Ammunition consumption in WWII and the balance between the number of barrels and shell consumption. Wehrmacht small arms. Wehrmacht small arms in WWII. Small arms of Germany mm rifle grenade launcher and ammunition for it
Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass-produced small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is a machine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it was not created by Hugo Schmeisser. However, first things first.
How myths are created
Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip.” And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone except those who were in the war. According to movies, the “Schmeissers” could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our soldiers. In addition, when watching these films, the viewer got the impression that all the personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War were armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass-produced small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from the hip, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, carrying out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunner unit, in which there are soldiers armed with repeating rifles, is clearly suicide, since simply no one would reach the trenches.
Dispelling the myth: MP-40 automatic pistol
This Wehrmacht small weapon in WWII is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. Why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly attached to him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned the patent for the magazine that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of the MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the magazine receiver. When these machine guns ended up as trophies among the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly believed that the author of this model of small arms was, naturally, Schmeisser. This is how this nickname stuck to the MP-40.
Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. Thus, in infantry units, only battalion, company and squad commanders were supposed to have MP-40s. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Nobody armed the infantry with them en masse, either in 1941 or after. According to archives, in 1941 the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass-produced weapon of World War II. In general, during the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were conscripted into the Wehrmacht units.
Why weren't the infantry armed with MP-40s?
Despite the fact that experts subsequently recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of World War II, very few of the Wehrmacht infantry units had it. This is explained simply: the sighting range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This is despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), the sighting range of which was 800 m for group targets. targets and 400 m for singles. If the Germans had fought with such weapons as they showed in Russian films, they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would have simply been shot, as if in a shooting gallery.
Shooting on the move "from the hip"
The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, having first unfolded the butt. In addition, long bursts were never fired from this machine gun, since it quickly heated up. Most often they fired in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single fire. Despite the fact that the tactical and technical characteristics indicate that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute, in practice this result has never been achieved.
Advantages of MP-40
This cannot be said that this small arms weapon was bad; on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts in our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular among criminals, and the price of such a machine gun is very high. And they are supplied there by “black archaeologists” who carry out excavations in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.
Mauser 98k
What can you say about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its target range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, these Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with them. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.
Self-loading rifles
At the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht infantry units received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems for military testing. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army had more than one and a half million similar systems in service: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to Soviet soldiers, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized as the best and adopted. The rifle is equipped with a hammer-type impact mechanism. Designed to fire only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for targeted shooting at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to contamination, it was produced in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in quantities of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.
Now let's return to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have happened.
Small arms - MP-41
This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the “Schmeisser” familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a forend trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, it was heavier and had a long barrel. However, these Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine gun due to a lawsuit from ERMA, which claimed illegal copying of its patented design. The MP-41 small arms were used by Waffen SS units. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.
MP-43, or StG-44
Schmeisser developed the next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means “assault rifle” (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle in appearance, and in some technical characteristics, resembles (which appeared later) and is significantly different from the MP-40. Its aimed fire range was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even had the ability to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher. To fire from cover, the designer developed a special attachment that was placed on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon went into mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of the German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were supplied to elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, these Wehrmacht weapons were used in
Automatic rifles FG-42
These copies were intended for paratroopers. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The development of weapons was undertaken by the Rheinmetall company already during the war, when, after assessing the results of airborne operations carried out by the Wehrmacht, it became clear that the MP-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, disadvantages associated with low strength and stability during automatic shooting also emerged. In 1944, a modernized FG-42 rifle (model 2) was released, and model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when shooting, a bipod is attached under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed to fire at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.
Luger P08 and Walter P38
Now let's look at what types of pistols were in service with the German army. “Luger”, its second name “Parabellum”, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then they were replaced by the more reliable Walter.
This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9-mm cartridges; the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. The target range of the "Walter" is 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.
Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45
In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, there were about 80 thousand units of this weapon in the Wehrmacht. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous fire. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you press the top one, the shooting was carried out in single shots, and when you press the bottom one - in bursts. It was intended for 7.92x57 mm Mauser rifle cartridges, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and the tactics of their use was the Second World War.
The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have significantly simplified and reduced the cost of production of these weapons. Thus, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes had a negative impact on the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The aimed fire range was two kilometers. Work to improve this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification known as the MG-45.
This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.
PzB-39 and Panzerschrek
PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These weapons of the Second World War were used with relative success at the initial stage to combat wedges, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, English Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank rifles “Panzerschrek”, “Ofenror”, as well as the famous “Faustpatrons”. The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to “pierce” 35 mm armor.
"Panzerschrek". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket gun. German designers equipped it with a shield that protected the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Rocket guns were extremely powerful weapons. “Panzerschreks” were weapons for group use and had a maintenance crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades for them were produced in 1943-1944.
Grenade launchers: “Faustpatron” and “Panzerfaust”
The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles could not cope with the assigned tasks, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could be used to equip infantrymen, operating on the “fire and throw” principle. The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered service in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (a smooth-bore seamless tube) and an over-caliber grenade. The impact mechanism and sighting device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.
The Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, which houses the trigger mechanism; the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the grenade's flight speed. In total, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses to Soviet tanks. Thus, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.
Conclusion
The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of small arms units is not diminishing. The accumulated experience in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.
Universal low-ballistic rifle system for close combat of Red Army infantry units
The available information about the ampoulo-throwers of the Red Army is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, a description of the design in the manual for the use of ampoulo-throwers, as well as some conclusions and common speculations of modern search engines and diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital's Iskra plant named after I.I. For a long time, Kartukov’s amazingly high-quality view series of photographs from front-line years lay as a dead weight. The text documents to it are obviously buried in the depths of the archive of economics (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So, when working on the publication, I had to summarize only known data and analyze references and images.
The existing concept of “ampulometre” in relation to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War does not reveal all the capabilities and tactical advantages of this weapon. Moreover, all available information relates only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampulets. In fact, this “pipe on a machine” was capable of throwing not only ampoules from a tin or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost “on the knee,” undoubtedly deserve much more respect.
The simplest mortar
In the flamethrower weapon system of the ground forces of the Red Army, the ampulomet occupied an intermediate position between backpack or mounted flamethrowers, firing at short distances with a jet of liquid fire mixture, and field artillery (barrel and rocket), which occasionally used incendiary shells with solid incendiary mixtures such as military thermite at full firing range brand 6. According to the developers (and not the customer’s requirements), the ampoule gun was mainly (as in the document) intended to combat tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles and fortified enemy firing points by firing at them with any ammunition of a suitable caliber.
An experimental 125-mm ampulomet during factory testing in 1940.
The opinion that the ampoule gun is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples is on display at the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, ampoulothrowers (as well as infantry flamethrowers) were developed in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirov (chief designer of the plant - I.I. Kartukov), which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR. Unfortunately, I do not know the names of the designers of the ampulettes.
Transportation of an experimental 125-mm ampoule gun in the summer when changing the firing position.
It is documented that with ammunition from ampoules, the 125-mm ampoule gun passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the design of the ampoule gun, given on the Internet, is borrowed from the manual and only in general terms corresponds to pre-war prototypes: “The ampoule gun consists of a barrel with a chamber, a bolt, a firing device, sighting devices and a carriage with a fork.” In the version we added, the barrel of the serial ampulomet was a solid-drawn steel pipe made from Mannesmann rolled steel with an internal diameter of 127 mm, or rolled up from a 2-mm iron sheet, plugged in the breech. The barrel of the standard ampoule gun rested freely with trunnions on the lugs in the fork of the wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical aiming mechanisms.
The experimental 125-mm ampoule gun had a rifle-type bolt in the chamber that locked a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder sleeve and a 15-gram sample of black powder. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the trigger lever with the thumb of the left hand (forward or down - there were different options), located near the handles, similar to those used on heavy machine guns and welded to the breech of the ampulet.
125-mm ampoule gun in a combat position.
In the serial ampoule gun, the firing mechanism was simplified due to the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under the thumb of the right hand. Moreover, the handles in mass production were replaced with steel pipes, curved like ram's horns, structurally combining them with a piston bolt. That is, now to load the bolt, turn both handles all the way to the left and pull it towards you with support on the tray. The entire breech with handles moved along the slots in the tray to the rearmost position, completely removing the spent cartridge case of the 12-gauge cartridge.
The sighting devices of the ampulomet consisted of a front sight and a folding sight post. The latter was designed for shooting at four fixed distances (apparently from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate ranges.
The photographs show that a crudely made wheeled machine welded from steel pipes and an angle profile was used on the experimental version of the ampulomet. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory stand. For the ampulomet machine proposed for service, all the parts were more carefully finished and equipped with all the attributes necessary for use in the army: handles, openers, slats, brackets, etc. However, the wheels (rollers) on both the experimental and production samples were provided with monolithic wooden , upholstered with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal bushing as a sliding bearing in the axial hole.
In the St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are later versions of a factory-produced ampulomet on a simplified, lightweight, wheelless, non-folding machine with a support of two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden blocks or oak crosspieces as carriages for ampoules were already used in wartime.
The manual mentions that the ammunition carried by the crew of the ampoule gun consisted of 10 ampoules and 12 expelling cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun, the developers proposed installing two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each in the transport position. One of the fighters apparently carried two dozen rounds of ammunition in a standard hunting bandoleer. At the combat position, the boxes with ammunition were quickly removed and placed in a shelter.
The barrel of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun had two welded swivels for carrying it on a belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any “architectural frills”, and the barrel was carried on the shoulder. Many people note the presence of a metal divider grille inside the barrel, in its breech. This was not the case on the prototype. Obviously, the grid was needed to prevent the cardboard and felt wad from hitting the glass ampoule with a blank cartridge. In addition, it limited the movement of the ampoule into the breech of the barrel until it stops, since the serial 125-mm ampoule gun had a chamber in this place. The factory data and characteristics of the 125 mm ampoule gun differ somewhat from those given in the descriptions and instructions for use.
Drawing of a serial 125-mm ampoule gun, proposed for mass production in 1940.
A 125-mm ampoule filled with self-igniting KS liquid ruptures in the target area.
Warehouse of finished products of the ampoule production workshop at plant No. 455 of the NKAP in 1942.
Incendiary ampoules
As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for the ampoules were aviation tin ampoules AZh-2 of 125 mm caliber, filled with a self-igniting type of condensed kerosene of the KS brand. The first spherical tin ampoules went into mass production in 1936. At the end of the 1930s. their improvement was also carried out at the OKO of the 145th plant (in the evacuation this is OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In factory documents they were called aviation liquid ampoules AZh-2. But still right
it would be more accurate to call the ampoules tin, since the Red Army Air Force planned to gradually replace the AK-1 glass ampoules with them, which had been in service since the early 1930s. like chemical munitions.
There have been constant complaints about glass ampoules that they are allegedly fragile, and if they break prematurely, they can poison both the aircraft crew and ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and fragility during use. The first, naturally, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombed from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of those that did not crash. Theoretically, their thin-walled tin analogues could solve the problem. As tests later showed, the aviators' hopes for this were also not fully justified.
This feature most likely manifested itself when firing from an ampoule gun, especially along flat trajectories at short range. Please note that the recommended type of targets for the 125-mm ampoule gun also consists entirely of objects with strong walls. In the 1930s gt. Aviation tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres from thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, since 1937 (with the beginning of austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), their transfer to tinplate with a thickness of 0.2-0.3 mm began.
The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, the Ofitserov-Kokoreva design was proposed for the manufacture of AZh-2 from four spherical segments with two options for rolling the edges of parts. In 1937, production even consisted of AZh-2, consisting of a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere of four spherical segments.
At the beginning of 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZh-2 from black tin (thin rolled 0.5 mm decapitated iron) were tested. From mid-1941, these technologies had to be taken full advantage of. When stamped, black tin was not as ductile as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel complicated production, so at the beginning of the war, AZh-2 could be made from 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as their various combinations with hemispheres).
Below: experimental AZ-2 ampoules with additional fuses. Photo 1942
Soldering the seams of products made of black tin in the presence of special fluxes then also turned out to be quite an expensive pleasure, and the method of welding thin steel sheets with a continuous seam was taught by Academician E.O. Paton introduced ammunition production only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, parts of the AZh-2 hulls began to be joined by rolling the edges and recessing the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoules, the filling necks of metal ampoules were soldered on the outside (for use in aviation this was not so important), but since 1940 the necks began to be attached inside. This made it possible to avoid different types of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.
The filling of ampoules AZh-2KS, the so-called “Russian napalm” - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ionov in one of the capital’s research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. Shevelkin and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939, he completed the development of technology for the industrial production of powdered thickener OP-2. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air remains unknown. I’m not sure that the trivial addition of white phosphorus granules to a thick petroleum-based incendiary mixture here would guarantee their self-ignition. In general, be that as it may, already in the spring of 1941, during factory and field tests, the 125-mm AZH-2KS ampoule gun worked normally without fuses and intermediate igniters.
According to the original plan, the AZh-2s were intended to infect the area with persistent toxic substances from aircraft, as well as to defeat manpower with persistent and unstable toxic substances, and later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - to ignite and smoke tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of chemical warfare agents in ampoules against the enemy was not excluded by using them from ampoules. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the incendiary purpose of ammunition was supplemented by the smoking of manpower from field forts.
In 1943, to guarantee the operation of the AZH-2SOV or AZH-2NOV during bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the developers of the ampoules supplemented their designs with fuses made of thermosetting plastic (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). According to the developers, such modified ammunition affected manpower as if it were chemical fragmentation ammunition.
Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal impact fuse) belonged to the category of all-destructive fuses, i.e. worked even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on aviation smoke bombs ADS, but it was no longer possible to fire such ampoules from ampoules: due to overloads, a non-safety type fuse could go off right in the barrel. During the war period and for incendiary ampoules, the Air Force sometimes used cases with fuses or with plugs instead.
In 1943-1944. AZH-2SOV or NOV ampoules, intended for long-term storage in equipped condition, have been tested. For this purpose, their bodies were coated inside with bakelite resin. Thus, the resistance of the metal case to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were mandatory installed on such ammunition.
Today, at the sites of past battles, “diggers” can come across only AK-1 or AU-125 (AK-2 or AU-260 - extremely rare exotic) glass ampoules in good condition. The thin-walled tin ampoules were almost all decayed. You should not try to discharge glass ampoules if you can see that there is liquid inside. White or yellowish cloudy - this is KS, which has not at all lost its properties for self-ignition in air even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent sediment with yellow large crystals is SOV or NOV. In glass containers, their combat properties can also be preserved for a very long time.
Ampoules in battle
On the eve of the war, units of backpack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of rifle regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using them in defense (extremely short flamethrowing range and the unmasking features of the ROKS-2 backpack flamethrower), they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoules and rifle mortars to throw metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, the ampoules also had significant shortcomings, and at the end of 1942 they were removed from service.
There was no mention of abandoning rifle-bottle mortars. Probably, for some reason they did not have the disadvantages of ampoules. Moreover, in other units of the Red Army rifle regiments, it was proposed to throw bottles with COP at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle throwers of the flamethrower teams were obviously revealed a terrible military secret: how to use the sighting bar of a Mosin rifle to accurately fire a bottle at a given distance, determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this “tricky business.” Therefore, they themselves adapted a three-inch cartridge case to the cut of a rifle barrel and themselves “outside school hours” learned how to accurately throw bottles.
When encountering a solid barrier, the body of the AZh-2KS ampoule burst, as a rule, at the solder seams, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air, forming a thick white
th smoke. The combustion temperature of the mixture reached 800°C, which, when it came into contact with clothing and open areas of the body, caused a lot of trouble for the enemy. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky CS with armored vehicles - from changes in the physical and chemical properties of the metal when locally heated to such a temperature and ending with the inevitable fire in the engine-transmission compartment of carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clean the burning CS from the armor - all that was required was to cut off the air supply. However, the presence of a self-igniting additive in the combustor did not exclude spontaneous combustion of the mixture again.
Here are a few excerpts from combat reports from the times of the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We also used ampoules. From an inclined tube mounted on a sled, a shot of a blank cartridge ejected a glass ampoule with a flammable mixture. It flew along a steep trajectory at a distance of up to 300-350 m. Breaking as it fell, the ampoule created a small but stable fire, striking enemy personnel and setting fire to their dugouts. The combined ampoule-throwing company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, fired 1,620 ampoules during the first two hours.” “The ampoule throwers came here. Acting under infantry cover, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points.”
By the way, intensive shooting with black powder cartridges inevitably created a thick layer of soot on the walls of the barrel. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampoule throwers would probably have discovered that the ampoule was being rolled into the barrel with increasing difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits, on the contrary, would somewhat improve the sealing of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing their firing range. However, the usual range marks on the sight rail have probably “floated”. Banners and other tools and devices for cleaning the barrels of ampoules were probably mentioned in the technical description...
But here is a completely objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The crew of the ampulomet consisted of three people. Loading was carried out by two people: the first crew number inserted the ejector cartridge from the treasury, the second put the ampoule itself into the barrel from the muzzle.” “Ampulometres were very simple and cheap “flame-throwing mortars”; special ampoule-thrower platoons were armed with them. The 1942 infantry combat manual mentions the ampoule gun as a standard infantry fire weapon. In battle, the ampoule gun often served as the core of a group of tank destroyers. Its use in defense generally justified itself, but attempts to use it offensively led to large losses of crews due to the short firing range. True, they were used not without success by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad.”
There are also memories of veterans. The essence of one of them comes down to the fact that at the beginning of December 1941, on the Western Front in one of the battalions of the 30th Army, Major General D.D. 20 ampoules were delivered to Lelyushenko. The designer of this weapon came here, as well as the army commander himself, who decided to personally try out the new technology. In response to the designer’s comments on loading the ampoule gun, Lelyushenko grumbled that everything was cunning and took a long time, and the German tank would not wait... At the very first shot, the ampoule broke in the barrel of the ampoule gun, and the entire installation burned down. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampoule. Everything happened again. The general “got angry”, switching to profanity, forbade the soldiers to use weapons that were so unsafe for crews, and crushed the remaining ampoules with the tank.
Using ARS-203 to fill AZ-2 ampoules with chemical warfare agents. A fighter bending down pumps out excess liquid, and standing near a tripod installs plugs on the filler necks of the AZh-2. Photo 1938
Quite a plausible story, although not very pleasant in the overall context. It’s as if the ampoules never went through factory and field tests... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned this) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, the respected veteran did not specify what material those ampoules were made of. The difference in temperature of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is burned when fired by the flame of the expelling gunpowder charge, can also have an effect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only with metal ampoules. But “in the hearts” the general could easily ride through ampoules!
Filling station ARS-203. Photo 1938
Front-line fire cocktail
It is only at first glance that the scheme for using an ampoule gun in the army seems primitively simple. For example, the crew of the ampulo gun at the combat position shot off the portable ammunition and dragged in the second ammunition... What’s easier - take it and shoot. Look, Senior Lieutenant Starkov’s two-hour unit consumption exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of incendiary ampoules to troops, it was necessary to solve the problem of transporting incendiary ammunition, which was far from safe to handle, over long distances from factories deep in the rear.
Tests of the ampoules in the pre-war period showed that these ammunition, when fully equipped, can withstand transportation no further than 200 km on peacetime roads in compliance with all rules and with the complete exception of “road adventures”. In wartime, everything became much more complicated. But here, without a doubt, the experience of Soviet aviators, where ampoules were equipped at airfields, came in handy. Before the mechanization of the process, filling ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and tightening of the fitting plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.
In 1938, for the Red Army Air Force at the 145th NKAP plant, a towed aviation filling station ARS-203, mounted on a single-axle semi-trailer, was developed and later put into service. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 also entered service, but it was focused on servicing aircraft jet devices, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for pouring chemical warfare agents into ammunition and isolated tanks, but they turned out to be simply irreplaceable for working with ready-made self-igniting incendiary mixtures.
In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment there should have been a small unit working to equip ampoules with a mixture of KS. Without a doubt, it had the ARS-203 station. But the CS was also not transported in barrels from factories, but was prepared on site. To do this, in the front-line zone they used any petroleum distillation products (gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel) and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ionov, different amounts of thickener were added to them. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Next, it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the fire mixture was added.
However, the option of adding the component directly to the ampoules and then pouring the CS liquid into them cannot be ruled out. In this case, the ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And an ordinary soldier’s aluminum mug could serve as a dispenser. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time in the open air (for example, wet white phosphorus).
ARS-203 was specially designed to mechanize the process of loading AZH-2 ampoules to working volume in the field. On it, liquid was first poured simultaneously from a large reservoir into eight measuring cups, and then eight ampoules were filled at once. Thus, in an hour it was possible to fill 300-350 ampoules, and after two hours of such work, the station’s 700-liter tank was emptied, and it was refilled with KS liquid. It was impossible to speed up the process of filling ampoules: all liquids flowed naturally, without pressurizing the container. The filling cycle for eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 liters were pumped into the station’s working capacity using a Garda pump in 7.5-9 minutes.
The PRS station is ready to refill four AZH-2 ampoules. The pedal is pressed and the process has begun! Refilling incendiary mixtures made it possible to do without a gas mask. Photo 1942
Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces was unexpected: the performance of the station, focused on the needs of the Air Force, was considered excessive, as, indeed, were its dimensions, weight and the need for towing by a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th Kartukov plant developed a PRS field filling station. In its design, measuring cups were abolished, and the filling level of opaque ampoules was controlled using a Glass SIG-an extremely simplified version of the PRS nasal tube. for use in the field. The capacity of the working re-
the tank was 107 liters, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The PRS was designed in a “civilized” version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified version, with the installation of a working container “on stumps”. The station's productivity was limited to 240 AZH-2 ampoules per hour. Unfortunately, when the field tests of the PRS were completed, the ampoule guns had already been removed from service in the Red Army.
Russian reusable "faustpatron"?
However, it would not be entirely correct to unconditionally classify the 125-mm ampoule gun as an incendiary weapon. After all, no one dares to consider a barrel artillery system or Katyusha MLRS as flamethrowers, which also fired incendiary ammunition when necessary. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant proposed expanding the arsenal of ammunition for the ampoules by using modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 with cumulative action, created at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
In the book by E. Pyryev and S. Reznichenko “Bomber weapons of Russian aviation 1912-1945.” the PTAB section states that small cumulative aerial bombs in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, they managed to design, test and fully develop a 1.5-kg PTAB with cumulative action. However, at the 145th plant I.I. Kartukov took up this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5 kg ammunition was called the AFBM-125 aviation high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.
Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled Colonel Gronov’s small-caliber high-explosive bombs from the First World War. Since the wings of the cylindrical tail were welded to the body of the aircraft ammunition by spot welding, it was not possible to simply replace its tail to use the mine in the infantry. The new mortar-type tail was installed on aerial bombs with an additional propellant charge built into it in the capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge. Thus, when applied to the ampoule, the system was obtained at a certain degree of fBM. 125 without additional NI active-reactive. contact fuze fuse.
For quite a long time, designers had to work on improving the reliability of arming a contact mine fuse along a trajectory.
BFM-125 mine without an additional contact fuze fuse.
Meanwhile, the problem is the above-mentioned episode of 1941 with the commander of the 30th Army D.D. Lelyushenko could also occur when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines FBM-125 of early models from ampoules. This is indirectly indicated by Lelyushenko’s grumbling: “Everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, the German tank will not wait,” since inserting an ampoule into a regular ampoule and loading the cartridge did not require any special wisdom. In the case of using the FBM-125, before firing the ammunition, it was necessary to unscrew the safety key, opening fire access to the powder pressing of the safety mechanism that holds the inertial firing pin of the contact fuse in the rear position. To do this, all such ammunition was equipped with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription “Unscrew before shooting,” tied to the key.
The cumulative recess in the front part of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel lining rather formed a given configuration when filling explosives, rather than playing the role of an impact core during the accumulation of a combat charge of ammunition. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when fired from standard ampoule guns, is intended to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (DOTov.DZOTovipr.).
An armor plate 80 mm thick, confidently penetrated by an FBM-125 mine during field testing.
The nature of the exit hole of the same pierced armor plate.
Field tests of the ammunition took place in 1941. Their result was the launch of the mine into pilot serial production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers proposed, if necessary, equipping such mines with irritating chemical agents (chloroacetophenone or adamsite), but this did not come to fruition. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant also developed the BFM-125 armor-piercing high-explosive mine. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in the factory certificates.
Cover the infantry with smoke
In 1941, the product developed at plant No. 145 named after passed field tests. CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADS. It was designed to set up vertical camouflage (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (fettering and exhausting enemy combat forces) curtains when dropping bombs from an aircraft. On airplanes, ADS were loaded into ampoule-bomb cassettes, having previously removed the safety plugs of the fuses. Checkers poured out in one gulp when the doors of one of the sections of the cassette were opened. Ampoule bomb cassettes were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long- and short-range bombers.
The contact-action checker fuse was already made with an all-shot mechanism, which ensured its operation when the ammunition fell to the ground in any position. The checker was protected from being triggered by an accidental fall by a fuse spring, which did not allow the striker to puncture the igniter capsule under insufficient overload (when dropped from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete).
It is probably no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in 125 mm caliber, which, according to the developers, made it possible to use ADS from standard ampoules. By the way, when fired from an ampoule gun, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when falling from 4 m, which means that the saber began to smoke already in flight.
Even in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that it is much more effective to cover your troops if, when attacking a firing point, you smoke it, and not your infantry. Thus, the ampoule launcher would turn out to be a very necessary thing when, before an attack, it was necessary to throw several checkers a couple of hundred meters to a bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoules were used at the fronts in this version...
When firing heavy ADS bombs from a 125-mm ampoule gun, its sights could only be used with adjustments. However, great shooting accuracy was not required: one ADS created an invisible creeping cloud up to 100 m long. And since it can be adapted to ADS
an additional expulsion charge was not possible; to fire at the maximum distance it was necessary to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45°.
Regimental propaganda activities
The plot for this section of the article about the ampulomet was also borrowed from the Internet. Its essence was that one day the political officer, coming to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make a propaganda mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov volunteered. He found the tools at the site of a destroyed forge, made the ammunition body from a piece of wood, adapting a small powder charge to explode it in the air, the fuse from a fuse cord, and the stabilizer from tin cans. However, the wooden mine for the mortar turned out to be lightweight and fell into the barrel slowly, without piercing the primer.
Ivanov reduced its diameter so that the air came out of the barrel more freely, and the primer stopped getting onto the firing pin. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. Leaflets swirled over the enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampoule gun to fire wooden mines. And in order not to provoke return fire on his trenches, he took it to the neutral zone or to the side. Result: German soldiers once came over to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.
This story is also quite plausible. It is quite difficult to make an agitator in a metal case in the field using available means, but it is quite possible from wood. In addition, such ammunition, according to common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what kind of propaganda is this! But factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, so that they fly further and so as not to greatly disturb the ballistics. However, before this, it never occurred to the designers of the ampoule gun to enrich the arsenal of their brainchild with this type of ammunition...
but charging, with a piston bolt. The firing mechanisms are similar in systems of both calibers.
The Ampulomet mounted mortars were not put into service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be classified as hard-type mortars. Theoretically, recoil forces when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased compared to throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than that of the ADS. And the expelling charge is the same. However, despite the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired along more flat trajectories than classic mortars and bomb throwers, the former were still much more “mortar-like” than the Katyusha guards mortars.
conclusions
So, the reason for the removal of ampoules from the arsenal of the Red Army ground forces at the end of 1942 was officially their unsafe handling and use. But in vain: ahead of our army was not only an offensive, but also numerous battles in populated areas. This is where they would be fully useful
100-mm easel anti-tank mortar in the process of loading.
By the way, the safety of using a backpack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also very questionable. Nevertheless, they were returned “to service” and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memories of a sniper, where he claims that the enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), so it is better to target him at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet from a powerful rifle cartridge pierces right through both the body and the tank with the fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and flamethrower “cannot be restored.”
The crew of the ampoule launcher could find themselves in exactly the same situation when bullets or shrapnel hit incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules could generally be smashed against each other by a shock wave from a close rupture. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business... And thanks to the “hussarism of General Lelyushenko”, such hasty conclusions were born about the low quality and combat ineffectiveness of individual types of weapons. Remember, for example, the pre-war ordeals of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar weapons, submachine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. Our gun designers, in the overwhelming majority, were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and no less than generals sought to bring victory closer. And they were “dunked” like kittens. The generals are also not difficult to understand - they needed reliable weapons with “foolproof protection.”
And then, the warm memories of infantrymen about the effectiveness of Molotov cocktails against tanks against tanks look somehow illogical against the backdrop of a very cool attitude towards ampoules. Both are weapons of the same order. Except that the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and it could be thrown 10 times further. It is not entirely clear what the “infantry” had more complaints about: the ampoule itself or its ampoules?
External suspended non-resettable container ABK-P-500 for salvo use of small-caliber aerial bombs from high-speed and dive bombers. In the foreground are AZH-2KS ampoules made of four spherical segments with edges sealed from the inside.
One of the variants of a hand-held (non-tank) flamethrower developed by the designers of plant No. 145 of the NKAP during tests in 1942. At such a range, this “aerosol can” can only be used to tar hogs.
At the same time, the same “very dangerous” AZH-2KS ampoules remained in service in Soviet attack aviation at least until the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945 (in any case, the attack air regiment of M.P. Odintsov used them already in the German territory along tank columns hidden in the forests). And this is on attack aircraft! With unarmored bomb bays! When all the enemy infantry hits them from the ground with whatever they can find! The pilots were well aware of WHAT would happen if just one stray bullet hit a cassette with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, the timid mention on the Internet that in aviation ampoules were used when firing from such aircraft ampoules is absolutely untrue.
I I - period before 1941
In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition remaining from the World War had already been exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then it was occupied by Krasnov’s White Guard army.
For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 pounds of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as some finished cartridges.
So Ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC Rus.-Balt plant acc. association of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Revel, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet times the Taganrog Combine Plant.) and by November 1918, the productivity of this plant increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N E. "How the Revolution Fought")
“On January 3 (1919), the allies saw the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog already revived and put into operation, where they made cartridges, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel silver shell, filled cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full operation. (Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov “The All-Great Don Army”) In the Krasnodar Territory and in the Urals, cartridges marked D.Z.
Most likely this marking means “Donskoy Plant” in Taganrog
Simbirsk, which was under construction, was under threat of capture. In the spring of 1918 The evacuation of the St. Petersburg Cartridge Plant to Simbirsk began. To establish the production of cartridges, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk in July 1919.
In 1919, the plant began production, and in 1922, the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed “Plant named after Volodarsky.”
In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. A part of the shell plant, located in the premises of the former Singer plant, was allocated for it. The remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. Since the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to remake foreign cartridges, and in November 1920 the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.
Since 1924 The production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association “Main Directorate of Military Industry of the USSR”, which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.
Since 1928, cartridge factories, except Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new workshops were built south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and from 1940 the Klimovsky plant No. 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It included the following plants: Ulyanovsk No. 3, Podolsk No. 17, Tula No. 38, Experienced Patr. plant (Maryina Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red Equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.
The markings of Soviet-made cartridges remain mainly with a protruding imprint.
At the top is the number or name of the plant, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.
Cartridges from the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were manufactured. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919 -30 puts the name of the plant (S, U, ZV) below.
In 1930, the spherical bottom of the sleeve was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing the Maxim machine gun. The protruding marking is located along the edge of the bottom of the cartridge case. It was only in the 1970s that cartridges began to be marked with an embossed imprint on a flat surface closer to the center.
Marking |
Start of marking |
End of marking |
||
Klimovsky plant |
||||
Kuntsevo plant |
Produced cartridges for ShKAS and with special bullets T-46, ZB-46 |
*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options
It is very rare to find shells from the Lugansk plant with the additional designation +. Most likely, these are technological designations and the cartridges were intended only for test firing.
There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges marked No. 50, but it is more likely that this is a vague mark No. 60
Perhaps, at the end of the thirties, cartridges or cartridges were produced at the Moscow Shot Foundry No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.
In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.
The case for the ShKAS machine gun, unlike an ordinary rifle case, has, in addition to the factory number and year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS case and a red primer were used for firing only from synchronized aircraft machine guns.
R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a supermachine gun Kalashnikov Magazine No. 1 2001
Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased from the USA and other countries 7.62x54 cartridges, which are found on the battlefields of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 and the Second World War. It is likely that pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.
Suomen Ampuma Tarvetehdas OY (SAT) , Riihimaki, Finland(1922-26) |
|
In the 1920-30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, producing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940
(UMC- Union Metallic Cartridge Co. affiliatedToRemington Co.) |
|
WinchesterRepeating Arms Co., Bridgeport, CT |
|
During World War I, Germany used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.
It is possible that, initially, German cartridges were produced without markings, but there will probably no longer be reliable information about this. |
|
Deutsche Waffen-u. Munitionsfabriken A.-G., Fruher Lorenz, Karlsruhe, Germany |
During the civil war, Spain received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that at first Soviet-made cartridges were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.
Fabrica Nacional de Toledo. Spain |
The English company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994." Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:
1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12g.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)
The 7.62x54 cartridge was produced in the 20-40s in other countries for commercial purposes:
A.R.S.it's unlikely that this isA. R.S.AtelierdeConstitutiondeRennes, Rennes, France, since this company uses cartridgesRS, most likely equipped in Estonia with participation of Finland |
|
FNC- (Fabrica Nacional de Cartuchos, Santa Fe), Mexico |
|
FN-(Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre, Herstal) Belgium, |
|
Pumitra Voina Anonima, Romania |
It is possible that some of the foreign ammunition listed above could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the “people's militia” in the initial period of the Second World War. Also now often found during archaeological research of WWII battle sites in Soviet positions are casings and cartridges produced in the USA and England, ordered by Russia for World War I. The order was not completed on time and was already supplied to the White Army during the Civil War. After the end of the civil war, the remains of this ammunition ended up in warehouses, probably used by security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but they turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes, at battlefields, cartridge cases of a 7.7mm English rifle cartridge (.303 British) are found, which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked V - Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production were supplied under Lend-Lease.
I I I - period 1942-1945
In 1941, all factories, except Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old factory numbers were retained in the new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-established. The numbering of all cartridge production is given, since there is no accurate data on the range of products they produce.
Marking with |
Plant location |
Marking with |
Plant location |
New Lyalya |
|||
Sverdlovsk |
Chelyabinsk |
||
Novosibirsk |
According to B. Davydov, during the war, rifle cartridges were produced in factories 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).
When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.
This mark is probably a product produced by the Podolsk plant during the period of its resumption of work.
There may be other designations. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the poorly readable mark of the Podolsk plant.
Since 1944, it has been possible to designate the month of manufacture of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has this marking.
IV - Post-war period
In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in cartridge production remained in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzan-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze -No. 60.
The markings of rifle cartridges from this period of production remain primarily with a raised imprint. At the top is the plant number, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.
In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:
G = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, I = 1955, K = 1956.
After WWII, the 7.62 caliber cartridge was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries. Designation options are possible
Czechoslovakia |
aymbxnzv |
Bulgaria |
|
Hungary |
|
Poland |
|
Yugoslavia |
P P U |
31 51 61 71 321 671 (usually the code is placed at the top, but code 31 can also be at the bottom) |
|
|
|
This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting versions.
Modern names and some of the commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990
The designs and characteristics of various bullets for 7.62 caliber cartridges are quite well presented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only the color designations of bullets are given according to the “Handbook of Cartridges...” of 1946.
Light bullet L model 1908 |
|
Heavy bullet D model 1930, the tip is painted yellow for a length of 5 mm |
|
Armor-piercing bullet B-30 mod. 1930 |
|
Armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 mod. 1932, the tip is painted black for a length of 5 mm with a red border stripe |
|
Sighting and incendiary bullet PZ model 1935. the tip is painted red to a length of 5 mm |
|
Tracer bullet T-30 mod. 1930 and T-46 arr. 1938 the tip is painted green for a length of 5 mm. |
Most of the above information was provided by the director of the local history museum of the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk
, who has been studying the history of small arms and ammunition for many years.
The museum contains a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the area, military operations in the area during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and anyone interested.
T
museum phone 8 812 423 05 66
In addition, I provide the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for the Krnka, Baranova rifle
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)
Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.
Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.
The designation of the third year of manufacture appears
Petersburg plant
Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations before 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.
Made by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.
By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the attack was reduced, which was compensated by the greater density of fire. As a consequence of this, the beginning of mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
Accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting on the move. With the advent of airborne troops, the need arose to create special lightweight weapons.
Maneuver warfare also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New types of small arms appeared (which was dictated, first of all, by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.
Small arms of the USSR World War II
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle division of the Red Army was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10,420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of heavy, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.
The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary vehicles.
Rifles and carbines
The main small arms of the USSR infantry units of the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-line rifle - the 7.62 mm S.I. Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, modernized in 1930. Its advantages are well known - strength, reliability, ease of maintenance, combined with good ballistics qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km. 
The three-line rifle is an ideal weapon for newly recruited soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created enormous opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-line gun had its drawbacks. The permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. The bolt handle caused serious complaints when reloading.
On its basis, a sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 models were created. Fate gave the three-line a long life (the last three-line was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical “circulation” of 37 million copies.
Sniper with a Mosin rifle (with a PE optical sight, model 1931)
The target range of the SVT-40 is up to 1 km. The SVT-40 served with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. Historical fact: having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were many SVT-40s, the German army... adopted it for service, and the Finns created their own rifle on the basis of the SVT-40 - TaRaKo.
The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 became the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in its ability to fire automatically at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of the AVT-40 is its low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and loud sound at the moment of firing. Subsequently, as automatic weapons entered the military en masse, they were removed from service.
Submachine guns
The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight, armed with a small number of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts. 
Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, the PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, housed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it fired at a rate of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, just a few months after the start of the war it was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap to produce mass weapon. 
From its predecessor, the PPD-40, the PPSh inherited a drum magazine with 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector horn magazine with 35 rounds was developed for it. The weight of the equipped machine guns (both versions) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and the ability to fire single shots.
To master the PPSh-40, a few lessons were enough. It could easily be disassembled into 5 parts made using stamping and welding technology, thanks to which during the war years the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexey Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its “bigger brothers” PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts using arc welding. 
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less manufacturing time. However, despite its quite obvious advantages, it never became a mass weapon, leaving the PPSh-40 to take the lead.
By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, 7.62mm caliber) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was powered by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from contamination and high temperatures.
The DP-27 could only fire automatically, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. Ammunition of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet towards the center in one row. The magazine itself was mounted on top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. An equipped magazine increased it by almost another 3 kg.
It was a powerful weapon with an effective range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire of up to 150 rounds per minute. In the firing position, the machine gun rested on a bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. The DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were produced.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II
The main strategy of the German army is offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep breakthroughs of the enemy’s defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy quickly lost their combat effectiveness. The defeat was completed by motorized units of the ground forces.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht infantry division
The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12,609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (machine guns), light and heavy machine guns - 425 and 110 pieces, respectively, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3,600 pistols.The Wehrmacht's small arms generally met the high wartime requirements. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its serial production.
Rifles, carbines, machine guns
Mauser 98K
The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed at the end of the 19th century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, founders of the world famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935. 
Mauser 98K
The weapon was loaded with a clip of five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could shoot 15 times within a minute at a range of up to 1.5 km. The Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable advantages of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts involving it, longevity and a truly sky-high “circulation” - more than 15 million units.
MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Perhaps the most famous Wehrmacht small arms of the Second World War was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Vollmer. However, as fate would have it, he is better known under the name “Schmeisser”, obtained thanks to the stamp on the store - “PATENT SCHMEISSER”. The stigma simply meant that, in addition to G. Vollmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store. 
MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the command staff of infantry units, but later it was transferred to the disposal of tank crews, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.
However, the MP-40 was absolutely unsuitable for infantry units, since it was exclusively a melee weapon. In a fierce battle in open terrain, having a weapon with a firing range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his enemy, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a firing range of 400 to 800 meters.
StG-44 assault rifle
Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation by Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47. 
The StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Its weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. At a target range of 800 meters, the Sturmgewehr was in no way inferior to its main competitors. There were three versions of the magazine - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an under-barrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.
Not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Its wooden butt sometimes could not withstand hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flame escaping from the barrel revealed the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in a prone position.
The 7.92 mm MG-42 is rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfus by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who experienced its firepower were very outspoken. Our soldiers called it a “lawn mower,” and the allies called it “Hitler’s circular saw.”
Depending on the type of bolt, the machine gun fired accurately at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a range of up to 1 km. Ammunition was supplied using a machine gun belt with 50 - 250 rounds of ammunition. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 - and the high technology of their production using stamping and spot welding.
The barrel, hot from shooting, was replaced with a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were produced. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths from many countries around the world when creating their machine guns.
In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.
The supply of weapons and ammunition to military factories in the south of the country stopped. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative impact on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. The GAU did not always know exactly the state of the supply of troops at the fronts, since strict reporting on this service was not established before the war. The urgent report card for ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and for weapons - in April
Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Department of Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored, with the GAU subordinate to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close interaction was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Transport.
The heroic work of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at military enterprises in the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations, and the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76 mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand are 82 mm caliber and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these supplies of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of troops in the field The army's supply of weapons and ammunition continued to remain strained. It took enormous effort from the military industry, the work of the central logistics agencies, and the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.
During the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was constantly growing in the eastern regions of the country, weapons were primarily provided by the reserve association of the Supreme High Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counter-offensive near Moscow were also met.
During this difficult period for our country, Moscow factories carried out a lot of work on the production of various types of weapons. As a result, the number of weapons on the Western Front by December 1941 for its individual types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. There was also a significant increase in armament among the troops of other fronts.
During the counteroffensive near Moscow, massive repairs of failed weapons and military equipment were organized in military repair shops and at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the supply of troops during this period was so difficult that Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.
As military factories came into operation, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, over 100 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), and many millions of shells and mines.
In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide support for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad area, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.
The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts expended: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.
Due to the enormous congestion of the railways with operational transportation, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaysatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front was allocated two automobile battalions, which in an extremely limited time managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.
The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous enemy bombing of crossings across the Volga. Due to enemy air raids and shelling, artillery depots of the front and armies were forced to frequently change locations. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse the supply trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in batches, 5-10 cars each, and then to the troops in small automobile convoys (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time it took to deliver it to the troops.
The supply of weapons and ammunition to troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complex and labor-intensive. During the defensive battle of Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand 217 guns.
Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle of Stalingrad accumulated weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).
Table 19
Supply of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218
| Ammunition | Front | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Stalingrad | Donskoy | Southwestern | |
| Rifle cartridges | 3,0 | 1,8 | 3,2 |
| Pistol cartridges | 2,4 | 2,5 | 1,3 |
| Cartridges for anti-tank rifles | 1,2 | 1,5 | 1,6 |
| Hand and anti-tank grenades | 1,0 | 1,5 | 2,9 |
| 50 mm mines | 1,3 | 1,4 | 2,4 |
| 82 mm mines | 1,5 | 0,7 | 2,4 |
| 120 mm mines | 1,2 | 1,3 | 2,7 |
| Shots: | |||
| 45 mm cannon | 2,9 | 2,9 | 4,9 |
| 76 mm cannon regimental artillery | 2,1 | 1,4 | 3,3 |
| 76-mm cannon divisional artillery | 1,8 | 2,8 | 4,0 |
| 122 mm howitzer | 1,7 | 0,9 | 3,3 |
| 122 mm cannon | 0,4 | 2,2 | — |
| 152 mm howitzer | 1,2 | 7,2 | 5,7 |
| 152 mm howitzer-cannon | 1,1 | 3,5 | 3,6 |
| 203 mm howitzer | — | — | — |
| 37 mm anti-aircraft | 2,4 | 3,2 | 5,1 |
| 76 mm anti-aircraft | — | 5,1 | 4,5 |
| 85 mm anti-aircraft | — | 3,0 | 4,2 |
Much work was done to provide the troops with ammunition during this period by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A.I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N.M. Bocharov, South-Western - Colonel S.G. Algasov, as well as a special group of the GAU led by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.
Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, and Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long distance of transport transport with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of cargo from railway to water transport and back, or from railway to road and mountain-pack transport, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such enormous distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During the six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2 thousand wagons of ammunition 219.
The delivery of ammunition from front-line and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. The 20th Guards Rifle Division, defending the Belorechensk direction, received shells from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to the regimental combat supply points by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered to almost all divisions of the 46th Army.
The working people of Transcaucasia provided great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the production of shells for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they produced 1.3 million hand grenade casings, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shell casings. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced 4,294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, and 46,492 220 machine guns in 1942.
The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to a besieged city was extremely difficult, so producing them on site was often crucial. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city’s industry supplied the front with 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.
Leningrad also supplied weapons to other fronts. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. The disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery workshop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. During the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.
Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tanks, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 222 thousand rockets. This made it possible to completely compensate for combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.
Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm and above 223 caliber, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU during the entire time of the counteroffensive and the liquidation of the encircled enemy group was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, 1095 wagons of ammunition were supplied to the Stalingrad Front, 1460 wagons to the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and to the South-Western Front (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943). January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3,923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts during the period November 1942 - January 1943.
The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting on July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and was unmatched in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and was twice as high as the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied in the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.
Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, and the heroic work of the working class, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly in 1942. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared to 1942 is shown in table. 20,225.
Table 20
The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and ongoing supply of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition.
The volume of supplies of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, over half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons 226.
In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army. It was carried out as follows. Every month the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which order, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what time it should be sent. Based on these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their requests, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at NPO bases and warehouses, production capabilities during the month, supply and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was reviewed and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, Colonel General, then the chief marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy - the head of the GAU, General N. D. Yakovlev, and was presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for approval.
Based on this plan, the organizational planning department of the GAU (chief General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports within a period of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their departure. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from central bases and NPO warehouses remained until the end of the war.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns 227.
The large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge and the intensity of combat operations in the planned offensive operations required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76 mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 rounds of ammunition; 122-mm howitzer rounds - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition sets 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, the named fronts were supplied with 4,781 cars (over 119 full-fledged trains) of various types of ammunition from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 cars, to Voronezh - 72 cars and to Bryansk - 31 cars 229.
The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. During the period July 5–12, 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling fierce enemy tank attacks, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days consumed 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts consumed about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of small arms ammunition, 70 wagons of anti-tank rifle ammunition, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons anti-aircraft artillery rounds and 5950 wagons of ground artillery rounds 230.
Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the heads of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - engineer-colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.
In the third period of the war, the provision of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Significant reserves of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created at GAU bases and warehouses. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns decreased slightly. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 versus 24 thousand in 1943).
At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain strained, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and higher, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122 mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152 mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203 mm shells - by 172 thousand 231
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely scarce ammunition on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially those in short supply.
By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide front troops with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.
On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand 233 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts 234. There were no interruptions in the supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to troops and to artillery firing positions. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases involve soldiers and local residents on impassable sections of roads to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.
Po-2 aircraft were used to provide ammunition to tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing in the operational depths of enemy defenses. On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield they delivered 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76-mm mines to the settlements of Baranye Pole and Druzhintsy. and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights per day. In total, over 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by plane to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Despite great difficulties with supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.
The supply of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, the following were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and 236 machine guns. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 ,3 ammunition loads of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition loads of 152-mm shells.
Such a high supply of ammunition to front troops has never been seen in any of the previously conducted offensive operations of a strategic scale. To ship weapons and ammunition to the fronts, NPO bases, warehouses and arsenals worked at maximum capacity. Personnel at all levels of the rear and railway workers did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.
However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from their bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high pace of restoration of railway communications severely destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Road transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.
Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to the troops advancing in wooded and swampy areas, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition reserves along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation existed in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the ammunition reserves accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of vehicles to collect and transport the remaining ammunition to the troops in the rear. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the chief of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front allocated 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, ammunition reserves were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by plane 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial positions lines, artillery firing positions and along the route of advance of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered with the fronts and armies.
The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But based on the large availability of weapons, it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) of small arms ammunition, 2,832 thousand (1,700 wagons) of mines, 478 thousand (115 wagons) of anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3,434.6 thousand (3656 wagons) of ground artillery rounds were consumed. artillery 238.
The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baykov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - engineer-colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - major general of the engineering and technical service V. I. Shebanin.
The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front consumed 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belarusian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high rate of advance of troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.
A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly among the troops. But during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops quickly advanced and took with them only the ammunition that their vehicles could carry. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great extent of military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and front rear services, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.
During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing troops with weapons and ammunition. The total reserves of ammunition on January 1, 1945 compared to 1944 increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery shots - by 35, for ground artillery shots - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany not only fully provided for the needs of the troops of the active army, but also managed to create additional reserves of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.
The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their preparation, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.
The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition during the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5,382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).
After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the river line. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces itself well provided the troops with everything necessary to deliver the final crushing blow to Nazi Germany. In preparation for the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million rounds of ammunition and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million were supplied to the fronts. (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account reserves) fully covered the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve by the end of the operation.
In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and mines, 392 million rounds of ammunition and almost 3 million hand grenades were used - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were expended. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported via Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of the Union and Western European gauge railways, the transshipment of ammunition in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was quite labor-intensive and complex work.
In general, the supply of ammunition to front-line troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in the four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure we must add the supply of ammunition to the country’s air defense forces, as well as to marine units. Taking this into account, the total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the active army for four months of 1945 amounted to 1327 trains 242.
The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying front-line troops and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.
The active army spent over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As is known, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate food and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.
Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support for the Armed Forces was industry, which during the war years supplied the active army with several million small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions shells and mines, tens of billions of rounds. Along with the steady growth in mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms, as well as sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were developed. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in essence, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to Soviet weapons. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems received as imports in the third period of the war were only partially used by the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at GAU bases until the end of the war.
The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war was largely ensured by the wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Of no small importance in the timely supply of troops in the field army with weapons and ammunition was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and support. Since 1942, establishing a system for recording and reporting weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service has continuously improved and improved the organizational forms, methods and methods of working to supply the troops of the army. Strict centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with rear headquarters and the military communications service, hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide troops of the fronts and new formations of Headquarters Supreme High Command of Armaments and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and targeted provision of troops with weapons and ammunition was developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of conducting combat operations. This system completely justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted supply of weapons and ammunition to the active army was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the efficient work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, workers of the defense people's commissariats and all levels of the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .