Zhilkin arrest. Zhilkin behaves like a Khan? Everyone was framed by "Clean Water"

The resignations of governors that stirred up the political life of the country in February, both those that have already taken place (the heads of Buryatia, the Perm Territory, the Novgorod and Ryazan regions, and Karelia), as well as those “planned” by political scientists and the media, encourage us to look at the positions of the head of the Astrakhan region Alexander Zhilkin. In our region last year and at the beginning of this year, a number of negative socio-political events took place, but they were balanced by positive information. Against the background of the all-Russian situation, we have a fairly stable situation, and so far, according to experts, the federal center has no reason to make cardinal personnel decisions.

Resilience scale

The political stability of the governor largely depends on the situation in the region entrusted to him. If “there is not a single strike at our factory” and you don’t particularly ask Moscow for money, then the head of the subject can feel relatively calm. If there are some “movements” in the region, then it all depends on how much they can shake the situation and what the leadership of the territory is doing to return events to a calm course. In this regard, the rating of the political stability of the regions of the Petersburg Politics Foundation, which is compiled monthly and has been written about several times, the last one in December last year, is not without interest.

Recall that the specialists of the "Petersburg Politics" evaluate the stability of the regions on a 10-point scale (maximum - 10 points, minimum - 1). According to the degree of stability, the subjects of the Russian Federation are divided into 5 conditional groups: regions with maximum stability (over 8 points); with high resistance (7.0-7.9 points); with medium resistance (6.0-6.9 points); with reduced stability (5.0-5.9 points); with weak resistance (below 5.0 points).

The Astrakhan region demonstrated a certain stability for almost the entire 2016, being in the lower part of the group of regions with medium stability (6.0-6.9 points) and balancing in the range of 6.0-6.2 points. However, following the results of December, having lost 0.2 points, we, with a score of 5.9 points, found ourselves in the group of regions with reduced stability. St. Petersburg political scientists called the events around the adoption of the Social Code, corruption scandals (convictions against ex-senator Gennady Gorbunov and former deputy minister of housing and communal services Mikhail Gaivoronsky) and a fire in the Oktyabr cinema ".

In January 2017, we did not seem to observe any out of the ordinary negative events, but at the end of the month, the authors of the rating deprived the region of another 0.2 points. Petersburg Politics experts considered the conflict around the Red Barricades shipbuilding plant, which lost the claim of Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft LLC for 613 million rubles in arbitration, coupled with reports from employees of the enterprise that equipment was being cut for scrap metal, a sentence to a fine, to be the main negative factors 950 thousand rubles for receiving a bribe to the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the region Yuri Tuzhilkin, as well as the destruction of the entire population of 600 thousand chickens at the Kharabalinskaya poultry farm due to bird flu. In addition, the region was blamed for the 275th place of Astrakhan in the rating of the quality of life of the 300 largest cities in Russia according to the Domofond portal.

Towards the elections

Most likely, the drop in the January rating of the political stability of the Astrakhan region was influenced not so much by the presence of negative events, but by the absence of a noticeable positive in the socio-economic life of the region. The authors of the study were able to scrape together only two good news: the opening of the children's department of the regional infectious diseases hospital after a major overhaul and the refutation by the leadership of the same Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft of rumors about plans to re-register the company in Kalmykia.

A drop in the regions' stability rating (we hope it's temporary) can hardly be seen as a threat to the position of the region's governor, Alexander Zhilkin, even in the context of the resignations of the heads of other regions that are now in progress. Firstly, as noted by the central media, a difficult situation has developed in them, requiring the administration of the President of Russia to make prompt decisions. Secondly, the governors, whose powers expire in 2017, leave ahead of schedule. A. Zhilkin's term of office ends in September 2019. Thirdly, from the point of view of the preparation of the 2018 presidential elections, the administration of Vladimir Putin still has no reason to believe that the Astrakhan region will show the “wrong” results in the voting, despite the low percentage of United Russia in the elections of deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation in September last years: after all, presidential and Duma elections are two big differences.

Therefore, presumably, if nothing extraordinary happens, then in March 2018 we will meet with the former head of the region. Moreover, at the end of this year it is worthy to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the formation of the Astrakhan province.
“Evaluated quite evenly”
The above is confirmed by another study - the “National Rating of Governors”, conducted by the Center for Information Communications “Rating” following the results of 2016. The authors of the study divided all heads of regions into three groups. The first group included 25 most “strong” governors. Alexander Zhilkin was in the second group ("middling") of 35 chapters, he was awarded the overall 56th place. Here is how experts assessed its activities in 2016:

“During 2016, the experts of the National Rating, as a rule, assessed the work of Alexander Zhilkin (Astrakhan Region) quite evenly. Positive emotions of the experts evoked individual reports from the economic field... Of course, the joint with Vladimir Putin and the head of the

"Lukoil" Vagit Alekperov launching an oil field on the sea shelf. Most of all, experts were surprised that the corruption scandals that shook and continue to shake the Astrakhan region still did not seem to affect the position of Alexander Zhilkin and the attitude of the federal center towards him.”

In the political and social field, it is pointed out further, the experts did not find much positive: “According to many experts, the uncharacteristically long tenure for this category of officials begins to play against the governor. In addition, negative trends of a general nature attracted attention: a decrease in salaries in the public sector, job cuts, trends towards the abolition of social benefits in all categories, a worsening budget situation, etc. Thus, the claims mainly touched upon the all-Russian problems”.

More privately, the governor was criticized by experts for the lack of a coherent strategy and the inability to defend the interests of the region. Alexander Zhilkin was accused of the lack of a constructive dialogue with the city administrations, of the inability to achieve unity of the local elites. But these accusations, in our opinion, if they had any basis, then in the distant past, but not in 2016.

Of course, the situation in the region was stirred up by discussions around the so-called “Social Code”. But the statement of Alexander Zhilkin, who promised that no category of those in need would be deprived of benefits, cooled passions.

“By and large, the positive and negative information coming from the Astrakhan region, taking into account the all-Russian realities, balanced the position of Alexander Zhilkin,” the authors of the rating write further. “The result of the National Rating, which was quite optimistic for him, was determined by the fact that in many regions things were going worse than his.”

The care center has enough
Summing up all of the above, we can assume that so far neither the political situation in the Astrakhan region and the information coming “upstairs” about the state of affairs in the region, nor the nature of the relationship between the leadership of the region and the federal center indicate the need for the presidential administration to make a decision on personnel changes in the near future. Moreover, the center of concerns already has enough - this year the powers of 10 heads of regions expire, the rotation has already begun, and we still need to look for suitable candidates to replace the outgoing ones, because the presidential campaign is ahead. Therefore, a large number of reshuffles in the regional elites is hardly beneficial to the Kremlin, and governors will be changed in a planned manner or in an emergency, if it is already impossible to leave a person in office.
However, political paths are inscrutable, and at any moment the situation can change. Both for the better and for the worse.

Who resigned in February Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn, Buryatia Viktor Basargin, Perm Territory Sergey Mitin, Novgorod Region Oleg Kovalev, Ryazan Region Alexander Khudilainen, Karelia

The Astrakhan governor, fearing resignation, began a "cleansing" of personnel. What will pseudo-reforms lead to?

Alexander Alexandrovich decided to finally prove himself a formidable boss. It took him thirteen years to do this. Zhilkin decided to fire the head of his government, Konstantin Markelov.

"I confirm the information about the dismissal of the head of the regional government, Konstantin Markelov, from today," the spokesman said.

Political analysts say that Zhilkin decided not to wait for the security forces, who have recently been actively arresting the people of the Astrakhan governor.

"Everything goes according to plan"

Recall that last summer they already managed to condemn the former Minister of Social Development and Labor of the Astrakhan Region, Ekaterina Lukyanenko. She collected "tribute" for "March 8" and other holidays from all members of the board of directors of institutions subordinate to the regional Ministry of Social Development. The "rate" was - 20 thousand rubles.

It turned out that in the end the amount is very worthy of 360-380 thousand rubles for each holiday.

The ex-minister put forward a demand to one of her subordinates “to collect money from the heads of institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Social Development and Labor in the amount of 700 thousand rubles for general patronage in the form of bonuses and non-disciplinary liability.”

It should be noted that the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Fishing Industry of the Astrakhan region, Yuri Tuzhilkin, was also convicted, found guilty of bribery.

In the summer of 2015, the prosecutor's office of the Astrakhan region approved "the indictment in the case of the former Minister of Agriculture of the region, Ivan Nesterenko."

The fact is that Mr. Nesterenko, who is considered an active supporter of Zhilkin, is accused of "improper performance of official duties" (negligence, article 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), which caused major damage.

The security forces established that in 2012, Minister Nesterenko, “provided the poultry farm JSC Astrakhan Product with a state subsidy in the amount of more than 108 million rubles.” The most important thing is that Nesterenko was aware that the controlling stake in the company was put up for sale for 13.64 million rubles. If 51% is worth 12.64 million rubles, then 100 shares are clearly not worth more than 30 million rubles. So the subsidy immediately raised questions.

It seemed that Zhilkin would be removed in 2013, when his main ally, Astrakhan Mayor Mikhail Stolyarov, was arrested. Representatives of the Astrakhan opposition say that "Stolyarov and Zhilkin were on the same team." Oppositionists claim that the mayor of Astrakhan could even share “kickbacks” with the governor.

And Valery Khomyakov, general director of the National Strategy Council, said in general that "Stolyarov's candidacy was actually imposed by the governor of the Astrakhan region Alexander Zhilkin."

Shaking from corruption scandals and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Astrakhan region. In 2015, law enforcement agencies began to “comb” the housing and communal services sector. For example, “in September 2015, a criminal case under article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Taking a bribe) was initiated against the former First Deputy Minister of Housing and Public Utilities Svetlana Arkharova.”

One can talk a lot about who Zhilkin is, but it is enough just to mention that he "came to power thanks to the support of the local authoritative businessman Alikber Pashayev, who financially supported the company in 2004 and 2012." Pashayev, as an adviser to the Astrakhan governor, illegally built up Astrakhan. “... Zhilkin's connections with ethnic structures and criminal elements are confirmed by the business activity of his friends! For example, journalists actively wrote about how the ex-deputy of the State Duma of the Astrakhan region, and now the adviser to the Astrakhan governor, Alikber Aleskerovich Pashaev, is illegally building up Astrakhan.

In general, under Zhilkin, the level of corruption was constantly growing. And interestingly, there were often officials who were considered to come from the “clan” of Zhilkin.

But active investigations began after the head of the Federal Security Service for the region was replaced in the Astrakhan region in 2014. Since then, Yuri Seryshev has been leading the Chekists. In the same year, Oleg Agarkov was appointed head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Astrakhan Region.

It was after this that Zhilkin "dismissed even his closest associates, including the ex-head of the regional Ministry of Property, Nina Popova, and the former Minister of Health of the Astrakhan Region, Viktor Chalov."

Visiting the governor?

But the security forces can also “enter” Zhilkin’s office. For example, to verify information according to which the governor owns a stake in Astrakhan Distillery OJSC (colloquially, ALVIZ).

There is talk of Alexander Alexandrovich's involvement in "a raider attack on the business of a well-known entrepreneur Gennady Smirnov (Smirnov brand), who built his own distillery near Astrakhan." Alexander Vasiliev wrote about the situation back in 2008.

"Portrait of the Governor"

Zhilkin brought the region over his "damn dozen" years of government to 23 billion rubles of public debt. By the way, when Alexander Alexandrovich headed the region in 2004, the debt was 773 million rubles!

In parallel with this, Zhilkin is trying to save money on the most disadvantaged segments of the population. In 2015, it turned out that “more than 70 thousand beneficiaries in the region want to deprive social benefits for 2 years.” Among them are “family members of the dead or dead combatants”!

It should be noted that in the rating of the effectiveness of governors of the Civil Society Development Fund, Zhilkin is constantly “at the bottom”, taking either 82nd or 83rd place. Against the backdrop of almost massive resignations of governors, the next one will most likely be Zhilkin, who brought the Astrakhan region to a crisis during the years of his rule. And "ostentatious" resignations are unlikely to help ...

Governor changed in Astrakhan region yesterday

Instead of Alexander Zhilkin, who headed the region since 2004, whose powers were terminated ahead of schedule by Vladimir Putin's decree, Sergey Morozov will be in charge in Astrakhan. So far, with the prefix "temporarily acting."

The official wording of Zhilkin's resignation, publicly voiced by Putin himself, is quite harmless - "he asked for a new job." I asked and they let me go.

But we will still try to understand and recall the events of the last year in Astrakhan, the Astrakhan region, which could have influenced the Kremlin in terms of changing the governor of our difficult subject.

In the outgoing year, as in the previous ones, the Astrakhan region continued to be shaken by high-profile corruption scandals, trials and arrests. Caught on the embezzlement of federal funds allocated under the Clean Water program, the ex-minister of housing and communal services of the region Viktor Yakovlev has already been convicted and is in prison. By the way, he was called a close friend of Zhilkin.

More recently, another ex-minister Vasily Korniliev went to the pre-trial detention center. He worked as the head of the Ministry of Construction and Housing and Utilities, but he worked so "fruitfully" that he is now suspected of multimillion-dollar embezzlement. Several other people were arrested with him - a lower rank. Korniliev was "taken" right at the gangway of the plane at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on August 9. According to rumors, he intended to fly to Spain. But he didn't.

The disruption of priority programs for the allocation of land to large families and gasification can also hardly be credited to ex-governor Zhilkin. The allocation of land plots for Astrakhan families has repeatedly become the subject of discussion at the federal level, because this is one of the points of the so-called "green folder" - an indicator of the effectiveness of the work of one or another head of the region. At first, the issue was not resolved at all, then the families were given such plots on which it was impossible to build anything and, moreover, to live. The gasification program stalled due to systematic non-payments by the population for gas, in connection with which Gazprom at some point actually curtailed it.

The tasks of dredging the Volga and other rivers of the region have not been fulfilled either. The scope of work planned several years ago was only partially completed, which creates certain problems for shipping, and also causes difficulties in the development of such an important project for the country as the North-South transport corridor, connecting Asia and Europe through the Astrakhan region.

And the most interesting, some problems could be solved. There was money for it. A few years ago, the Government of the Astrakhan Region launched the round-the-clock channel Astrakhan 24. Even then, experts said that a hat was not for Senka. To date, more than 300 million rubles have been spent on the maintenance of television, although it is still not accessible to many remote houses in the region. "Astrakhan 24" is not publicly available and does not have independent on-air broadcasting. The editors place their broadcasts on the Internet and in one of the cable networks.

One cannot discount the protest activity, which manifested itself significantly in Astrakhan due to the pension reform initiated by the Russian government. In our region, an impressive number of participants (in comparison with other regions) gathered protests, which could not help but notice in Moscow. It was in Astrakhan that they quite openly called for the resignation of President Putin. This year, pickets were added to the rallies against raising the retirement age, for example, in defense of trolleybuses - also very numerous and noticeable.

To this we can add the constant scandals in Astrakhan itself.

Zhilkin did not manage to curb the almost open conflict between the teams of the head of the Astrakhan administration Oleg Polumordvinov and the head of the city (and the City Duma) Alena Gubanova. The confrontation here takes place both through the media and social networks, and through street actions - various activists with posters periodically call on Polumordvinov or Gubanova to leave.

And this is only part of the recent scandals in the Astrakhan region that is visible to the general public. But we can also recall the recent past: the protests of the opposition, confident in the falsification of elections in 2009 and 2012, the criminal cases against the ex-mayor of Astrakhan Mikhail Stolyarov, the ex-minister of labor and social development Ekaterina Lukyanenko, the ex-minister of agriculture Ivan Nesterenko, corruption in the administration of Astrakhan, "cutting" money on large collapsed projects such as the Volodarsky dairy plant or a fish farm, a significant reduction in regional benefits, the loss of the notorious "oil taxes", in fact, the complete collapse of the public transport system in Astrakhan. In general, decently typed. Obviously, at some point in the Kremlin they could decide: the red line has been passed and something needs to be changed. Change has begun.

A new wave of gubernatorial resignations covered four regions

The Kremlin has launched a new rotation of governors. RBC figured out how the regions in need of replacement heads were identified, what is the logic of personnel decisions and how much it was influenced by the scandals that accompanied the September elections

Vladimir Putin (Photo: Mikhail Klimentiev / TASS)

Who has left and is preparing to leave?

A new series of resignations was planned even before voting day on September 9, two interlocutors close to the Kremlin told RBC. The federal official explained that "the president likes the policy of renewing the governor's corps."

In the near future, the resignation of the governor of the Kursk region, Alexander Mikhailov, added two sources close to the presidential administration to RBC. Lipetsk Governor Oleg Korolev is also being considered for resignation, two sources close to the Kremlin said. Korolev and Mikhailov are political centenarians, the Lipetsk governor has been in charge of the region since 1998, the Kursk governor since 2000.

Why removed?

The powers of 59-year-old Alexander Zhilkin ended in 2019. The Kremlin is replacing the heads of the regions, whose powers expire in a year, in order to be able to prepare the acting head of the region for the elections, reminds the head of the Petersburg Politics Foundation Mikhail Vinogradov.

Zhilkin has long belonged to the category of governors who are in "suspense" - along with the heads of the Kursk, Lipetsk, Vologda regions, political analyst Yevgeny Minchenko believes. He believes that Zhilkin held his post for too long.

Political scientist Alexander Pozhalov draws attention to the fact that next autumn the region was facing difficult elections. A Just Russia MP, Oleg Shein, is highly likely to run for office in the elections for the head of the region. “Shein has risen noticeably on the topic of pension reform. His summer speeches in the State Duma criticizing the pension reform gained millions of views on YouTube,” he notes. Given the increase in pensions, inflation and rising prices in connection with the increase in VAT and the predicted worsening of the socio-economic situation in the regions, it would be difficult for Zhilkin to fight Shein, he explains.

At the beginning of the year, two interlocutors of RBC, close to the Kremlin and the government of the region, spoke about Zhilkin's impending resignation. They cited a number of factors – the fatigue of the governor himself, who had long been asking to resign, personal motives (his wife died in 2014), loss of control in the region, intra-elite and inter-diaspora conflicts in the region where the Tatar and Kazakh communities are influential. Economic problems also have an effect, increasing the contradictions in the local elites - a few years ago, LUKOIL and Gazprom withdrew their offices from the region and stopped paying taxes to the local budget - as a result, the region is in a pre-default state.​

Yuri Kokov, who headed the KBR since 2013, was transferred to Moscow to the post of deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council "due to a number of circumstances, including family ones," Vladimir Putin said. In September, large-scale interethnic clashes took place in the republic due to the fact that residents of the Balkarian village of Kendelen did not let the Kabardians through, who organized a horse ride in honor of the 310th anniversary of the Kanzhal battle. After a clash between local residents and security forces, a rally in support of the Kabardians was held near the KBR government building in Nalchik. “The position of the authorities, who attracted the security forces, became a trigger for the development of the conflict, and the failure of the interethnic situation was taken as close to heart by the Kremlin as possible. Even Kabardian activists pointed out that the authorities behaved incorrectly,” said Grigory Shvedov, editor-in-chief of the Caucasian Knot.

He considers the main reason for Kokov's resignation to be the poor socio-economic situation in the KBR (the worst in the North Caucasus Federal District, according to the calculations of economist Natalya Zubarevich), superimposed on an unstable inter-ethnic situation. According to him, Kokov publicly tried to attribute the problems with the socio-economic development of the republic to the activity of the underground and the “atmosphere of fear”, but, according to criminal statistics, there have been no large-scale problems with militants in the KBR for a long time.

The main problem of Kokov was the high anti-rating and lack of managerial achievements, as well as the worsening of the criminal situation in the KBR over the years of his work, political consultant Dmitry Fetisov believes. “Considering that Kokov comes from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this especially annoyed the federal center. The unrest in the KBR over the past week and Kokov's inability to resolve the situation could be the last straw, ”the expert believes.

As for the candidacy of Kokov's successor, the interlocutor of RBC connects it with the tradition of succession in the appointment of leaders in the Caucasus, such as the appointment of the son of the President of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, as the new head of the republic. The events in Kendelen acted as a trigger, a symbolic end to Yuri Kokov's career in Nalchik, Sergei Markedonov from the Center for Political Technologies agrees with him.

Yuri Kokov (Photo: Alexey Druzhinin / RIA Novosti)

Kursk governor Mikhailov is one of the political centenarians, he has been in charge of the region since 2000. He is a rather weak leader, says one source close to the Kremlin. The big minus is too long stay at the head of the region, he adds.

The Kursk governor has always been in bad shape - conflicted, ineffective, with a low, if not low, level of support among the population and a lack of support in federal influence groups, agrees political scientist Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva.

Lipetsk Governor Oleg Korolev, whose resignation is also possible, is in good standing, one of RBC's interlocutors clarifies, but he has also been at the head of the region for too long.

In addition, the federal center does not like the public outcry tweets that Korolev periodically writes, says a source close to the Kremlin. For example, on June 29, after the defeat of the German national team at the World Cup, in the account of the head of the region on Twitter, that the Germans “unleashed two world wars on this earth”, and now “tens of millions of souls” are taking revenge on them. After a while, the tweet disappeared, and then a new entry appeared. “Someone told me again on Twitter ... now about the Germans in football. It can be seen that this “someone” is jealous of us because of the productive cooperation with Germany,” the governor wrote, urging “not to blurt out”, “do not interfere”, because it is “useless”.

Korolev is generally stronger than his colleague as a manager and politician: he was able to build relationships with the main groups of influence in the region and beyond, compares the two governors Kurbangaleev. But a long stay in the chair of the head takes its toll - "he began to talk about what his sometimes incoherent public speeches and scandalous posts are worth, his political instinct and reaction have dulled," the expert argues.

Political scientist Vitaly Ivanov also says that the Queen can be removed precisely because of a long stay in power: “You can’t be in power for too long.” The exception today is the governor of the Belgorod region, Yevgeny Savchenko, who was re-elected last year, Ivanov notes: “They also wanted to dismiss him, but Savchenko has too many influential friends, and the president treats him with respect.”

In addition, Korolev was in a permanent conflict with the owner of the Novo-Lipetsk Iron and Steel Works, Vladimir Lisin, Ivanov continues: "The conflict flared up, then faded, but never completely stopped."

In general, both Mikhailov and Korolev are very average governors in very average regions, Ivanov believes: “If these were richer regions, they would have been changed long ago. But neither the Kursk nor the Lipetsk regions are of particular interest to anyone (from the federal players).

Who was appointed?

So far, Putin has announced the appointment of new interim governors for the Astrakhan region and Kabardino-Balkaria. Zhilkin was replaced by Deputy Head of the Federal Customs Service Sergey Morozov, Kokov was replaced by his namesake, Kazbek Kokov, who previously worked in the Kremlin.

Sergey Morozov has been Deputy Chairman of the Federal Customs Service since August 2017. Prior to that, he was an assistant to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and an employee of the Federal Security Service.

Morozov worked in the personal security of Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov (he headed the Cabinet of Ministers from September 2007 to May 2008), says an acquaintance of the acting head of the Astrakhan region. Simultaneously with him, the current governor of the Tula region, Alexei Dyumin, is the adjutant of Zubkov and the head of his security, RBC's interlocutor adds. After Zubkov resigned and Putin became prime minister, Morozov "returned to the shift" - this is how the personal protection of top officials is called, the source explains. Morozov later became Putin's adjutant, just like Dyumin, who was appointed to this position earlier, says an acquaintance of Morozov. “Morozov had very good relations with Dyumin. But Dyumin patronized him a little, because he came (to the service) earlier, ”says the interlocutor of RBC. The fact that Morozov worked in Putin's bodyguard was also previously reported by a source in the FSO for The Bell.

The figure of Sergei Morozov is absolutely non-public, and little is known about him, experts agree. This is probably a temporary appointment for him, Vinogradov suggests. Considering that Morozov is a person with a power background and no experience in public politics, he has a year to unwind and enter the campaign, states Pozhalov.

Political scientist Fetisov believes that Zhilkin's successor Morozov was given a year's work at the FCS to gain the necessary experience. And in his new post, his main task will be to establish trade relations with the Caspian countries, primarily with Iran and Azerbaijan.

Alexander Zhilkin (Photo: Vladimir Sergeev / RIA Novosti)

45-year-old Kazbek Kokov is the son of the first president of the KBR, Valery Kokov, who led the republic from 1992 to 2005. In a conversation with the new acting head of the republic, Putin stressed that the Kokov family is connected with Kabardino-Balkaria "in the most intimate way." He noted that the father of the new acting in the republic has “a very kind, good memory”, called Kokov Sr. an effective leader and “a very reliable comrade”.

Since 1995, Kazbek Kokov has been in business, from 2003 to 2007 he was a deputy of the city council of Nalchik, in 2009 he was elected a deputy of the republican parliament. In 2010, Kokov was appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the KBR. Since 2013, he moved to the presidential administration - he oversaw the North Caucasus region as an adviser to the regional control block on domestic policy.

The fact that Kokov became Kokov's successor, Shvedov connects with the tradition of succession in the appointment of leaders in the Caucasus, such as the appointment of Magomedsalam Magomedov, the son of the president of Dagestan, as the head of the republic.

How does the Kremlin choose governors?

The current rotation of governors is already the fourth mass replacement of regional heads since Sergey Kiriyenko in October 2016 became the first deputy head of the presidential administration responsible for domestic policy. From July 2016 to February 2017, the Kremlin replaced ten heads of regions, in the fall the change of governors continued: already 11 resigned. RBC interlocutors close to the Kremlin explained the logic of the administration as follows: people have a request to update the top officials in the regions. By changing governors and relying mainly on those who passed a complex testing system, Putin signaled that he had begun to form a new generation of the management elite, one of RBC's interlocutors. Almost all the governors and regional heads who were replaced during this time had problems that had accumulated over the years of government: advanced age, intra-elite conflicts, public scandals, a difficult socio-economic situation, low ratings, etc.

In several regions, officials under the age of 50 were appointed to the positions of leaders, whom experts and political scientists defined as "young technocrats", and they, as a rule, were "Varangians". So, 38-year-old Maxim Reshetnikov was appointed to the Perm Territory, 43-year-old Alexander Brechalov to Udmurtia, and 45-year-old Nikolai Lyubimov to the Ryazan Region. But when selecting new governors, the authorities do not always focus exclusively on "young technocrats", experts from the pro-government Agency for Political and Economic Communications. The rejuvenation trend did not manifest itself in the appointments of 62-year-old Alexander Uss to the Krasnoyarsk Territory and 68-year-old Vladimir Vasiliev to Dagestan - the fundamental criteria for the Kremlin during the making of personnel decisions were efficiency and the establishment of manageability in the regions, experts pointed out.

The new leaders of the regions were not always “Varangians”: the same Uss, before his appointment, served as chairman of the Krasnoyarsk Legislative Assembly, and Dmitry Azarov, who was appointed acting head of the Samara Region, was the mayor of the administrative center of the region for several years before working in the Federation Council.​

Three or four years ago, governors were usually changed in March-April, leaving the interim six months before the elections, but since last year they began to change almost a year in advance, in fact, giving the new appointee the maximum possible time lag, Kurbangaleeva notes.

Is the new rotation connected with the scandal in the elections in the regions?

According to Kurbangaleeva, “a series of new gubernatorial resignations and reappointments was caused by a loud fiasco in four regions of the “second round”: “They change, first of all, the heads of long-lived regions, fearing that the effect of electoral fatigue will again play a bad joke on the governors.” And I don’t want to get “pig in a poke”: it’s unpleasant for the reputation of the federal government, and risky from the point of view of the subsequent socio-economic manageability of these territories, the expert adds.

Based on the results of the second rounds of the September elections, we can conclude that by the time of the next elections, the old-timer governors can become the personification of negative stability and irremovability of power and consolidate protest moods around them, Pozhalov notes. In particular, this, in his opinion, could influence the Kremlin's decision to remove Zhilkin. Political scientist Vinogradov also does not exclude that the replacement of Zhilkin was accelerated by elections in the Vladimir region and the Khabarovsk Territory.

Personnel changes in the governor's corps traditionally take place in spring and autumn. Perhaps this is an attempt by the presidential administration to divert attention from the problematic elections and the topic of pension reform, Vinogradov suggests.