zvenigorod tradesman Nikolai Ovchinnikov, surviving in Voskresensk, went to battle several times and was wounded in the arm; Resurrection merchant Pentiokhov, Zvenigorod tradesman Ivan Goryainov, courtyard people: Prince Golitsyn - Alexey Abramov, Mr.] Column - Alexey Dmitriev and Prokhor Ignatiev, Mr.] Yaroslavov - Fyodor Sergeev, patrimonial elders: villages of Ilyinsky gr. Osterman - Egor Yakovlev, Mr. Ivashkov village] Ardalionov - Ustin Ivanov and peasant of the same village Egor Alekseev. All of them had been in battles many times and encouraged others to exterminate and drive out the enemy.

In Serpukhov district. When enemy parties were divided for robbery, then the peasants who remained in their houses used cunning to exterminate the enemies of the fatherland. They tried to first get them drunk and make them confused, and then attack them. In this way, 5 people were killed in the government village of Stromilov, in the village of Lopasna, 2, in the village of Teterki (Mr. Zhukov), 1, in the village of Dubna (Mr. Akimov), 7 people were killed in the village of Artishchevo (Mr. Volkov). Count [of] V. G. Orlov of the village of Semenovsky, mayor Akim Dementyev and Count [of] A. A. Orlova-Chesmenskaya of the village of Khatuni, clerk Ivan Ilyin and the landowner of Orlov's village of Gorok, mayor Nikifor Savelyev, according to rumors that the enemy is coming along the Kashirskaya road , gathered the departments of their peasants and, arming them with pikes, pitchforks, axes and Count Orlov’s house guns, boldly awaited the enemy in the village of Papushkina, who, having learned about it and being in small forces, was forced to pass by.

In Ruzsky district. The peasants, having armed themselves and set up a bell in each village for collecting, hastily gathered at the appearance of enemy detachments of up to several thousand people and with such unanimity and courage attacked the enemy parties that more than a thousand of them were exterminated by them, not counting those taken with their help by the Cossacks in captivity. Last October, the 11th, having gathered up to 1,500 people, they helped the Cossacks completely drive the enemy out of Ruza.

In Vereiskomts district. When the enemy repeatedly attacked the Vyshegorod estate of Countess Golovkina in the last days of August and at the beginning of September, we were always repelled by the estate elders Nikita Fedorov, Gavril Mironov and the courtyard clerks of the same landowner Alexei Kirpichnikov, Nikolai Uskov and Afanasyev * Shcheglov with the peasants. In the month of October, when the enemy, returning from Moscow, attempted to cross the Protva River (on which a flour mill with five gates was built) to plunder the Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the landowner's house and state-owned bread store located near it, in which more than 500 quarters of rye were stored, at that time, the aforementioned clerks - Alexei Kirpichnikov and Nikolai Uskov, having gathered up to 500 peasants, tried by all means to repel the enemy, who had up to 300 people in his detachment. Peasant Pyotr Petrov Kolyupanov and her wife, Countess Golovkina, from the village of Lobanova, peasant Emelyan Minaev, who were at the mill workers of the Mozhaisky district of the economic Reitar volost of the Ilyinskaya settlement, despite the repeated gun shots at them, tore down the lava on the dam and, dismantling the boards, released the water , which was how they held back the enemy party and saved the aforementioned church, the landowner’s house with all the services, a bread store, also church houses and an embankment settlement, in which there are 48 peasant houses. In the same way, the villages of Dubrova and Ponizovye were saved with the churches in them, defended from the peasants of these and the villages close to them, who were especially encouraged by the advice and admonitions of the Verona cathedral priest John Skobeev, who was in the village of Dubrovo, to whom the sexton of the Assumption Church contributed a lot Vasily Semenov, who not only encouraged others, but also participated in repelling the enemy.

This news. sent and certified by the Commander-in-Chief in Moscow, General of the Infantry, Count F.V. Rostopchin. The commanding people mentioned in it are highly ordered to be distinguished with the St. George 5th class badge, and others with a silver medal on the Vladimir ribbon with the inscription: “for love of the fatherland.” Without a doubt, many excellent and courageous deeds of other peasants, due to the information that has not reached them, remain unknown.

Simultaneously with the peasants, there were army partisan detachments, formed by order of the command for reconnaissance and military operations behind enemy lines. The first army partisan commander was hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. This is how he himself recalls how he became a partisan:

“Seeing myself no more useful to the fatherland than an ordinary hussar, I decided to ask for a separate command, despite the words uttered and extolled by mediocrity: do not ask for anything and do not refuse anything. On the contrary, I have always been sure that in our craft he only fulfills his duty, who crosses his line, does not stand in spirit like shoulders in a line with his comrades, asks for everything and refuses nothing.

With these thoughts, I sent a letter to Prince Bagration with the following content:

“Your Excellency! You know that, having left the position of your adjutant, which was so flattering for my pride, and joining the hussar regiment, the subject of partisan service was due to the strength of my years, and experience, and, if I dare say, my courage. Circumstances lead me to this day in the ranks of my comrades, where I do not have my own will and, therefore, can neither undertake nor accomplish anything remarkable. Prince! You are my only benefactor; allow me to appear before you to explain my intentions; if they are pleasing to you, use me according to my desire and be confident that the one who has held the title of Bagration’s adjutant for five years in a row will support this honor with all the jealousy that the plight of our dear fatherland requires. Denis Davydov."

On the twenty-first of August the prince called me to his place; Having presented myself to him, I explained to him the benefits of guerrilla warfare under the circumstances of that time. “The enemy is following one path,” I told him, “this path has gone beyond measure in its length; transports of the enemy's vital and combat food cover the space from Gzhat to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow route contributes to the twists and turns of not only parties, but also our entire army. What are crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Having left a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and send them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon. Will strong troops attack them? “They have plenty of room to avoid defeat.” Will they be left alone? - They will destroy the source of strength and life of the enemy army. Where will she get her energy and food? - Our land is not so abundant that the roadside part could support two hundred thousand troops; weapons and gunpowder factories are not on the Smolensk road. Moreover, the return appearance of ours among the villagers scattered from the war will encourage them and turn the military war into a people's war. Prince! I’ll tell you frankly: my soul hurts from parallel positions every day! It's time to see that they are not covering the bowels of Russia. Who doesn’t know that the best way to defend the object of the enemy’s desire is not in a parallel, but in a perpendicular or at least indirect position of the army relative to this object? And therefore, if the kind of retreat chosen by Barclay and continued by His Serene Highness does not stop, Moscow will be taken, peace will be signed in it, and we will go to India to fight for the French!.. I now turn to myself: if I must certainly perish, then I would rather I'll lie here! In India I will disappear with a hundred thousand of my compatriots without a name and for a benefit alien to Russia, but here I will die under the banners of independence, around which the villagers will crowd, grumbling about the violence and godlessness of our enemies... And who knows! Perhaps an army destined to operate in India!..”

The prince interrupted the immodest flight of my imagination; he shook my hand and said: “Today I will go to the Most Serene One and tell him your thoughts.”

In addition to the detachment of D.V. Davydov, the detachments of A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S. Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, and I.M. Vadbolsky also operated successfully. The partisan movement was such an unexpected and unpleasant surprise for the French occupiers that they tried to accuse Russia of violating the rules of war; the chief of the General Staff of the French Army, Marshal Berthier, even sent Colonel Berthemy to Headquarters M.I. Kutuzov with a letter full of indignation. To which Kutuzov responded with a letter with the following content:

Colonel Berthemy, whom I allowed to pass to my main apartment, handed me the letter that your lordship had instructed him to deliver to me. I immediately presented it to the Imperial Majesty about everything that constitutes the subject of this new appeal, and the transmitter of this was, as, no doubt, you know, Adjutant General Prince Volkonsky. However, taking into account the long distance and bad roads at this time of year, it is impossible that I can already receive an answer on this matter. Therefore, I can only refer to what I had the honor to say on this issue to General Lauriston. However, I will repeat here the truth, the meaning and power of which you, Prince, will undoubtedly appreciate: it is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything that they have seen, a people who have not seen war on their land for two hundred years, a people ready to sacrifice themselves for homeland and who does not distinguish between what is accepted and what is not accepted in ordinary wars.

As for the armies entrusted to me, I hope, Prince, that everyone will recognize in their mode of action the rules that characterize a brave, honest and generous people. During my long military service, I have never known any other rules, and I am confident that the enemies with whom I have ever fought have always given due justice to my principles.

Please accept, Prince, the assurances of my deepest respect.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armies Field Marshal

Prince Kutuzov

The partisan and militia movement made a huge contribution to the defeat and extermination of the enemy. Cutting off the enemy's communications, exterminating his troops, instilling fear and horror in him, hour after hour it brought closer the inevitable defeat of the invaders. And the experience gained by the people in 1812 was very useful in the future.

Russian Civilization

2.1 Participation of the detachments of A. S. Figner and D. V. Davydov in the defeat of Napoleon’s troops.

Kutuzov put very deep content into the concept of “small war”. Its main task was to keep the enemy’s communications under attack and create a constant threat of encirclement in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.

Soon after the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov organized special light detachments from part of his cavalry, which were supposed to operate together with peasant partisan detachments. These detachments were entrusted with the task of disrupting the communications of French troops and forcing the enemy to leave significant forces to guard their communications.

To carry out this very difficult form of warfare, bold, energetic and proactive commanders and troops were needed, capable of operating in any conditions. In Kutuzov's army there was no shortage of officers who were eager to wage a dangerous fight with the enemy. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to wage a small war was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, formed at the end of August consisting of 130 people.

Already at the beginning of September, Davydov’s detachment brutally taught a lesson to a gang of French marauders who had robbed the peasants of one of the surrounding villages (Tokarevo). Having attacked the French at dawn, who were accompanying a convoy with things looted from the peasants, Davydov captured 90 people, the rest were killed during the skirmish.

Before the peasants had time to sort out the things looted by the French, the scouts informed Davydov that another detachment was approaching the village. The defeat of the French was complete, the Cossacks and hussars burst into the middle of the convoy and captured 70 prisoners, who were sent under escort to the nearest city of Yukhnov.

The first success greatly encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy traveling along the main Smolensk road.

It was a clear, cold September evening. It had rained heavily the day before. Davydov’s detachment secretly and quickly made its way through the ravine along the path leading to the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche.

Before reaching 6 km, Davydov noticed an enemy patrol. But, fortunately for the partisans, the French could not notice them.

Davydov quickly gave the order to the Cossack officer Kryuchkov, so that he and 20 Cossacks surrounded the patrol and took him prisoner. A brave and energetic Cossack with 10 partisans headed forward along the ravine and cut off the path of the enemy patrol, and 10 other Cossacks, suddenly jumping out of the ravine, struck the French head-on. Seeing themselves surrounded, the French first rushed about, then stopped and soon surrendered without a fight. This patrol consisted of 10 French cavalrymen led by a non-commissioned officer.

Davydov, who spoke excellent French, immediately began the interrogation. The prisoners showed that in the village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche there was a French transport with artillery shells. This transport was guarded by a cavalry detachment of 250 people.

The success of an attack on such a significant transport depended primarily on the surprise of the attack.

Davydov therefore decided to get close to the village as unnoticed as possible. He turned off the road and began to carefully move across the fields, hiding in the hollows. But 3 kilometers before Tsarevo-Zaymishche, the partisans met a detachment of French foragers - about 40 people. Seeing the Russians, the French immediately rushed to run back to their own. It was necessary to act quickly and decisively.

Davydov’s detachment burst into the village just at the very moment when the frightened French galloped there. An unimaginable panic arose in French transport. Everyone started running wherever they could. The defeat of the French was complete. Only one group of 30 people tried to defend themselves, but were killed by Russian hussars and Cossacks. As a result of this dashing raid, the partisans captured 119 soldiers and two officers. Only a few enemy soldiers escaped. The partisans had 10 food wagons and 1 wagon with ammunition at their disposal.

When Davydov’s detachment received the bitter news of the occupation of Moscow by the enemy, it did not in the least break their determination to beat the enemy in any conditions. The soldiers and officers of the detachment had one desire: to take revenge on the arrogant enemy for the loss of Moscow.

Davydov gathered his detachment on Yukhnov Square and solemnly set out on a campaign. By evening, the detachment arrived in the village of Znamenskoye, where it was joined by 170 Cossacks from the Bug and Teptyar regiments.

At night, Davydov’s detachment quickly but carefully made its way to Vyazma, occupied by the French. The Cossack, sent to the forward patrol, reported that there was a French transport ahead, consisting of 30 carts and three hundred covering men.

The detachment began to secretly approach the enemy. The surprise of the attack so stunned the French that most of them did not try to defend themselves. About 100 French infantrymen were cut down by hussars and Cossacks, the rest surrendered without any resistance. The detachment captured, in addition to 270 captured soldiers and 6 officers, large and valuable booty. In the hands of Davydov there were 20 carts, loaded to the brim with food, and 12 carts with artillery ammunition. Davydov gave the order to send two carts with ammunition and 340 rifles to Znamenskoye for the militia.

Thus, Davydov’s detachment not only caused considerable damage to the supply of Napoleon’s army with food and ammunition, but also made it possible to well arm a detachment of peasants who joined the ranks of the militia at Davydov’s call.

Soon into the night, Davydov’s partisans captured up to 70 French marauders roaming along the great Smolensk road. And early in the morning, having learned that a large number of enemy carts were moving along the road, the partisans dismounted and captured 250 soldiers and two officers, and also took possession of a large amount of food.

Of course, such an active and successful activity of Davydov could not go unnoticed by the French. The French governor, who was sitting in Vyazma, became furious when he received continuous reports of successful raids by Russian partisans. He decided to destroy Davydov’s detachment at all costs. For this purpose, he allocated 2,000 soldiers and officers. He ordered the head of this detachment to clear the entire space between Vyazma and Gzhatsk, defeat Davydov’s detachment and capture him, alive or dead.

On September 15, Davydov received information that this French punitive detachment was already on its way. And soon he learned about the approach of this detachment. Davydov decided to outwit the enemy. He and his detachment crossed side roads and paths to the northeast of Vyazma. The French were looking for Russian partisans on the road between Vyazma and Smolensk, and they were again already on the road between Vyazma and Gzhatsk. Now Davydov went to Vyazma itself. He decided to divert the attention of the punitive detachment in another direction with a strong firefight near the city itself.

Hearing the shots, the French detachment began to respond, but did not dare to move away from the city. At night, Davydov’s detachment secretly retreated.

The scouts reported that the punitive detachment had turned towards Gzhatsk, and now Davydov was quickly moving along side roads to the west from Vyazma to the village of Monin. In the evening, having carefully approached almost the village itself, the detachment stopped. The partisans quickly loaded their guns. Everything was ready for a surprise attack on the French, who were calmly settling down in Monino for the night.

And when the partisans, at this signal, rushed to the convoy, the French were so taken aback that no one thought about resistance. This time the detachment captured 42 wagons with food and 10 artillery decks (carts with shells). 120 soldiers, led by an officer guarding this transport, surrendered.

M.I. Kutuzov closely followed Davydov’s brave partisan raids and attached great importance to the expansion of the partisan struggle against the French. Therefore, the commander-in-chief decided to send 500 Cossacks to Davydov.

Now he already had a significant force at his disposal - up to 700 people. There was no longer any need to be afraid of an attack by a punitive detachment. On the contrary, now Davydov himself really wanted to attack him. And after the exercises, he was finally convinced that his squad was completely ready for an enemy attack. Davydov divided his detachment into three parts. On October 4, two hours before dawn, all three detachments set off.

After a series of attacks and battles, as a result of the actions of all three detachments, Davydov captured 496 soldiers and 5 officers and captured 41 wagons. Davydov kept some of the captured horses for the Cossack detachment, and distributed the rest to local peasants. Davydov immediately sent a report about the successful attack on the French to Kutuzov’s main apartment.

But it was important to complete the main task - to destroy the French punitive detachment directed against the partisans.

From his intelligence officers, Davydov received accurate information about the division of the punitive detachment into two parts. One of them was very close to Vyazma, the other was along the large Smolensk road, further from the city. And Davydov decided to beat the enemy piece by piece.

In the night clash with the first detachment, many enemy soldiers were killed and wounded, and there were fewer prisoners than usual. There were only 376 soldiers and 2 officers. However, during the attack on the second detachment of the French, an unfortunate mistake occurred.

When Davydov approached the village where the French were staying, a small group of foragers saw the partisans, who warned their detachment. But this did not in the least prevent the partisans from defeating the enemy, who, after unsuccessful resistance, fled. The chase continued until noon. The partisans captured officers, soldiers and horses. The victory over the punitive detachment was won.

When Davydov received the news that Napoleon and his army were retreating from Maloyaroslavets to the Smolensk road, he gathered his entire detachment - both cavalry and infantry - into one fist and rushed to the big Smolensk road.

Davydov said in his “Notes” that three miles before the main road they began to encounter a countless number of convoys and a cloud of marauders who did not offer the slightest resistance.

One day, while undertaking his next search, Davydov encountered the core of Napoleon’s army. This time in front of him was Napoleon's old guard - the best and most combat-ready part of his entire army. She was not on a hike, but on bivouacs.

The French were quite alarmed when they suddenly saw Russian partisans in front of them. All the soldiers rushed to their guns, even opened cannon fire. The firefight continued until the evening. And this time Davydov managed to capture 146 soldiers with 3 officers and 7 trucks. But the most important thing was that Davydov’s raid thwarted Napoleon’s plans for a surprise attack with all his forces on the vanguard of the Russian army.

One day, Davydov’s travels informed him that a large detachment of the French General Augereau had been discovered in the village of Lyakhov. The detachments of Seslavin and Figner joined forces with Davydov. There were significantly more forces, but not enough to successfully attack the entire French corps. Then Davydov decided to make a request to the Guards General Orlov-Denisov, who was nearby with his large partisan detachment.

After a short meeting with the commanders of the detachments, the partisans set out on a campaign. The advanced units - the vanguard - were led into battle by Davydov himself. He decided to direct his forces across the Smolensk road. Such a maneuver by the partisans deprived the French troops of the opportunity to unite when the Russians attacked them.

As soon as the French saw the partisans, everything fell into confusion in their camp. They began to form up randomly, the soldiers separated from the columns and ran out from behind the huts to meet the Russians. Davydov's Cossacks dismounted, and a fight immediately began to boil.

The battle continued until the evening. And only in the evening twilight did the partisans begin to discern a truce moving towards them. The negotiations lasted no more than an hour, and their consequence was the surrender of 2,000 privates, 60 officers and 1 general.

At a time when Kutuzov with the main army was heading towards Krasnoye, Davydov, together with the Orlov-Denisov detachments, boldly met the main forces of the retreating French army.

The partisans soon came across columns of enemy infantry. At dusk, Napoleon's old guard, about 20 thousand people, moved. She walked in great order. Noticing partisan detachments not far from the road, the guard soldiers just pulled the trigger on their guns and continued to march, without increasing their pace. No matter how hard the Russian partisans tried, disregarding the mortal danger, to tear at least one soldier away from the tightly closed ranks of the Napoleonic guard, nothing worked. The old guard still retained all its former discipline and remained a formidable fighting force.

The main forces of the French army fell behind the French guard, one column continuously followed the other.

Davydov could not be satisfied with the damage that his attacks caused to the enemy, so in the evening of the same day he ordered Chechensky and his Cossacks to immediately go forward and destroy bridges on their way, create blockages on the road and in every way complicate the further retreat of the enemy. The remaining partisan forces continually appeared on both sides of the road and harassed the French vanguard with their shots.

Davydov’s detachment, like detachments of other Russian partisans, always followed on the heels of the enemy army, not giving it a moment’s rest.

At the end of December, Davydov’s entire detachment, by order of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the army’s main forces as its advanced detachment.

In addition to Davydov’s detachment, there were many other famous and successful partisan detachments.

Kutuzov, still from Podolsk, i.e., during the flank march to Tarutin, advanced to the Mozhaisk road a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov consisting of three Cossack, one hussar and one dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery. Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike the enemy. Having completed the task, Dorokhov withdrew to Krasnaya Pakhra by September 15 (27).

At the end of August, the Winzengerode detachment was also formed, which included 3,200 people. Initially, this detachment was entrusted with the task of observing the corps of Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais during the advance of the Napoleonic army towards Moscow. Kutuzov kept in touch with Winzengerode all the time, who sent very valuable information about the enemy. It has already been noted that after leaving Moscow, Kutuzov considered it necessary to be one of the first to inform Wintzingerode about the upcoming flanking maneuver. Then (September 3) Kutuzov wrote to him that he intended to stop for three or four days near Podolsk, from where he could send parties to the Mozhaisk road. He ordered Wintzingerode to occupy the road to Tver with troops, leaving one of the Cossack regiments on the Yaroslavl road. This regiment was supposed to maintain communication with the Cossack post located in Pokrov (on the Vladimir road), that one with the post in Yegoryevsk, and so through a chain of posts a connection was established with the location of the army, allowing Kutuzov to receive daily reports about the enemy.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular the detachments of A. S. Figner, I. M. Vadbolsky, N. D. Kudashev and A. N. Seslavin. (Appendix 3)

The detachment of I.M. Vadbolsky, consisting of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks under his command, was supposed to operate on the Mozhaisk and Ruzskaya roads. To do this, he advanced to the village of Kubinsky in order to attack the enemy convoys and drive his parties away, taking possession of the road to Ruza. A detachment of Colonel I.F. Chernozubov, numbering 300 people, was also sent to the Mozhaisk area. To the north the detachment of A. Kh. Benckendorff operated. N.D. Kudashevasiloy’s detachment of 500 people received the task of operating on the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. A. N. Seslavin with a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and one squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment) was assigned to operate in the area of the road from Borovsk to Moscow. Figner’s detachment operated in the same area; Seslavin was recommended to establish immediate relations with him. The Ryazan road was intercepted by a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov, with whom the Cossacks of Pobednov, Ilovaisky and others interacted.

A. S. Figner’s detachment differed from the rest in that it penetrated the enemy’s rear the most, remaining unnoticed.

Figner began his partisan activities in Moscow. There, under the guise of a peasant, he began to gather people who fiercely hated the enemy and were ready to defend their homeland at any moment. So he managed to form a small detachment that carried out bold attacks at night on the gangs of French robbers rampaging through the city.

During the day, Figner, in his peasant clothes, wandered around the city, rubbed shoulders with a drunken crowd of French soldiers, and listened to their conversations. After such daytime reconnaissance, he returned to his comrades and prepared for new night attacks on the enemy.

Upon Figner’s return from Moscow, Kutuzov instructed him to form a separate detachment and operate behind enemy lines. In a short time, Figner managed to gather over 200 daredevils. With this small group of partisans, he began to attack the French along the Mozhaisk road. During the day, he hid his squad in the thicket of the forest, while he himself was engaged in reconnaissance. Dressed in the uniform of a French officer, he went to the very location of the enemy. To avert his eyes, he posed as a guard officer and, in impeccable French, began making comments to the French soldiers standing guard. So Figner was on the lookout for whatever he needed.

As soon as evening came, the partisans fell out of the blue on the French where their attack was especially unexpected. Figner did not limit himself to recruiting only regular army soldiers into his detachment. He diligently recruited peasants into his detachment, collected and armed them.

While conducting reconnaissance on the Mozhaisk road one afternoon, Figner noticed an enemy artillery detachment with 6 cannons.

As soon as night fell, Figner's partisans boldly attacked this detachment, killed the sentries and, without much difficulty, forced all the other artillerymen to surrender.

Soon Figner's partisan activities became known to the French command, and the French generals assigned a large sum of money to anyone who would indicate Figner's location and assist in his capture. They began to take decisive measures to destroy the partisan detachment.

In such conditions, Figner’s detachment had to be especially monolithic, consisting of reliable, loyal people. Figner decided to ask Kutuzov himself to allocate soldiers and officers from regular military units for his detachment.

Kutuzov understood well that in Figner he had found a fearless and courageous leader of a new partisan detachment. And the partisans were very, very needed in the dangerous situation in which the country was after the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon. Kutuzov allowed Figner to take 800 people from the light cavalry, hussars, lancers and Cossacks with the officers he chose for himself. So Figner gathered a large detachment of soldiers and officers and, leading it, became a thunderstorm for the French moving along the road between Mozhaisk and Moscow.

The French were very concerned about Figner's bold partisan raids. Napoleon ordered one infantry and one cavalry division to be allocated to fight the partisans on the Mozhaisk road.

Figner had to spend a lot of time behind enemy lines. In the French camp, Figner behaved with extraordinary simplicity and composure. He calmly drove up to the fires, talked a lot with the officers and at the same time managed to collect valuable information. And one day he managed to penetrate the main apartment of the head of the vanguard of the Napoleonic army, Murat.

Particularly important was the participation of Figner’s detachment in the capture of Vyazma. The friendly onslaught of Figner’s partisan detachment greatly contributed to the success of the actions of the main forces of the Russian army during the occupation of Vyazma.

General Ermolov in his “Notes” gives enormous merit to the partisans, in particular to Figner.

In September, the flying detachments included 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave partisan warfare a wide scope.

Kutuzov assigned military partisan detachments mainly the tasks of observing the enemy and delivering continuous attacks on his troops.

Observation of the enemy was carried out so well that Kutuzov had complete information about all movements of French troops, on the basis of which it was possible to draw correct conclusions about Napoleon’s intentions. Every day, the commander-in-chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, captured mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which was reflected in the log of military operations.

Continuous impact on the enemy had a deep meaning. The French had to keep part of their troops ready at all times to repel the attacks of military partisans and conduct their foraging operations under the protection of significant forces. According to the log of military operations, from September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand French were captured. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of peasant partisan detachments.

2.2 People's War of 1812.

Many participants in the events testify to the beginning of the movement among the people. Decembrist I.D. Yakushkin, a participant in the war, also emphasized that when the French approached, residents voluntarily retreated into forests and swamps, burning their homes, and from there they fought the invaders. A significant part of the nobles remained in place, trying to preserve their estates. There is a lot of evidence that the peasants demanded that the landowners fight the Napoleonic army and destroyed the estates of those of them who meekly met the enemy.

The deeper Napoleonic troops penetrated into Russia, the more obvious became the fierce resistance of the people who did not want to cooperate with the invaders. But if the French managed to force individual peasants to act as guides, many of them took the opportunity to lead detachments either into the thicket of forests or away from large populated areas. The feat of Ivan Susanin was repeated more than once at that time.

By mid-August, in a number of districts of the Smolensk province there were already several fairly large peasant detachments. Three detachments operated in the Sychevsky district. The first of them consisted of residents of the city of Sychevsk, headed by the mayor P. Karzhenkovsky. This detachment repeatedly repelled the attempts of the Polish lancers to destroy the villages around the city. The second detachment, led by S. Emelyanov, a combat Suvorov soldier, numbered 400 people, it fought 15 battles and destroyed 572 French soldiers. The detachment of police officer E. Boguslavsky was also active; he destroyed 1,760 enemy people.

Among the folk heroes there were many women. The memory of the famous elder of the Gorshkov farm of Sychevsky district, Vasilisa Kozhina, whose detachment captured and exterminated the French, still lives on. Also known is the “lacemaker Praskovya,” a peasant woman from the village of Sokolovo, Smolensk province.

In the Gzhatsk district, the actions of two detachments - Ermolai Vasilyevich Chetvertak (Chetvertakov) and Fyodor Potapov (Samusya) - became widely known.

The actions of the army partisan detachments would not have been so effective if they had not been supported by the peasants who formed their own detachments.

The head of the partisan peasant detachment was usually one of the peasants, or one of the wounded soldiers who had fought back. In fact, every village around Moscow had its own partisan detachments. “In every village,” wrote D.V. Davydov, “the gates were locked, and there stood young and old with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.” Sometimes small groups of partisans united, turning into quite large detachments that the French had to take seriously. Often numbering from 500 to 2 thousand people, such united detachments were very active. Thus, the “soldier-villagers” of the Ruza district exterminated more than a thousand French. In the Zvenigorod district, peasants defended the city of Voznesensk and exterminated more than two thousand people from enemy detachments. Residents of the Bronnitsky district acted in the same way. The peasants of Sychevsky district, having organized self-defense detachments, did not allow French foragers to approach them. Residents of the city of Sychevka also armed themselves and also acted actively. On the territory of this district, the enemy lost more than 1,800 people killed and over 2 thousand captured by September 1. The peasants of the Belsky district organized a mounted guard army of 100 people, which served as the beginning of the almost complete arming of the population. This district was also fenced off from the enemy. Self-defense was also organized in the Roslavl district. Here, too, a “security army” of 400 people was created, operating together with peasant detachments.

Kurin's detachment, operating in Bogorodsky district, numbered from 5 to 6 thousand people, of which more than 500 were mounted. This detachment defended the village of Vokhnu, where a strong detachment of French foragers was trying to penetrate. Kurin formed his detachment in three columns. One column operated from the front, the other two made a roundabout maneuver. As a result of the battle, the French detachment was defeated.

Near Moscow there was a three-thousand-strong line of Samus (Fedor Potapov), in which there were 200 cavalry men. Samusya's detachment destroyed more than three thousand French. “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages under his command. With him, everything was carried out according to signs, which were given through the ringing of bells and other conventional signs... Various beacons and ringing of bells of various sizes announced when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, to go into battle.”

Of equal interest are the actions of the detachment organized and led by the former private of the Kiev Dragoon Regiment E.V. Chetvertak (Chetvertakov). E.V. Chetvertak was captured in a rearguard battle near Tsarev-Zaimishche. Soon he managed to escape from captivity, and in the village of Basmannaya he organized a detachment of 47 people. Soon this detachment grew to 300 people, and in necessary cases, Chetvertak could field an entire army, numbering up to 4 thousand peasants. The detachment of E.V. Chetvertak kept the entire Gzhatsk district under control. S. Emelyanov’s detachment acted very energetically in Sychevsky district. The actions of the detachments of Stepan Eremenko (Eremeenko) and Vasily Polovtsev are also known.

Kutuzov appreciated the patriotism of the peasants and their zeal in defending their homeland. He reported: “The peasants, burning with love for their homeland, are organizing militias among themselves. It happens that several neighboring villages post sentries on elevated places and bell towers, who, upon seeing the enemy, sound the alarm. At this sign, the peasants gather, attack the enemy with desperation, and do not leave the battlefield without achieving final victory. They kill the enemy in large numbers, and take those captured to the army. Every day they come to the main apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and ammunition for protection from enemies. The requests of these respectable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with guns, pistols and gunpowder.”

The peasants fought with amazing resilience. They sacrificed everything for the liberation of their native country. “With martyrdom they endured,” wrote Kutuzov to Alexander I, “all the blows associated with the enemy’s invasion, hid their families and young children in the forests, and the armed themselves sought defeat in their peaceful homes against the emerging predators. Often the women themselves cunningly caught these villains and punished their attempts with death, and often armed villagers, joining our partisans, greatly assisted them in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants.”

D.V. Davydov, summarizing the experience of the partisan war of 1812, wrote: “It embraces and crosses the entire length of the routes, from the rear of the opposing army to that expanse of land that is designated for supplying it with troops, food and ammunition, through which, blocking the flow the source of her strength and existence, she exposes her to the blows of her army, exhausted, hungry, disarmed and deprived of the saving bonds of subordination. This is guerrilla warfare in the full sense of the word.” But this, Davydov further says, is not all. Equally important is the moral influence

guerrilla warfare, which consists in raising the fallen spirit of the inhabitants of those areas that are located in the rear of the enemy army.

The actions of the partisans forced Napoleon to strengthen the security of the roads. Of course, the Smolensk road was especially important. To ensure its safety, part of Victor’s corps, which previously provided the main communications from Vilna to Smolensk, was brought to Mozhaisk. Punitive detachments were sent against the partisans.

Frightened by the losses suffered by the French army as a result of the small war, Napoleon was nervous. He ordered Marshal Berthier: “Confirm my command that no transport be sent from Smolensk except under the command of a headquarters officer and under the cover of 1,500 people... Write to the generals commanding the corps that we are losing a lot of people every day... that the number of people , taken prisoner by the enemy, reaches several hundred every day... Write to the King of Naples, commander of the cavalry, that the latter must completely cover the foragers and protect the troops sent for food from attacks by the Cossacks... Finally, let the Duke of Elchingen know that he daily loses more people than in one battle, that in view of this it is necessary to better regulate the service of foragers and not move so far from the troops.”

It was the actions of the partisans, the people's war, that Lauriston had in mind, sent by Napoleon to Kutuzov to beg for peace, when, as Kutuzov reported this fact to Alexander I, “most of all he spread about the image of the barbaric war that we are waging with them.” “I assured him,” Kutuzov writes in his report to Tsar, “that even if I wanted to change this way of thinking among the people, I could not manage to ensure that they honor this war, just like the invasion of the Tatars, and I did not able to change their upbringing.”

Kutuzov expressed the same idea in his response to Marshal Berthier’s letter.

Around Moscow, occupied by the French, two rings formed, as it were, consisting of light troops - partisans and militias.

They gradually narrowed, threatening to turn the strategic environment into a tactical one.

Thus, with the help of a small war, Kutuzov, firstly, blocked the enemy army, depriving it of the supply of food and fodder, constantly disturbing and destroying small detachments, and secondly, protected his army from enemy actions, while simultaneously creating the opportunity for himself to always be keep abreast of all events.

Napoleon tried to organize the fight against partisans and flying detachments. Poniatowski's corps was advanced to Podolsk, Bessier's corps - to the Tula road; The Mozhaisk road was guarded by Brusier and light cavalry. Napoleon was especially worried about the Cossacks. “Neither the losses suffered in battle, nor the condition of the cavalry - nothing bothered him as much as the appearance of the Cossacks in our rear,” Caulaincourt wrote.

The people's militias, which formed the second ring of the enemy's encirclement, were also quite active at this time. The Tver militia numbering 14,500 people operated on the right flank. It was located between Moscow and Klin, covering the cities of Klin, Bezhetsk, Voskresensk, as well as a number of other points. The Tver militia was
subordinated to General Wintzengerode, who commanded the detachment covering the St. Petersburg road. In addition to him, Wintzingerode had at its disposal 3,200 regular troops, the Cossack detachment of I. Chernozubov, and separate detachments of military partisans (Prendel and others). In total, there were about 20 thousand people in this direction.

Ney's attempt to push back the Tver militia and reach Dimitrov was unsuccessful. A four-thousand-strong French detachment was driven back from Dimitrov. The French attempt to gain a foothold in Voskresensk was also unsuccessful: they were also driven back to Moscow.

The Ryazan militia was concentrated in the Dedinov area by the beginning of September. His task was to guard the line along the Oka River. The militia covered the approaches to the cities of Aleksin, Kasimov and Yegoryevsk. The enemy in this direction made only weak attempts to penetrate beyond the Oka River, which were easily repelled by the militia.

The road to Yaroslavl was covered by the Yaroslavl militia, located near the city of Pereyaslavl-Zalessky. But it formed relatively late and conducted almost no combat operations until the beginning of October. The Vladimir militia, numbering 13,969 warriors, was more active on the Vladimir road. Concentrating in the city of Pokrov, it interacted with the military partisans of Efremov and the peasant detachments of Kurin.

Napoleon, counting on a long stay in Moscow, decided to create several large supply bases around Moscow. One of these bases was supposed to be in the city of Bogorodsk, where up to 15 thousand French troops were sent on this occasion. They managed to capture the city before the formation of the Vladimir militia was completed. The entry of the French detachment to Bogorodsk, on the right flank of Kutuzov’s army, created a certain threat for it. In this regard, Kutuzov sent a detachment of Cossacks numbering about one thousand and 15 thousand warriors of the Vladimir militia to Bogorodsk. These forces blocked the French, preventing them from foraging, and then on October 1 (13) they stormed Bogorodsk. The French were forced to retreat to Moscow.

The Tula militia was also active. In early September, on the orders of Kutuzov, it advanced to the borders of its province, taking upon itself the protection of a cordon from Kashira to Aleksin, 200 km long. . On September 5 (17), the head of the Tula militia, N. I. Bogdanov, asked Kutuzov to add one artillery brigade located in Kolomna to the Tula military force so that he could “if necessary, repel the enemy and prevent him from crossing the Oka River.” On September 15 (27), he again asked Kutuzov to assign two horse artillery companies to the Tula militia for this purpose.

The Tula militia greatly contributed to the fact that the Russian army received a quiet rest in the Tarutino camp. It did not allow enemy troops to appear in the area where Russian troops were concentrated and, in addition, protected the population from robberies and murders by French marauders.

In addition to the militia, protective cavalry detachments (900-1000 people) were formed in the province, which developed vigorous activity. Many French troops were exterminated or captured during their attempts to reach the Tula arms factories.

Even more interesting are the actions of the Kaluga militia. 11 thousand Kaluga residents, initially concentrated in Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets, were forced to join the fight already in August 1812. Kutuzov set the Kaluga militia the task of covering Yelnya, Roslavl, Yukhnov and Zhizdra. In the battles for these points, the militia inflicted great damage on the enemy: he lost up to four thousand killed and more than two thousand captured.

The French command, during the stay of the “grand army” in Moscow, tried to expand the area it controlled, adjacent to the operational line going to the west. To do this, it sent large forces to Borovsk, Yelnya, Roslavl, which should

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