TFR "Striking": "petrel" with a bright fate. How our navy was killed Skr striking 1982 1986

Nikolay Gergievich Avraamov. Born on April 21, 1960. In 1977 he graduated from the Nakhimov Military Medical School, in 1982 - from the VVMU. M.V. Frunze, in 1988 - the 6th VSOK of the Navy.

Assignment of military ranks (dates of orders): June 1982 - lieutenant; June 1984 - Art. lieutenant; June 1987 - lieutenant commander; July 1990 - captain of the 3rd rank; October 1993 - Captain 2nd rank.

Passage of service: commander of the control group BCH-3 of the TFR "Svirepy" project 1135 BF (07.1982–08.1984); commander of the warhead-3 BPC "Glorious" project 61MP BF (08.1984–05.1985); Art. assistant commander of the BOD "Exemplary" project 61 BF (05.1985–11.1986); Art. assistant commander of the TFR "Strong" project 1135 BF (11.1986–08.1987); VSOK student (09.1987–06.1988); commander of the TFR "Svirepy" project 1135 BF (07.1988–23.02.1991); Commander of the Fearless TFR Project 11540 BF (02/23/1991–05/13/1993); teacher of the department "Tactics of the Navy" VVMU them. M.V. Frunze (05.13.1993–12.1998). Retired in 1998.

From group leader to senior assistant ship commander

In 1977, after graduating from the Nakhimov School, I entered the Anti-Submarine Department of the VVMU. M.V. Frunze, after which in 1982 he was assigned to Baltiysk, to the 128th brigade of anti-submarine ships (PLK). He began his service at the TFR "Svirepy" pr.1135 as commander of the control group BCH-3. Project 1135 ships were built in a fairly large series, for a long time they were classified as BOD of the 2nd rank, and in the late 1970s. assigned to the SKR class.

That year, six lieutenants came to the Ferocious, who graduated from different schools and had different specialties. Arriving in Baltiysk, I did not find my ship - it was on the BS in the North Sea. At the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, NATO exercises were in full swing, the Ferocious was tracking foreign ships, including an American aircraft carrier.

A month later, the Fierce arrived at the base, and I took my first post. I think that we, young lieutenants, were lucky then, because literally three months later we went to the BS in the Mediterranean Sea for 4.5 months. It was a very good school, we passed all the tests for admission to the independent management of units, to keeping watch on duty on the ship, we studied the materiel in practice.

I think that in order for a lieutenant to start his service successfully, three conditions must be met. First, the young officer must get on a floating ship. Secondly, he must have good, competent, strict, demanding, but fair teachers - direct commanders and bosses. Thirdly, a strong rear (wife, children, order in the family) or its complete absence (it is better for a lieutenant to be free from “everyday thoughts”). All this contributes to the formation of a young officer and the disclosure of his professional qualities. In any case, it used to happen so often when ships sailed, performing BS for 4, 6, 8 months. Speaking about ourselves, the BS in the Mediterranean allowed us to quickly join the crew. The officer team at the TFR was very good, I still keep in touch with many of them.

My first ship commander was the commander of the Fierce, Captain 3rd Rank Valery Rufyevich Golovunin - a very competent, intelligent commander, an incomparable person, an excellent educator, psychologist; an officer to whom, like many of my colleagues from the Ferocious, I still treat with love and respect. Subsequently, V.R. Golovunin became the NSH of the PLC brigade, brigade commander, and ended his service at the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet.

In the Mediterranean, the Fierce was temporarily subordinated to the command of the 5th OPESK. The situation in the region is complicated, the Middle East is restless - apparently, therefore, the grouping of our ships gathered quite impressive (the Druzhny TFR arrived from the Baltic, there were ships from the Black Sea Fleet and the Northern Fleet). We were very proud to represent our country in this region by displaying our naval ensign. The service was intensive, every week we carried out tracking on NATO aircraft carriers and submarines (once we pursued an American nuclear submarine, but were forced to stop tracking, as it went into Tunisian territorial waters). We were constantly in contact, as they said then, with a potential enemy.

Both the British and the Americans behaved correctly towards us, and others introduced the NATO countries that they met (I heard stories that bare asses were shown to our aircraft carriers - I personally did not have to deal with this). During meetings with "foreigners" they behaved very correctly, even when we tried to approach the distance of "arm's length" - for example, to an aircraft carrier while tracking. No provocative actions were taken. I happened to be involved in tracking CVN-68 "Chester W. Nimitz", CVN-69 "Dwight D. Eisenhower", CV-66 "America" ​​(they changed each other in the Mediterranean). We were constantly in radio contact with them on Channel 16.

It happened that the planes made overflights from the side of the sun, simulating an attack - they entered the ship at an extremely low altitude, roaring over it with a roar. But it did not cause a feeling of fear and even a negative reaction. Moreover, we used it to practice our anti-aircraft crews, our operators for real targets - we improved our skills, accompanying each NATO aircraft flight with our own AC and air defense systems. It was even useful for combat training.

During the BS, we made an official visit to Tunisia, we were in Bizerte. For me it was the first call to a foreign port. Then I had a chance to participate in many official events. Already after the BS, in 1984, "Svirepy" made another official visit - to Helsinki, but in general we were not spoiled with such events then.

It is no secret that our boats were constantly operating in the Mediterranean. Since there were practically no bases there, diesel-electric submarines often surfaced and moored to the sides of our ships to give the crews a rest (to walk around the wide decks of the ships and just wash normally). Greenish-violet in their disposable uniforms, the submariners climbed onto the deck of the superstructure of their boat, exposed themselves to the rays of the blinding Mediterranean sun, from which we, the surfacers, were already, frankly, foolish. For them, it was a real blessing. The courage of these people, who were constantly in a closed strong building, made a strong impression on me.

During one of the stops in the Strait of Messina, the crew officers were allowed to swim. As it turned out a little later, there was a very strong current in this area - such that, at best, with vigorous body movements, you remain in place. We did not know about this, since we anchored at night, and in the morning, after physical exercises, we went for a swim. We dived, and we were carried into foreign territorial waters. It’s good that our boat was on “tovs”. and behind the stern of the TFR on skerts in the water are lifebuoys. I had to carry out a small rescue operation to catch those who were not able to swim to the ship on their own.

I remember meeting with my family after BS It was the first time I had been away from my family for such a long time. By the way, while I was in the Mediterranean, my second child was born. True, my son was born on April 12, and I received a telegram about this only on the 21st.

Upon returning to the base, it turned out that we would not be allowed into Baltiysk right away. We stopped at the anchorage, and a barge of the mine and torpedo control of the fleet approached us. Having put on chemical kits and gas masks (“the probable enemy used OV”), they began to load mines - the command decided to test our skills in mine setting. Meanwhile, the wives stood on the pier, saw the ship and, figuratively speaking, waved handkerchiefs to us. So we were delayed by a joyful meeting for almost a day - then it was customary.

In 1984, I was appointed commander of the warhead-3 BOD "Glorious" pr.61MP. By the time of the appointment, the ship was completing an average repair in Liepaja SRZ-29. Within a month, we completed it, carried out sea trials quite quickly, passed course tasks and became part of the permanent readiness forces. "Glorious" did not make long trips at that time - they solved the tasks of the BP, the navigation area was limited to the Baltic. The Glorious was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Alexander Nikolaevich Komarov (in 2000, Assistant Commander of the Baltic Fleet) - a very competent commander.

In 1985, I became a senior assistant to the commander of the BOD "Obraztsovy" pr.61, commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Alexander Arkadyevich Tatarinov - a person, I would say, a legendary one (in 2000, the NSH Black Sea Fleet). Joint service has become a good but harsh school for me. I came to him as a senior lieutenant, quite young, in some ways even "green", and he was already an experienced commander. Service on the "Exemplary", where all the commanders of the warhead had the rank of captain of the 3rd rank, did not start easily.

When I went into the commander's cabin to report that I had accepted the affairs and duties of the first mate, addressing me with a brief parting word, Alexander Arkadyevich said: “Star mate, the ship is in your hands. My cabin is two decks higher than yours, so apart from the morning and evening reports, you must not come up to me with your problems. There should be only one problem: when you report that smoke has been found on the horizon, it must be the enemy.” But such a statement did not mean that the commander left me to the mercy of fate. In the future, he taught me a lot, helped me in many ways and suggested the right decisions, although I also got a lot of cones in my youth.

A.A. Tatarinov is a real sailor, an officer with great intellectual abilities, a well-read person. His passion for books, for knowledge simply amazed me - it was not clear when he had time to read. He spent all the time on the ship (maybe that's why he got married quite late). But, nevertheless, his literacy in all respects, great maritime practice, professional abilities - both as a ship commander and just as a person - aroused my admiration.

The foregoing does not mean that the relationship between the commander and the first mate developed easily and cloudlessly. It was not easy to serve with A.A. Tatarinov - I know this both from the experience of serving on the Obraztsovoye and Neustrashimy (when I already became the commander of the TFR, he was the commander of the brigade, which included the Neustrashimy). He had very high demands - perhaps not always clear to us, the performers. Now I analyze everything he did and come to the conclusion that it was impossible to do otherwise. Moreover, in his place, I would have done the same.

A few words about what caused such a "spurt" in the position ("starley" became the first mate). The fact is that in the Baltic this was not a special case. There were many young commanders both before me and after. Many of them are well known in the Navy. Valery Anatolyevich Kornyushko, who later became vice admiral (unfortunately, now deceased), became commander of the Indomitable TFR with the rank of lieutenant commander. The current commander of the 143rd brigade of ships under construction and repair A.V. Egorov (the son of the fleet commander) also became the commander of the ship, being a lieutenant commander. Our commanders were not afraid to promote young officers - this is a hallmark of the command of our division and the 128th brigade of the PLC.

Brigade of anti-submarine ships

All my service was in the 128th brigade of the BF PLC. The formation cannot be called the oldest in the Baltic, but, undoubtedly, this is one of the most glorious brigades of the fleet. Formed on April 12, 1951, it was originally called the EM brigade, and in the mid-1960s. became a brigade of missile ships. In the first years of the existence of the compound, it included KRL "October Revolution" pr. 68bis, BPC "Exemplary" and "Glorious" pr. 61, EM "Fearless" pr. DBK "Zorkiy" pr.57bis and "Elusive" pr.56M, etc. Since the mid-1970s. TFR pr.1135 appeared in the brigade - “Fierce”, “Vigilant”, “Cheerful”, “Watchdog”, “Strong” and others.

On February 22, 1968, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of February 22, 1968, “for a great contribution to strengthening the defense power of the Soviet Union, for success in political and combat training, and mastering new sophisticated military equipment,” the brigade was awarded the Order of the Red Star. The award was given not "for the deeds of bygone days", but really for the development of new technology and for long trips to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea. Then some of our ships made two BSs a year, “winding on a screw” of 30 thousand miles each (in 1967, the Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya KRL passed 28482 miles, the Svetly EM - 28279 miles, and the Zorkiy and Exemplary BODs "- 26,600 miles each).

The brigade became a forge of personnel for the entire fleet. Many NK brigade commanders served in our brigade, many flagship fleet specialists came from our unit. Over the years, Vasily Nikanorovich Apanovich (commander of the TFR "Strong", later - Rear Admiral), Gennady Antonovich Radzevsky (commander of the TFR "Druzhny", who became vice admiral, commander of OPESK), Aleksey Mikhailovich Kulish (commander of the TFR "Indomitable", captain of the 2nd rank, deputy brigade commander), Alexey Vladimirovich Egorov (TFR "Vigilant", captain of the 1st rank, brigade commander), Alexei Borisovich Tuzov (commander of the TFR "Bodry", captain of the 1st rank, brigade commander), Alexander Konstantinovich Tikhonov ( commander of the TFR "Indomitable" project 1135, later - captain of the 1st rank, served in the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet and the General Staff of the Navy). The list is far from complete - listing all of them will require a separate article.

During the existence of the connection, it was commanded by 14 commanders. seven of them rose to the rank of admiral. These are Rear Admirals Dmitry Sevastyanov, Yuri Mozharov, Yuri Klichugin, Oleg Pavlovich Grumbkov, Vice Admirals Valery Anatolyevich Kornyushko, Alexander Arkadyevich Tatarinov. For seven years, the current commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Grigorievich Egorov, commanded the brigade.

The brigade was not afraid to move young officers forward, they are not afraid of this even now. Vladimir Sokolov, my former missile battery commander at the Obraztsovy BOD, is now in command of the Bespokoinny project 956. My first mate Sergei Belonogy has already graduated from the Military Medical Academy, now he is the commander of the EM "Persistent". As a result of this approach, in my time the brigade headquarters was very young, senior lieutenants and lieutenant commanders served as flagship specialists.

But this is not the only thing our team is known for. The PLC brigade is the most floating, most combat unit in the Baltic Fleet and, perhaps, in the entire Russian Navy. The brigade is still, even in the current state of the fleet, the most combat-ready unit. Almost all ships are on the move, the crews are prepared to solve the assigned tasks. It has always been so and is so now, even with a change of command.

Path to the command bridge

By the time of my appointment, the Obraztsovy BOD was in service. Our navigation area was again limited to the Baltic Sea, but this was not always the case. About two years before my appointment, "Exemplary" went to the southeast Atlantic, where he was engaged in ensuring the protection of the fishing industry. This BS lasted 8 months, sometimes the ship was based in the port of Luanda (Angola). Then - a return to the Baltic, a short break (4 months) - and again the BS, in the same area, again for 8 months.

In 1986, when A.A. Tatarinov entered the Navy, Oleg Dmitrievich Demyanchenko, first mate captain of the 3rd rank, was appointed to the post of commander (later he became the division commander). I did not serve with him for long, since in 1986 I was appointed to the Strong Investigative Committee, to the position of senior assistant commander. This was not a downgrade, since the "Strong", like the "Exemplary", belonged to the ships of the 2nd rank. On the "Strong" there were problems with discipline and other shortcomings that needed to be corrected - it was necessary to strengthen the command. They figured I could handle it. The commander of the TFR was Captain 3rd Rank Sergei Rodionov.

On the "Strong" made 2 long trips. For the first time, for almost 2 months, we went to the Faroe-Icelandic border, monitored the progress of the exercises of the Naval Forces of the NATO countries. There was nothing interesting, routine. After some time - another long trip, almost the same.

Service at this TFR continued until 1987, when I became a student of the VSK. In the same year he was appointed to the post of commander of the Fierce TFR. The circle closed, and I returned to the ship where my service began. Here again I met with O.D. Demyanchenko. When the Exemplary was put in for repair, Oleg Dmitrievich became the commander of the Fierce, and he handed over the affairs to me.

TFR "Fierce"

My dream came true - I became the commander of the TFR pr.1135. These ships are my love. I consider them very successful for their time, well designed and worked out in detail (especially in terms of survivability, as well as crew placement). In addition, I would call SKR pr.1135 the most beautiful in the world in terms of architecture. Sometimes a seditious thought appears: was it worth it to “fence the garden” with project 11540? Maybe it was possible to upgrade the base project 1135. but not the way they did it with Ardent, but more deeply?

Of course, there were also problems. PLRK "Metel" fired much further than we could provide target designation with our own means. But the search and pursuit of submarines is not carried out alone, and if there is a helicopter nearby, everything is fine, shoot at the maximum range. Defeat is guaranteed - the main thing is that the rocket should fly normally.

SAM "Osa-M" - a very capricious "thing". The complex required constant maintenance, before each shooting it was necessary to carry out routine maintenance in order to be sure of a normal result. Only with this approach, one could expect a positive result, and then we normally fired the Wasp, knocking down targets, including low-flying ones.

During the command of the Ferocious, two non-standard situations were remembered: an inspector check by the USSR Ministry of Defense and an incident with Swedish fishermen.

Rarely enough (sometimes once every 10 years) did an inspection check by the USSR Ministry of Defense take place in the fleet, and then the fleet was studied from all sides by a high commission from Moscow. For me, this check resulted in the permanent presence on the ship of a representative of the Ministry of Defense (captain 1st rank from the Northern Fleet). Day and night, he watched the actions of the crew, the commander, recorded all actions, taking part in all ship events. Everything was checked - from drill (by the way, we, the only ones among the Baltics, received a “good” rating at the drill review, which was a very high achievement by naval standards) to combat training. Participated in missile firing, very successfully shot down a target missile at low altitude. They solved the problem of tracking the submarine with its subsequent "destruction" (they fired a torpedo). For torpedo firing, they received a "failure", since the weapon base loaded a recording film into the torpedo four times shorter than expected. Therefore, in the initial section of the trajectory, the guidance was fixed, and then the film ended, and everything remained "a mystery covered in darkness." The overall assessment for the inspection check is “satisfactory”.

I will remember that search for a boat for the rest of my life. The Ferocious was a rather old ship, its hull required dock repairs, and a day before the start of the search, the instrument compartment of the Titan-2 sonar was flooded. The incident happened in the evening, and in the morning it was necessary to go to the landfill. During the night, they drained the flooded premises, dismantled the devices, dragged them to the sauna, dried them there, poured a “barrel” of alcohol on them, then they collected everything and put the GAS into operation. And in the afternoon they normally discovered the "enemy" submarine.

The incident with the Swedish fishermen happened in 1989. Then the KPUG of three ships, including the Ferocious, worked with the submarine. They solved the tasks of anti-submarine training, the actions took place in a special training ground. The submarine was located where its commander decided, and we went on specially calculated courses to find the boat. Near the range, the Swedes were fishing. There are a lot of ships (up to 40) with set trawls - some behind the stern, some from the sides, on the left or on the right. Everything is lit up like Christmas trees. Apparently, the school of fish gradually moved to the range, and the fishermen ended up in the range right on our course. We are going with lowered BGAS, so we cannot change the direction of movement abruptly. Preliminarily and in the process of approaching the dangerous point, they began to fire flares and, in accordance with MPSS-72, give warnings on the radio: “Exercises are underway, working out joint actions with submarines. Please leave the area."

In general, my ship did not change course. They successfully worked with the submarine, the next day they returned to the anchorage, and a request from the fleet headquarters: “What is your incident with the Swedish fishermen?”. We didn’t even deny that our ship (with the hull or cable-rope of the BGAS) cut off the net for the Swedish fisherman. The choice was small: either change course and lose the towed body of the GAS, or cut into the side of a neighboring fisherman, or go straight. It turned out that the Swedes very quickly filed a protest through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the fact that we deprived them of their fishing gear and billed us for almost half a million dollars.

The situation is highly controversial. An officer of the international department of the General Staff of the Navy arrived from Moscow, checked our logbook, and analyzed the incident with the commanders of the ships. I did not find any mistakes in our actions, later they gathered senior assistants and commanders of the ships and explained once again how to act in such situations.

During these events, an earthquake occurred in Spitak (Armenia). The Swedes turned out to be decent people and postponed the issue of compensation until the aftermath of the earthquake was eliminated. And then everything smoothly came to naught (thanks to the diplomats).

Much attention was paid to anti-submarine training. We constantly, practically during any transitions, searched for submarines, ensuring the maintenance of the operational mode. The enemy was Swedish, Danish and especially often German submarines - diesel, low noise, with anti-sonar coating of the hull. It was not easy to find them in the difficult hydrological conditions of the Baltic.

When the Ferocious was commanded by Demyanchenko, there was a case of a long pursuit of the German boat pr.206. The ship was returning from the Liepaja training ground, where it worked with submarines. Normal contact was received at the crossing. The KPUG on duty was called from Baltiysk (then it included the German-built MPK pr.1331M), whose ships “clung” to the German submarine and drove it to the territorial waters of the FRG. Not far from the edge of the tervod, tracking was stopped, and the boat surfaced to charge the battery.

It cannot be said that during my tenure as the commander of the Ferocious, contacts with foreign submarines were quite frequent. Not because we have poor equipment or we were poorly trained - it’s just that the ship was specially engaged in the search for submarines only in those cases when it was part of the KPUG. Here we carried out a control study of the area or search for submarines on call (when a boat was "unscheduled" discovered by any ship at the crossing or according to our intelligence). There were enough contacts in such KPUG, and quite different in duration.

Remembering the persecution of foreign submarines, it is impossible once again to recall with a kind word the TFR pr.1135, its power plant and its capabilities. Once we were standing with the power plant decommissioned at one of the anchorages. The ship only had a diesel generator. The watchman for anti-sabotage defense discovered the periscope of an unknown submarine. Exactly 12 minutes later, the ship weighed anchor and set sail. Of course, to a certain extent, I had to "rape" the engine, because the normal emergency cooking mode for this project provides for a minimum of 15-20 minutes. And even if the submarine managed to submerge, we already made contact and confidently “held” the boat.

It is pleasant to remember that during the three years of my command, the ship became the best in the brigade in air defense, anti-aircraft defense and air defense more than once. The crew successfully completed all combat exercises, we repeatedly participated in the joint squadrons of the Warsaw Pact, made long trips, in 1989 went to the BS in the North Sea (tracking foreign ships). The ship had an excellent crew, very good officers were selected. All this allowed the ship, which was no longer young (almost two decades), to remain in a combat-ready state, capable of solving the tasks set by the command.

Apparently, such an attitude, such an approach was "transferred to the iron." In the 18th year of service, the ship was withdrawn from the permanent readiness forces, sold for scrap, and during the transition under tow to one of the European countries of the TFR, it sank - to the undisguised pleasure of the crew members (“Our proud“ Ferocious ”does not surrender to the enemy!). Crew officers believe that our ships should "die" in the Motherland, and we are proud of how our ship ended its life path.

Over the years, Baltic ships came to Leningrad for the parade. I had the opportunity to participate in naval parades four times, and all on the Fierce TFR. Twice I came to the city on the Neva as the commander of the BCH-3 group, twice as the commander of the ship (in 1990, on Navy Day and on November 7).

To establish normal working contacts, to work out joint actions, exercises of the fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries were held annually. These exercises were abbreviated as OBESK. Warships and auxiliary vessels of the fleets of the USSR, the GDR and Poland took part in them. As the commander of the "Svirepy", I took part in one of the OBESK exercises. The Soviet Union then represented the TFR "Svirepy" pr.1135. Poland - BOD "Warszawa" pr.61MP (former BOD "Brave"), East Germany - TFR "Berlin" and "Rostok" pr.1159. During the exercise, we paid a business visit to Warnemünde. According to the results of the exercise, our ship was recognized as the best ship of the OBESK (among the three fleets), the second place was taken by the TFR "Berlin".

OBESK were also interesting in that they made it possible to get acquainted with the sailors of other countries, to get a direct idea of ​​the training of sailors of various fleets. I want to say right away that there were no amateurs among the military sailors in the Baltic. All were more or less well prepared and had good professional skills. But each Navy had its own characteristics, and relations between the fleets were built differently. For example, East Germans really disliked West Germans. I was told that there were cases when their ships met at sea, instead of lowering the flag, one of the parties raised a rope loop on the yardarm. There have been such cases, I have heard about them more than once, and from my own experience I am inclined to believe in it. Sometimes there was a hint of tension between the East Germans and the Poles. Apparently, this happened historically, but the Russians also had no particular reason to love Germany. Probably, the Russian people are more resourceful, so our relations with both German and Polish sailors were quite warm.

German sailors are very disciplined, they clearly practiced maneuvering signals, acted meticulously in matters of communications, and took a very responsible approach to training crews on introductory. Our division commander (temporarily acting as commander of the OBESK) liked to "frolic" in this sense, unexpectedly giving introductory words. For example, when the ship was on patrol for air defense, the introductory message followed: “Low-flying target, bearing ...” It was required to transfer the complexes to combat mode, to guide the AU or SAM according to the specified bearing. The Germans, as a rule, were the first in these situations.

In Poland, the attitude towards military sailors was striking. It was felt that people in this profession are highly respected. I had to communicate with the commander of the Warszawa BOD, who spent about 15 years on the command bridge, before that he commanded the old Warszawa destroyer. An experienced sailor, a respected officer, a friend of the President of Poland L. Walesa and a fairly wealthy person at that time in Poland. A story was told about him that when the Polish BOD came on a visit to England, the pier was damaged during mooring. The Polish sailors were found guilty, and the Polish commander paid the entire penalty out of his own pocket. I think that this did not make him less wealthy, but personally it showed me the attitude and respect in Poland for the commanders of the ships.

TFR "Fearless"

In 1991, I received an offer to become the commander of a completely new TFR "Fearless" pr.11540. "Fierce" I handed over to Captain 3rd Rank Yuri Alexandrovich Tsvetkov.

TFR pr.11540, as you know, was designed by the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau and built at the Yantar Baltic Shipyard, and compared to other projects of this class, it took a long time to build. First of all, this was a consequence of the time when the ship was being built: the Union had not yet collapsed, but things were moving towards it - economic ties were broken, the solution of many issues related to the construction and testing of the ship was delayed. As a result, we tested the Fearless for almost two years, counting from the moment the factory director issued an order to start testing until the acceptance certificate was signed.

Unconventional, let's say, was the designer of the ship. As you know, the design of the TFR of the 2nd rank with us is the "patrimony" of the Northern Design Bureau. Project 11540 was developed by the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau. This was explained by the fact that when creating a new ship, very strict displacement restrictions were put forward - it should not exceed 2800 tons. With the given weapons systems, the SPKB considered it impossible to design the ship, having determined the “lower bar” of about 6000 tons. As a result, the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau began work on the project, as a result of which the Neustrashimy appeared ...

During my service, I had the opportunity to command the TFR of two projects. Therefore, willingly or unwillingly, I will compare Project 1135 and Project 11540. Indeed, despite the fact that these ships were created in different years, the TFRs of both projects are still in service and will remain part of our Navy for at least another ten years.

Since 1991, that is, from the moment the Neustrashimy entered service, our Navy has had a ship that fully corresponds to the achievements of world shipbuilding. The first thing that “strikes you” when you get to know the ship is the high saturation with modern weapons. I think that in terms of this indicator per ton of displacement, it surpasses all available analogues, including Project 1135, which at one time was also considered powerful. The ship is able to successfully solve the tasks of PLO. Air defense and air defense. In our fleet, the Fearless is classified as a TFR, although based on the list of tasks to be solved, it can be safely called a multi-purpose ship.

To search for submarines on the Neustrashimy, the Zvezda-M1 SJSC was installed, which I will respond very positively: a good complex, it successfully solves the tasks assigned to it. Moreover, I consider it even too powerful for the Baltic, since the use of Zvezda here is, in principle, wasteful. Such a complex should be used in the open spaces of the ocean, or, in any case, in the area of ​​the North, Norwegian or Barents Seas, in the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean. It is in these areas that he can reveal all his abilities and control a significant area of ​​water.

A huge "plus" for the ship, I think the permanent placement of the helicopter. An anti-submarine ship without a helicopter based on board - a “half-ship”. The helicopter, used in the search or strike version, expands the capabilities of the ship. There is a hangar for basing the helicopter, a cellar for storing aviation ammunition, a special cabin is equipped for helicopter pilots, where they can stay in their overalls for a long time, which allows, if necessary, to almost immediately lift the helicopter into the air.

The Vodopad-NK missile and torpedo complex is designed to destroy submarines. Rocket torpedoes or torpedoes are launched from universal rocket and torpedo launchers, of which there are 6 on the ship. Vodopad-NK is a modern anti-submarine complex and a serious argument in a dispute with an underwater enemy.

The TFR has a BIUS "Tron-Diplomant", which has serious combat capabilities. The system automates the solution of many combat missions - sometimes even unnecessarily (probably, when it was created, some subtleties of building combat control were not taken into account).

Significantly increased the ability to combat the air enemy air defense system "Dagger". The complex is much superior to the Osa-M air defense system, which I had encountered earlier. "Kinzhal" is a multi-channel complex, does not require special work to prepare for firing, and almost immediately after switching to combat mode, it is ready to destroy an air enemy.

The project for Neustrashimy provides for the Uran SCRC, however, by the time the ship entered service, the complex had not yet been completed, so the TFR was devoid of anti-ship missiles and would be powerless to oppose something serious to a surface enemy before they appeared. So I didn’t see the complex “live” on the ship, I only studied it in theory. Special lodgements were welded for the launcher on the upper deck, and places were reserved for the corresponding equipment. "Uranus" is often called the Russian "Harpoon", but this is not entirely true, since in terms of its performance characteristics it surpasses the American Harpoon anti-ship missiles (for example, in terms of warhead power).

TFR pr.11540 has a very good 3rd generation GTU, where M70 gas turbine engines are used as marching engines, and M90 as afterburners. As far as I know, the M90, although it was a new engine at that time, nevertheless turned out to be successful, small in size and easy to operate.

Two rudder blades greatly reduced the circulation diameter, which is very important for an anti-submarine ship. TFR is easy to operate, clearly obeys the helm, which is especially important in extreme situations (mooring - approach and departure from the wall, passage of narrowness).

There is no main engine telegraph on the ship. The control is carried out from the push-button control panel on the navigation bridge (with the possibility of transferring this control to the PET) during narrow passages, approach and departure, mooring of tankers. In its own way, this is unusual - usually this is used on boats, and on a ship of such a displacement it is implemented for the first time. Yes, this was the first experience of such a construction of the control of the ship's power plant, but it justified itself. We had to suffer a little getting used to such a system, but when we mastered it, we began to work without comment. *

* - In the naval newspaper "Guardian of the Baltic" there was even a note about the damage to the stern during the maneuvering of the "Neustrashimy" in the waters of the port of Baltiysk. "History" is directly related to the control system.

On that exit, the commander of the warhead-5 was on vacation. There were no other specialists trained to work at the KPU on board. Therefore, a representative of the industry, a counterparty, who carried out the debugging of the system, was put behind the KPU. He knew well the structure of the CPU, but, of course, he did not have the experience of a navigator, an officer.

The situation was difficult: a strong wind, there was a killer nearby, which interfered with us. I knew the capabilities of my ship, I had to repeat my commands on the CPU several times, but the industry representative acted exclusively within the instructions for using the means of propulsion: I successively switched from “medium forward” to “medium”, “small”, “smallest forward”, "stop", "smallest back". Maybe the naval officer would have "strained" the power plant a little, and we managed to avoid a collision. And so there was a bulk ... Then we had to change the cover of the aft fender of the towed antenna GAK.

On the navigation bridge of the ship there is a KPU GEM. According to the ship's schedule, a BC-5 midshipman should be on it, but I always had a BC-5 commander. Why? Because only an officer (and an experienced one) of an electromechanical warhead interacts with the commander during moorings, passages of narrowness, etc. When he stands behind the control room on the navigation bridge, he himself assesses the situation, seeing what landmarks pass, where the ship is, and where the wall, buoy, etc. are. To make the transition from "full front" to "small rear", you must follow a certain sequence of actions. First, the engines stop, then they begin to give reverse speed. All this takes time. A trained officer anticipates such a transition in advance and performs a maneuver without abrupt transitions. This saves the machine, since in such modes, active wear of engines and shaft lines usually occurs. That is, he provided for a maneuver and not exactly ahead of my commands - he was simply always ready for their implementation, keeping the power plant in readiness. Moreover, I knew: if I didn’t take something into account somewhere, he would correct me.

"Fearless" has an appearance unusual for a domestic ship. It is architecturally closer to Western ships. This "exterior" is a tribute to the "Stealth" technology. It is difficult for me to assess how much it was necessary to implement it and to what extent. But such a "pro-Western" architecture of the ship became the reason for several curious cases.

We were often, not yet accustomed to, asked from the post of SniS Baltiysk what kind of ship was coming. The border guards were mistaken more than once, wondering what a ship of an incomprehensible silhouette was doing in Soviet territorial waters. Our tail number "aggravated" the situation. When the Fearless left the factory, its tail number, applied in white paint, had a "shadow" of black, as was customary in some foreign navies. Such a variant of the outline was provided for by the technical documentation, and the current documents of the Navy did not prohibit this. Nevertheless, several times I was required to bring the side number to the traditional form, on this occasion there was even a small scandal with the commander of the brigade A.A. Tatarinov. I long resisted, but. in the end, I was forced to paint over the black shadow. But with or without a shadow, the side number of the ship was and remains constant - 712.

The seaworthiness of the Fearless is commensurate with the seaworthiness of the TFR Project 1135, and we can say that it is good. To moderate rolling, bilge keels are installed and retractable side rudders are provided. The Baltic is a specific maritime theater - the sea is shallow, a kind of wave. The use of motion stabilizers during a storm of 4-5 points made it possible to operate equipment and weapons normally, the crew to perform official duties, and have a normal lunch. The only thing that can be noted here is that. unlike the ship pr.1135, which breaks the wave to the sides with its cheekbones, the cheekbones of the Fearless have such a shape that even with a slight wave the bow is very flooded.

But just like every medal has two sides, the TFR pr.11540 has its drawbacks. First and. probably the main one is the absence of the Uranus SCRC, which I have already mentioned (but the developers of this system, which was late in terms of time, are to blame here).

Secondly, it seems to me that the designers approached the solution of survivability issues in a somewhat simplified way. Of course, the survivability of the ship is ensured and meets the requirements of the Navy. But in terms of its level in this aspect, the "Fearless" in many respects corresponds to the ship pr.1135. although, in my opinion, a more modern ship should also have higher survivability (this is also shown by the experience of the American Navy, where survivability is given increasing importance and work to improve it is ongoing). Freon is still used in fire extinguishing systems, as if science is not moving in this direction at all. When using freon, it is necessary to remove the crew from the compartment, and, accordingly, the maintenance of the mechanisms is stopped. In combat, this is an unaffordable luxury.

Thirdly, the issues of deployment of personnel and ensuring their livelihoods have been simplified. The personnel is placed compactly, in fact, for the entire crew - one "household device". There is a common block in the central part of the ship, and the ventilation is poor, a specific smell spreads and stays in this place for a long time.

Initially, the ship did not have a flagship cabin, which means that the presence of a division or brigade commander on the ship already raises questions - where to place it? I then had to equip the flagship cabin with two cabins that were supposedly intended for flagship specialists. Simple cabins were combined into a kind of salon. The commander of the ship and the flagship - it so happened - have one latrine for two. The entrance is from two sides, and the toilet is located at the head of the bunk in the bedroom (behind the bulkhead) of the ship's commander (the toilet bowl with a completely “wild” system for draining water - valves are knocking all the time, etc.). Apparently, these are familiar Russian details that we can’t easily get away from.

The autonomy of the ship is 30 days, there are enough rooms for placing supplies, but they are completely unsuitable for this. There is nothing new in the galley and dining room - the same cistern system as 20 and 30 years ago. One gets the impression that we do not think much about the nutrition of personnel. When I was a commander, I tried to change the food system, work out the scheme adopted in the West, sorry, in correctional institutions. The sailor receives a plastic tray, where there are places for the 1st and 2nd dishes, a hole for a glass of compote, a place for a spoon and a fork. With such a tray, the sailor passes by the distribution window, where two distributors put the 1st and 2nd appetizers there, put a glass of compote and give out cutlery. And he eats from this tray. No plates. This is convenient for the sailor - nothing spills and does not beat. It is also convenient for commanders and educators, because in its own way it eradicates anniversary (the distributor does not see to whom he puts a piece of meat - a young sailor or an old-timer); convenient along the galley, since nothing breaks, everything is easy to clean, and trays are practically not stolen. As a result, we implemented a food system with trays on the ship, for this we specially ordered trays from the factory, and everything functioned normally with us. How things stand now, I don't know.

Summing up a kind of result, I would call the project of the ship successful. Only the uniqueness of our "Fearless" is regrettable - the second and third buildings were never completed. If there were at least two ships of project 11540 in the Baltic, we would practically have a KPUG. which could solve the problem of blocking all the dangerous directions that exist there - first of all, the zones of the Baltic Straits, German ports, etc. Then these issues could be resolved quite effectively.

Crew

The formation of the crew was carried out on the basis of our PLC brigade in Baltiysk and ended by 1988. Initially, the ship was intended for the Northern Fleet. Those who served in the Navy know what it means to send a sailor to another fleet. Naturally, all ship commanders gave, to put it mildly, not the best people. Therefore, the crew was originally formed in such a way that, as they later said, it was creepy at night on the ship.

The first commander of the Fearless was Captain 3rd Rank Igor Arkadievich Kolyakov, who was appointed to this position on June 29, 1990. Under his command, the ship made its first sea trips, but for a number of reasons he left his post, and on February 23, 1991, to the position of commander assigned me. After some time, it turned out that the ship would not go to the North, but would remain in the Baltic. A corresponding directive was issued, which made it possible to equip the crew with, let's say, not the worst sailors. I was even allowed to conduct some selection.

This decision was not an easy one for the leadership. I had to convince many, including the brigade command, that the decision to equip a ship that has the latest technology with young sailors who had just joined the fleet, as well as sailors with serious misconduct, was wrong. So you can ruin not only equipment, but also the ship. In the end, they agreed with this approach, and soon a lot of smart guys appeared in the crew. Gradually, excellent specialists, experts in their field, began to emerge from them. This was facilitated by the presence on the ship of industry representatives, a delivery team. Direct communication, study of equipment right on the spot, under the control of BOD specialists, made it possible to prepare the crew well.

The ship was saturated with modern technology, and professionals were required first of all to manage it. Therefore, in the future, as a commander, I tried to complete the crew with "contract servicemen". Basically, these were sailors who had already served their terms of service and became experts in their field. Preference was given to missilemen, torpedomen, miners, navigational electricians, BCH-7 specialists, etc. As a result, when I left the ship, about 40% of the sailors and foremen served under the contract.

There was a good team of officers. Three officers - Igor Bukhalin (commander of BC-1), Mikhail Golovachev (commander of BC-5) and Pavel Prestensky (commander of BC-7) - were recognized as the best specialists of the Navy in their specialty. Accordingly, they could train their subordinates with high quality, which, in the end, made it possible to have a combat-ready crew.

Service

Starting the story about the service of the ship, it must be noted that the beginning of my command of the Fearless TFR fell on factory and state tests of the ship. This means that the crew had to carry out many tests, participate in various shootings. We shot very intensively, with different complexes several times (and sometimes dozens of times). Subsequently, when the ship was transferred to the permanent readiness forces, it did not perform as many combat missions in practice as we had the opportunity to perform during the period of receiving it from industry.

There was a period when we fired anti-aircraft missiles almost weekly, monthly - Vodopad-NK PLUR. Every week they went to sea for 3-4 days, actively conducted sea trials. Such a load had a positive effect on the crew - it rallied, many highly qualified specialists appeared in it. Therefore, I think, many remained on the ship, so as not to lose their acquired skills and not to receive a new specialty.

All weapons were tested. AU AK-100, RBU "West", SAM "Dagger", PLRK "Waterfall", SAM "Kortik" - everything was tested in action and proved to be excellent. We did not succeed in immediately mastering the Kortik - the first launches of missiles were unsuccessful. "Industry" looked askance at the crew, the crew - at "industry", and as a result it turned out that the reason for the failure was the sloppiness of the fleet's weapons base, which was preparing missiles for us. In the end, everything was done as it should, and after a while the Dirk destroyed all the targets that "encroached" on our ship.

This approach, apparently, is connected with our Russian mentality. On the one hand, a powerful modern weapon for the qualitative solution of any combat missions, on the other hand, unfortunate blunders and shortcomings, primarily due to someone's oversight. For example, on one of the tests of the Vodopad-NK PLRK, a target was required. It was welded from four empty barrels right on board, fastened with some kind of rusty corner, a pipe was welded on top, a kind of crosshair was made from the corners on it to increase the reflective surface. Then this "bandura" weighing about 600 kg was manually lowered overboard by the sailors at the ends. Something was not calculated, and the target lost its stability three times and turned over. We had to approach it again to return it to working position. We still put it and fired at it. The question is: what, it was not possible to allocate some kind of shield or a special target in order to conduct tests? It's funny to remember this, but this is the "norm" of our Navy.

If we talk about the interest in the "Fearless" on the part of "foreigners", then it should be noted that any exit of the ship to the sea was necessarily accompanied by a NATO ship (usually German or Swedish). Once it came to maritime hooliganism. When testing the universal rocket-torpedo launcher (URTPU) of the Vodopad-NK PLRK, we fired an old steam-gas torpedo, which by that time had already been removed from service. We were given the task of checking the work of the URTPU (figuratively speaking, how its “pipe” works, how the product “spits out”). The torpedo was "spit out" normally, it went. After some time, “Main” jumped up to her (the Germans have such a reconnaissance ship). The Germans pulled the torpedo out of the water, loaded it onto the deck and quickly dragged it towards them, heading towards Germany. But they didn’t manage to go far - the scout was overtaken by our glorious ships of the 128th anti-submarine brigade, and after short negotiations on the 16th channel of the Raid radio station, the torpedo was returned (apparently, they managed to make sure that this was an ordinary torpedo). They probably thought that something ultra-modern was fired from the URTPU, but they received a torpedo of the 1953 model. So the Germans were ready to go almost to the point of piracy in order to get our "secrets".

We worked out tasks No. 1, 2 and 3. On January 24, 1993, we raised the St. Andrew's naval flag and became part of the anti-submarine brigade of the Baltic Fleet. And on May 13, 1993, having received a new assignment, I was forced to leave the ship.

To be honest, all my life I dreamed of being the commander of a ship, and if there was such an opportunity, I would still be in command. I really liked this position, I enjoyed it, even with all the difficulties in the Armed Forces of the country and in the Navy in particular. Several times I was offered to go to study at the Navy with the prospect of further promotion, but I refused, because I liked to command the ship - this was where my calling was.

A ship is a kind of organism, a state within a state. You feel not like a king, but to a certain extent a master, the head of one large family, which is called a crew. A lot is concentrated in your hands, a lot depends on you. Any person, starting with a first-year sailor and ending with a senior mate - all these are people who are devoted not only to the Motherland, but also to me personally. After all, the Motherland put me in command. We understood each other so much that they knew: any of my teams is not tyranny, and they perceived it as completely normal. Our crew functioned as a single organism. It is most important.

So “fate” decreed that no one was awarded for testing and admission to the Navy of the head TFR pr.11540: neither the designers, nor the chairman of the State Commission for Military Acceptance, not a single member of the crew. Apparently, the delivery of the ship took place at that period in the history of our country, when Russia was not up to the fleet. If we talk about ourselves, then the biggest reward and the biggest pride for a surface sailor is to have a badge of a ship commander on his chest. I am more proud of this badge than some - orders and medals. I am also proud of the warm and kind letters from mothers of sailors who wrote to me after their sons returned home or during their service on the ship.

"USSR AND RUSSIAN NAVY ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS PART II (COMBATING SURFACE SHIPS AND BOATS) Supplement to the Naval Historical Review special issue No. 2 KHARKOV ..."

Kostrichenko V.V.

Aizenberg B.A.

Navy of the USSR and RUSSIA

ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS

PART II

(BATTLE SURFACE SHIPS AND BOATS)

Appendix to the Naval Historical Review

special issue #2

Harkov city

Bulk BOD "Smashing" on BOD "Bodry" on March 19, 1975 (BF) (SF) 3 Dangerous maneuvering 6PK "Nikolaev" on June 26, 1975 Touching the ground with the propellers of the torpedo boat "TKAB-127" on July 24, 1975. (Black Sea Fleet) 5 Bulk of the small anti-submarine ship "MPK-43" on the submarine "S-65" August 14, 1975 5 Naval destroyer "Ozarenny" on the military tanker "Zolotoy Rog" September 7, 1975 6 Dangerous maneuvering of the BOD "Active" and VTK "Mezen" (Black Sea Fleet) October 24, 1975 7 Touching the ground by the patrol ship "Irkutsk Komsomolets" (TF) in 1975 7 Collision of the patrol ship "SKR-92" (TF) with the fishing trawler "Poet" in 1975 8 Collision of the sea minesweeper "MT-56" with the motor ship Ivan Turgenev "(MMF USSR) in 1975 9 Landing stranded medium landing ship "SDK-110" on March 16, 1976 9 Collision of the patrol ships "1^nitsa" and "Voron" on April 6, 1976 10 Two navigation accidents with the patrol ship "SKR-32" (BF) in the autumn of 1976 10 The bulk of the large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" on the torpedo "TL-1005" on February 22, 1977 ode (Black Sea Fleet) 11 Collision of the small anti-submarine ship "MPK-97" (BF) with the Swedish tanker "Runo" on March 13, 1977 AND Bulk missile destroyer "Conscious" on a barrel in the Bosphorus on June 2, 1977 12 Grounding of a missile boat "R-97" (Black Sea Fleet) June 26, 1977 13 Landing on the stones of the medium landing ship "SDK-84" August 4, 1977 13 Grounding of the base minesweeper "BT-251" (Black Sea Fleet) December 13, 1977 14 Grounding patrol ship "Arkhangelsk Komsomolets" on December 18, 1977 15 Touching the ground by the base minesweeper "BT-176" (Black Sea Fleet) on March 15, 1978 16 Collision of "MPK-40" with the border patrol ship "Sapphire" on November 27, 1978 16 Touching the ground by a patrol ship Watchtower April 24, 1978:

–  –  –

Four patrol ships of project "50" from the 181st division of the Poti naval base conducted exercises at sea with a submarine. After the end of the exercise, the guards were with the stalled machines nine cables from each other. The commander of the brigade for the protection of the water area was on board the Raven TFR. At 0440 hours, the brigade commander ordered the patrol ship "Marten" to follow the patrol line, and the TFR "Voron" - to the roadstead of Poti. After 5 minutes, the Voron TFR began moving at a speed of 14 knots and its commander, confused in a simple environment, twice recklessly changed course left and right, trying to pass along the stern of the Marten at a distance of 1-1.5 cables. Brigade Commander 11 and his staff impassively watched the dangerous maneuvering and did not stop the incorrect actions of the Voron commander. Patrol ship "Marten" began to move at 4 hours 52 minutes circulation to the right, also giving a course of 14 knots. Without completing the maneuver, the commander of the TFR went down into the wheelhouse.

The watch officer of the "Marten" was confused and, seeing the dangerous approach of the guards, reported this to the commander belatedly. The commander of the "Marten" jumped out onto the navigation bridge and gave both machines ca.Mi.iii full speed back. At the same time, the "Crow" shifted the steering wheel to the right and gave full speed ahead. But measures to prevent a collision came too late, and at 4 hours 56 minutes, the Marten, having outstanding inertia of the forward course, delivered a glancing blow to the stern of the Raven on the port side. Collision damage was minor.

Hydrometeorological situation at the time of the collision:

Visibility - night, full.

The excitement of the sea - 2 points.

Wind force (120°) - 7m/sec.

TWO NAVIGATIONAL INCIDENTS WITH A GUARD

SHIP "SKR-32" (BF) IN AUTUMN 1976 The main data of the patrol ship "SKR-32" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "35".

1. During the next training-campaign, the patrol ship "SKR-20" received an order to provide assistance to the "damaged" patrol ship "SKR-32". The commander of the "twenty" requested the brigade commander by radio in order to clarify the task of the exercise: "Conditionally or in fact?" The answer of the brigade commander followed immediately: "In fact!". In the conditions of a 3-point storm "SKR-20" began the approach maneuver to the starboard side of the "SKR-32" from the stern course angles. At the moment of mooring with a lag, they began to destroy each other. The VHF antennas were knocked down from the masts, and the blows from the hulls crushed the ladder racks from the waist to the breakwater. With difficulty, the disengaged ships returned to the base for repairs.

2. Patrol ship "SKR-32" stood guard on the outer roads of Baltiysk. TFR "Vigilant" (project "1135") received an order to go to sea and, maneuvering at low speed, piled on the right side of the sentinel guard, crushing its aft end on the starboard side. "Watchful!"!" received two through holes in the bow and crushed the stem.

Appendix to VMIO. Issue N°2 11

BULK OF THE LARGE ANTI-SUBBOAT SHIP "BOLD"

ON THE TORPEDOLS "TL-1005" FEBRUARY 22, 1977 (Black Sea Fleet)

–  –  –

The accident occurred on the night of February 22, 1977 in the waters of the Sevastopol Bay. Torpedo torpedo "TL-1005" followed along the South Bay to the exit from the base to participate in anti-submarine exercises. The commander of the torpedo diver did not organize proper observation, and the watch signalman did not know the location of the signal posts on the shore. At 0055 hours, the commander of the Smely BOD (tail number 171) visually detected a torpedo launcher emerging from behind the Pavlovsky Cape, but did not take decisive measures to stop the dangerously maneuvering torpedo launcher. He limited himself to calling the torpedo hitter with a portside signal searchlight, which was taken by an inexperienced signalman "TL-1005" for a call from a coastal post. The signalman acknowledged the call, but did not report it to anyone.

The ships quickly approached and at 00 hours 57 minutes the commander of the BOD was forced to give a belated command "Both emergency vehicles back!" Less than a minute later, "Brave" made a bulk on the medium.

–  –  –

A naval anti-submarine strike group consisting of four units was returning from an exercise to the port of Svpnoustie to the place of permanent deployment. The patrol ship "SKR-90" (project "159") followed in the lead, and behind it in the wake - "MPK-97". "Combat readiness. Ntl" was set on the ships, and the situation along the course and in the roadstead was issued by a coastal post.

Visibility in the fog did not exceed 2 cables, rough seas, wind speed (40°) - 8 m/sec. At KPU G, information was given from the shore about following the left side of the fairway to the exit from port MPK-97 "that of the Swedish tanker Runo." The discrepancies between the ships occurred at 07:00 6:00. Following the second in the column, "MPK lost understanding of the situation, as the commander did not organize the work of the GKP-BIP and replaced the analysis of the situation with personal observation of the radar screen. As a result of a series of illiterate and incorrect actions, the commander of "MPK-97" believed that the tanker "Runo" turned to the right after parting with the lead ship in order to enter its side of the fairway. As a result: the Swedish tanker was visually detected right on the bow (50 meters away) and it was not possible to avoid a collision. As a result, the bow of the MPK-97 was broken and deformed, and the hull plating in the bow of the tanker was torn.

BULK OF ROCKET DESTROYER

"CONSCIOUS" ON A BARREL IN THE BOSPORUS

JUNE 2, 1977

Basic data of the missile ship of the project "56A", (EM "Kotlin" class):

–  –  –

military service in the Mediterranean. At 0830 hours the commander of the "Conscious" was warned by the flagship about the presence of a submerged barrel in the fairway. When the destroyer turned on a course of 178 "at 08 hours 39 minutes, a Turkish longboat with a red flag on the stock was visually detected and two minutes later a sunk yellow barrel, and a ferry with passengers was moving to the left. At 08 hours 41 minutes, the destroyer commander gave the command "Slow speed back!" And a minute later he stopped the cars, shifting the steering wheel to the right side. At 08 hours 43 minutes, the Conscious received three consecutive blows in the stern of the hull on the starboard side. As a result of the bulk on the barrel, two blades of the right propeller were bent.

–  –  –

The commander of the boat received an order to independently leave the port of Kerch, meet with tugs and then follow in tow to Sevastopol to a permanent base. In the maneuvering area

Calm, visibility reached 10 miles, and wind force (80 °) - up to 1 m / s. The commander of the boat V S T U P I L To the post only about a month ago and the check of the readiness of the boat for the transition was to be carried out by the headquarters of the division. The check was formal, the commander of the boat had no conditions for the passage, the laying was carried out on a map of a scale of 1: 200000, the mode and route of navigation were not studied, the preliminary laying was done carelessly.

LANDING ON THE STONES OF THE MEDIUM LANDING SHIP "SDK-84"

AUGUST 4, 1977 The main data of "SDK-84" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "771", "Midnight-A" class.

The medium landing ship "SDK-84" was heading to Vladivostok from Broughton Bay along the route north of the Kuril Islands. At 17:01, the KFOR commander independently changed the course of the ship and decided to enter the Zorkaya Bay of Iturup Island for poaching purposes.

He did not inform the fleet command about changing the route, but in order to hide the fact of deviation from the route, he reported the false position of the ship at 18:30. He proceeded from the calculation of movement at a ten-knot speed according to the plan, but in fact "SDK sailed in thick fog at a speed of 14 knots. Sea waves did not exceed 2 I () Accidents and catastrophes points, and wind speed (100") - 3 m / s. From 18:00 navigation laying was not carried out on the ship, and at 21:05, the ship passed through the Frieze Strait. Fifteen minutes later, when there were about 30 cables left to the shore, the KFOR commander left the bridge and left for tea. Only the helmsman and the signalman remained at the ship's GKP. Only at 21:50 did the BC-1 commander climb the bridge and begin /report to the ship's commander the distance to the entrance capes of Zorkaya Bay. He did not force the navigator to determine the place of the ship, conduct a navigational laying and report on a distance of 13 cables.

Meanwhile, at 22:00, when the radar scales were switched, the radar screen was out of focus. The distance to the shore at that moment was about 15 cables. Only four minutes later they reduced the speed to the smallest. The commander of the ship believed that "SDK-84" was located 8 cables from the entrance capes of Zorkaya Bay, while the ship was actually 2-2.5 cables from Cape Razdelny. After restoring the image on the radar screen, the navigator did not understand the situation and recommended turning to the right. At 2205 hours, the right car was stopped and the commanding officer ordered: "To the steering wheel - right, 15 °!" At the same time, an order was received from the echo sounder to shift the rudder to the right side. But it was too late. At 2208 hours, "SDK-84" in circulation sat on a rock near Cape Razdelny of Iturup Island. Over the next day, the commander did not report to the fleet command post about the accident of the ship and tried to get off the rocks on his own. Later - "SDK-84" was broken by a storm and after removal from the reefs was not subject to restoration.

Note: despite the seeming absurdity and criminal behavior of the ship's commander, such "calls" of Pacific Fleet warships were quite regular and the poaching actions of the crews caused damage to the country's fish stocks.

–  –  –

The base minesweeper "BT-251" (board number "703"), after dock repair, was put on a mooring barrel in Kazachya Bay (Naval Base Sevastopol). Contrary to the rules of maritime practice, the mooring nylon cable was fixed to the eye of the barrel not with the help of a bracket, but by winding the doplin to the barrel bridle. The deterioration of the weather (sea waves over 4 points and wind speed up to 17 m/s) had no effect on the ship's command and watch service. The mooring cable quickly frayed and the minesweeper began to quickly drift towards the rocky shore. The anchors were released too late and the ship, 10 minutes after the cable broke, landed on the bottom of the rocks 15 meters from the shore. At the moment of touching "BT-251" on the stones, it was possible to start the engines, but from the impact of the propellers on the stones, the engines stopped. The minesweeper began to hit the stones with the impact of the waves and its wooden hull received significant damage: the cockpit of personnel No. 1, the engine and generator compartments, and the view room were flooded.

Already at 2:50 pm, two hours after the accident, port tugboats from Kamyshovaya Bay tried to pull the minesweeper into clean water.

A towing steel cable was wound up behind the mooring bollards, but when the cable was pulled, they were pulled out along with the wooden sheathing. At 19:20, a diving inspection was carried out and the divers confirmed the presence of a hole near the keel in the area of ​​the cockpit No. 1 (400 x 400 mm in size). At 1945 hours, two ASS KChF tugboats - "Orion" and "SB-5" brought towing ropes to the minesweeper, securing them to the foundation of the minesweeping winch (in the stern) and to the foundation of the bow gun mount. When trying to retract, the minesweeper did not budge, but there was a danger of capsizing due to loss of buoyancy and stability when four adjacent compartments were flooded.

By 21.00, the wind force (30°) reached 20 m/sec, sea waves exceeded 4 points, air temperature +.GS. The minesweeper was secured to the dead anchors on the shore with 5 nylon cables, connected to the power supply of the mobile coastal power station and transferred to the ship of the drainage unit "NOB Appendix to the VMIO. Issue N ° 2 11 220 8". For a more dense landing of the ship on the ground - iritopiln rumnel compartment n tralyto pantry. On December 15, the Vityaz floating crane arrived in the bay. By this time, divers managed to bring under the bottom in areas of 22 and 69 psh. A whip antenna from the Proliv station was successfully used as a needle, and amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers were used to pull the lines. By 18:30, the bow lifting sling was wound up and taken to the Vityaz's 500-ton hook, and the minesweeper's interfering mast had to be dismantled. By 11:40 p.m. they launched and took a stern sling onto a 200-ton hook. By 00:45 on December 17, divers dragged /! needle for 51 sp.

n at 6 hours 30 minutes the third build on the second 500-ton hook. For strength, steel sheets were placed under the slings. At 2:30 pm, "BT-251" was removed from the stones, transferred to the Severnaya Bay on the hooks of a floating crane, and docked by 8:00 pm. The total duration of rescue work is 102 hours (around the clock).

In conclusion, it should be noted that fate was unfavorable to the base minesweeper "BTi" at 16:23 on August 19, 1989, it sank in the Ochamchirp roadstead as a result of a series of explosions.

GROUNDING OF THE PATROL SHIP "ARKHANGELSKY"

KOMSOMOLETS" DECEMBER 18, 1977 The main data of the patrol ship "Arkhangelsk Komsomolets" (until October 25, 1968 SKR-76) correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "50" ("Riga" class);

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On March 13, 1978, the commander of the minesweeper division received an order in writing to search for mines at the "stand J41? 31" (demagnetization of the control of the ship's electric fields). He superficially familiarized himself with the task and did not fully understand it. However, the next day he reported to the brigade commander of the OV Ra (protection of the water area) his decision to search for mines in "IBP L? 31", confusing it with "stand N ° ® 31.". The brigade commander and his staff did not detect this blunder either. As a result, the commander of the base minesweeper "BT-176" received a verbal order to search for mines in the Jv? 31. As a security measure, it is indicated not to enter pop maneuvering beyond the five-meter isobath. By 10:30 a.m., the minesweeper arrived in the area of ​​the shallow water range. Visibility at sea was about 60 cables, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (200°) - 8 m/s. The commander of the minesweeper did not bother to study the navigational features of the Cape Lucullus area using directions and manuals and began searching for mines with hydroacoustics. The ship followed a six-nodal speed and at 11 hours and 25 minutes (on a course of 183 °) hit a rocky ridge with a GAS fairing, completely breaking it against the stones. Having worked "full astern" with the machines, the ship managed to slide down from the ridge and left the shallow water area on its own.

COLLISION "MPK-40" WITH BORDER SENTRY

SHIP "SAPPHIRE" NOVEMBER 27, 1978 The main data of "MPK-40" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M" ("Grisha-3" class).

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And at that time, the Sapphire PSKR raced along the waters of the Kola Bay at a twenty-two-knot course in conditions of limited visibility. In violation of the established navigation regime and not on the recommended course, he followed to the area of ​​Kuvshin Island, cutting off the angle of the recommended route (course 330 °).

The radar on the guard was turned on, but the radar laying was not carried out and calculations for a safe divergence from the targets were not made, fog signals were not given.

At 2251 hours MPK-40 weighed anchor and began to circulate to port from heading 270° to heading 110°. The turn was made by the right machine operating in the "slow speed forward" mode. Radar observation on the circulation turned out to be ineffective due to the blurring of the image on the radar screen, and the MPK-40 also did not give foggy signals to the ship on the move. In addition, the PSKR "Sapphire" was approaching from the side of the sector of the ship's aft course angles, shaded for radar observation. At 22 hours 54 minutes "Sapphire" lay down on a course of 270 °, passing two cables north of the recommended path and with the end of the turn, reduced the course to 12 knots. This time, when the distance between the ships was reduced to 4 cables, and on the "MPK-40" the radiometrist discovered a dangerously approaching ship. Instead of stopping immediately after receiving the report, the IPC commander tried to understand the situation and lost time. At 22 hours 55 minutes on the Sapphire, when the radar scale was switched to a large scale, the image on the radar screen disappeared. But even under these conditions, the PSKR commander did not slow down, and after a minute and a half, both ships collided.

An attempt to turn to the right on both ships only led to a mitigation of the consequences of the collision, since the blow turned out to be a sliding one and did not lead the ships to death. But due to damage to the hulls, the ships were put into a lengthy factory repair.

TOUCHING THE GROUND BY THE PATROL SHIP "PAINT SHIP"

APRIL 24, 1978

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1 worked with a radio direction finder and was not engaged in navigation, and the officer on duty, taking advantage of the lack of control on the part of the commander, simply basked in the spring sun. Visibility at sea was about 10 miles, sea state - 1 point, and wind speed (230°) - up to 23 m/s (gusts). At 4:41 p.m., the ship followed a course of 151° at a speed of 18 knots, and five minutes later began to circulate to the left, laying down on a new course of 301°. At 16 hours 55 minutes the speed was reduced to 8 knots and the Sentry moved forward uncontrollably. Only at 17:01 on the bridge did they realize and began a belated circulation to the left. But the ship had already left the range area and at 17:11 touched the sandbar with its bow. As a result, the sonar radome located in the nose bulb was damaged.

DEMOLITION OF THE PATROL SHIP TO THE COASTAL BANK

SKR-53" (ChF) FEBRUARY 3, 1979 The basic data of "SKR-53" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "50" ("Riga" class).

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A small hydrofoil rocket ship took place in the summer of 1979. Factory and state tests in the Gulf of Finland.

When he was fulfilling the state test program on August 31, "MRK-5" made the transition in a course of 190 ° at a speed of 42 knots.

On board, in addition to the commander of the ship, there was a commissioning captain from industry and the chairman of the state acceptance commission.

Sea waves did not exceed 2 points, the speed of the wind RTO was 5 "ra (270 °) -8 m / s, visibility was 50 cable. By 11 o'clock, the RTO approached the coast in the area of ​​Cape Taran at a distance of 40 cable and reduced the speed to 17 knots . At 11 "hours 02 minutes, the commander of the BS-1 determined the place and established that the course leads to a coastal shallow area west of Cape Taran. His report was received by the chairman of the State Commission, standing at the autoplotter and observing the movement of the ship in the direction of danger. But instructions on recommended course...

he, as the senior K = 215 on board r, did not give any change of course and limited himself to the wish expressed aloud "not to go beyond the isobath of 20 meters." At 10 hours and 10 minutes, the commander of the warhead-1 reported to the bridge about the time of the necessary turn to the course 215 °, Due to the lack of practice

The GKP and its low organization - commands to the steering wheel were given in unison by all the chiefs present:

ship commander, commission captain, commission chairman, watch officer and navigator (!). but precisely at the moment of the necessary turn - everyone heard the report of the navigator, but no one gave the command to the steering wheel, but expected it from each other. Only three minutes later it dawned on the chairman of the state commission that the ship was not starting to turn and he gave the command to the steering wheel. The turn to the right was started with a significant delay, and a minute later the "MRK-5" hit the rocky ground in succession with bow and stern devices. As a result, the propeller-driven lowered feed columns were deformed and broken. The ship was out of order for almost six months.

Kostrichenko V.V., Aizenberg B.A. Navy of the USSR and Russia Accidents and catastrophes. Part I. (combat surface ships and boats) Editorial address: 310157, Kharkov-157, a.ya. 2675

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SHELL OF THE DESTROYER "NOBEL"

TO THE HYDROGRAPHIC VESSEL "MEMORY OF MERCURY"

MARCH 21, 1980

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The destroyer "Noble" performed the task of combat service in the Mediterranean Sea.

The commander of the destroyer, being the senior in the area, ordered the commander of the GISU "Memory of Mercury" to approach the port side of the "Noble" to transfer mail. But the commander of the "hydrograph" reported to the destroyer via VHF that the vehicles on the ship were out of action and additional time was required to bring them back on.

Visibility in the area of ​​the Elos Peninsula was determined at least 60 cables, sea waves - 2 points, wind speed (220 ") -6 m / s. Underestimating the hydrometeorological situation and not showing sufficient firmness, the commander of the "Noble" made an unreasonable decision to approach a vessel of smaller displacement Having dumped two pneumatic fenders on the port side, the destroyer moored to the starboard side of the "Memory of Mercury", which lay in a drift. Four minutes after mooring, at 21 hours 39 minutes, as a result of the rolling of both ships on the swell, there was a heap on each other The ships grappled with the protruding parts of the superstructures, which received significant damage and ruptures.

GROUNDING OF THE PATROL SHIP "SKR-50" (TF) ON APRIL 10, 1980 Basic data "SKR-50" corresponds to the performance characteristics of the project "50" ("Riga" class).

The patrol ship was returning from the exercises and at 4:33 pm on April 10, 1980 entered Avacha Bay. Without requesting permission for mooring from the officer on duty of the Kamchatka military flotilla, the commander of the guard decided to moor to the berth astern with a preliminary release of the anchor. At 17:47, he landed a mooring team from a boat on the berth, and until 18:20, "SKR-50" twice moored.

Due to a malfunction of the anchor device, they were unable to anchor twice at the calculated point, and finally, at 18 hours 24 minutes, the anchor was released, but with a delay relative to the calculated point. Visibility at sea was 50 cables, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (jordan-east) - 13 m/s. At 18:35 we managed to bring the right stern mooring line to the berth, but did not have time to secure it. By this time, the anchor had not yet taken the soil and, under the influence of the wind, the Appendix to the WSIS. Outlet N°2 11 and current "SKR-50" began to quickly drift to the left. The commander of the guard decided to stop the maneuver and ordered the moorings to be given up in order to move away from the pier.

They began to choose the anchor chain and slowed forward with both machines, but Avachi was a kind of bay due to sluggish and indecisive actions, the demolition of the ship increased rapidly and two minutes later, at 18 hours 38 minutes, the ship hit the shallows with the left propeller. Two minutes later, the "SKR-50" tightly sat down on the coastal bank with its port side.

Note: It should be noted that the patrol ship was equipped with an unusable anchor device, because anchors and anchor chains had a mass and thickness 40% less than formulaic.

COLLISION OF THE PATROL SHIP "SKR-90" (BF)

WITH MINE LOADER "FYUN" (DENMARK)

APRIL 18, 1980 The basic data of "SKR-90" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "159" ("Petya-1" class);

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The Soviet patrol ship carried out smooth tracking of the Danish mine layer and followed at a distance of 15-20 cable lines at a heading angle of 135 ° starboard, at the time of tracking, the visibility was variable, from 15 to 40 "SKR-90" cable lines, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (310 ") - 12 m / s. The commander of the guard decided to complete the task of ra- "Fyn" diotechnical countermeasures and reduce the distance to 1-3 cable. When performing the task, the Soviet ship overtook the "Dane" on the starboard side at a distance less than 180 meters on a course of 50" at 19 knots. At that time, the minelayer followed a sixteen-knot speed on a course of 37 "and" SKR-90 "reduced the distance to 100 meters and changed course and speed about ten times, dangerously maneuvering around the ZM Funen. From 15 hours 10 minutes the commander of" SKR-90 " repeatedly received reports from the BIP about the invariance of the bearing and the decrease in distance, but instead of increasing speed and turning to the left, he only reduced the speed at 15 hours 20 minutes I () Accidents and disasters to 8 knots. and did not use light signals, engaging in "marine hooliganism". Only two minutes before the collision, the commander of the "SKR-90" increased speed to 14 knots and began to turn away, but at 15 hours 27 minutes the ships collided, crushing the freeboard lining and damaging the lifelines After the collision, the ships turned in opposite directions and left the accident area at full speed.

GROUNDING OF THE ANTI-SUBBOAT CRUISER "MOSCOW"

JUNE 4, 1980

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The cruiser followed to Nikolaev to ensure the safety of the passages by the canal in the area of ​​​​the island of Berezan and had to receive the chief of staff of the formation, the flagship navigator and the head of the hydraulic section. Visibility at sea on that day was at least 60 cables, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (250°) - 10 m/sec. The chief of staff went out to meet the cruiser on the low-seaworthy small hydrographic boat "MGK-150" because of the excitement, he was unable to board the "Moskva". He allowed the commander of the ship to follow the BDLC (Bug-Dneprovsko-Limansky Canal) on his own, but did not report this to the operational duty officer of the Black Sea Fleet. The BDLC, sometimes called the Nikolaev Sea Approach Canal, starts at Berezan Island and stretches for 44 miles to the port of Nikolaev. Of the thirteen bends of the canal, 6 bends run along the Dnieper Estuary, and the rest - along the Southern Bug River. The width of the channel does not exceed 100 meters, and the smallest depth in the channel is 10.3 meters. At 08:01, the RCC Moscow "followed a course of 92.3 ° along the Pervomaisky (third) knee of the BDLC and from the following next h" MGK-150 "twice repeated the command to the cruiser commander to accelerate the turn to the left for the timely exit to the target of the fourth knee of the BDLC. Through 2 minutes "Moscow" turned to a course of 65 °, as the commander of the warhead-1 of the cruiser, without calculation and without assessing the situation in place and on the map, recommended the commander of "Moscow" to turn left by 4 ". Trusting the navigator and not assessing the situation on the map, the commander accepted the recommendation to change course, although he did not visually observe the alignments of channel 4 of the BDLC. The length of the fourth (Adzhigol) knee of the canal is 2.8 miles and after six minutes the cruiser crossed the left edge of the canal, on the "MGK-150", which was 2-3 cables ahead of the "Moscow", they discovered the dangerous maneuvering of the cruiser and desperately transmitted commands : "Your course is in danger", "Turn right", "Leave the milestone on the left and pass between the buoy and the milestone!". At 8 hours 10 minutes, the watch officer reported to the commander of the ship about the discovery of "milestone No. 108" on the right 10 ° -15 "at a distance of 2-2.5 cables. They did not manage to make an attempt to turn to the right, because after a minute the Moskva sat down tightly with its bottom on soil, damaging the Orion podkilny GAS.

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The missile boat left the base at 11:30 am on July 8, 1980 to provide combat training for the KTOF Air Force in the area of ​​Sukhodol Bay.

The regular commander of the BCH-1 was absent on the boat and another officer was assigned to the exit instead. Briefing on safety measures prom. Telyanovsky was led by the brigade commander and the head of the division headquarters, but without a map and without a specific task to provide the Fleet Air Force with a power supply. Visibility at sea was 10 miles, calm, wind speed (215 °) -2 m / s. At the passage to Sukhodol Bay and when sailing near the shore, laying was carried out on a map of a scale of 1:250,000 if a map of a scale of 1:50,000 was available. Visually, neither the commander nor the navigator determined the place of the boat, but the path, they used the data of the restored Tesla radar.

according to the records Radio bearings and the distance to Cape Azaryev were plotted on the map, measured not personally, but by a sailor-radiometrist, who, when determining the distance using fixed range rings, received large errors. Upon arrival in the indicated area of ​​Sukhodol Bay, the commander of the "R-87" did not know what to do, since he did not have a task to provide flights and did not establish contact with the command post of the provided air regiment. As a result, the boat maneuvered erratically on the approaches to the bay and at 12:45 pm the bottom touched the rocky ground near Cape Azaryev. During the accident, all the propellers and the line of the right shaft were damaged.

The boat lost speed and was towed to the base for repairs.

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The minesweeper, according to the plan of the exercise, was supposed to take the trawl from the helicopter south of the OKOP (detachment of fire support ships) maneuvering site. There was also a landing detachment (DESO) to the north. Visibility in the exercise area did not exceed 60 cables, sea state - 1 point, wind speed (310°) - 4 m/sec. The commander of "BT-336" incorrectly "by eye" "determined the area of ​​​​operation of the OKOP and considered that the forces of the OKOP would interfere with its movement along the designated route. On his orders, the minesweeper evaded to the south and ended up dangerously close to the Zinnovets Bank with an average depth of 2, 6 meters All maneuvers I () Accidents and catastrophes

–  –  –

GROUNDING OF THE BASIC MINESWEEPER "BE-132" (TF NOVEMBER 5, 1980) The main data of the "BT-132" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "1265" project.

The minesweeper underwent an average restoration repair and, according to the plan, was supposed to make the transition from Novik Bay to Uliss Bay. Permission to cross was received at 18:58 on November 5, 1980. The senior head of the group of ships under repair was absent on board, and the minesweeper commander and navigator did not know the navigation area, since they had just been transferred from the Kamchatka flotilla.

At sea, full night visibility was noted, sea waves - 1 point, cloudiness of the point, wind speed (320 °) - 7 m / s. At 1923 hours the minesweeper lay down on a course of 283° and half an hour later at seven knots approached a group of civilian vessels lying in a drift. The minesweeper commander reduced the speed to 3 knots and, on variable courses, began to make his way between them. The laying of the path was carried out carelessly, and as a result, the commander with the navigator practically lost the place of the ship. At 20 hours 12 minutes "BT-132" Appendix to the WSIS. Issue N ° 2 turned to heading 60 ", although the entrance gate of Uliss Bay was not visually identified and the ship's location was estimated by radar. The lights of the entrance buoys of Uliss Bay were identified incorrectly. A few minutes later, the minesweeper went to the right entrance buoy, counting it as the left one. 20 hours 17 minutes, the commander ordered to turn on a course of 65 ° in order to "get into the boom gates" and three minutes later, at a three-knot course, the minesweeper ran aground near Cape Arthur. next morning.

COLLISION OF THE MISSILE CRUISER "VICE-ADMIRAL DROZD"

WITH THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE "K-508" IN 1980. (SF)

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The missile cruiser provided practical missile firing for the nuclear-powered submarine and took up a position at a heading angle of 120 ° on the left boat at a distance of six cables from the K-508, which was under the periscope. The mutual position of the ships was monitored by radar, 1 hour before the dive, the radar watch was closed on the nuclear-powered ship, and only the direction-finding path of the boat sonata was used to assess the situation. Periodically, the bearing from the boat to the cruiser was reported via ZPS (sound-wave communication) to the head of firing. Haze was observed at sea and visibility did not exceed 50 cables, sea waves - 1 point, wind speed (200 °) - 3 m / s. Immediately before the dive, the cruiser commander reduced the distance to the boat by half the allowable one, but there was no constant hydroacoustic monitoring of the boat, no laying was carried out behind it and no reckoning of its place was done, the BIP and the GKP were practically inactive.

At 05:03, the firing leader instructed to send to the nuclear-powered ship "Commander to surface on the combat course 94!". But, the sailor, put on communication between the bridge and the ZPS station, did not hear the number of degrees and, without rehearsing, transmitted distorted information to the hydroacoustics with course numbers equal to 304. The boat commander, without analyzing the situation, thoughtlessly began to turn left on the indicated course and simultaneously surfaced on the periscope depth, increasing the course. The fact that an erroneous command was given to the boat became known only after three minutes, and the command was again given to the boat to surface on course 94 ". The BIP was also inactive on the nuclear-powered ship, the situation was not assessed and the distance to the cruiser was not measured. When the nuclear-powered submarine surfaced, no safety measures were taken (no signals were given by air bubbles, etc.) and at 05:12 "K-508" passed under the keel of the cruiser and hit the upper vertical stabilizer on its keel during the ascent, receiving small damage.

I () Accidents and disasters

DANGEROUS MANEUVERING OF A PATROL SHIP

"KUNITSA" IN MARCH 1981 The main data of the TFR "Marten" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "50".

Patrol ship "Kunica", together with the same type patrol boats "Jaguar", "Wolf", "Panther", "Voron", "SKR-57", was part of the 181st division of PLO ships based in the village of Poti. In March 1981, the patrol ship "Kunica" entered the outer roadstead of Poti and anchored. The commander of the guard, Captain-Lieutenant Alexander Zenchenko, did not report to the command about the failure of one boiler and went to sea with the only serviceable boiler. During the stay in the roadstead, the desalination plant failed and the "Marten" began to use up the emergency supply of boiler water. Because of the fear of being "scrambled" by the command, the commander continued to stand at the point and only a few times asked the operational duty officer of the base about the time to return to the base, to which he received a rude "stop!"

Only after receiving a storm warning, when the supply of boiler water was left for one hour of boiler operation, did the commander finally decide to report the impossibility of further stay in a stormy sea. Having received his "portion" of dressing from the brigade commander, he was ordered to immediately enter the base.

The storm had dispersed by that time and the sea waves exceeded 5 points, and the wind speed (320 °) was 13 m / s, visibility was 50 cables. The patrol ship weighed anchor and began maneuvering to enter the base. Many years of practice have developed a way to enter the base during a storm.

It is practically impossible to enter strictly along the fairway with a sharp turn to the right at a speed of less than 13 knots, since the loss of speed when turning and the presence of a complex whirlpool in this place cause a loss of control of the ship. The commander of the "Marten" chose the most unfortunate method of entry and walked straight along the fairway at the slowest pace. To all this, he also built mooring teams in vests on the bow and stern. Instead of a series of small smooth turns, he sharply turned to the entrance to the base and at that moment a large wave rolled onto the deck. She scattered the sailors and washed overboard one person, who instantly disappeared into the whirlpool, despite the life jacket. The distraught commander gave the order to lower the boat with rowers overboard. At this time, the port tug that came out from behind the Western Pier was almost overturned by the waves. The brigade commander, Captain 2nd Rank V. M. Voronkov, who was in tow, ordered the commander of the "Marten" to enter the port at full speed with a megaphone, and then anchor, the Watchman began to pick up speed and at that moment another sailor was washed away by waves. This unfortunate man decided to take a picture of a beautiful and spectacular wave, which successfully washed him over the borg. "Marten" flew at full speed into the so-called. The old port, anchored and the brigade commander, who boarded the ship, reversed the ship into the military harbor. The bodies of the dead sailors were found in a disfigured form only a week later. The ship's commander was removed from his post and almost got hit.

court on the claim of the parents of the deceased. h Note: The description of the navigation incident was compiled according to the description of an eyewitness who was serving at that time in Poti. The exact date of the accident has not been established.

The repetition of a similar situation in December 1986 led to a major accident with the patrol ship "SKR-40". / The diagram of the entrance to the port of Poti is given in the description of the accident "SKR-40" /.

TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH THE DESTROYER "KNOWLEDGE"

APRIL 10, 1981 The main data of the destroyer correspond to the performance characteristics of the "56PLO" project.

At the entrance of the destroyer "Informed" to the main base of the fleet, its commander received an order from the chief of staff of the brigade of anti-submarine ships to take training mines on deck. To do this, it was recommended to anchor and mooring lines to the eastern part of berth No. 19B with the bow to the exit. In the Sevastopol Northern Bay at that time there was full night visibility, sea state - 1 point, wind speed (140°) - 5 m/sec.

At 21:20 "Svedevyy" arrived at the beam of Sukharnaya beam and after 3 minutes began to turn to the right to follow in reverse to the pier, the maneuver was carried out without calculation, "by eye" and not an Appendix to the VMIO. Issue N°2

–  –  –

Note: The order for the destroyer to approach the western part of berth No. 19 was recklessly replaced by the chief of staff of the formation for the approach to the eastern part of berth No. 19B. The latter had no idea about the depths at the pier and did not consider it necessary to arrive on the destroyer to ensure maneuver in dangerous conditions. The chief of staff's violation of the original mooring plan was not necessary and was a manifestation of ordinary tyranny.

COLLISION OF MEDIUM LANDING SHIP "SDK-102"

WITH THE LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIP "RED CRIMEA" 15

APRIL 1981 The basic data of "SDK-102" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "771".

The main data of the BOD "Kr. Krym" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "61".

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LANDING BOAT "DKA-592" APRIL 24, 1981 LANDING BOAT (tail number "592") sailed from Feodosiya to Donuzlav after repairs.

The boat commander (midshipman) had poor practical navigation skills and failed to correctly analyze the surface situation in the outer roadstead of Sevastopol. He was navigating the Margopulo metro station on a small-scale map and did not know about the presence of groups of barrels on the route. Suddenly discovering a cluster of barrels, the boat commander decided to bypass them on the right and, losing control, allowed the boat to enter the sandy shore south of Cape Margopulo. The boat took off from the shallows on its own and without damage. At the time of the navigational accident, the sea was foggy (visibility is zero), the sea was 1 point, the wind speed (330") was b m / s e k.

DKA maneuvering is shown in the diagram.

Note: The tactical number of the landing craft and its type could not be established by the author.

LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIP COLLISION

"ADMIRAL ISAKOV" (SF) WITH A DESTROYER URO

"GLAZGO" (UK Navy) MAY 27, 1981 The main data of the military-industrial complex "Admiral Isakov" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1134A".

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A British guided missile destroyer was maneuvering in the Barents Sea outside the territorial waters of the USSR.

At 7 am on May 27, 1981, the Admiral Isakov BOD of the Northern Fleet began tracking the uninvited guest, there was full visibility (polar day), sea waves - 1 point, wind speed (45 °) - 7 m / s. A Soviet ship, contrary to the minimum approach distance established by the task of 10 cables. At 09:10, the Glasgow EM URO turned from a course of 190 "to a course of 90 ° and the Admiral Isakov BOD turned out to be astern. The commander of the Soviet ship decided to increase speed to maintain position abeam the British Destroyer and follow the course of 90 ° from speed of 9 knots, reached the starboard beam of the Glasgow and began to slowly overtake her.

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"KOMSOMOLETS OF GEORGIA" MAY 28, 1981 The main data of the IPC correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

MPK "Komsomolets of Georgia" (former "MPK-127", "Grisha-3" class) stood at the pier of Streletskaya Bay. Having received permission to leave the base, the stern mooring lines were given to the IPC and at 05:15 they began to haul the left anchor. Six minutes later, the anchor was chosen and to turn the ship with its bow to the exit (to the right) and extinguish the inertia of the forward course, the IPC commander gave the command: "Right machine - low speed back, column - starboard side, 90 °". Due to a malfunction of the engine telegraph indicator, the command "Full speed back" was worked out, and at the same time the telegraph in the wheelhouse continued to ring, which indicated its mismatch. The commander was informed of the malfunction and he continued to control the maneuver of the ship via the Kashtan loudspeaker through the PJ (energy and survivability post). At 0523 hours the commander gave the command: "Left - slow forward, right - stop." However, due to a communication failure in the PEZH-KMO section (stern engine room), the team arrived late. Only at 05:27, when the chief of staff of the formation, who was on board, switched the telegraph to the “Full speed ahead!” position, the telegraphs agreed and the right car began to slow down in reverse. At this time, the IPC commander gave the command: "Give the left anchor." At the same time, the commander of the BS-5 tried to make an emergency stop of the car "stop Application to the VMIO. Issue N ° 2 11

BULK BOD "RADYASCHYY" TO BOD "BODRY"

MARCH 19, 1975 (BF)

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The large anti-submarine ship "Smashing" was returning after state sea trials to the Military Harbor of the port of Baltiysk. The senior on board-rv was the Chairman of the state commission. acceptance. The navigator of the "Striking" presented to the commander of the BOD the maneuvering calculations for mooring, but the commander of the BOD retreated from the preliminary calculations and tried to turn the ship with its bow to the exit only by the action of the rudder, and not by the work of the machines in discord. At 21:32, the machines of the "Razchiy" were "slow moving backward" and the ship was slowly moving astern towards the moored v wall of the BOD "Bodry". The turn of the stern was very slow, and the commander of the "Striking" did not react to the reports from the poop, to the reports and recommendations of the navigator. The commander did not pay attention to the machine telegraph and believed that the machines were working in discord, while they were working backwards. The chairman of the state commission was impassively watching all this and did not stop the erroneous actions of the commander. At 21 hours 37 minutes BOD "Razchiyushchy" piled stern onto the starboard side of "Bodrogoy" in the bow, crushing its side plating in the surface part. On the "Razyaschy" the railings were crushed and the cover of the room for the towed hydroacoustic station "Vega" was damaged.

BULK BOD "KRONSTADT" TO BOD "SMISHLENNY"

JUNE 16, 1975. (SF)

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valve", but due to a malfunction thereof, this attempt was not successful. Only at 05:30 the right machine worked out the "slow speed forward", but the "Komsomolets of Georgia" on the inertia of the reverse touched the coastal shallows with a middle, idle propeller and bent one blade .

TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH THE BASIC MINESWEEPER "BT-176" (ChF) JULY 3, 1981 The main data of the "BT-176" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "257D" project.

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TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH A LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIP

"MARSHAL TIMOSHENKO" (SF) AUGUST 24, 1981 The main data of the BOD correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1134A".

BOD "Marshal Timoshenko" maneuvered on August 24, 1981 in the Kandalaksha Bay and at 8 hours 50 minutes the ship's commander decided to enter the Bolshaya Salma Strait, which was unfamiliar to him. The commander of the BOD did not even bother to look at the map (not to mention studying the navigational features of the area) and relied only on visual observation of the water area of ​​the strait, considering the situation simple and not preparing the ship for sailing in the narrowness, when approaching the narrowness, they discovered the absence of a large-scale map. The acting commander of the BS-1 was called to the bridge immediately before entering the strait and also did not know the navigation conditions, upon arrival at the GKP, he also limited himself to a superficial glance at the map at a scale of 1: 100000 and did not carry out any calculations (and they are not an Appendix to the VMIO. Issue N ° 2 was required), the combat information Kandalaksha Bay post was inactive, the officer on duty next to the commander of the ship and also did not take any part in navigation, was not interested in the place of the ship. The commander of the BOD at that time maneuvered "by eye" and did not require any data. At 2014 hours, he turned the ship on the return course, leaving for the Kerest site on a course of 90 ° at a speed of 18 knots. To the left of the alignment, the "Nefterudovoz-25" (heading 93.5) followed the exit from the strait and the BOD "Marshal Timoshenko" began risky overtaking this vessel. At the same time, the BOD was south of the alignment and its course led to danger. Visibility at sea was noted full daytime, sea state -1 point, wind speed (40°) -8m/s, low water level fell at 18 hours 45 minutes, under these conditions, a cross milestone was noticed on the BOD (on the isobath of 10 meters) with a great delay and did not have time At 20:22 the ship touched the ground and turned sharply to the left, crossed the course of "Nefterudovoz" dangerously close and left the strait.

TOUCHING THE GROUND BY THE PATROL SHIP "Jealous" (BF)

OCTOBER 4, 1981 Basic data. TFR correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1135M" (armed with 2x1-100mm universal guns).

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DEMOLITION TO THE SHORE OF THE MAIN MINESWEEPER "BT-83" JANUARY 9, 1982 The main data of the BT correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "257D".

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NAVAL BPK "KOMSOMOLETS OF UKRAINE" (BSF)

AT THE MILESTONE OF THE KIMES STAND ON MARCH 1, 1982 The main data of the BPC "Komsomolets Ukrainy" correspond to the standard performance characteristics of the BPC of the project "61", "Kashin" class.

BOD "Komsomolets Ukrainy" was supposed to be moored astern to berth No. 15 in second place. Visibility was 60 cable, sea state -1 point, wind force (20°) -7-9 m/sec. At 09:34, the ship followed the Inkerman alignment and three minutes later turned aft a little to the east of the setting site. The BOD commander decided not to moor, but to anchor in the area of ​​the Northern Dry Dock, but at 10:42 he changed his mind. Having stopped the cars, he gave a low speed back and began to move the ship astern to the roadstead of Sukharnaya Bay for anchoring. During the movement, it turned out that the Annex to the WSIS. Issue N ° 2 the place is occupied there. The commander of the BOD extinguished the inertia of the reverse gear and again decided to go to Sevdok. In two minutes of "thinking", the ship began to drift rapidly under the influence of the north wind and at 10 hours 46 minutes it piled on its left side on the yellow milestone of the KIMES stand (control and measuring magnetoelectric station). When working with machines to the right, the milestone of the stand was tightened under the hull and damaged all three blades of the left propeller.

BULK BOD "RED CRIMEA" TO BOD "AZOV"

MARCH 24, 1982 The main data of the BOD "Krasny Krym" correspond to the standard performance characteristics of the BOD project "61", "Kashin" class.

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GROUND TOUCH BY A SMALL ANTI-SUB SHIP

"MPK-155" (TF) APRIL 25, 1982 Basic data "MPK-155" corresponds to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

The ship was at the berth in the inner harbor of the port of Korsakov. The full-time IPC commander was on vacation and was temporarily replaced by the commander of a ship of the same type, the appointment of which was not authorized by the Fleet Commander. The Acting Commander of the IPC formally treated his duties and the Appendix to the WSIS. The release of hib "J up to 1 cable"), the commander decided to maneuver with variable moves before entering Streletskaya Bay. Having received permission from the OD base for movement and weighing anchor, the minesweeper passed between the two ships and turned around to enter Streletskaya Bay. But on the radar screen, the bay was confused and "BT-728" at 19 hours 51 minutes lay down on a course of 154 °, with a course of 10.5 knots.The course led directly to the entrance to the shallow Kruglaya Bay, and only before entering the bay on the minesweeper they reduced the speed to 5 knots, turning to course 147 °. The minesweeper entered the bay and suddenly on the bridge they saw, in front of the course, the coast and black stones protruding from the water. Having worked out the “full back” by the machines, the minesweeper at 20 hours 10 minutes stopped in front of the stones and immediately began to move stern forward, on They didn’t have time to orient themselves on the bridge, when two minutes later the BT-728, due to the inertia of the reverse course, firmly ran aground on the bottom.As a result of landing on stones, the fiberglass coating of the bottom was damaged and the nozzles of both screws. The ship needed complex dock repairs.

BULK OF MEDIUM LANDING SHIP "SDK-4" ON FLOAT BERTH

APRIL 16, 1985 The basic data of "SDK-4" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "771".

The ship was anchored in Lake Donuzlav (Crimean naval base). At sea, full night visibility was noted, calm, wind speed (40 °) - 4 m / sec.

At 2 o'clock in the morning the ship weighed anchor and began to move. The commander of the KFOR gave the command to work with the machines at random in order to approach berth No. 2 to receive military equipment through the bow ramp. The zero vehicle did not fulfill the "back" command and at 02:03 "SDK-4" began moving to the berth under one (right) vehicle at a speed of 5-6 knots. The distance to the end of the pier by this time was about 140 meters. At a distance of 70 meters, the right car was stalled and the command was given: "Both cars - full speed back!", But the ship did not obey the steering wheel well and the cars did not reverse.

When less than 50 meters remained to the berth, the stern anchor was given, but the order to delay it was given only at 02:05, when 10 meters remained to the end of the berth. A minute later, "SDK-4", due to the inertia of the forward course, fell with the bow of the hull on the end of the berth and damaged both gate leaves.

COLLISION OF THE PATROL SHIP "SKR-86"

WITH THE SEA MINESWEEPER "SVYAZIST" (BF) APRIL 17, 1985

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The small rocket ship "Komsomolets of Mordovia" (before April 28, 1982 was named "Swell") was returning after a training exit to Karantinnaya Bay (Sevastopol). At sea - calm, visibility - 100 cables, wind force (230 °) -4 m / s. When preparing the entrance to the narrowness of the bay, the MPC navigator did not carry out preliminary laying, did not calculate dangerous and turning bearings, and the time of turns.

He made gross errors in the available calculations, which led to a navigational accident. "Komsomolets Mordovia" followed 9 knots speed along the fairway with a course of 225.3 ° and at 11 hours 03 minutes made a turn to the left, to the alignment line (151.4 ° After the turn, the RTO commander stopped the cars and the ship went forward on inertia and was no longer controlled. This was followed by a command to work machines in discord and RTO bay JI05 crossed the line of alignment, and a little later, a dangerous bearing at the diving training ground.At 11 hours 05 minutes TTS iiO_ RTO "Komsomolets Mordovia" touched the right working propeller of an underwater obstacle and damaged all three blades.

Here it should be noted that the moment that the RTO commander did not take into account the time delay from giving the command to the steering wheel and to the car to its execution should also be noted.

TOUCHING UNDERWATER OBSTACLES BY MISSILE BOAT

"R-141" (LEN. VMB) JULY 1, 1982 The main data of the missile boat "R-141" (Kronstadsky Komsomolets) presumably correspond to the performance characteristics of the RKAB project "205".

The missile boat went to sea with an incomplete crew, some of the weapons and technical equipment were out of order, some members of the crew did not have permission to keep a watch. After completing the training task, the boat returned to the base on July 1, 1982. Visibility at sea was about 10 miles, waves -1 point, wind speed (270°) - 3m/sec. The boat was sailing along the Small Kronstadt raid on a course of 91 at a speed of 13 knots, but the alarm for navigation in narrowness was announced with a great delay and there was no direct connection between the GKP and the machines and the rudder. Maneuvering was carried out by the commander of the boat "by eye", and not according to alignments and recommended courses, navigation laying was also not carried out. At 19 hours 44 minutes, when the commander decided to turn to a course of 109 °, the diesel generator suddenly broke down and the autopilot with the engine remote control system was de-energized. Due to the unpreparedness of the personnel, the command to come to manual control of the engines and steering was not carried out. As a result, at a speed of 7 knots, the boat hit the base of the wall of the Merchant Harbor with its nose and crushed the ram compartment.

I () Accidents and catastrophes DISTURBANCE OF SWEDEN TERRITORIAL WATERS "PMK-27" (BF) AUGUST 10, 1982 The main data of the IPC correspond to the "performance characteristics of the project" 204 ".

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COLLISION OF LARGE LANDING SHIP "BDK-181"

AND MEDIUM LANDING SHIP "SDK-172" AUGUST 11, 1982

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The main data of "SDK-171" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "771" project. Landing ships were prepared for the exercise in a hurry and due to lack of time, their readiness to go to sea was not checked. The landing of the Marines was planned to be carried out in the Desantnaya Bay. According to the plan, the approach to the coast of "BDK-181" was planned on the left flank of the landing, and "SDK-172" - on the right flank. The flanks were marked with infrared lights and a target of infrared rays was installed. On the bridge of "BDK-181" was the Chief of Staff of the formation, who watched the movement of the ships through the only (!) Binoculars on the ship. Thus, he made it impossible to observe the situation of the ship and the navigator, and the ship went much to the right of the infrared alignments (that is, to the place planned for SDK-172). At 22:31, the commander of the BC-1 reported on the time of the anchor release, but the commander did not accept his recommendations and dropped the anchor only after the second report. As a result, the ship stuck its nose into the shallows and the bow gates did not open. The commander of "BDK-181" decided to shift the ship back and gave the command "medium back". At 22 hours 41 minutes, the BDK abruptly went back, but there were no observations of the planned dangerous situation. Full night visibility disappeared, sea approach 90.9 and -270.9 °, sea level - 1 point, wind speed (205 ° m / s. At this time, SDK-172, an investigator from heading 271° at a speed of 4 knots.. b. Infrared ray landing party At 2241 hours, both ships found each other on it, simultaneously with the large landing craft. The impact hit the starboard side of the medium landing ship in the area of ​​the superstructure.Medium damage was noted on both ships, requiring factory dock repairs.

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there were at least 80 cables, calm, wind force (200 °) - 2 m / sec. The patrol ship performed training tasks at the combat training ground (PBP-41). At 1750 hours, the watch signalman detected a surface target at a heading angle of 110° - 120° at a distance of about 60 cables and reported it to the watch officer. No one else followed this target, the elements of the movement of the target were not determined. The combat information post was not deployed, the radar station was not turned on. The watchman continued to follow the course of 0 ° at a speed of 13 knots. At 18:10, the commander left the bridge to the radio room for talks with the operational duty officer of the OVR and did not give instructions to the watch officer to diverge from the target. The distance to the tug was reduced by this time to 33 cables.

The officer of the watch was inactive and allowed the tug to approach at a distance of 2 cables. 1 minute before the start, he gave the command "Left rudder!" and "Machines full speed back!", But these measures were late and at 18 hours 26 minutes "SKR-110" on the inertia of the forward course heaped on the "Vagach" PB. Both ships escaped with dents. It should be noted that the towboat did not take any measures to prevent a collision, no signals or beeps were given.

Bulk of a small anti-submarine ship "MPK-6"

TO TRAWLER "ALTSIONA" ON JANUARY 13, 1983 The main data of "MPK-6" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

The ship was on patrol near Sevastopol and received two orders from the operational duty officer of the base to identify two naval targets. After identifying one target, the IPC lay down on a general course of 280 ° to rendezvous with another target. The ship was moving at speed. 26 knots and at 2 hours 35 minutes found her on the radar screen at a distance of about 12 miles. Sea waves did not exceed 2 points, wind speed (240 ") - bm / s, night visibility - no more than 50 meters. To identify the target, the IPC commander decided to get closer to the distance of voice communication and increased speed to 28 knots.

At 03:43, the ship caught up with the target and identified it as Alcyone's SRTM. After that, the MPK drifted on the sharp course angle of the trawler and ended up in the overtaking position, but no signals were made to the trawler about the course indication and it was only allowed to proceed further. The IPC commander left the navigation bridge for the radio room to negotiate with the operational duty officer of the base, and the officer on duty left the bridge and went down to the pilothouse to fill in the logbook without organizing observation of the target. By chance, at 03:46, the navigator went out to the left wing of the bridge to determine the place and found a trawler approaching it thirty meters from the MPK. He immediately reported this to the commander, and he, without leaving the bridge, ordered to set the middle course and shift the rudder to the right side. But it was too late, because a minute later the Alcyone crashed into the MPK-6. As a result of the collision, the MPK received a hole in the port side behind the superstructure (with an area of ​​0.8x0.7 m) and significant dents and deformations of the deck and port side plating in the surface part. The bow of the hull above the waterline was also crumpled on the trawler.

Appendix to VMIO. Release hib "J 39 GROUNDING OF THE BASE MINESWEEPER "BT-260" (BF) FEBRUARY 3, 1983

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The ship was returning to the port of Liepaja and before entering the base, a drill was not announced when passing through the narrowness. The senior on board was the chief of staff of the formation, who, during the maneuvering of the minesweeper, repeatedly interfered in the actions of the commander of the ship and created a nervous situation at the GKP. The ship's navigator did not conduct a navigation pad, and the minesweeper commander maneuvered "by eye" and was guided by the buoys. The chief of staff did not stop the illiterate actions of both officers, did not go up to the bridge (it was a winter night) and did not take command of the ship, giving contradictory "instructions" from the wheelhouse.

At 2003 hours, the minesweeper completed the circulation to the right and lay down on course 190 ", moving at a speed of 9 knots. The navigator controlled the turning point by buoys and alignments and at 2007 hours gave a recommendation to the bridge to turn left on course 171". The belated turn turned out to be insufficient and the course led directly to dangerous depths of 6 - 8 meters. And four minutes later "BT-260" ran aground in circulation and damaged the fairing of the hydroacoustic station "MG-69". The ship refloated on its own and in order to hide the incident, the minesweeper commander (with the consent of the chief of staff) ordered to forge entries in the watch and navigation log. The incident was revealed only "thanks" to the denunciation of one of the ship's officers, committed for career reasons.

GROUND TOUCH BY A SMALL ANTI-SUB SHIP

"MPK-108" (BF) MARCH 6, 1983 The main data of "MPK-108" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

The ship left the port of Liepaja to perform a combat training mission at a speed of 13 knots, instead of the recommended nine knots. The duties of the commander of the ship were performed by an officer from another ship of the same type. He did not take into account the large draft of the new ship, did not know about the absence on board of the IPC navigator and other officers who were resting on the shore. The commander did not carry out any calculations for the transition, did not declare readiness for battle and campaign, for navigation in narrowness, and when maneuvering, he was guided only by buoys. The battalion commander who was on board also imprudently showed arrogance and did not provide practical assistance to the new IPC commander. At 2003 hours, the MPK-208 commander left the navigation bridge and went to the radio room to negotiate with the operational duty officer of the base, ordering to turn from course 305 ° to course 334 in 6 minutes. on the navigator's ship, he tried to see the luminous leading signs against the background of the bright coastal lights of the night city. He did not find them and realized that the ship had crossed the alignment line for a long time. r o f y Crew: 360 people, including 33 officers.

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The large anti-submarine ship "Smyshlenny" was drifting on a course of 35 ". At sea there was full visibility, slight swell, excitement - 2 points, wind force (305 °) - 8 m / s. At 16 hours 25 minutes, the Kronstadt commander began to maneuver in order to approach the starboard side of the "Smyshlenny". The "Kronstadt" was moving at a nine-knot speed on a course of 15-30 "and at 16 hours 42 minutes its stem was level with the stern of the "Smyshlenny". The commander stopped the move, but having received a report from the tank about the impossibility of throwing a throwing line, he gave the right machine a slow move forward and shifted the steering wheel to the left. On the left wing of the bridge was the commander of the brigade of the formation, who observed the rapid approach of the ships and, not knowing about the rudder placed to the left, commanded the middle and then full speed ahead by telegraph. The brigade commander expected to have time to pass by the side of the "Smyshlenny", but due to the inconsistency of incorrect actions, a bulk occurred. The left side of the "Kronstadt" fell on the stem of the BOD "Smyshlenny" and as a result the side plating was crumpled and the left torpedo tube equipped with live torpedoes was torn off the foundation.

DANGEROUS MANEUVERING BOD "NIKOLAEV"

JUNE 26, 1975

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When passing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through the Bosporus, "Nikolaev" fell into a continuous fog. At 0653 hours the ship passed Cape Tarabya and visibility dropped to 15-20 meters.

The commander of the BOD decided to continue moving along the strait. At 7 hours 23 minutes "Nikolaev" barely avoided a collision with two ferries and parted with them at a distance of about 100 meters. The BOD commander reduced the speed to the smallest, but did not take into account that the ship was approaching the narrowest section of the strait. Here, the current speed is up to 2-5 knots, which makes the ship difficult to control. At 07:28, the commander stopped the right vehicle to accelerate the turn to the right in the area of ​​Cape 40. But his actions were late and at 20:13 "MPK-108" sat down on the western edge of the deepened channel. On the inertia of the forward course, the MPK slid down from the shallows and damaged only the fairing of the underwing GAS "Argun". The IPC commander jumped onto the bridge a minute before touching the ground and did not take any action.

DEATH OF ROCKET BOAT "R-82" (SF) ON MARCH 23, 1983 The main data of the RKA "R-82" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "205".

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rum "R-82" and without clarifying the situation (the discrepancy together was about 8 miles), the divisional commander reported to the head of the shooting that he was ready to carry it out. Having received permission, both boats launched two Termit (P-15) missiles at 18:17. A cruise missile fired from the "R-9" aimed at the KVNP "Ri a minute later hit him on the starboard side. As a result of the explosion and fire, the boat sank. The number of victims (and they undoubtedly were at least a third of the crew) was not officially reported anywhere. In the same year, the boat was lifted from a depth of 123 meters by the ACC KSF forces.The work was supervised by Captain 1st Rank Yu.V. Kononenko.The boat was not restored and was scrapped after studying the results of the explosion.

VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED SWIMMING MODE

SEA MINESWEEPER "KOMSOMOLETS OF BELORUSSIA"

AND TANKER "OLEKMA" ON APRIL 22, 1983 The main data of MT "Komsomolets Belorussii" (former "MT-502") correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "254".

The main data of the Olekma tanker correspond to the performance characteristics of the NT of the Pevek type.

The ships met at 09:22 in the area of ​​Ouessant Island. The minesweeper acted as an escort for the tanker, and after the latter turned around, both ships followed the oncoming traffic lane of the traffic separation system in the English Channel for two and a half hours. Neither the commander of the minesweeper nor the captain of the tanker reported on the fact of a gross violation of the rules of navigation. Only after reporting the fact of violation of the navigation regime through foreign diplomatic channels, both officers admitted that they had committed this violation in order to shorten the route of passage and "supposedly" to reduce pitching in stormy conditions.

COLLISION OF THE DESTROYER "EXCELLENT"

(BF) WITH THE NEVSKY-2 SHOW, MAY 1, 1983

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At 1207 hours, the destroyer "Otlichny" moved away from the quay wall of the plant named after. Zhdanov in Leningrad. A drill was announced on the ship and the destroyer was prepared for navigation in narrowness, but due to a malfunction of the factory tug, the commander of the formation decided to make the transition to Kronstadt on his own. Due to the lack of fusion of the personnel, they failed to properly organize visual and technical observation in foggy conditions. Visibility at sea is variable: from half-cable to 80 cable, calm, wind speed (270 °) - 2 m / s. , the course was reduced to 4 knots and fog signals began to be given.

At that time, 6 sea targets were observed on the radar screen (in the bow compartment), but the watch officer was not working on the CIC (combat information center)) continuous radar - laying behind the movement of targets. At 1436 hours, a mark of a small surface target appeared on the radar screen at a distance of 6.2 kbt. According to the calculations of the CIC, the ship was supposed to disperse with her at a distance of 0.9 kbt. left side. When the destroyer was withdrawn from the plant, traffic along the Sea Canal was closed, but the sudden appearance of an oncoming target did not alert the commander of the Excellent. When turning to the right on the recommended course of 315° at 1440 hours, a ship was visually detected straight ahead, going to the crossing. The destroyer commander immediately gave the command for full reverse, but his actions were too late and a minute later the destroyer hit the scow "Nevskaya-2" with its bow in the stern. A few minutes later, the scow sank astern due to a hole in the starboard side near the superstructure. Subsequently, the scow was raised and repaired. The destroyer is also forced to return to the factory for repairs.

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The R-42 missile boat passed factory tests and received an order to cross the inner road of the port of Vladivostok.

The commander of the boat did not set any tasks for the navigator for the transition, and he did not make a preliminary laying and maneuvering calculations. The preparation of the boat for the battle and the campaign was also not carried out, and half of the personnel of the BCH-1 was absent on board. When leaving the berth, the echo sounder was de-energized and the navigator went to fix the problem.

The commander of the boat drove recklessly and, instead of following the alignments, decided to follow along the coast without even looking at the map. After passing the booms of Ulysses Bay, the commander set a course through a dangerous shallow area at a distance of 90 meters from Cape Ostry. The boat was traveling at a speed of 10 knots, and at 20 hours 20 minutes the navigator restored power to the echo sounder and found a sharp decrease in the depths under the keel. He immediately reported to the bridge and the commander ordered the vehicles to be stopped.

But his actions were late and at 20 hours 25 minutes at a speed of about 10 knots, he sat down on a stone ridge at the bottom 50 meters from the coast. The bottom of the boat, propellers and propeller shafts were severely damaged and the boat stood in the dock for repairs for several months.

Appendix to VMIO. Issue N°2

COLLISION OF A SMALL LANDING SHIP ON

AIR Cushion "MDK-88" WITH A PASSENGER

JUNE 1, 1983

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MDK hovercraft was tested, based on the waters of the salt lake Uzunlar (north-west of Feodosia). The coast in this area is bordered by shallows with depths of less than 10 meters and is ideal for basing vessels of this type. Special concrete platforms are equipped for the parking of ships, but the control of hovercraft requires special skills. And on June 1, 1983, when the MDK-88 went ashore, the MDK commander did not take into account the influence of the slope of the underlying passage surface on the ship's controllability. He incorrectly chose the speed mode and did not fit into the size of the passage. The ship skidded to the left and at 20 knots speed it hit its nose on the left parapet of the passage. By the force of the impact, the ship was thrown to the right and he was forced to go down to the water in reverse and repeat the maneuver of going ashore. As a result of the collision, the left bow corner of the hull was dented and the bow ramp for the exit of military equipment was wedged. The elimination of the damage received required a factory repair carried out in Feodosia.

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The floating base of the submarine "Ivan Vakhrameev" maneuvered in the South China Sea. The commander of the BCH-1 on the PBPL was an officer who had previously been removed from a similar position on the submarine. Continuing to demonstrate his low professional training, he determined the position of the ship only by radar and did not analyze and did not take into account the resulting discrepancies indicating the current (speed up to two knots). Visibility at sea was about 60 cable, cloudiness - 9 points, sea waves "" - 1 point, wind speed (200 °) 7 m / s. On the evening of June 8, 1983, from 18.00 to 20.30 hours, the mother ship was drifting, but again he did not take into account the drift of her current and wind drift. At 2030 hours he determined the distances to Ratchang-Kam Ranh Cape and Noi Island, but mixed up the landmarks and determined the distances to Ratchang-Gan Capes and Tyala Island. Subsequently, the floating base began maneuvering away from the coast and no one was interested in its place, the commander of the BCH-1 ceased to be determined and went to sleep. The flagship navigator did not control its activities and did not personally determine the place of the ship from the moment it left the port. He had doubts about the place of the PBPL only by 11 o'clock on June 9, when, according to calculations, the coast was supposed to open, he demanded a place from all the ships of the detachment and, having decided, received a discrepancy of more than 48 miles (!)

TO THE SEARCH AND RESCUE SHIP (PSK) "TAMAN"

JULY 3, 1983 The main data of the BDK correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1171".

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The large landing ship "Krymsky Komsomolets" (former "BDK-6") was returning from the sea to Sevastopol and carried out the maneuver "Northern Bay of mooring to the pier of the Chicken Walls of Sevastopol ki. The wind speed (260°) reached 7 m/s and in order to avoid demolition of the ship, the rudder was shifted to the left. "Taman" Due to the small inertia of the reverse course and the lack of excitement, the damage received by both ships turned out to be insignificant.

VIOLATION OF NAVIGATION RULES CLOSE

TERRITORIAL WATERS OF NORWAY SMALL ROCKET

SHIP "VOLNA" (SF) AUGUST 29, 1983

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Polyutnkha Western. Visibility at sea reached 10 miles (polar day), excitement - 2 points, wind speed (300 °) - 8 / sec. At 08:11, the watch signalman reported the appearance of red leading signs indicating the direction of the state border of the USSR, but the commander and navigator did not know their purpose. After a turn to the left and several minutes of reflection, the commander ordered to stop the course at 8 hours and 20 minutes. At the same time, he received instructions from the radio technical post not to cross the border of the USSR and ordered the steering wheel to be shifted to the right on board. On a steep circulation to the right, RTO "Volna" approached the line of delimitation of territorial waters by 2.5 cable tons. This gave the Norwegian side a reason to protest.

COLLISION OF THE PAINT SHIP "STORM" (TF)

With the destroyer "FIFE" (U.S. Navy)

NOVEMBER 17, 1983 The main data of the TFR "Striking" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1135".

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The navigator's task is to change the course of the "Striker" to the right and increase the speed. At 14:22, the ships approached at a distance of less than two cable lengths and a signal was raised at the GKP: "Caution, my steering is out of order." Two minutes later, the American destroyer raised a response signal: "Understood your signal, I am conducting maneuvering exercises." The distance between the ships was reduced to 60 meters and at 14 hours 26 minutes a collision occurred. "Striking" hit the starboard side of the American with a stem and damaged the hull plating above the waterline (4.5m dent). The nose of the Soviet ship was also dented, and the "Striking" turned sharply to the right, barely avoiding a collision with another security ship.

TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH THE MINOR-BOAT "Resourceful"

MARCH 16, 1894 The main data of the EM (RKB) "Resourceful" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "56-A".

The ship was heading from Sevastopol to the Mediterranean Sea for the next military service. Having safely passed the Bosporus, at 08:18 on March 16, 1984, he entered the Sea of ​​Marmara. The ship's commander was at the GKP, the navigator was in the chart room, and the watch officer was in the BIP. The destroyer declared "combat readiness No. 2 and the Don navigation radar was constantly working, and visual observation was provided by three signalers. Visibility was about 60 cable, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (50 °) -14 m / s, current speed (250°)-0.8 knots The destroyer had a speed of 23 knots, but the navigator did not keep a graphical dead reckoning, but was guided by the "bunny" of the autoplotter and determined the ship's position every 40-50 minutes. with oncoming ships, and in the intervals between observations he was engaged in the repair of equipment.

At 11 hours 11 minutes "Resourceful" turned left on a new course 237", having a course of 22 knots. At 12 hours 00 minutes, the radiometrist measured the distance to Marmara Island, and the navigator laid it to Khairsyzada Island (see diagram). The discrepancy was about 4 miles (and recorded in the log - 0.9 miles. Depths were not measured by an echo sounder, and other methods and landmarks were not used to determine, the current was not taken into account. At 12 hours 25 minutes, the navigator again determined at three distances (on the radar screen) and the discrepancies amounted to 2.6 miles. The navigator recognized this observation as erroneous, but instead of repeating the observation, he left for lunch. The officers on duty (in two shifts) were not interested in the place of the ship and did not determine the place. The commander of the ship also did not deal with navigation issues and allowed lunch and a shift watch when sailing in narrowness, not having prepared their ship for sailing.At 12 hours 40 minutes, the destroyer began to overtake a passing ship at a distance and the commander of the BCH-1 arrived on the navigation bridge, a "training alert" was announced. the Indian evaded to the right and overtook at a distance of 12 cables. The course laid by the navigator led the ship directly to the Doganarslan Bank and at 12 hours 53 minutes the "Resourceful" touched the ground at a 22-huz speed (the course As a result of touching the ground, the bottom was dented on the destroyer and water leakage of the hull was found, which required a dock inspection and repair.

I () Accidents and catastrophes TOUCHING THE GROUND BY THE PATROL SHIP "SKR-90" (BF) APRIL 3, 1984 The main data of the "SKR-90" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "159".

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TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH THE "MODERN" DESTROYER

MARCH 1, 1985 The main data of the EM "Modern" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "956".

A detachment of Soviet ships made an official visit to the Yugoslav port of Split. The first to moor BOD "Stroyny" (project "61") and after him, taking on board the pilot - the destroyer "Modern". Visibility at sea reached 10 miles, sea state -1 point, wind speed (120°) - 4 m/sec.

Preliminary calculations and a graphic mooring plan were not made. The navigator and the CIC were practically inactive, and on the circulation to the left (see diagram), the destroyer almost came close to the dangerous isobath of 10 meters. At 10 o'clock 58 Annex to the WSIS. The release of hib "J" 49 minutes from the bridge was followed by a command to both cars "low speed back" and two minutes later - "both cars stop! Give up the right anchor. "Due to the rapid demolition of the ship at 11:03 a.m., a new command followed:" Both cars - the smallest move forward! A strong vibration of the hull began and the destroyer hardly left the shallows.Further mooring was carried out with the help of port tugs, and a diving inspection showed the need for dock repairs.

GROUND TOUCH BY THE SMALL ROCKET SHIP "TUCHA" (SF)

MARCH 14, 1985

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The small rocket ship "Tucha" was returning from the sea to the base of the village. Granite (Long Western Bay). At sea, variable visibility was noted and at times - snow charges, sea waves - 2 points, wind speed (210 °) - 5 m / s. The BC-1 commander did not have a large-scale tablet and did not keep a graphic reckoning when swimming in narrowness. He rarely determined the place of the ship and was fond of overly detailed entries in the navigation log, which took a lot of time. At 21:01, the navigator reported to the commander of the ship about the time to turn to the right and again left to fill out the log. Then he climbed to the bridge and on the radar screen found a significant deviation of the ship from the recommended path. He only reported that the ship did not fit into the turn, but his report was ignored by the commander. The ship's commander performed his duties formally and, having received the navigator's report on the time of the turn, continued to follow the 152 ° course at a speed of 11.5 knots and wanted to linger on the 170 ° course without calculation. Having ignored the alarming report of the navigator, at 2103 hours he received a message from the radiometer operator that the coast was right on the course.

Instead of immediately stopping the movement of the ship, the commander began a sharp turn to the right with cars in discord, and only a minute later reversed. His actions were clearly too late, and after 30 seconds the Tucha RTO crashed into a granite shore at a 7-knot course. The stem and the first compartment are completely broken and deformed. The flow of water was stopped and the ship was put into factory repair for a long time.

Supplement to IM&O. Issue M2 Kandilli. At 7 Freemason 31 minutes, the steering wheel was shifted to the left and the smallest forward speed was given by both cars. A minute later, in order to accelerate the turn to the left, the left car was stalled and the command was immediately given to it to “middle speed back”. At the same time, the right machine worked "mid forward".

But at that moment, the left car did not turn off from the forward course, and instead of turning to the left, "Nikolaev" began to dangerously approach the shore straight ahead. At 7 hours 33 minutes the left car was stalled, and the right car was given the maximum possible move back and both anchors were given. As a result of the emergency measures taken, the BOD "Nikolaev" stopped in Bebek Bay at a distance of about 100 meters from the shore

TOUCHING THE GROUND WITH THE PROPELLERS OF THE TORPEDO BOAT "TKAB-127"

JULY 24, 1975. (Black Sea Fleet)

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The large torpedo boat "TKAB-127", built in Leningrad at the Almaz plant, was transferred to the Black Sea to provide training for the crews of export ships. In the summer of 1975, the ship carried out factory sea trials and has not yet passed a single course task. Nevertheless, the torpedo boat, assigned to the Kerchno-Feodosiya naval base, was appointed to participate in the water sports festival on the Day of the Soviet Navy. On July 24, 1975, the boat entered the roadstead of the Kerch Bay to practice a torpedo attack episode. Visibility at sea - at least 70 cables, excitement - 1 point, wind speed (315 ") - 5 m / s, depth in the maneuvering area - about 4 meters. On board the torpedo boat was the chief of staff of the brigade, inactively observing the maneuvering of the boat. "TK-G27" at 18 hours 20 minutes followed the course 240 "at a speed of 15 knots and five minutes later turned left on a new course. But, due to the indistinct closure of the raid, a factory work boat passed to the intersection of the course "TK-127". The commander of the torpedo boat did not take into account the influence of shallow water, and after the boat hit the wave of the past vessel, the TK-127's stern sank sharply and it touched the rocky ground with all three propellers. As a result, the blades of all propellers of the boat were damaged.

The accident occurred at the point with coordinates: W= 45°20 "74", L= 36°28" 43"

Bulk of a small anti-submarine ship "MPK-43" ON

S-65 SUBMARINE ON AUGUST 14, 1975

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GROUNDING OF A SMALL ANTI-SUB SHIP

"MPK-161" (BF) APRIL 2, 1985 The main data of "MPK-161" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

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GROUNDING OF THE BASIC MINESWEEPER "BT-728" (ChF) APRIL 4, 1985 The basic data of the "BT-728" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "1265" project.

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did not organize the preparation of "MPK-155" for going to sea. The sea was calm, visibility exceeded 10 miles. Aniva Bay had been clear of ice for several weeks already, but the hydrographic service did not put up warning signs, including a buoy that bounds a bank with a depth of 1.3 m from the north. stroke 11 knots and laid down on a course of 280 °. On the bridge, in addition to the commander of the ship and the navigator, there was also the head of the division of the OVR ship. At the moment of passing the gates of the harbor of the port of Korsakov, in accordance with the preliminary laying, the navigator reported: "Time to turn on a course of 300 °." The commander of the ship accepted his report, but did not react and did not give commands to the steering wheel. The divisional commander standing nearby confirmed the correctness of the navigator's report, ordering the commander to "take to the right." Again, there was no reaction. The divisional commander, removing the commander of the ship from the telegraph, commanded - "Stop the car" and "Right on board." But it was too late and at 13 hours 52.5 minutes "MPK-155" on the inertia of the forward course and circulation to the right touched the ground. No damage noted.

BULK BOD "RESITELNY" ON THE BERTH ON JUNE 2, 1982 The main data of the BOD "Reshitelny" correspond to the standard performance characteristics of the BOD project "61", "Kashin" class.

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The main data of the submarine "S-296" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "613".

The border cutter from sideboard number "476" was moored on the left side to the frontier patrol ship of the "Stenka" class with tail number "022" (near the floating pier in Balaklava Bay). Nearby was under repair SKR "828" and three border boats. At 4:20 p.m., the commander of the boat, having given up the mooring lines, began to move and put the rudder to the right-15. The right engine of the boat worked "slow forward" and after passing the cut of the berth, at 16:21 the rudder was shifted straight, and the right engine was given a "stop". Without waiting for it to work out, the command "small forward" was given to the left car and the ship received the inertia of the forward course to the left. A minute later, the cutter hit the stern section of the S-296 submarine with its bow end. There was no serious damage to the hulls due to low speed, and the boat departed for the patrol line. At the same time, it also passed dangerously close to the SDK-4 medium landing ship, which arrived in Balaklava to repair the forward doors of the gate after the accident.

BULK OF THE PATROL SHIP "IMPOSSIBLE"

AT PSKR "DZERZHINSKY" ON JULY 16, 1985 The main data of the TFR "Impeccable" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1135".

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The patrol ship was returning from the sea and, turning into the South Bay of Sevastopol, was preparing to moor astern. "Impeccable" was ordered to berth No. 85 to moor to the place No. 4 of berth No. 84 No. 85 of the Mine Wall.

At 18 hours 11 minutes, the guard passed the traverse of the PSKR "Dzerzhinsky", moored to place No. 3. Visibility at sea was at least 8 miles, sea waves - about 1 point, wind speed (40 °) - 7 m / s. After the passage of the traverse of the PSKR, the senior assistant to the commander of the "Irreproachable" took command - control of the ship for training purposes. The first officer who took control did not take into account the weather conditions and the inertia of the ship. And the commander of the ship was again forced to take control of the "Irreproachable".

The new leadership did not improve the position of the guard, as the wind increased to 10 m / s, and the commander did not dare to repeat the maneuver again. Instead, he gained a lot of energy in reverse and gave the command to the cars to "forward" belatedly. The return of both anchors did not fix anything and at 18 hours 27 minutes "Irreproachable" made a pile with the left mine slope on the starboard side of the Dzerzhinsky PSKR.

As a result of the bulk, the freeboard plating of the PSKR was damaged.

Accidents and disasters

BULK OF PATROL SHIP "SKR-48" ON TANKER

"DAVID BAKRADZE" AUGUST 1, 1985 The basic data of "SKR-48" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "35M" project.

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Note: The commander of the patrol ship did not take any measures to prevent the bulk and looked indifferently at what was happening, instead of dropping anchor at a dangerous moment and keeping the machines in immediate readiness to set off.

GROUND TOUCH BY SEA MINESWEEPER "DIESELIST" (BSF)

OCTOBER 1, 1985 The main data of MT "Dieselist" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "266M".

The sea minesweeper was leaving the port of Menzel-Bourguibou (in the Goulet-du-lac Strait) to sail from the Mediterranean Sea to Sevastopol.

The pilot on board, together with the commander, gave commands in pure Russian. At 2039 hours the minesweeper's navigator made the last reliable observation. Visibility at sea was about 60 cables, sea state - 1 point, wind speed (240 °) - 9 m / sec and current speed (3 "- 0.3 knots. The ship followed a course of 354" at a speed of 10 knots and at 2047 hours, he approached buoys No. 19 and No. 20, enclosing the fairway, which helped to clarify the place of the minesweeper.

Two and a half minutes later, the navigator reported to the commander of the ship:

"Time to turn right to heading 70" ". The ship is in this Annex to the WSIS. Release hib" J 55 time approached extinguished buoys No. 17 and No. 18. The pilot, having heard the command of the ship's commander about turning to the right and having lost his exact orientation, believed that the ship was to the right of the fairway and gave the command: "Rudder left - 5th." The helmsman carried out the command of the pilot, and at that moment the signalman discovered a non-luminous buoy at a heading angle of 15 "starboard at a distance of 80 meters. With the discovery of the buoy, the pilot gave the command: "rudder-right - 10" "based on leaving it on the starboard side. At 20 hours 51 minutes, the ship on the right circulation at a speed of 9 knots touched the ground and broke the fairing of the lifting and lowering device of the hydroacoustic station.

SUBMARINE FLOATING GROUNDING

"MAGADAN KOMSOMOLETS" (TF) NOVEMBER 24, 1985

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INTEGRATED SUPPLY SHIP COLLISION

"BEREZINA" WITH THE MOTOR SHIP "CAPTAIN SOROKA"

(CHMP MMF USSR) MAY 14, 1986

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KKS "Berezina" followed from the Black Sea and at 11 hours 40 minutes on May 14, 1986 passed the Bosphorus. After leaving the Bosphorus, the ship was declared “combat readiness No. 1 and three minutes later the speed was increased to 18 knots (with a visibility of about 40 cable knots). But after increasing the speed, a strip of fog was discovered ahead of the course at a distance of 20 cable ropes. In order to bypass a group of civilians ships anchored due to fog, the commander of the Berezina lay down on a course of 225 "instead of the recommended course of 241 °. At 11:50 a.m., the radiometrist reported to the bridge: "A surface target was detected at a distance of 35 cables, along a bearing of 238 °." Despite the deterioration in visibility in the fog from 20 to 2 cables, the Berezina's speed was not reduced. The sea state at that moment did not exceed 1 point, the wind speed (200°) was 4 m/s, the speed of the southwest current was up to 2 knots. In hours 52 minutes, the Berezina's BIP determined the elements of the target's movement: heading = 60 °, speed - 12 knots, after which it reported to the GCP: "We will disperse with the starboard side at a distance of 4 kbt." At the entrance to the fog lane on the "Berezina", fog signals were started and a turn to the right on a course of 250 ° was started in order to enter the "recommended path". The distance to the target was already 24 cables (bearing). At 11 hours 54 minutes, a new report from the radiometrist followed at the GKP: "Dangerous target-bearing-248", distance-13 kbt. After receiving and comprehending the report, the ship commander gave the command at 11 hours 55 minutes : "Stop the car!". The distance to the target was reduced (bearing-250 °) and amounted to 10 cables. The ship "Kapitan Soroka", en route to Odessa, continued to follow the actual course of 53 ° at a speed of 12 knots and did not take any actions to avoid a collision On the "Berezina" at 11 hours 55.5 minutes a new command followed: "Start to board!" "Berezina" in the area of ​​the hold in front of the aft superstructure. Both ships had a speed of about 12 knots and the bow of the ship literally turned the side, opening it like a tin can. The cable routes along the side were destroyed and a fire broke out on the "Berezina" R. It was quickly located and extinguished. The holds of the warship were filled with fuel, food and ammunition (including nuclear). Fortunately, the threat of the death of the ship from a huge hole and an explosion of ammunition with possible radioactive contamination of the area was avoided thanks to the selfless actions of the Berezina crew and the huge size of the ship. "Berezina" was forced to return to the Black Sea for repairs. The hole in the left side was covered with a large sheet of tarpaulin and the KKS returned safely to Sevastopol. After unloading the ammunition, the "Berezina" was sent for repairs to Odessa (at the expense of the culprit of the collision - ChMP MMF).

JULY 11, 1986

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The artillery boat was part of the Kerch-Feodosia base and performed the tasks of guarding combat training grounds and weapons testing areas. Being on patrol on July 11, 1986, he received an order from the operational duty officer of the base to urgently go beyond the border of the area: Cape Kiik-Atlama Cape Chauda. The boat weighed anchor at 19:05 and headed to the specified place at a twenty-knot speed. Visibility in the area of ​​the Feodosia Bay was at least 70 cable, sea state, wind speed (180°) - 5 m/sec. The commander of the boat, on the recommendation of the navigator, appointed a course of 310 °,4. The course made it possible to perform the maneuver in the shortest possible time, but passed near dangerous depths with an isobath of 5 m. The helmsman did not catch the exact numbers of the course, but did not rehearse, but kept the boat on a course of 3! In fact, the boat, taking into account the drift and the error of the magnetic compass, was on course 321.

The radar and echo sounder on the boat did not turn on due to the apparent simplicity of the situation. And at 19:20, the boat jumped on the right side onto the coastal shallows near Cape Chauda, ​​but managed to crawl off it and left the dangerous area.

COLLISION OF LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIPS

"NIKOLAEV" AND "STROGY" (TF) JULY 16, 1986 The basic data of the BPK "Nikolaev" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1134B".

The main data of the BOD "Strogiy" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "61".

A group of Soviet anti-submarine ships led by the BOD "Tallinn" carried out training tasks in the Sea of ​​Japan. On the beam of the terminal tank "Admiral Spiridonov" (project "1155"), a Japanese frigate followed the task of tracking the Soviet detachment at a distance of 9 cables to the right.

Visibility at sea was at least 50 cables, cloudiness - 9 points, sea state - 1 point, wind speed (110°) - 3 m/sec.

At 03:12, a command from the chief of staff of the brigade of anti-submarine ships followed from the flagship BOD "Tallinn": "All of a sudden turn to the right, on a course of 275 °." And a minute later, three ships began to circulate to the right, except for the Admiral Spiridonov, which was hindered by a Japanese frigate. When turning, the distance between BOD "Nikolaev" and "Strict" began to decrease from 16 to 14 cables and continued to decrease with a constant bearing of 276 °. The ships had a speed of 15 knots, and the Japanese frigate, following a parallel course of 97 ° at the same speed, turned out to be at 03:14 right along the course of the Strict BOD at a distance of 10 cables. The commander of the "Strict" gave the command at that time: "Both cars

Stop!", and a minute later: "Left aboard. Right car - small forward. Left - tovs back!" At 3 o'clock Japanese.

16 minutes and on the bridge of the "Japanese" FRURO realized the danger of a collision and accidents and disasters began a sharp circulation to the right. To prevent a collision with the "Japanese" on the BOD "Strogiy", at that moment they began an evasive maneuver to the left, giving the command: "Right car - forward middle! Left

Stop!" Watching the actions of the Japanese frigate, on the "Strogiy" they lost sight of the turn of the BOD "Nikolaev", which was controlled by the senior assistant commander of the ship. Seeing the dangerous maneuvering of his neighbors, at 3 hours 16 minutes he gave an erroneous command to turn to the left and ordered to wake up the commander of the ship, reporting to him about the dangerous situation and a sharp decrease in distance.At the same time, the watch officer gave the command to the rudder: "Left on board!" The commander of the "Nikolaev" who jumped out onto the bridge, at 3 hours 18 minutes, only managed to give the command: "Stop the car", -how a minute later the stem of the "Strict" crashed into the starboard side of the "Nikolaev" due to the inertia of the forward course (10 knots). crushed by 3-4 meters and due to the inertia of the forward course "Nikolaev" (9 knots) - broken off in pieces. base for repair.

Bulk of a small anti-submarine ship "MPK-108"

ON THE SHIP OF PHYSICAL FIELDS "SFP-511" (ChF) ON AUGUST 14, 1986 The main data of "MPK-108" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124M".

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Both ships, after passing factory and state tests, were intended for transfer to other fleets of the USSR. The ship of physical fields "SFP-511" stood on the outer roads of Sevastopol, having given up the stern and bow anchors. Sea state reached 3 points, wind speed (310°): 10 m/s, sea visibility - 70 cables. The small anti-submarine ship left the base at 12 knots and passed in close proximity on the port side of SFP-511. Having described the circulation to the right, they put the steering wheel on the MPK to the left and stopped both cars. Then, the commander of "MPK-108" gave the command: "Both cars back, small one. Steering wheel - straight ahead!" When the SFP was 160 meters, the left anchor was given to the MPK and the rudder was set to the left to reduce the drift of the ship. When the distance between the ships decreased to 70 meters, both cars were stopped on the IPC and the steering wheel was turned straight. A few minutes later, a throwing end was filed, but in the excitement it was immediately cut off. An attempt to extinguish the inertia of the reverse gear by delaying the anchor - chain and giving both slow-moving machines forward was not crowned with success. A wave threw the stern of a small anti-submarine ship onto the starboard side of the "SFP-511" and the ships received minor damage to the plating and railings.

Appendix to VMIO. Issue hib "J 59

THE SHIP OF THE PATROL SHIP

"SKR-40" (Black Sea Fleet) DECEMBER 27, 1986 The basic data of "SKR-40" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "159" project, but during the last major overhaul in Bulgaria, 2 RBU-2500 installations and one stern torpedo tube were left.

The patrol ship arrived at the outer roadstead of Poti from Varna and the chief of staff of the brigade gave preliminary permission to enter the base by 14.00. At 13:41, the commander of the ship, Captain Lieutenant Grushevsky, again requested permission from the operational duty officer of the base to enter and provide tugboats. At 14:25, the base OD informed the commander by radio that there would be no provision for entry by tugs due to stormy weather. The sea state by this time had reached 4-4 points, the wind speed (315°)

12 m/s, overrun direction

100°, sea visibility - 50 cables. The entrance channel to the port of Poti with a width of 100 meters has the smallest depths of 8.5 m, and with a width of 60 meters

10 m. The entrance to the port during northwestern winds is difficult and dangerous. And at 2:27 p.m., the commander of the guard sent a message to the base’s OD: “I will go in on my own, wait for the tugboats at the entrance.” Following a course of 120° at a speed of 12 knots, "SKR-40" began to turn right at 14:35 to a course of 156°. But within two minutes, strong wave blows and wind pressure to the starboard side of the guard received a dangerous roll of 50 ° and was turned on a course of 120 °, losing control. The commander of the ship gave the command: "Stop the car, small back, full back!" In the period from 2:38 p.m. to 2:40 p.m., he tried to keep the ship in the fairway from drifting aground to the left with the help of machines.

Two providing raid tugs - "Captain Rekvava" and "Captain Khirikov" could not help him because of the strong swell and low power. At 1440 hours, the patrol boat piled on the western milestone with its left side and the commander ordered the starboard anchor to be dropped. Immediately, the wind and waves began to turn the ship to the right. The commander of the ship ordered the navigator to go to the tank to receive the towing line from the Captain Rekvava, but he received a severe chest injury while trying to navigate and was hardly saved by the sailors. stern and from a blow overboard flew off the first officer, who was carried by the waves to the beach.

With difficulty, the sailors secured the towing line, but at 1447 hours the SKR-40 caught on the ground with a sonar radome and a minute later the towing line burst. At the same time, the anchor-chain burst and the ship was carried astern to the shore. At 14 hours 50 minutes, it hit the stern on a stone pier, was thrown back by the waves and five minutes later ran aground with the whole hull. Waves, wind and strong rolling pushed the ship more and more towards the shore. At 15:05, the "SKR-40" managed to drop the port anchor, and by 16:00 it was already firmly sitting on the coastal shallows. Many sailors were seriously injured, but there were no reports of human casualties. The senior on board the "SKR-40" - the chief of staff of the 82nd division of training ships - did not provide practical assistance to the commander of the SKR during the accident. The New Year's "gift" turned out to be inappropriate for the command of the KChF, and rescue operations were launched very quickly. Already at 15:30, a powerful tug "Nastorzhenny" was called, which arrived in Poti in an hour and a half. At 20:30, the tug "Muzhestvenny" arrived from Sukhumi. On the morning of the next day, they took off from Sevastopol and at 11:15 arrived at the command post of the 184th brigade of ships protecting the water area - Rear Admiral Rybak, captain 1st rank Zhbanov (head of the ASS KChF), captain 1st rank Barinov and captains 2nd rank Yankovsky and Sidorenko. And in 12 I () Accidents and catastrophes

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A small anti-submarine ship was re-mooring in the port of Feodosia. At sea, full visibility was noted, sea waves - 2 points, wind force (310 °) - 8 m / s. On the afternoon of August 14, 1975, the commander of MPK-43 received an order to re-moor, but did not think over the mooring maneuver and did not make any calculations. The ship was supposed to moor in the gap between the same type of MPK and the S-65 submarine, standing at the floating berth. On the "MPK-43" they gave up the left anchor and brought the aft nylon end to the wall. But the downwind MPK piled on the submarine "S-65" and in this situation the commander of the MPK was confused and hastily gave the order to retrieve the anchor.

In a hurry, he did not follow the stern end, and when hauling the anchor, it burst. When the "MPK-43" was moving along the hull of the "S-65" submarine, the right propeller was damaged and the outer skin was dented.

SHELL OF THE DESTROYER "Illuminated"

TO THE MILITARY TANKER "GOLDEN HORN"

SEPTEMBER 7, 1975

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The military tanker "Golden Horn" was anchored on September 7, 1975 in the area of ​​Chauda. Sea roughness reached 4 points, wind force (240 ") - up to 6 points, visibility - full. The commander of the destroyer "Illuminated" received.! The task is to approach the stern of the tanker and refuel. the commander of the "Ozarenny" did not do it and maneuvered "by eye" "The approach maneuver was unsuccessful and the destroyer turned out to be to the left of the tanker in the traverse distance. Accident and catastrophe of the clock at the command post was deployed to lead the rescue operations. On the same day, December 28, 1986, measurements were made around the ship and preparatory work was carried out to refloat the TFR.

By 10:15 pm, the largest fleet rescuer, Elbrus, arrived from Sevastopol. At 10 am on December 29, work began on removing the patrol boat from the shallows: the fire boat "PZhK-67" pumped out water from the flooded compartments and departed for the port at 12:30 pm. Two landing craft "DKA and DKA-237" approached the starboard side and landed a group of rescuers on the ship. By 21:30, while trying to refloat the TFR, the towing line broke off again and the guard was stuck on the edge of the canal heading 69 °. No water filtration was observed. At 0230 hours, rescue tugs SB-922 and SB-4, a marine grader MGR-229600 and a dredger MDS-9, as well as a refull truck Kodor arrived in Poti. By 6 o'clock in the morning on December 30, 1986, the SKR-40 managed to get a steel cable from the tug "Muzhestvenny". At 100 o'clock in the morning "Muzhestvenny" began the operation of pulling the guard from the edge of the canal. Visibility at sea - 40 cables, sea waves - 2-3 points, southwestern wind speed - 8 m / s. Within an hour, "SKR-40" managed to be refloated and towed to the port for repairs. "

BULK ON THE BERTH OF A LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIP

"ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" (SF) APRIL 22, 1987 The main data of the BOD correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1134A".

BOD "Admiral Nakhimov" was returning from the sea to the Severomorsk base after working out the tasks of combat training, having one boiler in operation in each echelon. There was a high tide ("full water"), sea waves - 1 point, wind speed (310 °) - 5 m / s, current speed - 0.2 knots, visibility - up to 10 miles.

Having a course of 6 knots, "Admiral Nakhimov" lay down on a course of 140 ° with an estimated angle of approach to the berth of 8 °.

At 1209 hours the navigator discovered a drift to the right at a distance of 8.5 cables to the berth. The ship's commander neglected the navigator's report, but receiving continuous reports from the navigator about the demolition to the pier, he began to doubt the safety of the approach. At 12 hours 12 minutes - the distance to the pier was reduced and the commander shifted the steering wheel "to the left-15 °", "Both cars - tovs!" At 12:14 he reported to the chief of staff of the brigade about his doubts and stopped the move. The distance to the berth was less than two cable lengths and the angle of approach decreased to 4°. The chief of staff, comfortably seated on the couch, did not approve the decision to withdraw. And at 12 hours and 18 minutes, the Admiral Nakhimov BOD, on a course of 131 ° and a forward speed of about 2 knots, piled on the right side of the end of the floating berth. As a result of the bulk, the ship received a hole measuring 8.2 x 0.76 m above the waterline with a break in six frames, demagnetization windings, cable routes BCH-2 and RTS.

COLLISION OF SMALL ANTI-SUB-SHIP "MPK-41"

WITH THE BORDER PATROL SHIP "PSKR-803" (TF) SEPTEMBER 8, 1988 The main data of "MPK-41" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1124".

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The small anti-submarine ship "MPKs sh 0 DTR 41" together with the "MPK-117" performed the task of the K-ts of Turkmenistan "Lazo" of the close anti-submarine guard of the landing "Zealous" detachment (DESO) during the test tactical ^ ^ o "MPK-117" There was full night visibility, cloudiness - 10 points, sea state - 2 points, wind speed (80 °) - 7 m / s. There was no information on the border patrol ship "PSKR-803", which was carrying out the task of protecting the state border of the USSR about the place and actions of the forces participating in the exercise. The watchman maneuvered with the running lights off at a speed of 27 knots and tried to visually identify the ships. After visual identification with the searchlight of the two patrol ships "Zealy" and "Proud" at a distance of 1 cable, the commander " PSKR-803 "decreased speed to 15 knots and lay down on the reverse course of 90 °. This course was led by a guard towards the landing detachment. Meanwhile, "MPK-41" at 3 hours 06 minutes lay down on a course of 0 ° to check the hydroacoustic contact, which turned out to be false and at 03:22, she began to turn left on a course of 225 ° to take her position in the order, having a course of 14 knots. At 3 hours 46 minutes "MPK-41" turned to the right on a course of 270 ° and after 3 minutes the MPK commander visually detected the silhouette of the ship along the surf near the bow on the opposite course and 30 seconds before the collision managed to command: "Right to board!", And the brigade commander standing nearby, after a few seconds, made his contribution, commanding: "Left aboard!". On the border ship they also found an oncoming silhouette of the MPK at a distance of at least 400 meters, and the signalman of the PSKR only managed to shout at the GKP: "Right rudder!" The ships collided and "PSKR-803" inflicted a sliding blow with the bow on the port side of the "MPK-41" near the torpedo tube. Both ships received significant damage to their hulls and were out of action for a long time.

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wind speed (250") - 10 m / s. Having recognized the target in the light of the spotlight right on the bow, like a fishing vessel, the commander of the "SKR-86" illiterately turned to the left at 19:00. Three minutes later, the guard on the forward momentum 7 - 8 knots (on heading 107) hit the trawler with a stem. The blow fell on the port side of the SRTM "KI-8067" at an angle of 95 ° in the engine room, 1.5 meters above the waterline. On the guard, the stem was deformed in the region of 3 - 20 frames The rescue tug "SB-6" that arrived at the scene of the accident began towing the damaged trawler, but at 03:33 on December 9, 1988, the SRTM "KI-8067" sank at a depth of 98 meters at a distance of 28 miles from the coast.

Note: it should be noted that the captain of the trawler did not react to the signals given by the guard and continued to follow the same course and speed, which can only be explained by the alcohol intoxication of the trawler crew. Constant and rampant drunkenness on domestic small and medium-sized fishing vessels is the cause of many accidents and deaths at sea.

COLLISION OF BORDER PATROL BOAT "P-514"

WITH A TRANSPORT VESSEL OF THE "VOLGO-BALT" TYPE IN 1988 The main data of the P-514 PSK correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1400" ("Vulture").

In 1988, the border patrol boat "P-514", which is part of the 18th separate brigade of border ships (Odessa), carried out patrol service at sea and, in order to evade the storm, entered the Belgorod-Dniester port area near the western bank of the Dniester firth. When maneuvering in the area of ​​the Southern bucket between the Wide and Northern piers, it was crushed by a river transport vessel of the Volgo-Balt type. The blow of the bow of the Volgo-Balt fell in the middle of the hull and the border boat was forced to throw itself onto the coastal shallows to prevent flooding. Later it was refloated, but not restored, and after repairs it was sold to a private firm in Mariupol (in 1990). Note: The description of the navigation accident is based on an eyewitness account. The exact date of the accident has not been established by the authors.

TOUCHING THE GROUND BY THE R-334 (BF) ROCKET BOAT ON NOVEMBER 28, 1989 The main data of the "R-334" correspond to the performance characteristics of the "1241.1" project with the replacement of missiles with new missiles "Moskit".

The missile boat left the port of Lomonosov at 11:07 am on November 28, 1989 for its first exit to perform the first stage of factory sea trials. At 2:16 p.m., a tugboat was handed over and maneuvering began in the area of ​​the Leningrad receiving buoy to test the machines. At 17:00, the boat commander determined the place and, with the permission of the chief of staff, left the wheelhouse to bypass the boat. At 17:14, a slow move forward was made and negotiations on the UWC were started with the support vessel, which was in the remote annex to the WSIS. The release of hib "J 63 pin 59 cable. At 17 hours 15 minutes, the navigator of the boat determined the place by visual bearings and the shortest distance to the coast. There was full night visibility, sea state - 1 point, west wind speed - 3 - 5 m / s. the helmsman inattentively kept watch on the rudder and until 17:25 the boat circulated uncontrollably to the right, and the speed of the boat was increased to 14 knots. told him that he was watching the searchlight of the ship. But it was the fire of the Krasnaya Gorka lighthouse. The helmsman was ordered to steer on fire. At 17 hours 25 minutes, the navigator of the boat again tried to determine the place by visual bearings, but did not take an interest in the direction of the boat, and because of ignorance navigation area was unable to plot the reading of the bearings.At 17 hours 35 minutes the boat commander finished his round and arrived at the wheelhouse, but at the control the boat did not intervene, did not demand a course report and did not specify the situation. And at 17 hours 42 minutes the boat "R-334" touched the sandy ground at 12 knots. As a result of the incident, both screws and the bracket of the left shaft line were damaged by pebbles. After dock repairs and new tests, the boat was transferred to the Black Sea via inland routes.

GROUND TOUCH BY ARTILLERY BOAT "AKA-312"

DECEMBER 13, 1989 The main data of "AKA-312" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "205P".

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COLLISION BOD "MARSHAL VOROSHILOV"

WITH TRANSPORT REFRIGERATOR "Highlander"

ON THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 19 TO 20, 1990, the Marshal Voroshilov (project 1134A), under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V. Katasonov, returned to the base after completing combat training tasks and received permission from the operational duty officer to anchor in Patrokl Bay. At 23:45, a training alert was announced on the ship, and ten minutes later all combat posts and command posts reported to the bridge that they were ready to pass the narrowness (the Eastern Bosphorus Strait). The BOD followed a course of 300 degrees at a speed of 14 knots and at 00 hours 01 minutes it found three targets on the radar screen right on the course. By changing course to starboard by 5 degrees, the ship reduced its speed to 8 knots. At 0007 hours "Marshal Voroshilov" parted with the port side of the icebreaker "Kyiv" at a distance of 2.5 cables. Switching to monitor target No. 3 ("Highlander"), we calculated its course (120 °) and speed (7-8 knots). But after 2 minutes, they found that target #3 abruptly changed course #1 crosses the path of the BOD right in front of the nose. At 0009 hours, the commander of the ship gave the order: "Stop the car!", "Machine back medium" and "Machine back full." A minute later, the stem of the BOD cut into the bow of the Highlander refrigerator and cut the starboard side of the vessel, making a hole 8 x 9 meters in size. After 1-2 minutes, the colliding ship and the vessel dispersed. The BOD escaped with a crumpled stem and a hull crack 2 meters above the waterline. There are no victims.

Bulk of large anti-submarine ship "Kerch"

ON THE BERTH ON MARCH 1, 1993 The basic data of the BPC "Kerch" correspond to the performance characteristics. project "1134B".

When the BOD "Kerch" returned from the sea after completing the training task, he was given a new task of demonstrative mooring to the berth astern. The ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank A. Demidenko, in the presence of senior officials, decided not to lose face. But reckless maneuvering and extremely weak skills in managing the ship led to the fact that the demonstrative mooring failed. On the outstanding inertia of the reverse course, the BOD "Kerch" crashed into berth No. 14 with a roar. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but the Vega, towed by the MG-325 sonar, was crushed and destroyed by a blow against a concrete pier. The aft end of the "Kerch" turned into a kind of "accordion" and the ship was urgently towed to the bucket of the Sevmorzavod for emergency repairs. The shock work of the Sevastopol workers in less than two weeks made it possible to completely restore the ship and the Kerch was able to put to sea again.

DANGEROUS MANEUVERING OF A SMALL MISSILE SHIP

"SHTIL" WHEN TOWING ON MARCH 2, 1995 The main data of RTO "Shtil" correspond to the performance characteristics of the project "1234.1".

Small missile ship "Shtil" (until March 18, 1992 - "Komsomolets of Mordovia") completed the average factory repair at the Balaklava ship repair plant and received the task of moving to a permanent base in Sevastopol. On the morning of March 2, 1995, the tugboat "BUK-874" approached the board of the RTO to ensure its withdrawal from the Balaklava Bay. Visibility at sea exceeded 50 cables, waves - about 3 points, wind speed - 10 m/sec. After the return of the mooring lines and the winding of the stern towing cable, "BUK-874" dragged the RTO to the exit from the bay. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, the tugboat brought the ship to the exit fairway stern forward and with difficulty began to overcome the oncoming waves. The low power of the tugboat and strong gusts of wind led to the fact that the towing speed dropped to almost zero and the ships began to be blown onto nearby rocks. The commander of the "Calm" gave an uncalculated command: "Average move back. Give up the stern tug." Not in tow Annex to WSIS. The release of hib "J 65 managed to give up, as the RTO began to pick up speed. The tugboat turned lag to the wave and almost turned over from the impact of the wave on board. The sailors in tow and Shtil managed to cut off the cable and free the tugboat in a matter of moments, who hastily returned to Balaklava.

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about 200 meters. Instead of repeating the approach, the destroyer commander decided to turn to the right with the help of machines, working them in discord. The division commander, who was on board the destroyer, did not stop the erroneous actions of his subordinate and stared blankly at what was happening.

"Illuminated" was quickly blown away by the wind and the operation of the machines at low speed turned out to be inefficient. A few minutes later, the destroyer hit the bow of the tanker with force. As a result of the bulk, the bow end was dented on the "Ozarenny" and the guard rails were demolished from the starboard side, and the outer skin above the waterline was damaged on the tanker.

DANGEROUS MANEUVERING BOD "ACTIVE"

AND VTK "MEZEN" (Black Sea Fleet) OCTOBER 24, 1975

Basic data of BOD "Active" (project "1135", "Krivak-1" class):

(see TTD BOD "Smashing" in bulk 19.3.75g)

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Navigation accident. The large anti-submarine ship "Active" and the military transport "Mezen" took place in the roadstead of Streletskaya Bay in good weather and full night visibility.

BOD "Active" conducted tests of hydroacoustic stations, maneuvering on Inkerman sites. These tests were not planned for her, and in addition, the ship illegally raised the signals "vessel unable to give way", which did not comply with rule "4E" of the ship collision avoidance rules - (PPSS-60). On the opposite course south of the Inkerman ranges, the Mezen transport followed, on which they did not make out the signal raised by the "Active". At 04:32, the transport began to turn sharply to the left to enter Streletskaya Bay. The maneuver crossing the course of the "Active" was carried out suddenly and without preliminary turn signals. The distance between the ships was about 10 cables. The commander of the BOD, having discovered the sudden turn of the Mezen, was forced to work out the machines "Stop!", And then - "Full speed back!", The measures he took allowed him to avoid a collision and skip the "Mezen" on the nose at a distance of less than 4 cables.

TOUCHING THE GROUND BY THE PATROL SHIP "IRKUTSKY"

KOMSOMOLETS "(TF) IN 1975

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Patrol ship get;! the task of removing from the shore the L I CH N Y Y composition of the correction post g, in the area of ​​​​Cape Uspenie. The duties of the temporarily absent commander of the ship were performed by the chief of staff of the division. The estimated anchorage point, approved in advance, was between isobaths is 5 and 10 meters. At 19 hours 25 minutes, the commander "BCh-1" reported on the need to turn from course 255 "to course 0" and a minute later the ship arrived at the estimated parking point. The chief of staff ignored the reports of the navigator and the guard passed the isobath of 5 meters, anchoring five hundred meters from the shore.

The safety of the anchorage was not ensured. Having accepted the personnel of the correspondent post, the patrol ship weighed anchor at 20:38, circulating at low speed to the right. The navigator again, before shooting from anchor, offered to leave the parking lot in reverse to the isobath of 5 meters and already there to make a turn of the ship. But his recommendations were ignored and the ship began to turn to the right at low speed forward. At 2039 hours, the Irkutsk Komsomolets touched pitfalls and damaged the fairing of the Pegasus-2 hydroacoustic station and both propellers.

Note: the exact date of the navigation accident has not been established. The hydrometeorological situation at the time of the accident was: visibility 150 cables, sea state - 1 point, wind force (170 degrees) - 3 m/sec.

COLLISION OF THE PATROL SHIP "SKR-92" (TF) WITH THE FISHING TRAWLER "POET" IN 1975

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The patrol ship performed patrol functions in the area of ​​exercises and combat firing of the fleet. On the ship was also the acting brigade commander with his headquarters. The commander of "SKR-92" received an order from the operational duty officer of the base to identify and withdraw an unidentified vessel from the area dangerous for navigation. The watchman started moving. There was full night visibility, sea waves reached 4 points, wind speed (318 ") - 18 msec. At 3 hours 20 minutes, "SKR-92" detected an unidentified ship on the radar screen and began approaching, calling the ship via VHF. On an unidentified ship , and it turned out to be the Poet MRI, the VHF station was switched on on a different frequency and the calls were not accepted. At 4 hours 25 minutes, three red rockets were fired from the patrol ship, sailing on a course of 170 "at a speed of 13 knots, and the MRI turned around a few minutes later on reverse course. In the period from 4 hours 30 minutes to 4 hours 36 minutes on the guard came close to the intruder and visually identified him. The trawler left the dangerous area at a ten-knot speed and from a distance of 50-60 meters, the acting brigade commander sent an order to the trawler to leave the area into an electric megaphone. After that, he ordered the commander of the TFR to turn to the right and follow to the designated area, and he went down to the navigation cabin. At 4 hours 39 minutes the MRI "Poet" began to circulate to the left, laying down on a heading of 250 ° and a minute later, "SKR-92" began to turn to the right on a heading of 217", having a course of 12 knots. With the beginning of these maneuvers, no observation of the relative position was As a result, at the end of the circulation, "SKR-92" dangerously approached the trawler and at 4 hours 44.5 minutes struck it with a sliding blow with the stem.

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COLLISION OF THE MT-56 MAIN MINING SHIP WITH THE MOTOR SHIP

IVAN TURGENEV "(MMF USSR) IN 1975 A navigation accident (accident) occurred at full night visibility, wind (90) - I m / s, sea-calm. Sea minesweeper "MT-56" (project "254") received from the operational duty brigade of the OVR was ordered to escort the Ozernoye tanker, although such a task was not previously set by the combat training plan. The minesweeper was temporarily commanded by the division chief of staff, who replaced the commander who had gone on vacation. "Ozernoe", "MT-92" (project "254") and the ship "Kostroma". At 19 hours 16 minutes the convoy was traveling at a speed of 8.3 knots in the waters of Avacha Bay and the head minesweeper detected the radar directly on the course at a distance of 40 cable The on-duty duty officer of the OVR was not informed in time about the conduct of an accidental and unplanned piloting exercise, and he authorized the exit from the base of the I. Turgenev ship. I failed to detect the minesweeper in a timely manner and, while watching the tanker "Ozernoye", made the wrong decision to diverge from the tanker with a lapel to the left of the OSB fairway. At this time, "MTN 56" visually distinguished the lights of the vessel going towards it, and at 19 hours 30 minutes it reduced its speed to a small one, turning to the right on course 346. a number of commands: "Right to board!", "Left to board1", "Stop left!". At 19 hours" 35 minutes, the motor ship "Ivan Turgenev" hit the stem of the "MT-56" on the port side. A hole was formed in the borg above the waterline with a size of 0.8x1.0 square meters, cable routes along the side were damaged. The commanding officer arbitrarily left the emergency ship and went to the base on another ridge.

GROUNDING OF MEDIUM LANDING SHIP "SDK-110"

MARCH 16, 1976

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Three medium landing ships were returning after exercises to the Crimean naval base. There was thick fog on the sea, visibility was zero, sea waves were 1 point, wind speed (90 °) was up to 4 m / s.

The commander of the landing craft brigade, who was on the lead KFOR, made an unreasonable decision to enter the base in the fog in a wake formation with a distance between the ships of 80 meters. The speed of movement was determined at 6 knots. The organization of the passage by the entrance channel in difficult weather conditions was not provided and information was not kept about the relative position of the ships. At 01:15, the lead ship passed through the canal, but SDK-110, which was third in line, lost its bearings. The poor organization of the work of the GKP and control over the position of the ship "by eye" on the radar screen led to the fact that "SDK-110" at 01:31 a.m. first went beyond the left edge of the fairway. Three minutes later, buoy No. 26 was detected from the starboard side, limiting the left edge of the inlet channel. The commander ordered the rudder to be put "starboard" and changed the course from 55° to a course of 90°. Two minutes later, the SDK crossed the six-meter isobath and at 01:38 o'clock ran aground at the boom gate, going beyond the right edge of the drip. Due to the sandy soil, there was no damage to the hull and the next day the ship was safely refloated.

Viktor ZAIBERT Director of the Scientific Center for Archeology and Cultural Genesis of the Academy "Kokshe", Professor of Archeology, Doctor of History, Kokshetau Introduction: "The physical life of ancient cultures is deposited in archaeologists ..." 25 tasks. Part 1 contains 19 tasks, part 2 contains 6 tasks. To perform training work on the history of ... "LITERARY MONUMENT" Weave at least a small twig into that wreath of Glory with which St. Demetrius is crowned, add new features to his attractive , from childhood to a familiar image, ... ""SG-trans" "SG-trans" history since 1959 Main activities Provision of services for the transportation, sale and storage of liquefied gases Ge ... "EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION IN THE SYSTEM OF CULTUROLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE L. I. Zelisko Prykarpatsky National University... "of Culture PhD applicant of the Theory of St. Petersburg University and History of Culture Department, Culture and Art..." on its shore, the Koblin sedo is located. Now Koblin is insignificant ... "M.G., Korolev ... "

Patrol ships of projects 1135 and 1135M - 32 + 1 units.

A successful project of a gas turbine TFR capable of operating in the sea zone. Code name - "Petrel". Until 28/6/1977, all ships under construction and commissioned belonged to the BOD class. For the first time, powerful anti-submarine weapons, including the Metel PLRK, were placed on a domestic ship of a relatively small displacement. 11 ships (marked with * in the list) were built according to the improved project 1135: they replaced the 76-mm guns with single-barreled 100-mm guns, and also installed a more powerful sonar, which led to an increase in displacement by 140 tons. In the late 1980s . TFRs "Light", "Flying" and "Ardent" were modernized according to project 11352: they installed new radars "Fregat", and instead of RBU-6000 - frames for quad packages of anti-ship missiles "Uranus". True, due to insufficient funding, the latter were never received, and both ships still sail without missiles to this day.

"VIGILANT"(plant No. 151). On July 21, 1968, it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad and on December 20, 1968 it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on March 28, 1970, commissioned on December 31, 1970, and on February 20, 1971 included in the DCBF. 14.6-29.7.1972, while in the war zone while performing combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, he performed the task of assisting the armed forces of Egypt and Syria. 5 - 9.10.1973 and 20 - 24.7.1974 paid visits to Gdynia (Poland), 4-9.1.1979 and 5 - 9.10.1989 - to Rostock (GDR), 19-27.7.1980 - to Szczecin (Poland), 15 -21.4.1981 - to Havana (Cuba) and 15-20.6.1991 - to Amsterdam (Netherlands). In 1987 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG), and in 1988 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG). In June 1993, he participated in the exercises of the NATO countries "Baltops-93" in the Baltic Sea. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. On July 31, 1996, he was excluded from the Navy in connection with the surrender to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. On July 1, 1997, it was disbanded and at the end of 1997 was sold to a company from the Virgin Islands for cutting into metal.

"Peppy"(plant No. 152). 12/20/1968 was added to the lists of the Navy ships and 1/15/1969 was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on 4/28/1971, commissioned on 12/31/1971 and 14/2/1972 included in the DCBF. 14.6-29.7.1972, while in the war zone while performing combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, he performed the task of assisting the armed forces of Egypt and Syria. 10/31/1974 was awarded the pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense "For courage and military prowess". 27.6 - 1.7.1975 paid a visit to Gdynia (Poland), 7-10.8.1981 - to Helsinki (Finland), 12 - 18.6.1982 - to Luanda (Angola), 25.6 - 2.7.1982 - to Lagos (Nigeria) and 5 - 10/8/1984 - to Rostock (GDR). In 1988 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 17/7/1997 excluded from the Navy in connection with the surrender to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1997 disbanded.

"WORTHY"(plant No. 11). 11/8/1969 laid down on the slipway of the shipyard "Zaliv" in Kerch and 5/2/1971 enrolled in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on 8/5/1971, entered service on 12/31/1971 and 28/4/1972 after the inter-fleet transition from Sevastopol to Severomorsk included in the KSF . On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 30/6/1993 expelled from the Navy in connection with the surrender to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1993 disbanded.

"FEROCIOUS"(plant No. 153). On June 15, 1970, it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad and on October 20, 1970 it was added to the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on January 27, 1971, commissioned on December 29, 1972 and included in the DCBF on January 31, 1973. 20-24.7.1974 and 19-23.7.1984 paid visits to Gdynia (Poland), 22-27.8.1976 and 15-21.4.1981 - to Havana (Cuba), 5-10.10.1978 - to Rostock (GDR). 26-30.5.1983 - to the port of Tunis (Tunisia) and 11 - 15.6.1984 - to Helsinki (Finland). In 1987 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG), and in 1988 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 30/6/1993 expelled from the Navy in connection with the surrender to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. On December 31, 1993, it was disbanded and in 1994 sold to an English company for cutting into metal.

"STRONG"(plant No. 154). 10/20/1970 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 15/3/1971 was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, launched on 29/8/1972, entered service on 30/6/1973 and 16/7/1973 included in the DCBF. 5-9.10.1973 and 27.6-1.7.1975 paid visits to Gdynia (Poland), 22-27.8.1976 and 11-15.10.1985 - to Havana (Cuba), 10-14.10.1988 - to Praia (Cape Verde) and 5 - 9.10.1989 - to Rostock (GDR). In 1978 and 1983 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 28.3-4.4.1984 participated in the operational KShU of the Navy "Atlantika-84". On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Since 12.3.1990 it was at the Baltic Shipyard for overhaul, but on 30.6.1994 due to lack of funding it was expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. On September 1, 1994, it was disbanded and in 1994-1995 at the Yantar shipyard it was cut into metal.

"VALIANT"(plant No. 12). 11/30/1970 was laid down on the shipyard "Zaliv" in Kerch and 5/2/1971 was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on 22/2/1973, entered service on 12/28/1973 and 17/2/1974 after the inter-fleet transition from Sevastopol to Severomorsk, included in the KSF . In 1979 he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Since 19.6.1991 it was at SRZ-35 (“Sevmorput”) in Murmansk for a major overhaul, but on 3.7.1992 due to lack of funding it was expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. On 10/1/1993 it was disbanded and on 18/7/1995 it was sold to an intermediary company in the USA for cutting into metal.

"WATCHMAN"(plant No. 155). 10/20/1970 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 20/7/1972 was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, launched on 3/21/1973, entered into operation on 12/30/1973 and 12/7/1974 included in the DCBF. On November 8, 1975, an attempt was made by a part of the crew to protest against the policy of the authorities in order to attract the attention of the world community *. 11/10/1975 transferred to the KamFlRS KTOF and at the beginning of 1976 made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. 5 - 9.10.1974 paid a visit to Rostock (GDR). 10-15.9.1980 made a business call in Massawa (Ethiopia). In 1981, 1982 and 1983 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). From April 21, 1987 to November 14, 1994, a major overhaul was carried out at Dalzavod in Vladivostok.

"REASONABLE"(plant No. 156). On March 28, 1972, it was added to the lists of the Navy ships and on June 26, 1972 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on July 20, 1973, commissioned on September 30, 1974, and included in the DCBF on November 15, 1974. In the summer of 1975, he made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and on 11/6/1975 was transferred to the KamFlRS KTOF. 15-24.8.1978 paid a visit to Aden (South Yemen). In 1981, 1983 and 1986 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. On March 16, 1998, he was expelled from the Navy in connection with the surrender to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 1.5.1998 disbanded and in b. Zavoyko (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky) was laid up.

"SMASHING"(manufacturer No. 157), 28.3.1972 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 28.9.1972 was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard Yantar in Kaliningrad, launched 22.7.1974, entered service 12.30.1974 and 14.2.1975 after the inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Vladivostok is included in the KTOF. 10-17.11.1976 paid a visit to Port Louis (Mauritius) and 10-14.10.1981 to Da Nang (Vietnam). From November 1981 to April 1983 at the "Dalza-voda" them. The 50th anniversary of the USSR in Vladivostok underwent an average repair. On 11/17/1983, while on combat duty in the northern part of the Arabian Sea, it collided with the US Navy destroyer Ra!t, as a result of which it received minor damage to the hull. In 1984 he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 10/29/1992 was excluded from the Navy in connection with the surrender to the OFI for disarmament, dismantling and sale, 12/31/1992 disbanded and 10/6/1994 sold to a South Korean company for cutting into metal.

“FRIENDLY”(plant No. 158). On 06/04/1973, it was added to the lists of the Navy ships and on 10/12/1973 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on 01/22/1975, commissioned on 09/30/1975 and 10/25/1975 included in the DCBF. 25-30.8.1978 paid a visit to Gothenburg (Sweden), 4-9.10.1979 and 9-14.8.1982- to Rostock (GDR), 7-10.8.1981 - to Helsinki (Finland), 26-30.5.1983 - in port of Tunis and 1 - 5.6.1993 - to Cadiz (Spain). In 1981 and 1998 won the prizes of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG), and in 1998 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 28.3 - 4.4.1984 participated in the operational KShU of the Navy "Atlantika-84". From 1.7.1988 to 21.1.1992, a major overhaul was carried out at the Yantar Baltic Shipyard. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. In September-October 1994, he participated in the joint exercises of the Naval Forces of the NATO countries “Koorega11u-94”.

"ACTIVE"(plant No. 13). On March 28, 1972, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on June 21, 1972 it was laid down on the slipway of the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch, launched on April 5, 1975, entered into operation on December 25, 1975, and on February 19, 1976 it was included in the KChF. 30.6 - 4.7.1977 paid a visit to the port of Tunis, 25 - 30.7.1981 - to Tripoli (Libya) and 11 - 15.8.1989 - to Varna (Bulgaria). In 1978 and 1988 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). Since 1991, he was at SRZ-91 (Sevastopol) for overhaul, but on 10/7/1995, due to lack of funding, he was expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. On 10/1/1995 it was disbanded and on 6/4/1997 it was taken by the tugboat "Future" to Turkey for cutting into metal.

"SQUID"(plant No. 152)*. 06/04/1973 enrolled in the lists of ships of the Navy and 12/10/1973 was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, launched on 05/30/1975, entered service on 12/30/1975 and 19/2/1976 after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk was included in the KSF. In 1979, 1985, 1994 and 1995 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 7 - 11.9.1982 paid a visit to Puerte Noire (People's Republic of the Congo), 2 - 10.12.1982 - to Havana (Cuba) and 14-18.5.1993 - to Tromsø (Norway). From December 6, 1989 to August 6, 1992, the SRZ-35 (“Sevmorput”) in Murmansk underwent a major overhaul. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.

"HOT"(plant No. 711). 10/6/1973 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 16/4/1974 was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanova in Leningrad, launched on 11/3/1975, entered service on 6/29/1976 and 8/11/1976 after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk, it was included in the KSF. 07/12/1983 during the passage of a major overhaul at the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanova in Leningrad burned out badly due to a fire that arose as a result of the fire of rags and fuel in the aft engine room. 5 - 22.6.1991 participated in the search anti-submarine operation of the Northern Fleet in the North-East Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. From May 25, 1993 to 1996, the SRZ-35 (“Sevmorput”) in Murmansk underwent a medium repair. In 1996, he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG).

"CUTTING"(plant No. 160). On April 5, 1974, it was included in the lists of the Navy ships and on July 28, 1974 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on February 17, 1976, commissioned on September 30, 1976 and included in the DCBF on November 1, 1976. In the winter of 1977, he made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Vladivostok and on 2/2/1977 was transferred to the KTOF. In 1980, he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 16-21.12.1977 paid a visit to Bombay (India), 16-20.2.1984 - to Massawa (Ethiopia) and 22-26.5.1984 - to Port Louis (Mauritius). 17-21.5.1987 participated in the displacement of the US Navy URO "AgKapzab" from the territorial waters of the USSR. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 08/04/1995 expelled from the Navy in connection with the surrender to the OFI for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1995 disbanded and 7/9/1996 sold to a South Korean company for cutting into metal.

"Zealous"(plant No. 712). 10/6/1973 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 12/6/1976 was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanov in Leningrad, launched on 14/8/1976, entered service on 12/28/1976 and 5/2/1977 after the inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, it was included in the KamFlRS KTOF. 10/30/1978 participated in the search for the US Air Force "Opop" aircraft and its crew, which crashed into the sea off the coast of Kamchatka. In 1980, 1986 and 1992 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 08/04/1995 expelled from the Navy in connection with the surrender to the OFI for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1995 disbanded and 7/9/1996 sold to a South Korean company for cutting into metal.

"STRIKING"(plant No. 161)*. 5/6/1974 was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and 11/2/1975 was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, launched on 1/7/1976, entered service on 12/31/1976 and 5/2/1977 after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Sevastopol was included in the KChF. 25 - 30.7.1981 paid a visit to Tripoli (Libya), 28.12.1984-2.1.1985 - to Havana (Cuba) and 24-28.4.1989 - to Constanta (Romania). 14/7/1997 disbanded, 1/8/1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and renamed "Sevastopol" (II 132). September 8, 1997 expelled from the Russian Navy.

"LENINGRAD KOMSOMOLETs", from 15.2.1992 - “Light” (plant No. 713). 22/4/1974 was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard im. A.A. Zhdanov in Leningrad and on May 8, 1974, was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on April 1, 1977, entered service on September 29, 1977 and November 29, 1977, after the inter-naval transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk, it was included in the KSF. In 1979, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). From 10/27/1988 to 1/22/1991, the SRZ-35 (“Sevmorput”) in Murmansk was modernized according to project 11352 and overhauled. 23 - 26.3.1994 participated in joint exercises with the Norwegian and British Navy ships "Rotog-94" in the Norwegian Sea. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 12 - 16.7.1993 paid a visit to Istanbul (Turkey) with the Navy Commander on board and 24 - 25.10.1994 - to Kirkenes (Norway).

"THREAKING"(plant No. 162)*. On May 4, 1975, it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, and on May 7, 1975 it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on February 7, 1977, commissioned on September 30, 1977, and included in the KTOF on November 29, 1977. In 1978, he made an inter-fleet passage from Baltiysk to the Black Sea, and from February 24 to July 3, 1979, he sailed around Africa from Sevastopol to Vladivostok, making business calls to Luanda (Angola), Maputo (Mozambique) and Port Louis (Mauritius). ). In 1980 he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG). 9-13.6.1983 paid a visit to Colombo (Sri Lanka). From 14.3.1990 was part of the SakhFlRS KTOF. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. From 18/8/1992 it was at Dalzavod in Vladivostok for a major overhaul, but on 13/2/1995 due to lack of funding it was expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1995 disbanded and in 1997 sold to an American intermediary company for cutting into metal.

"INDOMITABLE", from 11/2/1987 to 3/27/1990 - "Komsomolets of Lithuania" (plant No. 163). On May 7, 1975, it was included in the lists of the Navy ships and on January 22, 1976 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on September 7, 1977, commissioned on December 30, 1977 and included in the DCBF on February 17, 1978. 5-10.1978 and 7-11.10.1985 paid visits to Rostock (GDR). 12 - 18.6.1982 - to Luanda (Angola), 25.6-2.7.1982 - to Lagos (Nigeria), 26 - 30.5.1985 - to Gdynia (Poland), 5 - 8.6.1990 - to Kiel (Germany), 21 - 23.6.1990 - to Szczecin (Poland), 2-6.9.1991 - to Amsterdam and 23-25.4.1997 - to Rotterdam (Netherlands). In 1981, 1984, 1998 and 1999 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for artillery preparation, in 1981 and 1988. - prizes of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG), in 1983 and 1998 - prizes of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.

“SELFLESS”(plant No. 14). On 06/04/1973, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on 05/28/1976 it was laid down on the slipway of the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch, launched on 05/07/1977, commissioned on 12/30/1977 and 02/17/1978 included in the KChF, on 10 - 08/13/1979 struck visit to Varna (Bulgaria) and 26 - 31.3.1987 - to Istanbul (Turkey). On February 12, 1988, the US Navy URO “VogMo \ l / n” entered the territorial waters of the USSR off the coast of Crimea. In 1988 he won the prize of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 14/7/1997 disbanded, 1/8/1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and renamed "Dtpropetrovsk" (and 134). September 8, 1997 expelled from the Russian Navy.

"VOLATILE"(plant No. 714). On 05/07/1975 it was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and on 03/09/1977 it was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanova in Leningrad, launched on 19/3/1978, entered service on 10/8/1978 and 20/9/1978 after the inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, it was included in the KamFlRS KTOF. 13-17.12.1981 paid a visit to Maputo (Mozambique) and in December 1981 made a business call to Victoria (Seychelles). In the period from May 1987 to October 1991, it was modernized at Dalzavod in Vladivostok under project 11352. In 1992 and 1999 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG).

"LOUD"(plant No. 164)*. On April 14, 1976, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on June 23, 1976 it was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard Yantar in Kaliningrad, launched on April 11, 1978, entered service on September 30, 1978 and November 23, 1978, after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk, it was included in the KSF. In 1980 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for artillery preparation (as part of the KUG), and in 1987 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). 26 - 30.8.1991 participated in the escort of the convoy "Der-vish-91" from the Kola Bay. to Arkhangelsk, dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the start of the movement of allied convoys. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. From 04/06/1993 he was at SRZ-35 ("Sevmorput") in Murmansk and from 12/27/1996 - at SRZ-10 ("Shkval") in Pala Bay (Polyarny) for overhaul, but on 03/16/1998 due to lack of funding, expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 1.5.1998 disbanded and in 1998. on SRZ-35 it is cut into metal. From 10/12/1977 to 9/1/1979, the TFR was commanded by I.N.

"PERMANENT"(plant No. 165)*. On April 14, 1976, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on January 11, 1977 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on August 9, 1978, commissioned on December 26, 1978 and February 9, 1979, after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk, it was included in the KSF. In 1979 and 1993 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG), and in 1980 and 1982. - prizes of the GKVMF for artillery preparation (as part of the KUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. On March 16, 1998, he was expelled from the Navy and handed over to the SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 1/5/1998 disbanded and laid up in Severomorsk.

"ARDENT"(plant No. 715). 05/07/1975 was added to the lists of the Navy ships and 05/06/1977 was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanov in Leningrad, launched on 8/20/1978, entered service on 12/28/1978 and 1/24/1979 included in the DKBF, and shortly after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Sevastopol, it was transferred to the KChF. 10-14.10.1983 paid a visit to Piraeus (Greece) and 18-23.7.1996- to Zeebrugge (Belgium). From 2/19/1987 to 7/9/1993 at the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, it was modernized according to project 11352, after which it was returned to the DCBF. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. In 1998 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG).

"PROVOCATIVE"(plant No. 716). On May 16, 1977, he was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on November 10, 1977 he was laid down on the slipway of the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanova in Leningrad, launched on 25/3/1979, entered service on 31/8/1979 and 13/9/1979 after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Severomorsk, it was included in the KSF. 12/28/1984 - 1/2/1985 and 3 - 11/7/1988 paid visits to Havana (Cuba), and 2 - 6/5/1984 - to the port of Algiers (Algeria). in Leningrad was overhauled. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. In 1997 and 1998 won prizes of the Civil Code of the Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). In May 1997, he participated in joint exercises with the British Navy frigate “!hop Oik” in the Barents Sea.

"PROUD"(plant No. 166)*. On May 16, 1977, it was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and on July 26, 1977 it was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard "Yantar" in Kaliningrad, launched on May 3, 1979, entered into service on September 20, 1979 and October 17, 1979 after the inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk to Vladivostok, it was included to the KTOF. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. 5/7/1994 expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 10/1/1994 disbanded, 10/6/1994 sold to a South Korean company for cutting into metal. 27/6/1995 taken away from Vladivostok in tow.

“PERFECT”(plant No. 15). On May 16, 1977, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on July 12, 1978 it was laid down on the slipway of the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch, launched on June 3, 1979, commissioned on December 29, 1979, and on March 3, 1980 included in the KChF. 27.9 - 2.10.1981 paid a visit to Jezair (Algeria), 26 - 31.3.1987 - to Istanbul (Turkey) and 15-19.8.1991 - to Constanta (Romania). In 1994, he won the prize of the Navy Commander-in-Chief for artillery preparation (as part of the KUG). 14.7.1997 disbanded, 1.8.1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and renamed "Mykola! in" (II 133). September 8, 1997 expelled from the Russian Navy.

"ZEALOUS"(plant No. 167)*. On May 16, 1977, it was added to the lists of ships of the Navy and on March 1, 1978 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on September 1, 1979, and commissioned on December 31, 1979. 21/2/1980 after the inter-fleet passage around Africa from Baltiysk to Vladivostok, it was included in the KTOF. 8 - 12.5.1982 paid a visit to the port of Victoria (Seychelles), 1 - 5.8.1982 - to Hodeida (North Yemen), 13-17.8.1985 and 4-8.7.1986 - to Wonsan (DPRK). In 1984 he won the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG), and in 1987 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG). From 17.1.1992 he was a member of the SakhFlRS KTOF. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. From 01.06.1989 it was on Dalza-Voda in Vladivostok for a major overhaul, but on 17.07.1997 due to lack of funding it was expelled from the Navy and handed over to SARS for disarmament, dismantling and sale. 12/1/1997 disbanded.

"OK"(plant No. 16). On February 17, 1978, it was included in the lists of the Navy ships and on May 25, 1979 it was laid down on the slipway of the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch, launched on May 7, 1980, commissioned on December 29, 1980 and included in the KChF on February 25, 1981. 7 - 10.8.1981 paid a visit to Varna (Bulgaria) and 18-22.6.1996 to Piraeus (Greece). In 1991 and 1993 he won the prizes of the Navy Civil Code for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG), and in 1994 - the prize of the Navy Civil Code for artillery preparation (as part of the KUG). In 1994, he participated in joint exercises with the ships of the Naval Forces of the NATO countries "Vp" z-94, and on May 8, 1995 - in the international naval parade in St. Petersburg, dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. On July 27, 1997 he replaced Naval ensign of the USSR on Andreevsky.

"ZEALOUS"(plant No. 168)*. On February 17, 1978, it was included in the lists of the Navy ships and on June 27, 1979 it was laid down on the slipway of the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad, launched on April 23, 1980, commissioned on December 27, 1980, and on February 21, 1981 included in the KTOF KamFlRS. At the beginning of 1982, he made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Baltiysk, while simultaneously performing the task of carrying out military service in the Indian Ocean, on 12/4/1982 he arrived in Vladivostok, from where he soon moved to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. Since 17.1.1992 it has been part of the SakhFlRS Pacific Fleet. On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.

"INQUISITIVE"(plant No. 717). On February 17, 1978, he was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, but on February 21, 1979 he was removed from construction and at the Shipyard named after. A.A. Zhdanova was not laid in Leningrad.

"INQUISITIVE"(plant No. 169)*. On February 21, 1979, it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on June 27, 1979 it was laid down on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard Yantar in Kaliningrad, launched on April 16, 1981, commissioned on November 30, 1981, and on February 9, 1982, after the inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to Sevastopol, it was included in the KChF. On May 30 - June 3, 1988 he paid a visit to the port of Algiers and on January 22-26, 1991 - to Piraeus (Greece), and on December 2, 1989 he participated in providing a working meeting of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev with US President George W. Bush. In the period 07/09/1993 to 1996, a major overhaul was carried out at the Yantar Baltic Shipyard. 28/7/1996 participated in the international maritime parade in St. Petersburg, on the sacred 300th anniversary of the Russian fleet. On July 27, 1997, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.

"GUSTY"(plant No. 17). On May 21, 1980, it was laid down on the slipway of the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch and on May 28, 1980 it was included in the lists of ships of the Navy, launched on May 16, 1981, commissioned on December 29, 1981, and on February 9, 1982 included in the KTOF. In the period from September 18, 1983 to February 27, 1984, he made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Sevastopol to Vladivostok, making business calls on November 12-20, 1983 to Luanda (Angola), December 8-13, 1983 - to Victoria (Seychelles) and inflicting 5-10.2.1984 visit to Madras (India). From September 21, 1983 to February 27, 1984, he was part of the KamFlRS KTOF. 13 - 17.8.1985 and 14-18.8.1990 paid visits to Wonsan (DPRK), 5 - 10.4.1987 - to Colombo (Sri Lanka) and 25-30.11.1987 - to Aden (South Yemen). In 1984 he won the prizes of the Navy Civil Code for anti-aircraft training (as part of the KUG) and for anti-submarine training (as part of the KPUG). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. On May 8, 1992, he was withdrawn from combat strength to the reserve of the 2nd category and laid up in Vladivostok; use for educational purposes and disbanded on 12/15/1994, but on 3/20/1997 it burned out badly as a result of a fire when parked at the wall of SRZ-178 in b. Golden Horn (Vladivostok).

The maximum displacement is 3436 tons, total 3191 g, normal 3013 tons, standard 2835 tons; length 122.9 m, width 14.19 m, draft 7.21 m. GTU power 2x26,000 hp; full speed 32 knots, economic 20 knots; cruising range 4600 miles. Armament: 1x4 PUPLRK (4 Metel rocket-torpedoes), 2x2 Osa-M air defense missile launchers, 2x2 76-mm AUAK-726 (on the TFR project 1135M *: 2x1 100-mmAU AK-100), 2x12 RBU-6000 (on the TFR “Light”, “Flying” and “Ardent”, instead of the RBU-6000, 2x4 PU SCRC “Uranus” were installed), 2x4 533-mm TA, minefields. The crew of 180 people, including 22 officers.

* About the "mutiny" at the military-industrial complex "Storozhevoy" and its initiator V.M. Sablin, the book by A.G. Maidanov "Directly on the course - death" (Riga, "Lita", 1991) and the documentary film "Russian Tragedy" are most detailed . - Approx. ed.

Project 1135 patrol ships.

Patrol ships of project 1135 (code "Petrel", NATO code - Krivak I, II, III). The lead ship is the Vigilant. Until 1977 they were classified as large anti-submarine ships.

Patrol ship Vigilant.

Patrol Ship Vigilant- Built according to project 1135. Launched on March 28, 1970. and entered service on December 31, 1970, and already on February 20, 1971. became part of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF). June to July 1972 performed the task of assisting the armed forces of Egypt and Syria. In June 1993 participated in the NATO exercises "Baltops-93". In 1992 Andreevsky Naval flag was raised on the ship.Board numbers: 500(1970), 509(1974), 502(1974), 520(1974), 205(1975), 512, 515, 250(1977), 700(1978), 719(1982), 744(1983) ), 713(1987), 744(1989), 707(1991).Decommissioned: 1996

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Patrol ship Impeccable.

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Patrol ship Selfless.

Patrol ship Selfless- Built according to project 1135. Launched on May 07, 1977. and entered service on December 30, 1977. and already February 17, 1978. became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). In 1988 displaced, together with SKR-6, the missile cruiser "Yorktown" and the destroyer "Caron" of the US Navy that entered the territorial waters of the USSR off the coast of Crimea. Board numbers: 195, 192(1978), 805(1978), 878(1978), 811(1981), 817(1984), 807(1997). August 1, 1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and renamed "Dnepropetrovsk" (U134).

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Patrol ship Cheerful.

Patrol ship Bodry- Built according to project 1135. Launched on April 28, 1971 and entered service on December 31, 1971, and already on February 14, 1972 became part of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF). From June to July 1972, he performed the task of assisting the armed forces of Egypt and Syria. October 31, 1974 He was awarded the pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense "For courage and military prowess". On July 26, 199, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.Board numbers: 220(1970), 503(1971), 222(1972), 517, 508(1974), 204(1975), 513(1975), 505(1977), 514(1978), 788(1978), 705(1979), 724(1981), 704(1984), 722(1988), 710(1990).Decommissioned: 1997

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Patrol ship Active.

patrol ship- Built according to project 1135. Launched on April 5, 1975, and entered service on December 25, 1975, and already on February 19, 1976. became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). Board numbers: 193, 192(1976), 533(1976), 196(1976), 800(1979), 801(1980), 810, 814(1984), 813(1986), 811(1992). Decommissioned: 1995

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Patrol ship Valiant.

Patrol Ship Valiant- Built according to project 1135. Launched on February 22, 1973, and entered service on December 28, 1973, and already on February 17, 1974. became part of the 10 BrPLK 2 DPLC of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF). At the end of 1975 the ship was awarded the title of "excellent ship", and the ship's anti-submarine crew was declared the best at the KSF. In 1982 he was reassigned to the 130 BrPLK. July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.Board numbers: 167(1974), 544(1976), 257(1977), 944(1978), 912, 983(1985), 949(1989).Decommissioned: 1992…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………............

Patrol ship Worthy.

Patrol Ship Worthy- Built according to project 1135. Launched on May 8, 1971, and entered service on December 31, 1971. and already April 28, 1972. became part of the 10th BrPLK of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF).In 1975 took part in the exercises "Ocean-75", and in 1977. in the exercises "North-77".In 1982 was reassigned to the 130 BrPLK. Next in1983 took part in the exercises "Ocean-83" and "Magistral-83". May 19 to May 24, 1984 as part of the KPUG, he took part in exercises with the ships of the united squadron of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact "Squadron-84". July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky.Board numbers: 550(1973), 557(1975), 542(1976), 255(1976), 503(1979), 971(1983), 976, 944(1989), 978(1990).Decommissioned: 1993

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Patrol ship Zadorny.

Patrol ship Zadorny- Built according to project 1135. Launched on March 25, 1979, and entered service on August 31, 1979. and already on September 13, 1979. became part of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF). In 1981, he took part in the Avangard-81 exercise, and on July 5, 1981, he took part in the North-81 exercise and on September 19, 1983. - takes part in the exercise "Ocean-83". August 31, 1984 the ship was declared the best anti-submarine ship of the KSF. July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. . In 1996 participates in the Victory parade in the city of Hero of Murmansk and in the same year participates in the parade in the city of Arkhangelsk in honor of the 300th anniversary of the Navy. May 1997 participated in joint exercises with the frigate of the British Navy in the Barents Sea. In August 2001, participation in the exercise "Dervish-2001".Board numbers: 965, 909, 948 (1983), 937 (1985), 959 (1988), 955 (1998).Decommissioned: 2005

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Patrol ship Ladny.

Patrol ship Ladny- Built according to project 1135. Launched on May 07, 1980, commissioned on December 29, 1980. and already on January 25, 1981. became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). In 1994 participated in joint exercises of NATO countries, and on May 8, 1995. - in the international naval parade dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. July 27, 1997 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. In August 2008 the ship took part in the Active Endeavor anti-terrorist operation jointly with NATO countries, exercising control over shipping in the Suez Canal area. Currently, it is part of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. Board numbers: 802, 815 (1981), 824 (1986), 801 (05.1990).

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Patrol ship Flying.

Patrol ship Flying- Built according to project 1135. Launched on March 19, 1978, and entered service on August 10, 1978, and already on September 20, 1978. became part of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet (KTOF). July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 510(1978), 845, 713(1980), 646(1980), 699(1981), 686(1983), 645(1990), 661(1996). Decommissioned: 2005

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Patrol ship Impulsive.

Patrol Ship Gusty- Built according to project 1135. Launched on May 16, 1981, and entered service on December 29, 1981, and already on February 9, 1982. became part of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet (KTOF). In the period from September 18, 1983 to February 27, 1984, he made an inter-naval transition around Africa from Sevastopol to Vladivostok. July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 859(1981), 806(1984), 628(1985), 641(1986), 626(1989), 670(1990), 618(1990). Decommissioned: 1994

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Patrol ship Ardent.

Patrol ship Ardent- Built according to project 1135. Launched on August 20, 1978. and entered service on December 28, 1978. and already on January 24, 1979. became part of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF) and soon in the same year became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). After modernization, according to project 11352, in 1993. was returned to the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF). 07/26/1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 518(1978), 806(1981), 810, 819, 813, 807(1982), 808(1984), 758(1985), 809(1987), 807(1988), 702(1993). Currently, it is part of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Federation.

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Patrol ship Ferocious.

Guard ship Ferocious- Built according to project 1135. Launched on January 27, 1971, and entered service on December 29, 1972, and already on January 31, 1973. became part of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF). July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 517(1974), 502(1975), 504, 507(1977), 715(1978), 742(1980), 758(1984), 725(1987), 719(1990). Decommissioned: 1993

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In 1975, a TFR of a new project appeared - 1135M. It was equipped with a 100-mm artillery mount and two 533-mm four-tube torpedo tubes. The lead ship is the Frisky.

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- Built according to project 1135M. Launched May 30, 1975. and entered service on December 30, 1975. and already February 19, 1976. became part of the 10th BrPLK of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF). In 1981, he took part in the exercise "West-81" under the leadership of the Minister of Defense of the USSR. In 1984 participated in the Atlantic-84 exercise. In 1986 guarded the Dutch ship "Deepwater-2" during a deep-sea operation to raise gold bars from the British cruiser "Edinburgh" that died during the Second World War in the Barents Sea. A share of the USSR gold was delivered to Murmansk by ship. July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. July 11, 1995 the ship as part of the OBK participated in the exercise "Kumzha-2". Board numbers: 210(1976), 212(1977), 958(1980), 916(1981), 942(1983), 930(1985), 210(1986), 930(1985), 970(1987), 952( 1991), 916(1996). Decommissioned: 2001

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- Built according to project 1135M. Launched April 11, 1978. and entered service on September 30, 1978. and already November 23, 1978. became part of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF). From 26 to 30 August 1991 participated in the escort of the Der-vish-91 convoy from the Kola Bay to Arkhangelsk, dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the start of the movement of allied convoys. 26.7.1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 794(1977), 926(1979), 916(1979), 757(1980), 935(1985), 962(1986), 968(1990). Decommissioned: 1998

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- Built according to project 1135M. Launched on 3 May 1979 and commissioned on 20 September 1979. and already October 17, 1979. became part of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet (KTOF). July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 777(1979), 758(1980), 621(1985), 643(1987), 670(1987), 641(03/16/1993). Decommissioned: 1994

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Built according to project 1135M. Launched on February 7, 1977. and entered service on September 30, 1977, and already on November 29, 1977. became part of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet (KTOF). In 1978 made an inter-fleet transition from Baltiysk to the Black Sea, and in the next 1979. crossing around Africa from Sevastopol to Vladivostok. July 26, 1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 758(1980), 695(1982), 648(1987), 678(1990), 620(1990), 643(1991), 621(1994). Decommissioned: 1995

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- Built according to project 1135M. Launched on August 09, 1978, and entered service on December 26, 1978. and already February 09, 1979. became part of the Red Banner Northern Fleet (KSF). On July 26, 1992, he changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 931(1981), 913(1983), 967(1989), 933(1990), 963(1995). Decommissioned: 1998

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Patrol ship Striking.

Patrol ship Striking- Built according to project 1135M. Launched on July 1, 1976, and entered service on December 31, 1976, and already on February 5, 1977. became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). August 1, 1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy and renamed "Sevastopol". Board numbers: 235(1976), 232(1977), 249(1977), 165(1978), 808(1978), 812(1979), 806(1980), 804(1984), 821(1987), 807( 1989), 819(1990).

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Patrol ship Indomitable.

Patrol ship Invincible- Built according to project 1135M. Launched on September 7, 1977, and entered service on December 30, 1977, and already on February 17, 1978. became part of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF). November 2, 1987 renamed to "Komsomolets of Lithuania", and March 27, 1990. the ship was returned to its original name - "Indomitable" 26.7.1992 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 517(1977), 720(1978), 700(1981), 317(1982), 701(1982), 733(1984), 755, 741(1988), 731(1990). Decommissioned: 2009

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Patrol ship Inquisitive.

Guard ship Inquisitive- Built according to project 1135M. Launched on April 16, 1981, and entered service on October 30, 1981, and already on February 9, 1982. became part of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (KChF). July 28, 1996 participated in the international maritime parade in St. Petersburg, dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the Russian fleet. July 27, 1997 changed the Naval flag of the USSR to Andreevsky. Board numbers: 942(1981), 751(1981), 759, 888(1982), 826(1984), 889(1988), 808(1.05.1990). Currently, it is part of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.

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PSKR pr.11351 - 1+1 units

TTX:
SKR project 1135 (1135M)
Displacement, t:
standard: 2835 (project 1135M - 2935)
full: 3190 (project 1135M - 3305)
Dimensions, m:
length: 123
width: 14.2
draft: 4.5
Full speed, knots: 32
Cruising range: 4000 miles (14 kt), 3515 miles (18 kt), 3155 miles (24 kt), 1240 miles (32 kt)
Autonomy, days: 30
Power plant: 1x48000 hp GTA M7 (2x6000 hp, sustainer M60, 2x18000 hp, afterburner M3), 2 fixed pitch propellers, 5 diesel generators DGAG-500/G-MSh (or DGAS-500/1MSh) 500 kW each
Armament:
1x4 launchers KT-M-1135 URPK-4 "Metel" (4 PLUR 85R);
2x2 76 mm AK-726 (2000 rounds); project 1135M - 2x1 100 mm AK-100 (1250 rounds);
2x2 launchers ZIF-122 SAM 4K33 "Osa-M" (40 SAM 9M33);
2x4 533 mm ChTA-53-1135 (4 SET-65 torpedoes, 4 53-65K torpedoes);
2x12 RBU-6000 "Smerch-2" (96 RSL-60);
18 min IGDM-500 or 10 min KSM or 14 min KAM or 14 min KB "Crab" or 10 min "Serpey" or 4 min PMR-1 or 7 min PMR-2 or 7 min MTPK-1 or 14 min RM-1 or 12 min UDM-2
Crew, people: 192 (23 officers, 27 midshipmen) (project 1135M - 196)

PSKR pr.11351
Displacement, t:
standard: 3274
full: 3642
Dimensions, m:
length: 122.98
width: 14.2
draft: 4.8
Full speed, knots: 31.04
Cruising range: 3636 miles (14.05 kt), 3000 miles (18 kt), 2600 miles (20 kt), 1600 miles (30 kt)
Autonomy, days: 30
Power plant: 1x46000 hp GTA M7K (2x6000 hp sustainer M62, 2x17000 hp afterburner M8K)
Armament:
1x1 100 mm AK-100 (500 rounds);
2x6 30 mm AK-630M (12,000 rounds);
1x2 PU ZIF-122 SAM "Osa-MA2" (20 SAM 9M33);
2x4 533 mm ChTA-53-1135 (8 torpedoes);
2x12 RBU-6000 "Smerch-2";
1 Ka-27PS helicopter;
Crew, people: 193 (22 officers)

Story:
Under the terms of the division of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, the naval forces of Ukraine got 2 SKRs of project 1135 and 1 SKR of project 1135M; in addition, 2 ships for the border fleet of the USSR 2 PSKR project 11351 were built at the Zaliv shipyard (Kerch), they also became part of the Ukrainian fleet.
TFR "Striking" - FR "Sevastopol" U132
TFR "Impeccable" - FR "Mikolaiv" U133
TFR "Selfless" - FR "Dnipropetrovsk" U134
PSKR "Kirov" - FR "Hetman Sagaidachny" U130
PSKR "Red Vympel" - FR "Hetman Vyshnevetsky" U131 ( not completed)

TFR "Striking" - FR "Sevastopol" U132
entered service on December 31, 1976 and on February 5, 1977, after the inter-naval transition from Baltiysk to Sevastopol, it was included in the KChF.
From July 25 to July 30, 1981 he paid a visit to Tripoli (Libya), from December 28, 1984 to January 2, 1985 - to Havana (Cuba) and from April 24 to 28, 1989 - to Constanta (Romania).
August 1, 1997 transferred to the Ukrainian Navy (U 132).

On November 30, 2004, by order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine N 875-r, it was excluded from the fleet
On July 6, 2006, at 13:00, tugboats took the ship out of the bay and dragged it to Turkey for cutting.

TFR "Impeccable" - FR "Mikolaiv" U133
March 3, 1980 included in the KChF.
From September 27 to October 2, 1981 he paid a visit to Jezair (Algeria), from March 26 to March 31, 1987 - to Istanbul (Turkey) and from August 15 to 19, 1991 - to Constanta (Romania).
In 1994 he won the prize of the Navy Commander-in-Chief for artillery preparation (as part of the KUG).
On July 14, 1997 it was disbanded, on August 1, 1997 it was transferred to the Ukrainian Navy (U 133).
On September 8, 1997, he was expelled from the Russian Navy.
In 2001, he was expelled from the Ukrainian Navy and cut into metal.

TFR "Selfless" - FR "Dnipropetrovsk" U134
February 17, 1978 the ship was included in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet.
From August 10 to 13, 1979 - a visit to Varna (Bulgaria).
From March 26 to March 31, 1987 - a visit to Istanbul (Turkey).
In January 1988 - a visit to Tobruk (Libya).
In 1988 he won the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy for anti-submarine training (as part of a naval strike group).
On February 12, 1988, during an operation to oust US Navy ships from the unilaterally declared 12-mile zone of the USSR off the coast of Crimea, he made a bulk attack on the US Navy cruiser Yorktown.
After the bulk on the Yorktown, the ship's rails were torn, the anchor was lost, and the hull was cut above the waterline. At the base, a hole was found in the acoustic "bulb". After the incident, the ship was under repair for about a month, after which it continued to carry out military service in the Black Sea.
In 1988 - 1989, the ship monitored US Navy ships in the Black Sea and took part in exercises.
On August 1, 1997, under the terms of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the Bezzavetny was transferred to the Ukrainian Navy.
In October 2002, the Dnipropetrovsk frigate was withdrawn from the combat ships of the Ukrainian Navy.
On March 26, 2005 she was taken away in tow from Sevastopol and on May 12, 2005 she was scuttled in the Black Sea.

PSKR "Kirov" - FR "Hetman Sagaidachny" U130
On October 5, 1990, it was laid down as "Kirov" at the slipway of the Shipyard "Zaliv" in Kerch, by order of the naval units of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR.
In June 1992, in an unfinished state, it became the property of the Ukrainian Navy and renamed. Entered service on April 2, 1993 and raised the naval ensign of Ukraine on July 4, 1993. The flag was raised by the commander of the ship, captain of the 3rd rank Katushenko V.S. Initially (until July 1994) wore tail number "201", then U-130. Reclassified to frigate. Currently - the flagship of the Ukrainian Navy.
In June 1994 he made an official visit to France, in 1995 he made a business visit to Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) to the Idex-95 weapons exhibition, in the same year the ship visited the port of Varna (Bulgaria) and Spezia (Italy) ). In 1996, he made the first transatlantic voyage at the head of a detachment of Ukrainian Navy ships in the United States to the port of Norfolk. At the same time, business visits were made (twice) to the ports of Gibraltar (UK) and Ponta Delgada (Portugal) in the Azores.
In 1996 he visited Poti, Istanbul and Varna. In June 1999, he made an official visit as part of a detachment of ships of the Ukrainian Navy to Israel in the port of Haifa. In 2000-2004, independently and as part of groups of ships, he visited various ports in Turkey and Bulgaria.
In 2008, the ship took part in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean for 3 months.
On September 24, 2013, the Hetman Sahaydachny frigate with a Ka-27 helicopter on board and a special forces group set out to sea from the port of Sevastopol to join NATO's Ocean Shield operation to counter piracy at sea. On January 3, 2014, the operation was completed and on January 20, Sahaidachny joined the EU operation Atalanta.
In March 2014, the ship was returning from the Mediterranean Sea due to the events in the Crimea, the frigate arrived in Odessa on March 5, where it remains to this day.

Photo album:
1 - U132 "Sevastopol"

3 - TFR "Selfless" during the bulk on the American CD "Yorktown"