"night hunter" against "apache" - war and peace. Night Hunter vs Apache Mi 28n Night Hunter vs Apache

By analogy with the Americans, a competition was announced with the participation of the Moscow Helicopter Plant named after. M. L. Mil and in the OKB N. I. Kamov. Despite the fact that the specifications for the implementation of the design and development work were approved by the commanders-in-chief of the Air Force and Ground Forces only in 1980, the preliminary requirements became known earlier. The new aircraft for round-the-clock and all-weather use was supposed to have a high indicator of the “efficiency-cost” criterion, borrowed from the West and becoming “fashionable” in the USSR. In addition, it was necessary to ensure crew survival in critical situations, autonomous operation with minimal use of ground equipment, high operational manufacturability and low cost in mass production, a highly automated on-board complex, and powerful high-precision weapons. One or two crew members had to cope with such a multifunctional creation.

Scheme Selection

A special feature of the competition was the participation of design bureaus - adherents of various helicopter designs. Thus, the problem of determining methods for comparing them was initially laid down. It would be naive to assume that existing developments will not be used in new projects. To justify the design decisions taken, specialists from both design bureaus analyzed transverse, single-rotor and coaxial designs, and assessed their impact on the performance of main combat missions, one of which is air combat. To solve this problem, it was necessary to increase maneuverability, the achievement of which was impossible without taking into account the latest advances in the field of aerodynamics and strength. Increasing combat survivability required measures to armor and duplicate some units and systems. The optimal composition of the crew, its placement and rescue scheme were determined. At the same time, foreign analogues were analyzed, the latest achievements of science and technology, and the latest weapons were taken into account. The rotary-wing aircraft, designed to support ground forces, escort transport helicopters, destroy armored vehicles, as well as conduct close-in air combat, was supposed to be operated primarily at extremely low altitudes (AL), flights at which have features that influence design decisions.

Drawing of a transverse rotorcraft made by S. N. Fomin

Experience in the combat use of helicopters has shown that in order to minimize the impact of air defense, they must fly in the so-called “safety corridor” at a PMV of 5-15 m. At the same time, reducing the likelihood of damage was achieved by increasing maneuverability, by increasing permissible overloads, roll and pitch angles, and flight speeds and sliding angles.

A complex task was being solved - piloting while simultaneously searching for and destroying targets. Working in such conditions is characterized by a high level of linear and angular accelerations and psychophysiological loads on the pilot with a lack of time. These factors favored a two-person crew. To save them, the customer required the installation of ejection seats, based on information about the presence of such on the S-72 helicopter, created in the USA under the RSRA program (Rotor Systems Research Aircraft - an aircraft for researching rotor systems). The use of catapults presupposed the mandatory shooting of the NV blades, however, tests carried out on the Mi-4 showed the difficulty of implementing safe shooting, so the developers of the MVZ considered as a priority the option of a twin-rotor rotorcraft with a transverse design, including with a pusher propeller. This solution not only guaranteed safe ejection outside the NV zone, but also made it possible to include the wing, which had become almost an iconic element, in the design. All previously developed strike vehicles in the United States had it, including the notorious AN-56, which could not but influence Soviet design thought. There were also developments on the wing on the Mi-6, Mi-24 and V-12. Not only did it make it easier to place the entire range of weapons under the wing, it also made it easier to take off an overloaded vehicle with a running start, providing advantages over a classic helicopter, and also unloaded the NV in flight, preserving its service life.

At OKB im. N.I. Kamov had a good groundwork for the Ka-22 transverse rotorcraft. The design of transverse combat helicopters in this design bureau was carried out under the leadership of the head of the technical projects department, S. N. Fomin. He personally did the drawings of the external views.

The design of the B-100 combat rotorcraft with a transverse rotor arrangement and an additional pusher propeller was brought to the stage of a demonstration model. Not without the influence of “Cheyenne” - the B-100 was distinguished by the high degree of novelty of the proposed scientific and technical solutions. The initial projects of this team were two-seater.

The designers of the N.I. Kamov Design Bureau, in their research on a transverse rotorcraft, which had fairly perfect aerodynamic shapes, only went as far as layout drawings and models. The cost center specialists went further.

In 1972, under the leadership of chief designer M. N. Tishchenko, the design of “product 280” began. In 1973, they designed a twin-engine machine with a take-off weight of 11.5 tons, with two propellers with a diameter of 10.3 m and a pusher propeller. The pilot production of the cost center built its full-size model with relatively conservative shapes.

Demonstration model of a two-seat transverse combat rotorcraft B-100 with two three-bladed, folding NVs, one pusher propeller and an air-to-ground missile

However, calculations carried out by both companies showed that when performing coordinated horizontal maneuvers, even not with maximum roll values, a transverse helicopter will always reach heights above 15 meters due to the large transverse dimensions compared to helicopters of other configurations. In this case, the probability of its defeat increases to 85-90%. In addition, lateral stability and controllability deteriorated during uncoordinated maneuvers due to aerodynamic features and cross-links on transverse helicopters, which is unacceptable in WWI. Satisfying air transportability requirements also became significantly more difficult. For the B-100, a rather complex version of folding the LNV with rotating the wing and fixing it along the fuselage was worked out.

Model of a twin-rotor MVZ helicopter with a transverse design and a pusher propeller

Kamovites also analyzed the design of a longitudinal combat helicopter, as evidenced by the presence in the design bureau of a demonstration model, beyond which the work did not progress. The transverse design, despite its promise in terms of achieving a maximum speed of 450-550 km/h, was rejected by both companies. Thus, the designers turned to traditional, single-screw and coaxial designs.

Model B-100 with folded NV blades and rotated wing

Demonstration model of a helicopter from the N. I. Kamov Design Bureau, indicating the development of longitudinal design projects at the company

Interest in the coaxial design was fueled by the fact that since 1973, Sikorsky had been conducting research under the ABC (Advance Blade Concept) program. Two experimental S-69 (XN-59A) helicopters were built with rigid coaxial NVs, which solved the problem of their “clapping”.

This helicopter reached a maximum speed of 296 km/h, in a flat dive - 358 km/h, and with the use of additional turbojet engines - 485 km/h. The coaxial design was a priority of the N.I. Kamov Design Bureau, which initially designed a two-seat combat helicopter. Later they developed a single-seat vehicle based on the developments of S. N. Fomin.

The design of a single-seat aircraft was considered by the OKB to be a progressive step, a qualitatively new technical step in helicopter engineering and should have a positive effect on improving combat and operational characteristics. The emphasis was placed on the development of information technology to provide intellectual support for the pilot. At the same time, it was planned to preserve the possibility of ejecting the pilot. An experimental machine of a coaxial design with semi-rigid fastening of the blades to the HB bushing by means of a plate-like metal torsion bar was designated B-80.

Experimental helicopter S-69 (ХН-59А) with rigid coaxial rotors

Model of the first version of the two-seat combat helicopter of the N. I. Kamov Design Bureau of a coaxial design with a fixed gun

The designers of the cost center approached coaxial and longitudinal schemes, at least according to the residual principle, and turned to their favorite classic single-rotor scheme. At the same time, the requirements for the possibility of performing flight in the mode of following the terrain and delivering strikes from low and ultra-low altitudes led to the abandonment of catapults. The pilots simply did not have time to use them during WWII; they had to rely only on the strength of the vehicle and means of survival. The latter involved the use of safely deformable structural elements, an energy-intensive chassis and energy-absorbing seats.

The first layout option for a single-seat combat helicopter, proposed by S. N. Fomin

The abandonment of the rotorcraft design made it possible to increase the weight output, combat load and simplify the design.

Many models and several mock-ups were built, including six full-size ones, which made it possible to work out the optimal layout. Among them there was a transverse design with an NV with a diameter of 8.25 m and two GTD-10FP engines with a power of 1,950 hp. With. each and two mock-ups of a single-rotor design: with an NV with a diameter of 14.25 m and two GTD-10FP engines, as well as with a diameter of 16 m and two TVZ-117F engines. The latter option was considered more promising; a significant role was played by the fact that reliable TV3-117 had already been mastered by industry.

Model of the first version of a single-seat combat helicopter from the N. I. Kamov Design Bureau with a self-aligning wing and a fixed gun

By 1976, the appearance and layout of the “ed. 280" have decided. The main weapons were to be the Sturm ATGM and a mobile 30-mm cannon. The cockpit and main units had to be protected from 7.62 and 12.7 mm caliber bullets, and the flight navigation system had to ensure operation in minimal weather conditions, day and night. The maximum speed was set within 380-420 km/h. The work was headed by Deputy Chief Designer A. N. Ivanov, the responsible leading designer was M. V. Weinberg.

Before the approval of technical specifications for R&D in 1980, both companies carried out preliminary design, based on their own understanding of the concept and based on known requirements. Design bureaus had relative freedom of action, which led to competition unprecedented in the history of aviation. Combat helicopters were designed that differed not only in aerodynamic design, but also in weight, armament, equipment and crew.

The helicopter, designated Mi-28, was designed as a two-seater. This made it possible to divide the functions of piloting, observation, target recognition, aiming, and communications between crew members. Placing pilots side by side was abandoned after analysis of side-view diagrams from the cockpit. The qualitative assessment of the view from the Mi-24 taken as a basis was “satisfactory” and became “insufficient” when assessing the left pilot’s view to the right, with the “side-by-side” layout. The asymmetry of the view made it difficult for the pilot to perform maneuvers to the right due to the difficulty of assessing the distance to the ground on the PMV. And this, in turn, affected survivability and combat effectiveness.

The choice of the “tandem” design, with a fairly narrow fuselage and a high pilot position relative to the side, provided “excellent” visibility, like the AN-64 “Apache”, which was to be surpassed in key indicators.

Weight perfection with a given strength, reliability and combat survivability were achieved thanks to the optimal design method, which proved its effectiveness in the creation of the Mi-26 (see “Science and Technology” No. 3/2013). At the same time, a layout with the so-called “central core” was considered, when vital units and systems were located inside the longitudinal load-bearing frame, and secondary equipment and units were outside it. The difficulties in achieving compliance with vibration and strength characteristics, as well as the vulnerability of auxiliary equipment, forced us to abandon this attractive design and return to a traditional layout.

One of six full-size mock-ups of the “280 product”, in which there is a clear resemblance to the nose of the Mi-24, but the artillery mount is like in the US AAN projects

The given level of combat survivability was ensured by duplicating the main units with their maximum separation and shielding by less valuable ones. The selection of materials, design dimensions and armor provided enough time to return to base in case of damage and prevented catastrophic destruction of the vehicle.

The preliminary design was completed by the end of 1977. For another year and a half, the requirements for the weapons system and the sighting, flight and navigation system were coordinated. The approval of the TTZ was completed only in 1979, after which detailed design and work began in specialized research institutes and flight test organizations such as TsAGI, LII, VIAM, NIIAS, State Research Institute of the Air Force, etc. Such a number of participants indicates that the design of the “product 280" has taken on the character of a national comprehensive program comparable in complexity to the creation of a promising combat aircraft. To test the units, 54 ground stands and several LLs based on the Mi-8, -24 were created.

The barrel of the Mi-28 gun board 012 was used as a tool rod on which the PVD and ROV were placed

The second prototype of the Mi-28 board 022, intended for testing weapons

In August 1980, the Military Industrial Commission approved the construction of two prototypes, pending the official conclusion of the layout commission, the positive conclusion of which was received only at the end of the next year. In 1981, a sample was ready for static testing, and in July 1982, the first flight sample was ready - board No. 012, on which on November 10, 1982 test pilots (G. R. Karapetyan and V. V. Tsygankov) performed a hover, and December 19, 1982 - first circular flight.

In September 1983, the second flight prototype was ready - board 022, on which weapons were mainly tested. Both prototypes, intended for use in daytime, limited adverse weather conditions, were tested until 1987.

Features of national competition

In 1983, factory tests of the Ka-50 and Mi-28 helicopters were completed, and in December the first stage of state tests began, ending on September 20, 1984 and April 19, 1985 for the Ka-50 and Mi-28, respectively. 27 flights were carried out on each type of helicopter, after which they were transferred to the State Research Institute of the Air Force named after. Chkalov for the second stage of testing.

In 1986, the Mi-28 successfully passed the main part of the state testing program, received a high rating, fully corresponded to its purpose and was superior in many respects to helicopters of a similar class. MAP decided to mass produce the Mi-28 at the Progress plant in Arsenyev. By this time, the pre-production prototype “Product 286”, designated Mi-28A, was ready at the Moscow Helicopter Plant. This was the third experimental vehicle 00-03, the construction of which began in 1985 and in which all the wishes of the military were taken into account. However, the customer chose the Ka-50, considering that at the current pace of electronics development it was possible to create an automated complex that would allow a single-seat combat helicopter to more effectively cope with the tasks assigned to it.

Experimental B-80, first flight, which took place in June 1982

In addition, during the tests it turned out that the Ka-50 had superiority in static ceiling, rate of climb, ease of piloting, the efficiency-cost criterion and the effectiveness of supersonic ATGMs. According to the commission, the only advantage of the Mi-28 was the presence of a mobile cannon installation. The dispute turned to tactics and safety of use. Supporters of the Mi-28 put forward the argument that one pilot cannot detect, recognize targets and attack them at the altitudes specified by the TTZ, due to safety conditions. In contrast, S.V. Mikheev voiced the essence of the concept of a single-seat attack combat helicopter: “There is no need to prove that one pilot works better than two, there is no need to prove the unprovable. But if one pilot on our helicopter can do what two pilots on a competing helicopter will have to do, that will be a victory.” The Ka50 clearly appealed to the fighter pilot, Air Force Commander-in-Chief P.S. Kutakhov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, and was chosen for mass production. The achievements realized during the creation of the Mi-28 were proposed to be used for a new modification of the Mi-24, which corresponded to the principle of reverse unification laid down in the TTZ, i.e., the possibility of using components and assemblies of the helicopter being developed to modernize existing ones.

The third experimental pre-production Mi-28A No. 032. Photo taken at the Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky by A. Oblamsky, courtesy of S. Moroz

The experimental helicopter Mi-28N (OP-1) board 014 was converted from the first experimental Mi-28 No. 00-01, board 012

The third prototype of the Mi-28 No. 032 was the first to be equipped with an X-shaped tail rotor and a new design. For exhibition in Le Bourget, it was assigned the exhibition number “H-390”

The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not allow discussing this decision during the life of P. S. Kutakhov. However, his death allowed the management of the Moscow Helicopter Plant to appeal to the new Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal A. N. Efimov, and to the MAP with a request to continue comparative tests of the Mi-28 and Ka-50 in testing conditions as close as possible to combat ones.

It was decided to carry out the tests according to a single program for both helicopters in a short time with a minimum allocation of resources. At the first stage, performance characteristics, characteristics of stability, controllability, maneuverability, and strength were assessed. At the same time, the target environment of the training ground was formed and a method was developed for comparative assessment of the capabilities of helicopters to search for ground targets. At the second stage, it was necessary to study the main characteristics of SD, NAR, and cannon weapons and evaluate the safety of their use. To do this, single and group targets from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and vehicles were placed at the training grounds, which, at the command of the experiment leader, could appear unexpectedly for the pilots, on periodically changed routes. To record the accuracy of ATGM hits, there were shields with frontal and side projections of tanks, which could move at variable speeds. In the target area, light, smoke and dust interfered with the ATGM guidance systems. Penetration was assessed based on the impact on armor plates 1,000 mm thick and on real tanks. Separate target fields were intended to determine the accuracy characteristics of the NAR and the gun. The escort helicopter filmed the launches and firing, and also noted the results of the hits.

The movement parameters of the helicopter and ATGM systems, the control actions of the pilots and their psychophysiological state (pulse and breathing rates, attention reserve) were recorded. Video cameras recorded the direction of the pilot's gaze and the duration of his delay on the instruments and outside the cockpit.

The experimental Mi-28 board 012 was equipped with a three-blade tail rotor from the Mi-24. Photo taken at the LII Zhukovsky by A. Oblamsky, courtesy of S. Moroz

During tests of the Mi-28, a controllability margin was revealed, and by 1986 the customer wished to expand the range of permissible overloads for more energetic maneuvering. Refinement of the LNV and hydraulic system made it possible to increase the vertical overload when performing a “slide” to 2.65 units. at an altitude of 500 m and 1.8 units. at an altitude of 4,000 m. At the same time, the flight speeds “sideways” and “tail forward” increased. The successful development of the helicopter's systems and their compatibility with weapons made it possible to carry out the first experimental night launch of a guided missile against a ground target.

In 1987, an X-shaped tail rotor and an electronic control unit of a new design were installed on the Mi-28A No. 032, after which the appearance and equipment for production vehicles was finally determined. Testing of the helicopter began in January 1988, and since 1989 it has participated in the Le Bourget and MAKS air shows. Since 2010 it has been in the Museum of the Moscow Helicopter Plant.

Since January 1991, Mi-28A No. 042 joined the tests. During participation in LeBurget-93, it was assigned the exhibition number N-315.

In 1993, a preliminary conclusion was received based on the results of the first stage of state tests of the Mi-28A attack helicopter and a decision was being prepared to release their pilot batch. By that time, the general designer of the Moscow Helicopter Plant named after. M. L. Mil became M. V. Weinberg, who, taking into account world experience and achievements in the field of avionics and night vision systems, proposed to stop the development of the Mi-28A and begin the development of a round-the-clock, all-weather modification with a fundamentally new set of Mi-28A avionics 28N (“N” - night) R&D “Avangard-2”. The program was headed by chief designer V. G. Shcherbina.

According to the plan, the Mi-28N was supposed to carry out combat missions at any time of the day, in any weather, remaining unobtrusive to air defense systems due to flight at an extremely low altitude of 10-20 meters, skirting the terrain and flying around obstacles in automatic mode. In addition, the helicopter must exchange data on enemy targets both with ground control points and with other aircraft via closed communication channels. For its ability to hit all kinds of enemy targets at night, the helicopter received the name “Night Hunter”.

The experimental Mi-28N (OP-1) helicopter, board 014, was converted from the first experimental Mi-28 No. 00-01, board 012 in August 1996. The crew of test pilot V. Yudin and navigator S. Nikulin first took it into the air on November 14, 1996 at the Moscow Helicopter Plant. M. L. Mil. On April 30, 1997, factory flight tests began. At the same time, the Rostov Helicopter Production Association (RVPO) was preparing for serial production with an acute shortage of financial resources, which delayed the creation of some complexes and systems for the Mi-28N.

In 2000, the general director of Rostvertol OJSC B. N. Slyusar (died in 2015) initiated a program to build prototype helicopters at the expense of the plant. "Rostvertol" together with the Moscow Helicopter Plant named after. By the beginning of 2004, M. L. Mil created a prototype in Rostov - “OP-2”, which performed its first hover on March 25, and already made its first flight on March 31.

In February 2005, a state commission was created to conduct state joint tests (GST) of prototypes - OP-1 and OP-2, the latter of which began testing in June 2005.

After the successful completion of the first stage of the GSI in March 2006, the state commission chaired by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, Army General V.S. Mikhailov, issued a conclusion on the release of the pilot batch of Mi-28N, and already in May the first production Mi-28N board No. 32 arrived for testing ( 01-01). In total, two experimental and seven production aircraft participated in the GSI, which performed more than 800 flights, after which on December 26, 2008, Air Force Commander-in-Chief A. N. Zelin approved the GSI Act for the Mi-28N helicopter.

A modern combat helicopter for the Russian Armed Forces has been created! On October 15, 2009, the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree on the adoption of the Mi-28N helicopter into service with the Russian Air Force as the main attack helicopter.

Modifications with dual controls and others

As soon as the Night Stalkers entered service, the need for a dual-control version arose. In April 2009, an agreement was concluded between Rostvertol and the cost center on its creation directly at the serial plant. At the same time, the Mi-28UB was supposed to be the first Rostvertol aircraft, in the production of which digital models were used. They decided to build a prototype Mi-28UB (OP-1) on the basis of the Mi-28N No. 02-01, tail No. 37, produced in 2007.

In 2012, the helicopter was returned to the factory to replace the nose with a new one, created using those same digital models. In addition to organizing a full set of redundant controls in the front cabin, other changes were made: the cabin became wider, the canopy and the entrance door were slightly different, the side glazing area was increased to improve visibility, and the configuration of the energy-absorbing seat changed. Now in the front cockpit, instead of a navigator-operator, there was a pilot-instructor or an operator, if necessary.

This allows the Mi-28UB to be used for effective training in piloting helicopters of the Mi-28N (NE) type while fully maintaining all the combat capabilities of the base vehicle.

On July 31, 2013, the crew consisting of honored test pilots of Russia - commander S. S. Barkov and operator G. A. Ananyev - took the vehicle off the ground for the first time, and on August 9 performed the first full-profile flight.

In 2013, it became known that the creation of a prototype of a deeply modernized version of the Mi28NM, which has been under development since 2008, began. The new modification must differ significantly from its prototype and be fully adapted for operation in network-centric wars, which involves full integration into the global system for transmitting video images, target coordinates and other information through available channels. The helicopter, like its competitor, the latest modification of the AN-64E, will be capable of working with UAVs. According to the deputy head of the Russian Helicopters holding company A. Shibitov, tests of the Mi-28NM should begin soon.

Comparative assessment of the MI-28NE helicopter with its competitor AN-64D

Correct comparison is impossible without conducting sufficiently in-depth scientific research. In the USSR, such research was carried out in the air force academies - engineering named after. N. E. Zhukovsky, who turns 95 years old on November 23, 2015, and the team named after. Yu. A. Gagarin. Based on the analysis of available information, methodological manuals were published, which were sent to combat units to study the aircraft of a potential enemy and successfully combat them. In 1986, such a manual was published on the AN-64A. Similar work was carried out at TsAGI, in this case the results were used by the Design Bureau and other industrial organizations to create promising aircraft.

In 1995, the Swedish Ministry of Defense decided to update its fleet of combat helicopters and selected the Russian Mi-28A and the American AN-64A Apache from various types to conduct comparative tests. Our Mi-28A board 042 was delivered on an Il-76 transport aircraft to Sweden, where it was tested, including live firing.

Mi-28 board 042 with exhibition number N-315 and a tool rod for PVD and DUAS installed on the left side of the forward fuselage. Photo: S. G. Moroz

Roll out of the first Mi-28N, produced at Rostvertol in 2005, which became the second prototype of the Night Hunter (OP-2)

On the territory of the Northern Military District, the Mi-28A performed combat training missions: combat with an advancing group and a strike on targets in deep enemy defenses. Strikes from different directions against targets against a real tactical background were simulated. The Mi-28A helicopter was countered by short-range air defense systems RBS-90 and ZSK LVKV 90, as well as JA-37 2Vigen fighters.” The Mi-28A did not perform real combat firing, but the use of all types of weapons was simulated. The surveillance and sighting system functioned flawlessly, and even Swedish operators without the appropriate level of training found it easy to work with it. The tests demonstrated the high probability of target detection, the speed of bringing weapons into combat readiness and the ability to use weapons from the maximum distance from the target. At the training ground in Vidzel, the “twenty-eighth” completed a one-day live firing program with all types of weapons. The helicopter was piloted by a Swedish crew. The 9M114 “Sturm” ATGM was launched from a hover at a target 900 m away, and the 9M120 “Attack” was launched from a horizontal flight at a speed of 200 km/h and a target distance of 4,700 m. Both missiles passed at a distance of about 1 m from target tank. The Swedes considered this result to be good, and the preservation of hit accuracy with increasing range and flight speed of the carrier was amazing.

The launch of the S-8 NAR was carried out from horizontal flight at a speed of 160 km/h to a range of 2,000 m and from pitching up at a speed of 220 km/h to a range of 4,000 m.

The fourth prototype of the Mi-28 board 042 is in flight

The main part of the missiles covered an area measuring 400-600 m by 100-200 m. The launch results from 2,000 m were considered acceptable, and from a range of 4,000 m - surprisingly good. During one of the launches, due to the non-design mode of use of the NAR, a surge occurred in one of the helicopter engines. The electronic regulator brought the second engine to maximum power, and the crew managed to land the car safely. The Swedish pilot explained to Russian specialists that on any other type of helicopter he was familiar with, a similar incident could have ended very sadly.

After firing at the training ground, the Mi-28A made a flight of almost 1,000 km to the Central Military District. Here, against a real tactical background, two more combat training missions were completed: containing mechanized forces and supporting the advance of tank units, and then a second demonstration flight took place. In total, the Mi-28 “Technical Demonstration Program” took three weeks and about 30 flight hours.

Ultimately, the Swedes assessed the Mi-28 as a very durable and reliable helicopter, well suited for use in field conditions, with high survivability. Not a single flight was disrupted due to mechanical system failures. Maintenance could be performed by conscript personnel under the supervision of a technical officer. It was especially emphasized that the Mi-28 turned out to be capable of effectively performing combat missions in accordance with the Western concept of using anti-tank helicopters. The Mi-28 is focused on the Russian tactics of striking on the move, when external control of the crew’s actions is reduced to a minimum. The Swedes “profess” Western tactics - launching ATGMs at maximum range from an almost stationary position in folds of the terrain (before launching a missile, the helicopter “bounces”) with preliminary reconnaissance of the target and issuing target designation to the crew of a combat helicopter.

According to the Swedes, the helicopter proved to be “very reliable and well adapted to field conditions.” The Swedes demanded that the helicopter be equipped with equipment that would allow it to conduct combat operations at night. The second stage of the tender was postponed to 2001 and later cancelled.

As soon as the “Night Hunter” entered service with the armed forces of its country, it became in demand on the world market, for which the Mi-28NE modification was created.

One of the Mi-28Ns successfully completed a series of demonstration flights in North Africa in July 2007. According to media reports, Venezuela and Algeria are showing interest in purchasing them. In 2009, the Mi-28NE participated in a tender announced by the Indian Defense Ministry for the purchase of 22 modern combat helicopters. The finalists of the tender were the Russian Mi-28NE and the American AH-64D. In 2010, both helicopters performed a series of demonstration and test flights in the difficult climatic and mountain conditions of India, and before that, one Mi-28N (No. 38) underwent special tests in the vicinity of Elbrus, confirming high performance characteristics in high altitude conditions. However, the old story repeated itself - in the final choice, preference was given to the Apache.

According to media publications, the first foreign operator of the Mi-28NE should be Iraq. Potential customers may be countries such as Algeria, Venezuela, Peru, etc.

Some sources on helicopter topics say that from a distance of 3,000 m at certain viewing angles, the AN-64 and Mi-28 are difficult to distinguish, explaining this by external similarity and once again accusing the Russians of plagiarism. Yes, both helicopters have almost the same aerodynamic configuration for the Mi-28 and YAN-64A modifications, but different external contours and contours. In addition, the Mi-28 fuselage is longer and wider, which led to a larger projection area of ​​the helicopter from below. The cross-sectional areas of helicopters are approximately the same. Another significant difference is the five-blade NV with a larger diameter than the four-blade Apache propeller. Based on this, the Russian helicopter is heavier than the American one and has differences in performance characteristics. Comparative characteristics of the Mi-28NE helicopters and its competitor AN-64D are given in the table.

Despite the fact that the Russian helicopter is three tons heavier than the American one, the ratio of normal take-off weight to engine power of the Mi-28 is better. In terms of mass and specific weight of the combat load, the Mi-28NE surpasses its competitor, it is almost 21%, while for the AN-64D this figure is about 19%. In terms of other performance characteristics, the Mi-28NE is inferior to its opponent. Nevertheless, it also has significant advantages. We cannot agree with the opinion of some representatives of the Indian Air Force that the AH-64D is more maneuverable and its armor protection is superior to the Mi-28N.

Thus, at a speed of more than 120-150 km/h, gliding for the AN-64 is limited or not allowed at all due to the strength of the flywheel and tail boom, which significantly limits the ability to perform combat maneuvers, while the Mi-28 performs basic aerobatics, despite for heavy armor.

In addition, the five-blade NV Mi-28 is more efficient than the four-blade propeller installed on the AN-64, especially at low speeds, and has a lower level of vibration, which is very important when aiming. The view from the Apache's pilot and gunner's cabins is limited: forward and down by the side sponsons, back by the engines. On the Mi-28, the smooth lateral contours of the front part of the fuselage provide good visibility. At the same time, the glazing area of ​​the cockpit of the American car is larger, and the panels have a slight convexity, while the flat panels on the Mi-28 are capable of creating unidirectional glare in the cockpit, interfering with the reading of instrument readings.

Pre-production Mi-28N board 38 during testing in high altitude conditions. This machine became a model of the export version of the Mi-28NE and participated in test flights abroad

The design of both helicopters is designed to withstand 23mm shells. At the same time, the Mi-28 has a greater chance of surviving in battle due to better armor, since the Apache only has armor covering the cockpit.

The design of the Mi-28 allows it to withstand a collision with the ground without serious consequences for the crew with a vertical descent speed of 15.4 m/s, while the Apache has this speed limited to 11.69 m/s.

The vehicle's on-board equipment includes an all-round radar. Unlike the radar of the American Apache helicopter, it is capable of solving flight and navigation problems.

A comparative assessment of the Mi-28NE helicopter in terms of the use of cannon armament indicates that the 2A42 cannon is superior to the M230 ChainGun in terms of range of use and mass per second salvo. The use of the 2A42 gun made it possible to increase firepower, but, at the same time, aggravated serious problems. With a gun mount mass of about 200 kg, the recoil when firing is much higher than that of aircraft guns. Placing the gun on the turret entailed local strengthening of the structure and an increase in the weight of the empty helicopter. Due to the high recoil and the presence of a shoulder to the center of mass, the helicopter sways, which leads to a deterioration in shooting accuracy. Nevertheless, representatives of the Moscow Helicopter Plant guarantee better shooting accuracy than the AN-64. The Apache has 1,200 rounds of ammunition, while the Mi-28 has only 250, but it requires fewer rounds to destroy a target, given the much higher efficiency of its gun mount (3-4 times according to various estimates).

In addition, it is possible to install two universal gun containers UPK-23-250, with a 23-mm GSh-23L cannon and an ammunition load of 250 shells.

The main caliber of “tank hunters” are ATGMs. Their number is the same for both helicopters. However, the Hellfire has laser guidance, and its use at night is problematic, while the Attack has radio command guidance, which is susceptible to radio interference, but has no restrictions on atmospheric transparency.

Self-guided supersonic air-to-air missile of the Igla-V type ensures destruction of all types of tactical aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs in conditions of background and artificial interference, operates on the “fire and forget” principle at altitudes from 10 to 3 500 m and is not inferior to the American AIM-92 Stinger.

The NAR S-8 80 mm caliber, S-13 122 mm caliber and S-24 240 mm caliber used on the helicopter have a greater range and armor penetration than the 70 mm M260 and Hydra 70 missiles.

Competing helicopters have an onboard defense system that is approximately the same in composition and capabilities, including spreaders of IR traps and dipole reflectors and receivers that warn of laser and radar irradiation. However, potential customers stated that the American helicopter is superior to the export version of its Russian competitor in the capabilities of electronic warfare systems, survivability, the level of situational awareness of the crew, the ability to conduct combat operations at night, the effectiveness of on-board electronics, as well as its weapons. At the same time, as we remember, the Swedes noted the impossibility of using it in night combat as the biggest drawback of the Mi-28A, expressing confidence that the Mi-28N would be able to cope with such a task.

In relation to the Apache, the excessive complexity of on-board equipment and systems was noted. Its maintenance requires lengthy training of engineering and technical staff.

Considering that the modernization of the AH-64D and -E helicopters is currently ongoing and a new modification of the Mi-28NM is being created, they will remain competitors and the most advanced combat helicopters in the world for a long time. But which one is better and by what criteria is up to you to decide, based on the above analysis and the history of the development of combat helicopters. At the same time, we should not forget that “all other things being equal, in a real battle much is decided by chance and not so much by the characteristics inherent in military equipment, but by its skillful use.”

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And I was very surprised. It turns out that “Military Review” publishes materials of the “Star” level, without any pre-moderation by a specialist. In short, the author explains the loss of the Mi-28NE to the American AN-64D “Apache Longbow” in the Indian tender. The most important reason, the description of which 80% of the article is devoted to, is the loss of the Russian Ataka missiles to the American Helfire missiles. Plus, the author has also been threatening, since 2016, with ultra-modern fourth-generation JAGM ATGMs, which have nothing to do with the contract at all.
For some reason the author “forgot” that the tender actually started in 2008!!!

It is stupid to assess the loss of a helicopter by “bad” missiles. Especially when the advantage is “fire and forget” with the “Helfire” instead of accompanying the missile with an operator, as with the “Attack”. I will not convict the author of specific lies when citing the characteristics of missiles and their modifications - that is not the point. The main lie is that India could easily purchase Mi-28NEs and equip them with Helfires purchased from the Yankees.


The reason for the loss is different. "Apache" has been used for many years and has a rich history of combat use. And the Mi-28N not only had just been put into service, it crashed during an exercise due to “choking” engines (the helicopter was intact, as was the crew). The Indians simply did not intend to bother with fine-tuning the helicopter after the purchase, which today is superior to the Apache Longbow in all respects. But this is today, and not at the time of the purchase of the first American helicopters. The road is a spoon for dinner. I repeat - this is in a nutshell.

Now about the rockets. The author writes a lot and rightly that missiles with a “fire and forget” principle are good for fighting partisans. Precisely because they allow you to reduce the time the carrier remains in the affected area when aiming and launching. This is important, but the only advantage. Everything else is shortcomings. All equipment equipped with systems such as "Shtora" and similar ones will reject these missiles in the same automatic mode as the missile seeker. Moreover, in smoke conditions and with the use of various interference, automatic guidance suffers even more. As a result, the “Attack” becomes more effective.

The article mentions the poor heavy gun with little ammunition on the Mi-28. A clear example of bias. The American M230 cannon weighing 54 kilograms provides a rate of fire of 625 rounds per minute with an effective firing range of 3 kilometers. It was created specifically for a helicopter and is characterized by not very high accuracy and insufficient power.

Installed on the Mi-28Nold and provenmodified 2A42 tank gun. It is noticeably heavier than the American one and has serious recoil. However, its accuracy is higher than that of the M230. At the same time, the 2A42 is the most powerful helicopter gun in the world: the weight of the projectile and the initial speed are almost twice that of the M230, the firing range is 4 kilometers, and the rate of fire is up to 900 rounds per minute. A projectile fired from the Mi-28N penetrates 15 mm armor from a 1.5 km distance.

Moreover, the 2A42 is extremely reliable and practically does not overheat, unlike the M230. The 2A42 is capable of fully firing its entire ammunition load without any cooling breaks. Plus, the shooter himself chooses the type of projectile: armor-piercing or high-explosive fragmentation.

I focused on comparisons of guns because it is easier - a large selection of missile modifications and their use from a helicopter can be discussed endlessly. The main advantage of “release and forget” is a mass launch and minimal time for the helicopter to remain in the zone of probable destruction. But The laser-guided Hellfire AGM-114A and radar-guided AGM-114B have a range of 6-7 kilometers and, unlike Russian missiles, are subsonic. It takes missiles 15 seconds to reach a target 4 kilometers away, while Russian missiles take 1.5 times less time. And the new version of the Ataka-D missile has a range of up to 10 kilometers.

This is if we describe weapons. Returning to the lost tender, it is worth recalling that samples that have a history of combat use and have been tested always and everywhere win in equal conditions. As for the Indian contract, there is one more subtlety - Indian legislation provides for the diversification of military procurement. This is what Western competitors take advantage of, often offering more expensive cars, missiles,...

The author of the opus briefly describes the armor of the Mi-28NE in a derogatory manner: “the crew’s armored box is made of 10-mm aluminum alloy sheets on which ceramic tiles are glued. This design can save the crew from 7.62 mm caliber bullets.”

This phrase immediately shows that the article was written not by an illiterate person, but by a specialist who was deliberately ordered to deliver devastating material. My namesake really writes a lot about military equipment and he wouldn’t accidentally write something like this. It is useless to guess who exactly. Maybe there are strategists in Moscow who believe that Russian technology should be written poorly until the opposite became obvious in Syria.

In fact, only the armored capsule of the crew was described. But - partially. In fact, the so-called “bathtub” is made of 10 mm aluminum sheets onto which 16 mm armor elements made of ceramics. But this is only a small part of the armor protection.

In general, the “Night Hunter” is protected by highly resistant armor, fully armored plane-parallel glazing can withstand direct hits from armor-piercing bullets of 12.7 mm caliber into windshields and bullets of 7.62 mm caliber into side windows and door windows, the body armor can withstand hits from high-explosive fragmentation shells 20 mm caliber, the blades remain operational when hit by 30 mm shells [*] .

The cabin doors are made of fiberglass with an aluminum plate and ceramic armor. The cabin windshields are made of transparent silicate blocks 42 mm thick, and the side windows and door windows are made of the same blocks, but 22 mm thick. The pilot's cabin is separated from the operator's cabin by a 10-mm aluminum armor plate, which minimizes damage to both crew members when a small-caliber high-explosive incendiary (HEF) shell explodes in one of the cabins. The fuel tanks are filled with polyurethane foam and equipped with a latex self-tightening protector.

Shooting a Mi-28 from 7.62 to 20 mm cannon at point blank range. Moreover, the old Mi-28:

Agree, this is a slightly different survivability.

In general, you can find a lot of different pros and cons. The Indians found as many as 20 reasons why they preferred the Longbow.

Below is a video of how the Night Stalker falls and what happens to the crew. So, for an example of the survivability of the capsule. The rescue system and much more are described in the video above:

Comparing modern military equipment is a thankless task. All other things being equal, in a real battle, much is decided by chance and not so much by the characteristics inherent in it, but by its skillful use. But we’ll try anyway, because everyone is so interested in who is cooler, our Mi-28N and Ka-52 or “their” Apache?

It is clear that comparison of the most modern combat helicopters in the world is a topic that has given rise to a great many “holy wars” on Internet forums. So we will try to summarize only the most important points.

Video: Ka-50

The first thing worth considering is the schematic diagram of the rotors. The Mi-28N and AN-64 Apache are built on a classic basis, with one main rotor and one tail rotor. In contrast, the Ka-52 is based on an extremely rare and technically complex coaxial design, with two propellers that simultaneously perform both flight and taxiing functions. This scheme provides a gain in power, increasing the available flight ceiling by 100-200 m, which can be extremely useful in mountainous areas. And the absence of a tail rotor has a good effect on the reliability of operation on mountain slopes.

In addition, the helicopter becomes more compact in length. But his profile increases in height, so the gain turns out to be rather dubious. Flight control is slightly improved, which makes it possible for the Ka-52 to make the famous “Funnel” figure - rotating around the aiming point and continuously pouring fire on it. However, all this is not so significant as to speak of serious advantages of the coaxial design over the classic single-rotor design.

The difference is much greater elsewhere. The fact is that the main enemy of helicopters is armored vehicles, but any modern tank has air defense systems that are effective at distances of up to 6 km. A helicopter in this area has only a few seconds to detect and recognize a target and shoot at it. In that amount of time you can only fire a cannon; a rocket requires more.

The Americans solved this problem by using combinations of 1 reconnaissance and target designation helicopter along with several attack vehicles. A light reconnaissance aircraft literally sneaks close to the enemy, and it is much more difficult to detect and hit it than the AN-64 Apache attack tanks that remain outside the air defense range of the tank. He transmits a signal - and only after that the Apaches strike.

The immediate predecessor of the Ka-52, the “Black Shark” Ka-50, was also designed for this type of action. This made it possible to make it both lighter and more maneuverable, getting rid of one crew member and focusing on the means of exchanging information between helicopters in the group. However, Soviet (and now Russian) industry still cannot produce a light reconnaissance vehicle suitable for such purposes. The Ka-50 (and with them the descendants of the Ka-52) were quickly transferred to a different style of combat, using the Vikhr missile system, capable of operating from a distance of up to 10 km. However, with the Vikhr, at night this effective distance is reduced to the same fatal 6 km, and the laser missile guidance system is not very reliable.

Video: Mi-28N

The Mi-28N was initially a simpler and cheaper option. The two-cabin layout made it possible to accommodate both the pilot and the gunner operator, who takes care of all the shooting. And the Ataka complex installed on this helicopter operates at distances of up to 6-8 km, using a more reliable radio command guidance method (the Americans also upgraded their AN-64 Apache for missiles with the Hellfire AGM-114B radio command guidance system).

An important element of both Russian helicopters is the Arbalet onboard radar, which performs reconnaissance and target designation tasks, for which the American approach allocates an entire separate helicopter (Bell OH-58D Kiowa). This seemingly insignificant detail makes the Ka-52 and Mi-28N weapons of a completely new level - all-weather. The radar provides detection and recognition of targets, route mapping, target designation of missiles, and supports low-altitude flight. On the Mi-28N and Ka-52, the radar is installed above the propeller hub - just like the all-weather version of the AN-64 Apache, the notorious Longbow.

But the American radar is not capable of solving aerobatics and navigation problems, but the Crossbow can. The Mi-28N is considered the only helicopter in the world capable of such a trick: even at night and in bad weather conditions, switching to automatic mode, fly around the terrain at an altitude of 5 m at night, while searching, identifying and destroying targets, while simultaneously conducting target designation for other participants in the battle. Impressive.

But still, the most alarming advantage of the Americans is in electronics. According to some data, among the 13 thousand electronic components that are installed on the Mi-28N, more than 70% were developed 15 or more years ago. The Apache's modern avionics make it possible to work with targets faster and more efficiently, and even rank them by importance, which reduces the time the helicopter needs to spend within range of enemy air defense systems. (Such “smart” missile control systems are also used in Russia - for example, in the Granit anti-ship missiles, which can be read about in the article “Peter Morskoy”). The electronics itself will distinguish a conventional vehicle from an anti-aircraft gun and will select the desired target.

Mi-28N vs AN-64 Apache

Otherwise, the Apache is very similar to the Mi-28N. But rather, on the contrary, since the Mi-28N was created on the basis of one of the most successful Soviet helicopters, the Mi-8, and with an eye on American competitors. Both have fixed landing gear and a tail gear. Both carry a pair of engines located in nacelles on the sides of the fuselage. Both have a crew positioned in tandem - one slightly behind and above the other. The Ka-52, by the way, has two crew members sitting side by side, which is considered a disadvantage, reducing visibility and increasing the frontal projection of the vehicle.

Compared to the AN-64 Apache, the Mi-28N is almost 3 tons heavier, but its engines are also more powerful, which even gives it an advantage in maximum combat load and flight characteristics. In addition, the visibility from the Mi-28N cockpit is better, but the AN-64 Apache is equipped with convex windows that do not create glare that could interfere with the operation of instruments. Even outwardly, these helicopters are easy to confuse.

If we compare cannon armament, then the Mi-28N will most likely have an advantage, although it is not too significant. Both it and the Apache are armed with movable automatic single-barrel 30mm guns. The American M230 cannon weighing 54 kg provides a rate of fire of 625 rounds per minute, with an effective firing range of 3 km. It is believed that this gun is not very accurate and has insufficient power.

The Mi-28N is equipped with a modified 2A42 tank gun, old and proven. It is noticeably heavier than the American one and has serious recoil. However, the helicopter designers coped with the last problem, achieving accuracy even higher than that of the American competitor. But, having solved a number of difficulties, they received the most powerful helicopter gun in the world: the weight of the projectile and the initial speed are almost twice that of the M230, the firing range is 4 km, and the rate of fire is up to 900 rounds per minute. A projectile fired from the Mi-28N penetrates 15 mm armor from a 1.5 km distance.

In addition, the 2A42 cannon is extremely reliable and practically does not overheat: unlike the AN-64 Apache, the Mi-28N is capable of fully firing its entire ammunition load without any cooling breaks. Finally, the shooter himself chooses the type of projectile - armor-piercing or high-explosive fragmentation.

There are also differences in rockets. The main “tool” of both helicopters is anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), each carrying 16 of them, suspended on external nodes. For the Mi-28N, they created a supersonic high-precision missile “Ataka-V” with radio command guidance, which we have already mentioned. Such missiles operate in conditions of smoke and dust, which scatters laser beams, interfering with “conventional” laser-guided missiles. And the new version of the Ataka-D missile has a range of up to 10 km.

The AH-64 Apache's most important weaponry is the laser-guided AGM-114A Hellfire missile and the radar-guided AGM-114B missile. The helicopter can accept both types of missiles, and the crew has the opportunity to choose the appropriate option right during the battle. Their range is 6-7 km, but, unlike Russian missiles, Hellfires are subsonic. It takes missiles 15 seconds to reach a target 4 km away, while Russian ones need 1.5 times less time.

But in general, all this is more reminiscent of games from the “find ten differences” series: all three cars have approximately the same characteristics and belong to the same generation. So, it is apparently impossible to make an unambiguous conclusion about “who is cooler”. As stated at the beginning of this note, everything is decided by skillful application and, of course, fate.

According to Litovkin, the Mi-28N is a kind of response to the helicopter created by American designers. Compared to the AH-64 Apache, the Russian vehicle has a number of advantages.

Thus, the Mi-28H power plant (2000 hp) is much more powerful than the American one (1900 hp). One could argue that the Russian helicopter is heavier than the American one, but the Night Hunter carries a larger payload and is more heavily armored. Thus, the maximum combat load of a Russian helicopter is 2300 kg, and that of an American helicopter is 771 kg.

In addition, the Mi-28H is equipped with a powerful 2A42 cannon, which is used on infantry fighting vehicles and has an initial speed of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile of 1120 m/s (usually 970 m/s); the Apache gun is much weaker: the M230 Chain Gun fires at a shorter range , and the projectile speed is only 792 m/s. Also, the “Night Hunter” carries supersonic “Attack” missiles, and the “Apache” is armed with subsonic ones.
Dmitry Litovkin also pointed out the unique characteristics of the Russian aircraft, noting that the Mi-28N is the only helicopter in the world that can carry out automatic flight, following the terrain at an extremely low altitude of up to 5 meters. And thanks to the presence of the Arbalet radar station, the helicopter can ambush the enemy.
In terms of survivability, the Russian helicopter is also ahead of its American competitor. Dmitry Litovkin noted that the Mi-28N has an almost completely armored cabin, therefore, when the helicopter crashed during testing, the armored capsule did not collapse and saved the lives of the pilots.

For the Americans, the situation is exactly the opposite: during the Iraqi campaign, an Apache was shot down using a rather old weapon. Most likely, the bullet hit between the armored shields directly into the engine.

Therefore, Litovkin summarized that with the same level of pilot skill, the Russian machine will win: after all, the Mi-28N has higher maneuverability and combat performance.

Characteristics of the Mi-28N Night Hunter / AH-64D Apache Longbow
First flight 1996 / 1991
Empty weight, kg 7890 / 5352
Normal take-off, kg 10500 / 7270
Maximum take-off, kg 11700 / 8006
Engine power 2 x 1660 kW / 2 x 1417 kW
Maximum speed, km/h 324 / 276
Cruising speed, km/h 265 / 268
Range, km 500 / 480
Ferry range, km 1105 / 1900
Practical ceiling 5700 / 4465

Armament of the Mi-28N: One 30-mm 2A42 cannon with 300 rounds of ammunition. Combat load - 1605 kg on 4 hardpoints: 4x4 ATGM Shturm or Ataka-V and 2 launchers UV-20-57 20x55 mm or UV-20-80 20x80 mm NUR or 2 launchers with 130 mm NUR. It is possible to install 2x2 R-60 air-to-air missiles, containers with 23 mm cannons or 30 mm grenade launchers or 12.7 mm or 7.62 mm machine guns, or 500 kg bombs, or mine launchers. Under the wings - 16 ATGM Whirlwind.

Armament of the AH-64D: One 30 mm M230 Chain Gun with 1200 rounds of ammunition. Combat load - 771 kg on 4 hardpoints: 16 (4x4) AGM-114D Longbow Hellfire ATGMs or 4 M260 or LAU-61/A launchers with 19x70 mm CRV7 or Hydra70 guided missiles, 4 AIM-92 Stinger or AIM air-to-air missiles -9 Sidewinder, Mistral and Sidearm, installation of Starstreak missiles is possible.

Comparing the weapons of helicopters, some “experts” criticize the Hunter’s cannon:
“You can’t ignore the characteristics of helicopter cannon systems. For example, the mass of the 2A42 cannon of the Mi-28N helicopter is 2 times greater than the mass of the M230 Apache cannon, and the ammunition capacity of the latter is almost 3 times greater than that of our vehicle, and all this with the same caliber. Note that if the M230 was specially developed for the AN-64 helicopter, then the 2A42 was “borrowed" from the BMP-2. It’s time to cure these and other old diseases."
It turns out that the gun is heavy and has little ammunition. And in general, it is a tank, they took it from the BMP-2 out of poverty. In fact, the gun is a special song, this is another advantage of the Hunter. And they took it from the BMP not out of poverty or the stupidity of the engineers, but after a thorough analysis of the unique characteristics of the weapon:
“The powerful 30 mm cannon mount was borrowed from the ground forces and is completely unified in terms of ammunition used with the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. The 2A42 gun has a variable rate of fire and selective ammunition supply from two cartridge boxes loaded with armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation shells. This allowed 30% increase in the effectiveness of hitting ground-based lightly armored and air targets. The combat survivability of the 2A42 cannon barrel allows you to fire the entire ammunition load (500 rounds) without delays or intermediate cooling. Both on the BMP-2 and on the army combat helicopter, the cannon mount operates reliably in conditions increased dustiness. Generally speaking, the 2A42 cannon is one of the most (if not the most...) powerful helicopter guns in the world! It is capable of consistently disabling lightly and medium-armored targets and openly located enemy personnel at a distance of up to 3-4 km!
For example, the cannon of the American Apache helicopter, vaunted (by foreign authors, of course...), of the same caliber, barely hits 1.5 km... Just no comments... Although I won’t deny myself the pleasure... While the Apache walks on a collision course with any of our combat helicopters with a 2A42 cannon installed on it, our helicopter will have time to shoot it four times before the Apache enters the permissible shooting zone in which it would have at least some chance of hitting the target.
The rest of the weapons are no worse - 16 Ataka-V ATGMs have a range of up to 8 km (similar to the AGM-114D Longbow Hellfire ATGM) and penetrate 950 mm of armor. The effectiveness of its predecessor, the Shturm-M missile, is confirmed by the history of the destruction of a column of American armored vehicles in Iraq by one Mi-24 helicopter with an Iraqi pilot. There are also statistics there: “Of the 43 tanks of the occupying forces destroyed by the Mi-24, 31 became victims of the Sturm ATGM, of which 16 American M1A2, 7 American M1A1, 8 British Challenger-Mk2. It is noteworthy that for the destruction of 31 The th tank needed only 34 launches..."

“In addition to the shortcomings of radio-electronic equipment, the Mi-28N helicopter, by its design, is a technology of yesterday. Currently, leading American aviation companies are inclined to think that the future in helicopter construction lies only with coaxial machines. This was repeatedly stated by representatives of the Sikorsky company at the Le Bourget Air Show and at the Farnborough 2006 exhibition. The first American coaxial aircraft is already being tested. In the next few decades, the Pentagon intends to completely re-equip all types of armed forces with combat and transport helicopters built according to this design." This is another argument used by critics. Completely illiterate, I must say. While Sikorsky is going to re-equip the army with helicopters using this design and is testing the first coaxial unit, Russia has long adopted the Ka-50, which is made exactly according to this “advanced design.”

The advantages of such a scheme are not that great and are offset by some disadvantages. What does the encyclopedia say about the choice of coaxial design for the Ka-50?

“The choice of a coaxial design was determined by the higher thrust-to-weight ratio of the vehicle, due to the absence of loss of power from the power plant to the tail rotor drive, which in turn ensures a high rate of climb and a larger static ceiling.”

It should be noted that the tail rotor does not take so much power and the gain due to this is not large. Although the same Ka-52 can boast of a much larger combat load (up to 2800 kg) and a higher maximum speed - 350 km/h, apparently due to precisely this design (the engine is the same and the weight is similar). But this same scheme makes the helicopter significantly higher - due to the danger of the blades overlapping, they were spread almost a meter apart! Because of this, it is no longer possible to install an overhead all-round radar "Crossbow" on top, as was done on the Mi-28N.

The complexity of maintenance and higher price made the Ka-50 and Ka-52 “helicopters for special forces”, but the Okhotnik with a classic design is still recognized as a combined arms helicopter. Cheapness and ease of maintenance for the army are still of great importance, we must admit. It is better for the army to have two helicopters with slightly worse characteristics instead of one with better ones. However, it is never too late to change your mind if both types of helicopters are produced. It will reduce the cost of the Kamov and we will have another combined arms helicopter. But this has nothing to do with comparing the Hunter with the Apache - the Apache is made according to the classical design. That is, according to the critic, it is a technique of yesterday. By the way, maybe that’s why the choice fell on “Mil” - our military’s monkey instinct kicked in? This can also be the case, they are very afraid to make original decisions and you can understand them - mistakes here are expensive.

But the main complaint about the helicopter was and remains its “outdated electronics.” Or avionics, as electronics for flying vehicles are commonly called. Moreover, for some reason, it is not its capabilities and functions that are being discussed, but its age..
In battle, it is not the age of the electronics that decides, but its reliability and implemented functions. This is what we should be talking about. It would be possible to fight with a stone ax if it were more effective than missiles. And if you look specifically at the implemented avionics functions, then the Night Hunter has something to brag about. How and on what basis they were implemented - let it remain a secret of our talented engineers. Yes, even on lamps! If only it flew better than on microprocessors.

The media write that “the Mi-28N is the only helicopter in the world capable of automatically flying at an altitude of 5 meters and following the terrain both day and night.” And this time it's true:

“When solving combat missions, the Mi-28N integrated on-board equipment complex (ISO) provides terrain-following piloting in both manual and automatic modes. The helicopter is equipped with a multifunctional Arbalet radar manufactured by NIIR Phazotron in a spherical fairing above the main rotor hub. ". It provides information about obstacles, including free-standing trees and power lines, making it possible to fly around the clock at an extremely low altitude of 5 - 15 meters, even in difficult weather conditions.
The same purpose is served by night vision goggles and a flight thermal imaging station, which can provide information as an infrared “window into the night” ahead along the course or in any direction indicated by the rotation of the pilot’s head, receiving target designation from a helmet-mounted system or on-board computer. The helicopter is also equipped with a high-resolution cartographic information system and a bank of digital data on the terrain in the combat area. Based on this data, the computer system can form a three-dimensional image of the area where the helicopter is located, and this can be easily clarified using satellite navigation combined with inertial navigation. The whole variety of information is presented to the pilot and navigator-operator on color liquid crystal displays installed in threes in the front and rear cockpits.
The electronic equipment also includes a system for orientation based on the physical fields of the Earth, and a set of communications equipment and an overhead all-round radar "Crossbow". The radar allows the helicopter to search for targets, working together with the Rotor OPS in normal mode. The helicopter can search for targets, hiding in folds of the terrain or behind trees, exposing only its “top of its head” from behind the cover. In this case, only the use of radar is sufficient. Having determined the targets and their type, distributing them as necessary among the helicopters of the group, selecting an object for attack, the helicopter energetically leaves the ambush and “processes” the targets with weapons or directs strike aircraft or other helicopters of the group. In addition, the Mi-28N radar, unlike the AH-64D "Longbow" radar, is capable of solving flight and navigation tasks."
In my opinion, as an electronics engineer, these functions are quite up to date and exceed the capabilities of the Apache, which cannot use its radar for automatic piloting. It is hardly possible to come up with something more perfect. The only thing that the Apache can boast of in terms of electronics is the ability to recognize types of targets and track a larger number of them. However, for the success of the battle this is not so fundamentally important - there is no point in accompanying more targets than there are missiles. It is much more important to be able to fight at a height of only 5 meters. The Hunter can do this, but the Apache cannot.

The final test of any weapon is in a combat situation. Our Hunter has not yet passed such a test, but his competitor has. Combat operations in Iraq, where Apaches were used very intensively, provided an opportunity to evaluate this vehicle. What did they show?

During the year of war, the coalition troops lost at least 30 helicopters of various types. Up to 150 coalition troops died on board. The American military command in Iraq announced its dissatisfaction with the results of the combat use of the AH-64 Apache and AH-64 D Apache Longbow fire support helicopter. The vehicle turned out to be extremely expensive and poorly protected from conventional small arms fire.
The concept of a “long-range combat helicopter” did not materialize in Iraqi conditions. The focus on detecting and hitting targets at maximum range from medium altitudes in Iraq has shown to be ineffective. Poor visibility, urban conditions, and close combat contact between the warring sides forced the Apache pilots to operate in the altitude range from 100 meters to 500, at ranges rarely exceeding 800 - 1500 meters. As a result, the helicopters found themselves in the zone of effective small arms fire. First of all, machine guns and chargers. The Iraqis quickly mastered fire ambush techniques, opening concentrated fire from several machine guns into the rear hemisphere or from a three-quarter angle. As a result, at least 10 Apache helicopters were lost in Iraq during the year. According to the former commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General David Petraeus, “We need a battlefield helicopter. A helicopter capable of hanging on the shoulders of the enemy. Inexpensive and well protected car. "Apache" turned out to be of little use for this..."
It seemed to me that the Major General was talking about our Mi-28N? Does he dream of a less expensive and more secure car? We have it:
The armored crew cabin, the so-called “bath,” is made of 10 mm aluminum sheets, onto which 16 mm ceramic tiles are glued. The cabin doors are made of two layers of aluminum armor and a layer of polyurethane between them. The cabin windshields are made of transparent silicate blocks 42 mm thick, and the side windows and door windows are made of the same blocks, but 22 mm thick. The pilot's cabin is separated from the operator's cabin by a 10-mm aluminum armor plate, which minimizes the defeat of both crew members with one shot. Fire tests carried out at GosNIIAS showed that the sides can withstand bullets from the American 20-mm Vulcan machine gun, the windshield can withstand 12.7 mm caliber bullets, and the side windows and door windows can withstand 7.62 mm bullets.
The Hunter's armor makes him what an American general dreams of after just a year of fighting in Iraq. I think that after several years, his dream has already turned into a hopeless melancholy. For the losses of US army aviation and its allies in Iraq since 2003 have already amounted to 125 helicopters, of which approximately half were shot down by fire from the ground. This is according to unofficial data, as Russian experts believe, while official data is underestimated by approximately half and amounts to approximately 60 vehicles. Which is also a lot. And American experts finally came to the conclusion that their helicopters are poorly protected from conventional small arms and RPGs. Was it worth waiting for such losses to reach such a conclusion? One look at the car is enough!

The idea that an armored helicopter had a better chance of surviving in a combat situation finally occurred to them. Fortunately, our engineers had this idea earlier and made it possible to make the vehicle not only well-armed, but also well-protected, and also equipped with a unique crew rescue system. But I won’t describe these details anymore. Enough has already been said. The Mi-28N is not just better than the Apache, it is many times superior to it.