Tank units of the USSR in the Second World War. Comparison of Red Army and Wehrmacht tanks. Technical superiority of the USSR in the pre-war years and during the war
The history of the creation of two famous WWII tanks is very interesting. It can explain the rather ambiguous assessment of these two vehicles, and provides an explanation for some of the failures of our tankers that took place in the summer of 1941. The whole problem is that not even experimental, but conceptual cars went into production.
None of these tanks were created to arm the army. They were only supposed to show what a tank of its class should look like.
Pre-war tanks produced by plant No. 183. From left to right: BT-7, A-20, T-34-76 with L-11 cannon, T-34-76 with F-34 cannon
Let's start with KV. When the leadership of the country of the Soviets realized that the tanks in service were so outdated that they were no longer tanks at all. Then a decision was made to create new technology. Certain requirements for this technology were also put forward. Such a heavy tank should have had anti-ballistic armor and several guns in several turrets. For this technical project, the design of machines called T-100 and SMK began.
QMS 
T-100 
But the designer of the SMK, Kotin, believed that a heavy tank should have a single turret. And he had the idea to create another car. But his entire design bureau was busy creating the ordered QMS. And then he was lucky: a group of students from the Armored Tank Academy arrived at the plant for their graduation project. These “students” were entrusted with creating a new tank. Without hesitation, they shortened the SMK body, leaving room for one tower. A second cannon was stuck into this tower instead of a machine gun. And the machine gun itself was moved to the rear niche of the turret. The armor was strengthened, bringing the weight of the project to that specified in the task. We stumbled upon knots, the drawings of which were studied at the academy. They even took components from an American tractor that had been discontinued in the States 20 years earlier. But they didn’t change the suspension, copying it from the SMK. Despite the fact that the length of the tank has decreased by 1.5 times. And the number of suspension units decreased by the same number. And the load on them has increased. The only thing the “students” themselves did was install a diesel engine. And according to these drawings the KV tank was created. Presented for testing along with the T-100 and SMK.
The very first KV, autumn 1939 
But then the Finnish War began and all three tanks were sent to the front. Which revealed the complete superiority of the KV concept over other tanks. And the tank, despite all the objections of the chief designer, was accepted for service. The Great Patriotic War, which began soon, revealed all the shortcomings of the HF design. The tank turned out to be extremely unreliable, especially these tanks suffered from suspension failures and components copied from an American tractor. As a result, in 1941, only about 20% of these vehicles were lost to enemy fire. The rest were abandoned due to breakdowns.
QMS in battle 
SMK blown up by a landmine in the depths of Finnish positions 
Military people are generally conservative people. If they considered a heavy tank to have a multi-turret, then this is exactly what they ordered. And if the tanks for raids were wheeled and tracked, then this is exactly the type of vehicle they ordered. To replace the BT-7 series tanks. But they wanted to get a vehicle protected from anti-tank artillery. Why was it supposed to make inclined armor? The Koshkin military design bureau in Kharkov issued an order for such a vehicle.
A-20 
A-32 
But he saw a completely different car. Therefore, together with the vehicle ordered by the military, which received the index A-20, he made almost exactly the same one, A-32. Almost, with 2 exceptions. Firstly, the mechanism of movement on wheels was removed. Secondly, the A-32 had a 76.2 mm cannon. Instead of 45 mm on the A-20. At the same time, the A-32 weighed a ton less than the A-20. And in tests, the A-32 proved to be more preferable than the A-20. Especially when the next modification of the A-34 vehicle was released, with more durable armor and an F-32 cannon, the same as on the KV. True, the weight of the tank increased by 6 tons. And the spark plug suspension, inherited from the A-20, began to not hold up.
Tank A-34 (2nd prototype) 
But the Red Army was in dire need of new tanks. And despite the identified defects, the tank went into production. And even with a more powerful and heavier F-34 cannon. Koshkin and the gun designer Grabin knew each other. Therefore, even before the appearance of this gun in service, he received a set of drawings. And based on them, he prepared a place for a cannon. And the medium T-34 turned out to have a more powerful gun than the heavy KV. But as a result of design costs, the situation turned out to be close to the situation with HF. T-34s of the first releases were more often abandoned due to breakdowns than due to combat damage.
The very first KV, but in the spring of 1940 after its conversion according to the KV-2 project. And the turret from the very first KV, which had the number U-0, was installed on the tank number U-2. 
This is not to say that the designers did not recognize the shortcomings of their cars. The fight against “childhood diseases” of structures began immediately. As a result, by 1943 we managed to obtain those famous T-34 and KV that we know about. But in general, these vehicles were considered only as temporary, until the appearance of new tanks. So Kotin worked on the KV-3 with a 107 mm cannon. And the design bureau in Kharkov over the T-34M. The design of the car, with a transverse engine and vertical sides. The T-34M even managed to be put into production. We made about 50 sets of parts for this type of tank. But before the capture of Kharkov, not a single tank had time to be completely assembled.
T-34M, also known as A-43. 
And so it turned out that the tanks of victory were tanks whose appearance was not foreseen. And their adoption was considered a temporary measure and not for long. Tanks that were not intended to be used as main ones, and which were simply design concepts.
It cannot be said that in 1940, after the shortcomings of our new tanks were identified, there were no attempts to create new vehicles. I already wrote about the T-34M project. There was an attempt to create a new heavy tank. Received the index KV-3. In the project of this vehicle, an attempt was made to eliminate the shortcomings inherent in the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks (the same KV-1, but with a new turret and a 152-mm howitzer), and the experience of the war with the Finns was also used in the project. It was planned to arm this tank with a 107 mm cannon. However, tests of the first model of the gun were not successful. It was difficult and inconvenient for the loader to work with ammunition of this size and weight. Therefore, the tank presented for testing in the summer of 1941 was armed with the same 76 mm cannon. But then the war began and in September 1941 the experimental vehicle went into battle on the Leningrad Front. From which she did not return and is officially listed as missing. But there is a report from one of the commanders of the Red Army, who claimed that the tank that broke through into the depths of the German defense was fired upon by 105-mm German howitzers. From the fire of which the ammunition detonated. The turret was torn off, and the tank itself was completely destroyed.
KV-3. Layout. 
The newsreels are probably familiar to everyone. They show a seven-wheeler KV-3 with a turret from the KV-1. 
But neither the T-34M nor the KV-3 were considered as the main tank of the Red Army before the war. It was supposed to be a car with the T-50 index. The prototype of this vehicle was created in 1940 and looked very much like the T-34, only it was slightly smaller in size. But it had the same 45-mm sloped armor, although the vehicle was armed with a 45-mm cannon and 3 machine guns. The project was considered not entirely successful; the machine turned out to be too high-tech. And the factories where it was planned to be produced could not master it. And the tank turned out to be too heavy for its class.
T-126 in Kubinka 
Then it was decided to reduce the thickness of the armor to 37 mm, remove the forward machine gun, and install not a stack of machine guns in the turret, but one machine gun. Apply a number of other technical solutions aimed at reducing weight and manufacturability of production. All this pushed back the start of production to June 1941. And production vehicles appeared in the army after the start of the war. In total, not many such tanks were produced, several dozen. The plant for their production was evacuated from Leningrad, and at the new location it was decided to begin production of other types of machines.
T-50 
Its competitor created at the Kirov plant 
But we will continue to talk about unknown Soviet tanks of the 2nd World War. I already wrote about the T-34M project, but the developments of this project turned out to be in demand. In 1943, the T-43 tank, which was the direct successor to the T-34M project, was put into service. But the appearance of “Tigers” and “Panthers” on the battlefields did not allow this vehicle to go into large production. But it served as the basis for the best WWII tank, the T-44. By mid-1942 it became clear that the Red Army needed a new medium tank. The design of such a tank, called the T-43, was completed by June 1943. The main requirement of the military, to provide maximum protection with a minimum increase in mass, was fulfilled. Its hull, which inherited the T-34 configuration, already had all-round 75 mm armor. The thickness of the frontal part of the turret, in which the 76.2 mm F-34 tank gun was installed, was increased to 90 mm (versus 45 mm for the T-34). But the length of the engine-transmission compartment could not be reduced, resulting in a smaller fighting compartment. Therefore, in order to provide the crew with the necessary internal space, the designers used a torsion bar suspension, more compact than a candle suspension with vertical springs, as on the BT and T-34 tanks. Superior to the T-34 in terms of armor protection and not inferior in armament to the heavy tank KV-1 and KV-1s, the medium tank T-43, however, approached the heavy tanks in terms of specific ground pressure, which negatively affected maneuverability and range. And its design was extreme, excluding further modernization. And when the serial “thirty-four” was equipped with an 85-mm cannon, the need for the T-43 temporarily disappeared, although it was the turret from the T-43 that was used with minor modifications for the T-34-85 tank, so the experience of working on it was not in vain. The fact is that the test run of the T-43 is 3 thousand km. clearly proved the correct choice of torsion bar suspension for a medium tank and the futility of gradually changing the traditional layout.
T-43 
T-34 and T-43 
It became clear that a fundamentally different machine was needed. It was this that they began to design at the Morozov Design Bureau. The result of the work was the T-44 tank. The creation of the T-44 tank began at the end of 1943. The new tank received the designation “Object 136” and in the series - the designation T-44. The new car not only featured a transverse engine arrangement, but also a number of other technical innovations. If implemented separately, on different tanks, they would not have given a noticeable effect, but together they made the T-44 design one that determined the development of domestic armored vehicles for decades. The height of the engine-transmission compartment was reduced by moving a new type of air cleaner from the camshaft of the Y-shaped engine to the side. By the way, the B-44 diesel itself was equipped with improved fuel equipment, which made it possible to increase power from 500 to 520 hp. With. with the same cylinder volume as on the previous B-34. In place of the fan, which protruded beyond the dimensions of the crankcase, a compact flywheel was installed. This made it possible to mount the diesel engine on a low, rigid, but light engine frame, and as a result, the body height was reduced by 300 mm.
Two experimental samples of T-44 
The medium T-44 and its German counterpart, the heavy T-V “Panther”. 
They also introduced other design developments that could not be implemented on serial T-34s. Thus, the new design of the engine-transmission compartment made it possible to move the turret of a new design with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon to the center of the hull, where the tankers were less affected by the tiresome angular vibrations of the vehicle, and the long-barreled gun could not stick into the ground when moving over rough terrain. Firing accuracy has also increased. And most importantly, this alignment allowed the designers to increase the thickness of the frontal armor plate to 120 mm without overloading the front rollers. We would like to add that the increase in the strength of the front plate was facilitated by the relocation of the driver's hatch to the roof of the hull and the abandonment of the ball mounting of the course machine gun, since combat experience revealed its insufficient effectiveness. In the new tank, the course machine gun was rigidly fixed in the bow of the hull, and a fuel tank was placed in the vacant space next to the driver. On the T-44-85 prototype there was a small gap between the second and third road wheels. On production vehicles the gap was between the first and second rollers. In this form, the T-44 successfully passed state tests and was adopted by the Red Army in 1944. T-44 tanks were mass-produced in Kharkov.
T-44 
From the end of 1944 to 1945, 965 tanks were manufactured. T-44s did not take part in hostilities. Although they began to enter the troops in the spring of 1945. So, until May 9, 1945, 160 tanks of this type entered service with individual guards tank brigades. Which were in the 2nd echelon of the active army. And which should have been an unpleasant surprise for the Germans if they had new types of tanks. For example, the Panther-2 being developed. But there was no need for this type of tank. And the T-44 did not take part in the hostilities. Even against Japan. Thus falling out of sight of military historians. It's a pity. Because this tank was the best tank of the 2nd World War. 
Analyzing the reasons for the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, one can consider many factors, proving its regularity and inevitability. However, in addition to the moral superiority, mass heroism of soldiers and officers, and the feat of home front workers, attention should also be paid to such an important component of overall success as the technical support of the troops. The main striking force of ground forces during World War II were tanks. The USSR had in its arsenal unsurpassed models of armored vehicles already in the late thirties. For a long time no country in the world could achieve such a technological level.
First tanks
The basic ideas of tank building were formed painfully; the search for optimal layout schemes, criteria for sufficiency of protection and the ratio of maneuverability to firepower was accompanied by many mistakes and insights. It was important to find the best suspension for the road wheels, the correct location of the drive wheels, calculate the gearbox, and choose the appropriate caliber of turret guns. The first tanks of the USSR were produced abroad, more precisely, in France, by Renault. They were renamed in honor of the “freedom fighters comrades Lenin and Trotsky,” and there were only two of them. There could not have been any experience of mass construction of tanks in Soviet Russia, and before the revolution this issue was not given enough attention. In fairness, it should be remembered that both in the 20s and 3s, discussions were still ongoing between strategy theorists about the primary importance of cavalry during deep invasion operations and defense, not only in our country, but also abroad. abroad. We had to start practically from scratch.
20s
Accusing pre-war cavalry supporters of illiteracy and retrograde thinking has long been considered a win-win proposition. These, of course, included Budyonny and Voroshilov, and Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Uborevich, and even Yakir, who suffered from Stalin, were just as schematically classified as “progressives.” In fact, the supporters of the “equestrian” theory, of course, had their own, and quite weighty, arguments. In the early 30s, armored vehicles were, to put it mildly, imperfect. The armor is bulletproof, otherwise the low-power carburetor car engine could not move the car. The armament was also in most cases at the level of the famous “Rostov cart”. A logistical problem arose in the delivery of fuel and lubricants; a car is not a horse; you can’t feed it grass. And yet, already in the twenties, the first tanks of the USSR appeared. Photos of these samples today are not impressive, and neither are the technical characteristics. In most cases, they copied foreign analogues and did not stand out in anything special.
We had to start somewhere. The starting point can be considered the T-18, which became the first mass-produced Soviet tank. It was produced in 1928-1931, 9 hundred copies were built. All tanks of the USSR and Russia can be considered the descendants of this “grandfather” of Soviet tank building. The same Renault 17 served as the basis for its creation. The work of the designers was complicated by the need to “reinvent the wheel,” since not all parts and components were preserved after the Civil War. The tank was light, armament consisted of one machine gun. Until the conflict on Lake Khasan, it remained in service, and the main value of this vehicle is that it laid the foundation for the Soviet tank building school.
Wheel-track concept
The mid-30s were marked by the heyday of the wheeled-tracked concept. Its essence boiled down briefly to the fact that in future offensive operations the priority factor for success will be speed, and vehicles that move along European highways like cars will be able to achieve it. But you still need to get to good roads, having overcome the chronic Russian impassability. Caterpillars could also be needed to cross fortified areas, trenches and ditches. The enemy should not be underestimated; he would definitely use all known methods of defense.
This is how the idea of a hybrid chassis arose, providing for the ability to carry out the initial stage of an offensive on tracks, then drop them, and then develop success using actually wheeled tanks. The USSR was preparing for an offensive, fleeting war on foreign territory, accompanied by minor losses, with the support of the rebellious proletariat of the liberated countries.
T-29
The first embodiment of the wheeled-tracked concept was the T-29. Theoretically, he absorbed all the most advanced technical ideas of his time, even going beyond them. The caliber of the turret gun was unthinkable for the mid-30s, it was as much as 76 mm, had slightly larger dimensions than the previous T-28 model, and with 30 mm armor thickness it could move quite quickly, no worse than light tanks of the USSR of that time . The machine was let down by the complexity of production and low reliability; it remained experimental, but its role should not be downplayed.
Grotte's Mystery Machine
Those uninitiated in the intricacies of tank history may consider the name of this Soviet model foreign. In a sense, this is true.
In parallel with the T-28 and T-29, work was carried out in the USSR to implement another secret project. Having become a communist, the German designer Edward Grotte created his own car in our country, using unusual and even revolutionary approaches. Some of his achievements were later used by Soviet engineers (welding technologies, for example), but other of his ideas were not continued (spiral suspension of rollers and multi-tiered placement of weapons). Alas, the tank of the German engineer Grotte suffered from unnecessary complexity, was expensive to produce and unreliable.
Multi-tower QMS
The first heavy tanks of the USSR were named after the murdered leader of the Leningrad Bolsheviks, Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Based on the already proven design of the T-35, a means of breaking through echeloned enemy fortifications was created. The mass of the vehicle was 55 tons, it was armed with two guns (76 and 45 mm caliber), placed in individual turrets. The original design included a five-turret design, but the weight was too high and it was simplified. SMK - the most unusual tanks of the USSR. Their photos give an idea that the maneuverability of these machines leaves much to be desired. Their silhouette is immortalized on the obverse of the medal “For Courage”. In the Great Patriotic War, this tracked artillery battery practically did not have to fight, but the experience of the Finnish campaign revealed the general constructive conceptual depravity of the multi-turret scheme.
Fast
All light tanks of the USSR of the Second World War are generally considered obsolete, even taking into account the fact that their age in 1941 was measured in a period of several years. Their armor was modest and their armament was insufficient, at least that’s what post-war historians claimed. The BT series turned out to be of little use for the defense of the country, this is true. However, this does not at all detract from their technical merits. A 45-mm cannon was quite enough to destroy any German tank during the initial period of hostilities. Vehicles of this series performed excellently during offensive operations at Khalkhin Gol in very difficult conditions. It was on them that the main ideas were tested, according to which all subsequent tanks of the USSR were built, including the rear location of the transmission unit, inclined armor and the indispensable diesel engine. The speed of the vehicles justified the name of the series (BT-2 - BT-7), it reached figures of 50 km/h or more (on tracks), and exceeded 70 km/h on wheels.
Floating
When conquering vast territories, the armed forces of any country face the problem of crossing numerous water barriers. Usually it is solved by landing troops and holding the bridgehead for the time necessary to establish a pontoon crossing. The ideal case would be the capture of bridges, but the retreating enemy, which is quite logical, seeks to destroy them before retreating. Immediately before the war, our designers created amphibious tanks. The USSR, according to the official historical version, did not expect World War II, but prepared the Red Army to overcome numerous rivers and other bodies of water. T-38 and T-37 were built in large series (by 1938 there were over a thousand of them), and in 1939 the T-40 was added to them. They were of little use for defense, the armament was rather weak (7.62 or 12.7 mm machine gun), so at the initial stage of the war almost all the vehicles were lost. By the way, the German Wehrmacht did not have amphibious tanks at all.
Main tank T-34
The most famous and mass-produced tanks of the USSR from 1941 to 1945 were the T-34s. The designers of the warring countries were never able to create a better car. And it’s not about the super-thick protection or the unique caliber of the gun. The main advantage of this tank was its amazing survivability, mobility, ability to repel projectiles, and manufacturability. All this was achieved thanks to the correct layout of the components. The designers lowered the silhouette by placing the drive rollers at the rear and removing the driveshaft. The armor weight has decreased and driving performance has improved. The 1944 modification received a cast hexagonal turret and a gun with a caliber increased to 85 mm. A lot has been said and written about this tank; it deserves it, even despite its shortcomings, which, however, not a single piece of equipment can do without.
T-44
A further development of the “thirty-four” concept was the T-44. This vehicle was distinguished by an even more advanced layout, in particular, the diesel engine was placed in it coaxially with the drive rollers, perpendicular to the longitudinal line of the armored hull. This solution made it possible to reduce the length (as well as weight), improve habitability conditions, move the driver's hatch to a horizontal plane in front of the tower and solve a number of other design problems. 190 copies of the T-44 were produced by KhTZ until May 1945. After the appearance of modern T-54 tanks, the chassis of the “forty-four” managed to serve as tractors, and various auxiliary equipment was mounted on them. The film career of the T-44 is also noteworthy: for the filming of feature films they were often “made up” to look like German “Panthers”.
"Klimas" - the heaviest tanks - 1941
The USSR was preparing to crush enemy fortifications on foreign territory. By the end of 1938, in parallel with the mentioned SMK, the Kirov plant began to design a unique single-turret KV vehicle. A year later, the first copies were tested in quite combat conditions in Karelia. According to the established plan, more than two hundred copies rolled off the assembly line in 1940, and in 1941 it was planned to produce 1,200 of them. Weight - 47.5 tons, speed - 34 km/h, turret gun caliber - 76 mm. No army in the world had such a machine. Its main purpose is to break through layered defenses equipped with powerful anti-tank weapons. Other WWII tanks appeared at its base. By the beginning of hostilities, the USSR already had a well-thought-out and perfect technological chain that made it possible to use the successful KV chassis in combination with various types of turrets and a variety of artillery weapons (KV-1, KV-2, KV-3, etc.). The industry of Nazi Germany could not create such a maneuverable heavy tank. However, the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition did not succeed either.
IS - Stalin in metal
In order to name a tank after the leader, you had to have courage, but even if you had it, caution was also necessary. However, at the Kirov plant there were owners of both advantages. Without a doubt, these were the most powerful and invulnerable tanks of the USSR. The Second World War, with its monstrous pendulum, had already swung to the West, the Soviet Army went on the offensive, but the enemy was still strong and tried to turn the tide of hostilities in its favor, releasing more and more monsters onto the battlefields with the elongated trunks of long-range guns. In 1943, tests of the IS-1, which was a deeply modernized version of the KV, ended. This machine had a relatively small caliber, like the latest T-34 model (85 mm). The IS-2 was a further development of this series (caliber 122 mm), and for the IS-3 they came up with a new form of reflective surface of the frontal armor, nicknamed the “pike nose”.
After the war, many outstanding tanks were created, which are still considered the best in the world. The basis of the science and practice of armored vehicles production was laid by WWII tanks. The USSR became the leading tank-building power. This tradition continues in the new Russia.
As the great holiday approaches, I would like to remember the real Heroes who defended our Motherland from fascist invaders and gave us peace over our heads. Especially for Victory Day, Orbita Network offers for viewing a series of documentary photographs dedicated to the victory in the Second World War of 1941-1945. The selection of black and white photographs captures moments of military attacks and repulses, photos of tanks and aircraft, photographs of Soviet soldiers and German fascists. The WWII photo archive contains unique photographs of participants in military battles and command personnel, military equipment of the Second World War, weapons and equipment from the Second World War. We look at online documentary photos of the Second World War 1941-1945.
Soviet tank crews and a civilian
Artillerymen of the Soviet 6th Tank Brigade inspect damaged German tanks
Soldiers of the 13th Guards Rifle Division in Stalingrad during rest hours
Soldiers of the 138th motorized rifle brigade who took part in the liberation of the Stalingrad station
Soldiers of the working battalion - militias, at the firing line in the area of the Red October plant
In February 1943, Hauptmann (Captain) Winkler was captured and died shortly thereafter in the Beketovka prison camp.
A group of Red Army soldiers surrenders to German rangers from the 97th division in the Uman region
A group of captured wounded Red Army soldiers on the steps of a church in the Baranovichi region. Belarus, August 1941
A Red Army soldier pulls a wounded comrade out of the battlefield on the outskirts of Stalingrad
German artillerymen deploy a PaK 38 anti-tank gun in battle on the outskirts of Stalingrad
German soldiers inspect an overturned T-34 tank with turret number “62”. The tank overturned, hitting a German truck
German soldiers inspect a Soviet T-34 tank with its own name "Chapaev" destroyed near Kharkov.
Smoke break of Soviet soldiers in Stalingrad
A captured Soviet colonel. Barvenkovsky boiler. May 1942
A Soviet light tank BT-7, model 1937, with an M-17T engine, knocked out in a field. The main external difference from the BT-7M tank is the presence of a dust collector “cake”
A German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter was shot down and grounded (the landing gear was down) in the center of Stalingrad. Summer 1943
The position of a German machine gun crew in one of the houses in Stalingrad
Colonel Z.T. Serdyuk, member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev, Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov
Traveling portrait of an unknown junior officer of the SS division "Totenkopf" on the territory of the USSR in the summer of 1941
Almost completely destroyed Stalingrad six months after the end of hostilities. A railway bridge is visible in the distance. Taken from a Po-2 aircraft
Machine gun crew MG-34 of the SS division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” in the battles for Mariupol
The machine gun crew of Sergeant I.P. Parshev is preparing to repel an enemy attack
Machine gunners Kokarev and Zinchenko fire from a captured Italian 6.5 mm Breda 1930 machine gun. Don area
Broken Katyusha BM-13 on a ZiS-6 chassis, STZ-5 tractor, burnt T-34 tank
A wounded German soldier smokes with the pilots before being sent to the rear from Stalingrad
The crew of the 7.5 cm LeIG 18 light infantry gun changes position in the battle in Stalingrad
Crew of a Soviet 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun at a position in the Stalingrad area
The crew of the MG-34 heavy machine gun is preparing for street battles in the suburbs of Stalingrad
With a machine gun in his hands and a food thermos on his back with rations for the defenders of the city, a Red Army soldier makes his way through the ruins of Stalingrad
A medical instructor assists a wounded soldier during the battle in Stalingrad
Soviet convoy destroyed by German aircraft near Kharkov while crossing the river
Soviet 122-mm A-19 guns of the 1931 model, captured by Wehrmacht units in Karelia
Soviet machine gunners in battle near Stalingrad
Soviet troops on the offensive near Stalingrad, the famous Katyusha rocket launchers in the foreground, T-34 tanks behind
Soviet troops are on the offensive, in the foreground is a horse-drawn cart with food, behind are Soviet T-34 tanks. Stalingrad Front
Soviet machine gunners with a Maxima machine gun of the 1910 model change position near Stalingrad
Soviet intelligence officers report on the completed mission
Soviet soldiers attack with the support of T-34 tanks near the city of Kalach
Soviet soldiers fire from a 45-mm anti-tank gun Model 1937 53-K at German positions on the banks of the Volga in Stalingrad
Soviet soldiers carry small arms in liberated Stalingrad. Both German and Soviet-made weapons can be seen on the sled.
Soviet soldiers aim a 120mm mortar at an enemy position
Soviet soldiers before the attack at Stalingrad. In the foreground is a crew of a PTRD anti-tank rifle.
Soviet soldiers examine captured Nazi flags and weapons
Soviet fighter I-16 at the start before taking off on a mission in the Odessa area
Soviet machine gun crew changes firing position in a broken house in Stalingrad
Soviet KV-1 tank abandoned near Bryansk
Soviet T-28 tank, blown up by its own crew. According to the characteristic features in the photo, the T-28 tank with the L-10 cannon, manufactured in 1938
Stalingrad after the battles near the station building
Tanks and armored vehicles of the 24th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht advance in the steppes towards Stalingrad
Tank landing on T-34 tanks of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Brigade is preparing to attack enemy positions. Southwestern Front, Kharkov operation, May 1942
Photojournalist Natalya Bode in Stalingrad
Member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev inspects a captured German tank in Stalingrad
Member of the Military Council Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (future leader of the USSR) in liberated Stalingrad talks with a Soviet youth who survived the Battle for the city
"Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion on the Kursk Bulge
Artillery is the god of war!
Infantry is the queen of the fields!!
Tanks are an iron fist!!!.
Dear colleagues, I bring to your attention information about the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
How was it possible to lose in 41? having 26,000 tanks?!
Notes (hereinafter simply - Note). Once again, a person, exploring the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the Wehrmacht the same methods (and the same shirts) that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally replaced. We will highlight and analyze these places separately.
I immediately picture long and slender columns of armored vehicles - like the Parade on Red Square...
Well, let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVELY and QUALITATIVELY….
SO – QUANTITATIVELY
As of 06/22/41 The USSR had 12,780 tanks and wedges in the Western districts...
The Wehrmacht had 3,987 armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites advanced 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total – 3987+347= 4334
Note The number 4334 also includes tanks and wedges. Let's really figure it out and count. Nothing secret, official network data.
1. Tank Pz I (no more than a wedge), all modifications (Ausf A and B), including command ones, as of June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), not serviceable (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 wedges. This wedge had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two MG-34 machine guns with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.
2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to G4 took part (last version April 1941). There are 1074 tanks in total. Immediately serviceable - 909 (85%), in repair - 165 pieces (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
3. Tank Pz III. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 825 (82%), in repair - 174 pieces (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to E took part. A total of 480 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 439 (91%), in repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.
At the same time, there are 223 (7%) (maximum number, excluding faulty tanks) tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm.
Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) units. And the most popular Wehrmacht tank is the Pz I wedge - 1,122 pieces.
Now we begin to deal with satellite tanks.
347 tank is generally all the tanks in the bunch of all the allied countries of Germany in World War II. This includes Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons. On June 22, 1941, these may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but nothing more than that, if you just want to laugh. We will not take them into account in our article. Because we will not follow Gareev’s methods.
The superiority is exactly 3 times...
Note So far the superiority is exactly 4 times.
However, there is an English proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see the DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, well, we had 3 times more tanks than the Germans, forget that the Germans, in principle, have 4334 - this is serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.
Note Why on earth did ALL 4334 BECOME SERVICEABLE AND COMBAT READY? This is where the details start to emerge. Everything is fine. But we won’t believe it.
In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be combat-ready... The first category is a completely new technology.
The second category is serviceable military equipment, used and faulty military equipment requiring routine repairs.
The third and fourth categories - there are already various types of repairs - medium repairs, major repairs, non-repairable, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (minus those requiring routine repairs).
2. Categorizing equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. Categorization is intended to indicate the service level of a tank (or other equipment) in the army. Categorization has nothing to do with the practice of using tanks.
3. Medium repairs were carried out in departments by departments with the involvement of specialists from repair departments. In average repair there may be tanks not only of III or IV categories, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is written off. Before this, the tank was in category III. And it will be repaired.
Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as Germany. First, ALL THE TANKS that GERMANY COULD HAVE are counted. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks manufactured in 1917. And in relation to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories, that is, new tanks, will be counted. That's just not how things are done. If you want to count, count, just apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then our number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 and no more.
Where did the number of 8000 tanks come from?
Very simple. This is arithmetic (Pupkina, without pictures). It’s just that 4,780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, outdated and faulty tanks. Why was this done? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Once again, pay attention. When counting German tanks, the words " near" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of these. Plus these have so much more. And everything is fine.
And the USSR (poor thing) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it cannot be.
Let's really look at the details. And let's compare.
As of June 22, the Western Special Military District alone had 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But, by the way. Captured T-26s were used by the Wehrmacht in both 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 was in service until 1961.
October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under the cover of... the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).
October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.
Armored car Ba-20 from the Germans.
Another Ba-20 in different hands.
And this is the T-34, on the other side.
This is a modernized (by the Germans) KV-1 tank
August 1941, apparently - these are not serviceable tanks?
November 1941. Modernized and improved (by the Germans) thirty-four.
September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2, they also brought it to mind. The finishing is visible to the naked eye.
March 1945. Soviet tank crews did not disdain German tanks.
Armor - 15 mm (20 mm since 1939), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But, let’s not let the T-26, armor is the only thing that the T-26 was inferior to German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of armament he was superior to them. Because the T-26 had a 45-mm 20-K tank gun. The initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile is 760 m/s. Until December 1941, this was quite enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26, produced in 1938 and 1939, had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Therefore, it was easier for this type of tank (the latest modification consisted of 2567 vehicles) to fire on the move, without short stops.
The ratio is 1 to 2... It seems to be good... However, there is such a sad thing: 95% of Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun...
Note And 93% of German tanks (we have already proven this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.
The PAK 35/36 penetrated 40 - 50 mm of armor with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer away.
Note And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K penetrated 40-50 mm of armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer away.
Speed - firing 10-15 rounds per minute...
Note The Soviet gun has the same rate of fire, 10–15 rounds per minute.
Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42, and the Red Army in 43-45, tried to avoid an oncoming tank battle in the offensive: what’s the point of spending a lot of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps/division into it, in order to 20-30 km, exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It would be much more reasonable to place your anti-tank missile system under counterattack by enemy tanks...
Note But stop here. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We're looking specifically at 1941.
The attacker uses his infantry formations, which are the majority in the army, to attack a pre-selected area of defense. The defender can only cover this blow to a limited extent with the same infantry formations - he could assemble for “ sealing» breakthrough only those of them that were in close proximity to the affected area. The defender is forced to use valuable motorized mechanized formations to parry the attack, pulling them towards the section of the front that is being breached….where he runs into anti-tank defenses on the flanks of the enemy’s attack….
THAT. the entire number of Soviet tanks was devalued by their bulletproof armor...
Note The same thing applied to German tanks, whether on defense or on the offensive. However, this is not the answer to the question “ Why" This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated actions. And not rides, in order to “ pulling together, bumping" Any anti-tank unit is not without its limits. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. That’s why in the USSR the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called “ goodbye Motherland"(there was also an option " death to the enemy..... calculation"), and in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun was called " mallet».
Now let's look at the QUALITY side...
We had the best tank in the world, T-34-76 and KV... They would have prayed to roll it out " in an open field» - « crowd on crowd"all German tanks...
Hmm...I immediately remember a joke...
There is a tour of the zoo. He reaches a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- What does he eat with you?
“Well,” the guide answers him, “cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, a total of 100 kilograms.”
- So what - will he eat all this? - the curious tourist is surprised.
“He’ll eat something,” the guide answers, “but who will give it to him?!”
Note And who, one might ask, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the anecdote given is somewhat inappropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, a tank platoon of senior lieutenant Zinovy Konstantinovich Klobanov disabled 22 enemy tanks in just one battle. If we take the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question arises, who limited Kolobanov’s elephants? Nobody. That is, when no one interfered with the tank crews of the Red Army in battle (from the elephant breeders, in the form of senior management), the tank crews not only achieved results, but also accomplished real feats.
If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of clashing in an oncoming tank battle with enemy tanks, then it’s clear that we would have given them a task... But the trouble is, the vile little thing, both at Prokhorovka, and at Lepel, and wherever it could - exposed her anti-tank missile system to the counterattack of Soviet tanks... against which the tank attacks were safely broken up... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tanks were burned at distant approaches...
Note The point is not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. But the point is that, I repeat, the battle is organized and coordinated actions. It is not a single tank that achieves success in battle, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the Germans’ reconnaissance worked at the proper level and identified Soviet tanks: without infantry, without artillery and air support, then why blame the Germans? It turns out that it was not the Germans who were idiots, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.
BUT! It seems like we were talking about 1941. It’s not clear how to return the author to 1941? Prokhorovka is just flowers. But the berries appear further. There really is a joke there.
Here’s a small detail - the share of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy) capable of resisting anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front - about 50%.
Note Here they are, the berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR there are only 5% of them. This is an anecdote, if only they could compare it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with USSR tanks it’s funny. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe there was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost will be answered below.
We can name the Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author name “ heavy"German tanks on June 22, 1941?
Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - “ medium and heavy" And for the Soviet " faulty and outdated" This is a method of NLP (neuro-linguistic programming). The key to this method is the union " And" This was always done in the USSR when it was necessary to denigrate something. This method can be used to denigrate anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites" We didn’t say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negativity is already obvious. The result will come if you repeat this constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Lebonne.
But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Isn't it true!?
Note In some ways yes, but in others no.
I’m disappointed, but the best tank of the Red Army was the T-34-76 in 1941. still inferior to his German " opponent».
Note The key word in the sentence above is the word " after all" Therefore, we will answer the author in the same word (and method): the T-34-76 in 1941 was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.
ARMOR - as an opportunity to resist enemy anti-tank weapons:
T-34-76 - 40 – 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.
Note Pz III Ausf. J is a tank manufactured in March 1941. This is the only thing the author grabbed onto. But there is one small thing. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 calibers, or 2100 mm).
Since December 1941, Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50-mm KwK 39 L/60 cannon (50-mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).
Since March 1941, all T-34s have been equipped with a 76.2 mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers, which is 3162 mm.
Two clarifications need to be made here:
- the strength of German armor was approximately 1.5 times higher than that of Soviet armor (in 1941, where did this come from?)
- the T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.
But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, the artilleryman of a 50-mm cannon was “ purple“At what angle are the armor plates of the tank bent... the main thing is to hit it.
Note It turns out that rational angles of inclination are bullshit? Why then did all the countries in the world subsequently switch to rational angles? But! On a German tank from June 1941, a 50 mm cannon with a short barrel. A very wonderful weapon. But this weapon could only cause harm to the T-34 manufactured in March 1941 from a distance of 300 meters, and to the side or rear. All. In all other cases, it could not. But that’s not even the main thing. Not every hit on a tank and penetration of the armor means the defeat of the tank.
And the T-34 could, with its 76-mm cannon, harm the Pz III Ausf J from at least 500 meters, even from 1000. Not just because the gun was more powerful, but in addition to the cannon, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational armor angles. Which they hit at everything not with a 50 mm cannon, but with a 76 mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank received more than 40 hits from German shells during the battle. And not only was it not damaged, but it was also capable of further battles. Very surprisingly, Kolobanov’s tank did not fall into category IV after the battle on August 22. This was for the Soviet tank crews " purple whether a German shell will hit them or not. Because they knew very well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns, which were not intended to fight armored targets.
By December 1941, the Wehrmacht command had just reconsidered its attitude towards its tanks. Because the Wehrmacht tankers were far from “ purple“A Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing shell will hit them or it won’t.
ENGINE:
T-34-76 -engine " V-2» « was dying» after 40-60 hours of operation. This is an indicator of production quality.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " Maybach"had a service life of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of production quality.
SPEED (Highway/Road):
T-34-76 – 54/25 km/h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km/hour
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated at a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km/h, while the best figure for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h. The BT-7 on wheels, singled out as a standard, reached only 68.1 km/h!
AT THIS POINT: The German vehicle surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it also turned out to be less noisy - at maximum speed the Pz.III could be heard from 150–200 m away, and the T-34 from 450 m away. Even in this case, you can add the author that Soviet tankers, sadly enough, were very fond of the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even version N. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. Nothing whistled, fell off, or turned on its own.
CREW CONVENIENCE:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man turret, in which there were quite comfortable conditions for the combat work of crew members. The commander had a comfortable turret, which provided him with excellent visibility, and all crew members had their own intercom devices.
The T-34 turret could hardly accommodate two tankers, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases, as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members – the tank commander and the driver – were provided with internal communications. All of the above is absolutely true. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is the problem of Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This generally applied to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize that this is not a problem with the T-34, it’s a problem with the Soviet tank school.
"ARMOR PIERCING" tank in '41:
- T-37-76 – limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941 solved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J – limited by a relatively weak gun.” At the end of 1941 solved by introducing a new gun...
Note The absence of an armor-piercing shell is not an indication that a tank cannot fight against a tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and ears, a hit from a 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile would be enough. And just one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another.
After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what is the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8,000 serviceable tanks, manage to dry out 3,050 tanks in the initial phase of the war, of which the vast majority were wedges?
After all, everything is calculated very simply. For every German tank there are 2 Soviet ones and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know.
But they didn’t do that. And they didn’t.
As of October 28, 1941, there were 441 tanks on the Western Front, of which: 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, on the Western Front, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times fewer tanks than there were on June 22 of the same year!
But if you already need to answer the question, then there is no problem.
REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 6/22/1941 to 10/28/1941:
1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored cart. Each tank had appropriate communications equipment. He didn't just have something. These means of communication have been tested, there was some experience in using them. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how a means of communication works, what it is needed for, and what is achieved with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person would NEVER BE PUT TO THE POST OF A TANK COMMANDER;
2. The Wehrmacht command tank is not just the same tank as the others, just a little different. This is a control vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal basis with all the tanks in the platoon. But with all this, she not only controlled, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of a Wehrmacht tank platoon had in his command tank: communications for interaction with infantry, communications for interaction with artillery, communications for interaction with aviation and a means of communication with senior authorities. And if the commander of a tank platoon could not CORRECT ARTILLERY FIRE, DIRECT OWN AVIATION, AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH INFANTRY, then such a person would never be appointed to the position of commander of a tank platoon.
As of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) means of communication to interact with aviation, and does not have contact with his own artillery. He has very infrequent and very unstable communication with his tanks, as well as (not always) with the infantry;
3 . A Wehrmacht tank platoon is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. A Wehrmacht tank platoon consists of 7 tanks. Two in each compartment, plus the commander’s tank itself, the 7th tank. Therefore, a Wehrmacht tank company could be used to carry out operational tasks. And I was attracted. But why? It is still not clear in the USSR and in Russia. Because the organization is not just different. But completely different. Not even close to Soviet.
There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first one performs a maneuver (any), and the second one covers it at this time. There are generally a lot of options for action;
4 . The term for coordinating a Wehrmacht tank crew is two years (the figure is still wild for the USSR army and especially for Russia). People not only learned from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, from one half glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew was supporting and which was operating. And therefore they did not create a mixture of people.
The Wehrmacht tank commander was not a loader. He was only a gunner in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.
And one last thing. The specific customers of tanks in Germany were not generals, but those who fought in tanks. That is, when the German Minister of Armaments sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, then representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with driver mechanics, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. The tank division commander could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and its protection.
That's why the Germans didn't have " flying tanks“, but this is precisely why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on Pz I Ausf A wedges.
And everything that was slapped in the USSR before 1941, into which a simply colossal resource was poured (factories sank space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly abandoned (and accordingly went to the Germans) or lost - because was not intended for war at all. For travel during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.
Gareev’s methods still live today. Not only do they rewrite history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is assessed in the Russian army. And everything is not of high quality. The training of those who will fight in general is not taken into account. So not so long ago, the Chief of the General Staff of Russia, Gerasimov, stated that: “ The troops are poorly prepared, but the headquarters are very well prepared».
But, " highly professional staff"they cannot prepare in any way (even before their " almost"level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.
In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared to such an extent “ Fine"that this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating all the way to Moscow.
When tanks appeared during the First World War, it became clear that it would no longer be possible to fight battles as before. Old-fashioned tactical schemes and tricks completely refused to work against mechanical “animals” equipped with machine guns and cannons. But the “finest hour” of steel monsters came during the next war – World War II. What the Germans and the Allies were well aware of was that the key to success was hidden precisely in powerful tracked vehicles. Therefore, crazy amounts of money were allocated for constant modernization of tanks. Thanks to this, metal “predators” evolved at a rapid pace.
This Soviet tank acquired the status of a legend as soon as it appeared on the battlefield. The metal beast was equipped with a 500-horsepower diesel engine, “advanced” armor, a 76 mm F-34 gun and wide tracks. This configuration allowed the T-34 to become the best tank of its time.
Another advantage of the combat vehicle was the simplicity and manufacturability of its design. Thanks to this, it was possible to establish mass production of the tank in the shortest possible time. By the summer of 1942, about 15 thousand T-34s were produced. In total, during production, the USSR created more than 84 thousand “thirty-fours” in various modifications.
In total, about 84 thousand T-34s were produced
The main problem of the tank was its transmission. The fact is that it, together with the power unit, was located in a special compartment located in the stern. Thanks to this technical solution, the cardan shaft became unnecessary. The dominant role was played by control rods, the length of which was about 5 meters. Accordingly, it was difficult for the driver to handle them. And if a person coped with difficulties, then the metal sometimes gave way - the rods simply broke. Therefore, T-34s often went into battle in one gear, switched on in advance.
Tank evolution developed rapidly. Opponents constantly brought more and more improved fighters into the “ring”. The IS-2 became a worthy response to the USSR. The heavy breakthrough tank was equipped with a 122 mm howitzer. If a shell from this weapon hit a building, then, in fact, only ruins remained.
In addition to the howitzer, the IS-2's arsenal included a 12.7 mm DShK machine gun located on the turret. Bullets fired from this weapon pierced even the thickest brickwork. Therefore, enemies had practically no chance to hide from the formidable metal monster. Another important advantage of the tank is its armor. It reached 120 mm.
An IS-2 shot turned the building into ruins
There were, of course, some downsides. The main thing is the fuel tanks in the control compartment. If the enemy managed to penetrate the armor, then the crew of the Soviet tank had virtually no chance of escape. The worst thing was for the driver. After all, he did not have his own hatch.
The "Tiger" was created with one purpose - to crush any enemy and send him into a stampede. Hitler himself personally ordered that the new tank be covered with a frontal armor plate 100 millimeters thick. And the stern and sides of the Tiger were covered with 80 millimeters of armor. The main “trump card” of the combat vehicle was its weapon - the 88 mm KwK 36 cannon, created on the basis of an anti-aircraft gun. The gun was distinguished by its consistency of hits and also a record rate of fire. Even in combat conditions, the KwK 36 could “spit” shells as many as 8 times in a minute.
In addition, the Tiger was another one of the fastest tanks of that time. It was driven by a Maybach power unit with 700 hp. It was kept company by an 8-speed hydromechanical gearbox. And on the chassis the tank could accelerate to 45 km/h.
The Tiger cost 800,000 Reichsmarks
It is curious that the technical manual contained in each Tiger contained the following inscription: “The tank costs 800,000 Reichsmarks. Keep him safe!". Goebbels believed that the tankers would be proud that they were entrusted with such an expensive toy. But in reality it was often different. The soldiers were panicky that something might happen to the tank.
Before facing the Germans, the heavy tank underwent baptism of fire in the war with the Finns. The monster weighing 45 tons was an invincible enemy until the very end of 1941. The tank's protection consisted of 75 millimeters of steel. The frontal armor plates were placed so well that the shell resistance terrified the Germans. Still would! After all, their 37 mm anti-tank guns could not penetrate the KV-1 even from a minimum distance. As for 50 mm guns, the limit is 500 meters. And a Soviet tank, equipped with a long-barreled 76 mm F-34 gun, could knock out the enemy from a distance of about one and a half kilometers.
Weak transmission is the main problem of the KV-1
But, unfortunately, the tank also had disadvantages. The main problem was the “raw” design, which was rushed into production. The real “Achilles heel” of the KV-1 was the transmission. Due to the heavy loads associated with the weight of the combat vehicle, it broke down too often. Therefore, during retreats, tanks had to be abandoned or destroyed. Since it was unrealistic to repair them in combat conditions.
Still, the Germans managed to snatch several KV-1s. But they didn’t let them get involved. Constant breakdowns and lack of necessary spare parts quickly put an end to the captured vehicles.
The German Panther, weighing 44 tons, was superior to the T-34 in mobility. On the highway, this “predator” could accelerate to almost 60 km/h. It was armed with a 75 mm KwK 42 cannon, the barrel length of which was 70 calibers. The “Panther” could “spit” an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, flying a kilometer in the first second. Thanks to this, the German vehicle could knock out almost any enemy tank at a distance exceeding a couple of kilometers.
"Panther" could penetrate tank armor at a distance of over 2 kilometers
If the Panther's forehead was protected by an armor plate with a thickness of 60 to 80 mm, then the armor on the sides was thinner. Therefore, Soviet tanks tried to hit the “beast” precisely in that weak spot.
In total, Germany managed to create about 6 thousand Panthers. Another interesting thing is that in March 1945, hundreds of these tanks, equipped with night vision devices, went on an attack on Soviet troops near Lake Balaton. But this technical trick did not help either.