Battle of Smolensk month. The heroic defense of Smolensk briefly. Main stages of the battle

A complex of defensive and offensive actions of Soviet troops against the German Army Group Center and part of the forces of Army Group North in the main Moscow direction. For two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941), fierce fighting continued over a vast territory: 600-650 km along the front (from Idritsa and Velikie Luki in the north to Loev and Novgorod-Seversky in the south) and 200-250 km in depth (from Polotsk, Vitebsk and Zhlobin in the west to Andreapol, Yartsevo, Yelnya and Trubchevsk in the east). At different times, they were attended by: on the Soviet side - ground forces and aviation of four fronts (Western, Central, Reserve and Bryansk), as well as aviation of the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Corps of the RGK, on ​​the German side - troops of Army Group Center, part of the forces Army Group North and aviation of the 2nd Air Fleet.

The Battle of Smolensk includes a number of separate battles and operations:

• Defense of Polotsk
• Defense of Smolensk
• Battle of Bobruisk
• Defense of Mogilev
• Elninsky operation
• Dukhovshchina operation
• Roslavl-Novozybkov operation

Previous Events

After the defeat of the main forces of the Soviet Western Front in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, the German mobile forces of Army Group Center reached the Western Dvina in the Vitebsk region (3rd Tank Group) and the Dnieper near Orsha and Mogilev (2nd Tank Group).

The weakened and scattered divisions of the Western Front of the Red Army that had withdrawn from the border areas from the 13th and 4th armies were withdrawn to the rear for reorganization and replenishment. Units of the Second Strategic Echelon, included in the Western Front on July 2, continued to arrive from the depths of the country and were not yet fully deployed. Some of the troops were already fighting in the Polotsk and Sebezh fortified areas (URs) and on the bridgehead in the Disna area (22nd Army), in the Lepel direction (20th Army; see Lepel counterattack) and at crossings in the area of ​​Bykhov and Rogachev (21 -i army). The Soviet mobile forces participating in the counter-offensive on Lepel (5th and 7th mechanized corps) suffered serious losses, especially in tanks.

In total, at the line from Idritsa to the area south of Zhlobin, by the beginning of the Battle of Smolensk, 37 of the 48 advancing divisions managed to take positions, of which 24 divisions were in the first echelon. The defense created by the front was not prepared in engineering terms and did not have the necessary stability.

Plans of the parties

In the new offensive in the Moscow direction, the German command expected to achieve decisive success. The general plan provided for the dissection of the Soviet defense front into three parts, the encirclement and liquidation of the Polotsk-Nevel, Smolensk and Mogilev groupings of the Western Front and thereby creating favorable conditions for an unhindered attack on Moscow.

The encirclement of the right-flank Polotsk-Nevel group of Soviet troops (22nd Army) was entrusted to the troops of the adjacent flanks of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The main forces of the enemy's 4th Army (2nd and 3rd Tank Groups) were directed against the Smolensk group of the Red Army (20th, 19th and 16th armies) and the Mogilev group (13th Army).

The decision of the German command to launch a new offensive in the Moscow direction with mobile formations alone, without waiting for the approach of infantry divisions, was an unpleasant surprise for the Soviet command.

The exact plans of the Soviet command are unknown, but judging by the attempted counterattack in the Lepel direction and subsequent events, it can be assumed that after the concentration of all the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon on the Western Front, some active actions should have been taken.

Actions of the parties

First stage (July 10−20): Wehrmacht offensive

The Battle of Smolensk began on July 10-12 with the offensive of mobile formations of the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht in two wedges towards Vitebsk and Mogilev.

The main forces of the 3rd Tank Group (Goth) (39th Motorized Corps consisting of 3 tank and 2 motorized divisions), having overcome the resistance of the 19th Army (I.S. Konev) in the Vitebsk area, began to advance east . The remaining forces of the 3rd Tank Group (57th Motorized Corps consisting of the 19th Tank and 14th Motorized Divisions) struck in the direction of Nevel from a bridgehead in the Disna area west of Polotsk.

At the same time, the 2nd Panzer Group (Guderian) crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev with two wedges. To the north of Mogilev there were the 47th motorized corps (two tank and one motorized division) and the 46th motorized corps (10th tank division and the SS motorized division "Das Reich"), to the south - the 24th motorized corps (two tank and one motorized division).

Immediately, German troops achieved serious successes:

• On the northern flank The German 57th Motorized Corps advanced and captured Nevel. The Soviet 22nd Army was cut into two parts and found itself semi-encircled; On July 16, under the threat of complete encirclement, her troops left Polotsk.
• In the Vitebsk area The 7th and 20th tank divisions of the 39th motorized corps, having defeated the Soviet units of the 220th motorized division and the 25th rifle corps, drove them back from the city. On July 13 they occupied Velizh and Demidov. On July 16, the enemy occupied Yartsevo northeast of Smolensk. It turned out that the administration of the 25th Corps was destroyed, and the corps commander, Major General S. M. Chestokhvalov, went missing and was captured.
• On the southern section Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, having crossed the Dnieper to the south and north of Mogilev, occupied Orsha and, bypassing Mogilev with two wedges, moved in the direction of Smolensk. In the Mogilev area, six rifle divisions of the Red Army of the 20th and 61st corps were surrounded.

On July 16, the 29th Motorized Division from Guderian's group broke into Smolensk, where stubborn battles ensued with the city's defenders (see Defense of Smolensk (1941)). On July 19, the 10th Panzer Division advanced southeast of Smolensk and occupied Yelnya. 20 rifle divisions of the Red Army, part of three armies (16th, 19th and 20th), were under threat of encirclement in the Smolensk region.

Thus, in less than a week, German troops managed to reach Smolensk, which was the operational goal of the entire offensive. At the same time, in a vast area to the west, north and east of Smolensk, large forces of the Western Front (second strategic echelon) were operationally surrounded: the 16th Army (M.F. Lukin), the 19th Army (I.S. Konev) and the 20th 1st Army (P. A. Kurochkin). Communication with these armies was maintained via the only pontoon crossing across the Dnieper in the area of ​​the village of Solovyovo (15 km south of Yartsevo), which was defended by a combined detachment under the command of Colonel A.I. Lizyukov. This crossing was shelled by enemy artillery fire and was subjected to constant attacks from its aircraft.

The Soviet 13th Army (F.N. Remezov) was dismembered by the enemy in two: one part was surrounded in the Mogilev region, the other was surrounded in the Krichev direction, with heavy fighting it broke through the Sozh River, where it gained a foothold.

Actions on the southern flank of the Western Front

Events developed completely differently on the southern flank of the central section of the Soviet-German front. Here the Soviet 21st Army, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, went on the offensive on July 13 with the task of capturing Bykhov and Bobruisk to go behind enemy lines in the Mogilev-Smolensk direction.

The 63rd Rifle Corps (corps commander L. G. Petrovsky) successfully crossed the Dnieper, occupied Rogachev and Zhlobin and continued the attack on Bobruisk.

To the south, the 232nd Rifle Division of the 66th Corps advanced 80 km and occupied crossings across the Berezina and Ptich rivers.

The 67th Rifle Corps began an offensive in the direction of the German bridgehead in the area of ​​​​Stary Bykhov.

The German command urgently sent the 43rd and 53rd Army against the 21st Army, then the 12th Army Corps of the 2nd Field Army, as well as the 52nd Infantry Division from the reserve of the High Command, which managed to stop the Soviet offensive.

Second stage (July 21 - August 3): counterattack of the Red Army

From July 16, infantry formations of the GA “Center” began to approach the battle area, which were supposed to consolidate the success of the tank groups. Taking into account what had been achieved, the German command concluded that the Soviet Western Front was no longer able to provide serious resistance and that the GA “Center” was capable of conducting a further attack on Moscow with infantry divisions alone. On July 19, the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) issued Directive No. 33 on the further conduct of the war in the East, and on July 23, an addition to it, in which the task of defeating Soviet troops between Smolensk and Moscow and capturing Moscow was assigned to the 2nd and 9th armies .

On July 23, Hitler, in a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, explained:

This decision indicated that the Wehrmacht high command was still full of optimism and believed in the successful implementation of the Barbarossa plan.

In the rear of the Western Front, the Third Strategic Echelon was deployed, consolidated on July 14 into the front of the Reserve Armies (Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov): the 29th, 30th, 24th and 28th Armies in the first echelon, the 31st and the 32nd Army - in the second. In addition, on July 18, another echelon was formed on the distant approaches to Moscow - the Mozhaisk Defense Front.

However, already in the second half of July 1941, alarming symptoms for the Wehrmacht appeared: after the occupation of Nevel, German troops continued the attack on Velikiye Luki and occupied the city on July 19, but were knocked out of it already on July 21. At the same time, part of the previously surrounded Soviet 22nd Army broke out of the encirclement.

On July 22, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder, made a note about the northern flank of the GA Center:

Actions of the Red Army

On July 21, the Supreme High Command Headquarters attempted to carry out a counteroffensive in order to release units of the 20th and 16th armies locked in the Smolensk area. Five were involved in the counterattacks operational groups, formed from the 29th, 30th, 24th and 28th new armies of the Reserve Front. Soviet troops launched concentric attacks in the direction of Smolensk:

• task force I. I. Maslennikov (3 rifle divisions) were ordered to advance in the direction of Velizh,
• task forces V. A. Khomenko (3 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions) and Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin (3 rifle divisions) attacked from the northeast
• task force K.K. Rokossovsky (2 rifle and 1 tank divisions) advanced from the east
• task force V. Ya. Kachalov (2 rifle and 1 tank divisions) - from the southeast (from the side of Roslavl).

Direct leadership of the operational groups was entrusted to Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko (from July 19 - commander of the Western Front).

At the same time, on the southern flank of the Western Front, the 21st Army was tasked with resuming the offensive with the goal of defeating the enemy’s Bobruisk-Bykhov group and restoring communications with the besieged Mogilev, and the 13th Army was to continue attacks on Krichev and Propoisk (Slavgorod).

From the zone of the 21st Army, a cavalry group consisting of 3 cavalry divisions was sent to the rear of the Mogilev-Smolensk enemy group.

Results of the second stage

The Soviet offensive, which was prepared in haste and carried out by separate insufficiently powerful groups, was not successful. The enemy inflicted significant damage on the advancing Soviet troops: five divisions from Kachalov’s operational group near Roslavl were surrounded and killed. The command of the Western Front was unable to ensure the simultaneous action of all groups. It was also not possible to ensure interaction with the encircled 16th and 20th armies, locked in the Smolensk area.

The approach of German infantry divisions from near Minsk turned the tide of the battle for Smolensk, and on July 28, the last Soviet troops left the city (see Defense of Smolensk 1941). On August 4-5, the remnants of the Soviet troops emerged from the encirclement.

On July 26, after fierce fighting, Soviet troops also left Mogilev (see Defense of Mogilev).

Position at the end of July

The Soviet and German command assessed the situation differently.

Soviet counterattacks pinned down German troops, who lost their freedom of maneuver. The active actions of the 21st and 13th Armies on the southern flank of the Western Front pinned down the entire 24th Motorized Corps (a third of the 2nd Tank Group) and 15 divisions of the 2nd Field Army.

Thus, despite significant successes, German troops were exhausted by continuous fighting. On July 30, the OKW, in its Directive No. 34, was forced to order Army Group Center with its main forces to go on the defensive. Without replenishing and eliminating the threat to its flanks and rear, and without eliminating the overhanging Soviet troops from the north and south, Army Group Center's offensive on Moscow proved impossible.

German command version

By the end of July 1941, troops of Army Group Center occupied Yartsevo, Smolensk and Yelnya. Since July 10, in the battles for Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk and Mogilev, about 300 thousand people were captured, over 3 thousand tanks and approximately the same number of guns were captured.

The offensive of Army Groups “North” and “South” was not so fast. Therefore, on July 19, Hitler issued Directive No. 33, which ordered the transfer of tank formations of the GA Center to the disposal of the GA North (Tank Group Hotha) and GA South (Tank Group Guderian). The attack on Moscow was ordered to continue with infantry formations. According to German military leaders, this decision led to a delay in the attack on Moscow and, ultimately, to the failure of Plan Barbarossa. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, Hermann Hoth, later wrote:

New battles on the Smolensk Bulge (August 1−21)

At the end of July 1941, the command of the GA "Center", having switched to defense in the central sector of the front, turned attention to its flanks.

On the southern flank, the German command decided to first carry out a limited operation in the Roslavl area, then in the Rogachev area, then defeat Soviet troops in the Gomel area, and then use the 2nd Field Army in operations against the Korosten group - the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front. The German command intended to use its mobile troops (2nd Tank Group) to encircle the Soviet Southwestern Front east of the Dnieper in cooperation with the 1st Tank Group of Army Group South.

On the northern flank, a new offensive by German troops was being prepared in the Velikie Luki area.

The German offensive in the Velikiye Luki area, launched on August 2 by the forces of the left flank of the 9th Army, ended in failure. Events on the southern flank developed much more successfully for the enemy. On August 1, the offensive of Guderian's army group began (2 army and 1 motorized corps, a total of 2 tank, 1 motorized and 7 infantry divisions) in the Roslavl area. Already on August 3, Roslavl was occupied, the Soviet troops of the operational group of the 28th Army (2 rifle and 1 tank divisions) were surrounded. By August 6, the German operation was completed, the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov, and his chief of staff, Major General P. G. Egorov, were killed, according to the German command, 38,000 prisoners were taken prisoner, 250 were captured tanks, 359 guns and other weapons.

On August 8, a new offensive by Guderian's group began against the Soviet 13th Army of the Central Front. By August 14, the fighting in the Krichev-Miloslavichi area was over, as a result the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps was defeated, and the corps commander, Major General E. Ya. Magon, was killed. The German 2nd Tank Group continued to develop its offensive to the south towards Unecha, Klintsy, Starodub.

At the same time, on August 12, the offensive of the 2nd Field Army began in the Gomel direction and in Polesie. In the area of ​​​​Zhlobin and Rogachev, the 63rd Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General L.G. Petrovsky was surrounded and defeated, Petrovsky himself, appointed commander of the 21st Army on August 13, died.

Developing an offensive to the south, on August 19, 1941, the German 2nd Field Army took Gomel. As a result of the fighting in the area of ​​​​Zhlobin, Rogachev and Gomel, the German command reported the capture of 78,000 prisoners, 144 tanks and more than 700 guns. A gap was made in the defense of the Central Front, the position of the left-flank 3rd Army worsened, which had to leave Mozyr on August 22.

On August 21, Hitler ordered the 2nd Field Army and 2nd Panzer Group to continue their advance south with the goal of reaching the rear of the Soviet Southwestern Front.

Meanwhile, on August 8, formations of the 19th (Lieutenant General I.S. Konev) and 30th (Major General V.A. Khomenko) Armies resumed attacks in the direction of Dukhovshchina. And although the next attempt of the Soviet troops to break through the enemy’s defenses and enter the operational space was unsuccessful, the German command began to express concern about the fate of the Barbarossa plan.

On August 16, a new offensive began on the central sector of the Soviet-German front by forces of the 30th (Major General V.A. Khomenko), 19th (Lieutenant General I.S. Konev), 16th (Major General K. K. Rokossovsky) and the 20th Army (Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin) of the Western Front with the goal of defeating the enemy’s Dukhschin group (9th Army).

At the same time, attempts by part of the Reserve Front forces to defeat the Yelnin group continued. Only on August 21, unsuccessful attacks aimed at eliminating the Yelninsky ledge were stopped.

In the conditions of the advancing south of the German 2nd Panzer Group on August 16, at the junction of the Reserve and Central Fronts, a new Bryansk Front was created (Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko) as part of the 50th Army and the 13th Army transferred from the Central Front . The Soviet Supreme Command Headquarters assumed that the enemy's plan was to strike in order to bypass the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts from the south through Bryansk, and created a new front to cover the Moscow strategic region from the south.

The final stage of the Smolensk battle (August 22 − September 10)

On August 22, the Headquarters ordered the troops of the Western Front to continue the offensive begun on August 16. They were ordered to defeat the German 9th Army and reach the Velizh, Demidov, Smolensk line. At the same time, the troops of the left flank of the Reserve Front (24th and 43rd armies) received orders to put an end to the enemy’s Yelnya grouping, capture Yelnya and, having subsequently launched attacks in the direction of Pochinki, Roslavl, by September 8 reach the line Dolgiye Niva, Khislavichi, Petrovichi .

The idea of ​​the Soviet Supreme High Command Headquarters was to actively disrupt the advance of the troops of the right flank of Army Group Center in the southern direction.

On August 24, the Supreme High Command decided on the advisability of combining the efforts of the troops operating against the German 2nd Field Army and 2nd Tank Group, advancing on Konotop and the Gomel direction. For this purpose, the Central Front was disbanded, its armies were transferred to the Bryansk Front, which now included the 50th, 3rd, 13th and 21st armies. The commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko, was entrusted with responsibility for the defeat of the enemy group advancing to the south. On the night of August 30, he was given an order: go on the offensive to Krichev, Propoisk, and by September 15 to go to the Petrovichi, Shchors front.

This would mean the collapse of the right flank of the GA "Center". However, attempts by the fronts to implement this directive from Headquarters were unsuccessful.

On the northern flank, the offensive of the 22nd Army coincided with a new offensive of German troops in the Velikiye Luki area. On August 25, the enemy captured Velikiye Luki and completed the encirclement of the 22nd Army; only part of the troops managed to escape from the encirclement. On August 29, 1941, German troops captured Toropets.

In connection with the start of the German operation in the Velikiye Luki region, the offensive missions of the Soviet 29th Army were cancelled. Nevertheless, the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front went on the offensive on September 1, but were unable to break enemy resistance and advanced only a few kilometers. On September 10, the attacks were stopped, and it was ordered to go on the defensive at the occupied lines.

On August 30, two armies of the Reserve Front resumed their offensive: the 24th Army operated in the Elninsky direction, the 43rd Army attacked Roslavl. On September 5, the German 20th Army Corps, defending in the Yelnya ledge, began to withdraw; on September 6, Soviet troops occupied Yelnya. However, Soviet troops were unable to advance further.

An air operation was planned and carried out in the Bryansk Front zone, in which 460 aircraft of the Bryansk and Reserve Front Air Forces, the 1st Reserve Air Group and Long-Range Bomber Aviation took part. The operation was led by the deputy commander of the Soviet Army Air Force, General I. F. Petrov. The Air Force flew more than 4,000 sorties between August 29 and September 4. However, the results of the air operation were not fully used by the ground forces.

The 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were unable to build on their success, while the most powerful 50th Army of the Bryansk Front, which attacked in the direction of Roslavl in cooperation with the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front, did not act against 2nd Panzer Group, and against the 4th Army that had taken up the defense.

On August 31, the operational group of the Bryansk Front under the command of Major General A. N. Ermakov was brought into battle. In the multi-day tank battle near Trubchevsk, Soviet troops were unable to reach the communications of the 2nd Tank Group. It was also not possible to close the gap between the 21st and 13th armies, which increased to 60 km (on September 6, the 21st Army was transferred to the command of the Southwestern Front).

The transition to the defense of the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts on September 10 ended the Smolensk battle, enormous in scope and intensity.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Tank Group, having repelled Soviet attacks, continued its attack on the flank and rear of the Soviet Southwestern Front. By September 10, its troops crossed the Desna River, entered the operational space and on September 15 united with the 1st Tank Group of Army Group South in the Lokhvitsa area deep in the rear of the Soviet troops, encircling the Kiev group of Soviet troops: troops of the 5th, 21st , 26th and 37th armies of the Southwestern Front (see Kiev operation (1941)).

Results of the battle

The Battle of Smolensk was an important stage in the disruption of the German Blitzkrieg strategy and the Barbarossa plan. Despite heavy losses, Soviet troops slowed down the enemy's advance to the east and gained time to prepare for defense in the Moscow direction.

However, it was not possible to defeat the German troops. The Supreme Command headquarters always set offensive tasks for the fronts, although there were not always objective and subjective prerequisites for this. The offensives were carried out without careful preparation, hastily, without the necessary material support, in the absence of sufficient information about the enemy, without knowledge of his weaknesses.

After repelling the Soviet offensive and eliminating the forces of the Southwestern Front in the Battle of Kiev, German troops resumed their attack on Moscow (see Battle of Moscow).

The final stage of the Smolensk battle, the Elninsk operation, is associated with the appearance of guards units, formations and associations in the Red Army. In the fall of 1941, for mass heroism, courage of personnel, high military skill demonstrated during the bloody battles of the Smolensk Battle, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of September 18, 1941 No. 308, four rifle divisions 100th, 127th , the 153rd and 161st were renamed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards.

In just a few weeks of war, in the summer 1941 years, German troops, as is known, came close to the borders of the Smolensk region, subjugating border Belarus.
The enemy's onslaught was palpable, Soviet troops retreated in all directions, suffering huge losses, incomparable with the losses of the enemy. The most vulnerable areas were those bordering Belarus and Ukraine. The headquarters of the High Command, realistically assessing the situation, decides to initiate the first defensive battle on the territory of the Smolensk region.
The Battle of Smolensk has begun 10 July 1941 of the year. It was carefully prepared by the command, which clearly understood the enemy’s plans and tactical moves. All information was checked by experienced intelligence officers. The leadership of the headquarters had high hopes for this event: the Smolensk battle was supposed to give the first significant rebuff to the invaders.
Units of Soviet units opposed the most powerful group of German troops called “Center”. The Germans concentrated the largest amount of various weapons in their army. In terms of the number of combatants, the “Center” significantly exceeded the composition of the Soviet units.
At its core, the operation was a series of defensive and offensive operations. The territory covered not only Smolensk, but also some nearby areas of other regions. The front area is vast – with an area of ​​approximately 162,500 sq. km. The Reserve, Western, Central, and Bryansk fronts took part in the operation. The Smolensk-Moscow direction of attack has become key, since its geographical location represents a convenient, unique corridor between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Historians nicknamed this site “Smolensk Gate”. Recapturing these gates meant denying the enemy access to the capital.
The Smolensk operation included a number of smaller events. This is the liberation of cities (Smolensk, Polotsk, Bobruisk, Gomel, Mogilev, Velikiye Luki, Yelnya, Roslavl).
The German army units were the first to move towards Mogilev and Vitebsk. They crushed the offensive actions of Marshal I.S. Konev and advanced further to the east. At the same time, Guderian's tank army moved to the Dnieper, and with its successful formation, it also penetrated far to the east.
From the north, in the Nevel area, the Soviet army found itself semi-encircled, and only thanks to the Battle of Polotsk the situation improved a little. But the enemy’s rapid advance on Smolensk did not stop. There were fierce battles in the city.
In the southern direction, the successes of the Red Army were much better.
But still the situation remained difficult.

The second stage of the offensive of the German army (21 July 1941) began with the fact that the Germans decided that Soviet troops were not able to provide serious resistance.
However, Soviet troops were preparing a desperate response. The surrounded armies broke out of the encirclement, and Velikiye Luki was recaptured.
The Soviet military leadership created task forces under the command of experienced officers who were supposed to advance simultaneously and rapidly. In August, developing the offensive, our troops captured Gomel.
Only thanks to the constant onslaught in the southern direction from Smolensk did the Soviet army gain the advantage of an accurate and successful offensive.
As a result of bloody, desperate battles, the approaches to Moscow were recaptured by the Soviet army. But the losses were colossal.
So the German operations “Blitzkrieg” and “Barbarossa”, if not disrupted, were suspended for some time.
The news of the successful operation led to an unprecedented rise in the morale of personnel on all sectors of the front.

The Battle of Smolensk in 1941 lasted 2 months (from July 10 to September 10) and was a great achievement in the fight against the fascist occupation. The complex of offensive and defensive operations on four fronts made it possible to destroy the plans and take up time from the army of Nazi invaders.

Stages, goals of the battle

A large number of German troops surrounded Smolensk, as well as the nearest cities to it. But the Soviet Army managed to gather all its forces and organize the Western Front. During the defensive operation, several battles were fought.

The main clashes took place near Bobruisk, Velikoluksk, Gomel, Dukhovshchinsk, Elninsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Smolensk, Roslavl-Novozybkov. The goal of the entire complex of operations was to prevent the enemy from further approaching Moscow, to give the Soviet army the opportunity to prepare and organize its defense.

Reasons, preparation

The reasons for organizing defensive measures were the fact that the German command ordered its army to break through the Western Front at any cost for further rapid advance towards Moscow. From several large armies, a group called “Center” was created, led by Field Marshal Von Bock.

The Soviet command, having discovered Hitler's plans, issued a decree on the preparation of defensive-offensive measures to protect the path to Moscow and push the Germans away from the front line and Smolensk. S.K. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front, composed of several armies.

Progress of the operation, results

The German army was four times larger than the Soviet army, had a large range of equipment and modern weapons, this allowed it to occupy Smolensk for some time. Despite all the obstacles, the task of not letting the enemy go further was completed. Having received reinforcements, the USSR army launched a counter-offensive, which came as a complete surprise to the enemy.

Since the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops, the Germans were forced to turn from attackers into defenders. Subsequent reorganizations of the USSR army made it possible to create a powerful front. The battles lasted a long time and with varying success, the winners were either one or the other, but in the end the fascist threat in the direction of Moscow and Smolensk was eliminated.

The Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) is one of the largest-scale defensive-offensive operations of the Soviet Union army against the German army during the period.

The operation was carried out in Smolensk and nearby cities. The Battle of Smolensk, despite its name, is not a single clash between two armies, but a whole complex of large and small battles on the territory of the Western Front. It is also important to note that the Battle of Smolensk took place not only on the territory of Smolensk, but also affected many other cities.

It is customary to identify several main clashes during the Battle of Smolensk:

• Battle of Bobruisk;
• Battle of Velikiye Luki;
• Gomel defensive operation;
• Dukhovshchina operation;
• Elninskaya operation;
• Defense of Mogilev;
• Defense of Polotsk;
• Defense of Smolensk;
• Roslavl-Novozybkov operation.

The main goal of the Smolensk operation was to prevent the enemy from breaking through towards the Moscow strategic direction, thereby enabling the USSR to more thoroughly organize the defense of the capital and not allow the Nazis to take the city.

Reasons for the Battle of Smolensk

In July 1941, the German command set its army the task of encircling and capturing Soviet troops located on the territory of the Western Front (Western Dvina, Dnieper, Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk). This was necessary in order to open the way for Hitler’s army to Moscow. To carry out the operation, the Center group was sent, which included several large and well-equipped armies under the command of Field Marshal T. von Bock.

Preparations for the Smolensk operation

The Soviet command became aware of the plans, so an order was issued to immediately begin preparations for their own defensive-offensive operation, which was supposed to protect the path to Moscow and push the Germans further from Smolensk and the front line. For these purposes, at the end of June, several Soviet armies were deployed on the middle reaches of the Dvina and Dnieper, which became part of the united Western Front under the command of S.K. Tymoshenko.

Soviet soldiers were also sent to several other strategically important points, but were unable to get there in time. Unfortunately, the preparation of the defense began too late, so by the beginning of the operation the Soviet army was scattered, there was no single line of defense, there were significant gaps in it, which allowed the Germans to strike more accurately at weak points and undermine the defense.

German troops also did not reach Smolensk in full strength: part of the army was delayed by battles in Belarus. However, even this delay could not significantly affect the balance of power: the German army was almost four times larger than the Soviet one, moreover, the Germans had the most modern equipment and weapons.

Progress of the Smolensk battle

The first attack occurred on July 10, 1941, when the German army began to advance on the right wing and center of the Western Front. The attacking group consisted of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions, which was several times larger than the defensive detachments of the Soviet army. The attack ended with a complete breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which allowed German troops to confidently move towards Mogilev. Mogilev was also captured in the shortest possible time, followed by Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelny and Krichev. The Soviet army not only suffered losses and lost the operation, but also lost a number of divisions that found themselves surrounded by Germans.

On July 21, the Soviet army received reinforcements and could participate in battles on almost equal terms. At the same time, the command announced the start of a counteroffensive - Soviet troops carried out a surprise attack, and a fierce battle ensued.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to defeat the German army this time, but Soviet soldiers broke German resistance and actually forced Hitler’s army to retreat. From that moment on, the Germans turned from attackers into defenders, and the initiative was in the hands of the command of the USSR army. Several Soviet units were reorganized to create a more powerful front.

On August 8, the picture changed again. The Germans again went on the offensive in the area of ​​the Central and Bryansk fronts. This was necessary in order to protect the German army from the Soviet threat and provide the opportunity for a wider and more open offensive. The Germans managed to force the retreat of the Soviet army, but it later turned out that this was a strategic move by the USSR to bring up new forces to remote areas. On August 17, the USSR again launched an offensive against German troops, which ended with huge losses for the latter.

Throughout the entire campaign, the balance of power changed every now and then, and the initiative passed from the USSR to Germany, but the German army suffered more and more losses every day, while the Soviet troops were in a more advantageous position. On September 8, 1941, the USSR managed to completely eliminate the fascist threat in this direction and secure the routes to Smolensk and, accordingly, to Moscow from the west.

Results of the Smolensk operation

Despite the length of hostilities, as well as the numerical and technical superiority of the Nazis, the USSR still managed to defend Smolensk. The victory at Smolensk thwarted the further plans of the German command, which allowed the USSR to gain an advantage and time to organize an army.

The USSR managed to gain time to ensure the protection and defense of Moscow, which was the main goal of the Germans.

The tragedy of 1941. Causes of the disaster [anthology] Morozov Andrey Sergeevich

D. E. Komarov UNKNOWN BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

D. E. Komarov

UNKNOWN BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

In modern historical science and society, there has recently been an increased interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Many scientific and journalistic works appear, examining various episodes of that war. However, it should be noted that various pages of the Great Patriotic War are now being studied far from equally. Against the background of increased attention to the events in the Leningrad direction, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Vyazemsky encirclement, the problems of the Smolensk Battle are practically not being developed. The degree of scientific study and understanding of this battle, colossal in its scale and consequences, is still at the level of the early 80s. last century. Suffice it to say that in Russian historiography there is no monographic study devoted to this most important event in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Such “inattention”, both on the part of official science and independent modern researchers, is difficult to explain. Most likely, the attention of researchers is primarily attracted to the so-called “blank spots,” and the Battle of Smolensk, “about which so much has been written,” is considered a well-established topic. However, this is not the case. The Battle of Smolensk is far from an unambiguous and controversial page of the bloodiest war in the entire history of mankind.

The Smolensk region, where the main events of the battle unfolded, was not a border region, but already three weeks after the start of the war, fighting took place on its territory. The enemy offensive developed rapidly. Units of the Red Army, resisting the enemy, retreated. At the end of June, fighting was already taking place in the area of ​​the old border. On June 26, German troops occupied Minsk, and on June 30 they entered Lvov. In the first 15–18 days of the war, enemy troops advanced in the North-Western direction to a depth of 450 km; in Western - 450–600 km; in South-West - up to 350 km. Units of the Red Army suffered huge losses.

The Nazi command considered the main direction of the offensive to be the central - Moscow direction. It was here that the enemy concentrated his main forces. Of the total number of manpower and equipment concentrated for the attack on the USSR, Army Group Center included 40.2% of all divisions (including 48.2% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet of the Luftwaffe. They accounted for 36% of all personnel, 53% of tanks, 41% of guns and mortars and 43% of aircraft deployed from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea. Parts of this group were supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District located in the Bialystok ledge, and after their destruction, develop an offensive against Smolensk and Moscow. The main attack of Nazi troops took place on the territory of the Smolensk region. It was here that a grandiose confrontation between opposing forces unfolded on the central sector of the front in the initial period of the war, which went down in history as the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941).

The Battle of Smolensk represents the first major defensive operation of the initial period of the war, in which the enemy's advance was stopped for two months. The enemy suffered significant losses, and in some areas was forced to retreat (Yelninsky offensive operation). If failures in border battles with the enemy could, to a certain extent, be justified by the fact of surprise and lack of preparation, then the Smolensk battle developed under completely different conditions. There is no longer any need to talk about surprise, the main plans of the enemy and the tactics of the enemy troops were clearly outlined, the country turned on its mobilization, political and economic resources to full capacity, units and formations were pulled up from the rear areas, a great patriotic upsurge reigned in society.

The Battle of Smolensk was a complex complex of interconnected offensive and defensive actions of Soviet troops on a huge section of the front of 650 km and a depth of up to 250 km. This battle spread to the territory of Smolensk and nearby regions. Units and formations of four Soviet fronts - Western, Reserve, Central and Bryansk - took part in it. The main direction where the main hostilities unfolded was the Smolensk-Moscow direction, and the hub of our defense was the city of Smolensk. Due to its geographical features, this area received the code name “Smolensk Gate” (the interfluve of the Western Dvina and Dnieper). It was the possession of these “gates” that opened the way to Moscow.

The enemy’s successes in breaking through the state border and in Belarus in the first two weeks of the war gave the German command confidence that in the rear of the Western Front there were no reserves capable of providing serious resistance on the way to Moscow. After the defeat near Minsk, our troops retreated to Mogilev and Zhlobin, and on the Soviet-German front in the Sebezh-Mogilev sector, a “gap” was formed, where the troops of Army Group Center aimed their attack. The commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, determined the forces of the Western Front in the Smolensk-Moscow direction to be only 11 divisions. In this regard, the German command considered the defeat of parts of the Western Front as a fait accompli and planned further actions. Chief of the General Staff Halder noted on June 30: “When we cross the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy’s armed forces, but about taking away industrial areas from him,” “after the destruction of the Russian army near Smolensk ... cut the railways leading to the Volga and take possession of the entire territory up to this river.”

The general plan of the enemy’s actions in the Smolensk direction was to cut the defenses of the Western Front into three parts, encircle and eliminate its Nevelsk, Smolensk and Mogilev groups and thereby create favorable conditions for an attack on Moscow.

The enemy troops in this direction were opposed by the practically newly created Western Front under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, whose troops had to create a defensive line: the river. Zap. Dvina to Vitebsk, Orsha, r. Dnieper to Losev. By this period, the front command had scattered and weakened divisions of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies, which had withdrawn from the border areas and were withdrawn for reorganization and replenishment. At the same time, the forces of the fresh 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies, included in its composition and arriving in early July from the rear areas and other sectors of the front, were transferred to the front. In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Smolensk, seven armies were operating as part of the Western Front, five of which (13, 19, 20, 21 and 22) were allocated to the first echelon. The second echelon was to consist of units of the 4th and 16th armies. Understanding the complexity of the situation in the Western direction, Headquarters made a decision in the rear of the Western Front, 100 km east of Smolensk, to deploy a front of reserve armies, which included six combined arms armies, a significant part of which were staffed by militia formations.

For a long time, in Soviet historiography, as an explanation and justification for the catastrophic defeats of the initial period of the war, including the unsuccessfully started Battle of Smolensk, they referred to the enemy’s superiority in manpower and equipment. To show this “superiority”, the authors resorted to a variety of methods - from open falsification to “original” techniques. For example, the total number of troops on the Western Front at the beginning of the enemy offensive was 579,400 people. However, in official science, not the entire combat power of the Western Front was compared with the enemy forces, but only the forces of the first echelon, which amounted to 24 divisions, 145 tanks, about 3,800 guns and mortars and 389 serviceable aircraft. Each first-echelon division accounted for 25–30 km of the front line of defense, and in some areas - up to 70 km. At the beginning of the offensive, Army Group Center had 29 divisions (12 infantry, 9 tank, 7 motorized and 1 cavalry), 1040 tanks, more than 6600 guns and mortars and over 1 thousand aircraft. With this comparison, at the beginning of the enemy offensive on July 10, the ratio of the forces that entered the battle was in favor of the enemy: in people - 1.5: 1; in artillery 1.7:1; in tanks - 7:1.

As a rule, what followed was a description of the complexity of the situation in which the practically newly formed Western Front entered the battle. Our troops did not have time to prepare defensive lines in engineering terms; often the defense was organized under fire from the advancing enemy. The command did not have clear intelligence information about the deployment, forces and plans of the Nazis. Many divisions did not have time to deploy on the indicated lines before the start of the enemy offensive and were immediately introduced into battle: in the Polotsk direction - units of the 22nd Army, in the Lepel direction - of the 20th Army, at the crossings of the Dnieper at Bykhov and Rogachev - of the 21st Army .

Of course, all these facts took place, but citing them without analyzing the state of the enemy troops on the eve of the offensive contradicts scientific principles. Firstly, not all forces of Army Group Center were able to take part in the offensive “on Smolensk”. The offensive began when the battle between Bialystok and Minsk was not over. Secondly, the enemy has largely lost its penetrating ability. The tank units of Army Group Center were pretty battered by the resistance of the Soviet army and the poor roads. In the 3rd Tank Group alone, tank losses amounted to 50% in the first days of July. There were significant losses in manpower. Thus, from June 22 to 28, the 9th Army Corps suffered losses of 1,900 soldiers and officers (killed and wounded), the 78th Infantry Division lost 340 people in Belarus, the 137th - 700, the 263rd - 650, etc. d. It is obvious that at the beginning of the offensive the central group of German troops did not have the superiority that was attributed to it in Soviet historiography. On the contrary, we can agree with the German historian W. Haupt, who noted that “for the first time during the campaign it turned out that the Soviets were stronger.”

From the very beginning of the war, the Nazi command did not hope for a numerical superiority of its troops, especially against the backdrop of the mobilization capabilities of the Soviet Union, the enormous superiority of the Red Army in tanks, aviation, etc. The German command relied on the speed, preparedness and coherence of the military mechanism. The haste in the offensive was caused primarily by the desire to prevent the creation of a strong defense by the armies retreating from Belarus and Soviet units newly arriving at the front.

To quickly break through our defenses, the German command created a significant superiority in forces in the main attack zone. The concentration of tanks at the breakthrough sites reached 30 units per kilometer of front. Thus, in the offensive zone of the enemy’s 18th tank and 29th motorized divisions (offensive front 37 km), 350 tanks were brought into battle. The opposing 18.53 and 110th Soviet Rifle Divisions had no tanks at all. Sixteen enemy divisions acted against six divisions of the 22nd Army, defending in a 280 km zone.

On July 10, 1941, Nazi troops in the central sector of the front went on the offensive. The Germans delivered the main blow in two directions - from the Vitebsk area towards Dukhovshchina (in order to bypass Smolensk from the north) and from the Orsha-Mogilev area to Yelnya (to bypass Smolensk from the south and thereby encircle the main forces of the Western Front). At the same time, in the north - on the right wing of our Western Front - the enemy launched an auxiliary strike in the north-east direction towards Nevel and Velikiye Luki, and on the left wing - in the south-east in the direction of Krichev. With these attacks, the Nazis planned to isolate the flank groupings of the Soviet troops of the Western Front.

At the beginning of their offensive, the Nazis achieved significant success, but then the situation began to change. Instead of a swift, victorious operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were drawn into a bloody two-month battle on the Smolensk borders.

Even in the Soviet period, a periodization of the Battle of Smolensk developed, considering this grandiose confrontation on the central sector of the front in four stages: the first - from July 10 to 20; the second - from July 20 to August 7; third - from August 8 to 21; the fourth - from August 22 to September 10. The very isolation and definition of the boundaries of these periods (taking as a basis the nature of military operations, the setting of goals and the results achieved) seems quite legitimate, however, many conclusions from the standpoint of the achievements of modern science seem very controversial.

Let us make an attempt to analyze the stages of the Battle of Smolensk from the perspective of a set of documents and materials that are currently available to modern Russian researchers.

The first stage was characterized by a successful start to the offensive for the German army, especially on the right wing and in the center of the Soviet Western Front. Our troops were forced to retreat to the east. The 22nd Army of General F.A. Ershakov, fighting in the Polotsk region, was cut into two parts, and its divisions fought surrounded. The 19th Army of General I. S. Konev, which did not have time to concentrate and deploy at the indicated line, was unable to hold back the enemy’s onslaught and retreated to Smolensk, where, together with the 16th Army of General M. F. Lukin and the 20th Army of General P. A. Kurochkina fought almost completely surrounded. The 13th Army of General V.F. Gerasimenko was also cut up, one part of it fought surrounded in the Mogilev area, the other in the Krichev area.

On the southern flank of the Western Front, the situation developed differently. Here, the 21st Army of General F.I. Kuznetsov on July 13 went on the offensive in the direction of Bobruisk and drove the Germans out of the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin. This blow came as a complete surprise to the German command, and it hastily began to transfer mechanized units from near Smolensk to the breakthrough area.

A difficult situation was developing directly in the Smolensk direction. The enemy looked for weak points in our defense and directed attacks from their motorized units there. So, for example, having encountered stubborn resistance on the main road to Smolensk from Orsha, which was provided by units of the 20th Soviet Army, the invaders changed the direction of the main attack, rushing to Krasny. By July 14, 1941, the tank divisions of the 39th German motorized corps made their way to Rudna and Demidov, the 47th motorized corps rushed to Smolensk through Krasny, the 46th corps covered Smolensk from the south. A catastrophic situation was developing - on the fifth day of the offensive, the enemy found himself at the gates of Smolensk. On July 14, the commander of the Western Front issued an order according to which the defense of the city was entrusted to the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General Lukin, and all Soviet troops located in the city’s defense sector and arriving from the rear and from other directions were subordinate to him.

It should be noted that General Lukin received this order a day and a half before the enemy captured Smolensk. It is legitimate to pose the question - did Lukin have the opportunity to prevent the capture of Smolensk? In our opinion, the answer is obvious - the front command set General Lukin an already impossible task. At the time, the army commander had only two divisions at his disposal - the 46th of Major General Filatov and the 152nd of Colonel Chernyshev, which occupied the defense north of the Moscow-Minsk highway (the remaining divisions of the army were either transferred to other armies or were on the way to Smolensk ). The only thing that the command of the 16th Army could do in this situation was to create mobile mobile groups to cover the most dangerous directions. One of these groups, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Bunyashin, set up an ambush near the village of Khokhlovo on the Krasny-Smolensk road: ditches were dug, rubble was made between the houses, guns and machine guns were placed so that they could conduct crossfire. An enemy motorcycle regiment fell into this ambush and was almost completely destroyed. Subsequently, the Nazis made three attempts to take Khokhlovo, but each time their attacks were repulsed by bravely defending Soviet soldiers. Only after the fourth assault did the detachment begin to retreat to Smolensk.

Of course, the heroic resistance of individual units and formations could weaken and delay the advance of Nazi troops in certain directions. The soldiers of the 127th Infantry Division showed themselves courageously at the beginning of the Battle of Smolensk, and on July 11 they entered into battle 30 km from Rudnya with the advanced units of the enemy’s 3rd Tank Group. With a swift and unexpected blow, the division's soldiers attacked the enemy's rearguard and put them to flight. Having brought up the main forces, the enemy attacked the division's positions, and he managed to encircle one of its battalions. The encircled battalion under the command of Captain M. S. Dzhavoev, sensing a weak point in the enemy’s defenses, quickly broke out of the encirclement. During the first days of the battle, this battalion alone destroyed more than a hundred Nazis and 20 enemy tanks. A striking example of heroism and military skill is the attack of the 57th Tank Division under the command of Colonel V. A. Mishulin. The division was advanced from Smolensk to the Krasny region and immediately entered into a counter battle with the enemy’s 29th motorized division. The enemy, having suffered significant losses, was forced to suspend his offensive. But the fate of the city, which did not have sufficient forces for defense and found itself under a concentrated attack from motorized enemy groups, was already sealed.

On the evening of July 15, enemy mobile groups from the Roslavl, Kyiv highway and Krasninsky highway entered the southern part of Smolensk. During July 16, the Nazis managed to capture most of the city. Resistance to the enemy directly in the city was provided by the Smolensk garrison, the most combat-ready part of which was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Bunyashin. In addition to this detachment, the following entered the battle on the streets of Smolensk: the brigade of P. F. Malyshev, a detachment of city police under the command of G. N. Odintsov, cadets of the police school led by F. I. Mikhailov, a fighter battalion under the command of E. I. Sapozhnikov and etc. These semi-regular formations could not organize persistent, organized resistance. First, the defenders retreated to the city center, then to the park of culture and recreation and to Smirnov Square. At night, having blown up the bridges behind them (on July 15 at 24.00 the new bridge across the Dnieper was blown up, on July 16 at 2–3.00 the old one was blown up, but there is some information that the railway bridge was not destroyed, which the enemy immediately took advantage of), the defenders of the city crossed to the other bank of the Dnieper.

In post-war historiography, a certain template has developed within the framework of which these battles are described. The central place is occupied by the heroic examples shown by the defenders of Smolensk during the defense of the city. In battles on the streets of the city, the brave G.N. Odintsov and F.I. Mikhailov died. At the House of Specialists, policeman G.I. Poddubny performed a heroic feat, throwing himself under an enemy tank with a bunch of grenades. The defenders of the northern part of the city showed particular tenacity, about whom German sources say the following:

“In the northern part of the city, in the industrial suburbs, the police and workers' militia fought stubbornly. Each house, each basement had to be stormed separately, knocking out the defenders with small arms, hand grenades and bayonets.”

Undoubtedly, those Soviet armed forces that took part in the defense of the city showed heroism and determination, but these facts should not obscure the scale of the disaster that occurred - almost immediately the Nazis captured the most important stronghold of our defense, which was of enormous strategic and political importance. The enemy's rapid capture of Smolensk is a clear indicator of the level of organization and command of troops in the western strategic direction. Upon the capture of Smolensk, a special “Military Expert Commission on the issue of the abandonment of Smolensk by our troops on July 15–16, 1941” was created, headed by General I.P. Camera.

Of course, when working with the documents of this commission, it is necessary to take into account the conditions in which it worked, and the pressure from the Headquarters, and personally from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but at the moment the materials of the commission are one of the few official documents in which significant material about the capture is summarized and analyzed Smolensk. Already in the very name of the commission, which worked in hot pursuit, the phrase “abandonment of Smolensk” was indicated. The definition of military operations in the Smolensk region as “defense of Smolensk” will appear much later. The results of the work of this commission were summarized in November 1941. According to the data collected by the commission, units with a total number of 6.5 thousand people were directly involved in the defense of the city, and in the garrison there were “no personnel units, but only reserve and special ones.” Regarding the battles directly outside the city, the commission makes an unambiguous conclusion:

“The battles directly for the city of Smolensk on July 15, 1941 continued extremely quickly.”

Both the garrison command and the command of the 16th Army, which were entrusted with responsibility for the defense of the city, did not take effective measures to ensure a stable and effective defense of Smolensk: “instead of organized resistance to the enemy, in the southern part of the city with the available forces... the defense of the city resulted in scattered battles with the enemy”, “from 16 A, who knew about the difficult situation of the city, no real measures were taken, and the entire fight against the advancing enemy was transferred to the hands of only the garrison commander.” With regard to those units that covered the southern part of the city, the commission’s conclusion, based on the conclusions of the Military Council of the 16th Army, sounds unequivocal: “they turned out to be extremely unstable and during the first clash with the enemy they surrendered the city without any armed resistance”.

As we can see, the commission made a conclusion that is not entirely consistent with the scale of the events that took place. The enemy's capture of Smolensk was the culmination of a large-scale operation of the German Army Group Center, which unfolded on a front of several hundred kilometers and almost 200 kilometers deep into our defense. Such a scale cannot be the area of ​​responsibility of the army command (in our case, the 16th Army). In addition, responsibility for the defense of the city was entrusted to General Lukin just a day and a half before the invaders entered the southern outskirts of Smolensk. The enemy's rapid capture of Smolensk is a clear indicator of the level of organization and command of troops in the entire western strategic direction (on the scale of the front, both the General Staff, and Headquarters).

The commission's conclusions about the rapid capture of the city without staunch resistance from its defenders are confirmed by documents from the German side. Thus, in the report of one of the units that took part in the capture of Smolensk, it was noted: “When we entered this dead city, a ghostly picture opened before us. No shots were heard. The individual Soviet soldiers who appeared took to their heels. All bridges across the Dnieper were destroyed." Having “observed” the breakthrough of the mobile German group to Smolensk, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction S.K. Timoshenko and the Commander of the Western Front took actions to defend the northern part of the city and return Smolensk under their control. Already on July 16, the 129th, 12th and 158th rifle divisions came under Lukin’s command. These forces significantly outnumbered the enemy troops, who captured almost the entire city. But time was lost, the enemy firmly entrenched himself on the achieved lines. Our units moved to the defense of the northern part of the city along the Dnieper River.

As you know, the capture of Smolensk aroused anger on the part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Subsequently, Soviet troops, in pursuance of Stalin's orders, would carry out constant attacks in order to recapture Smolensk. So, on July 20, soldiers of the 127th and 158th rifle divisions crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and began fighting with the enemy, liberating part of the city, but were unable to gain a foothold on the captured lines.

It is sad to realize that in almost the same way, but without any opposition, the Nazis, more than two months later, would capture Vyazma, thereby completing the creation of the huge “Vyazma Cauldron.” Moreover, it should be noted that our troops were unable to effectively use natural barriers in defensive battles: in Smolensk - the Dnieper, in the Vyazma direction - the Dnieper, Vopets and other rivers. But these same obstacles cost our soldiers enormous blood during the liberation of the region in 1943.

Very often, especially in Soviet historiography, one of the main reasons for the capture of Smolensk is the lack of engineering and defensive structures. But in the initial period of the Smolensk battle, a similar situation developed in other sectors of the front where there were defensive structures. For example, in the report of the operational department of the headquarters of the 24th Army, units of which defended the city of Yelnya, on July 18 it was noted that the construction of defensive lines in the city area was completed by 85 %. However, despite the time available for preparation and arrangement of defensive lines, the presence of artillery, the city of Yelnya was taken by the enemy during a fleeting battle on July 19, 1941.

It can be concluded that the Soviet high command did not develop effective measures to combat enemy mobile formations. The enemy, using them, broke through the defense line, entered the operational space, and made large-scale movements with deep coverage of tens and even hundreds of kilometers. Moreover, according to the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group G. Hoth, Smolensk was captured on July 16 by the forces of just one 29th Motorized Division.

Based on the above materials, it can be argued that numerous Soviet historiography, testifying to the facts of feat and heroism in the battles for Smolensk, is associated with individual, isolated facts of heroism on July 15–16, 1941 in the battles for the city (but not mass heroism and perseverance ), which is quite traditional. As you know, very often the fearlessness, courage and heroism of individual soldiers is what compensates for mass panic, irresponsibility, and sometimes open betrayal. In separate works, considering the “heroic defense of Smolensk,” the authors focus on the facts of heroism and courage shown by Soviet soldiers during the period of numerous attempts to recapture the city, but not during its defense. The feasibility of capturing Smolensk by troops who themselves were almost completely surrounded and who would sooner or later be tasked with breaking through to the main forces of the front seems rather vague. But this was the requirement of Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

At the first stage of the Battle of Smolensk, the Nazis achieved the main goals of the initial stage of the offensive operation. They managed to break through the front line, advance 200 km, capture Smolensk, Yelnya, Velikiye Luki, Yartsevo and practically encircle units of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies. However, it was precisely in these first days of the Battle of Smolensk that Hitler’s strategy began to crack.

Firstly, the Soviet troops offered strong resistance to the enemy, which the enemy did not expect, thinking that our troops would retreat to the east due to the threat of encirclement. Thus, in the report on the combat operations of the 2nd tank group from July 12 to August 10, 1941, it was noted: “When very large enemy forces were discovered in front of the 2nd tank group east of the Dnieper and south of Smolensk, the command of the 3rd tank group did not believed that the enemy would risk throwing them into a decisive battle near Smolensk.” As can be seen from the document, the enemy expected that our troops, due to the threat of encirclement, would retreat to new defensive positions, and they did not plan to create a “Smolensk cauldron”. But the fighting began to develop according to a different scenario. And, as it turned out, the forces for the rapid defeat of the Soviet troops in the current situation at the front were clearly not enough.

Our troops not only put up serious resistance, but also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. For example, the encircled units of the 13th Army of General V.F. Gerasimenko only from July 11 to 16, according to Soviet data, in the area between the Dnieper and Sozh rivers they destroyed 227 vehicles, 27 guns, 11 aircraft and at least 1 thousand Nazis. The troops of the 20th Army under the command of General P.A. Kurochkin east of Orsha inflicted significant losses on the enemy’s 27th Motorized Corps. The enemy lost 35 tanks and 25 motorcycles and was forced to fight in this area for three days. Even taking into account the additions inherent in Soviet military statistics, it can be argued that the enemy in the Smolensk direction suffered losses (German statistics will be given below), which were unparalleled during the entire previous period of the Second World War.

Here, near Orsha, the first blow was struck against the enemy with BM-13 rocket launchers. The salvo, which lasted only 15 seconds, caused significant damage to the enemy.

Units of the Red Army managed to carry out a number of counter-offensive operations. The greatest success was achieved by the offensive of the 21st Army corps under the command of F.I. Kuznetsov, individual units of which managed to break through 80 km into the depths of enemy defenses. In total, the army's troops pinned down up to 15 fascist divisions, which significantly weakened the enemy's onslaught in the main direction.

Secondly, after the capture of Smolensk, the enemy was unable to launch a further attack on Moscow. On July 17, the path to enemy units was blocked by a formed battle group under the command of General Rokossovsky, consisting of the 38th Infantry Division and the 101st Tank Division, and the active actions of the encircled Soviet units did not give the Nazis the opportunity to release a sufficient number of troops for a successful advance in the Moscow direction. The troops of K.K. Rokossovsky not only stopped the enemy, but also carried out a rapid and unexpected offensive operation for the enemy. On July 19–20, 1941, having crossed the river, they struck at the enemy, who had not had time to gain a foothold, and liberated the city of Yartsevo (almost two months before the liberation of the city of Yelnya, recognized as the first liberated during the war).

In addition, as noted above, the German command expected that, due to the threat of envelopment, our troops would retreat. However, our units, semi-encircled, organized an active defense and made continuous attempts to recapture Smolensk. The enemy clearly did not have enough forces to defeat this group. The German troops resembled a boa constrictor that had swallowed prey it could not digest. In the future, the lessons of the “Smolensk cauldron” will be used in the preparation of Operation Typhoon, when the enemy concentrated the necessary amount of forces not only for a rapid breakthrough and encirclement, but also for the rapid destruction of the encircled troops. The “Vyazemsky Cauldron” was cleared by the enemy in less than ten days.

Thirdly, the enemy was unable to achieve complete encirclement and isolation of units of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies from the main forces of the front. Partly, the presence of a corridor connecting the Soviet troops located in the Smolensk area with the main forces of the front is explained by the inconsistency of the actions of the German army and tank groups (the troops of the 2nd German tank group and the 4th Army, operating from the south, “were late in reaching the intended line” ). Almost throughout the entire period of fighting by the encircled Soviet armies in the enemy rear, there was a crossing across the Dnieper near the village of Solovyevo (15 km south of Yartsevo), which provided the encircled 16th and 20th armies with communication with the main forces of the front.

If in the first period of the Battle of Smolensk Soviet troops fought predominantly defensive battles, then in the subsequent period parts of the Western and Reserve Fronts (within the Smolensk region) conducted offensive operations.

The second period of the Battle of Smolensk is characterized by the transition of units of the Western Front to the offensive with the goal of returning Smolensk and destroying the Smolensk enemy group. It is distinguished by the widespread use of active methods of combat on both sides, which led to a sharp increase in tension in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. And it was at this stage of the Battle of Smolensk that the tension in the confrontation between Soviet and German troops in the western strategic direction reached its culmination - the German command would go on the defensive in the central sector of the front.

On July 19, the Headquarters decided to conduct a counteroffensive in the Western Front. The next day, July 20, negotiations between Stalin and Zhukov took place with front commander Timoshenko, where the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in his characteristic manner, set the task for the marshal to create strike groups of 7-8 divisions: “I think it’s time for us to move from small-scale struggles to action in large groups.”

In pursuance of the order of the Headquarters, 5 army operational groups were created from 20 divisions of the front of the reserve armies, each consisting of 3-4 divisions, which became part of the Western Front. These groups of troops, which were led by generals V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinin, K.K. Rokossovsky, V.Ya. Kachalov and I.I. Maslennikov, were to deliver simultaneous attacks from the northeast, east and south to general direction to Smolensk. After defeating the enemy who had broken through, they were supposed to unite with the main forces of the 16th and 20th armies.

When planning the actions of our operational groups, the Soviet command set ambitious tasks for them, indicating errors in assessing the operational situation in the Western direction and underestimating the enemy. So, for example, the group of General Khomenko on July 24 was given the following task: “... the main task of this group is to defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region and reach the Dnieper River line to restore the situation and expel the enemy from the Orsha region” (information from the negotiations on BODO between Zhukov and Tymoshenko July 24).

To increase the striking power of these groups, a tank battalion (21 tanks) was transferred to each division assigned for the offensive, and the 104th tank division was transferred to General Kachalov’s group. To support and cover strike groups from the air, three aviation groups were allocated, each consisting of up to a mixed aviation division. In addition to this, taking into account the extended communications of the enemy and the lag of his rear units, it was decided to send a cavalry group (consisting of three cavalry divisions), concentrated in the zone of the 21st Army, on a raid behind enemy lines.

The situation was not conducive to going on the offensive, but its necessity was obvious. It was impossible to give the Nazis the opportunity to take advantage of the results achieved in the Smolensk direction. It was necessary to force his strike forces to disperse and pull enemy troops to secondary directions. In addition, an important task was to remove the threat of complete encirclement of the 16th and 20th armies.

The fact that a certain number of armored vehicles and aircraft were allocated to strike groups of 20 divisions indicates that at that time the front troops and all armed forces had the necessary reserves and forces to carry out major offensive actions. In Soviet historiography, attention is focused on the insufficient strength and weakness of these task forces, but this does not seem to be the main problem. It should be recalled that enemy troops captured Smolensk with only one division. The main issue of the effective use of these forces lies in the calculated and competent strategy for using these troops, in identifying the most vulnerable areas of defense, in the coherence and coordination of actions and the skill of the troops.

The offensive of our troops, on the 20th of July, coincided with active offensive actions by enemy troops, seeking to expand and strengthen the outer ring of encirclement. The battles of the second period were distinguished by their opposing nature and fierceness. However, it should be said that it was not possible to achieve this goal during the offensive of the Western Front units at the end of July 1941. The forces to deliver effective strikes on the enemy were clearly insufficient; moreover, the troops acted in isolation from each other and had too little time to prepare the operation. In some areas, our troops managed to achieve some success. Thus, the strike group of troops of the 30th Army acted in the direction of Dukhovshchina and advanced with battles 20–25 km, pinning down large enemy forces. The offensive of other parts of the Western Front was not successful. For example, General Kachalov’s group, which went on the offensive on July 23, found itself surrounded and suffered significant losses. By July 27, the group's divisions, during continuous battles, lost: 104 TD - 1,540 people killed and wounded; 143rd Infantry Division - 966 people killed and wounded; 145 SD - 2241; in the entire group only 45 guns of all calibers remained, etc. During the breakout from the encirclement, General Kachalov also died. Almost the entire Kachalov task force was destroyed and captured by the enemy. In the operational report of the GA "Center" dated August 8, 1941, it was noted that in the Roslavl area 38,561 Red Army soldiers, 250 tanks and reconnaissance vehicles, 359 guns of all calibers, etc. were captured.

The desire to return Smolensk by any means to fulfill the demands of Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief led to the fact that units of the 16th and 20th armies, which had stormed the outskirts of the city since July 20, weakened their flanks. On July 26–27, the enemy managed to strike at the rear of these armies and encircle them north of the city.

In addition, a simultaneous strike by task forces did not work out. For example, a group of troops under General Rokossovsky was unable to go on the offensive at the set time, repelling numerous enemy attacks. But it was this group that, having stopped the enemy, struck a blow that ensured a break in the enemy ring, in which at the end of July units of the 20th and 16th armies north of Smolensk found themselves.

Despite heavy, incessant fighting and heavy losses, including those under encirclement, units of the Red Army, according to the German military leaders themselves, fought “fiercely and fanatically.” Fierce resistance by Soviet troops near Smolensk weakened the offensive power of the German Army Group Center. She found herself pinned down on all sectors of the front. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, wrote in those days: “I am now forced to bring into battle all my combat-ready divisions from the reserve of the army group... I need every person on the front line... Despite the huge losses... the enemy attacks every day in several sectors in such a way that until now it has not been possible to regroup forces and bring up reserves. If a crushing blow is not struck somewhere in the near future, then the task of completely defeating them will be difficult to complete before the onset of winter.” It was during the Battle of Smolensk that the Nazi command’s miscalculation in assessing the ability of the Soviet troops to resist was clearly evident.

As a result of persistent and bloody defensive battles near Smolensk and on other sections of the Soviet-German front, the enemy’s offensive tempo weakened, Wehrmacht units were exhausted and suffered significant losses, and, most importantly, the enemy could no longer conduct an offensive in all three main directions.

Based on the current situation, Hitler signed Directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941, according to which the troops of Army Group Center were to go on the defensive. By order of the Fuhrer, the main efforts of the Wehrmacht were transferred from the center to the flanks. In August, it was planned to continue the offensive, primarily with the goal of encircling and destroying Soviet troops in Ukraine, and also, together with Finnish troops, to blockade Leningrad. The tank groups that were part of Bock's troops were withdrawn from the battles for the urgent restoration of combat effectiveness and their subsequent use on the flanks of the Eastern Front (the 2nd tank group of General Guderian came under the command of the commander of Army Group South, the 3rd tank group of General Hoth supported offensive of Army Group North). This decision was the last point in a long dispute between Hitler and the German General Staff about the direction of strategic strikes in the war with the USSR. Many prominent military leaders of Nazi Germany (Halder, Jodl, Guderian, Tippelskirch, etc.) considered the decision to turn forces south to “seize Ukraine” as one of the tragic decisions during the war with Russia.

Thus, the heroism of Soviet soldiers in the central direction and other sectors of the front forced the German command to reconsider the original plans and change the direction of the main attacks in August-September. Among the German generals at this time, doubts were increasingly expressed about the “possibility of achieving decisive success” in certain areas, because the stubborn resistance of the Red Army “leads to a critical aggravation of the situation in certain areas.” According to the German side, from June 22 to August 13, 1941, the losses of the entire eastern front amounted to 3,714 officers, 76,389 soldiers and non-commissioned officers; wounded - 9,161 officers and 264,975 soldiers and non-commissioned officers. These figures represented approximately 10% of the total number of troops on the eastern front. Compared to the Wehrmacht losses in Poland and France, they were extremely large.

However, Soviet troops suffered significantly greater losses. For example, in August 1941 alone, the troops of the Western Front lost 138 thousand people. Researcher L.N. Lopukhovsky, using the example of individual units of the Soviet and German armies opposing each other, attempted to determine the ratio of losses during the defensive battles of this period in the western direction. Comparing the 19th Soviet Army, whose losses amounted to 45 thousand people from August 1 to September 10, 1941, and the losses of the German 8th Army Corps opposing it - about 7 thousand people, supporting its 7th Panzer (about 1 thousand people) and the 14th motorized (about 1 thousand people) divisions, he received a ratio of 4.4: 1 in favor of the enemy.

The third stage of the Battle of Smolensk resulted from the peculiarities of the operational-strategic situation that was developing at that time on the Soviet-German front. Between 8 and 21 August, the Soviet command made a new attempt to seize the initiative. With the turn of a significant part of the forces of Army Group Center to the south, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts went on the offensive with the aim of defeating the Elninsky and Dukhshchinsky enemy groups. It should be noted that in the first half of August the epicenter of military events moved to the south, to the Central Front (created by the Headquarters on July 24 with the 13th and 21st armies subordinate to it), and then to the Bryansk Front (created on August 16 as part of the 13th and 50th armies).

On August 8, the enemy's 2nd Tank Group went on the offensive and broke through the defenses of the Central Front in the 13th Army zone. At the same time, the 2nd Field Army deeply enveloped the 21st Army from the east. Simultaneously with the strikes of the enemy troops, units of the Western Front also resumed offensive operations. The troops, in accordance with the order, had to “firmly holding the borders of the Dnieper River with the left wing of the front and repelling enemy attacks on its right wing, defeat and destroy the enemy’s Dukhshchinsky group with the center.” The main role in solving the task was assigned to the formations of the 19th and 30th armies.

On August 8, the troops of these armies went on the offensive, and for several days parts of the armies unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy positions. The Germans organized a dense defense and offered effective resistance. One of the few positive results of our offensive on Dukhovshchina was a breakthrough in the 19th Army zone from the enemy rear of General Boldin’s group, which carried out a 500-kilometer raid behind enemy lines. On August 15, the front command gave the order to continue the Dukhovshchina operation. This stage of the Dukhovshchina operation was more carefully prepared and provided with troops and weapons. On August 17, the 19th Army began the offensive, and then the 30th and 29th Armies took over. The troops broke through the enemy's defenses, but failed to develop further success. The offensive capabilities of the armies have dried up. But as a result of offensive actions, the enemy was forced to transfer the 57th Mechanized Corps from the 3rd Tank Group to the Dukhshchinsky direction.

The offensive by the Reserve Front units in the Elninsky direction was less successful. Units of the 24th Army did not complete their assigned task - to destroy the Yelninsky ledge. But it was precisely the active offensive actions that led to the fact that the strike group that the enemy concentrated in the area of ​​the Yelninsky ledge was drained of blood. Thus, in a telegram report from the headquarters of the 46th Tank Corps to the commander of the 2nd German Tank Group it was noted:

“There are ongoing battles in the area of ​​the Yelninsky bridgehead. The combat effectiveness of the corps, especially the SS divisions and the Grossdeutschland infantry regiment, is decreasing daily to such an extent that their further combat use raises serious doubts.”

UNKNOWN ABOUT THE FAMOUS PHOTO OF V. A. Opakhov with his daughters Laura and Dolores. Photo LENTASS, May. 1942…Spring day 1942. Two women are walking down the street, with them is a girl of about five years old - she is trying to play and jump as she goes... At that moment a military man photographed them