People's Commissar of Finance Zverev. About Stalin's People's Commissar of Finance A.G. Zverev. About the research and development cycle and its financing

A. G. Zverev

The Great October Socialist Revolution not only opened a new era in the history of mankind as a whole, but also created a special type of person - a Soviet citizen, infinitely devoted to Marxist-Leninist ideas and the cause of the Communist Party. This is exactly what Arseny Grigorievich Zverev was like. His memoirs clearly and vividly show the path he took from a young textile worker at the Vysokovskaya manufactory to a statesman of a socialist power, a prominent theorist and a major practical economist, who headed the USSR Ministry of Finance for over two decades.

I was lucky enough to work under the leadership of A.G. Zverev for many years. We first met in 1930. This was a time when the issue of personnel was acute in the country. The country needed thousands of highly educated specialists. Solving this problem, the party sent many communists to study at the expense of the “party thousand”. Arseny Grigorievich Zverev also came to the Moscow Financial and Economic Institute on a Bolshevik ticket.

I taught political economy there. Zverev quickly stood out among his classmates. Practical work had an impact, which helped him master the course of academic disciplines. Attentive to his comrades, sociable, student Zverev was soon elected secretary of the university party organization, and then a member of the Baumansky district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

In his memoirs, Arseny Grigorievich talks in detail about this period of his life. Intense study, extensive social work, lectures and reports in factories and factories - this is how all the students lived without exception, including the author of this book. If you managed to sleep for six hours, he writes, then such a day was considered good and easy. Sometimes it’s hard to believe that under these conditions we somehow managed to carry out our plans, almost without stumbling. Nevertheless, this is a fact! Our children and grandchildren sometimes complain about being overly busy. Honestly, if any of us had had the capabilities of the current generation then, we would have considered ourselves lucky. Subsequently, for many years, I had the opportunity to witness the intense activity carried out by A.G. Zverev as People's Commissar, and then as Minister of Finance of the country.

For more than twenty years he was a member of the CPSU Central Committee and was repeatedly elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The years of the creation of socialism, the Great Patriotic War, then the restoration of the national economy and the elimination of the damage caused to our country by Hitler's Germany. A time filled to the limit with historical events. The talent of Arseny Grigorievich, an extraordinary organizer and leader, unfolded to its full extent. The Notes clearly show how the complex economic problems facing the USSR were solved.

Not the least role in this matter belonged to financial workers. Extensive practical experience and deep economic knowledge, constant and close contact with the team, and reliance on the communists gave A.G. Zverev the opportunity to find the right answer to the most difficult questions raised by life. During my years of work at the Ministry of Finance (consultant to the People's Commissar, head of the monetary circulation department, deputy minister of finance), I often had to observe when people present at meetings made contradictory proposals. But the minister usually acted very calmly and quickly found a way out of difficult economic situations. And if he was convinced of the correctness of the decision, he then firmly and steadfastly defended it in any instance.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War is especially memorable in this regard. Colossal funds had to be found and immediately mobilized for defense needs. Under the leadership of A.G. Zverev, the financial system was quickly and clearly rebuilt on a military basis, and throughout the war, the front and rear were uninterruptedly provided with monetary and material resources.

In everything, A.G. Zverev was distinguished by his deep adherence to principles. He unwaveringly stood guard over the socialist ruble and put state interests above all else. As an innovative economist, he conducted extensive research and teaching work in the field of socialist finance. Already in the last years of his life, Arseny Grigorievich defended his doctoral dissertation, became a professor at the All-Union Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics and a member of the Higher Attestation Commission. He authored the monographs “National Income and Finance of the USSR”, “Problems of Pricing and Finance”, “Economic Development and Finance in the Seven-Year Plan” "and many other works. All these works are permeated with the idea of ​​​​the struggle for a full-blooded, all-encompassing and revenue-generating state budget. The author of the Notes considered this the first commandment of every Soviet financier.

The reader will find in the book a lot of valuable materials about the specific activities of a financial worker on a district, regional and national scale. The stories about the author’s meetings with prominent political figures in our country are also of great interest. The reader will find numerous facts in the book on the history of our Motherland. The author himself was an active participant in important events in the life of the Soviet Union, and his story about them is very interesting.

I would like to end my word about the author of this book with its final lines. The author writes: “Bequeathing Soviet Russia’s march into communism, V.I. Lenin said in his last public speech: “Before, a communist said: “I give my life,” and it seemed very simple to him... Now, before us, communists, stands absolutely another task. We must now calculate everything, and each of you must learn to be calculating.” Lenin's words fully retain all their meaning to this day. Learning to be prudent is not so easy. But without this there is no progress. So that the shining heights of communism do not remain a dream, they must be achieved. And the road lies through the highly productive, planned, taken into account and wisely used labor of the human collective.” The bright and great life of A. G. Zverev, traced in the “Notes of the Minister,” is of significant interest to both the older generation and young people.

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences K. N. PLOTNIKOV

FIRST QUARTER OF THE CENTURY

From village to factory

West of Klin. - Weaving everyday life. - Me and the prophet Jonah. - Vysokovskaya factory. - Vladykin and others. - “It’s too early for you to go on strike!”

If you have ever traveled from Moscow to the city of Kalinin through Klin, then you will have noticed that the hills of the Dmitrov ridge give way to a swampy plain under Klin. This is the right bank of the Upper Volga. Even at the beginning of this century, there were almost continuous forests here, interspersed with clearings and scanty arable land. The rivers Malaya Sestra, Yauza (not to be confused with the Moscow river of the same name), and Vyaz flow towards the Volga and its large tributaries. To the west of Klin, on the old highway to Rzhev, are the villages of Vysokovsk, Nekrasino, Petrovskoye, Paveltsevo... This region is my homeland. Here I was born in 1900 into a poor family of a worker and a peasant woman. I was sixth, followed by seven more brothers and sisters.

The Klin district of the Moscow province has long supplied workers for the textile industry. From all the villages closest to the highway - Troitskaya, Smetanina, Negodyaeva, Teterina and others - men and women flocked to the village of Nekrasino, looking for food for themselves and their families. There was a spinning and weaving factory nearby. Its first owner was “his brother” - the merchant G. Kataev, who came from a peasant background. Becoming an entrepreneur, he quickly profited from the sweat and tears of his fellow countrymen. Twelve years later the factory burned down. But a year later he built a new building, a stone one. The cheapness of labor and the high demand for fabrics attracted the capital of a number of rich people here. The largest manufacturers of the Moscow province and several foreigners formed the joint-stock “Partnership of the Vysokovskaya Manufactory”.

A five-story weaving building was erected, then a spinning building. Need drove ever new crowds of people from the villages. They huddled in cramped and dirty closets of a factory dormitory. They got up at dawn, went to bed in the dark, swallowed toxic dust in the workshops and pulled the labor burden for pennies. I remember the song “Tkach” almost from early childhood. Its words were written by Philip Shkulev, author of the famous “Blacksmiths”:

Knock, knock, machine,
Dive, dive, shuttle!
The sun is still high
And my day is long.
The drives are noisy, chewing,
Everywhere you look.
And the foundation stretches
Like life's days.
All around in a caustic frenzy
Everything dances and trembles,
A boring working day
Runs so slowly...

The song very accurately told about the life of Vysokovites. When I was still a boy running around the streets of our village, about two thousand spinners and weavers were working at the factory. In 1912, when I went to work there, their number exceeded four thousand. My father, Grigory Grigorievich, earned little, even though he was a literate person. Feeding thirteen children was incredibly difficult. My father worked in textile factories almost all his life, and worked on the railroad for ten years. He died already in Soviet times, at an old age.

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev was one of I.V.’s closest associates. Stalin in the 1930s - early 1950s. He served as People's Commissar and then Minister of Finance of the USSR and carried out the famous monetary, "Stalinist" reform in the country, and did a lot for the development of the economy of the Soviet Union.

In his book, the materials of which formed the basis of this article, A.G. Zverev talks about his meetings with Stalin and how the most important issues in managing the country’s finances were resolved. According to Zverev, I.V. Stalin had an excellent understanding of financial problems and pursued highly effective economic policies, which is proven by numerous examples.

We will devote this article to Zverev himself and some of his recipes for organizing the economic life of our country.

Briefly about Zverev

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev has come a long way. He began working as a textile worker at the Vysokovskaya manufactory; he wrote about this period of life during tsarist times in his book “Stalin and Money” as follows:

You work ten hours and wander, staggering from fatigue, to the hostel. In a cramped closet with a low ceiling, dirty walls and smoked windows, older comrades or peers lie on hard bunks, muttering in their sleep. Some are playing cards, others are swearing in a drunken argument. Their lives are broken, their dreams are crushed. What do they see other than dull, exhausting and monotonous work? Who enlightens them? Who cares about them? Pull the veins out of yourself, enrich the owners! And no one is stopping you from leaving your work records in the tavern...

A very eloquent description of the pre-revolutionary state of society, very close to us, isn’t it?

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev

After the February revolution, Zverev moved to Moscow and actively participated in the life of the workers of the Prokhorov Trekhgornaya manufactory, where he gained his first experience in political activity. Then, when the October Socialist Revolution broke out, many plants and factories were nationalized. In 1918, Arseny Grigorievich Zverev joined the party and asked to go to the front, but in 1920 he was sent to Orenburg to enter the cavalry school. He writes about the most difficult days of the outbreak of the civil war:

The most difficult memories associated with the hungry spring of 1921. Every day trains packed with people pass through the station. It is from the starving Center and the Volga region that they go to Tashkent - the “city of grain”. Some, having climbed out of the car for water, remain lying near the railway, not having the strength to rise from the ground. The bagmen are screaming. Children are crying. Here are several people, with shaking fingers, rolling cigarettes, with cabbage and nettle tops instead of tobacco, from leaflets issued by the provincial health department “On the methods of using surrogate bread.” To the side, typhoid people's lice-strewn dresses are being burned on fires. Kazakh families slowly wander towards the embankment. They gathered near the Caravanserai in the hope of help. But not everyone was able to help: the city workers themselves are on meager rations.

No other political party, no other government in the world could have withstood what our country experienced in the terrible years of 1921-1922. Only the Communist Party, only Soviet power was able to raise the state from ruins, put people on their feet, and open up before them the horizons of a new life won in the days of the socialist revolution, foreign military intervention and civil war!

Since 1925, Zverev worked as the head of the Klin district financial department, in whose position he encountered problems that are still relevant today:

While studying the regional taxation system, I very quickly came across the attempts of many private owners to hide the true size of their income and deceive government agencies. First of all, this concerned resellers, speculators, brokers and other “intermediaries” of the trading world.

In the spring of 1930, he became the head of the Bryansk district financial department, and already in 1932 he became the head of the Bauman district financial department of Moscow, this is how he described his work there:

What did the daily life of the zavrayfo consist of? There was no standard. Day to day never happened. A note that survived from 1934, which I compiled as a memo while sitting one day in the office of the chairman of the district executive committee, D.S. Korotchenko, may give some idea of ​​the individual details of the daily turnover. He received the workers, listened to their demands, complaints, requests and wishes, and every time he drew my attention to them when it came to upcoming expenses. During the few hours of the meeting, I wrote down so many questions that I am still amazed how we managed to accomplish all this in a short time. I will list just a few of them. Increase the number of tram cars arriving at the factory gates; build another school in Syromyatniki; open courses for admission to workers' faculty; pave Khludov passage; build a kitchen factory; organize a laundry at one of the factories; clean the Yauza from dirt; green Olkhovskaya Street; launch an additional electric train on the Nizhny Novgorod Railway; open a grocery store on Chistye Prudy; introduce children's screenings at the cinema on Spartakovskaya; open a children's playground on Pokrovsky Square; to supply the button factory dormitory with a film mobile... There were not one such day, but dozens.

After meeting with I.V. Stalin refused the offer to head the State Bank, because he did not consider himself competent enough for this job. However, from September 1937, Zverev was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR, and in January 1938 - February 1948 he became People's Commissar (from March 1946 - Minister) of Finance of the USSR.

After the war, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, Zverev developed a project for financial reform and implemented it in the shortest possible time, which allowed the USSR, the first of the countries participating in World War II, to abandon the card system for distributing products and goods to the population, and then constantly reduce prices for them. This continued until Stalin's death, after which many of the achievements of the previous period were lost; A.G. was soon retired. Zverev.

The circumstances of his departure are still shrouded in mystery. Most likely, the reason for the resignation was A.G.’s disagreement. Zverev with Khrushchev’s financial policy, in particular with the monetary reform of 1961.

Writer and publicist Yu.I. Mukhin writes about it this way:

In 1961, the first price rise occurred. The day before, in 1960, Finance Minister A.G. was retired. Zverev. There were rumors that he tried to shoot Khrushchev, and such rumors convince us that Zverev’s departure was not without conflict.

Khrushchev could not decide to openly raise prices in conditions when the people clearly remembered that under Stalin prices did not rise, but fell annually. The official goal of the reform was to save the penny; they say, a penny cannot buy anything, so the ruble must be denominated - its denomination must be reduced by 10 times.

In reality, Khrushchev carried out the denomination only for the purpose of covering up price increases. If meat cost 11 rubles, and after the price increase it should have cost 19 rubles, then this would immediately catch the eye, but if denomination is carried out at the same time, then the price of meat is 1 ruble. 90 kopecks At first it’s confusing - it seems like the price has dropped. From that moment on, an imbalance arose between state stores and the black market, where it became more profitable for traders to sell goods, and from that moment on, goods from stores began to disappear.

Zverev had a conflict with Khrushchev precisely over this reform. Thus, Khrushchev (or his hands) began the plunder of the country, giving a signal to all corrupt officials.

In his book, Arseny Zverev talks about his life path - from a simple working guy to a minister - and proves that this was only possible in a Soviet country, where every citizen had broad prospects for realizing his best abilities.

We will present several recipes that this outstanding economist of the “Stalin” era used in his work.

Economic recipes from Zverev

On the role of the state bank

The change on a national scale was also helped by new principles for building a credit system. Since 1927, the State Bank began to manage it from beginning to end. Industry banks turned into bodies of long-term credit, and the State Bank - short-term. This separation of functions, along with increased control over the use of loans, ran into an obstacle in the form of the availability of commercial bill credit. Therefore, within two years, other forms of payments and lending were introduced: check circulation, intra-system settlements, direct lending without taking into account bills.

How to build factories?

The ability not to spray products is a special science. Let’s say we need to build seven new enterprises in seven years. How to do it better? One plant can be built annually; as soon as he starts a task, take on the next one. You can build all seven at once. Then, by the end of the seventh year, they will begin to produce all the products at the same time. The construction plan will be carried out in both cases. What, however, will happen in another year? During this eighth year, seven factories will produce seven annual production programs. If you go the first route, then one plant will have time to produce seven annual programs, the second - six, the third - five, the fourth - four, the fifth - three, the sixth - two, the seventh - one program. There are 28 programs in total. The winnings are 4 times. The annual profit will allow the state to take some part from it and invest it in new construction. Smart investments are the crux of the matter. Thus, in 1968, every ruble invested in the economy brought the Soviet Union 15 kopecks of profit. Money spent on construction that is not completed is dead and does not generate income. Moreover, they “freeze” subsequent expenses. Let's say we invested 1 million rubles in the construction of the first year, another million the next year, etc. If we build for seven years, then 7 million were temporarily frozen. This is why it is so important to speed up the pace of construction. Time is money!

About financial reserves

The Five-Year Plan must provide for the speed of advancement of entire parts of the national economy. Naturally, the errors and imbalances made in the annual plan will increase over five years and overlap each other.

This means that it is useful to have so-called “deflection reserves”. If they are present, the wind will not break the tree; it may bend, but it will stand. If they are not there, strong roots will protect the tree only until a very strong hurricane, and then not far from a windbreak.

Consequently, without financial reserves it is difficult to ensure the successful implementation of socialist plans. Reserves - cash, grain, raw materials - are another permanent item on the agenda at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And in order to optimize the national economy, we tried to use both administrative and economic methods of solving problems. We did not have computers like today's electronic counting machines. Therefore, they did this: the governing body gave lower-level tasks not only in the form of planned figures, but also reported prices for both production resources and products. In addition, they tried to use “feedback”, controlling the balance between production and demand. The role of individual enterprises thereby increased.

About the research and development cycle and its financing

An unpleasant discovery for me was the fact that scientific ideas, while they were being researched and developed, consumed a lot of time, and therefore money. Gradually I got used to it, but at first I just gasped: it took three years to develop the design of the machines; it took a year to create a prototype; they spent a year testing it, reworking it and “finishing it”: they spent a year preparing technical documentation; for another year we moved on to mastering the serial production of such machines. Total - seven years. Well, if we were talking about a complex technological process, when semi-industrial installations were required to develop it, even seven years might not be enough. Of course, simple machines were created much faster. And yet, the cycle of complete implementation of a major scientific and technical idea took, on average, up to ten years. The consolation was that we were ahead of many foreign countries, because world practice then showed an average cycle of 12 years.

This is where the advantage of the socialist planned economy was revealed, which made it possible to concentrate funds in areas and directions needed by society, despite someone’s purely personal will. By the way, there is a huge reserve of progress here: if you reduce the time for implementing ideas by several years, this will immediately give the country an increase in national income by billions of rubles.

Another way to quickly get a return on investment is to temporarily slow down some construction projects if there is an excessively large number of them. Mothballing some, and at this expense speeding up the construction of other enterprises and starting to receive products from them, is a good solution to the problem, but, alas, also limited by specific conditions. If, for example, in 1938-1941 we had not built many large facilities at once in different parts of the country, we would not have had the necessary production reserve after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and then the defense industry could have experienced a breakthrough.

Conclusion

The main difference between Zverev and modern economists was that people for him were not just another economic resource, but the main beneficiaries of the development of the entire economy. Having gone from a factory worker to the Minister of Finance of the USSR, Zverev did not lose this quality - humanity and concern for people, although he had to make difficult decisions in the interests of the state, but even then he understood that the state was created for the working people and by the working people themselves.

Our current economists, unfortunately, think more about numbers and indicators than about why they work at all and why they are called to their positions. But the result of such a policy turns out to be worthless.

In the second part of the material, we will try to evaluate the results of Zverev’s most difficult case in his high post - the monetary reform of 1947 and analyze the possibilities of using this invaluable and unprecedented experience in modern conditions.

Materials:

A.G. Zverev "Stalin and money"

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev was one of I.V.’s closest associates. Stalin in the 1930s - early 1950s. He served as People's Commissar and then Minister of Finance of the USSR and carried out the famous monetary, "Stalinist" reform in the country, and did a lot for the development of the economy of the Soviet Union.

In his book, the materials of which formed the basis of this article, A.G. Zverev talks about his meetings with Stalin and how the most important issues in managing the country’s finances were resolved. According to Zverev, I.V. Stalin had an excellent understanding of financial problems and pursued highly effective economic policies, which is proven by numerous examples.

We will devote this article to Zverev himself and some of his recipes for organizing the economic life of our country.

Briefly about Zverev

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev has come a long way. He began working as a textile worker at the Vysokovskaya manufactory; he wrote about this period of life during tsarist times in his book “Stalin and Money” as follows:

You work ten hours and wander, staggering from fatigue, to the hostel. In a cramped closet with a low ceiling, dirty walls and smoked windows, older comrades or peers lie on hard bunks, muttering in their sleep. Some are playing cards, others are swearing in a drunken argument. Their lives are broken, their dreams are crushed. What do they see other than dull, exhausting and monotonous work? Who enlightens them? Who cares about them? Pull the veins out of yourself, enrich the owners! And no one is stopping you from leaving your work records in the tavern...

A very eloquent description of the pre-revolutionary state of society, very close to us, isn’t it?

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev

After the February revolution, Zverev moved to Moscow and actively participated in the life of the workers of the Prokhorov Trekhgornaya manufactory, where he gained his first experience in political activity. Then, when the October Socialist Revolution broke out, many plants and factories were nationalized. In 1918, Arseny Grigorievich Zverev joined the party and asked to go to the front, but in 1920 he was sent to Orenburg to enter the cavalry school. He writes about the most difficult days of the outbreak of the civil war:

The most difficult memories associated with the hungry spring of 1921. Every day trains packed with people pass through the station. It is from the starving Center and the Volga region that they go to Tashkent - the “city of grain”. Some, having climbed out of the car for water, remain lying near the railway, not having the strength to rise from the ground. The bagmen are screaming. Children are crying. Here are several people, with shaking fingers, rolling cigarettes, with cabbage and nettle tops instead of tobacco, from leaflets issued by the provincial health department “On the methods of using surrogate bread.” To the side, typhoid people's lice-strewn dresses are being burned on fires. Kazakh families slowly wander towards the embankment. They gathered near the Caravanserai in the hope of help. But not everyone was able to help: the city workers themselves are on meager rations.

No other political party, no other government in the world could have withstood what our country experienced in the terrible years of 1921-1922. Only the Communist Party, only Soviet power was able to raise the state from ruins, put people on their feet, and open up before them the horizons of a new life won in the days of the socialist revolution, foreign military intervention and civil war!

Since 1925, Zverev worked as the head of the Klin district financial department, in whose position he encountered problems that are still relevant today:

While studying the regional taxation system, I very quickly came across the attempts of many private owners to hide the true size of their income and deceive government agencies. First of all, this concerned resellers, speculators, brokers and other “intermediaries” of the trading world.

In the spring of 1930, he became the head of the Bryansk district financial department, and already in 1932 he became the head of the Bauman district financial department of Moscow, this is how he described his work there:

What did the daily life of the zavrayfo consist of? There was no standard. Day to day never happened. A note that survived from 1934, which I compiled as a memo while sitting one day in the office of the chairman of the district executive committee, D.S. Korotchenko, may give some idea of ​​the individual details of the daily turnover. He received the workers, listened to their demands, complaints, requests and wishes, and every time he drew my attention to them when it came to upcoming expenses. During the few hours of the meeting, I wrote down so many questions that I am still amazed how we managed to accomplish all this in a short time. I will list just a few of them. Increase the number of tram cars arriving at the factory gates; build another school in Syromyatniki; open courses for admission to workers' faculty; pave Khludov passage; build a kitchen factory; organize a laundry at one of the factories; clean the Yauza from dirt; green Olkhovskaya Street; launch an additional electric train on the Nizhny Novgorod Railway; open a grocery store on Chistye Prudy; introduce children's screenings at the cinema on Spartakovskaya; open a children's playground on Pokrovsky Square; to supply the button factory dormitory with a film mobile... There were not one such day, but dozens.

After meeting with I.V. Stalin refused the offer to head the State Bank, because he did not consider himself competent enough for this job. However, from September 1937, Zverev was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR, and in January 1938 - February 1948 he became People's Commissar (from March 1946 - Minister) of Finance of the USSR.

After the war, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, Zverev developed a project for financial reform and implemented it in the shortest possible time, which allowed the USSR, the first of the countries participating in World War II, to abandon the card system for distributing products and goods to the population, and then constantly reduce prices for them. This continued until Stalin's death, after which many of the achievements of the previous period were lost; A.G. was soon retired. Zverev.

The circumstances of his departure are still shrouded in mystery. Most likely, the reason for the resignation was A.G.’s disagreement. Zverev with Khrushchev’s financial policy, in particular with the monetary reform of 1961.

Writer and publicist Yu.I. Mukhin writes about it this way:

In 1961, the first price rise occurred. The day before, in 1960, Finance Minister A.G. was retired. Zverev. There were rumors that he tried to shoot Khrushchev, and such rumors convince us that Zverev’s departure was not without conflict.

Khrushchev could not decide to openly raise prices in conditions when the people clearly remembered that under Stalin prices did not rise, but fell annually. The official goal of the reform was to save the penny; they say, a penny cannot buy anything, so the ruble must be denominated - its denomination must be reduced by 10 times.

In reality, Khrushchev carried out the denomination only for the purpose of covering up price increases. If meat cost 11 rubles, and after the price increase it should have cost 19 rubles, then this would immediately catch the eye, but if denomination is carried out at the same time, then the price of meat is 1 ruble. 90 kopecks At first it’s confusing - it seems like the price has dropped. From that moment on, an imbalance arose between state stores and the black market, where it became more profitable for traders to sell goods, and from that moment on, goods from stores began to disappear.

Zverev had a conflict with Khrushchev precisely over this reform. Thus, Khrushchev (or his hands) began the plunder of the country, giving a signal to all corrupt officials.

In his book, Arseny Zverev talks about his life path - from a simple working guy to a minister - and proves that this was only possible in a Soviet country, where every citizen had broad prospects for realizing his best abilities.

We will present several recipes that this outstanding economist of the “Stalin” era used in his work.

Economic recipes from Zverev

On the role of the state bank

The change on a national scale was also helped by new principles for building a credit system. Since 1927, the State Bank began to manage it from beginning to end. Industry banks turned into bodies of long-term credit, and the State Bank - short-term. This separation of functions, along with increased control over the use of loans, ran into an obstacle in the form of the availability of commercial bill credit. Therefore, within two years, other forms of payments and lending were introduced: check circulation, intra-system settlements, direct lending without taking into account bills.

How to build factories?

The ability not to spray products is a special science. Let’s say we need to build seven new enterprises in seven years. How to do it better? One plant can be built annually; as soon as he starts a task, take on the next one. You can build all seven at once. Then, by the end of the seventh year, they will begin to produce all the products at the same time. The construction plan will be carried out in both cases. What, however, will happen in another year? During this eighth year, seven factories will produce seven annual production programs. If you go the first route, then one plant will have time to produce seven annual programs, the second - six, the third - five, the fourth - four, the fifth - three, the sixth - two, the seventh - one program. There are 28 programs in total. The winnings are 4 times. The annual profit will allow the state to take some part from it and invest it in new construction. Smart investments are the crux of the matter. Thus, in 1968, every ruble invested in the economy brought the Soviet Union 15 kopecks of profit. Money spent on construction that is not completed is dead and does not generate income. Moreover, they “freeze” subsequent expenses. Let's say we invested 1 million rubles in the construction of the first year, another million the next year, etc. If we build for seven years, then 7 million were temporarily frozen. This is why it is so important to speed up the pace of construction. Time is money!

About financial reserves

The Five-Year Plan must provide for the speed of advancement of entire parts of the national economy. Naturally, the errors and imbalances made in the annual plan will increase over five years and overlap each other.

This means that it is useful to have so-called “deflection reserves”. If they are present, the wind will not break the tree; it may bend, but it will stand. If they are not there, strong roots will protect the tree only until a very strong hurricane, and then not far from a windbreak.

Consequently, without financial reserves it is difficult to ensure the successful implementation of socialist plans. Reserves - cash, grain, raw materials - are another permanent item on the agenda at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And in order to optimize the national economy, we tried to use both administrative and economic methods of solving problems. We did not have computers like today's electronic counting machines. Therefore, they did this: the governing body gave lower-level tasks not only in the form of planned figures, but also reported prices for both production resources and products. In addition, they tried to use “feedback”, controlling the balance between production and demand. The role of individual enterprises thereby increased.

About the research and development cycle and its financing

An unpleasant discovery for me was the fact that scientific ideas, while they were being researched and developed, consumed a lot of time, and therefore money. Gradually I got used to it, but at first I just gasped: it took three years to develop the design of the machines; it took a year to create a prototype; they spent a year testing it, reworking it and “finishing it”: they spent a year preparing technical documentation; for another year we moved on to mastering the serial production of such machines. Total - seven years. Well, if we were talking about a complex technological process, when semi-industrial installations were required to develop it, even seven years might not be enough. Of course, simple machines were created much faster. And yet, the cycle of complete implementation of a major scientific and technical idea took, on average, up to ten years. The consolation was that we were ahead of many foreign countries, because world practice then showed an average cycle of 12 years.

This is where the advantage of the socialist planned economy was revealed, which made it possible to concentrate funds in areas and directions needed by society, despite someone’s purely personal will. By the way, there is a huge reserve of progress here: if you reduce the time for implementing ideas by several years, this will immediately give the country an increase in national income by billions of rubles.

Another way to quickly get a return on investment is to temporarily slow down some construction projects if there is an excessively large number of them. Mothballing some, and at this expense speeding up the construction of other enterprises and starting to receive products from them, is a good solution to the problem, but, alas, also limited by specific conditions. If, for example, in 1938-1941 we had not built many large facilities at once in different parts of the country, we would not have had the necessary production reserve after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and then the defense industry could have experienced a breakthrough.

Conclusion

The main difference between Zverev and modern economists was that people for him were not just another economic resource, but the main beneficiaries of the development of the entire economy. Having gone from a factory worker to the Minister of Finance of the USSR, Zverev did not lose this quality - humanity and concern for people, although he had to make difficult decisions in the interests of the state, but even then he understood that the state was created for the working people and by the working people themselves.

Our current economists, unfortunately, think more about numbers and indicators than about why they work at all and why they are called to their positions. But the result of such a policy turns out to be worthless.

In the second part of the material, we will try to evaluate the results of Zverev’s most difficult case in his high post - the monetary reform of 1947 and analyze the possibilities of using this invaluable and unprecedented experience in modern conditions.

Materials:

A.G. Zverev "Stalin and money"

On May 4, 1935, Stalin, at the graduation of the Red commanders, uttered his famous phrase: “PERSONNEL DECIDE EVERYTHING!”

J.V. Stalin introduced this formulation into political life during the years of industrialization of the Soviet state. When the leader of the Soviet people coined: “Cadres decide everything,” he realized that each leadership team is called upon by society to solve specific problems posed by time. A change in the historical stage presupposes a change in the composition of management personnel. In the conditions of post-war peaceful construction, he did not believe that a cohort of party members with pre-revolutionary experience should make a difference in the leadership of the party and the country. On October 16, 1952, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Stalin said: “They ask why we relieved prominent party and government figures from important ministerial posts. What can you say about this? We relieved ministers Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others from their duties and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? The job of ministers is a man's job. It requires great strength, specific knowledge and health. That is why we relieved some honored comrades from their positions and appointed new, more qualified, proactive workers in their place."

In the leadership of the party after the 19th Congress, the leading role began to be occupied by leaders who went through the harsh school of working in the government during the Great Patriotic War and in the difficult years of the post-war restoration of the national economy. Those who were not fed up with this hellish work ended up in the personnel team, which I.V. Stalin bequeathed to continue socialist construction according to the mid-term and long-term plans approved by the 19th Party Congress. One of them is the Minister of Finance of the USSR A.G. Zverev.

Our story is about this wonderful person and a professional with a capital P, about one of Stalin’s people’s commissars who were part of Stalin’s so-called soldiers. These were people gifted by nature not only with high intelligence, a rare ability to understand the world around them, but also with the highest sense of responsibility for their work. Possessing extraordinary abilities, thoroughly knowing all the intricacies of the sphere of activity that they led, they solved the problems of building a new state unknown to the world with truly outstanding results.

Finance, as you know, is one of the powerful tools for the economic and social development of society. In finance we can sometimes find the key to understanding history. It is no coincidence that people who have mastered the secrets of finance and financial mechanisms play an important role in the life of the state and society. And the people who headed the Ministry of Finance can write their name in the history of the state and have a significant impact on the development of the country’s economy and finances.

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev (1900–1969) is one of these people.

Arseny Grigorievich was born in the village of Tikhomirovo-Vysokovsky district, Moscow region, into a working-class family. There were 13 children in the family.

In 1912 he began his independent career: he worked at textile factories in the Moscow region, and from 1917 at the Trekhgornaya manufactory in Moscow.

In 1919 he volunteered for the Red Army. In 1920–1921 was a cadet at the Orenburg Cavalry School. Participated in battles against Antonov's gangs. Having been demobilized from the army, “I took with me “as a souvenir,” as Arseny Grigorievich wrote in his memoirs, “I took away the wound from a bandit’s bullet and a military order.”

In 1922–1923 A.G. Zverev worked as a senior district inspector for food supplies. The struggle for bread in these years, according to A.G. Zverev, was a genuine front, and therefore he perceived his appointment to the food committee of the city of Klin as a militant party assignment.

In 1924 he was sent to Moscow to study. This year his activities in the financial system began.

In 1930, he worked as head of the district financial department in Bryansk.

And in 1932 he was appointed head of the Baumansky district financial department of Moscow.

In 1936, he was elected chairman of the Molotov district executive committee of Moscow,

in 1937 - first secretary of the RK CPSU (b) of the same region.

I.V. Stalin had an amazing, simply divine instinct for smart personnel. Often he nominated people who had not yet had time to really prove themselves. Former Trekhgorka worker and cavalry platoon commander Zverev is one of them. In 1937, he worked only as a secretary of one of the district party committees of Moscow. But he had a higher financial education and experience as a professional financier. In conditions of a wild shortage of personnel, this was enough for Zverev to become first the Deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR, and after 3 months already the People's Commissar.

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev devoted 45 years of his life to working in the financial system, of which 22 years he was the head of the country's central financial department. From 1938 to 1946 he headed the People's Commissariat of Finance, and from 1946 to 1960 - the Ministry of Finance of the USSR. He was the last People's Commissar and the first Minister of Finance of the USSR.

22 years is a whole era: from Chkalov to Gagarin. An era that could have been much harder and hungrier if not for Arseny Zverev. This time coincided with the years of the creation of socialism, the Great Patriotic War, then the restoration of the national economy and the elimination of the damage caused to our country by Hitler's Germany.

Even those who did not like Zverev - and there were many of them, because he was a tough and domineering person, fully justifying his name - were forced to recognize his exceptional professionalism.

“The financier must be adamant when it comes to public funds. The party line and state laws must not be violated, no matter how thunderous! Financial discipline is a sacred matter. Compliance in this matter borders on crime.”

From the very first days of his work, he did not hesitate to openly talk about shortcomings, sharply dissonating with the general tone of enthusiastic Soviet patriotism. Unlike others, Zverev preferred to fight not against abstract “enemies of the people,” but against inept directors and sluggish financiers.

He defended a strict economy regime, sought to eliminate product losses, and fought against monopolism.

“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) demanded that the People’s Commissariat employees know the state of affairs not only in the economy, but also in the country as a whole, because at one stage or another, each event depends on its material support. The Party Central Committee approached issues here like a prudent owner. The party constantly directed the People's Commissariat of Finance to decide our departmental triune task: accumulation of funds – spending them wisely – control of the ruble.”(A. Zverev, “Stalin and Money”)

WAR AND MONEY

It was especially difficult for A.G. Zverev in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Colossal funds had to be found and immediately mobilized for defense needs. Under the leadership of Zverev, the financial system was quickly and clearly rebuilt on a military basis, and throughout the war, the front and rear were uninterruptedly provided with monetary and material resources.

During the Great Patriotic War, the country's financial system, using the economic and financial capabilities formed in the pre-war years, directed all efforts towards the formation of resources necessary for the front, the organization of the military economy, and the production of weapons. The state actively used the possibilities of finance as the most important lever in solving defense and socio-economic problems,

in the distribution of the costs of war among different segments of the population.

Ensuring uninterrupted financing of defense orders during the war.

During the years of the most difficult trials, the country's financial system did not undergo radical, fundamental changes. State ownership of the main means of production remained unshakable in a planned economy; the basic forms of financial relations, the formation of funds of funds and their use fully confirmed their viability.

The stability and accuracy of all aspects of financial relations, the high maneuverability of specific forms and methods of work in conditions of firm state regulation of the economy and finance, and the policy of austerity were reflected in the overall financial results of the war. The greatest test of the strength of our state was financed with a stable state budget: for the period 1941-1945. Budget revenues amounted to 1 trillion. 117 billion rubles, expenses - 1 trillion. 146 billion rubles.

Not a single warring state, including the United States, maintained such financial stability during the Second World War!

The superiority of Soviet aviation at the decisive stages of the war became possible largely thanks to the People's Commissar of Finance A. Zverev.

Seriously changed financial conditions in the country required changes in specific forms and methods of resource mobilization. Income from the national economy decreased significantly, and it was necessary to find new sources. During the war years, revenues from the national economy (turnover tax and deductions from profits) fell in the state budget by 20% compared to 1940 (from 70% in 1940 to 50% based on the results of war financing). Taxes and various fees from the population (including government loans) increased significantly. They rose from 12.5% ​​in 1940 to 27% following the war, with personal taxes rising from 5.2% in 1940 to 13.2%. (In peacetime, independence, our population would simply be envious of such tax rates: 13.2%!). The year 1942 was especially difficult: expenses to meet the needs of the war reached 59.3% of the total budget expenditures.

Judging by the indicated indicators, Ukraine has been at war for 22 years! And it’s mediocre to the extreme.

Any war has a price in the literal sense of the word : 2 trillion 569 billion rubles That’s exactly how much the Great Patriotic War cost the Soviet economy. The amount is huge, but accurate, verified by Stalinist financiers.

The labor feat of the Soviet people was supported by the timely payment of wages and the almost uninterrupted supply of workers' food cards.

The largest battle in world history required equally gigantic funding, but there was nowhere to get money from. By November 1941, the territories where about 40% of the total population of the USSR lived were occupied. They accounted for 68% of iron production, 60% of aluminum, 58% of steel production, and 63% of coal production.

The government had to turn on the printing press; but not at full strength, so as not to provoke already high inflation. The amount of new money put into circulation increased during the war years by only 3.8 times. This seems to be quite a lot, although it would be worth recalling that during another war – the First World War – emissions were 5 times greater: 1800%.

Immediately after Hitler's attack, it was forbidden to withdraw more than 200 rubles a month from savings books. New taxes were introduced and loans were stopped. Prices for alcohol, tobacco and perfumes have increased. The population stopped accepting government winning loan bonds; at the same time, the country launched a massive campaign of borrowing funds from the population by issuing new military loan bonds (in total, 72 billion rubles were issued).

Vacations were also prohibited; compensation for unused vacation was transferred to savings books, but it was impossible to receive them until the end of the war. As a result, during all 4 years of the war, one third of the state budget was formed at the expense of the population.

War is not just about winning battles. Without money, any army, even the most heroic, is unable to move. Few people know, for example, that the state generously paid its soldiers for their combat initiative and did not forget to financially encourage and stimulate the feats they accomplished. For example, for the downing of a single-engine enemy aircraft, the pilot was paid a thousand rubles bonus; for a twin-engine - two thousand. The destroyed tank was valued at 500 rubles.

The undoubted merit of Stalin's People's Commissar is that he was able to quickly transfer the economy to a war footing and preserve, keep the financial system on the edge of the abyss. “The monetary system of the USSR withstood the test of war,” Zverev wrote proudly to Stalin. And this is the absolute truth. Four grueling years could plunge the country into a financial crisis worse than even the post-revolutionary devastation.

The name of Arseny Zverev today is known only to a narrow circle of specialists. It never sounds among the creators of victory. This is unfair. Like all good financiers, he was very stubborn and unyielding. Zverev dared to contradict Stalin as well. The leader not only accepted this, but also hotly debated with his commissar and most often agreed with the latter’s arguments.

STALIN'S MONETARY REFORM

But Stalin would not have been himself if he had not thought several steps ahead. In 1943, when there were two long years left before victory, he entrusted the People's Commissar of Finance Zverev with preparing the future post-war monetary reform. This work was carried out in the strictest secrecy; only two people fully knew about it: Stalin and Zverev.

On a December night in 1943, the telephone rang in Zverev’s apartment. When the People's Commissar of Finance answered the phone, it turned out that the person who disturbed him at such a late hour turned out to be Joseph Stalin, who had just returned to Moscow from Tehran, where a conference of the heads of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was held from November 28 to December 1. Let us recall that for the first time the “Big Three” gathered there in full force - Stalin, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was then that the Soviet leader made it clear to his negotiating partners that after the victories at Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the USSR was able to deal with Nazi Germany alone. Stalin was tired of the endless delays in opening a second front in Europe. The allies, who realized this, immediately promised that in six months they would finally open a second front in Europe. Then the Big Three discussed some issues of the post-war world order.

Already from the middle of the war, Zverev began to gradually transform the financial system to the task of restoring the country's economy. Due to the regime of severe austerity, he achieved a deficit-free budget for 1944 and 1945 and completely abandoned emissions. But still, by the victorious May, not only half of the country lay in ruins, but also the entire Soviet economy of the former occupied territories.

It was impossible to do without a full-fledged reform; the population has accumulated too much money in their hands; almost 74 billion rubles - 4 times more than before the war. Most of them are speculative and shadow resources acquired illegally during the war.

What Zverev did, no one before him or after has been able to repeat: in record time, in just one week, three-quarters of the entire money supply was withdrawn from circulation. And this is without any serious shocks or cataclysms.

PREPARATION FOR MONETARY REFORM

The financial situation of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II was difficult, and the reasons for reform were serious. Firstly, during the war the printing press worked hard. As a result, if on the eve of the war there were 18.4 billion rubles in circulation, then by January 1, 1946 - 73.9 billion rubles, or four times more. More money was issued than was needed for trade turnover, since prices were fixed, and most of the products were distributed on cards.

At the same time, a significant part of the funds ended up with speculators. It was them who the state decided to rid them of their wealth not by righteous labor, but more often by criminal activity.

It is no coincidence that later official Soviet propaganda will present the monetary reform of 1947 as a blow to speculators who profited during the difficult war and post-war years for the country. Secondly, along with Reichsmarks, the ruble was in circulation in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the authorities of the Third Reich printed counterfeit Soviet rubles, which, in particular, were used to pay salaries. After the war, these fakes needed to be urgently withdrawn from circulation.

The State Bank of the USSR had to exchange cash for new rubles within a week (in remote areas of the country - two weeks). Cash was exchanged for newly issued money at a rate of 10 to 1. The population's deposits in savings banks were revalued depending on the size: up to 3,000 rubles - one to one; from 3,000 to 10,000 - three old rubles for two new ones, and over 10,000 - two to one.

Government bonds were also subject to exchange. During the war, four loans were made. Moreover, the last one came just a few days before its end. Historian Sergei Degtev notes: “The monetary reform was accompanied by the conversion of all previous government loans into one 2 percent loan of 1948. Old bonds were exchanged for new ones in a ratio of 3 to 1. The three percent winning bonds of the freely marketable loan of 1938 were exchanged for a new 3% internal winning loan 1947 at a ratio of 5 to 1.”

RESISTANCE TO REFORM

Despite the fact that preparations for the reform were kept secret (Zverev himself, according to legend, even locked his own wife in the bathroom and ordered his deputies to do the same), leaks could not be completely avoided.

Rumors about the upcoming reform have been circulating for a long time. They especially intensified in the late autumn of 1947, when information leaks began from the environment of responsible party and financial workers. Numerous frauds were associated with this, when trade and catering workers, speculators, and black brokers tried to legalize their capital by buying huge quantities of goods and products.

Trying to save their cash, speculators and shadow traders rushed to buy furniture, musical instruments, hunting rifles, motorcycles, bicycles, gold, jewelry, chandeliers, carpets, watches, and other industrial goods. Traders and catering workers showed particular resourcefulness and assertiveness in saving their savings. Without saying a word, they began to massively purchase goods that were available in their retail outlets everywhere.

For example, if the turnover of the capital's Central Department Store on ordinary days was about 4 million rubles, then on November 28, 1947 it reached 10.8 million rubles. Long-lasting food products (chocolate, candy, tea, sugar, canned food, grained and pressed caviar, balyki, smoked sausages, cheeses, butter, etc.), as well as vodka and other alcoholic drinks, were also swept off the shelves. Even in Uzbekistan, the last stocks of previously unsaleable skull caps were swept off the shelves. There was a noticeable increase in turnover in restaurants in large cities, where the wealthiest crowd was in full swing. In the taverns the smoke stood like a rocker; no one counted the money.

Queues began to form at the savings banks to deposit money into the savings book. For example, on December 2, the Ministry of Internal Affairs noted “cases when depositors withdraw large deposits (30-50 thousand rubles and more), and then invest the same money in smaller deposits in other savings banks for different persons.”

However, for the most part people survived the reform calmly; The average Soviet worker never had a lot of money, and he had long been accustomed to any kind of hardship.

RESULTS OF THE REFORM

As planned, simultaneously with the exchange of money, the card system was also canceled. Uniform state retail prices were established, and food and industrial goods went on open sale. The abolition of cards was accompanied by a decrease in prices for bread, flour, pasta, cereals and beer. At the end of December 1947, with salaries of the majority of the urban population at 500 - 1000 rubles, a kilogram of rye bread cost 3 rubles, wheat - 4.4 rubles, a kilogram of buckwheat - 12 rubles, sugar - 15, butter - 64, sunflower oil - 30 , frozen pike perch - 12; coffee - 75; liter of milk - 3-4 rubles; a dozen eggs - 12-16 rubles (depending on the category, of which there were three); a bottle of Zhigulevskoe beer - 7 rubles; half-liter bottle of “Moscow” vodka - 60 rubles.

Contrary to official statements, those partially affected by the reform included not only speculators, but also the technical intelligentsia, high-ranking workers, and the peasantry. The situation of rural residents was worse than that of urban residents. Money was exchanged in village councils and collective farm boards. And if some of the peasants who actively speculated in food in the markets during the war had more or less serious savings, not all of them risked exposing them.

The above costs of the monetary reform could not overshadow its effectiveness, which allowed the “architect” of the reform, Minister of Finance Arseny Zverev, reporting to Stalin on its results, to confidently state that there was much less hot cash in the hands of the population, and the financial situation in the Soviet Union improved. The state's internal debt has also decreased.

The exchange of old rubles for new ones took place from December 16, 1947, during the week. Money was exchanged without any restrictions, at the rate of one to ten (a new ruble for an old ten); although it is clear that large sums instantly attracted the attention of people in civilian clothes. There were queues at the savings banks; despite the fact that the contributions were overvalued quite humanely. Up to 3 thousand rubles - one to one; up to 10 thousand - with a decrease of one third; over 10 thousand – one to two.

“When carrying out a monetary reform, certain sacrifices are required,” wrote the resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated December 14, 1947, “the state takes on most of the victims. But it is necessary for the population to take on some of the victims, especially since this will be the last victim.”

“The successful economic and social development of the country after the monetary reform was a convincing confirmation of its timeliness, validity and expediency. As a result of the monetary reform, the consequences of the Second World War in the field of economics, finance and monetary circulation were largely eliminated, and a full-fledged ruble was restored in the country.” (A. Zverev. “Stalin and Money”)

Simultaneously with the reform, the authorities abolished the card system and rationing; Although in England, for example, cards lasted until the early 1950s. At the insistence of Zverev, prices for basic goods and products were kept at the level of rations. (Another thing is that before they managed to raise them.) As a result, products began to become cheaper sharply in collective farm markets.

If at the end of November 1947 a kilogram of market potatoes in Moscow and Gorky cost 6 rubles, then after the reform it fell to seventy rubles and ninety rubles, respectively. In Sverdlovsk, a liter of milk was previously sold for 18 rubles, now it is 6. Beef has fallen in price by half.

By the way, the changes for the better did not end there. Every year the government lowered prices (Pavlov and Gorbachev, on the contrary, raised them). From 1947 to 1953, prices for beef decreased by 2.4 times, for milk - by 1.3 times, for butter - by 2.3 times. In general, the food basket fell in price by 1.75 times during this time.

Knowing all this, it is very interesting to listen to liberal publicists today telling horror stories about the post-war economy. No, life in those days, of course, was not characterized by abundance and satiety. The only question is what to compare with.

And in England, and in France, and in Germany - and in Europe in general - it was even more difficult in a financial sense. Of all the countries at war, Russia was the first to manage to restore its economy and improve the monetary system, and this is the undoubted merit of Minister Zverev, a forgotten hero of a forgotten era...

By 1950, the national income of the USSR had almost doubled, and the real level of average wages had increased by 2.5 times, even exceeding pre-war figures.

Having put his finances in order, Zverev began the next stage of reform; to strengthen the currency. In 1950, the ruble was converted to a gold base; it was equated to 0.22 grams of pure gold. (A gram, therefore, cost 4 rubles 45 kopecks.)

A new rise of the Soviet people over post-war ruins

Zverev not only strengthened the ruble, but also increased its ratio to the dollar. Previously, the rate was 5 rubles 30 kopecks per US dollar; now it has become exactly four. Until the next currency reform in 1961, this quote remained unchanged.

Zverev also prepared for a long time to carry out a new reform, but did not have time to implement it. In 1960, due to a serious illness, he was forced to retire, thus setting a kind of record for political longevity: 22 years in the chair of the country's main financier.

After in 1947, the ruble and prices were stabilized, and a systematic and annual reduction in prices for all goods began. The USSR market became more and more capacious, industry and agriculture were spinning at full capacity, and production was continuously increasing, and the “reversal of trade turnover” - long chains of purchases and sales of semi-finished products - automatically increased the number of owners (economists), who, fighting to reduce the price of their goods and services, were not allowed to produce unnecessary things or goods in unnecessary quantities.
At the same time, the purchasing power of 10 rubles for food and consumer goods was 1.58 times higher than the purchasing power of the American dollar (and this is with practically free housing, treatment, holiday homes, etc.).

From 1928 to 1955 the growth of mass consumption products in the USSR was 595% per capita. The real incomes of workers increased 4 times compared to 1913, and taking into account the elimination of unemployment and the reduction of working hours - 5 times.

At the same time, in capital countries, the level of prices for essential food products in 1952 as a percentage of prices in 1947 increased significantly. The successes of the USSR seriously worried capitalist countries, and primarily the USA. In the September 1953 issue of National Business magazine, Herbert Harris’s article “The Russians are catching up with us...” noted that the USSR was ahead of any country in terms of growth in economic power, and that Currently, the growth rate in the USSR is 2-3 times higher than in the USA. Pay attention to the discrepancy between the title and the content: “they are catching up with us” in the title and “ahead of any country”, “the growth rate is 2-3 times higher than in the USA.” It’s not catching up, but has long been overtaken and left far behind.

US presidential candidate Stevenson assessed the situation in such a way that if production rates in Stalinist Russia continue, then by 1970 the volume of Russian production will be 3-4 times higher than the American one. And if this happened, the consequences for capital countries (and primarily for the United States) would be catastrophic.
Hearst, the king of the American press, after visiting the USSR proposed and even demanded the creation of a permanent planning council in the United States.

Capital understood perfectly well that the annual increase in the standard of living of the Soviet people is the most compelling argument in favor of the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Capital, however, was lucky: the leader of the Soviet people, Joseph Stalin, died

But during Stalin’s lifetime, this economic situation led the USSR Government to the following decision on March 1, 1950:

“In Western countries, currency depreciation has occurred and continues, which has already led to the devaluation of European currencies. As for the United States, the continuous increase in prices for consumer goods and the ongoing inflation on this basis, which was repeatedly stated by responsible representatives of the US government, also led to a significant decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar. Due to the above circumstances, the purchasing power of the ruble has become higher than its official exchange rate. In view of this, the Soviet government recognized the need to increase the official exchange rate of the ruble, and to calculate the ruble exchange rate not on the basis of the dollar, as was established in July 1937, but on a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.”

Based on this, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided:

1. Stop, as of March 1, 1950, the determination of the ruble exchange rate against foreign currencies on the dollar basis and transfer to a more stable gold basis, in accordance with the gold content of the ruble.

2.Set the gold content of the ruble to 0.222168 grams of pure gold.
3. From March 1, 1950, establish the State Bank purchase price for gold at 4 rubles 45 kopecks per 1 gram of pure gold.

4. Determine the exchange rate for foreign currencies from March 1, 1950 based on the gold content of the ruble established in paragraph 2:

4 rub. for one American dollar instead of the existing one - 5 rubles. 30 kopecks;

11 rub. 20 kopecks for one pound sterling instead of the existing one - 14 rubles. 84 kopecks

Instruct the State Bank of the USSR to change the exchange rate of the ruble in relation to other foreign currencies accordingly. In the event of further changes in the gold content of foreign currencies or changes in their exchange rates, the State Bank of the USSR will set the exchange rate of the ruble in relation to foreign currencies, taking into account these changes” (“Pravda”, 03/01/1950).

FIRST PERSON

Here is what A. Zverev said about some key moments in the formation of the Soviet financial system:

Arseny Zverev - “Chief of the General Staff” of the most successful Stalinist monetary reform of 1947 in history

About the reforms of the 20s and taxes,citing one instructive and typical case for global capital.

“As before, workers and employees with a monthly salary of up to 75 rubles, pensioners, military personnel and students were exempt from tax. Inheritance tax, war tax, stamp duty, land rent and a number of local taxes were also levied. Within the state budget, taxes then had a large share, decreasing from 63 percent in 1923 to 51 percent in 1925.

If we briefly summarize all these figures, giving them a socio-political characterization, then it will be necessary to say that taxes then served not only as a source of state revenue, but also as a means of strengthening the union of workers and peasants, a source of improving the lives of working people in the city and countryside, and stimulating the activities of state government. cooperative sector in the economy. This was the class meaning of the financial policy of the Soviet government.

The income received was used to restore the national economy, then to the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. While our industrial base was weak, we inevitably had to turn from time to time to foreign companies and purchase machines, machinery and equipment from them, spending limited reserves of foreign currency on this.It happened more than once that capitalists, who thought about profit and hated the USSR, tried to sell us rotten and defective products. The case with the American Liberty aircraft engines caused a lot of noise. Our planes, which were equipped with engines from a batch purchased from the USA in 1924, repeatedly crashed. Analysis showed that these motors had already been previously used. They scraped off the “Unfit for Service” inscription from each of the engines and sold them to us. Later, when I worked at the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, I recalled this incident more than once. It is very characteristic of capitalists, especially in matters where it comes to obtaining benefits by any means. [Nowadays, the Ministry of Defense purchases samples of foreign equipment not in order to equip them en masse, but in order to study and use new technologies in its own defense industry. The same thing was done in the 30s for the same purpose. During the war this was all very useful.].
The change on a national scale was also helped by new principles for building a credit system. Since 1927, the State Bank began to manage it from beginning to end.”(A. Zverev, “Stalin and Money”)

ABOUTadvantages of a planned economy

“...Without financial reserves it is difficult to ensure the successful implementation of socialist plans. Reserves - cash, grain, raw materials - are another permanent item on the agenda at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And in order to optimize the national economy, we tried to use both administrative and economic methods of solving problems. We didn’t have computers like today’s electronic counting machines. Therefore, they did this: the governing body gave lower-level tasks not only in the form of planned figures, but also reported prices, both for production resources and products. In addition, they tried to use “feedback”, controlling the balance between production and demand. The role of individual enterprises thereby increased.

An unpleasant discovery for me was the fact that scientific ideas, while they were being researched and developed, consumed a lot of time, and therefore money. Gradually I got used to it, but at first I just gasped: it took three years to develop the design of the machines; it took a year to create a prototype; they spent a year testing it, reworking it and “finishing it”: they spent a year preparing technical documentation; for another year we moved on to mastering the serial production of such machines. Total - seven years. Well, if we were talking about a complex technological process, when semi-industrial installations were required to develop it, even seven years might not be enough. Of course, simple machines were created much faster. And yet, the cycle of complete implementation of a major scientific and technical idea took, on average, up to ten years. The consolation was that we were ahead of many foreign countries, because world practice then showed an average cycle of 12 years. This is where the advantage of the socialist planned economy was revealed, which made it possible to concentrate funds in areas and directions needed by society, despite someone’s purely personal will. By the way, there is a huge reserve of progress here: if you reduce the time for implementing ideas by several years, this will immediately give the country an increase in national income by billions of rubles.” .

“The ability not to spray products is a special science. Let’s say we need to build seven new enterprises in seven years. How to do it better? One plant can be built annually; as soon as he starts a task, take on the next one. You can build all seven at once. Then, by the end of the seventh year, they will begin to produce all the products at the same time. The construction plan will be carried out in both cases. What, however, will happen in another year? During this eighth year, seven factories will produce seven annual production programs. If we go the first route, then one plant will have time to produce seven annual programs, the second - six, the third - five, the fourth - four, the fifth - three, the sixth - two, the seventh - one program. There are 28 programs in total. The winnings are 4 times. The annual profit will allow the state to take some part from it and invest it in new construction. Smart investments are the crux of the matter. Thus, in 1968, every ruble invested in the economy brought the Soviet Union 15 kopecks of profit. Money spent on construction that is not completed is dead and does not generate income. Moreover, they “freeze” subsequent expenses. Let's say we invested 1 million rubles in the construction of the first year, another million the next year, etc. If we build for seven years, then 7 million will be temporarily frozen. This is why it is so important to speed up the pace of construction. Time is money!

I know economists who, having excellent command of the mathematical apparatus (and this is excellent!), are ready to offer you a mathematical “model of behavior” for any occasion in life. It will take into account any possible turns in the economic situation, any changes in the scale, pace and forms of economic and technical development. Sometimes there is only one thing missing: a political approach.By the art of putting into the tape of an electronic calculating machine a task that generalizes for the future all conceivable and inconceivable zigzags of domestic and international development, taking into account technology, economics, politics, and the psychology of the broad masses of the people, and the behavior of individuals at the helm of state, we are still , alas, we did not master it. It is necessary to outline only the most probable aspect of development. But it is not identical to the mathematical model...

As you know, the Communist Party rejected the possibility of receiving foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us “human” ones. Thus, the usual methods for the bourgeois world for creating savings necessary for the reconstruction of the entire economy were not used in the USSR. The only source for creating such resources was our internal savings - from trade turnover, from reducing production costs, from the economy regime, from the use of labor savings of Soviet people, etc. The Soviet state opened up for us various opportunities here that are inherent only in the socialist system.”(A. Zverev, “Stalin and Money”)

But with what persistence today the impotent ruling elite of independent Ukraine is trying to obtain more and more predatory loans from the IMF and the World Bank; and with what stupid mediocrity he squanders them!

AT THE END OF THE GREAT JOURNEY

The circumstances of A. Zverev’s resignation from the post of Minister of Finance are still shrouded in mystery. Famous writer and publicist Yu.I. Mukhin believes that the reason for the resignation was A.G.’s disagreement. Zverev with Khrushchev’s financial policy, in particular with the monetary reform of 1961.

Mukhin writes about it this way:

“The first price rise occurred in 1961. The day before, in 1960, Finance Minister A.G. was retired. Zverev. There were rumors that he tried to shoot Khrushchev, and such rumors convince us that Zverev’s departure was not without conflict.

Perhaps the basis of this conflict was the monetary reform of 1961, and as we remember from the reform of 1947, such events begin to be prepared about a year before they take place. Khrushchev, apparently, could not decide to openly raise prices in conditions when the people clearly remembered that under Stalin, who had already been spat upon by Khrushchev, prices did not rise, but fell annually. The official goal of the reform was to save the penny; they say, you can’t buy anything with a penny, so the ruble must be denominated - its face value must be increased 10 times.

Note that such a modest denomination is never carried out, for example, in 1997 the ruble was denominated 1000 times, although even the poor immediately threw out a kopeck from the change - in 1997 it was impossible to buy anything with 10 kopecks.

Khrushchev carried out the denomination only to cover up the price increase. If meat cost 11 rubles, and after the price increase it should have cost 19 rubles, then this would immediately catch the eye, but if denomination is carried out at the same time, then the price of meat is 1 ruble. 90 kopecks At first it’s confusing – it seems like the price has dropped.

It’s hard to say, but it can’t be ruled out that Zverev had a conflict with Khrushchev, precisely over this purely political, rather than economic, use of finance.”

A.G. Zverev was a man of action, with a strong, strong-willed character that led him through life, through the steps of the official hierarchy. At decisive moments he was uncompromising and firmly defended his position. In his young years, he made his life choice and remained faithful to it.

A.G. Zverev, by his principles, was a statist, a supporter and an active participant in the creation in Soviet Russia of a centrally regulated state economic system, a financial system based on the centralized distribution of financial resources through the state budget.

His life's work can be called active work at all levels of the financial system, where he had the opportunity to serve in creating and strengthening a system of control over the movement of financial resources. He viewed finance as an instrument of state accounting and control of the economic activities of enterprises and organizations. And with his strong-willed nature, he strove to solve these problems.

A.G. Zverev left the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR in 1959 due to a stroke. After recovery, in 1960 he went to work at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and from October 1, 1962, he began working at the All-Union Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics at the Department of Finance, where he worked until July 28, 1969. During work at VZFEI A.G. Zverev published a number of monographs on issues of national income, finance, pricing, economic reform in the financial and credit system and other works, trained a number of candidates of science and hundreds of specialists for the financial system.

“Life and profession leave their mark on a person. Two aspects of financial activity seem to me to be the most important for the foreseeable future:

- how to work better;

– where it is more expedient to invest funds.

The first is an internal factor associated with some changes in the daily activities of financial authorities. The second is external, related to the economic foundations of the socialist economy as a whole.”(A. Zverev. “Stalin and Money”)

These are his own words; Arseny Grigorievich Zverev constantly lived and worked with such thoughts.

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev

Zverev Arseny Grigorievich (03/2/1900–07/27/1969), economist and statesman, Doctor of Economics (1959). In 1913–19, a worker at the Vysokovskaya Manufactory factory in Moscow province. and at the Trekhgornaya manufactory in Moscow. In 1933 he graduated from the Moscow Financial and Economic Institute. In 1937 deputy People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. In 1938–46, People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. From 1946 to Feb. 1948 and from Dec. 1948 to 1960 Minister of Finance of the USSR. Since 1963, professor at the All-Union Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics.

Materials used from the site Great Encyclopedia of the Russian People - http://www.rusinst.ru

Official certificate

Zverev Arseny Grigorievich (19.02 (02.03).1900-27.07.1969), party member since 1919, member of the Central Committee in 1939-1961, candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee 16.10.52-06.03.53. Born in the village. Tikhomirovo, Vysokovsky district, Moscow region. Russian. In 1933 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Finance and Economics, Doctor of Economic Sciences (since 1959). Since 1919 in the Red Army. Since 1923 in financial work. In 1936-1937 Chairman of the district executive committee, in 1937 first secretary of the district party committee in Moscow. In 1937-1938 and in February-December 1948, deputy. People's Commissar ("Minister") of Finance of the USSR. From 1938 to February 1948 and from December 1948 to 1960 People's Commissar (Minister) of Finance of the USSR. Retired since 1960. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1-2 and 4-5 convocations. He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow.

The country's largest financier

Zverev Arseny Grigorievich (18.2.1900, village of Tikhomirovo, Klin district, Moscow province - 27.7.1969), statesman, Doctor of Economics (1959). The son of a peasant. He received his education at the Central Courses of the People's Commissariat of Finance (1925), at the Moscow Institute of Finance and Economics (1933). From 1913 he worked at a textile factory, from 1917 - at the Trekhgornaya Manufactory. In 1919 he joined the RCP(b) and the Red Army. In 1922-1924 and 1925-1929 he worked in the Klin district, an employee of the district committee of the RCP (b), sales agent, financial agent, head. department, in June - August 1929 before. executive committee of the county council. Since 1932 he worked in local financial authorities. 3.’s career took shape during the mass arrests of party and economic personnel, when the need arose to attract young specialists.

In 1936 before. Molotov District Executive Committee, in 1937 1st Secretary of the Molotov District Committee of the RCP(b) (Moscow). In 1937-50 and 1954-1962 deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From September 1937, Deputy People's Commissar, and from January 19, 1938, People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR. In 1939-1961 member of the Central Committee of the party. He managed public finances during the Great Patriotic War, providing the necessary funds for organizing military production. Under him, the issue of government internal loans was established, which were forcibly distributed among the population (sometimes a large part of the salary was spent on them). He organized the sale of “Narkomfin goods” (for example, white rolls and bagels) at increased prices, and local leaders were required to unconditionally ensure their sale in the declared volumes. 16.2.1948 transferred to the position of deputy. Minister of Finance of the USSR, but on December 28 of the same year he again headed the ministry. In October 1952 he became a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

After the death of I.V. Stalin, as the country's largest financier, retained his posts, although he lost his membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee. Retired on May 16, 1960.

Materials used from the book: Zalessky K.A. Stalin's Empire. Biographical encyclopedic dictionary. Moscow, Veche, 2000

Read further:

Closing speech of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR A. G. Zverev. May 29, 1939 (Third session of the Council of Nationalities).

Essays:

Finances of the USSR for 40 years of Soviet power//Finance and socialist construction. M., 1957;

Economic development and finance in the seven-year plan (1959–1965). M., 1959;

Problems of pricing and finance. M., 1966;

National income and finance of the USSR. 2nd ed. M., 1970.



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