Reduction of nuclear weapons. Russian-American treaties on the reduction of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arsenal of Russia and the USA

July 31, 1991 USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev And US President George H. W. Bush The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed. Despite the considerable efforts that countries have made in this direction, the problem of mutual nuclear threat has not yet been resolved and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. According to Russian military experts, this is due to the actions of the United States, which are pushing the world towards a new arms race.

On the brink of war

The nuclear race between the USSR and the USA became a true attribute of the Cold War, which began in the late 50s. World powers competed furiously in military power, sparing neither money nor human resources. It’s a paradox, but perhaps it was the extreme efforts in this race that prevented any of the countries from clearly surpassing the “potential enemy” in weapons, and therefore maintained parity. But in the end, both superpowers found themselves even over-armed. At some point, there was talk of reducing strategic arms - but also on a parity basis.

The first negotiations to limit nuclear stockpiles took place in Helsinki in 1969. The signing of the SALT I treaty by the leaders of the countries dates back to this period. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level at which they were at that moment, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles strictly in the same quantity as the obsolete ground-based missiles that had previously been decommissioned. The second treaty - SALT-2 (essentially a continuation of the first) - was signed 10 years later. It introduced restrictions on the placement of nuclear weapons in space (orbital rockets R-36orb) and although it was not ratified by the US Senate, nevertheless, according to experts, it was implemented by both sides.

The next stage of negotiations on the need to reduce strategic arms took place in 1982, but did not lead to anything. Negotiations were suspended and resumed several times.

In October 1986, at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, the USSR put forward a proposal for a 50% reduction in strategic forces and agreed not to take into account the strategic weapons available to US NATO allies. However, the Soviet Union's proposals were linked to the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty signed in 1972. Perhaps that is why these proposals remained unanswered.

In September 1989, the USSR decided not to link the issue of missile defense with the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of strategic arms, and also not to include sea-launched cruise missiles in the scope of the new treaty. It took about two years to finalize the text. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, on whose territory nuclear weapons were stationed, recognized themselves as its successors under the treaty. By signing the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledged to eliminate or transfer nuclear weapons to Russian control. They soon acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states.

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed on July 31, 1991 in Moscow by the Presidents of the USSR and the USA, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush. It prohibited the development and deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles, heavy ballistic missiles, underwater launchers of ballistic and cruise missiles, high-speed reloading systems for launchers, increasing the number of charges on existing missiles, and converting “conventional” nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. True, the document only came into force on December 5, 1994, becoming the first (ratified) arms control treaty to ensure a real reduction in deployed strategic weapons and establish a strict regime for verifying its implementation.

How much was and how much became

The system for monitoring the implementation of the START I treaty included mutual inspections at base sites, notification of the production, testing, movement, deployment and destruction of strategic offensive weapons. At the time of signing START-1, according to data from September 1990, the USSR had 2,500 “strategic” delivery vehicles, on which 10,271 warheads were deployed. The United States had 2,246 carriers with 10,563 warheads.

In December 2001, Russia and the United States announced the fulfillment of their obligations: Russia remained with 1,136 delivery vehicles and 5,518 warheads, the United States - 1,237 and 5,948, respectively. The agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons - START-2 - was signed in Moscow January 3, 1993. In many ways, it relied on the basis of the START-1 treaty, but envisaged a sharp reduction in the number of ground-based missiles with multiple warheads. However, the document did not enter into force, since the United States did not complete the ratification process, in 2002 withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, to which START II was linked.

Proposals for the development of START-3 began to be discussed in March 1997 during consultations Presidents of the Russian Federation and the USA Boris Yeltsin And Bill Clinton in Helsinki. This agreement was planned to establish “ceilings” at the level of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads, and there was also an intention to give the agreement an open-ended nature. However, at that time the document was not signed. The initiative to restart a new negotiation process in June 2006 was made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the development of the document began in April 2009 immediately after the meeting President Dmitry Medvedev And Barack Obama in London as part of the G20 summit. Negotiations began in May 2009, and ended 11 months later with the signing of an agreement by the presidents of Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 in Prague (START-3, “Prague Treaty”). Its official name is the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It came into force in February 2011 and will be in force for 10 years.

At the time of the development of the document, Russia had 3,897 nuclear warheads and 809 deployed launch vehicles and launchers in its arsenal, while the United States had 5,916 nuclear warheads and 1,188 launch vehicles and launchers in its arsenal. As of June 2011, when Russia and the United States first exchanged data under START III, Russia had 1,537 warheads, 521 deployed carriers, and together with non-deployed ones, 865 units. The United States has 1,800 warheads, 882 deployed carriers, with a total number of 1,124. Thus, even then Russia did not violate the treaty-established threshold for deployed carriers of 700 units and was lagging behind the United States in all respects.

“I have a hard time assessing the signing of the disarmament treaty, because parity was violated by the United States, which is now led by peace activist and Nobel laureate Comrade Obama. In fact, the Americans deceived us then. They never told us the truth. When the USSR collapsed, they clapped their hands. They promised that NATO would not expand, but it has already approached Russia’s borders to such an extent that it is just a stone’s throw away,” believes Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vladimir Komoyedov, hinting at the unreliability of the partnership with America.

Military expert Igor Korotchenko I agree that stopping the USSR military race was the right decision, but at the same time it was completely uneven.

“During the Soviet era, we had an abundance of nuclear weapons. Just like the Americans had it in excess. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce objectively. But we just got really into it. We first began to reduce nuclear forces, then agreed to the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact without any clear compensation from the West. After this, well-known events occurred related to the collapse of the USSR,” Igor Korotchenko explained to AiF.ru.

Not by quantity, but by quality

At the moment, experts say that parity has been restored.

“It was achieved a long time ago. But quality remained with the United States, which has about two-thirds of its nuclear-tipped missiles on submarines, which are constantly on the move. And we have them all on stationary launchers, which are easier to hit. Therefore, the Americans came up with the concept of a lightning strike, and today they are building an additional missile defense system, but in fact it is a surveillance system, fire support, and the border itself. Plus, they established a ship line in the English Channel area and strengthened the continental industrial region of New York,” Komoyedov explained to AiF.ru.

According to him, the United States today wants to intimidate Russia and dictate its terms to it, but “they need to hide these emotions and ambitions somewhere” and instead start negotiating.

In 2014, for the first time since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia caught up with the United States both in the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles, and in the number of warheads (including in connection with the adoption of nuclear submarines of the new Project 955, equipped with Bulava missiles with several warheads; in addition, the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles with one warhead were replaced by Yars missiles with three warheads). Thus, as of September 1, 2014, the United States had 794 deployed carriers, and Russia only 528. At the same time, the number of warheads on deployed carriers for the United States was 1642, for Russia - 1643, and the number of deployed and non-deployed installations for the United States - 912, Russia - 911.

According to the US State Department data on the progress of implementation of START III dated January 1, 2016, the United States has 762 deployed nuclear warhead carriers in its arsenal, Russia has 526. The number of warheads on deployed carriers in the United States is 1,538, in Russia - 1,648. Overall, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB in the USA - 898, in Russia - 877.

According to Korotchenko, first of all, parity is based on the implementation of existing restrictions under the START-3 treaty, which is a strategic further step in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

“Today, the Russian strategic nuclear forces are being updated, primarily due to the arrival of new silo-based and mobile-based solid-fuel RS 24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, which will form the basis of the grouping of strategic missile forces for a period of 30 years. A decision was also made to begin the development of a combat railway missile system, plus a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile using liquid fuel is being developed. These are the main directions related to maintaining parity in terms of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). As for our naval nuclear forces, Borey-class submarine missile cruisers with Bulava sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are being serially built and transferred to the fleet today. That is, there is parity in naval nuclear forces,” says Korotchenko, noting that Russia can respond to the United States in the airspace.

But as for the proposals coming from the United States about further reductions in nuclear weapons or about nuclear zero in general, Russia, the expert believes, will not respond to these proposals.

“For the United States, the role of nuclear weapons is decreasing every year, thanks to the fact that they are developing conventional high-precision strike weapons, which achieve the same effect as when using nuclear weapons. Russia is relying on nuclear forces as the basis of our military power and maintaining balance in the world. Therefore, we will not give up nuclear weapons,” says the expert, emphasizing the inappropriateness of further reduction of nuclear weapons.

According to him, America is now pushing the world with all its actions to resume the arms race, but it is not worth giving in to this.

“We need to maintain a self-sufficient defense balance,” Korotchenko believes.

Based on the fact that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR, it is a full participant in international treaties ratified by the USSR.

At the end of July 1991, the START-1 Treaty was signed in Moscow. We can safely say that in terms of its scope, degree of detail, and complexity of the problems resolved in it, this is the first and last Treaty of this kind. Subject of the agreement: ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, TB, as well as ICBM warheads, SLBMs and TB nuclear weapons. The parties agreed to reduce their strategic weapons to the level of 1,600 deployed carriers and 6,000 warheads on them. At the same time, the number of our heavy ICBMs must be reduced by half. Restrictions were also introduced on non-deployed assets. For the first time, a limit was set on the total throw weight of ballistic missiles. It should not exceed 3600 tons.

It turned out to be very difficult to agree on the procedure for counting strategic offensive weapons, especially TB weapons. Without dwelling on this issue in detail, it should be emphasized that ultimately a conditional counting was adopted here - a heavy bomber was counted as one unit in the number of carriers, and all nuclear bombs and short-range missiles on it were counted as one nuclear warhead. As for ALCMs, they were counted as follows: for the USSR within 180 TB - 8 warheads on each bomber, for the USA within 150 TB - 10 warheads, and in addition to these agreed quantities for each TB, the number of ALCMs was counted for which it is actually equipped with.

Arms reductions must be carried out gradually within 7 years from the date of entry into force of the Treaty. It should immediately be noted that the Treaty came into force three and a half years after its signing in December 1994. There were reasons for such a long delay (unfortunately, there is no opportunity to dwell on them). In December 2001, the parties completed reductions in their weapons to the agreed levels provided for in the START I Treaty. Arms reductions were carried out through their elimination or re-equipment according to detailed procedures. Lukashuk, I.I. International law. General part: textbook. for law students fak. and universities; 3rd edition, revised. and additional / I.I. Lukashuk. - M.: Wolters Kluwer, 2005. - 432 p.

Monitoring compliance with obligations under the START I Treaty includes the use of NTSC; 14 different types of inspections; continuous surveillance at mobile ICBM production sites; providing access to telemetric information transmitted from ballistic missiles during their launches, including the exchange of magnetic tapes with recorded telemetric information; confidence measures that contribute to the effectiveness of control. To facilitate the implementation of the goals and provisions of the START I Treaty, the Joint Commission on Compliance and Inspections (JCI) was created and is still functioning.

It must be said that later important changes occurred in the negotiation process.

Even before the START-1 Treaty entered into force, the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of START was signed (in January 1993), which received the name START-2 Treaty. This Treaty is ninety percent, if not more, based on the provisions of the START-1 Treaty, and therefore it was prepared in an extremely short time, approximately within six months. Tolstykh, B.JI. International law course: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluwer, 2009. - 1056 s.

The START-2 treaty provided for a reduction in the parties' strategic offensive arms to a level of 3000-3500 warheads, with a sub-level of 1700-1750 warheads on SLBMs. The advantage of this Treaty can be considered the agreement on a real accounting of weapons for all TBs. At the same time, its features, and many experts considered its shortcomings, were the requirements for the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs, as well as the complete elimination of all our heavy ICBMs. It was possible to reorient (without any mandatory procedures) up to 100 TB to perform non-nuclear tasks. In essence, they were removed from the count. Essentially all restrictions on the possibility of reducing the number of warheads on ballistic missiles were lifted.

All this, it was believed, gave clear advantages to the United States and, as a result, predetermined very heated discussions during the ratification of this Treaty in the State Duma. Ultimately, the State Duma ratified the START-2 Treaty, but the US Congress did not complete this procedure (the Protocol to the START-2 Treaty, signed on September 26, 1997 in New York, on the extension of arms reduction deadlines) was not ratified. With the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, the question of bringing the START II Treaty into force was finally removed. Russian Foreign Ministry June 14 this year made an official statement that in the future we do not consider ourselves bound by the obligation to comply with this Treaty.

With the advent of the George W. Bush administration in the United States, there has been a sharp change in the American side's attitude toward the development of agreements in the field of arms control. A line was proclaimed to carry out arms reductions unilaterally, without the development of legally binding documents, without appropriate control. It is clear that such an approach, if adopted, would lead to the destruction of the negotiation process. This could not be allowed.

In such conditions, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials of Russia and the United States was born, which was prepared in record time and signed on May 24 of this year in Moscow. This Treaty immediately caused heated debate. Supporters of the Treaty see the reductions envisaged in it to the level of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads as a step aimed at further strengthening strategic stability. It is also considered an achievement that it is legally binding. Opponents of the SNP Treaty emphasize that it is essentially only a document of intent. It does not define the subject of the agreement, there are no rules for counting nuclear warheads, reduction procedures, or control provisions. Reductions under the new Treaty should be completed in 2012. At the same time, it maintains the START I Treaty, which expires 3 years earlier - in 2009. And it is not clear how the new Treaty will function during these three years?

Of course, all these questions are fair. But we cannot ignore the fact that the reduction in the level of warheads on deployed carriers from 6000 units. (under the START-1 Treaty) until 1700-2200, this is a step that helps strengthen security and stability.

By the end of the 1990s. The process of nuclear disarmament between countries has significantly slowed down. The main reason is the weakness of the Russian economy, which could not maintain the quantitative parameters of strategic forces at the same level as the Soviet one. In 2002, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SNP Treaty) was concluded, which entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Treaty consists of 5 articles; strategic vehicles are not mentioned in it. According to the agreement, the parties pledged to increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012. However, the treaty does not have a clear concept of what is meant by the term “strategic nuclear warhead,” and therefore it is not clear how to count them. When signing the SNP Agreement, the parties did not agree on what they were going to reduce, and therefore this agreement does not provide for control measures. After the signing of this agreement, a many-year period of stagnation began in the disarmament sphere, and finally, in 2009-2010. Certain positive trends began to appear. Tolstykh, B.JI. International law course: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluwer, 2009. - 1056 s.

On April 5, 2009, in Prague (Czech Republic), the US President announced an initiative on a future without nuclear weapons and possible ways to achieve it. During his speech, Barack Obama not only noted the existing challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, ongoing nuclear weapons testing, the black market for trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, etc., but and outlined the trajectory that must be followed to build a world without nuclear weapons. First, it is a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of states. Work in this direction must begin with the reduction of strategic weapons. To implement a global nuclear test ban, the Obama Administration will immediately and aggressively seek U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encourage other countries to join in the process. To close the pipelines that supply the elements needed to build nuclear bombs, it is necessary to seek a new treaty that would ban in a controlled manner the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons arsenals.

Secondly, to strengthen the NPT, a number of principles must be adopted:

• 1. It is urgently necessary to find additional resources to strengthen the powers of international inspections;
• 2. There must be real and immediate consequences for countries that break the rules or attempt to withdraw from the NPT without good reason.

Violators of NPT norms must be punished. On April 6, 2010, a new US nuclear doctrine was adopted, which allows the US to use nuclear weapons against a number of states, in particular those that do not comply with their obligations under the NPT. Moreover, these countries are specifically named - North Korea and Iran;

3. A new framework for civilian nuclear cooperation must be created, including an international nuclear fuel bank, so that all countries that have renounced nuclear weapons have access to peaceful energy without increasing the risk of proliferation. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the context of modern international legal order / O.G. Paramuzova. - St. Petersburg: Publishing house S.-Petersburg. University, 2006. - 388 p.

At the same time, the US President stated that his administration will strive to interact with Iran on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. The United States supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities, subject to strict inspections by the IAEA. However, until these checks are fully implemented, Iran's activities pose a threat to Iran's neighbors, the United States, and American allies. As long as the threat from Iran continues, the United States will continue to implement plans to create an effective missile defense (BMD) system. If the Iranian nuclear threat is eliminated, the United States will cease its missile defense program; 5. There is an urgent need to work together to ensure that terrorists are never able to acquire nuclear weapons. In this regard, Barack Obama announced a new international effort aimed at securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. All countries must develop partnerships to ensure strong protection of these potentially dangerous materials and increase their efforts to disrupt the black market, identify and intercept materials in transit, and use financial instruments to eliminate channels of this dangerous trade. We need to start with the global summit on nuclear security.

The United States, as the only nuclear power that has used nuclear weapons, has no moral right to remain inactive, which is why the President of the United States has clearly and with conviction declared America's commitment to the cause of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the US President especially emphasized that he understands well that this goal will not be achieved quickly, perhaps this will not happen while he is alive, but the entire world community will need patience and perseverance in resolving this complex issue.

For its part, the Russian Federation has always supported and interacted with the authors of initiatives aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament (the Hoover Initiative, the Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, etc., which are based on proposals aimed at strengthening the NPT and solving global security problems on a multilateral basis) . Russia views the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of a gradual, step-by-step process of general and complete disarmament. This goal can only be achieved through an integrated approach under favorable international conditions, i.e. while maintaining strategic stability and observing the principle of equal security for all states without exception, taking into account the existing inextricable relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, as stated by the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. On February 5, 2010, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved, which directly states that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the existing balance of forces in the nuclear missile sphere, as well as an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons are the main external military dangers for Russia.

The Russian Federation also believes that in order to strengthen international security, it is necessary to formulate specific parameters under which further progress along the path of nuclear disarmament is possible. We are talking about conditions such as the resolution of regional conflicts, the removal of incentives for states to acquire or retain nuclear weapons, a controlled cessation of the buildup of conventional weapons and attempts to “compensate” with them for the reduction of nuclear systems, reliably ensuring the viability of key disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, and preventing the deployment of weapons in space. The Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of nuclear states also remains relevant. Its implementation would lead to the maximum expansion of the territory of areas where nuclear weapons are completely absent. Russia believes that in the foreseeable future, all states possessing nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons states, should smoothly join the Russian-American efforts to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.

outside the NPT framework.

An important step in the process of nuclear disarmament should be the early entry into force of the CTBT. Russia welcomes the changed position of the United States in relation to this treaty and persistently calls on all states, and primarily those on which the entry into force of this Treaty depends, to sign and ratify it without delay. Compliance with a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, despite the importance of this measure, cannot replace legal obligations in this area. An important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be the early launch of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the development of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for Nuclear Weapons (FMCT). Sidorova E. A. International legal regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. K.Yu. n. -M., 2010.

The priority remains the task of preventing nuclear materials and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors, primarily terrorists. It is necessary to increase multilateral cooperation in this matter based on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004.

Due to the rapidly growing demand for energy in the world, which the peaceful atom can satisfy, Russia believes that movement towards “global zero” is impossible without building a modern proliferation-resistant architecture for international cooperation in the peaceful nuclear sphere, based on tough instruments for verifying non-proliferation obligations under the 1968 NPT, as well as multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Russian Federation considers it an important task to improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of the Additional Safeguards Protocol, which should become mandatory standards for verifying compliance with obligations under the NPT and a universal standard in the field of nuclear export controls. Today, Russian * initiatives on the development of global nuclear energy infrastructure and the creation of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services are being implemented in full swing. A serious step forward was the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Russian proposal to create a guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA.

On March 29, 2010, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, V.I., spoke at a session of the UN Disarmament Commission. Churkin, who outlined in detail Russia’s official position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and on May 4, 2010, at the next Review Conference to review the NPT, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.A. spoke. Ryabkov, who covered in detail the work done by Russia within the framework of the NPT. In particular, it was noted that the Russian Federation is consistently working to reduce its nuclear arsenal. The obligations under such disarmament agreements as the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty have been fully implemented. The Russian Federation considers it necessary to systematically move forward along the path of real nuclear disarmament, as required by Art. VI NPT. Aware of its special responsibility as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia, in a spirit of goodwill, continues deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive weapons. One of the important steps on this path was the signing on April 8, 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic

offensive weapons.

The provisions of the new Treaty provide that each of the parties reduces and limits its strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, their total quantities do not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles; 1,550 units for warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy tanks; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers (PU) of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as TB (Articles I and II of the Treaty). This level enshrines deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as warheads, in the legal framework of the Treaty, which makes it possible to limit the “return potential” of the parties (the possibility of a sharp increase in the number of deployed warheads in a crisis situation) and creates an additional incentive for the elimination or re-equipment of reduced strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the Treaty provides that each party has the right to independently determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Thus, the Russian Federation has once again clearly demonstrated its desire for large-scale reductions in strategic offensive arms. Now it is necessary to ensure the speedy ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force, as well as to guarantee the consistent and steady implementation of all obligations laid down in the Treaty without exception. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the context of modern international legal order / O.G. Paramuzova. - St. Petersburg: Publishing house S.-Petersburg. University, 2006. - 388 p.

According to experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as soon as the START-3 Treaty enters into force, the further subject of negotiations between the parties should be non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and missile defense (ABM). It seems that, in isolation from them, further progress along the path of strategic offensive arms reductions will be extremely difficult.

There is no international legal mechanism for non-nuclear weapons requiring their control and reduction. Carried out in the early 1990s. reductions in non-nuclear weapons were carried out by the USSR/RF and the USA on a voluntary basis and unilaterally. There are no official data on the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to estimates by non-governmental experts, the United States currently has about 1,300 nuclear warheads of this class, and Russia has about 3,000. The danger of further maintaining NSNW is explained by the fact that, firstly, NSNW stockpiles will introduce a certain destabilizing factor into Russian-American relations and slow down any drastic changes in the field of disarmament; secondly, stockpiles of non-nuclear weapons will make it difficult to involve other nuclear states in the process of controlled reduction of nuclear weapons; and third, the lack of control over non-nuclear weapons will be a source of doubt among non-nuclear-weapon countries about the commitment of the United States and Russia to their obligations under the NPT. Sidorova E. A. International legal regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. K.Yu. n. -M., 2010.

However, establishing control over non-nuclear weapons is impossible without their complete withdrawal from European territory due to the fact that the non-nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are considered strategic by the Russian military, since they are located in sufficient proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will strive to link its readiness to consider non-nuclear weapons issues with the agreement of NATO and EU countries to accept for consideration the Russian proposal to develop a Treaty on European Security. In addition, there are technical difficulties in establishing control, which are due to the fact that it must be installed directly over nuclear weapons, and not delivery vehicles.

Taking further steps to reduce nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the issue of missile defense. Unilateral US actions to create a missile defense system raise Russian concerns regarding its impact on the survivability of Russian strategic forces. When signing the START III Treaty, Russia issued a Statement on Missile Defense, in which it was noted that the new Treaty could be effective and viable only in the absence of a qualitative and significant quantitative increase in the capabilities of US missile defense systems, which could ultimately lead to to the emergence of a threat to Russian strategic forces. The fact is that the US replacement of plans adopted by the previous administration for the deployment of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland removed the urgency of the issue only for a while, since the new four-story adapted plan for building a US missile defense system in Europe provides for the deployment by 2020 of a system capable of intercepting ICBMs . Therefore, today it makes sense to take advantage of the current positive situation to resume efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures and develop cooperation in the field of missile defense. The first step in this direction, according to the Russian Federation, could be work on a joint assessment of the capabilities of “third” countries in the field of creating ballistic missiles in order to develop a common point of view on emerging threats. This, in particular, would be facilitated by the opening of the Data Exchange Center for Early Warning Systems (DEC). On June 4, 2000, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a corresponding memorandum regarding the creation of a joint data center, which was supposed to begin operating from the moment of signing until 2010, but the work on creating the data center encountered organizational problems, and as a result, the data center never began operating despite of all importance for cooperation and the formation of relations between Russia and the United States.

Cooperation between Russia and the United States to find comprehensive solutions to the problems identified above will create real conditions for the further stage of nuclear arms reduction.

The serious concerns of the world community in connection with existing challenges related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for international action to prevent them were reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted unanimously on September 24, 2009. The resolution contains two main conclusions: first, modern challenges in the area of ​​nuclear weapons proliferation can and should be resolved on the basis of the NPT, which has stood the test of time and has established itself as the only universal basis for interaction in this sensitive area; secondly, the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists is of serious concern, which means it is necessary to strengthen the international “safety net”, which allows such risks to be mitigated at distant approaches.

On April 12-13, 2010, a nuclear safety summit was held in Washington (USA), in which representatives of 47 countries, including Russia, took part. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss ways to improve physical nuclear protection and prevent the danger of nuclear terrorism. At the summit it became known that Canada had abandoned significant reserves of highly enriched uranium. Chile and Mexico abandoned all uranium reserves. The same intention was expressed by the President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych, who stated that all reserves of highly enriched uranium will be exported to the Russian Federation by 2012. Russian President D. Medvedev announced the closure of the reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium in the city of Zheleznogorsk.

During the summit, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signed a Protocol to the 2000 bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the disposal of plutonium, declared as plutonium that is no longer needed for defense purposes, its management and cooperation in this area. This agreement was signed by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Vice President of the United States on August 29 and September 1, 2000. In accordance with Art. XIII of the Agreement, it was to apply provisionally from the date of its signing and enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification that the parties had completed their internal procedures necessary for its entry into force. Unfortunately, the agreement was never implemented due to some technical reasons. The protocol signed by H. Clinton and S. Lavrov should eliminate these technical obstacles, as a result of which the practical implementation of the agreement will become possible. The agreement itself is a concretization of the joint Statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States on the principles of handling and disposal of plutonium, declared as plutonium that is no longer necessary for defense purposes, dated September 2, 1998.

In accordance with the principles for the disposal of such plutonium agreed upon in the Statement, the Agreement provides for its disposal as nuclear fuel in existing nuclear reactors, reactors that may appear in the future, as well as through immobilization with highly radioactive waste or any other mutually agreed means (Article III of the Agreement). The agreement does not provide for any restrictions on the type of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. In accordance with Art. II of the Agreement, each party must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of disposition plutonium. The implementation of this Agreement will also clearly demonstrate the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States to the further development of the nuclear disarmament process, since in addition to the actual limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic offensive weapons, it is necessary to do something regarding the plutonium that is released as a result of this process, which is an important contribution to the implementation Art. VI NPT.

The Washington summit ended with the signing of a joint declaration, which stipulated further actions on disarmament. The next summit is scheduled for 2012, which will be held in South Korea.

Iran was not invited to the nuclear security summit in Washington and, as an alternative, on April 17-18, 2010, Tehran hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held under the motto “Nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear weapons for no one.” The conference was attended by representatives from more than 50 countries, including the Russian Federation, who outlined their national approaches and priorities in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament. In addition, representatives of the expert community and relevant non-governmental organizations made presentations.

As a result of the conference, a document was adopted that set out the main provisions of the discussions. In particular, it was said about the need for nuclear disarmament as the main priority of human society, as well as the complete destruction of these inhumane weapons within a certain period of time; implementation of disarmament obligations assumed by nuclear-weapon states on the basis of the NPT and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, full implementation of the “13 Steps to Disarmament” program; conclusion of a universal Convention and adherence to a non-discriminatory and legal approach to the problem of a complete ban on the proliferation, production, transfer, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the experience of concluding two conventions: the Development, Production Prohibition Convention and the accumulation of stockpiles of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 1993, as well as the provision of security guarantees to non-nuclear countries until general disarmament is achieved; implementation of further programs to create nuclear weapon-free areas in various regions of the world, especially in the Middle East; compliance with the principles of immutability, openness and truthfulness in the implementation of international control over the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The document also emphasizes the right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the need to develop international cooperation in this area based on the obligations formulated in Art. IV NPT; serious concern was expressed regarding the weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the application of double and discriminatory standards by some nuclear powers and, especially, the cooperation of these nuclear countries with states that are not parties to the NPT and their ignorance of the fact that they have a nuclear arsenal.

Taking into account the importance of this Conference and the results achieved at it, Iran proposed to send the final document of the forum to the UN Secretary-General, as well as other international bodies and organizations. Taking into account the attention shown by the participants of the Conference to the topic discussed at it, as well as in order to monitor the implementation of the tasks set by the Conference, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its participants, it was decided to hold the second meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and International Security in the second half of April 2011. in Tehran.

Thus, based on the above initiatives and real steps taken by nuclear countries, it can be assumed that building a nuclear-free world is not a utopia. Progress towards it is possible subject to the adoption of effective, systematic, consistent legal measures in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the world community does not jointly strive for a world without weapons, then it will forever remain out of reach. Paramuzova O.G. Nuclear safety in the context of modern international legal order / O.G. Paramuzova. - St. Petersburg: Publishing house S.-Petersburg. University, 2006.

Disarmament Week is observed annually from 24 to 30 October, as stipulated in the Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly.

Disarmament is a set of measures designed to stop the buildup of means of war, their limitation, reduction and elimination. The general international legal basis for disarmament is contained in the UN Charter, which includes “the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” among the “general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security.”

The only multilateral negotiating forum of the international community to develop agreements on disarmament issues - Conference on Disarmament(Conference on Disarmament). Created in January 1979. As of 2007, there are 65 member states.

Since decisions of the Conference on Disarmament are taken strictly by consensus, the body has had difficulty agreeing on a major program of work since 1997 due to a lack of agreement among participants on disarmament issues.

Nuclear weapon

Nuclear weapons began to be produced in 1945. Since then, more than 128 thousand charges have been manufactured. The arms race peaked in 1986, when the total global nuclear arsenal reached 70,481 warheads. At the end of the Cold War, a process of reduction began. In 1995, the total number of charges was 43,200, in 2000 - 35,535.

As of January 1, 2007, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces included 741 strategic delivery vehicles capable of carrying 3,084 nuclear warheads.

The most important arms reduction treaties

Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). Signed on May 26, 1972. He limited the number of anti-missile systems of the USSR and the USA to two on each side - around the capital and in the area where intercontinental ballistic missile launchers are concentrated (in 1974, the USSR and the USA signed an additional protocol limiting the number of anti-missile systems to one on each side). Ineffective since June 14, 2002, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from it.

Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I Treaty). Signed on May 26, 1972. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers of the USSR and the USA to the level reached at the time of signing the document, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles placed on submarines, strictly in the quantity in which obsolete ground-based ballistic missiles had previously been decommissioned.

Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II Treaty). Signed on June 18, 1979. He limited the number of launchers and introduced restrictions on the placement of nuclear weapons in space.

Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Signed on December 7, 1987. The parties pledged not to produce, test or deploy medium-range (1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and shorter-range (500 to 1,000 kilometers) land-based ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, the parties pledged to destroy all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers within three years. This was the first time in history that agreement was reached on the issue of real arms reduction.

By June 1991, the agreement was fully implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems, the USA - 846. At the same time, the technological equipment for their production was eliminated, as well as operational bases and training places for specialists (a total of 117 Soviet facilities and 32 American ones).

Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1 Treaty). Signed on July 30-31, 1991 (an additional protocol was signed in 1992, which recorded the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). The USSR and the USA, within seven years, pledged to reduce their own nuclear arsenals to 6 thousand warheads on each side (however, in reality, according to the rules for counting warheads carried on heavy bombers, the USSR could have about 6.5 thousand warheads, the USA - up to 8 .5 thousand).

On December 6, 2001, the Russian Federation and the United States announced the fulfillment of their obligations: the Russian side had 1,136 strategic delivery vehicles and 5,518 warheads, the American side had 1,237 strategic delivery vehicles and 5,948 warheads.

Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2). Signed on January 3, 1993. It included a ban on the use of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and provided for a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 2003. It did not come into force because in response to the US withdrawal from the Russian ABM Treaty on June 14, 2002, it withdrew from START-2. Replaced by the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SOR Treaty).

Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SRT Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty). Signed on May 24, 2002. Limits the number of nuclear warheads on combat duty to 1700-2200 for each side. Remains in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the parties.

Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and has more than 170 member states (this does not include, in particular, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Establishes that a state possessing nuclear weapons is considered to be one that produced and detonated such weapons before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France, China).

Since the signing of the NPT, it has been possible to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons from 55 thousand to 22 thousand.

Multilateral Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Opened for signature on September 24, 1996 and has 177 member states.

Conventional weapons

Main documents:

1980 - The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCWW) prohibits certain types of conventional weapons considered to cause excessive injury or have indiscriminate effects.

In 1995, a revision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention) resulted in Amended Protocol 2, which imposes tighter restrictions on certain uses, types (self-deactivating and detectable) and transfers of anti-personnel mines.

1990 - The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) limits the number of various types of conventional weapons in a region stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

However, a group of states considered the measures taken to be insufficient and developed a document on a complete ban on all anti-personnel mines - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines - which was opened for signature in 1997. As of 2007, 155 states have joined the convention.

The application of the conventions has resulted in the destruction of stockpiles, the clearance of areas in some States and a reduction in the number of new casualties. At least 93 states are now officially mine-cleared, and at least 41 of the 55 producing states have stopped producing this type of weapon. States that are not members of either convention have declared a unilateral moratorium on the use and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Chemical and biological weapons

Main documents:

In 1925, the Geneva Protocol “On the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Similar Gases and Bacteriological Agents in War” was signed. The Protocol represented an important step in the creation of an international legal regime limiting the use of bacteriological weapons in war, but left their development, production and storage outside the brackets. By 2005, 134 states were members of the Protocol.

In 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was adopted, imposing a comprehensive ban on these types of weapons. Came into force in 1975. As of April 2007, it was signed by 155 states.

In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted, imposing a comprehensive ban on this type of weapon. Came into force in 1997. As of August 2007, it was signed by 182 states. It is the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and provide for a mechanism for international verification of the destruction of this type of weapons.

As of August 2007, countries participating in the CWC have destroyed 33 percent of their chemical weapons stockpiles (the process must be completed by April 29, 2012). States parties to the CWC hold 98 percent of the world's stockpiles of chemical warfare agents.

In the Russian Federation, in order to fulfill its obligations under the CWC, the Federal Target Program “Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation” was approved in 2001. The program began in 1995 and ended in 2012. Provides for both the destruction of all stocks of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation and the conversion or liquidation of the corresponding production facilities.

At the start of the Program, there were about 40 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation. Upon completion of the second stage of fulfillment of international obligations under the CWC - on April 29, 2007 - 8 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents were destroyed in the Russian Federation (20 percent of the available ones). By the end of December 2009, when it is determined to complete the third stage of fulfilling international obligations to destroy chemical weapons, Russia will destroy 45 percent of all chemical weapons stockpiles, i.e. - 18.5 thousand tons.

In 1991 and 1992 The presidents of the USA and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to remove from combat service a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were voluntary, non-legally binding, and were not formally linked to the retaliatory steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to complete them quickly enough, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. The projects of some initiatives were prepared by experts in Voronezh on the basis of one research institute, for which the employees needed to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without implementing legal procedures for the denunciation of an international treaty. The first PNA was put forward by US President Bush on September 27, 1991. USSR President Gorbachev announced “reciprocal steps and counterproposals” on October 5. His initiatives were further developed and specified in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin on January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the US President included: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended for arming ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical Lance missiles) to the territory of the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; removal from service of surface combatants and submarines of all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, storing them on US territory and subsequent destruction of approximately half of their number; termination of the development program for a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, intended for arming tactical strike aircraft. Counter steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, consisted of the following: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense would be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based weapons are subject to destruction; a third of the warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to reduce by half the stockpiles of aviation tactical nuclear weapons by eliminating them; on a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear weapons intended for strike aircraft, together with the United States, from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage warehouses 5 . It seems very difficult to quantify these reductions, since, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States must have eliminated at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were still armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2000 units, including about 500-600 aerial bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The general assessment of the US tactical nuclear arsenals at present is given above.

According to the estimates of a Russian authoritative study, within the framework of the NPR, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 ammunition of engineering troops (nuclear landmines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for front-line aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for Navy ships and submarines, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This accounted for almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with the former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the nuclear warhead is difficult to overestimate. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on reductions of strategic offensive arms. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete elimination: nuclear shells and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear landmines 8 . Secondly, the scale of the reductions significantly exceeded the indirect restrictions contained in the START agreements. Thus, according to the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were supposed to remove 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads from combat service, or 8-10 thousand units together. Reductions within the framework of the PNA opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16 thousand warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the PNP encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage in 1992, they were associated with Russia's withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of these weapons was agreed upon in the founding documents for the dissolution of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the newly independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapons. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities were hampered by the lack of sufficient volumes at storage facilities. This led to overcrowding of warehouses and violations of accepted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear safety. It was provided mainly by the United States under the famous Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrets, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This made it possible to free up the financial resources necessary for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign assistance provided partial unilateral transparency not provided for by the PNA. Donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right of access to the facilities they supported to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and complex negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and on the other, the necessary level of access. Similar limited transparency measures also covered such critical facilities as the nuclear disassembly and reassembly facilities operated by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities operated by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of the NPR in Russia was presented in the speech of Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as land-based naval aircraft and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear weapons for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is being completed. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear aircraft bombs have been destroyed." 10 Assessments of Russia's implementation of the PNA are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of 2000, Russia has largely complied with the PNA. As planned, all naval munitions were moved to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the removal of all such weapons from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistent official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNA, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to remove tactical ammunition from combat service and destroy it together with the United States, which did not do this. As for the elimination of Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations were fulfilled. In terms of air defense means, the PNAs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the area of ​​complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out PNA in the field of air force and possibly naval warheads, as well as partially air defense. In the Ground Forces, some tactical nuclear weapons still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the PNA provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and their complete elimination. The latter was explained by financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of NPRs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became an integral part of the “13 Steps” Plan to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The “13 Steps” plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e. representatives of Russia and the United States also voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was made contrary to the United States' commitments under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with the treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made full compliance with these decisions by other parties unlikely. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Step Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has lost force. This could not but affect the implementation of the PNA. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the famous unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are complex in nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability.”

Russia's official reference to the fact that nuclear weapons address, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, other important issues affecting strategic stability, clearly comes from the idea of ​​​​the interconnection of the implementation of the initiatives of 1991-1992. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the statement that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has arisen since the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This agreement was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis across five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it became completely obsolete.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional weapons, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty in Istanbul in 1999. This option took more into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops along its borders. However, NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, the increasing imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as a superstructure over the basic one, never came into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. It is obvious that fears associated with NATO's advance to the east in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, call into question the advisability of implementing the PNA in full, especially taking into account the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the lack of further official statements about the fate of the PNA, they were never fully implemented.

This fact clearly shows both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out as part of the PNA, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the lack of verification measures does not allow the parties to confidently assume what kind of reductions actually took place. The lack of legally binding status has made it easier for parties to effectively refuse to implement initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of the “informal” approach to disarmament are tactical in nature, but in the long term it is not sustainable enough to serve as a stabilizer in the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can become a source of additional mistrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less economically burdensome disarmament agreements.

Today, as half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the global technological superiority of the US armed forces. DARPA's concerns also include the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, agency specialists began actively preparing for nuclear war. Was project launched on protection against radiation damage, including using techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new treatment methods, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the human body's susceptibility to high doses of radiation. Those treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) reducing the level of negative consequences and preventing death and the development of cancer complications; c) modeling the effects of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and system-wide levels.

The agency took up the new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a nuclear power plant disaster, or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not arise out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Like Truman, he did not drop atomic bombs on foreign countries. And in general, he constantly talks about reducing nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also his own, American ones.

This peacemaking of his went so far that very influential gentlemen turned to him with a written petition, in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA Director James Woolsey, former US Representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps General Carl Mundy and others. International affairs analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to a certain secret report, the authors of which include individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US Strategic Command (in short, a complete military-secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in the country's arsenal today “far exceeds the quantity necessary to ensure nuclear deterrence,” but in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite sufficient. But a group of influential politicians, who, of course, know this data, still demand that Obama abandon the “rash step.”

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that “the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran” can lead to “catastrophic changes.” And the “American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability,” can restrain the aspirations of Iran and North Korea, and only it, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold established by the New START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States should leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue negotiations with Moscow on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The concerns of eighteen people are based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What “catastrophic changes” can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that the American politicians and military men who signed the letter to their president were afraid of Ahmadinejad’s recent words that Iran is a “nuclear power.” Or are 1,550 warheads not enough to defeat North Korea?

Reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, which Obama will most likely implement this time, is by no means a “workout” for the Nobel Peace Prize. The US President is faced with the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being resolved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts to military programs and tax increases that are extremely unpopular among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a way to save money: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Broek (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called “automatic reduction”. The Pentagon estimates that by the end of the current fiscal year (September 30) it will have to cut spending by $46 billion. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would reduce America to a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses in Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. An entire army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial losses in earnings will amount to $180 million.

When it comes to maintenance, states with large warehouses will suffer, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two major maintenance depots that modernize complex weapons systems, including the Patriot, for example. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communications devices and vehicles. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

There is no up-to-date data on the expected losses of nuclear service contractors. But there is no doubt that there will be such. Obama will look for any reserves in order to reduce budget expenditures.

As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear: America alone is somehow not comfortable reducing atomic weapons. That’s why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a major reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the USA.

Vladimir Kozin (“Red Star”) reminds Regarding information about further reductions in strategic offensive arms, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements on this matter in the next presidential address to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington’s readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of “nuclear weapons”, without indicating any quantitative parameters. However, the fact remains: reductions are planned. Another thing is in what way and by what types.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on further reduction of strategic offensive arms. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a “lightning strike” anywhere in the world...” According to the analyst, the United States is “trying to hide behind various kinds of “new proposals and ideas" in the field of arms control, their far-reaching plans for the deployment of forward-based weapons in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military-strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been created over several decades."

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel a European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a diversionary maneuver for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. Given the budget sequestration, this is a very topical topic.

It is useless to accuse Americans of deceit or double standards: politics is politics. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”, speaks , that “the idea of ​​freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away.”

“Moreover,” he continues, “if you trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people as Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even destruction of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really demanded increasing the efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding this whole situation perfectly, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - without blinking an eye, announced that they also advocate complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit bloodthirstiness. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

“I once studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended in World War III.”

According to Karaganov, Russians should thank Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates for the current sense of security.

Let's return to the USA. According to the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it has narrowed the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. The strategic document also stated: “... the United States is not prepared to pursue a policy according to which deterrence of a nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.” This indicates the possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations given above.

Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not exclude the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and using them first. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to the adoption of the doctrine of no first use, writes the American magazine Foreign Policy, is based on the fact that the enemy can “act dishonestly” and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would the enemy create a nuclear disaster for himself? After all, the threat of assured retaliatory destruction remains a very powerful deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same 2010 doctrine was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. What if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? US President in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation...”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction of nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the “taming” of what was called 3 years ago “the greatest threat to the United States and global security.” The fewer nuclear weapons, the Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely it is that they will fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clean logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is becoming like its artificially cultivated enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of “need” and given the appropriate opportunity, she will arrange an explosion first (we are not necessarily talking about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to the first, albeit “preventive”, nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten the world. Like al-Qaeda.