Coases transaction costs. Ronald Coase and the theory of transaction costs. Transaction costs and their types

Transaction costs are any losses arising from

ineffectiveness of joint decisions, plans, concluded agreements and

created structures. Transaction costs limit options

mutually beneficial cooperation

1. Costs of searching for information. Before it is committed

transaction, you need to have information about where you can find potential

buyers or sellers of consumer goods or industrial goods

factors and what are the current prices. Costs of this kind

consist of the time and resources required to conduct the search,

as well as from losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the received

information.

2. Negotiation costs. The market requires a distraction

significant funds for negotiations on the terms of exchange, for

conclusion and execution of contracts. The more participants in the transaction and the

The more complex its subject matter, the higher these costs. Loss due to failure

concluded, poorly executed and unreliably protected agreements are

a powerful source of these costs.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a complex

characteristics. When exchanging, only some of them are inevitably taken into account,

Moreover, the accuracy of their assessment can be extremely approximate. Sometimes

the qualities of the product of interest are generally immeasurable and to evaluate them it is necessary

use intuition The purpose of saving them is due to such forms of business

practices such as warranty repairs, branded labels,

4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. In this category

includes expenses for the maintenance of courts, arbitration, government bodies,

the expenditure of time and resources necessary to restore violated rights,

as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. Term

"opportunistic behavior" was introduced by O. Williamson. So called

unconscionable behavior that violates the terms of the transaction or is aimed at

obtaining unilateral benefits to the detriment of a partner. This category includes

various cases of lying, deceit, loafing at work, skimping

obligations assumed. There are two main forms of opportunism,

the first of which is typical for relations within organizations, and the second for

market transactions.

Shirking represents work with less impact and

liability than it should be under the terms of the contract. When absent

the ability to effectively control the agent, it can begin to act

based on one’s own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the interests

the company that hired him. The problem becomes especially acute when people

work together (“as a team”) and everyone’s personal contribution is very clear

Extortion (holding-up) observed in cases where someone

of agents made investments in specific assets. Then he

partners have the opportunity to claim a portion of the income from these

assets, threatening otherwise to break off relations (for this purpose they

may begin to insist on revising the price of the product received, increasing

its quality, increasing the volume of supplies, etc.). Threat of "extortion"

undermines incentives to invest in specific assets.

6. Costs of "politicization". This general term can be used to designate

costs that accompany decision making within organizations. If

participants are endowed with equal rights, decisions are made collectively

hierarchical ladder, then superiors unilaterally accept

decisions that are binding on subordinates

R. Coase's theorem.

An analysis of the problem of social costs led Coase to the conclusion that J.

Stigler called it the “Coase theorem.” Its essence is that

what if the property rights of all parties are carefully defined, and

transaction costs are equal to the bullet, the final result (maximizing

value of production) does not depend on changes in the distribution of rights

property.

Transaction costs are zero, which means:

Everyone knows everything and learns new things instantly and unambiguously. Everyone's friend

understand perfectly, that is, words are not needed.

Everyone's expectations and interests are always aligned with everyone else. When it changes

terms and conditions are agreed upon instantly. Any opportunistic

behavior is excluded.

Each product or resource has many substitutes.

Under these conditions, “the initial distribution of property rights is completely

does not affect the structure of production, since ultimately each

of the rights will end up in the hands of the owner who is able to offer for it

the highest price based on the most effective use of this right"

Comparison of a pricing system that includes damage liability

from negative externalities, with a pricing system when such

there is no responsibility, led R. Coase to something paradoxical at first glance

the conclusion that if the participants can agree on their own, and the costs of such

negotiations are negligible (transaction costs are zero), then in both

In cases under conditions of perfect competition, the maximum

possible production value.

However, when taking into account transaction costs, the desired result may be

not achieved. The fact is that the high cost of obtaining the necessary

information, negotiations and litigation may exceed possible

benefits from the transaction. In addition, when assessing damage, it is not excluded

significant differences in consumer preferences (for example, one

values ​​the same damage much more than the other). To take these into account

differences, a clause was later introduced into the formulation of the Coase theorem

regarding the income effect.

Experimental studies have shown that the Coase theorem is true for

limited number of participants in the transaction (two or three). When increasing

the number of participants, transaction costs increase sharply and

the assumption of their zero value ceases to be correct.

It is interesting to note that the Coase theorem proves the importance of transactional

costs “by contradiction”. In reality they play a huge

role and it is surprising that neoclassical economic theory before

I haven't noticed them at all recently.

A huge contribution to transaction theory was made by: O. Williamson, A. Alchiani,

G. Demsets, S. Grosman and others.

The study of the reasons for the existence of external effects in economic theory is usually associated with the name of the Nobel laureate in economics (1991) Ronald Coase, who not only described the mechanism of occurrence of external effects, but also tried to determine the reasons for the existence of the latter, as well as the conditions for their neutralization for society as a whole. This economist's views are known as the Coase theorem (or more commonly as Coase-Stigler theorem).

The essence of the Coase theorem is that if the property rights of all parties are carefully defined and transaction costs are zero, the final outcome (maximizing the value of production) is independent of changes in the distribution of property rights.

A comparison of a pricing system that includes liability for damage from negative externalities with a pricing system where there is no such liability led R. Coase to the conclusion that if the participants can agree themselves and the costs of such negotiations are negligible, then in both cases, under conditions of perfect competition, the maximum possible result is achieved, maximizing the value of production.

In other words, efficient allocation of resources will be achieved regardless of the distribution of ownership rights to these resources; it is enough just that the costs of establishing and protecting property rights, negotiating and securing an agreement on the redistribution of these rights would not be so great. As a result of these negotiations, all resources not previously taken into account in market calculations receive a monetary value and their owner becomes (or remains) the economic entity that benefits most.

The Coase theorem shows that Externalities arise when there is disagreement over rights to use resources. If it is clear who owns the property rights and who must pay for the right to use the resources, externalities can be eliminated through negotiations, which can be carried out if the number of participants is small.

Consider the following example. A pastry chef moves into one of the houses located next to the house where the doctor sees patients. The confectioner creates his own production, one of the key components of which is an electric mortar, which makes quite a lot of noise during operation. The noise interferes with the work of the doctor, who risks losing some of his clients because of it. Thus, a conflict of rights to the space around houses arises. The doctor's estimated net loss if the confectioner continues to work is 2000 units, while the confectioner will lose 2500 units if he stops working. net gain.

If we assume that the doctor was initially vested with property rights (if, for example, the court took into account the fact that the doctor was the first to use this resource), then the net loss of social welfare will be 500 units, since without the doctor’s permission the confectioner will not be able to continue working. (or the doctor will reduce the number of patients). At the same time, the amount that can be transferred to the doctor by the pastry chef for the right to continue working should not exceed 2,500 units.

Accordingly, the value of ownership of this resource can be estimated at up to 500 units. All other things being equal, it would be beneficial for the doctor to give up his practice (or reduce the number of patients he sees) by agreeing to the amount A between 2000 and 2500 units. It does not matter how the amount is determined. It is assumed that reaching an agreement and implementing it costs nothing. As a result, the net gain will be equal to 2500. Moreover, the doctor’s net gain is equal to A, whereas the net gain of the confectioner is (2500 - A).

Let us assume a less “natural” (at first glance) option for resolving the issue of the initial distribution of rights. They belong to the pastry chef. The amount that a doctor can pay for a confectioner’s refusal to continue production should not exceed 2000 units. Meanwhile, the confectioner loses 2,500 units as a result of reaching an agreement. In other words, the net loss to social welfare will be 500 units. Thus, it is rational to refuse to complete the transaction. As a result, the confectioner has final ownership rights.

Thus, regardless of how property rights are distributed, the final distribution of rights allows us to maximize social welfare, the value of which is equal to 2500 units. The only difference is the results of the distribution of wealth among the stakeholders.

It follows from the theorem that a socially efficient outcome can be achieved without government intervention, regardless of who initially has ownership rights.

However, society cannot rely on this in all cases. As the number of participants in a transaction increases, transaction costs increase sharply. Therefore, this theorem is applicable only to situations in which a small number of participants are involved and the sources of negative externalities are easily identified.

Thus, the Coase-Stigler theorem is based on concepts of property rights and transaction costs . Let's take a closer look at these categories.

Ownership are rules established by law that determine what benefits can be used or controlled by a certain person, as well as the conditions under which this use or control can be exercised.

Ownership- this is a set of power rights, sanctioned behavioral relations that develop between people regarding their use of economic benefits.

Property rights are a certain set of partial powers, which can be strengthened by adding more and more rights to it (specification) or weakened by separating (eroding) some powers from it.

The process of specification or dilution of property rights is associated with transaction costs.

Transaction costs are the costs associated with the transfer of ownership rights.

The following types of transaction costs are distinguished:

1. Costs of searching for information. Before a transaction is made or a contract is concluded, you need to have information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and factors of production, and what the current prices are. Costs of this kind consist of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information.

2. Negotiation costs. The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The main tool for saving this kind of costs is standard (standard) contracts.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. In the act of exchange, only some of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their assessment (measurement) can be extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are generally immeasurable, and to evaluate them one has to use surrogates (for example, judging the taste of apples by their color). This includes the costs of appropriate measuring equipment, the actual measurement, the implementation of measures aimed at protecting the parties from measurement errors and, finally, losses from these errors. Measurement costs increase with increasing accuracy requirements.

Enormous savings in measurement costs have been achieved by mankind as a result of the invention of standards for weights and measures. In addition, the goal of saving these costs is determined by such forms of business practices as warranty repairs, branded labels, purchasing batches of goods based on samples, etc.

4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, government bodies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection. Some authors (D. North) add here the costs of maintaining a consensus ideology in society, since educating members of society in the spirit of observing generally accepted unwritten rules and ethical standards is a much more economical way to protect property rights than formalized legal control.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. This is the most hidden and, from the point of view of economic theory, the most interesting element of transaction costs.

There are two main forms of opportunistic behavior. The first one wears Name moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when one party in a contract relies on another party, and obtaining actual information about his behavior is costly or impossible. The most common type of opportunistic behavior of this kind is shirking, when an agent works with less efficiency than is required of him under the contract.

Particularly favorable conditions for shirking are created in conditions of joint work by a whole group. For example, how to highlight the personal contribution of each employee to the overall result of activities<команды>factory or government agency? We have to use surrogate measurements and, say, judge the productivity of many workers not by results, but by costs (such as labor time), but these indicators often turn out to be inaccurate.

If the personal contribution of each agent to the overall result is measured with large errors, then his reward will be weakly related to the actual efficiency of his work. Hence the negative incentives that encourage shirking.

In private firms and government agencies, special complex and expensive structures are created whose tasks include monitoring the behavior of agents, detecting cases of opportunism, imposing penalties, etc. Reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior is the main function of a significant part of the management apparatus of various organizations.

Second form opportunistic behavior – extortion. Opportunities for it appear when several production factors work in close cooperation for a long time and become so accustomed to each other that each becomes indispensable and unique to the other members of the group. This means that if some factor decides to leave the group, then the remaining participants in the cooperation will not be able to find an equivalent replacement on the market and will suffer irreparable losses. Therefore, the owners of unique (in relation to a given group of participants) resources have the opportunity for blackmail in the form of a threat to leave the group. Even when “extortion” remains only a possibility, it always turns out to be associated with real losses. (The most radical form of protection against extortion is the transformation of interdependent (interspecific) resources into jointly owned property, the integration of property in the form of a single bundle of powers for all team members).

The deepening division of labor and the development of specialization of production contribute to the growth of transaction costs.

In order to reduce the overproduction of goods and services with negative external effects and make up for the underproduction of goods and services with positive external effects, it is necessary to transform external effects into internal ones.

The transformation of external effects into internal ones can be achieved by bringing marginal private costs (and, accordingly, benefits) closer to marginal public, or social costs (benefits).

One of the ways to force a person to take into account the external effects that he generates through his activities is to internalization external effects (from lat. internus- internal). Internalization refers to the transformation of an external effect into an internal one. A possible way of internalization is to unite the entities connected by the external effect into one entity.

There is another way to induce the person who is the source of external effects to take into account the costs that these effects generate - to force him to pay these costs. If the producer of external costs is forced to take them into account, he will try to optimize the ratio of costs and benefits, and this is the path to Pareto efficiency.

The first to propose the use of taxes and subsidies as a means of correcting discrepancies between social and private marginal costs was the English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou.

Transaction and transformation costs. Coase-Stigler theorem

In a market economy, a firm's costs can be divided into three groups: transformation, organizational and transactional.

Transformation costs are the costs of transforming the physical properties of products in the process of using production factors. Organizational costs are the costs within a firm to ensure control and allocation of resources, as well as to minimize opportunistic behavior of employees. Transaction costs are a special economic category of costs associated with coordinating the behavior of economic agents.

The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in his work “The Nature of the Firm” (1937). Although K. Menger wrote about the possibility of the existence of exchange costs and their influence on the decisions of exchanging subjects. Within the framework of modern economic theory, transaction costs have received many interpretations, sometimes diametrically opposed. Thus, K. Arrow defines these costs as the costs of operating the economic system (or the costs of operating the economic system). In D. North’s interpretation, transaction costs “consist of the costs of assessing the useful properties of the object of exchange and the costs of ensuring rights and enforcing their observance” 1 . In the theories of some economists, these costs exist not only in a market economy (Coase, Arrow, North), but also in a planned economy (S. Chang, A. Alchian, J. Demset).

In the economic literature there are many classifications and typologies of transaction costs. The most common typology includes the following types of costs:

• search for information;
• conclusion of contracts (search for a counterparty, negotiations and payment of the agent who will negotiate);
• control over the execution of the contract;
• measurement (identifying the properties and qualities of a good);
• specifications (establishments) and protection of property rights;
• opportunistic behavior (deception, concealment of information, violation of obligations, contract terms, etc.).

Transaction costs, which can be calculated in advance, are expressed in cash costs and time costs (and this is also money, but lost). Therefore, these costs are taken into account along with fixed and variable costs when deciding

0 what, how and for whom to produce.

The Coase theorem (more precisely, the Coase-Stigler theorem, since it was Stipler who owned this very definition and the original formulation of the theorem) states: with zero transaction costs and a clear establishment of property rights, regardless of how these property rights are distributed between economic entities, private and social costs will be equal Indeed, if property rights belong to the source of the negative externality, then the possible payment by the recipient of the external effect for reducing the volume of output of the product generating the external effect until the socially optimal quantity is achieved will be higher than the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal private costs of the producer of such a product, since throughout interval from Q P before Qs MEC > MSB - MRS. An example of this statement is point 0" in Fig. 19.4, A.

Rice. 19.4. The Coase-Stigler theorem. Ownership rights belong to: A- source of negative externality; b- recipient of negative externality

If property rights belong to the recipient of the negative externality, then the possible payment from the source of the external effect for bringing the volume of output that generates the external effect of the product until it reaches its socially optimal quantity 0y will be higher than the marginal external costs. This occurs because the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal private cost of the producer of such a product MBV - MRS over the entire interval from 0 to 0 R more MES, for example for 0 (Fig. 19.4, b). The result of the negotiations in any case will be the socially optimal amount of this good 05, as follows from the Coase-Stigler theorem.

Oleg Levyakov

In the past, economic theory suffered from its inability to articulate its premises clearly. While developing the theory, economists often avoided examining the foundations on which it was built. But such research is essential not only to prevent false interpretations and unnecessary disputes that arise from insufficient knowledge of the initial premises of the theory, but also because of the extreme importance for economic theory of rational judgment in choosing between competing sets of theoretical premises.
Perhaps the central section of microeconomic theory is the theory of the firm, which enriched economics with the concept of transaction costs. The use of this particular concept for the study of economic processes currently seems to be very fruitful. It is the possibility of reducing transaction costs that makes it effective to replace market exchange with internal organization, which explains the existence of firms.

Transaction cost theory

The theory of transaction costs is an integral part of a new direction in modern economic science - neo-institutionalism. Its development is primarily associated with the names of two economists - R. Coase and O. Williamson. The basic unit of analysis in the theory of transaction costs is an act of economic interaction, a deal, a transaction. The category of transaction is understood extremely broadly and is used to refer to the exchange of both goods and legal obligations, transactions of both a short-term and long-term nature, requiring both detailed documentation and involving a simple mutual understanding of the parties. The costs and losses that may accompany such interaction are called transaction costs. Transaction costs are the central explanatory category of all neoinstitutional analysis. Orthodox neoclassical theory viewed the market as a perfect mechanism, where there is no need to take into account the costs of servicing transactions. The key importance for the operation of the economic system of transaction costs was realized thanks to the article by R. Coase “The Nature of the Firm” (1937). He showed that in every transaction it is necessary to negotiate, supervise, establish relationships, and resolve disagreements. Initially, transaction costs were defined by R. Coase as “the costs of using the market mechanism.” Later this concept acquired a broader meaning. It has come to mean any types of costs that accompany the interaction of economic agents, regardless of where it takes place - on the market or within organizations, since business cooperation within hierarchical structures (such as firms) is also not free from friction and losses. According to the most widely recognized definition by K. Dahlman, transaction costs include the costs of collecting and processing information, negotiating and making decisions, monitoring compliance with contracts and enforcing their implementation. The introduction of the idea of ​​positive transaction costs into scientific circulation was a major theoretical achievement.

Concept and types of transactions

The concept of transaction was first introduced into scientific circulation by J. Commons. A transaction is not an exchange of goods, but an alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society. This definition makes sense (Commons) due to the fact that institutions ensure the spread of the will of an individual beyond the area within which he can influence the environment directly through his actions, i.e. beyond the scope of physical control, and therefore turn out to be transactions in differences from individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods. Commons distinguished three main types of transactions:

1. The transaction of the transaction serves to carry out the actual alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms, and its implementation requires mutual consent of the parties, based on the economic interest of each of them.
2. Management transaction - the key in it is the management relationship of subordination, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one party.
3. Rationing transaction - in this case, the asymmetry of the legal status of the parties is preserved, but the place of the managing party is taken by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: the preparation of a company budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative body, the decision of an arbitration court regarding a dispute arising between operating entities through which wealth is distributed. There is no control in the rationing transaction. Through such a transaction, wealth is allocated to one or another economic agent.

The presence of transaction costs makes certain types of transactions more or less economical depending on the circumstances of time and place. Therefore, the same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions depending on the rules that they order.
Transactions can be simple, for example, buying a bunch of radishes on the market, or complex, for example, implementing an ERP system with the help of external consultants. Complex and responsible agreements are always formalized by contracts. Any Transaction consists of two parts:

1. Preparation of the agreement. At this phase, the buyer must find a seller, collect information about prices (ask the price), evaluate quality, select a seller and come to an agreement with him. The seller must buy a place on the market, undergo quality control of his goods, and continuously collect information on prices.
2. Implementation of the agreement. At this phase, the buyer pays for the goods, receives them at his disposal, and evaluates the quality again.

Each Transaction necessarily defines 4 groups of parameters:

Transaction participants

The resources used in the transaction and the expected results,

The rights of participants to resources and results,

Duties of the parties.

Transaction costs and their types.

Transaction costs are any losses arising from the ineffectiveness of joint decisions, plans, concluded contracts and created structures. Transaction costs limit the possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Developing Coase's analysis, supporters of the transaction approach proposed various classifications of transaction costs (costs). In accordance with one of them, the following are distinguished:

1. Costs of searching for information. Before a transaction is made, it is necessary to have information about where potential buyers or sellers of consumer goods or production factors can be found and what the current prices are. Costs of this kind consist of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the information received.
2. Negotiation costs. The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The more participants in the transaction and the more complex the subject matter, the higher these costs. Losses due to poorly concluded, poorly executed and unreliably protected agreements are a powerful source of these costs.
3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. When exchanging, only a few of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their assessment can be extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are generally immeasurable and you have to use intuition to evaluate them. The purpose of their savings is determined by such forms of business practices as warranty repairs, branded labels,
4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, government bodies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection.
5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. The term "opportunistic behavior" was introduced by O. Williamson. This is the name of dishonest behavior that violates the terms of the transaction or is aimed at obtaining unilateral benefits to the detriment of the partner. Various cases of lying, deceit, loafing at work, and neglecting one’s obligations fall under this heading. There are two main forms of opportunism, the first of which is characteristic of relations within organizations, and the second of market transactions.
   Shirking is work with less impact and responsibility than required under the terms of the contract. When there is no possibility of effective control over an agent, he may begin to act based on his own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the company that hired him. The problem becomes especially acute when people work together (as a "team") and each person's personal contribution is very difficult to determine.
   Extortion (holding-up) is observed in cases where one of the agents made investments in specific assets. Then his partners have the opportunity to claim part of the income from these assets, threatening otherwise to break off relations (for this purpose, they can begin to insist on revising the price of the product received, improving its quality, increasing the volume of supplies, etc.). The threat of extortion undermines incentives to invest in specific assets.
6. Costs of "politicization". This general term can be used to describe the costs that accompany decision making within organizations. If participants are endowed with equal rights, then decisions are made on a collective basis, by voting. If they are located at different levels of the hierarchical ladder, then the superiors unilaterally make decisions that are binding on the subordinates.

Ronald Coase

The nineties of the 20th century brought success to economists in the study of markets, property, firms, and corporations. A unique synthesis of neoclassicism and institutionalism, “pure” theory and applied developments, macro- and microeconomic analysis was formed. The rapid implementation of theoretical results into practice makes us repeat the words of one of the outstanding physicists: “There is nothing more practical than a good theory.” The world of economists is talking about a new paradigm in science, capable of determining both the future of the economy itself and its application in a wide variety of areas of the economy. One of the troublemakers was the American Ronald Coase (Nobel laureate 1991).
Ronald Coase received his award “for pioneering work on the problems of transaction costs and property rights” at a very old age - an 80-year-old professor at the University of Chicago had retired more than 10 years ago. He was born in 1910 in Great Britain and graduated from the London School of Economics. After moving to the USA, he worked at the University of Virginia and the University of Chicago.
Coase's works serve as a brilliant refutation of the now seemingly irrefutable opinion that success in economic research can only be achieved by using mathematical methods, constructing multi-factor models. In Coase's works there are no formalized models, mathematical calculations, or even graphs and diagrams. However, they (only three articles published in 1937, 1946 and 1960) revolutionized the vision of economic reality, served as a source of paradigmatic changes in modern economic analysis, and gave rise to a number of rapidly developing scientific concepts.
Coase's ideas were not immediately understood and accepted. Published in 1937, the article “The Nature of the Firm” did not make any impression at the time. The attention of scientists at that time was focused on the macroeconomic theory of Keynes, on works analyzing “market failures” and justifying the inevitability of state regulation of the market system. Coase, in this and subsequent publications, approached the problems of the market, the firm, and the state from a completely different angle. In the end, his ideas began to cause serious objections from many American economists, especially professors at the University of Chicago, who were literally discouraged by the paradoxical approaches and conclusions of not the most eminent of scientists.
It seemed that the generally accepted concepts, known even to college students, about “market failures,” about the inevitability of government regulation of monopolies, education funding, and solutions to environmental problems, were turned on their heads. Coase, he writes, “was forced to express his thoughts more fully” by publishing “The Problem of Social Costs.” Since that time, the theories of “property rights” and “transaction costs” developed by the scientist began to gain recognition, and what is especially important, their application in practice turns out to be effective.

Coase theorem

Analysis of the problem of social costs led Coase to a conclusion that J. Stigler called the “Coase theorem” (Coase theorem). The idea is that if the property rights of all parties are carefully defined and transaction costs are zero, the final result (maximizing the value of production) does not depend on changes in the distribution of property rights. Transaction costs are zero, which means:
Everyone knows, and they learn new things instantly and unambiguously. Everyone understands each other perfectly, that is, words are not needed. Everyone's expectations and interests are always aligned with everyone else. When conditions change, approval occurs instantly. Any opportunistic behavior is excluded.
Each product or resource has many substitutes. Under these conditions, “the initial distribution of property rights does not affect the structure of production at all, since ultimately each of the rights will end up in the hands of the owner who can offer the highest price for it based on the most effective use of this right.” Comparison of a pricing system that includes responsibility for damage from negative external effects, with a pricing system when there is no such responsibility, led R. Coase to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that if the participants can agree themselves, and the costs of such negotiations are negligible (transaction costs are zero), then In both cases, under conditions of perfect competition, the maximum possible value of production is achieved. However, when taking into account transaction costs, the desired result may not be achieved. The fact is that the high cost of obtaining the necessary information, negotiating and litigation may exceed the possible benefits of concluding a deal. In addition, when assessing damage, significant differences in consumer preferences cannot be ruled out (for example, one person values ​​the same damage much more than another). To account for these differences, the income effect clause was later introduced into the formulation of the Coase theorem.
Experimental studies have shown that the Coase theorem is true for a limited number of participants in a transaction (two or three). As the number of participants increases, transaction costs increase sharply and the assumption of their zero value ceases to be correct. It is interesting to note that the Coase theorem proves the meaning of transaction costs “by contradiction”. In reality, they play a huge role and it is surprising that until recently neoclassical economic theory did not notice them at all. A huge contribution to transaction theory was made by: O. Williamson, A. Alchiani, G. Demset, S. Grosman and others.

Conclusion

Transaction cost theorists have been able to identify the most important characteristics that define the essence of a firm. This is the formation of a complex network of contracts, the long-term nature of business relationships, production by a single “team”, investment in specific assets, and an administrative coordination mechanism using orders. All explanations that developed the ideas of R. Coase were based on the general idea of ​​the company as a tool for saving transaction costs. According to the theory of transaction costs, this key principle explains not only the very fact of the existence of firms, but also many particular aspects of their functioning - financial structure, forms of management, organization of the labor process, etc. The fruitfulness of this approach was confirmed in the study of hybrid organizational forms, intermediate between the market and the firm, such as franchising. He contributed to a radical revision of ideas in the field of antitrust regulation, demonstrating that many atypical forms of business practice are explained not by the pursuit of monopoly advantages, but by the desire to save transaction costs. The theory of transaction costs has become widespread in our country. Modern representatives of which are Malakhov S., Kokorev V., Barsukova S.Yu., Shastiko A.E., Kapelyushnikov R.I. etc. For example, Malakhov considers the role of transaction costs in the Russian economy. Kokorev analyzes their dynamics. Barsukova highlights transaction costs in small businesses. Thanks to the transactional approach, modern economic theory has acquired greater realism, revealing a wide range of phenomena in business life that were previously completely out of sight.

Transaction cost theory is a theory of enterprise organization, the object of study of which is a multilateral agreement as a form of organization.

The task of the theory of transaction costs is to explain the problems of the efficiency of certain economic transactions within a certain institutional framework, that is, the ability of various organizational forms to effectively plan and implement economic goals. This theory is based on the assumption that any action in an economic context is primarily associated with costs.

Transaction cost theory contradicts the assumptions of the “ideal market” by emphasizing the role of organizational forms. It provides an explanation of the interaction between (joint) ventures and the market, thus helping in the choice of type of cooperation and form of organization.

The beginning of the economic theory of transaction costs was the work of Ronald Coase, published in 1937, The Nature of the Firm, for which R. Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. In this article, the author, referring to transaction costs, comes to the conclusion about the need for the existence of enterprises as a non-market form of transactions.

The Coase theorem is a provision of the new institutional economic theory, according to which, at zero transaction costs, the market copes with any external effects.

It should be noted that there are many cases where the Coase theorem does not apply. This occurs when negotiations are impossible or very costly (for example, in the presence of a large number of parties to a contract or dispute). The term transaction costs itself means the costs arising in connection with the conclusion of contracts, that is, the costs of collecting and processing information, negotiating and making decisions, monitoring and legal protection of the implementation of contracts.

The theorem itself is formulated as follows: “If property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, then the allocation of resources (production structure) will remain unchanged and efficient regardless of changes in the distribution of property rights.”

The Coase theorem contains three basic conditions that must be met in order for the legal system not to influence the allocation of resources and production efficiency.

The first of these is a clear specification of property rights. The reason for externalities is vague, unclearly specified property rights. Sometimes a clear specification of property rights is enough to make the market work.

The exchange of powers must be preceded by a determination of who owns the disputed powers.

The second condition of the Coase theorem is zero transaction costs, which will not prevent the conclusion of a mutually beneficial deal between the parties to the conflict. When transaction costs block negotiations and prevent agreement, the efficiency of resource use will be determined by the initial distribution of property rights. The normative version of the Coase theorem indicates how a court should act when deciding disputes in conditions of high transaction costs that prevent the achievement of private agreements. In conditions of positive transaction costs, the efficiency of the final allocation of resources is not independent of the choice of legal norm, therefore preference should be given to such an initial distribution of rights that minimizes the impact of transaction costs.

Transaction costs are key to the functioning of the market. If they are insignificant, then externalities can be eliminated through the market mechanism without government intervention. The inefficient distribution of property rights will be corrected through the process of market exchange of these rights. However, if transaction costs are high and prevent the conclusion of market transactions between parties, then the market mechanism ceases to operate.

If transaction costs are positive, the situation can be corrected through government intervention, but it would be a mistake to assume that the rules that the government sets will always maximize the total utility or wealth of society. Therefore, government intervention will not always be the best way out of the situation. There are also costs associated with using government mechanisms. To make a decision, officials need information, therefore, there are costs of collecting information; in addition, a lack of knowledge and incompetence of persons making decisions on regulating a certain area cannot be ruled out. Politicians making decisions may be influenced by certain groups pursuing their own specific interests. When the benefits of government intervention are less than the costs of that intervention, the optimal policy would be to take no action at all on the externality. Coase believes that politicians and economists overestimate the benefits of regulation. But the right choice between regulation and laissez-faire still depends on a comprehensive analysis of alternative options and consideration of the costs associated with each option. Perhaps the best choice is to impose a tax on the party producing the externality, and sometimes the best choice is to do nothing.

The third condition of the Coase theorem is the value of the wealth effect. This effect can be defined as the dependence of the price of demand for a certain resource on the wealth and/or income of the individual. If such a relationship exists, it means that the utility of wealth relative to the resource in question changes; say, if the demand price rises, then the relative utility of wealth decreases. .

The next important theoretical publications were the works of Kenneth Arrow in 1969, in particular on transactions and transaction costs. Finally, in 1985, Oliver Williamson presented a scientific article containing a detailed summary of transaction cost theory.

Williamson divides transaction costs into the following categories:

• · expected (ex-ante) costs: costs of collecting information, negotiations associated with signing the agreement and other costs that arise before the acceptance of the agreement;
• · actual (ex-post) costs: costs of monitoring or achieving fulfillment of obligations that arise after the agreement.

The decisive factors of transaction costs are:

• · Specificity of investments associated with the transaction (factor specificity): describes, within the framework of the transaction, the capital investments made in production capacity and the achievement of the required qualifications.
• · Risk: contains uncertainty in the parameters of the external environment and uncertainty in the behavior of the parties to the contract, based on possible opportunism.
• · Frequency: takes into account the possibility of cost degression with an increase in the frequency of identical transactions as an effect of mass production or synergy.

The assessment of the behavior of transaction participants contradicts the premises of an ideal market and is based on the following principles:

• · Bounded rationality is caused by the narrowed perception and incomplete information of the parties involved.
• · Opportunism in behavior, the driving force of which is to achieve maximum personal gain by resorting to cunning and deceit.
• · Risk neutrality is used for simplification purposes.

The following can be considered as means of social control to avoid opportunism:

• · Trust as a means of increasing efficiency, reducing control costs, faster reaching agreement and mutual understanding in risk assessment.
• · Culture as a framework that defines common values, concepts and goals as a factor influencing the solution of coordination problems. Associated with them is the process of entering into contact and agreement: with a longer partnership in a monoculture, there is likely to be an increase in transaction costs as a result of dependence, abuse of trust and opportunism, undermining efficiency.
• · Reputation serves as specific capital, the preservation of which is made difficult by the possibilities of opportunism. A good reputation reduces the incentive to opportunism and thus the costs of information gathering and negotiation.

Williamson considers the types of agreements that determine institutional forms of organization:

• 1) Classic contract - carrying out a transaction using the market. A typical example of such a transaction is a purchase and sale agreement for a regular product with the following features:
  • - conditions are predetermined and established,
  • - the parties do not expect to change the contract after its conclusion,
  • - the contract is short-term in nature;
• 2) Neoclassical contract - implementation of a transaction using a long-term contract. Examples of such agreements include joint ventures and franchising. Peculiarities:
  • - the difficulty of taking into account exclusively all the nuances of the proposed contract. The prerequisites for the possibility of change and the type of correction in this case are fixed in the contract, for example, in the form of warranty or insurance conditions,
  • - focus on long-term collaboration.

A binding relationship is an agreement within an organizational structure. Such relationships are determined by the complex social connections of its participants, requiring joint decisions, coordination and development. Examples of such transactions are processes within enterprises. .

The exchange of goods and services associated with limited risk and low specific investments is carried out within the framework of the market: the conditions of fierce competition and its intensity limit the possibilities of opportunism and its stimulation. The cost-effective possibility of adjusting the contract after its conclusion allows for autonomous actions of contract participants and the search for alternatives.