The use of USSR artillery in WWII. The main firepower of the ground forces during the Great Patriotic War was artillery. Development of artillery materiel
It was divided into military (battalion, regimental, divisional, corps, and in 1943 army) and reserve artillery of the Supreme High Command. The artillery was armed with cannons, howitzers, mortars, and combat vehicles (mounts) of rockets. The battalion and regimental artillery of the Red Army until 1943 was represented by pre-war models, while the Wehrmacht increased the effectiveness of its already stronger infantry artillery. Thus, at the end of 1941, a cumulative projectile was added to the ammunition load of a German light infantry gun for destruction, which was replaced in 1942 with a more powerful one.
In 1943, regimental guns were created simultaneously in the Soviet Union and Germany on an almost identical carriage, the design of which was borrowed from a 37-mm anti-tank gun (in the USSR and in most cases in Germany, when creating both guns, a carriage from a 45-mm anti-tank gun was used guns model 1937). The new Soviet regimental 76-mm gun of the 1943 model (OB-25) was much lighter than the old regimental gun.
Compared to its predecessor, it significantly improved in mobility and fire maneuver capabilities, as well as in the fight against tanks due to the presence of cumulative shells in its ammunition. However, it was inferior in maximum range and accuracy of fire. In the Wehrmacht, the 75 mm le 1G18 cannon was replaced in production by the new 1G37 cannon. The new Soviet and German guns had similar tactical and technical characteristics, but the barrel of the Soviet gun did not have a muzzle brake, which caused increased loads on the carriage when firing, and the Germans used a powerful slotted muzzle brake. The 75 mm 1G37 was equipped with a semi-automatic wedge breech, and the OB-25 used the old piston breech of the regimental gun of the 1927 model. Modern researchers of military weapons give both positive and negative assessments of the combat qualities of the 76 mm regimental gun of the 1943 model.
In particular, the gun's weak ballistics, insufficient vertical guidance angle for overhead fire, the gun's low rate of fire and other shortcomings are pointed out. In 1944, the Krupp company developed an even more advanced 75-mm infantry gun 1G42, which had an increased elevation angle, which made it possible to increase the firing range. In the same year, an attempt was made in the Soviet Union to create a 76-mm regimental gun with a wedge breech, but this weapon was not adopted for service. At the beginning of 1945, tests of a smooth-bore infantry gun were carried out in Nazi Germany, but German designers did not have time to advance beyond prototypes. In the battles of World War II, infantry suffered the greatest losses from mortar fire.
However, in the pre-war years, the attitude of military specialists from the armies of many countries towards them was quite restrained. The dominant view was on mortars as a cheap surrogate weapon that was easily accessible for mass production. In the pre-war years, mortars were included in the artillery weapon system, and by the beginning of the war the troops received 82-mm and 120-mm mortars of a very successful design. Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, mortars have been modernized several times. The 82-mm battalion mortar of the 1941 model, developed at the Design Bureau of V.N. Shamarin, had an eccentric mechanism built into the breech of the barrel, which made it possible to increase the safety of the process of unloading the mortar. The two-legged carriage of the 82-mm battalion mortar of the 1943 model was a rigid frame with openers welded to it, which, when fired, went deep into the ground and ensured high stability of the mortar.
In the 120-mm regimental mortar of the 1943 model, under the leadership of A. A. Kotov, the design of the barrel built into the breech and the firing mechanism were simplified, a double-loading safety device, improved shock absorbers and an oscillating sight were installed. Unlike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht considered the mortar only as an infantry weapon. In this regard, it was planned to have 50-mm mortars in the infantry company and 81-mm mortars in the machine-gun company of the infantry battalion. The 105-mm mortars developed before the war were intended for chemical warfare as part of “smoke troops” and were not used in infantry. The 120-mm German mortar (GR-42) was structurally made as an exact copy of the Soviet 120-mm mortar of the 1938 model (design documentation captured in Kharkov was used). The tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet and German mortars were approximately the same. It should be noted that the German troops used their mortar weapons tactically competently, sometimes inflicting very significant losses on the Soviet troops. The reaction to this was the decree of the State Defense Committee, which led to a significant increase in the production of mortars, their supply to the troops and the improvement of methods of combat use.
By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had a completely modern divisional artillery system, the main models of which later became: 76.2-mm cannons of the 1939 model (F-22USV), model of 1942 (ZIS-Z), 122-mm howitzers of the model 1938 (M-30). An achievement of design thought in the design bureau of V. G. Grabin was the development of the 76.2-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun, recognized for its power, design perfection, external lightness and even, as some experts put it, elegance as the best gun of the Second World War. Factory tests of this gun began in 1940 and were completed at the beginning of 1941. When creating the gun, the idea of placing the F-22 USV gun barrel equipped with a muzzle brake on the carriage of a 57-mm anti-tank gun was used. The new weapon provided a solution to the entire range of tasks of divisional artillery: the destruction of manpower and armored vehicles, the suppression and destruction of infantry and artillery fire weapons, the destruction of long-term firing points, etc. However, on the eve of the war, this gun was not accepted for service, since the development was carried out without an official GAU assignment, and the 76-mm caliber of divisional artillery was considered unpromising.
At the beginning of the war, V.G. Grabin, in agreement with the management of plant No. 92, launched the ZIS-3 into mass production at his own risk. In the battles of 1941, the ZIS-3 proved its superiority over the F-22 USV, which was distinguished by the difficulty of aiming at a target, had a large mass and significant recoil force. This allowed V.G. Grabin to personally present it to I.V. Stalin and receive official permission for production. As a result, the ZIS-3 was put into service under the name “76.2 mm Soviet divisional and anti-tank gun of the 1942 model.” ZIS-3 became the main artillery system of the Soviet divisional artillery. In terms of firing efficiency, it was superior to the German 75 mm cannon. When a high-explosive fragmentation grenade exploded, 870 lethal fragments were formed with a continuous damage radius of 15 m (the German shell produced 765 fragments with a continuous damage radius of 11.5 m).
At a range of 500 m at an impact angle of 90 degrees, the cannon's armor-piercing projectile penetrated 70 mm thick armor 164. The main advantage of the ZIS-3 over similar weapons from foreign countries was its unpretentiousness. Like the T-34 tank, the ZIS-3 cannon, although since 1943 its combat capabilities no longer fully met the requirements, became one of the symbols of the achievements of domestic industry during the Great Patriotic War. In the second half of 1944, the new 85-mm divisional gun D-44, which was designed at F. F. Petrov's design bureau to replace the 76-mm ZIS-3 gun, passed state tests.
The transition to a larger caliber was on the agenda as Germany had new heavy tanks with thick armor. However, the need for subsequent improvements did not allow this gun to participate in the war. The D-44 cannon was distinguished by its compact placement of guidance mechanisms, low height of the firing line and the ability to be transported by mechanical traction at speeds of up to 60 km/h. The time for transferring the gun from the traveling position to the combat position and back did not exceed one minute. The maximum firing range of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile was 15,820 m. In Nazi Germany, ammunition for divisional howitzers received rapid development. Thus, since 1942, cumulative shells were introduced into the ammunition load of the 150-mm howitzer sFH-18, which hit the armor of Soviet heavy tanks at a range of up to 1500 m. Rheinmetall and Krupp companies in 1941–1944. released improved active-reactive 150-mm Rgr-19/40 projectiles, providing a firing range of up to 19 km, but their accuracy and durability of the projectiles left much to be desired. By the end of the war, high-explosive finned shells (winged mines) were developed for the 150 mm howitzer.
The Red Army received cumulative ammunition with a significant delay. With the restoration of the hull control link, a practical need arose to have a hull howitzer with high maneuverability, a powerful projectile and a firing range that ensures counter-battery warfare. This problem was solved by the creation of a 152-mm howitzer model 1943 (D-1) 166 . It fully satisfied the requirements of the Red Army in terms of mobility, power and firing range. The D-1 could fire a full range of 152mm howitzer shells. According to N.N. Voronov: “Compared to the previous howitzer of the same caliber, it had significant advantages. In connection with the transition of the Red Army to large offensive operations, new offensive weapons were required. This is exactly what the new, lightweight 152-mm howitzer, which was well received by the troops, turned out to be.” The lightweight D-1 howitzer was a very reliable weapon, had high shooting accuracy and good survivability.
The D-1 howitzer, at a minimum, was not inferior in its characteristics to the best world models of guns of this class. A comparative analysis of similar guns shows that the German heavy field howitzer of 150 mm caliber sFH-18, surpassing the D-1 in maximum firing range by almost a kilometer (13,325 m), was too heavy for its class (almost 2 tons heavier than the D-1 ) 168 . The Germans were unable to put into production the more advanced sFH-36 howitzer (the firing range and weight corresponded to the D-1 indicators). The Czech 150-mm howitzer K4, in the German version - sFH-37(t), the 149-mm Italian howitzer of the Ansaldo company and the 155-mm American howitzer M1, having a greater firing range than the D-1, were much inferior to it in mobility due to its heavy weight. French and British howitzers of this class were inferior to the D-1 both in terms of firing range and weight. In 1943, the troops received the best 160-mm breech-loading mortar in the world at that time with an integral carriage.
Giving an assessment of this mortar after the war, Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov wrote: “Among the new products was also a 160-mm mortar, a powerful offensive weapon with a firing range of 5150 meters, with a mine weighing 40.5 kilograms, which has a powerful high-explosive effect. The weight of the mortar in firing position was only about a ton. This weapon turned out to be indispensable in breaking through enemy defenses and destroying their wood-earth structures. When the new mortars were first massively used on one of the fronts, they had a huge moral impact on the enemy. The shots from these mortars are dull, the mine flies up very high along a steep trajectory, and then falls down almost vertically. At the very first explosion of such mines, the Nazis decided that they were being bombed by ours, and began to sound air raid signals.” Other countries did not have such powerful and maneuverable weapons.
Throughout the war, Germany tried to develop experimental samples of 150, 210, 305 and even 420 mm mortars, but until the end of the war, none of them left the design stage. Similar attempts in the United States were also unsuccessful. At the beginning of the war, due to the failures of the Red Army, personnel and material losses, the army and the country faced the most difficult task of ensuring the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery in conditions of heavy defensive battles and operations. Great hopes for increasing the effectiveness of fire from indirect firing positions were placed on rocket artillery, the birth of which in the Red Army was heralded by the first salvo of the BM-13 battery against the enemy near Orsha on July 14, 1941. The high efficiency of rocket artillery was noted by the Chief of the General Staff, General G.K. Zhukov.
In his report to J.V. Stalin in September 1941. he wrote: “The rockets, by their actions, caused complete devastation. I examined the areas where shelling was carried out and saw the complete destruction of defensive structures. Ushakovo, the main hub of the enemy’s defense, was completely destroyed as a result of volleys of rockets, and the shelters were overwhelmed and broken.” Rocket artillery units were organizationally part of the artillery of the RVGK and were called guards mortar units. They were armed with BM-8 and BM-13 rocket systems. The multi-charge nature of the rocket launchers determined their high fire performance and the ability to simultaneously hit targets over large areas. Volley fire provided surprise and a high material and moral impact on the enemy.
In Nazi Germany, rocket artillery appeared as a result of the search for effective means of creating smoke jammers. The first installations equipped with 150-mm rockets were called "Nebelwerfer" (a device that shoots smoke). This mortar consisted of six barrels mounted on a modified carriage of a 37-mm RaK-35/36 cannon. In 1942, self-propelled ten-barreled rocket launchers, mounted on half-track tractors, 150-mm Panzerwerfer 42, appeared. By the beginning of the war, the Germans also had 280-mm and 380-mm mines, the launchers for which were simple tubular barrels or wooden frames (Packkiste), used as stationary installations to create a fire shaft or by engineering assault groups to destroy houses and other wells. protected objects.
The rockets used for firing from Soviet and German launchers were fundamentally different from each other: Soviet projectiles were stabilized in flight by the tail, and German projectiles were turbojet, that is, they were stabilized in flight by rotating around the longitudinal axis. The tail unit significantly simplified the design of projectiles and made it possible to manufacture them using relatively simple technological equipment, while the production of turbojet projectiles required precision machines and highly qualified labor. During the war, this was one of the main factors holding back the development of German rocket artillery. Another difference between Soviet and German rocket launchers was a different approach to the selection of the base chassis. In the USSR, rocket artillery launchers were considered as a means of conducting maneuverable combat operations.
These requirements were met by self-propelled guns, which made it possible to carry out wide maneuvers with rocket artillery units and quickly concentrate them in the most important directions to hit the enemy with massive fire. In the USSR, cheap trucks were used as chassis, and in Germany, a light wheeled carriage from an anti-tank gun or a scarce chassis of a half-track armored personnel carrier was used. The latter immediately excluded the possibility of mass production of self-propelled launchers, since armored personnel carriers were in dire need of their main consumers - the armored forces of the Wehrmacht. The Germans used rockets on June 22 near Brest, but until the end of the war they were unable to find the structures of military formations and establish forms and methods that would ensure combat effectiveness comparable to the Soviet one. The BM-13 multiple rocket launchers combined multiple charges, rate of fire and a significant mass of combat salvo with self-propelledness and high mobility.
They have become an effective means of fighting tanks, as well as in destroying strong defensive and other engineering structures. It should be noted that not a single army that took part in World War II ever created similar designs for the mass use of rockets. In 1943, the unified (normalized) launcher BM-13N was put into service. At the same time, it was possible to increase the vertical guidance speed by 2 times, the firing sector by 20%, reduce the forces on the handles of the guidance mechanisms by 1.5–2 times, and increase the survivability and operational reliability of the combat installation. The tactical mobility of rocket artillery units armed with BM-13N installations was enhanced by the use of the powerful American Studebaker 6×6 truck as a base for the launcher. At the end of 1943, at the Kompressor plant, the design group of A. N. Vasilyev began developing a launcher for firing projectiles with increased range M-13-DD and improved accuracy M-13UK, which rotated at the time of launch and on the trajectory. Despite a slight reduction in the flight range of these projectiles (up to 7.9 km), their dispersion area was significantly reduced, which led to a threefold increase in fire density compared to M-13 projectiles.
In 1943, Ya. B. Zeldovich, who at that time headed the laboratory of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was tasked with investigating cases of abnormal operation of jet engines. As a result, the theory of combustion of solid propellant charges in a rocket chamber emerged, which placed the development of rocket technology on a deeply scientific basis. In the USA, similar work was carried out only in 1949. During the offensive operations of the Red Army, the need for a rocket with a powerful high-explosive effect to destroy defensive structures was revealed. The need to quickly and reliably suppress enemy defense units with salvo fire required increasing the maneuverability of M-31 units and formations and better accuracy of shells in salvos. The development in 1944 of 132-mm and 300-mm projectiles with increased accuracy ensured a further increase in fire density by 3–6 times, respectively. With the adoption of the BM-31-12 combat vehicle into service in 1944, the problems of fire maneuver and mobility of units that used M-31 rockets (caliber 300 mm and weighing 92.5 kg) from special frame machines were solved.
The development and deployment of mass production of the M-2 artillery tractor, which ensured the movement speed of heavy artillery 20–30 km/h, contributed to increasing the maneuverability of artillery through the use of domestic vehicles. The time to prepare a division salvo was reduced from 1.5–2 hours to 10–15 minutes. During the war, work was constantly carried out to increase the firing range and improve accuracy. In 1944, a new combat vehicle BM-13-SN 174 was developed to fire M-13-DD shells.
This self-propelled launcher was equipped with 10 guides, each of which, in turn, consisted of four spiral rods. When moving along spiral (screw) guides, the feathered missiles received rotation at a low angular velocity. When firing from the BM-13-SN, the accuracy of M-13-DD shells increased by 1.5 times, and M-13UK - by 1.1 times compared to firing from the BM-13N launcher. In the spring of 1945, tests were carried out on the BM-8-SN installation, which showed an increase in the accuracy of fire with M-8 shells by 4–11 times. However, with the end of the war, M-8 shells were discontinued, and the BM-8-SN launcher was never put into service. In the pre-war years, only two countries in the world - Germany and the USSR - had real achievements in the field of creating missile weapons. During the war years, Germany occupied a leading position in the field of creating long-range surface-to-surface missile systems.
The achievement of German rocket scientists was the creation of long-range missile systems for the V-1 (FZC-76) aircraft and the V-2 (A-4) guided missile, which were not used on the eastern front, but were used to strike England and port facilities in Western Europe from June 1944 until March 1945. Missile launches were carried out both from equipped stationary and field launch positions and from complexes. The V-1 projectile aircraft weighing 750–1000 kg with a firing range of 240 km (later increased to 400 km) is the most famous aircraft equipped with a pulsating air-breathing engine. “This projectile took off on its first test flight in December 1942, and its attractive sides immediately became visible.” The projectile control system was an autopilot, which kept the projectile on the course and altitude specified at launch throughout the flight. Another “weapon of retaliation” was the surface-to-surface ballistic missile V-2 (V-2, A4) with a liquid rocket engine and a maximum firing range of more than 300 km.
To guide the V-2 missile to the target, radio control, autonomous control, and automation without radio control, but with a displacement integrator (queerintegrator), which determined the lateral drift of the rocket by double integrating the lateral drift accelerations, were used separately and in combination with each other. The first combat launch took place on September 8, 1944. The missiles had low hit accuracy and low reliability, at the same time, the V-2 became the first object to make a suborbital space flight.
Soviet cruise missiles have been developed since the summer of 1944, when V. N. Chelomey completed the preliminary design of the projectile aircraft with his D-3 pulsating air-breathing engine, called 10X 178. Its unmanned missile was developed on the basis of the German V-1 rocket. The first launch was carried out from a Pe-8 aircraft carrier on March 20, 1945, but the test results were not impressive. The shortcomings of the inertial guidance system led to large dispersion, and V. N. Chelomey’s cruise missile never entered service. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet high-power artillery was withdrawn to the rear and entered into hostilities at the end of 1942. High-power and special-power artillery played a special role in breaking through the fortified defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and during the capture of fortified cities such as Poznan and Koenigsberg , Berlin, as well as in street battles in other populated areas. Thus, during the assault on Koenigsberg, 203-mm howitzers, destroying two-meter walls of forts, fired powerful concrete-piercing shells at direct fire, although the shooting rules did not provide for such use for high-power guns. The role of artillery was especially great in organizing anti-tank defense and destroying enemy tanks. At the beginning of the war, the main anti-tank weapon was the 45-mm gun of the 1937 model. However, its low combat qualities, coupled with the increasing thickness of the armor of German tanks, necessitated the creation of a weapon of higher power while maintaining high maneuverability. The task of increasing the armor penetration of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was solved by lengthening the barrel and using a new shot, in which the projectile and cartridge case remained unchanged, and the weight of the powder charge was increased. This made it possible to increase the pressure in the barrel bore and increase the initial velocity of the projectile from 760 to 870 m/s.
In turn, an increase in the initial velocity of the projectile ensured an increase in armor penetration at an impact angle of 90 degrees at a range of 500 m to 61 mm, and at a range of 1000 m to 51 mm 179, which allowed the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model M-42 to successfully fight all medium tanks of the Wehrmacht in 1942. The main anti-tank gun of the Wehrmacht was the 50-mm anti-tank gun PaK-38; in terms of armor penetration it was approximately equivalent to the 45-mm cannon of the 1942 model, but could not hit Soviet medium and heavy tanks. Only with the advent of the 75-mm anti-tank PaK-40 in 1942 did the German infantry receive a more or less acceptable means of combating Soviet tanks. Among the German medium-caliber anti-tank guns, the 76.2 mm PaK-36(g) 181 should be noted. It was created by the method of deep modernization of the captured Soviet divisional gun F-22.
3a by increasing the volume of the barrel chamber and the gunpowder charge, German designers managed to achieve armor penetration of 120–158 mm. This gun literally saved the German infantry at the initial stage of the war, when the Wehrmacht's 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns were powerless against Soviet medium and heavy tanks. In 1941–1942 Soviet gunsmiths developed and put into service a 76-mm cumulative projectile 182. In 1942, NII-24 created cumulative shells for 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, ensuring successful combat against all armored targets, including the latest German Tiger tanks. In the competition between projectile and armor, a significant role was played by the adoption in 1943 of a sub-caliber projectile for 45, 57, 76 mm guns. The presence of these shells in the ammunition ensured a successful fight against heavy enemy tanks. The Soviet ZIS-2 with BR-271P and BR-271N shells penetrated armor 145 mm and 155 mm thick, respectively. As the legendary artillery designer V.G. Grabin recalled: “In the spring of 1943, when the Nazi army used thick-armored Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns... only the ZIS-2 could resist the new German tanks” 183. With the adoption of new generation heavy tanks by the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, both opposing sides developed more powerful anti-tank guns: the Soviet 100-mm BS-3 184 and the German 88-mm PaK-43/41 and 128-mm PaK-44/PaK- 80.
These guns confidently penetrated armor 160–200 mm thick, but due to their large mass they had low tactical mobility. BS-3 was distinguished from previously developed domestic systems by a torsion bar suspension, a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism and a carriage made according to an inverted support triangle. The choice of a torsion bar suspension and a hydropneumatic balancing mechanism was determined by the requirements for lightness and compactness of the units, and a change in the carriage design significantly reduced the load on the beds when firing at maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine. The new scheme also simplified the equipment of the combat position. The experience of the Germans using the 88-mm Flak-18 (Flak-37) anti-aircraft gun as an anti-tank weapon deserves special mention.
Despite its large dimensions and low mobility, the gun was successfully used to combat Soviet tanks due to the high initial speed (820 m/sec) of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 9.24 kg. The German army used recoilless rifles quite successfully 187. Compact, lightweight, equipped with fragmentation and armor-piercing grenades and shrapnel shells, they were used to provide fire support to paratroopers and mountain riflemen. The infantry refused to use dynamo-reactive guns due to their operational and combat inconveniences. The attitude towards recoilless rifles in the German army changed dramatically after the creation of cumulative shells for them. Light guns with such shells were considered an extremely effective means of fighting tanks.
Production of the LG 40 light recoilless rifle continued until the end of the war. With the outbreak of hostilities, the weakness of Soviet military anti-aircraft artillery was revealed. In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of air defense at the beginning of the war, the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model underwent significant modernization aimed at increasing its combat and improving operational characteristics. In 1943, under the leadership of N.I. Kostin, a twin 25-mm anti-aircraft gun was developed, which was a combination of two machine guns with recoil devices from a 25-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1940 model 72-K, a sight, a guidance mechanism, a machine tool and a cart from 37-mm anti-aircraft gun model 1939, rotating mechanism from the 37-mm naval anti-aircraft gun 70-K.
However, this gun was not widely used due to insufficient aiming accuracy, high smoke output and unreliable operation of the machine guns. Other types of anti-aircraft artillery guns were developed and tested, but for various reasons they were not adopted for service, but this created a scientific and technical basis for the creation of anti-aircraft artillery of the future. In the third period of the Great Patriotic War, small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery significantly reduced its effectiveness as the survivability of enemy aircraft increased. The main medium-caliber weapon throughout the war was the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun. As combat experience has shown, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns could be successfully used for direct fire at ground targets.
The high initial velocity of the projectile, the speed of fire, and the possibility of all-round horizontal fire ensured anti-aircraft artillery success in the fight against enemy tanks 189 . In 1944, a more powerful 85-mm anti-aircraft gun (KS-1) appeared. It was obtained by placing a new barrel on the carriage of an 85-mm 52-K anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model. The new anti-aircraft gun was equipped with PUAZO-4A anti-aircraft artillery fire control devices, its vertical range reached 12 km. The disadvantages of the KS-1 were its low stability when firing and the high force on the flywheel of the lifting mechanism, so its development continued until the end of the war. In 1944, the TsAKB, under the leadership of V.G. Grabin, began the development of a new 57-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun S-60, which was never put into production until the end of the war. The achievement of German industry was self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (ZSU). The first German ZSU-38 with a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun was made on the basis of a light Czechoslovak tank on the TNHP-S chassis of the Skoda company (manufactured since 1943 in Czechoslovakia, a total of 141 units were produced).
The Virbelvild self-propelled gun system was produced on the basis of the T-IV tank with a quadruple 20-mm FlaK-38 automatic installation (106 installations were produced). The same design solutions were used when installing a 37-mm machine gun. The development of anti-aircraft artillery during the war years followed the path of modernizing anti-aircraft systems in production, creating new guns and ammunition that provided high initial projectile velocities and high rates of fire for aircraft. At the same time, the means of reconnaissance of air targets and control of anti-aircraft fire were improved. As a result of the modernization of the guns, the firing range increased to a height of 14–15 thousand m, and the accuracy of hitting targets increased. In general, it should be emphasized that the contribution of artillery to victory is enormous. Moreover, about 40% of the artillery systems that were in service with the Red Army and used in combat operations were designed and mastered by industry during the war.
Domestic artillery stood the test of war, however, there was a qualitative lag in the field of optical instruments for various purposes, communications and control equipment, as well as means of propulsion. Innovative activities were actively carried out during the creation of weapons. Thus, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. G. Chetaev ensured an increase in the accuracy of gun fire by solving a complex mathematical problem to optimize the steepness of the rifling of gun barrels; Academician A. N. Kolmogorov gave a mathematical definition of the optimal dispersion of artillery shells; professor, later academician L. F. Vereshchagin, relying on research on ultra-high pressures, led the work on creating an installation that made it possible to carry out autofrettage (hardening) of mortar and gun barrels not only of small and medium, but also of large caliber, which had not been possible before to be implemented neither in our nor in foreign practice. The new method ensured an increase in the service life and range of guns and mortars.
It is especially important that the accumulated scientific, technical and production potential and the quality of management made it possible to continuously improve artillery weapons and expand their production, taking into account the accumulated experience of combat use and understanding the needs of the front. One can note the prompt response of Soviet design thought. As soon as the insufficient armor penetration of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was discovered, it was quickly modernized, and the 45-mm gun of the 1942 model entered the troops, providing the much-needed level of armor penetration of 50 mm at a firing range of up to 1 km.
The low effectiveness of the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1939 model in the fight against tanks led to its replacement with the 76-mm gun of the 1942 model, the iconic ZIS-3. The reaction to the appearance of heavy German tanks on the battlefield was the adoption of a 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1943 model, the shells of which pierced armor 120–150 mm thick, and from the summer of 1944, the most effective anti-tank gun of its time began to arrive in the army. 100-mm BS-3 cannon, providing armor penetration up to 162 mm. At the same time, a promising 85-mm divisional gun was created. The introduction of the corps level in the army was accompanied by the timely creation of a 152-mm corps howitzer of the 1943 model. When the low effectiveness of 50-mm mortars was revealed in battle, they were discontinued, and the modernization and deployment of 82, 107, 120-mm mortars was carried out in a short time mortars, and in 1943 the troops received the best 160-mm breech-loading mortar in the world at that time with an inseparable carriage.
Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. In 12 volumes. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2013. - 864 pp., 20 l. ill., ill.
Introduction
Despite the fundamental changes that have taken place in the development of weapons, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of the combat use of missile forces and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.
Soviet artillery played an extremely important role in the Great Patriotic War and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. It was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle of Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Soviet artillery demonstrated formidable fighting qualities in the great Battle of the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery with its fire played a decisive role in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.
The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade from hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery support. The main defense was anti-tank artillery. It accounts for over 70% of enemy tanks destroyed. Respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the “god of war.”
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery increased quantitatively 5 times. The Soviet Union outsold Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA by 1.3 and 3.2 times, and England by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry supplied the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to deliver crushing fire strikes against the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and military skill of Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.
The work examines the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.
Development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War
Development of artillery materiel
During the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing artillery equipment, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the firing angles, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.
The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal firing angle, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.
In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of combating all types of tanks of that time.
A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30), 152-mm howitzers-guns 1937 (ML-20), 203-mm howitzers mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).
The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.
In the pre-war years, mortars were re-created. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where military operations showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.
Table 1 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War
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Organizational affiliation |
Firing range, km |
Projectile weight kg |
Initial projectile speed |
Weight of gun kg |
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45 mm PT gun 1937 |
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76 mm gun 1927 |
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76-mm gun 1939 (USV) |
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122 mm howitzer 1938 (M-30) |
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152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10) |
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107 mm gun 1940 (M-60) |
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122 mm gun 1937 (A-19) |
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152 mm howitzer-gun 1937 (ML-20) |
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152 mm gun 1935 (Br-2) |
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203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4) |
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210 mm gun 1939 (Br-17) |
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280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5) |
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305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18) |
So, if throughout 1939 1,678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940, 5,322 of them were fired. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service and 120 mm.
The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 20s at the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments; research and experiments began most fully in the 30s. Some samples were tested in combat on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, not a single self-propelled artillery mount was put into service.
Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat installations was manufactured, in February they began their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made on the comprehensive development of multiple launch rocket systems and the immediate deployment of their mass production.
Thus, thanks to the care of the party and government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having mainly modern artillery material. A number of guns fully met wartime requirements, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the presence of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.
By the end of the war, the share of anti-tank guns in ground artillery was 14%, and for firing from indirect firing positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), RA BM - 3%.
The main anti-tank weapon of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war was the 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)
The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943, a new system entered service - the 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model ZIS-2. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank weapon whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.
Soviet designers responded to improving the armor of enemy tanks by creating a 100-mm field gun, model 1944, BS-3. The gun had high ballistic data and combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the originality of the design of its components and their layout.
In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm gun mod. In 1927, a new system was introduced, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By placing a 76 mm barrel on the carriage of a 45 mm gun mod. In 1942, a regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1943 (ob-25).
Beginning in 1942, it was adopted into divisional artillery, replacing the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most popular gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for winning single-handed battles with several enemy tanks.
With the restoration of the corps control level in 1943, the need arose to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the models created in the pre-war period, a hull-mounted 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by superimposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) onto the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army artillery systems produced during the Great Patriotic War are shown in Table 2.
Based on pre-war developments and experience in the use of rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. In the Great Patriotic War, dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used. The most famous are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 - was put into service.
The main direction of improvement of rocket projectiles during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the projectile's flight range. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army's rockets during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.
Table 2 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of the Red Army artillery systems produced during the Great Patriotic War
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Name |
Weight in firing position, kg |
Firing range, km |
Projectile weight, kg |
Initial projectile speed, m/s |
Rate of fire, rds/min |
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45-mm anti-tank gun (M-42) mod. 1942 |
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57-mm anti-tank gun (ZIS-2) mod. 1943 |
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76-mn P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942 |
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76 mm P (rev-25) mod. 1943 |
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100 mm P (BS-3) mod. 1944 |
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152 mm G (D-1) mod. 1943 |
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160 mm M arr. 1943 |
During the war, the number of mortars increased almost sixfold. This is explained by their high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at lower costs. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain-pack mortar (1943) underwent modernization. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars did not receive further development and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also modernized. The result was a system that is still used today with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.
Table 3 - Main tactical and technical characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War
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Projectile type |
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Time of adoption |
January 1943 |
April 1944 |
April 1944 |
October 1944 |
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Caliber, mm |
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Explosive weight, kg |
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Table range, max., m |
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Range deviation at max. range, m |
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Directional deviation at max. Range, m |
Self-propelled artillery received its development, essentially, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, the light self-propelled gun SU-76, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon, was put into service. The gun was located in an armored cabin open at the top and rear. It was first used in battle in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.
At the end of 1942, based on the T-34, production of the SU-122 self-propelled gun began; in August 1943, the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which was replaced by the new SU-100 at the end of 1944.
Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed “St. John’s worts,” were created in 1944 on the basis of the IS-2 heavy tank. There are known cases when ISU-152 shells tore off the turrets of heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to accompany all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, showing excellent combat qualities during the assault on the forts of Koenigsberg and during street battles in Berlin.
Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was removed from the subordination of the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army and subordinated to the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Forces; in combat use it was equated to tanks and is not considered further in this work.
The fighters of these units were envied and, at the same time, sympathized with. “The barrel is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Farewell, Motherland!” - all these nicknames, hinting at high mortality, went to soldiers and officers who fought in the anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.
The crew of senior sergeant A. Golovalov's anti-tank gun fires at German tanks. In recent battles, the crew destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (battery of senior lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is a return shot from a German tank.
All this is true: the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality rate among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located next to, or even in front of, the infantry front... But it’s true and the fact that anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, every fourth was a soldier or officer of anti-tank destroyer units. In absolute numbers, it looks like this: out of 1,744 artillerymen - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the "Heroes of the Country" project, 453 people fought in anti-tank destroyer units, whose main and only task was direct fire at German tanks...
Keep up with the tanks
The very concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this type of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, the fight against slow-moving tanks was quite successfully carried out by conventional field guns, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, the armor of tanks until the early 1930s remained mainly bulletproof and only with the approach of a new world war began to increase. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapon were required, which became anti-tank artillery.
In the USSR, the first experience in creating special anti-tank guns occurred at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37-mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun intended for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm cannon was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus the 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model, the 19-K, appeared. Five years later it was modernized, eventually receiving a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model - 53-K. It was this that became the most popular domestic anti-tank weapon - the famous “forty-five”.
Crew of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru
These guns were the main means of fighting tanks in the Red Army in the pre-war period. Since 1938, it was with them that anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were armed, which until the fall of 1940 were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, the anti-tank defense of a pre-war state rifle battalion was provided by a platoon of 45 mm guns - that is, two guns; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a “forty-five” battery, that is, six guns. And since 1938, the rifle and motorized divisions had a separate anti-tank division - 18 45 mm caliber guns.
Soviet artillerymen are preparing to open fire from a 45 mm anti-tank gun. Karelian Front.
But the way the fighting of World War II began to unfold, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level may not be sufficient. And then the idea arose to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the High Command. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the standard armament of the 5,322-man unit consisted of 48 76 mm caliber guns, 24 107 mm caliber guns, as well as 48 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and another 16 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, the brigades did not actually have anti-tank guns, but non-specialized field guns, which received standard armor-piercing shells, more or less successfully coped with their tasks.
Alas, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the country did not have time to complete the formation of the RGK anti-tank brigades. But even underformed, these units, placed at the disposal of the army and front-line command, made it possible to maneuver them much more effectively than anti-tank units in the staff of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses in the entire Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this the necessary experience was accumulated, which quite soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.
The birth of artillery special forces
It quickly became clear that standard divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting Wehrmacht tank wedges, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced light field guns to be rolled out for direct fire. At the same time, their crews, as a rule, did not have the necessary preparation, which means that they sometimes did not act effectively enough even in conditions favorable to them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and massive losses in the first months of war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be managed much more carefully.
Soviet artillerymen roll 45mm M-42 anti-tank guns as they follow the ranks of advancing infantry on the Central Front.
In such conditions, the only correct decision was the formation of special reserve anti-tank units, which could not only be placed on the defensive along the front of divisions and armies, but could be maneuvered, thrown into specific tank-dangerous directions. The experience of the first war months spoke about the same thing. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the active army and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had at their disposal one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad Front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. Moreover, they actually existed, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that following the battles of the autumn of 1941, five anti-tank regiments were awarded the “Guards” title, which had just been introduced in the Red Army.
Soviet artillerymen with a 45-mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg
Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a decree of the State Defense Committee was issued, introducing the concept of a fighter brigade, the main task of which was to fight Wehrmacht tanks. True, its staff was forced to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. The command of such a brigade had three times fewer people at its disposal - 1,795 soldiers and commanders versus 5,322, 16 76 mm guns versus 48 in the pre-war staff, and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-mm cannons and 144 anti-tank rifles appeared on the list of standard weapons (they were armed with two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, in order to create new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered within a week to review the lists of personnel of all branches of the military and “withdraw all junior and private personnel who had previously served in artillery units.” It was these soldiers who, having undergone short retraining in reserve artillery brigades, formed the backbone of the anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be staffed with fighters who had no combat experience.
Crossing of an artillery crew and a 45-mm 53-K anti-tank gun across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon of A-3 landing boats
By the beginning of June 1942, twelve newly formed fighter brigades were already operating in the Red Army, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar division, an engineering mine battalion and a company of machine gunners. And on June 8, a new GKO resolution appeared, which reduced these brigades into four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, who were quickly advancing into the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous order No. 0528 “On the renaming of anti-tank artillery units and subunits into anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanding and rank and file of these units” was issued.
Pushkar elite
The appearance of the order was preceded by a lot of preparatory work, which concerned not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber the new units should have and what advantages their composition would enjoy. It was absolutely clear that the soldiers and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives every day in the most dangerous sectors of the defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also moral incentive. They did not assign the title of guards to the new units upon formation, as was done with the Katyusha rocket mortar units, but decided to leave the well-established word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. The same effect, as far as can be judged now, was also intended for the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of the anti-tank artillery - a black diamond with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov “unicorns”.
All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. The same separate clauses prescribed special financial conditions for new units, as well as standards for the return to service of wounded soldiers and commanders. Thus, the commanding personnel of these units and subunits were given one-and-a-half salaries, and juniors and privates were given double salaries. For each destroyed tank, the gun crew also received a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the crew - 200 rubles. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As for the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding staff of anti-tank fighter units, up to the division commander, had to be kept under special registration, and at the same time, the entire staff, after treatment in hospitals, had to be returned only to the specified units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the same battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not end up in any other units other than anti-tank fighters.
The new order instantly turned the anti-tank fighters into the elite artillery of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subtype of artillery where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the front of the defending infantry and fired direct fire often died earlier than their equipment.
From battalions to divisions
New artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the Red Army's anti-tank destroyer artillery consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank destroyer regiments, 168 anti-tank destroyer regiments and one anti-tank destroyer division.
An anti-tank artillery unit on the march.
And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0063 of April 10, 1943 introduced in each army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern Fronts, at least one anti-tank fighter regiment of the wartime army staff: six 76-mm batteries guns, that is, 24 guns in total.
By the same order, one anti-tank artillery brigade of 1,215 people was organizationally introduced into the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts, which included a fighter-anti-tank regiment of 76-mm guns - a total of 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-mm guns, armed with 20 guns.
Guards artillerymen roll a 45-mm 53-K anti-tank gun (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.
The relatively calm time that separated the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad from the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge was used to the fullest by the command of the Red Army to fully reorganize, re-equip and further train the anti-tank destroyer units. No one doubted that the coming battle would largely rely on the massive use of tanks, especially new German vehicles, and it was necessary to be prepared for this.
Soviet artillerymen with a 45-mm M-42 anti-tank gun. In the background is a T-34-85 tank.
History has shown that the anti-tank destroyer units had time to prepare. The battle on the Kursk Bulge became the main test of the artillery elite's strength - and it passed it with honor. And the invaluable experience, for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units had to pay a very high price, was soon comprehended and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but, unfortunately, already too weak for the armor of the new German tanks, the “magpies” began to be gradually removed from these units, replacing them with 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, and where these guns were not enough, to the well-proven divisional 76-mm ZIS-3 guns. By the way, it was the versatility of this gun, which showed itself well both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with the simplicity of design and manufacture that allowed it to become the most popular artillery gun in the world in the entire history of artillery!
Masters of "fire bags"
In an ambush is a “forty-five”, a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K).
The last major change in the structure and tactics of using anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were as many as fifty such brigades in the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them there were another 141 anti-tank artillery regiments. The main weapons of these units were the same 76-mm ZIS-3 cannons, which the domestic industry produced at incredible speed. In addition to them, the brigades and regiments were armed with 57 mm ZIS-2 and a number of “forty-five” and 107 mm guns.
Soviet artillerymen from units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.
By this time, the fundamental tactics for the combat use of anti-tank units had been completely worked out. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strong points, developed and tested before the Battle of Kursk, was rethought and refined. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops became more than sufficient, there were enough experienced personnel to use them, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of “fire bags” arranged along the routes of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and were camouflaged with the utmost care. And they opened fire not when the first line of enemy tanks was in the zone of confident destruction, but only after virtually all the attacking tanks had entered it.
Unidentified Soviet female privates from a fighter-anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).
Such “fire bags,” taking into account the characteristics of anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat distances, which means that the risk for artillerymen increased many times over. It was necessary to show not only remarkable restraint, watching as German tanks passed almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire, and fire it as quickly as the capabilities of the equipment and the strength of the crews allowed. And at the same time, be ready to change position at any moment as soon as it came under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of sure destruction. And in battle this had to be done, as a rule, literally by hand: most often there was simply no time to adjust the horses or vehicles, and the process of loading and unloading the gun took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with the advancing tanks allowed.
A crew of Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun, model 1937 (53-K), at a German tank on a village street. The crew number hands the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.
Heroes with a black diamond on their sleeve
Knowing all this, you are no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank units. Among them were real artillery snipers. Such as, for example, the commander of the gun of the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who has almost three dozen fascist tanks, and ten of them (including six Tigers!) he knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, fought all the way to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few days in January 1945, nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April of the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Hero of the Soviet Union, gun commander of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard, senior sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union, gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard, sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov (1924- 1990) reading the letter. In the background, Soviet artillerymen at the 76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.
Z.L. Asfandiyarov at the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. He particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrischensky district, Cherkasy region), a gun under the command of Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having brought the enemy attacking column within direct shot range, the gun crew opened targeted sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger tanks. Guard senior sergeant Asfandiyarov himself destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from his personal weapon. When the gun failed, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, whose crew was out of order and, repelling a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two Tiger tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, Guard Senior Sergeant Asfandiyarov’s crew destroyed ten enemy tanks, six of them “tiger” types and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) was awarded to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 1, 1944.
V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. At the artillery school he became a gunner. Since July 1943, at the front, he fought in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment as a gunner. He received his baptism of fire at the Kursk Bulge. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave his combat post. For courage and perseverance in battle, accuracy in defeating tanks, Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin. He particularly distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in an area at a fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyryshchensky district of the Cherkasy region, the crew of the guard of Senior Sergeant Asfandiyarov, whose gunner was Sergeant Permyakov, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with precise fire, of which four were Tiger tanks. When the enemy landing force approached the artillery positions, they entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having repulsed the attack of the machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guards switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, whose crew had failed and, repelling a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two more Tiger tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During a raid by enemy bombers, the gun was destroyed. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Guard Sergeant Permyakov Veniamin Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).
Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of the anti-tank gun, Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.
Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin has been at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 during the crossing of the Dnieper. Sergeant Spitsin's crew destroyed three enemy machine guns with direct fire. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit destroyed the gun. The artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle they captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy with their own guns.
On October 30, 1943, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism displayed, Sergeant Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).
But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of the anti-tank artillery, the feat of the only two-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Vasily Petrov, stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School right before the war, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery division in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.
Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first “Golden Star” of Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest he wore two Orders of the Red Star and a medal “For Courage” - and three stripes for wounds. The decree conferring the highest degree of distinction on Petrov was signed on the 24th and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both arms in one of the last battles. And if not for the legendary order No. 0528, which ordered the return of the wounded to anti-tank units, the newly minted Hero would hardly have had a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, always distinguished by his firmness and tenacity (sometimes dissatisfied subordinates and superiors said it was stubbornness), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.
With this guard regiment, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, crossed it and distinguished himself by holding a bridgehead on the west bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring exploits on the Oder, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in service. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!
After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and the Military Academy, received a candidate of military sciences degree, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief of the missile forces and artillery of the Carpathian Military District. As the grandson of one of General Petrov’s colleagues recalls, from time to time, going for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged military leader managed to literally drive his adjutants, who could not keep up with him, on the way up...
Memory is stronger than time
The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, changing in accordance with the changing challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of units and subunits of anti-tank artillery, as well as anti-tank rifle units, stopped receiving increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, of which the anti-tank crews were so proud, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: the next order to introduce a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.
The need for specialized anti-tank artillery units gradually disappeared. Anti-tank guided missiles replaced guns, and units armed with these weapons appeared in motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word “fighter” disappeared from the name of anti-tank fighter units, and twenty years later, along with the Soviet army, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never cancel the courage and those exploits with which the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army glorified their branch of the army during the Great Patriotic War.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3/2000, pp. 50-54
Experience in the use of artillery in the Great Patriotic War and modern practice
Colonel A. B. BUDYAEV,
candidate of military sciences
FIFTY-FIVE years separate us from the day when the Great Patriotic War ended. The participants have long since completed their service in the Armed Forces, the combat experience they accumulated is gradually being forgotten, and yet this experience has enduring significance.
Today, scientific research is increasingly focused on those forms and methods of armed struggle that are used abroad during local wars. However, they involve the use of the latest weapons and military equipment, which our Armed Forces, given the deplorable state of the country’s economy, are unlikely to be equipped with in the near future. That is why, when determining ways to increase the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery, it is necessary to turn to the rich heritage of the artillerymen of the Great Patriotic War.
In the preparation and conduct of military and military operations, one of the main questions is on the organization of artillery reconnaissance. IN During the war, it was divided into air and ground. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out by crews of corrective reconnaissance aircraft, units of which were transferred to operational subordination to front artillery headquarters, and from observation balloons. Ground reconnaissance was carried out from observation points (OP) of artillery commanders of all units and artillery instrumental reconnaissance. In addition, special teams were assigned to monitor enemy artillery, and in some cases artillery reconnaissance groups were sent behind the front line. Then it was believed that discovering a target was no less valor than hitting it. This position was confirmed in literally every battle. If the artillery fired not just “in the direction of the enemy,” but at targets that had been scouted in advance and accurately, success in battle was guaranteed.
The enemy always sought to act suddenly, so he carefully camouflaged his battle formations, and it was not easy to open his fire system. Under these conditions, artillery reconnaissance worked with particular intensity, and the duty of artillery reconnaissance officers at observation points was organized on the principle of guard duty, which emphasized the responsibility of the personnel on duty. This approach had a beneficial effect on the discipline of observers, the organization of their work, and prevented the unmasking of reconnaissance sites.
As combat experience shows, optical reconnaissance had the greatest effect in cases where the reconnaissance sector assigned to one observer did not exceed 1-00 (6°), so that he had the opportunity to study every fold of the terrain and detect even subtle targets.
Optical reconnaissance was based on a wide network of observation points, some of which were moved forward into infantry battle formations, and sometimes beyond the line of combat contact of troops. It also happened that the most distant targets could be discovered from points located at heights, in the depths of our battle formation, and targets on the front line could only be reconnoitred when we were as close as possible to them. So, in
During the battle of Stalingrad, scouts from one of the artillery regiments, sergeants Karyan and Razuvaev, conducted observation at a distance of 200 m from the enemy and discovered three well-camouflaged guns, a machine-gun battery and a large dugout during the day. An artillery battery was discovered in the same regiment, the exact coordinates of which could only be determined when Lieutenant Chernyak came close to the German front line. In both cases, the targets were destroyed.
Very often, artillery reconnaissance officers were included in military reconnaissance groups and night search parties. With them, they infiltrated behind the front line of the enemy’s defense and reconnoitered targets, and subsequently often controlled fire.
The use of all types of artillery reconnaissance, the inclusion of artillerymen in military reconnaissance groups, as well as the careful organization of the work of each observer, the collection and processing of intelligence data ensured the receipt of fairly complete information about the targets. Major General of Artillery M.V. Rostovtsev, sharing his combat experience, wrote: “... our fire will always be adequately accurate if the artillery commanders painstakingly engage in reconnaissance, and the combined arms commanders contribute to this in every possible way.”
Let's consider how today we can using existing artillery reconnaissance means to increase its effectiveness.
To conduct reconnaissance in artillery units of combined arms formations and units, it is advisable to have artillery observer groups of two or three people: a group commander (a sergeant, and in some cases an officer - a specialist in artillery fire control and topographic geodetic reference), a reconnaissance rangefinder, a signalman-sniper. The group's armament should include a laser rangefinder with a coordinate converter, a navigation device, a portable radio station, and special small arms.
We propose to have the number of groups equal to the number of guns in an artillery battery (in a mortar battery - the number of fire platoons). We believe that in rocket artillery and army (corps) artillery, optical reconnaissance should be carried out by existing agencies.
The presence of such a structure of reconnaissance organs at the regimental and division level will make it possible to organize the effective defeat of the enemy from the maximum artillery firing ranges. For example, when going on the defensive outside of contact with the enemy, a network of forward observation posts must be deployed in advance behind the front edge of our troops. Observation points must be equipped in engineering terms and carefully camouflaged. From them, targets for which artillery fire is being prepared, as well as the most likely routes of enemy advance, should be clearly visible. After completing tasks from the forward OP, the groups, continuing to control artillery fire, move along a predetermined route to the battle formations of their troops.
Improving the organizational structure of artillery reconnaissance will be facilitated by the inclusion of units, formations and formations in the staff of artillery headquarters artillery reconnaissance control points.
Another important problem is placement of artillery in combat formations of troops. One of the main principles of organizing artillery combat operations during the Great Patriotic War - massing it in the main directions* - remains relevant in modern conditions. This implies both the massing of artillery units (units) and the massing of their fire.
According to the current statutory documents, the main firing positions are selected (depending on the organizational affiliation of the artillery and the conditions of the situation) at a distance of 2-6 km from the forward units of friendly troops. This situation has remained unchanged since the Great Patriotic War. However, the firing range of cannon artillery in those years averaged 10 km. Today, artillery capabilities exceed this figure more than twice. Thus, modern divisional artillery is capable of hitting the enemy to almost the entire depth of the combat mission of a formation in an offensive. As during the war, artillery firing positions are assigned in the direction of the main attack of our troops. In rather narrow zones of the upcoming offensive of units and formations, a significant amount of artillery is concentrated, and no less than 2-3 hours before the start of artillery preparation for the attack. With modern reconnaissance means, hiding such a group from the enemy is very problematic. In addition, by concentrating a large number of artillery fire units in the direction of the main attack, we give the enemy the opportunity to reveal our plan in advance. In addition, when going on the offensive on the move with advance from the depths, the deployment of combined arms units for the attack will take place in the area of artillery firing positions, which at this time is conducting high-density fire, carrying out, as a rule, the last fire raid of the artillery preparation for the attack. Firing positions, especially in summer conditions, will be shrouded in dust and smoke, which will significantly complicate the actions of tank and motorized rifle units.
In our opinion, the massing of artillery must be ensured primarily through the massing of its fire. Having placed the main part of the firing positions on the flanks of the combat formations of units, operating in the direction of the main attack (the breakthrough area), we will, firstly, mislead the enemy regarding our intentions, and secondly, we will ensure the necessary depth of his defeat. In the main direction, you can equip false firing positions and simulate firing from them with nomadic guns. This arrangement is also supported by the fact that the effectiveness of firing at platoon strongholds from firing positions located on the flanks is 1.5-2 times higher than when they are hit from the front.
In a defensive battle, the main artillery firing positions are assigned in tank-hazardous directions between the battalions of the first and second echelons. Artillery groups of units, formations, and sometimes formations are deployed in a small space. Such a massing of artillery units increases their vulnerability and unmasks areas on the retention of which the stability of the defense depends. The increased depth capabilities of artillery make it possible to designate areas of main firing positions at a greater distance from our forward edge. So, for grouping the artillery of a formation, they can be chosen between the second and third positions of defense of our troops and away from the direction of concentration of the main efforts. It is also possible to deploy parts of the association’s artillery group there; in some cases, it can be placed behind the third position.
The expediency of this approach is also indicated by the fact that during the fire repelling of an attack, especially when the enemy has penetrated into the defense areas of the first echelon battalions, the artillery must fire with maximum intensity, without moving to reserve firing positions.
Between the first and second positions in the most important tank-hazardous directions, taking into account terrain conditions, firing positions should be assigned to artillery battalions from the regimental artillery group. They must be technically equipped and camouflaged. In case of a fight against enemy armored vehicles that have broken through into the op area, it is necessary to prepare areas for direct fire.
Requires separate consideration the issue of placing command and observation posts. IN In an offensive battle, combined arms formations (units), as a rule, are reinforced by a fairly large amount of artillery. In addition, they are also assigned supporting artillery units and units. Command and observation posts of batteries, divisions, and observation posts of artillery groups cover in a dense network all areas more or less suitable for their deployment. In many cases they are located literally “overlay”. For example, a regiment advancing in a breakthrough area can be reinforced and supported by at least two artillery battalions. This means that it will be necessary to deploy at least one and a half dozen command and observation posts at intervals of 100-200 m along the front with a depth of about 500 m. If we take into account that the command and observation posts of combined arms commanders, artillery senior commanders, military branches and special troops will be in the same area, the difficulties arising in connection with this will become clear.
There is a known case in the history of war when, in the zone of action of a formation that was preparing for an offensive, there were up to ten command and observation posts of infantry and artillery at a commanding height. They had the most varied design: some were well camouflaged and equipped with strong ceilings, others were built hastily, representing only open cracks. The entire area in this area and on the approaches to it was covered with a web of wires. At each command and observation post, combat life flowed differently. In some, the movement of soldiers and officers was strictly regulated. They camouflaged themselves on the approaches to the NP, choosing hidden paths to move. In others, everyone walked around openly, unmasking not only themselves, but also their neighbors. As soon as the division began its offensive, enemy artillery opened fire along the heights. Unit control was disrupted, which primarily affected the interaction between infantry and artillery and led to large losses of our troops.
The experience of war, as well as the training of troops in the post-war period, shows that the issues of placing command and observation posts, especially in motorized rifle and artillery units located in close proximity to the enemy, should be resolved centralized in combined arms headquarters. When assessing the terrain, the combined arms headquarters must determine areas suitable for the location of observation and command observation posts. The fewer of them there are in the offensive zone, the more organization is needed in their use. Otherwise, most commanders will prefer areas convenient for observation, and it may turn out that the best ones will be occupied by those who need them less.
In addition, in each area where observation posts are located, it is necessary to appoint a general commander, giving him responsibility for maintaining order. He must determine camouflage measures at observation posts and monitor their implementation, outline approach routes, and organize their equipment. In open sections of the route it is necessary to install vertical masks, and in areas under enemy fire, communication passages and cracks must be torn off. Equipment locations should also be equipped. On routes leading to the area where observation posts are located, traffic controllers should be posted to meet arriving liaison officers and messengers and point them in the right direction.
We believe that it is necessary to abandon the stationing of commanders of artillery units of the army (corps) and rocket artillery at the control point. Their workplace should be fire control points, located in areas of firing positions. This is due to the fact that it is at firing positions that a large amount of work is carried out to carry out fire missions, combat, technical and logistics support. In addition, this will reduce the total number of observation posts and reduce the losses of artillery unit commanders.
To summarize what has been said, we would like to once again emphasize the need for a creative approach to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, its processing taking into account the peculiarities of armed struggle in modern conditions.
∗ In the most important operations of the final stage of the war, artillery densities reached 300 guns per 1 km of the breakthrough area.
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