Violations in the operation of embankments of warehouses with centuries. Justification of the system of indicators of survivability of arsenals, bases and ammunition depots. General requirements for fire and explosion safety when designing arsenals, bases and ammunition depots

364. In case of fires at ammunition depots, it is possible:

rapid spread of fire in various directions, accompanied by explosions and destruction of building structures, obstruction of access roads to water supply sources, damage to water supply systems, fire fighting equipment and equipment; damage to fire workers from fragments and shock waves.

365. In the event of fires in storage facilities, workshops and ammunition work areas, it is necessary to:

immediately call fire brigades in accordance with the fire protection plan;

concentrate the main forces and means in places where the spread of fire can cause explosions;

use fire monitors and “A” guns for extinguishing, keeping in mind that a timely and skillfully used powerful water jet determines the success of extinguishing a fire;

simultaneously with extinguishing, cool the ammunition and evacuate it from the fire zone;

when a capping with ammunition in stacks burns, remove the stacks and extinguish the capping;

provide protection personnel and fire equipment from damage due to explosions, using various shelters (ditches, ditches, etc.);

when extinguishing stacks of ammunition small arms protect the shooters with light shields made of boards or plywood;

prevent the accumulation of personnel and equipment in hazardous areas;

organize surveillance of neighboring buildings and structures, as well as the surrounding area, preventing the fire of buildings, grass and bushes;

provide for the placement on the roof of non-burning storage facilities and other buildings of unit personnel with extinguishing means to eliminate possible fires.

366. Combat deployment be carried out in such a way that fire trucks and hose lines cannot be put out of action during explosions; for this purpose, hose lines should be laid in the direction of the corners of buildings and structures, using ditches and lowlands whenever possible, and trenches, crevices and shelters should be used to protect linemen.

Extinguishing fires in rooms with electrical installations

367. In the event of a fire in rooms with electrical installations, it is possible:

rapid spread of fire when the oil system of transformers and switchgears is damaged, spreading of burning oil over the structural elements of buildings;

dense smoke with the formation of toxic products;

danger of electric shock to fire department personnel.

368. When extinguishing a fire in rooms with electrical installations, it is necessary to:

Immediately contact the shift supervisor at the power facility, obtain from him information about the fire situation and written permission to extinguish. Firefighting units begin to extinguish fires at electrical installations after instructions from a senior member of the technical staff or the operational mobile team;

begin supplying fire extinguishing agents to electrical installations only after appropriate instruction has been given to fire department personnel by a senior member of the facility’s technical staff;

use primarily stationary fire extinguishing equipment and portable fire monitors to extinguish fires in electrical installations and protect coatings;

prevent independent actions by personnel to de-energize power lines and electrical installations, as well as supply fire extinguishing agents;

supply fire extinguishing agents from mobile fire equipment to burning electrical installations only after they have been previously de-energized;

do not allow excessive numbers of fire brigade personnel to accumulate in rooms with electrical installations.

Extinguish fire inside transformers and other oil-filled electrical equipment with powder, low expansion foam or sprayed water; feed trunks through the openings of busbars, while avoiding emergency drainage of oil from transformers.

On the territory of the artillery ammunition depot, special signs and markers are installed along the roads (1.5-2 m from the roadside) and near the relevant objects in clearly visible places. They should be supported by metal, reinforced concrete or wooden poles. The height of installation of indicators and signs from the bottom cut to the ground level is 1800 mm.

dimensions indicators and signs 450X360 mm, general background - blue with white border, border width 10 mm. Symbols for a fire extinguisher, fire detector, telephone, fire reservoir and fire hydrant are red, and the open area is white on a white background. Dimensions of the field (white background) for application symbols 300X300 mm.

Height of letters on fire reservoir, open area and direction signs 20 mm, line thickness 4 mm. The height of the letters on the fire hydrant sign and the numbers on the direction indicator is 80 mm, the line thickness is 10 mm. The height of the numbers on the open area sign is 200 mm, the line thickness is 15 mm.

The inscriptions on signs and signs are white. Top part The direction indicator to the nearest fire extinguisher (fire detector, etc.) is the corresponding image of the fire extinguisher sign (fire detector, etc.).

Appearance indicators and signs are shown in Fig. 1-7.

Rice. 5. Open area sign

ABOUT THE CHAPTER

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

Chapter 1. Basic provisions for organizing the operation of rocket-

artillery weapons ……………………………………………………. 4

Operation planning………………………………………………………6

Permission of personnel to operate ………………………………………… 9

Commissioning and transfer of missile and artillery weapons -

Accounting for missile and artillery weapons, reporting and procedures

forms (passports)……………………………………………………….. 11

Monitoring the technical condition and organization of operation…………. 14

Warranty obligations, duration of operation, procedure

extension of operation …………………………………………………………… 15

Damage, accidents and the procedure for their investigation…………………….. 20

The procedure for making improvements and changes to

operational documentation……………………………………………………………….. 22

Features of RAV operation in various climatic conditions……… 23

Transportation ………………………………………………………………………………… 25

General maintenance instructions………………………………27

Organization of weapon maintenance ………………………… 28

Weapon repair ………………………………………………………………………………… 32

Chapter 2. Basic provisions for organizing the storage of weapons and

military-technical property……………………………………………….. 36

General provisions…………………………………………………………………………………. -

Organization of technical maintenance……………………………………. 38

Organization of control over the condition of stored weapons and property ..... 43

Placement of weapons and property in storage areas…………………….. 47

Chapter 3. Features of operation of boiler inspection facilities, electrical installations

new items, protective equipment, military measuring instruments, sleeves and hoses

high and low pressure………………………………………………….. 55

Peculiarities of operation of boiler inspection facilities……………………………. -

Features of the operation of military electrical installations……………………….. 58

Features of the operation of protective equipment used in electrical

installations…………………………………………………………………………………………. 60

Features of the operation of military measuring instruments……………………. 61

Features of the operation of high and low pressure hoses

leniya……………………………………………………………………………….. 62

This document contains:

• How are the hazard categories of ammunition storage facilities determined? Ammunition hazard categories.
• Ammunition base locations. Equipment of the base territory. Equipment of base premises.
• Explosion protection of buildings.
• Fire extinguishing - reservoirs, automatic installations, alarms and warnings,
• Features of power supply of buildings, lighting.
• Provision of fire fighting equipment - fire extinguishers, fire shields.
• Lightning protection and grounding.

• Features of fire and explosion safety of bases of aviation weapons (aircraft armament), anti-submarine weapons, storage facilities with missiles (including missiles with liquid propellant engines).
• Additional requirements for the design and maintenance of weapons storage facilities and radiation, chemical and biological protection equipment.
• Additional requirements for the design and maintenance of warehouses for engineering ammunition, nuclear ammunition,
• Premises in which automatic fire extinguishing systems are installed.

Weapons and ammunition must be stored in reinforced concrete (brick) storage facilities with strong floors and ceilings. Wooden gates (doors) are covered with metal sheets, ventilation hatches, windows, and gates are equipped with technical security alarms with output to the guard commander.

Storage facilities for weapons and ammunition must provide:

• secure storage of weapons and ammunition;
• convenience for monitoring weapons and ammunition and performing work to maintain them in constant combat readiness.

To ventilate warehouses (storages), lattice doors are installed, which are locked, and metal grilles and nets are installed on windows and ventilation hatches; the dimensions of the doors and grilles should be no more than 150x150 mm, the thickness of the rod should be no less than 10 mm. The rods are welded at each cross.

Ventilation hatches, windows and gates are equipped with standard TSOs with output to the chief of guard; in storage rooms with small arms and ammunition, an audible alarm is installed.

To ensure ventilation and ease of work in storage facilities, the distance from the stack to the storage walls and ceiling should be at least 0.6 m, the distance to heat sources and windows should be at least 1 m.

The stacks are installed on pads of such a height that the bottom of the box is at least 10 cm from the floor. If the floor is earthen, this distance must be at least 20 cm. When equipping a storage facility with racks and pyramids, the distance between the floor and the bottom shelf of the rack or pyramid must be at least 20 cm.

A passage of at least 1 meter is left between the site fence and the stack (boxes, pyramids) with weapons and ammunition.

Storage facilities with small arms and ammunition, which are located in the parks,Requirements for RAV warehouse locations as well as in the area of ​​food, clothing and other structures for storing material assets, are fenced with an additional double fence (barbed wire) and are separated into a separate post.

Storage facilities must have natural or artificial ventilation. Ventilation and its scheme are determined taking into account the types of weapons (property), the capacity and layout of the storage facility, as well as the storage mode.

Heating of storage facilities should be central.

Heated storage facilities must maintain a temperature of 5 to 40 degrees C and a relative air humidity of no more than 70%. A short-term increase in relative air humidity up to 80% is allowed (but in total no more than one month per year). The daily temperature difference should not exceed 5 degrees C.

SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 1/2006, pp. 26-29

UDC 623.001.5

Colonel N.I. LISEYCHIKOV,

Head of Department

Research Institute

Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,

Doctor of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor

Lieutenant colonel Yu.I. ANIKEEV,

head of the department of design and operation

missile and artillery weapons

Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus

Ensuring the safety and protection of the population, economic facilities, as well as the territory of the Republic of Belarus from emergency situations is an important socio-economic and environmental problem. The development of science and technology, industrial production and technological processes leads to the fact that the scale of use of dangerous goods in society is expanding. Experience shows that the greatest number of emergencies associated with the use of dangerous goods, including explosive materials and ammunition, occur during their storage and transportation. The organization of transportation of dangerous goods receives constant attention in the literature. At the same time, storage issues, primarily of ammunition and explosives, are not fully disclosed. The operation of potentially hazardous production facilities is associated with a global applied problem, the external sign of which is the increase in the number of accidents, catastrophes, and other emergencies of a natural and man-made nature, the increase in their scale and consequences

For example, the explosion on June 4, 1988 at the Arzamas station of three cars with industrial explosives. Then 91 people died, more than 900 were injured of varying degrees of severity, 151 residential buildings were destroyed, 250 were destroyed. In the Russian Federation for 1977 - 1995. More than 40 major fires occurred in warehouses with explosives and ammunition, about 10 thousand wagons of ammunition or 200 thousand tons of explosives were destroyed. Material damage amounted to more than 35 billion rubles. . The number of emergency situations during the storage of explosive materials, ammunition, and their possible consequences show the relevance of this issue not only for the Republic of Belarus, but also for all former republics of the USSR (Table 1).

The analysis of the organization of ammunition storage at arsenals, bases and warehouses (storage facilities) showed that ensuring their survivability is currently carried out through the implementation of specific organizational and technical measures. These measures are based on theoretical developments of the 1970s - 1980s of the last century and do not allow for changes in storage conditions, design, sensitivity of explosives, technical condition of ammunition and other factors. The situation is clear: the scientific and theoretical justification for practical activities in this area is clearly insufficient. Current applied problems are:

comparative analysis of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities;

identification of critical elements at each facility;

justification of rational ways to ensure the survivability of the objects under consideration;

optimization of the consumption of financial and material resources;

reducing resource intensity, increasing the efficiency of the ammunition storage regime.

To successfully solve these problems, it is advisable to use mathematical modeling methods. In this case, the distinctive features (features) of ammunition storage facilities and survivability properties should be taken into account.

1. Ammunition storage facilities are a complex organizational and technical system consisting of n elements. Elements of objects are structures with ammunition placed in them for storage. These structures (storage facilities, open storage areas, etc.) may have additional engineering equipment (embankment, technical means of protection) and differ in the degree of protection from adverse external influences. The degree of protection and sensitivity of ammunition to external influences determine the state of the elements of ammunition storage facilities during the development of emergency situations. The condition of the elements is characterized by the volume of ammunition available on them and suitable for use, and the possibilities for their shipment.

2. Characteristic of these objects is the possibility that, in the event of external influence on any of its elements, secondary consequences may arise, leading to the emergence and development of the “domino” effect. The “domino effect” is understood as an avalanche-like development of an emergency situation at an ammunition storage facility, leading to the destruction and (or) destruction of part of its elements or the entire facility as a whole.

3. By the survivability of ammunition storage facilities, it is advisable to understand their ability to maintain and restore the ability to fully or partially perform the functions of storing and supplying ammunition for a given period of time under extreme conditions of their operation. At the same time, extreme operating conditions are understood as those when, as a result of enemy influences, natural disasters, man-made disasters, “human factor”, etc., there is a danger of a “domino” effect.

4. The objects under consideration are intended for storing stocks of ammunition of the nomenclatures. For a comprehensive assessment of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities, a probabilistic assessment of the ability to preserve the required number of elements and ensure specified volumes of supplies of ammunition to the troops within a specified time frame is necessary. Consequently, it is necessary to develop two groups of survivability indicators: according to the condition and according to the results of completing the task of providing troops with ammunition.

5. In general, any of the P object elements. For the case when the mth element of the object is exposed to external influence, the corresponding those probability distribution of the number of destroyed elements of an object where To - number of affected elements.

Taking into account the noted features, we will justify the survivability indicators of ammunition storage facilities by state (the first group of survivability indicators). As initial information we take the probability distribution number of destroyed elements of the ammunition storage facility. The specified distribution is determined by solving the corresponding system of differential equations, for the determination of which the previously developed corresponding survivability model by state is intended. Indexes T And To(hereinafter) respectively indicate the number of the element exposed to external influence and the number of affected elements. Due to the fact that any of the P elements of an ammunition storage facility, then in general it is necessary to consider P probability distributions of the number of its elements destroyed. Therefore, we will call the introduced indicators private. These indicators include:

mathematical expectation (ME) of the number of affected elements - M;

interval assessment of the MW of the destroyed volume of explosives -W;

interval estimates of the MLC of the destroyed volume of ammunition of each nomenclature - Q.

Each of the entered indicators is calculated for the case when the 1st, 2nd,... or nth element of this or that object under consideration is subject to the initial external influence. Therefore, for each indicator we have a set of partial indicators, the number of which is and, since for each indicator the calculation of the aggregate

P private indicators are not fundamentally different from each other. Therefore, the introduced superscript T(the number of the element that was subjected to the initial external influence) will not be indicated.

Let us consider the corresponding analytical expressions.

Mathematical expectation of the number of affected elements

Total number of possible combinations of the number of affected elements of the ammunition storage facility

For each i-th combination, i = 1,s, we find destroyed elements Wi- MOL of the volume of destroyed explosives (this calculation is easily performed, since the elements destroyed as a result of external influence are known). We define

Then we have a second indicator of survivability: an interval estimate of the maximum volume of destroyed

By analogy with the obtained interval estimate for each combination of the number of affected elements, the total number of which is equal to s, we find the MOZ of the volume of destroyed ammunition for the z-th range of ammunition. We present the calculation results in the form of a matrix. Matrix element q, standing at the intersection of the i-th row and the j-th column shows the MOZ of the volume of destroyed ammunition of the j-th nomenclature in the event of the destruction of the i-th combination of elements of the ammunition storage facility. Let's perform the operations

As a result, we obtain interval estimates of the MOJ volume of destroyed ammunition for each nomenclature

As a result, the third partial survivability indicator has been determined.

Let us substantiate the general survivability indicators of ammunition storage facilities based on their condition.

Mathematical expectation (ME) of the number of affected elements - M.

Interval assessment of the liquid mass of the destroyed volume of explosives (explosives) - W.

Interval estimates of the MOE of the destroyed volume of ammunition of each nomenclature - Q.

Let's consider the hypotheses:

H1 - The 1st element is exposed to external influence, i.e. T= 1;

H2 - the 2nd element is exposed to external influence, i.e. T= 2;

Np - the nth element is exposed to external influence, i.e. t = p.

Probability distribution determined by the above-mentioned features of OCB.

As an event Ak Let us accept the following: no more than To elements of an ammunition storage facility. Then the probability of the event Ak subject to the hypothesis Hi. determined by the expression

Where as in the calculation of partial survivability indicators, it is the probability distribution of the number of destroyed chemical safety elements.

Thus, the probability of destruction of no more than k elements is taken as a general indicator of survivability by state

By analogy with the particular indicators discussed above, an interval estimate of the volume of destroyed explosives and interval estimates of the volume of ammunition of each nomenclature are determined. The total number of possible combinations of damaged elements of the ammunition storage facility. For each i-th combination of destroyed elements, we find the volume (Vi) destroyed explosives. As a result, we have estimates , by which we determine the minimum and maximum elements. Ultimately, we have the required interval estimate

Index To shows that the estimate was obtained for the case when no more than To object elements. Thus, it can be argued that with probability Rk the volume of destroyed explosives will be in the range

In some cases, it is advisable to consider instead of the event: no more than To elements of the ammunition storage facility other events. Consider, for example, the event VC, consisting in the fact that it is destroyed exactly To elements of an ammunition storage facility. In this case, using the probability distribution

Then, the possible number of destroyed elements will be

As a result, in contrast to private survivability indicators, a point estimate of the MOI of the number of destroyed elements of an ammunition storage facility was obtained. However, it is not possible to obtain point estimates of the MOI of destroyed volumes of explosives and ammunition for each nomenclature. This is because there is uncertainty about the combination of object elements that are destroyed. Therefore, for the remaining two general indicators, the calculation scheme is similar to that considered for particular indicators of survivability by state. Thus, a set of specific and general indicators of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities by condition has been considered. Let us justify and introduce the second group of survivability indicators.

Indicators of survivability of ammunition storage facilities based on the results of the task.

The survivability of ammunition storage facilities based on the results of completing a task characterizes their ability not only to withstand emergency situations, but also to successfully complete the assigned task. In this case, an object having the structure S0, completes the task within time t. After external influence, a new structure may arise Si, including subsets of functional, partially and completely inoperative elements. After the end of the external influence, the object with the new structure must begin to perform the assigned task within a given period of time.

The following are considered as indicators of survivability based on the results of the task:

conditional probability of completing the task of providing troops with ammunition at a storage facility during a given period of time (0,τ);

survivability coefficient for a single exposure;

survivability coefficient under u-fold exposure.

Conditional probability of completing the task of providing troops with ammunition by a storage facility with a structure (Si), preserved after external influence for a given period of time

The survivability coefficient of an ammunition storage facility based on the results of completing a task with a single impact determined by the expression

and represents the ratio of the conditional probabilities of completing tasks by an object with a new P(t/S0) and original structure P(t/S0).

The task of an ammunition storage facility can be carried out after one, two,..., multiple external influences. That's why survivability coefficient of an ammunition storage facility based on the results of completing a task with double exposure can be calculated:

where is the conditional probability of completing the task of the ammunition storage facility with the initial (S0) and with the structure after one- (S1), double (S2) external influence accordingly.

The survivability coefficient of an ammunition storage facility based on the results of completing a task with n-fold exposure

Where P(t/S0), P(t/Sn) - the conditional probability of the task being completed by the object under consideration with the initial structure and with the structure after an u-fold external influence, respectively. To calculate survivability indicators according to expressions (1-4), it is necessary to determine the probability of the task being completed by the object in question (1 volume of a given structure. For this, a mathematical model of survivability, proposed in one of the author’s works, can be used..

The proposed system of indicators allows us to find specific scientifically based solutions to the specified applied problems in the most complete way, with a high degree of reliability. The presence of a set of specific and general indicators belonging to two groups, the need to have a system of indicators reflects, from a systemic point of view, the complexity of the object of research (the survivability property of arsenals, bases and ammunition depots). At the same time, the advantages of the proposed system of survivability indicators include

1. Clear physical meaning and simple interpretation of calculation results.

2. Adequate reflection of the properties of the object under study - the survivability of the ammunition storage facility.

3. Relatively simple mathematical expressions for calculating input indicators.

4. A universal approach to calculating the survivability of ammunition storage facilities for various levels of the system.

5. The ability to estimate the number of elements of the objects under consideration, the volume of explosives, as well as the volumes of destroyed ammunition for each nomenclature, destroyed as a result of external influences.

Thus, it should be concluded that the proposed system of survivability indicators and the results of the work make it possible to solve the applied problems noted in the first paragraph of this article.

LITERATURE

1. Volterra V. Mathematical theory of the struggle for existence. - M.: Nauka, 1976.

2. Rudenko B.N., Ushakov I.N. Reliability of energy systems. - M.: Nauka, 1986. - 252 p.

3. Ryabinin I.A. Reliability, survivability and safety of ships // Marine collection. - 1987. - No. 8.

4. Cherkesov G.N. Methods and models for assessing the survivability of complex systems. - M.: Knowledge, 1987. - 55 p.

5. Shkurko M.D., Pryakhin A.S., Filin N.N., Malkov S.I. Fundamentals of the design, service and safe life of ammunition bases: Textbook. - Penza: PAII, 2002. - 205 p.

6. Anikeev Yu.I. Mathematical model of survivability of class 1 hazardous cargo storage facilities // News of the Belarusian Engineering Academy No. 1(17)/1. Mn.:, 2004. - P.238 - 240.

7. Anikeev Yu.I. Justification of the survivability of ammunition storage facilities based on the results of the task // Bulletin of the Military Academy No. 2 (3). Mn.: VA RB, 2004. - P. 16 - 20.

8. Shchukin Yu.G., Kutuzov B.N., Tatishchev Yu.A. Industrial explosives based on recycled ammunition. - M.: Nedra, 1998. - 315 p.

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VSN 21-01-98*
---------------------
RF Ministry of Defense

DEPARTMENTAL BUILDING STANDARDS

STANDARDS FOR DESIGNING ARSENALS, BASES AND STORES OF MISSILES AND AMMUNITION. FIRE AND EXPLOSION SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

Date of introduction 2008-02-01

PREFACE

1. DEVELOPED BY FSUE "26 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation".

2. INTRODUCED by the Military Scientific Committee of the Housing and Arrangement Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

3. ENTERED INTO EFFECT by the Head of the Housing and Accommodation Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on January 22, 2008.

4. INSTEAD VSN 21-01-98/MO RF "Norms for the design of arsenals, bases and ammunition depots. Fire and explosion safety requirements", orders of the head of the Housing and Arrangement Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated June 9, 2006 N 75 "On compensation measures in the design of facilities within the framework of the Federal target program "Restructuring of stocks of missiles, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system of their storage and operation into an explosion- and fire-proof state for 2005-2010", dated December 19, 2006 N 132 "On introducing changes and additions to the order of the head of the SRiO of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated June 9, 2006 N 75 “On compensation measures when designing facilities within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Restructuring of stocks of missiles, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system of their storage and operation into an explosion- and fire-proof state for 2005-2010.”

1 area of ​​use

1 area of ​​use

1.1 These departmental building standards establish the basic fire and explosion safety requirements that must be taken into account when designing newly built and reconstructed arsenals, bases and warehouses (hereinafter referred to as bases) of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the military, where assembly, repair, maintenance and storage of ammunition are carried out , the action or behavior in case of fire is based on the use of explosion (combustion) energy of conventional explosives, gunpowders, products made from them and pyrotechnics.

1.2 The requirements of these standards apply to production and warehouse premises, buildings and structures in which missiles and ammunition are stored or work with them is carried out.

1.3 When using these standards, the following requirements should be followed: the provisions of section 5 are common to all bases; the requirements of sections 6-11 are clarifying for certain types of bases.

1.4 The requirements are mandatory for ordering, design, and operating organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, fire supervision authorities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and organizations of other departments involved in the design of missile and ammunition bases.

1.5 To implement the goals of the Federal target program "Restructuring of stocks of missiles, ammunition and explosive materials, bringing the system of their storage and operation into an explosion- and fire-proof state for 2005-2010" to bring the storage system and operation of bases in accordance with established regulatory requirements, before the allocation of additional funds means, it is allowed to design bases in accordance with Appendix A to these standards.

2 Terms and definitions

The following terms and definitions are used in this document:

ammunition: A part of weapons designed to engage targets and perform other combat and training missions.

knockout surface: A surface in the enclosing structures of a building (room) in the form of an opening, open or filled with an easily removable structure.

daytime surface of the earth: The surface of the landscape of a given area.

buried building (structure): A building (structure), the upper mark of the internal volume of which is located below ground level at a depth of more than 1 m.

restricted area: A strip of terrain adjacent outside to the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting site, in which the residence of the population is prohibited, as well as the construction and placement of objects not provided for by the general plan of the base.

restricted area: A strip of terrain adjacent to the outer fence of the base, in which it is prohibited to erect buildings and carry out work that could pose a threat to the security of the base.

protective yard: A protective structure installed in front of the ejection surface of a special cabin to localize the damaging effects of an explosion.

ammunition hazard category: A set of indicators characterizing the behavior of ammunition in a fire, such as: the ability to ignite from external ignition sources, burn (explode) in a fire, and spread fires.

easy-to-reset design: A structure that fills the knockout surface and is capable of being thrown off or destroyed under the influence of excess pressure or an air shock wave.

ground building (structure): a building (structure), all floors of which are located above the ground surface.

bunded building (structure): A building (structure) around which a protective rampart (protective rampart system) is constructed.

embankment building (structure): A building (structure) whose enclosing structures are covered with a layer of soil at least 1 m thick.

underground structure: A structure made without opening the surface of the earth.

fire and explosion safety: The condition of an object in which, with a regulated probability, the possibility of a fire (explosion), its transition to an explosion (fire) and the impact of dangerous factors of fire and explosion on people is excluded, and the protection of material assets is ensured.

semi-buried building (structure): A building (structure), the enclosing structures of which are located in the ground, and the upper mark of the internal volume of the building (structure) is above the ground surface or located below it at a depth of up to 1 m.

rocket ammunition: Ammunition containing a jet engine.

sorting area: An area intended for the reception, safety testing, sorting, and temporary storage of category 3 ammunition*, including dangerous ammunition, as well as all ammunition, spent cartridges and containers coming from the troops.
________________
* Category 3 ammunition includes ammunition that is not suitable for combat use and must be disposed of.


special cabin: A protective structure designed to contain explosive technological operations.

technical area: An area intended for the reception, dispatch, storage, assembly, repair, dismantling, disposal, and maintenance of missiles and ammunition.

3 Normative references

This document uses references to the following interstate standards:

GOST 30244-94 Construction materials. Flammability Test Methods

GOST 16363-98 Fire retardants for wood. Method for determining fire retardant properties

GOST 12.1.044-89 SSBT. Fire and explosion safety of substances and materials. Nomenclature of indicators and methods for their determination

4 Symbols and abbreviations

The following general symbols and abbreviations are used in this document:

ADS: Autonomous diesel station

Gas station: Gas station

TSA: Aviation weapons

AUPS: Automatic fire alarm installation

AUPT: Automatic fire extinguishing installation

BB: Combat units

BB: Explosives

Spare parts: Spare tools and accessories

SAM: Anti-aircraft guided missiles

GZ: Flammable liquids

MS: Head parts

fuels and lubricants: Fuels and lubricants

Liquid rocket engine: Liquid jet engines

KIL: Control and measuring laboratory

Instrumentation: Instrumentation

Checkpoint: Checkpoint

CRR: Maintenance building

KRT: Rocket propellant components

LVZH: Flammable liquids

MIC: Installation and testing building

NIITs PB RF Armed Forces: Research Testing Center for Fire Safety of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

ANSWER: Fire extinguishing agents

PAD: Powder aircraft engines

PRD: Powder jet engines

ATGM: Anti-tank guided missiles

SV: Explosive means

SOUE: According to NPB 104-03

TRT: Solid rocket fuel

UVK: Universal ejector chamber

YBP: Nuclear weapons

5 General requirements for fire and explosion safety when designing arsenals, bases and ammunition depots

5.1 Rules for determining the hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises

5.1.1 The hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises are determined by the hazard categories of ammunition located in these buildings, structures and premises. The determination of the hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises must be made regardless of the number of missiles, ammunition, explosives, gunpowder and products made from them located in these buildings, structures and premises.

5.1.2 The hazard categories of buildings, structures and premises, determined in accordance with these standards, should be applied when developing technical solutions regarding development planning, determining the areas of fire compartments, as well as buildings, structures and premises, placement of premises, selection of design solutions and engineering equipment (electrical installations, communications and alarm systems, ventilation, air conditioning, sewerage, water supply and heating).

5.1.3 Missiles and ammunition are divided into hazard categories E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, B, D. The determination of hazard categories of ammunition should be carried out by sequentially checking their belonging to the hazard categories given in Table 1, from the highest ( E1) to the lowest (D).


Table 1 - Hazard categories for missiles and ammunition

5.1.4 Buildings, structures and premises that do not contain missiles and ammunition or contain missiles and ammunition that do not contain explosives, gunpowder, pyrotechnic compositions and products made from them are divided into categories A, B, B1-B4 and D for explosion and fire protection fire hazard in accordance with NPB 105-03.

5.1.5 If there are ammunition of different categories in the room, then the hazard category of the room is determined by the highest category of ammunition contained in it.

It is prohibited to place buildings, structures and premises of fire hazard category G in accordance with NPB 105-03 on the technical territory.

5.1.6 If premises, along with ammunition, contain flammable gases, flammable or combustible liquids, as well as substances and materials that can explode and burn when interacting with water, air oxygen or with each other, then these premises must be checked for compliance with categories A or B for fire and explosion hazard according to NPB 105-03.

If flammable gases, flammable liquids with a flash point of not more than 28 ° C are circulating in the room in such quantities that they can form explosive vapor-gas mixtures, upon ignition of which a calculated excess explosion pressure in the room develops exceeding 5 kPa or substances and materials capable of exploding and burn when interacting with water, air oxygen or with each other in such quantities that the calculated excess explosion pressure in the room exceeds 5 kPa, then such a room should be classified as category A for explosion hazard according to NPB 105-03.

If flammable dusts or fibers, flammable liquids with a flash point of more than 28 ° C, flammable liquids in such quantities that they can form explosive dust-air or steam-air mixtures, upon ignition of which develop a calculated excess explosion pressure in the room exceeding 5 kPa, circulate in the room, then such a room should be classified as category B for explosion and fire hazard according to NPB 105-03.

If an explosive mixture, when ignited, can develop a calculated excess pressure of less than 5 kPa, then an explosive zone is considered to be in the room within a range of up to 5 m horizontally and vertically from the process equipment, from which the release of flammable gases, liquid vapors and dust is possible. In this case, the entire premises should be classified as a hazard category determined by the highest hazard category of the ammunition located in this premises.

Buildings containing premises with categories E1-E7, as well as premises with explosion and fire hazard categories A and/or B, should be classified as category A or B in accordance with the rules set out in NPB 105-03.

If a building (structure) does not belong to categories A or B for explosion and fire hazard according to NPB 105-03, then the hazard category of the entire building is determined by the highest hazard category of the premises located in it.

5.1.7 A building should be classified as fire hazard categories B1-B4 if two conditions are simultaneously met:

- the building does not belong to hazard categories A, B, E1-E7;

- the requirements of NPB 105-03 for buildings and structures of fire hazard categories B1-B4 are met.

5.1.8 A building should be classified as hazard category D if it does not belong to categories A, B, B1-B4, D for explosion and fire hazard according to NPB 105-03 and to hazard categories E1-E7, C.

5.2 Master plans

5.2.1 The areas where bases are located are established by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the command of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, branches of the military, main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

5.2.2 The placement of bases is not allowed in the territories and areas:

- flooded as a result of natural and man-made disasters;

- exposed to snow avalanches, landslides, mudflows, moving dunes and hummocky sands;

- with underground workings or with the presence of minerals;

- having radioactive soil contamination above the established maximum permissible norm;

- classified in accordance with the legislation as the first zone of the sanitary protection zone of resorts and water supply sources;

- external transport (railroad junctions, sea and river ports, airports);

- in sanitary protection zones of sanitary facilities and public utility installations (sewage treatment plants, landfills, etc.);

- archaeological and other reserves, in their protected zones;

- cultural monuments;

- with seismic activity more than 8 points;

- located closer than 1 km from landfills and cattle burial grounds, closer than 500 m from cemeteries;

- in contact with peat deposits.

The construction of buildings, structures and communications of the base directly above karst formations is not allowed.

5.2.3 In order to ensure security, bases should be located on a separate territory in compliance with external security gaps in accordance with VSN 34-94 and Table 2.

Table 2 - Minimum distances from objects to external wire fences of the security perimeter

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* Display of civil air routes on the ground should be taken according to aeronautical reference books published in the established order.

5.2.4 The database includes, in accordance with Figure 1:

- technical territory (8)-(11) (for composition, see clause 5.2.10);

- sorting area (1);

- security perimeter of the technical territory and sorting area (2);

- economic zone (3);

- residential area (4);

- barracks area (5);

- demolition field or destruction site (6);

- helipad (7).

Figure 1 - Typical layout of the base territory

Figure 1 - Typical layout of the base territory

5.2.5 The base must include water intakes and treatment facilities if it is not possible to connect the corresponding communications of the base to the water supply and sewerage networks of nearby settlements and industrial facilities.

5.2.6 The distance from the blasting field to the outer wire fence of the security perimeters of the technical territory and sorting site, individual residential buildings, railways and highways must be at least 1.5 km, and to the outskirts of populated areas (housing and communal camp of the base), factories , factories and similar structures - at least 3 km. As a rule, in relation to the technical territory, the blasting field and the residential area are located on opposite sides.

5.2.7 The helipad must be located at a distance of at least 1.2 km from the outer wire fence of the security perimeters of the technical territory and the marshalling area and connected to the base by highways.

5.2.8 From the outer wire fence of the security perimeters of the technical territory and the sorting area of ​​the base, the following are installed:

- restricted zone - at least 400 m wide;

- restricted area - at least 3 km wide.

5.2.9 On the technical territory, zones should be provided - areas of terrain on which groups of buildings are located, homogeneous in the nature of technological processes. As a rule, the technical territory should include (see Figure 1):

- storage area for ammunition of hazard categories E7, B, D (8);

- production area (9);

- storage area for ammunition of hazard categories E5, E6 (10);

- storage area for ammunition of hazard categories E2 (11).

The list of these zones is determined by the range of ammunition specified in the design assignment.

5.2.10 It is recommended to place buildings and structures on the technical territory in such a way that, as they approach economic and residential areas, the hazard category of these buildings decreases. At the same time, buildings and structures with ammunition of hazard categories E5, E6 should be located at a distance of at least 1 km from residential and barracks areas.

It is allowed to place buildings and structures with a lower hazard category in areas with buildings and structures with a higher hazard category.

5.2.11 Buildings and structures for production purposes (workshops, points for working with missiles and ammunition, workshop platforms, storerooms) should be located in the production area.

5.2.12 The mechanized loading and unloading complex and most of the loading and unloading platforms are located, as a rule, in the storage area for ammunition of hazard categories E5, E6, and the mechanized loading and unloading complex should be located, as a rule, closer to the production area and sorting area .

5.2.13 All above-ground and semi-buried buildings and structures of the technical territory and sorting area are subject to embankment. Diking should be carried out in accordance with Appendix B.

5.2.14 Buried and embanked buildings and structures, as well as buildings and structures of hazard categories B, D, workshops, workshop platforms and storerooms may not be embanked.

5.2.15 Above-ground, semi-buried and recessed buildings and structures on the technical territory, unless otherwise specified, should be placed in compliance with the minimum permissible distances given in Table 3.

Table 3 - Minimum distances between buildings and structures of various hazard categories

5.2.16 The distances between embankment buildings (structures), except for buildings (structures) of hazard category E2, as well as between embankment and underground buildings (structures), may be reduced by 2 times.

The distance between underground buildings (structures), except for buildings (structures) of hazard categories E2, can be reduced by 4 times.

Workshop supply storerooms of fire hazard categories A and B may be located from buildings and structures of hazard categories E2, E5, E6 at a distance of no closer than 150 m, and from buildings and structures of fire hazard categories A and B and hazard categories E1, E3, E4 , E7 - no closer than 40 m.

5.2.17 All buildings and structures of the technical area should be located on the ground so that if an explosion occurs in one of them, the direction of the front of the shock wave and the greatest dispersion of fragments will pass bypassing other buildings and structures. At the same time, they should be placed, as a rule, in a checkerboard pattern.

5.2.18 It is allowed to place buildings and structures with different hazard categories at distances closer than those indicated in Table 3, only in cases where calculations have determined that these distances are safe for the corresponding buildings and structures.

5.2.19 All buildings and structures of the sorting site must be located at a distance of at least 200 m from the buildings and structures of the technical territory.

5.2.20 The boundaries of the technical territory and the sorting site are equipped with external and internal wire fences located at a distance of at least 50 m from each other. The strip of terrain between the outer and inner wire fences is a security perimeter, which must be equipped in accordance with VSN 160-92 and other regulatory documents.

If the technical territory and the sorting site are adjacent, their security perimeters should be combined. At the same time, the sorting area must be separated from the technical area by one row of wire fencing.

5.2.21 If the security road is located on the outside of the outer fence, then the additional row of fencing to protect the security road, provided for by VSN 160-92, may not be installed.

5.2.22 All buildings and structures of the technical territory and sorting area must be located no closer than 40 m from the internal wire fence of the security perimeter.

5.2.23 The security perimeter strip must be cleared of trees and bushes, the grass on it must be mowed, and the control and trail strip must be plowed.

5.2.24 Enclosed fire reservoirs (reservoirs) with a capacity of at least 50 m for every 400 m of the perimeter should be equipped on the security perimeter.

5.2.25 On the outside of the outer wire fencing of the security perimeter, it is necessary to create a protective fire strip with a width of at least 50 m, plowed to the full width.

5.2.26 The demolition field is designed to discharge and destroy unusable and dangerous ammunition and explosive components of missiles. The demolition field must have a wire fence, around which a restricted zone with a width of at least 400 m and a restricted area of ​​at least 3 km shall be established.

5.2.27 The utility zone is intended to accommodate buildings and structures of auxiliary production, services and warehouses.

The economic zone must be equipped with a fence with the required number of gates and checkpoints and can be divided into:

- a service area in which control buildings, military fire protection and rescue teams, vehicle parks, railway depots, measurement equipment laboratories, etc. should be located;

- production area in which woodworking, repair and construction, mechanical repair shops, backup power plants, boiler houses, gas distribution points, etc. should be located;

- storage area in which fuel and lubricant warehouses, material warehouses, subsidiary farms, etc. should be located.

In the production area of ​​the economic zone, an area should be allocated for storing empty containers, linings, spent cartridges and cardboard products. It is allowed to place the specified area on the technical territory in the area for storing ammunition of hazard categories B, D. The area must have a wire fence with a height of at least 2 m.

5.2.28 The guardhouse should be located on the security perimeter at the entrance to the technical territory no closer than 70 m from the internal wire fence. An approximate layout of the guardroom is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Layout of the guardhouse

Figure 2 - Layout of the guardhouse

5.2.29 All buildings in the residential and barracks areas must be located no closer than 400 m from the outer wire fence of the security perimeter of the technical territory and the marshalling area.

5.2.30 For the storage of special equipment intended for servicing, loading, unloading and transporting ammunition, storage facilities, sheds, and open areas should be provided in accordance with Order No. 225 of the USSR Minister of Defense dated September 1, 1977.

5.2.31 When designing railways, a separate dead-end branch should be provided for parking a fire train, which should be located in the service area of ​​the economic zone. This branch should connect to the railway network of the technical territory.

5.2.32 On the technical territory and sorting site for motor transport, at least two dispersed entrances (exits) with a width of at least 6.5 m should be provided with the type of road pavement as for main roads adjacent to public roads.

5.2.33 The main roads in the technical territory and sorting site must ensure the organization of circular traffic and not pass between the building (structure) and its embankment.

5.2.34 Secondary roads provide direct access to the buildings (structures) of the technical territory and the sorting site. Entrances to buildings (structures) should be carried out according to the principle: one entry and one exit without turning around at the building (structure).

5.2.35 Primary and secondary roads should be constructed with cement-concrete monolithic, prefabricated, reinforced concrete monolithic, reinforced concrete monolithic and prefabricated.

The carriageways of main roads must have at least two lanes and be at least 6.5 m wide.

The carriageways of secondary roads must be at least 4.5 m wide.

The design service life of main and secondary roads before major repairs should be no more than 25 years.

5.2.36 Each fire reservoir (reservoir) must be provided with access areas measuring at least 12x12 m for the installation of at least two fire trucks so that they do not create obstacles for traffic on main and secondary roads. Access areas should be constructed with monolithic and prefabricated cement concrete, monolithic reinforced concrete, monolithic reinforced concrete or prefabricated ones.

5.2.37 The fire station should be located in the economic zone at a distance of at least 70 m from the external wire fence of the security perimeter of the technical territory and, as a rule, closer to the entrance to the technical territory. The fire station should be located at a distance of no more than 2.5 km from the buildings and structures of the technical area and the marshalling yard, measured along the road.

5.2.38 Trees (tree crowns) on the technical territory and sorting site must be cut down if they are located closer than 10 m from the contour of buildings (structures) protected from lightning.

5.3 Demolition fields and destruction sites

5.3.1 Planned work on the demolition field (destruction site), determined by the specifics of the base, as well as the standards for laying ammunition for discharge or destruction must be specified in the design assignment.

5.3.2 The equipment of blasting fields (destruction sites) should be carried out in accordance with these construction standards.

5.3.3 The blasting field must be a plot of land with an area of ​​at least 20 hectares. It is not allowed to place a blasting field in an area that has underground workings. Within a radius of 200 m from the site allocated for the blasting field, there should be no swampy or peat areas, as well as natural bodies of water.

5.3.4 When selecting a land plot for a blasting field (destruction site), it is necessary to coordinate the coordinates of the restricted airspace zone for aircraft flying over the blasting field in accordance with the established procedure with the authorities of the Unified Air Traffic Control System.

5.3.5 Depending on the designed standard for storing gunpowder for combustion, the area around the blasting field (destruction site) must be cleared of trees at a distance of at least:

- with a laying rate of up to 10 t - 300 m;

- with a laying rate of up to 5 tons - 150 m;

- with a portioned filling rate of up to 5 kg when burning using a continuous method - 50 m.

5.3.6 The territory of the blasting field (destruction site) should be marked out with a single-row wire fence at least 2 m high, mounted, as a rule, on reinforced concrete pillars. Inconspicuous obstacles should be installed on the inside and outside of the wire fence.

5.3.7 Around the demolition field (destruction site) directly behind its fence, a 50-meter firebreak should be created, plowed to its full width, and the territory of the demolition field should be cleared of trees and bushes.

5.3.8 Before entering the territory of the blasting field (destruction site), a closed fire reservoir (reservoir) with a capacity of at least 100 m must be installed. It is allowed to install two closed fire reservoirs (reservoirs) of 50 m each.

5.3.9 In order to extinguish forest (steppe) fires in the restricted area of ​​the blasting field on natural or artificial reservoirs (reservoirs), entrances and places for water intake by fire trucks must be equipped. The number of places for water intake by fire trucks is determined by the customer in the design assignment.

5.3.10 The demolition field (destruction site) must be connected to the sorting site of the base by road or railway, which should be laid bypassing populated areas no closer than 400 m from buildings.

5.3.11 Next to the gate on the inside of the fence there must be a dugout for the checkpoint controller. The dugout must be provided with telephone or radio communication with the base duty officer, the work manager and the military fire protection and rescue team.

5.3.12 A fire shield equipped with primary fire extinguishing equipment must be installed at the controller’s dugout.

5.3.13 For bases intended only for storing ammunition, it is permitted to design destruction sites instead of demolition fields.

5.3.14 The destruction site is intended for burning gunpowder, burning ammunition elements in armored furnaces and single explosions of ammunition carried out with a camouflage (without flying fragments).

5.3.15 Destruction site - a section of terrain with an area of ​​at least 7 hectares, located at a distance of at least 1000 m from the external wire fence of the security perimeter of the technical territory and the sorting site.

5.3.16 On the blasting field (destruction site) a shelter (for example, a caponier) must be equipped for a fire truck with a combat crew.

5.3.17 In contrast to the blasting field, when designing destruction sites, the following is permitted:

- provide only a dugout for the checkpoint controller and operating personnel;

- establish only a prohibited zone with a width of at least 400 m.

5.4 Buildings and structures

5.4.1 The requirements of this subsection apply to warehouse and industrial buildings and base structures in which missiles and ammunition are stored or work is carried out with them.

5.4.2 The design of buildings and structures on the technical territory should be carried out in accordance with SNiP 21-01-97 * and these standards.

5.4.3 The degree of fire resistance of buildings and structures of hazard categories E1-E7 must be taken not lower than II. It is allowed to accept a degree of fire resistance for a mechanized loading and unloading complex, loading and unloading platforms, and powder storage facilities of at least III.

Wooden structures of buildings and structures must be treated with fire retardant compounds with fire retardant efficiency group I in accordance with GOST 16363-98 (NPB 251-98).

The use of bitumen-based materials such as "roofing felt" when equipping floors (shelters) for buildings and structures below the II degree of fire resistance is not allowed.

5.4.4 The area and number of floors of buildings, except for buildings with hazard categories E1-E7, should be determined in accordance with departmental and federal regulations.

5.4.5 The structural fire hazard class of buildings with hazard category E1-E7 must be C0 according to SNiP 21-01-97 *. The fire hazard class of building structures with hazard categories E1-E7 should be taken according to SNiP 21-01-97 *. An error has occurred

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