International situation of modern Russia (90s). International situation of modern Kazakhstan No change in the western direction

From the chain of political upheavals in Latin America to the endless political crisis in Great Britain. From a series of armed attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf to sharp fluctuations in US-China relations.

Against this complex background of chronic instability and volatility in the international situation, Russian foreign policy stood out especially clearly. Even the most irreconcilable critics of Moscow are forced to admit that in the past year, the Russian line in international affairs has been characterized by continuity and consistency. Russia does not look like a convenient partner to everyone on the world stage, but it cannot be blamed for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner. This undeniable advantage over some other great powers earns the respect not only of our friends and allies, but also of our adversaries and adversaries.

Apparently, the coming 2020 will be characterized by a further decline in the stability of the world system. I would, of course, like to be wrong, but the energy of the collapse of the old system of international relations has clearly not yet been completely exhausted. It is unlikely that it will be possible to stop the chain reaction of decay so quickly - this is not a task for a year or two, but for a long historical perspective. And the task is not for one or a group of the world’s leading countries, but for the entire international community as a whole, which, for a variety of reasons, is not yet ready to take it seriously.

Under these conditions, a natural temptation may arise to limit Russia’s participation in international affairs as much as possible, to isolate itself from the unpredictable and dangerous outside world, and to focus on solving internal problems. It is understandable that we do not want to “import instability”, to become unwitting hostages of those negative processes and trends in world politics that we are unable to manage and which no one is able to control. The public’s request for the country’s leadership to focus on our internal problems, which, unfortunately, we still have in abundance, is also understandable.

But the strategy of self-isolation, even temporary and partial, is dangerous in at least two respects. First, consistent self-isolation is virtually impossible in today's interdependent world, with rare exceptions such as North Korea. And for Russia, deeply integrated into global political, economic and social processes, any attempts at self-isolation will inevitably mean abandoning many of the most important gains of our foreign policy over the past 30 years. And, moreover, they will significantly slow down the solution of those internal tasks on which it is proposed to focus.

Russia does not look like a convenient partner to everyone on the world stage, but it cannot be blamed for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner.

Secondly, the strategy of self-isolation will actually also mean Russia’s withdrawal from active participation in the creation of a new system of international relations, in the construction of a new world order. And the creation of this new world order is inevitable in any case - the main questions are only in the timing and the price that humanity will have to pay for this world order. When the era of instability is left behind and global controllability is restored in one way or another, we will have to play by the rules developed by someone else and reflecting the interests not of Russia, but of other participants in world politics.

Therefore, Russian foreign policy in the coming year, it seems, should not be limited to solving primarily current, operational tasks in various regions of the world, although the importance of these tasks cannot be overestimated. But no less important is the development of new principles, models and mechanisms of international cooperation for the future. Figuratively speaking, if today it is too early to start building the building of a new world order, then it is possible and necessary to select individual “bricks” and even entire building blocks for this future building today. In this complex work, Russian foreign policy has something to rely on.

For example, in Syria, our country has accumulated unique experience in multilateral diplomacy, which makes it possible to bring together the positions of seemingly the most irreconcilable opponents and achieve a sustainable reduction in the intensity of military confrontation. Russia has managed to achieve in Syria what many not so long ago considered essentially unattainable. Obviously, in the coming year it is worth trying to extend this practice to the Middle East region as a whole, consistently developing and concretizing the Russian concept of a regional collective security system, which is certainly in demand in the Middle East.

In Asia, Russia and its partners were able to take serious steps towards building a fundamentally new democratic and open system of international institutions. Among recent achievements, it is enough to mention the expansion of the SCO, the promotion of the BRICS+ concept, the activation of the trilateral RIC format (Russia, India, China), impressive progress towards connecting the development of the EAEU and the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” project. Apparently, filling new institutional forms with specific content is especially important here. Russia, hosting the BRICS and SCO summits on its territory in 2020, could confirm its leading role in expanding the “project portfolio” of these organizations.

Russian-Chinese relations are confidently becoming an influential factor in the entire system of international relations. Further increasing the level of coordination between Russia and China in the international arena, including in the field of security, will continue to strengthen their authority and influence in world affairs.

In the European direction, although the outgoing 2019 did not become a turning point for the better for Moscow, it nevertheless brought certain positive results. Russia returned to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It was possible to achieve common approaches between Russia and the West to resolve the political crisis in Moldova. After a long break, the mechanism of the “Normandy Four” summits on the settlement in Donbass began to work. There has been progress in trilateral negotiations with Ukraine and the European Union on energy issues.

Europe is entering a period of deep rethinking of its regional integration model. And it’s not just about the UK’s upcoming exit from the European Union. On the agenda are pressing issues of socio-economic development, regionalization, security problems, etc. Against this background, a serious political dialogue on the future of relations between Russia and Europe in all strategic areas of our relations is becoming more than in demand. And such a dialogue must begin without delay.

With the 2020 election campaign well underway in the United States, it's not the best time to start trying to mend our bilateral relationship. But we cannot agree with those who believe that Moscow should take a pause in these relations, awaiting the results of the presidential elections and the US exit from the deep political crisis that split American society three years ago. History shows that waiting for a “favorable moment” can last forever, and there will always be plenty of good reasons to extend the pause again and again. If contacts with the US executive branch are objectively difficult today, then we need to increase our activity along other lines, including on the second track of our relations.

In relations with Africa, 2019 was a breakthrough year - the Sochi Russia-Africa summit not only demonstrated the existence of mutual interest in developing cooperation, but also revealed the potential of such cooperation. Now the main thing is that the received impulse does not go into the sand, and therefore 2020 in this sense should be a year of practical steps.

These and many other problems will face Russian foreign policy in 2020. Our country has already demonstrated the skills of an effective crisis manager, capable of coping with the most serious current challenges to regional and global security. Russia has the opportunity, in addition to these skills, to also demonstrate the abilities of an experienced design engineer who is ready, together with his partners, to design individual components and entire units of a complex and as yet unformed mechanism of the new world order.

2020 will be held under the banner of the 75th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. Looking back, it is impossible not to note that already in 1945, far from us, the victorious powers, despite deep differences on the most fundamental issues of world development, were able to agree not only on the general rules of the game on the world stage, but also on the creation of an entire system of international institutions guaranteeing the preservation of global and regional stability. This system, with all its shortcomings and imperfections, has served humanity for many decades.

Today, the international community faces challenges comparable in scale to those of the middle of the last century. I would like to hope that modern politicians, like their great predecessors, are aware of their historical responsibility and demonstrate statesmanship in the interests of resolving pressing problems of our time.

International situation of modern Russia (90s)

The collapse of the USSR changed Russia's position in the international arena. First of all, it was necessary to achieve recognition of Russia as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union in the UN. Almost all states recognized Russia. Including the recognition of the sovereignty of Russia, the transfer to it of the rights and obligations of the former USSR in 1993-1994. declared the countries of the European Community (EC). Partnership and cooperation agreements were concluded between EU states and the Russian Federation.

The Russian government joined the Partnership for Peace program proposed by NATO, subsequently agreeing with NATO to conclude a separate agreement.

At the same time, Russia could not remain indifferent to the attempts of Eastern European countries to join NATO. Moreover, the NATO leadership published a document formulating the conditions for the expansion of this bloc. Any country wishing to join NATO must be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. It became obvious that the only power in the world that lays claim to global intervention in the affairs of other countries is the United States.

In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe (created in 1949, uniting 39 European states), which was responsible for issues of culture, human rights, and environmental protection. However, during the events in Chechnya, Russia began to be subjected to discriminatory criticism in the Council of Europe, which raised the question of the appropriateness of its participation in this organization.

The dynamism of international events required constant maneuvering from Russian diplomacy. Russia has become a participant in regular annual meetings of the G7 (after Russia joined the G8) - the leaders of the leading developed countries of the world, where the most important political and economic issues are discussed. In general, ties with France, Great Britain, Italy and especially Germany (after the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1994 from the territory of the former GDR) developed positively.

The establishment of partnerships with the United States and Western European countries occurred in parallel with Russia’s turn to “face” the East. Russia is a major power and the center of Eurasia. Naturally, its geopolitical strategy should be based on equal treatment of countries of both the West and the East. The policy of “Eurocentrism,” pursued during the years of “perestroika” under Gorbachev’s slogan “Enter the European House,” was perceived with caution by the leaders of eastern countries and caused bewilderment among the population of the Asian regions of Russia. Therefore, mutual visits of the heads of state of Russia and China (treaties and agreements of 1997-2001), strengthening relations with India (treaty of 2001) became a serious contribution to improving the international climate, to the development of the concept of a multipolar world, as opposed to US claims to establish a “new world order."

A very important issue in relations between Russia and non-CIS countries, and primarily the United States, is the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and security. Although Russia's economic status has fallen, in terms of nuclear weapons it still retains the position of the USSR as a superpower. The political leaders of modern Russia were accepted on equal terms by the G8 and NATO. In this regard, the ratification in 2000 by the Third State Duma of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) concluded in 1992 between Russia and the United States raised questions among civilian and military experts who believe that this is a unilateral concession in favor of the United States. Because by 2003, the most formidable ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the SS-18, were subject to elimination from the Russian defensive arsenal (they are based in almost invulnerable silos and carry combat duty in the version of 10 multiple warheads of individual targeting). Russia's possession of these weapons forces the other side to comply with agreements on nuclear stockpile reductions and missile defense.

In 2002, in connection with the US withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, the Russian side announced the termination of its obligations under the START-2 Treaty.

Foreign economic relations and trade between Russia and foreign countries developed. Our country supplies oil, gas and natural resources in exchange for food and consumer goods. At the same time, states in the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are showing interest in Russia’s participation in the construction of hydroelectric power stations, metallurgical enterprises, and agricultural facilities.

Relations with the CIS countries occupy an important place in the foreign policy activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. In January 1993, the Commonwealth Charter was adopted. At first, the central place in relations between the countries was occupied by negotiations on issues related to the division of property of the former USSR. Borders were established with those countries that introduced national currencies. Agreements were signed that determined the conditions for the transportation of Russian goods through the territory of the CIS countries to foreign countries.

The collapse of the USSR destroyed traditional economic ties with the former republics. Trade with the CIS countries is developing, but has a number of problems. Perhaps the most pressing one is this: Russia continues to supply the former republics with fuel and energy resources, primarily oil and gas, for which the Commonwealth states cannot pay. Their financial debt in billions of dollars is growing.

The Russian leadership seeks to maintain integration ties between the former republics within the CIS. On his initiative, the Interstate Committee of the Commonwealth Countries was created with its headquarters in Moscow. A collective security agreement was concluded between seven states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) (May 15, 1992). Russia, in fact, has become the only state that actually carries out peacekeeping tasks in the “hot spots” of the CIS (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan).

Interstate relations between Russia and some former republics of the USSR were not easy. Conflicts with the governments of the Baltic states are caused by discrimination against the Russian population living there. In relations with Ukraine, there is the problem of Crimea, which, together with the Russian city of Sevastopol, was “gifted” to Ukraine by Khrushchev’s voluntaristic decision.

The closest, fraternal ties are developing between Russia and Belarus (treaties of 1997, 2001). Integration relations are developing between them, leading to the formation of a single union state.

It is now clear that Russia can play a more significant role in strengthening economic, political, and cultural ties between the CIS states if it achieves success in its domestic policy, the revival of the national economy, and the rise of culture and science. And Russia’s authority in the world as a whole can be ensured by the stable development of its economy and the stability of the internal political situation.

article. In paragraph 1 of the resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated July 23, 2009 No. 64 “On some issues in the practice of considering disputes about the rights of owners of premises to the common property of a building”8 it is stated that since the relations of the owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising regarding the common property in such a building are not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the norms of legislation regulating similar relations are subject to application to these relations, in particular Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

Since 2009, the provisions of the above-mentioned Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the right of common shared ownership of its common property for the owners of premises located in a non-residential building9.

As a result of our excursion into the development of legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary at the legislative level to consolidate the status of common property in non-residential premises and thereby identify gaps in the legislation.

1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA is a scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/ EotkopM^ebObjects/tgu-ww.woa/wa/Mam?textid=3030&1eve1 1=tat&^e12=ag11s^

2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.

3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.

4 See, for example: resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District dated December 18, 2002 No. F03-A51/02-2/2512; resolutions

FAS of the Ural District dated 09/03/2003 No. F09-2398/03-GK, dated 01/20/2005 No. F09-4495/04-GK.; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Moscow Region dated August 17, 2005 No. KG-A40/7495-05. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

5 See, for example: Lapach V.A. Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. P. 12.; Ilyin D.I. Real estate legislation: problems of the content of used concepts // Journal of Russian Law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil legal grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Author's abstract. Diss... cand. legal Sci. M., 2006. P. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. P. 47.; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of an investment and construction project // New Legislation and legal practice. 2009. No. 1.

6 Sweet Yu.P. Features of ownership of the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.

7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Author's abstract. Diss... doc. legal Sci. M., 2006. P. 30.

8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.

9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District dated October 22, 2009 No. A05-3116/2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District on the case dated November 18, 2009 No. A05-9710/2008; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga District on the case dated November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Ural District dated November 9, 2009 No. Ф09-8894/09-С5. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE

DEVELOPMENT

V.N. Fadeev,

Doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology of the Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - criminal law and criminology;

criminal-executive law Reviewer: Doctor of Economic Sciences, Candidate of Legal Sciences, Professor N.D. Eriashvili

E-mail: fadei87@mail. ru

Annotation. An analysis of the international position of Russia at the present stage of historical development is provided. Trends that negatively affect the socio-political situation, the viability and security of our country in modern conditions and for the future have been identified and substantiated; an assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.

Key words: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counter-terrorism cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT

Doctor of Legal Science, professor of Criminology department

of Moscow University MVD RF

Annotation. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have negative impact on the social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.

Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.

The United States, which faces “threats” from al-Qaeda and Iran, increasing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly does not need new enemies. However, their relations with Russia will objectively worsen every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is increasing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War era. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missile missiles in Poland do nothing to ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redistribution. The world order established after the Second World War began to collapse before our eyes. The United States continues to arrange the world according to its own scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.

China has always had and will have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. That leaves Russia. Of course, the United States would like to deal with an obedient “Kozyrev” Russia, or at least the one it was under the late Yeltsin - let it “blurt”, let it “clang,” but they knew that we have almost nothing behind our souls was.

It’s not that the United States did not expect the oil price boom in recent years - they themselves provoked it - they did not expect that the oil genie would pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today is beginning to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the United States and the West. Let us note that our relations with Japan somehow faded into the background in the last years of Putin’s rule. This does not mean that we have lost interest in contacts with Japan. This speaks more about the weakening of Japan's overall influence on the world stage.

Of course, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were Moscow’s increasing independence in domestic policy and assertiveness in foreign policy. However, the United States and the West also bear a considerable share of responsibility for the mutual cooling and gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But gas alone may not be enough.

But what especially irritates the United States and alarms the West is the “disorderly” transformation of Russia, according to their scenario, from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, setting itself ambitious goals of modernizing the economy, and therefore the army. The United States in relation to Russia will still have to rely on the prevailing opinion in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War, in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. In the Second World War there were two winners - the USSR and the USA and its allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In reality, this is not the case, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.

The collapse of the USSR is undoubtedly the greatest defeat of our Fatherland, perhaps in its entire history. A great state - essentially an empire - was destroyed. But this is the external side. The United States and the West did indeed win the Cold War, but in this case, the victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, were among the victors of the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psycho-

chology of the Vlasovites or other traitors during the war who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of ​​​​fighting the Bolsheviks.

But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and enormous resources. Even if someday, although hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still persist. Of course, the realities of the 21st century. will force the United States to reconsider its strategy towards Russia more than once. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.

Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here we cannot do without a Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policies of the superpowers. Who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - the USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the 20th century. the thesis was relevant - whoever controls Eurasia controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of the bridge. And Russia may find itself at the epicenter of the interests of superpowers. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its bridge and not end up under the bridge, Russia will have to be strong and independent both economically and military-politically. There is simply no other way. A one-sided orientation only to the West or to the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.

It is possible that in the coming years the United States will have no time for Russia. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy towards Russia has always left the impression that turning Russia into a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed Russian cooperation, they could secure it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed especially inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the US political lead and, over time, might even like it. In Washington, it seems, they forgot that American soldiers did not stand on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground by atomic bombs. Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia

I have practically already gotten rid of the complex of defeating the USSR. Russia is a different country. Therefore, Russia did not suffer a major defeat; began to carry out transformations and “clean up” after the collapse of the “parental home”. It is not the same. And this, basically, will determine Russia’s reaction to the actions of the United States.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has built relations with the United States not as a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend, but it has not behaved as an adversary, and, especially not as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of opponents of the United States is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically different. And this is a serious reason for future confrontation. The United States does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar stations in the Czech Republic and missile defense in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and, possibly, Ukraine), will inevitably lead to military confrontation, albeit based on the doctrine of containment. But this is a new round of the arms race.

For the United States and the West, this is a technological gap from Russia and China; for us, these are unaffordable costs, akin to those that Reagan gave us with his “star wars” concept. For the weak to catch up with the strong means to be hopelessly behind. And this path was ordered for us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where the US and its allies are weak, where they make mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the situation from developing in a downward spiral.

Russia must understand that in the 21st century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other disasters at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we have stayed too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War significantly influenced the formation of US policy towards Russia. Although Washington's actions were one of the important factors that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should be given much more credit than is usually given to reformers in Moscow itself.

Let us not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was not at all inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had emerged during the time of Leonid

Brezhnev. And this: the lack of free military resources, which was especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense expenditures that placed an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the decline in the general prestige of the USSR, accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was supposed to be an increase in the influence and prestige of the USSR.

When Gorbachev sharply cut subsidies to the Eastern Bloc, abandoned support for retrograde regimes in the Warsaw Pact states, and initiated “perestroika,” the political dynamics in Eastern Europe changed fundamentally, resulting in the largely peaceful fall of communist regimes and the weakening of Moscow’s influence in the region. Ronald Reagan contributed to this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, not the White House, who ended the Soviet empire.

American influence played an even smaller role in the collapse of the USSR itself. The George H. W. Bush administration supported the Baltic republics' desire for independence, and made it clear to Gorbachev that violent action against the legally elected separatist governments in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to participate and win relatively free elections, and by refusing to take decisive action to remove them from power through the security forces, Gorbachev effectively ensured the Baltic states' secession from the USSR. Russia itself dealt the final blow to it, demanding for itself the same institutional status as other union republics. At a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev said: if Russia is allowed to gain sovereignty, this will be the “end of the empire.” And so it happened. After the unsuccessful attempt at a reactionary putsch in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from “dismantling” the Soviet Union.

The administrations of Reagan and Bush Sr. realized all the dangers associated with the collapse of a superpower, and ensured the “manageability” of the collapse of the USSR, skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. Thus, they outright rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for large-scale economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after

After he captured Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show proper politeness towards Gorbachev, “not rub his nose in this fact,” as then-Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, largely on Washington's terms.

If the George H. W. Bush administration had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, a large-scale financial aid “package” could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the long term, would have contributed to a closer “tie” of Russia to the West. However, Bush's position was too weak to decide on bold steps to help Russia. At that time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the current president for being overly focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.

Although domestic political issues occupied a central place in his election campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately tried to help Russia. His administration organized significant financial assistance for Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was willing to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against the separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin was practically already on a “short leash” with Clinton. Actually, Clinton passed this leash on to Bush. In the United States, unlike Russia, foreign policy does not change much with the change of owner of the White House. Americans elect a president for themselves, and not for the outside world, and especially not for Russia.

The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in maintaining a “short leash” was its decision to continue to take advantage of Russia’s weakness. She sought to achieve maximum benefits for the United States in terms of foreign policy, economics, and security in Europe and the post-Soviet space until Russia recovered from the shocks of the transition period. The United States and the West did not expect that the transition period in their relations with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the “hangover” of the first president. But Russia “sobered up” much earlier than expected in the United States and the West; Moreover, in the morning she began to remember everything that happened to her “the night before” selectively and with indignation.

Behind the façade of external friendship, Clinton administration officials believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their opinion, if Moscow's preferences are not compatible with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, Russia's economy was in ruins, its army was collapsing, and in many ways it was behaving like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that abandoned former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to negotiate terms that would protect its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic policy, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often welcomed pressure from the IMF and the United States, thereby justifying the harsh and extremely unpopular monetary policy, which in fact they carried out of their own free will.

Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, nicknamed “Mr. Yes” for his acquiescence to the West, began to irritate his “cruel affair” with the Clinton administration. He once told Talbott, who held the position in 1993-1994. the position of ambassador-at-large to the newly independent states: “It’s already not very pleasant when you guys tell us: we will do this and that, whether you like it or not. So at least don’t rub salt into the wounds by saying that obeying your orders is also in our interests.”

But these requests fell on deaf ears even in Washington, even among Yeltsin’s most loyal US reformers, where such an arrogant approach was becoming increasingly popular. Talbott and his aides called this approach “feeding Russia spinach”: Uncle Sam paternally plies Russian leaders with political “foods” that Washington considers “good for the health of the new Russia,” no matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin’s reformers, like in kindergarten, followed the rule: “The more you tell them that this is for their own good, the more they choke.” By making it clear that Russia should not have an independent foreign - or even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration certainly created strong rejection among sensible politicians in Moscow. While they were not in power, this neo-colonialist approach of the United States, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, as most even Western economists now believe, were absolutely unsuitable for Russia and were so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, some Yeltsin

radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time the Communist Party of the Russian Federation interfered with them, then Yevgeny Primakov.

However, politicians such as former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and Russia specialists, recognized the depravity of this course in Washington and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed a willingness to turn a blind eye to the Yeltsin administration's "drastic" measures against its Supreme Council if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. “Encouraging democratic backsliding in a country with such an authoritarian tradition as Russia’s is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline,” Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeded from the “fatally flawed assumption” that Russia was no longer a world power and would not be for a long time, its actions would jeopardize peace and democracy in the region.

However, Clinton ignored this advice from Nixon and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon reached a stalemate, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree dissolving it, which ultimately led to an outbreak of violence and the shelling of the parliament building with tank guns. After this, Yeltsin “pushed through” a new constitution that gave the head of state the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislative branch. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step made it possible to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of a “drift” towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's penchant for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Other aspects of the Clinton administration's arrogant foreign policy only increased the discontent of sensible politicians in Russia. NATO expansion - especially its first wave, which included Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself such a serious problem. The majority of Russians were ready to agree that NATO expansion, although an unpleasant event, still poses almost no threat to their country. But this was the case until the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite the categorical objections of Moscow and without the authorization of the Security Council.

UN officials, the Russian elite and the people soon came to the conclusion that they had been deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against Orthodox peoples.

Of course, the Russian elite, which considers itself the custodian of the traditions of a Great Power - especially one in a state of “decline” - has never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces who were seriously thinking about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with a thousand-year history. They felt that Russia was seriously faced with Hamlet’s question: “to be or not to be.” And this understanding of Putin’s team today is much more important than the ideas of nationalization “according to Zyuganov” and Zhirinovsky’s foreign policy ambitions combined.

Today Russia is leaving the US “umbrella” and even itself is offering an energy umbrella to Europe. This is a gratifying trend for us. But it will undoubtedly cause sharp opposition from the United States and NATO. And we will soon feel it. The next cycle of the global economic crisis, which began in 2008, will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away with the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalie. Perhaps we will score pucks into someone else's goal, but how many will we let into our own? We have already almost lost our domestic market. The WTO will finally complete this “dirty deed”. What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if we hand over the domestic market, which in normal countries accounts for up to 90% of the domestic economy, to foreigners?

Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, protection of our national interests always and everywhere, subtle diplomatic play on the contradictions between the powers that be, dosed assistance taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this is what should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, until The USA and the West will have no time for us. At the same time, quietly and quietly, we must modernize our economy and armed forces. Russia has only 7-10 years to do this. And time went by. In this regard, we cannot talk about what should have been done yesterday.

The lack of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not yet allow us to prevent possible threats. And there cannot be a clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West are already accustomed to not taking Russia into account (as is Russia, they don’t take the UN into account either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, one must not hesitate and

show excessive “flexibility of the back”, otherwise we will constantly find ourselves turned “backward” to events. And to get out of this pose with dignity, you need to have filigree technique or know the 1001 tales of Scheherazade. Vladimir Putin learned something.

There are plenty of such examples. Despite the indignation that the Kosovo events caused in Russia, at the end of 1999, Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the entry of troops into Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was concerned about the Chechens' ties to al-Qaeda and the fact that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by these security interests, and not by a sudden “outburst of love” for the United States, Putin proposed establishing cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative fell on prepared ground, as it already had its own background. After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US administration had more than enough information to understand the mortal danger Islamic fundamentalists pose to the United States.

At one time, Clinton and his advisers, irritated by opposition to Russia in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key posts in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgia-ridden, dysfunctional, financially weak state, and sought to ensure maximum benefits for the United States at Russia's expense. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR by taking as many post-Soviet states as possible “under the wing” of Washington. Therefore, they “put pressure” on Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia. They encouraged the opportunistic Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO and gave instructions to American embassies in Central Asian countries to counteract Russian influence.

Therefore, in 1999, the United States rejected Putin's proposal for Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation, viewing Russia's proposal as the gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to restore its influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not understand then that by doing so it was missing a historic chance to force al-Qaeda and the Taliban

go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly make it impossible to conduct major operations. Such cooperation began only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, claimed the lives of almost 3,000 American citizens.

When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001—eight months after Vladimir Putin became Russia's president—his administration faced new, relatively unknown figures in the Russian leadership. Trying in every possible way to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not consider relations with Russia as one of its priorities: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been fair at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin went well. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally “vouched” for the democratic beliefs and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.

The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and caused an emotional wave of support and sympathy for the United States in Russia. Putin reiterated his previous offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted overflight rights to the U.S. Air Force over Russian territory, supported the creation of U.S. bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped Northern Alliance militias. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted based on the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as a novice politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation was based on a convergence of fundamental interests, rather than a shared ideology or mutual sympathy.

Despite such interaction, relations between the two countries remained tense in other areas. Bush's December 2001 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, one of the last remaining symbols of Russia's superpower status, once again deeply wounded the Kremlin's pride. Likewise, our hostility towards NATO only increased when the North Atlantic Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which were Estonia and

Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the situation of the Russian-speaking minority.

Around the same time, Ukraine became a new serious source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the United States’ support for Viktor Yushchenko and the “Orange Revolution” was connected not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Moscow state back in the 17th century, very close to Russia in cultural terms. plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia rightly believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative boundary between the two Union republics - extends far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas inhabited by millions of Russians. which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.

The Bush administration's approach to relations with Ukraine—namely, the pressure it puts on a divided Ukraine to apply for NATO membership and its financial support for non-governmental organizations that actively help pro-presidential political parties—should continually fuel our concern that whether the United States has moved to a new version of the containment policy towards Russia. Few Bush administration officials or congressmen thought about the consequences of opposing Russia in a region so important from the point of view of its national interests, such as Ukraine, Crimea, and the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries the strongest emotional charge.

Soon Georgia became another “battlefield” between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main tool for restoring Georgian sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where indigenous peoples we support have fought for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded that the two self-proclaimed republics be returned to Tbilisi’s control: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders sympathetic to Russia. He portrayed himself as a champion of democracy, enthusiastically supporting US foreign policy. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to join the allied contingent in 2004.

Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%) when elected president, and also took control of parliament and television, did not cause much concern outside Georgia itself. The obvious arbitrariness with which he repressed leaders of the business community and political rivals did not raise any questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterweight to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (it was alleged that as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that the Saakashvili regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian oppositionists causes concern in the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-Katsishvili was not noticed in Washington.

The farce of early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the bloody massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, the falsification of election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his irreconcilable opponent Badri Patar-Katsishvili should have finally , destroy confidence in Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties constantly supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the United States urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main “client state” in the Transcaucasus and near-Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo has been chosen as such a client state.

The United States supplies weapons and trains the Georgian military, thereby allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance towards Russia; The Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers stationed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and stationed on the territory of Georgia itself.

Of course, Russia’s own behavior towards Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow granted Russian citizenship to most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly imposed economic sanctions against Georgia.

At that time, Washington’s blind support for Saakashvili must have reinforced the feeling that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which in August 2008 a military conflict was provoked on the Georgian side with

Russia. The United States is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.

Despite growing tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary of the United States. There is still a chance to prevent further deterioration of relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where the interests of the United States and Russia coincide, especially in matters of combating terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Skillful diplomacy will also be required in cases where both countries' goals are the same but their tactical approaches differ, such as with respect to the Iranian nuclear program.

But most importantly, the United States must recognize that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today, Washington is simply not able to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 90s of the last century. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is anti-terrorism and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the defining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where thousands of nuclear warheads are located. The most important help for Washington would be Russian support for sanctions - and, if necessary, the use of force - against “destructive states” and terrorist groups.

The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic orders in the post-Soviet region, but expecting Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy is already naive. Therefore, Washington will continue to ensure that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and independently making foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will need to understand that its capabilities to meet this challenge are limited.

Russia, benefiting from high energy prices and pursuing a reasonable financial policy that has reined in the “oligarchs,” no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the increasing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are beginning to willingly flow into Russia. As long as stability, relative material well-being, and a newfound sense of pride in one’s country are maintained in Russia itself,

to restrain popular discontent by tightening government control and gross manipulation in the political sphere.

The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in Russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, sharply limits the ability of the United States to create a “support base” for its recommendations regarding internal processes in the country. In the current situation, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. It doesn't help matters that the US's own reputation as a moral exemplar has suffered greatly in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion of Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with fear even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. Overall, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.

While Moscow itself views the West with suspicion, Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes has angered Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries that are entirely dependent on Russian energy supplies.

Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy lever as a political tool. Unfortunately, only Gazprom is in the hands of the government. But, apparently, in the future, if necessary, the matter may come to oil companies, in particular, Rosneft has today become a giant on a global scale.

Undoubtedly, Gazprom supplies friendly states with energy resources at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain special political and economic relations with it by selling them oil and gas at below-market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the “NATO” choice of neighboring countries, but Russia is not obliged to subsidize them after that. We must always keep in mind that when Washington reacts to Russia’s “politicized” use of its energy resources with noble indignation, it does not look very sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions against others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.

The United States has continually accused Russia of obstructionism in Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly stated position has been that it will accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from reaching an agreement with Kosovo. But also to recognize one thing

Russia did not intend to declare Kosovo's independence ahead of time. After Kosovo declared independence, the situation changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies “did not care” about international law, the UN Security Council, or Russia. This should free Russia's hands. Moscow will only benefit from the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, especially Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and subsequently Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede. Many in Russia are quite happy that the fate of Kosovo has become a precedent for the unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and subsequent integration with Russia. And here Russia does not need to particularly adhere to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.

A number of other disagreements on foreign policy issues are only adding to the tension. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and the same position was taken by some of the United States' key NATO allies, in particular France and Germany. Russia supplies conventional weapons to some states that the United States considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis without violating international law in any way. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians feel the same way about American military supplies to Georgia.

Contrary to its interests, Russia must stop participating in the policy of soft “containment” of Iran and North Korea. On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the United States and Europe would like, and, ultimately, still supports the introduction of sanctions against both countries.

There are quite a lot of disagreements between the United States and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the United States. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging war against America, and no longer spreads “competing” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as was the case during the Soviet era. Moreover, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any neighboring country. Finally, Russia has decided not to stir up separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the presence of a significant and very active Russian minority in that country.

The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adapt to American preferences any longer, especially to the detriment of its own interests.

History of Russia [Tutorial] Team of authors

16.4. International situation and foreign policy

The Russian Federation, after the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, acted as the legal successor of the USSR on the world stage. Russia took the place of the USSR as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and other international organizations. However, changing geopolitical conditions - the collapse of the bipolar East-West system, which was dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, required the development of a new concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The most important tasks were strengthening ties with leading world powers, deepening the process of integration into the world economy, and active participation in international organizations. Another main direction was the strengthening of Russia’s position in the CIS countries and the development of fruitful political, economic and cultural cooperation with them within the framework of the Commonwealth, protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking population in these countries.

Russia and “far abroad”

The immediate consequence of the collapse of the USSR was a sharp reduction in economic, cultural, and scientific ties with Eastern European states. The Russian Federation was faced with the task of establishing with its former allies in the socialist camp new relationships based on true equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's affairs. Russia should have comprehended the changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and determined new principles of political and economic relations with each of them.

However, this process was extremely slow and with great difficulties. After the Velvet Revolutions of 1989, the countries of Eastern Europe intended to quickly join the European Economic Community (EEC) as equal partners. The settlement of relations between Russia and these states was burdened by serious financial, military and other problems that our country had to solve as the legal successor of the USSR.

The restoration of diverse ties between the Russian Federation and its former allies in the socialist camp began with the signing of mutually beneficial treaties and cooperation agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

The development of Russian-Yugoslav relations was hampered by the ongoing interethnic war in the Balkans. In December 1995, with the active participation of Russia, a peace treaty was signed in Paris between the republics of the former Yugoslavia, which became an important step towards ending the war. In March 1999, in connection with the problem of the autonomous region of Kosovo and NATO missile attacks on Serbia, a new stage of Russian-Yugoslav rapprochement opened. The tragic events in the Balkans showed that without Russia’s participation it is impossible to ensure international security and cooperation in Europe.

Fundamental changes have occurred in Russian relations with leading Western countries. Russia sought partnership with them and asserted this status through cooperation with the entire international community. Economic cooperation, rather than military confrontation, has become a priority in Russian foreign policy.

During the state visit of Russian President B. N. Yeltsin to the United States of America On February 1, 1992, the Russian-American Declaration on the End of the Cold War was signed, in which it was stated that Russia and the United States “do not consider each other as potential adversaries.”

In April 1992, Russia became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which pledged to provide it with financial assistance in the amount of $25 billion to carry out market reforms. Russia also signed a number of other important documents. Among them are the Charter of the Russian-American Partnership, the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Global System for the Protection of the World Community, an agreement on the joint exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes, and an agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments. On January 3, 1993, the Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2) was concluded in Moscow.

In April 1993, a meeting between Presidents B. Clinton and B. I. Yeltsin took place in the United States. As a result, a special commission was formed to coordinate Russian-American relations, headed by US Vice President A. Gore and Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V. S. Chernomyrdin. In order to further develop economic ties between the two countries, the US-Russian Business Council and the CIS-US Trade and Economic Cooperation Council (CTEC) were established.

Simultaneously with economic ties, Russian-American contacts in the military field developed. In 1993, the United States abandoned the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In December 1994, an agreement on mutual control over nuclear weapons was signed. In March 1997, during a meeting between the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States in Helsinki, a statement was adopted on the parameters for reducing nuclear missile weapons.

In order to strengthen relations with leading world powers, Russia sought to use the capabilities of international organizations. In May 1997, an agreement on a “special partnership” between the Russian Federation and NATO was signed in Paris. In June of the same year, Russia took part in the meeting of leaders of the G7 states, which includes the USA, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy and Canada, held in Denver (USA). The heads of these states hold annual meetings to discuss global economic policy issues. An agreement was reached to transform it into the G8 with the participation of the Russian Federation.

During the same period, Russia strengthened ties with leading European countries - Great Britain, Germany and France. In November 1992, a package of documents on bilateral relations between England and Russia was signed. Both powers reaffirmed their commitment to democracy and partnership. Similar bilateral agreements were reached with Germany, France, Italy, Spain and other European countries. In January 1996, Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe. This organization was created in 1949 to promote integration processes in the field of human rights. Russia joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Interparliamentary relations with European countries were actively developing.

In the 1990s. has changed significantly eastern policy Russia. The national and state interests of Russia required the establishment of new relations not only with the USA and Europe, but also with the industrialized countries of the Asia-Pacific region. They were supposed to ensure stability and security on Russia's eastern borders and create favorable external conditions for its active inclusion in regional integration processes. The result of this policy was the revival of bilateral relations with China, the Republic of Korea, India, etc. Russia became a member of the Pacific Economic Cooperation (TEC) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organizations.

The main issue of Russian foreign policy in the Far East was the strengthening of good neighborly relations with China. During his presidency, B. N. Yeltsin visited this country four times - in 1992, 1996, 1997 and 1999. Chinese President Jiang Zemin came to Moscow in 1997 and 1998. With the active participation of the Russian Federation, the “Shanghai Five” was created in 1996 to coordinate political and economic ties, which included Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

One of the leading directions of Russian foreign policy in the east has been the improvement of relations with Japan. In October 1993, the President of the Russian Federation visited Japan on an official visit, during which a Declaration on the Prospects of Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Relations, a Memorandum on Japan’s assistance in accelerating reforms in Russia and a Memorandum on the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Russian Federation were signed. The following year, 1994, a Memorandum was signed on the establishment of a Russian-Japanese intergovernmental commission on trade and economic issues. In 1997–1998 Agreements were reached between Russia and Japan on expanding financial and investment cooperation, on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, environmental protection, disposal of Russian weapons in the Far East, etc. At the same time, the establishment of good neighborly relations with Japan was complicated by the problem of the Kuril Islands. Japan put forward the return of the islands as an indispensable condition for improving relations with Russia.

The Russian Federation pursued an active policy in the Near and Middle East. Here Russia maintained friendly relations with Egypt, Syria, Iran and Iraq. In 1994, an agreement was concluded on the basis of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. As a result, by the end of the 20th century. Trade turnover between the two countries increased fivefold; in 2000, more than 100 Turkish companies operated in Russia. Russia initiated the creation of an international association - the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

After the collapse of the USSR, states found themselves in the background of Russian foreign policy Africa and Latin America. International summit meetings have almost ceased. An exception was the visit of Russian Foreign Minister E.M. Primakov in November 1997, during which he visited Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica. He signed a number of documents on economic and cultural cooperation with these countries.

Commonwealth of Independent States

The principles of relations between the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States were set out in the Declaration on its formation dated December 21, 1991. Azerbaijan and Moldova, which did not ratify the Declaration, remained outside the CIS framework. In 1992, the CIS countries signed over 200 documents on friendship and cooperation, and agreements were reached on the creation of 30 coordinating bodies. The bilateral agreements concluded by Russia with the countries of the Commonwealth included obligations on mutual respect for national independence and territorial integrity, “border transparency”, cooperation in ensuring peace and security, a single economic space, environmental protection, etc. Signed in May 1992, at the Tashkent meeting of the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, an agreement on the collective security of these countries for a period of five years.

The CIS countries had great potential for economic cooperation. The geographical proximity and contiguity of the territories implied their natural trade, economic and political partnership. This was facilitated by many years of mutual production, scientific and technical ties, and unified energy and transport systems.

The participating states have developed common positions on such an important issue as the creation of peacekeeping forces within the Commonwealth. The leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan showed the greatest consistency and activity in this. In 1994, the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev made a proposal to form a Eurasian Union within the former USSR. On March 29, 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia entered into an agreement “On deepening integration in the economic and humanitarian fields”, in 1999 - “On the customs union and common economic space”.

After the signing of the Commonwealth Charter in January 1993 in Minsk by seven CIS member countries, work began to further strengthen the forms of cooperation between them. In September 1993, an agreement was concluded to create the Commonwealth Economic Union. The Customs Union was formed in 1997, and the Economic Council in 1999. The CIS partner countries united time-tested economic, cultural, educational ties, common international and regional interests, and the desire to ensure political, economic and social stability.

Belarus and the Russian Federation have gone through a significant, albeit difficult, path to strengthening comprehensive interstate ties. On April 2, 1996, an agreement on the formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia was signed in Moscow. In May 1997, the Community was transformed into the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Union Charter was adopted. In December 1998, Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and A.G. Lukashenko signed the Declaration on the creation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. For 1996–1999 Russian regions signed more than 110 treaties and agreements with the government, regional authorities of Belarus and about 45 with ministries and departments of the republic.

In May 1997, agreements were signed in Kyiv with Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the principles of its basing in Sevastopol. At the same time, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine was concluded. Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kuchma adopted the “Program of Long-Term Economic Cooperation for 1998–2007.”

Russia has signed similar agreements on long-term economic cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The most difficult relations developed after the collapse of the USSR were with the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The governments and leaders of these states did not seek political and economic cooperation with Russia and pursued pro-Western policies. In the Baltic countries, there have been numerous cases of violation of the rights of Russian citizens, who make up a significant part of their population.

However, significant difficulties remained in the relations between the Russian Federation and other CIS countries. Many agreements on cooperation reached were not implemented. Thus, out of almost 900 documents adopted by the bodies of the Commonwealth during the first eight years of its existence, no more than one tenth was implemented. Moreover, there has been a tendency towards a reduction in political, economic and cultural ties. Each of the CIS countries was guided primarily by its own national interests. The instability of ties within the Commonwealth was negatively impacted by the unstable alignment of political forces in most CIS countries. The behavior of the leaders of the former Soviet republics not only did not contribute, but sometimes even hindered the establishment of relations of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually beneficial partnership. Suspicion manifested towards each other, mutual distrust grew. In many ways, similar phenomena were due to disagreements regarding the division of property of the former Soviet Union - the Black Sea Fleet and determining the status of Sevastopol, weapons and military equipment in Ukraine and Moldova, the Baikonur space center in Kazakhstan, etc. All this turned into severe crisis manifestations in the CIS countries: it was falling apart economy, the standard of living of the population fell.