Interesting facts about tanks. Legends and facts Simplicity and high maintainability
The spirit of a tanker is stronger than steel!
The rest is all bullshit!
Comrade Stalin taught us
Why, our armor is strong!
Armored tracked vehicles have always occupied a special place in Soviet society. The USSR knew how to make tanks, and they were proud of them. The nimble and nimble “high-speed carts” BT that chased the samurai at Khalkhin Gol, the mobile fortresses KV and IS, the “hunters” SU/ISU-152, the endless arsenals of the post-war T-54/55, one of best tanks 20th century T-72 “Ural”... Songs were written and films were made about tanks, they stood on pedestals in every Russian city, and every citizen of the Land of the Soviets knew that “the armor is strong, and our tanks are fast.” Among the many designs born by Soviet tank builders, the T-34 “Victory tank” occupies a special place, whose priority was unconditionally recognized even by foreign experts:
“Exceptionally high fighting qualities. We had nothing like this,” wrote Major General von Melenthin after the first meetings with the T-34. “The best tank in the world,” Field Marshal von Kleist voiced his opinion. “Alarming reports have been received about the quality of Russian tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which had existed until now, was lost and passed on to the enemy,” this is how the creator spoke about the results of tank battles on the Eastern Front tank troops, Colonel General Heinz Guderian.
The T-34 was given an equally high rating by British experts: “The design of the tank demonstrates a clear understanding of the most important combat qualities of armored vehicles and the requirements of war... Creation and mass production such advanced tanks in such huge numbers represents an engineering and technical achievement of the highest level...”
Constructors' Championship
After comprehensive tests of the T-34 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, the American military was in no hurry to shower compliments and made quite predictable conclusions, which formed the basis for the enchanting report of the head of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Major General V. Khlopov:
The T-34 medium tank, after a run of 343 km, is completely out of order, its further repair is impossible...
Chemical analysis of the armor showed that the armor plates of the Soviet tank are surface hardened; the bulk of the armor plate is mild steel. The Americans believe that the quality of armor can be improved by increasing the depth of hardening...
An unpleasant discovery for them [the Americans] was the water permeability of the T-34 hull. During heavy rains, a lot of water flows into the tank through the cracks, which leads to failure of electrical equipment...
Tight fighting compartment. The turret rotation mechanism has caused a lot of complaints: the electric motor is weak, overloaded and sparks terribly. The Americans recommend replacing the turret rotation mechanism with a hydraulic system or even a manual drive...
The Christie pendant was considered a failure. The spark plug type suspension was tested in the USA back in the 30s, and the American army abandoned it...
The tank, from an American point of view, is recognized as slow-moving (!) - the T-34 overcomes obstacles worse than any of the American tanks. It's all due to a suboptimal transmission. Despite the tank's high thrust-to-weight ratio, chassis does not allow the full potential to be realized.
The welding of the T-34 hull armor plates is rough and sloppy. The machining of parts, with rare exceptions, is very poor. The Americans were especially outraged by the ugly design of the gearbox - after much torment, they replaced the original design with their own part. It was noted that all the mechanisms of the tank require too many settings and adjustments.
Racing through impassable mud. Sherman and Pershing with more advanced transmissions took the lead.
At the same time, the Yankees meticulously noted all the positive aspects of the T-34 tank, among which there were several unexpected moments:
The choice of angles of inclination of the armor plates of the hull and turret indicates excellent projectile resistance...
Wonderful sights. The viewing instruments are unfinished but very satisfactory. Overall visibility is good.
I really liked the F-34 gun, it is reliable, has a very simple design, is easy to install and easy to maintain.
The aluminum diesel B-2 is very light for its size [of course! The B-2 was developed as an aircraft engine]. There is a desire for compactness. The only problem with the engine was the criminally poor air cleaner - the Americans called the designer a saboteur.
A vehicle from a “special series” was sent to the USA - one of five specially assembled “reference” T-34s, but the Americans were horrified by the low quality of the tank’s parts, the abundance of “childhood diseases” and completely ridiculous, at first glance, design errors.
Well, it was a high-volume production product. In difficult times of war, in conditions of evacuation and general chaos, shortage of labor, equipment and materials. The real achievement was not the quality of the armor, but its quantity. Fifty thousand T-34s - approximately the same number of tanks produced by USSR factories by the end of the Great Patriotic War.
Tanks are waiting at the front!
All the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34 were well known in the USSR long before the tests in the USA. That is why the state acceptance department refused to accept the “raw” tank for service for so long, and throughout the war, detailed designs for a new medium tank were developed: T-34M, T-43, T-44, in which the shortcomings of the original “thirty-four” were corrected step by step. The T-34 itself was also continuously modernized during the production process - in 1943, a new three-seat “nut” turret appeared, the four-speed gearbox was replaced with a five-speed one - the tank began to reach speeds of more than 50 km/h on the highway.
Alas, the turret moved forward did not allow strengthening the frontal armor; the front rollers were already overloaded. As a result, the T-34-85 continued to run until the end of the war with a 45 mm forehead. The deficiency was corrected only in the post-war T-44: the engine was turned across the hull, the fighting compartment was moved closer to the center, and the thickness of the frontal armor immediately increased to 100 mm.
At the same time, for 1941 the T-34 was a revolutionary machine:
- long-barreled 76 mm gun (compared to foreign models of tank weapons)
- rational armor angles
- high-torque diesel engine with a power of 500 hp.
- wide tracks and excellent maneuverability
No army in the world at that time had such advanced combat vehicles in its arsenal.
Combat classification
Average T-III tank. 5000 units produced.
Medium tank T-IV, the most mass tank Wehrmacht. 8600 units produced.
Medium tank Pz.Kpfw.38(t) made in Czechoslovakia. 1,400 units entered service with the Wehrmacht.
Tank "Panther". 6000 units produced.
The Great and Terrible Tiger. 1350 units produced.
Account " Royal Tigers“It went into hundreds: the Germans managed to produce only 492 cars.
From the point of view of arithmetic, the Wehrmacht had about 23,000 “real” tanks in service (I deliberately did not take into account the T-I wedge, the T-II light tank with bulletproof armor and a 20 mm gun and super heavy tank"Mouse")
And in war, as in war...
From the point of view of the average person, a steel avalanche of 50,000 of the world's best T-34 tanks was supposed to sweep away all this German rubbish and victoriously end the war on May 9, 1942 (by the way, in 1942 alone, Soviet industry produced 15 thousand T-34s for the front ). Alas, the reality turned out to be discouraging - the war lasted for four long years and claimed millions of lives Soviet citizens. As for the losses of our armored vehicles, historians cite figures from 70 to 95 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns.
It turns out...the T-34 was undeservedly awarded the title of “best tank”? The facts eloquently demonstrate that the T-34 was not the “workhorse” of the Red Army, the T-34 was “cannon fodder”...
What's going on, comrades?
Error in calculations
Tanks rarely fight tanks. Despite the colorful descriptions of the duels “T-34 vs Panther” or “Tiger vs IS-2”, half of the losses of armored vehicles were the result of work anti-tank artillery. Legendary Soviet “forty-fives”, 37 mm German “mallets”, formidable 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, with the inscription on the carriage “Shoot only at the KV!” - these are the real tank destroyers. It is from this position that one must look at the use of the T-34.
Shots for the Soviet 57 mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2. For all occasions.
By the end of the war, the situation for tankers became catastrophic - the Germans managed to create a simple and cheap anti-tank weapon, ideal for combat in urban conditions. The rate of production of “Faustpatrons” reached 1 million per month!
The Faustpatron was not so formidable for our unsurpassed T-34 tank. During the offensive, I talked very seriously with the personnel and found out that the Faustpatron was a bogeyman that some tanks were afraid of, but I repeat that in the Berlin operation the Faustpatron was not such a terrible weapon as some imagine.”
At the cost of the boastful words of the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces S.I. Bogdanov became thousands of burnt tank crews who did not live to see Victory for only a few days. In our time, the anti-tank rocket launcher continues to remain one of the most terrible opponents of armored vehicles - an extremely secretive, mobile and elusive weapon, which, as practice shows, is capable of destroying any tank, despite the ingenious multi-layered protection.
The second worst enemy of tanks is mines. 25% of armored tracked vehicles were blown up on them. Some of the vehicles were destroyed by fire from the air. When you get acquainted with the statistics, it becomes clear that the tank battle near Prokhorovka is just a rare coincidence of circumstances.
Ferdinand
Discussions about the number of German armored vehicles often bypass self-propelled artillery mounts on German tank chassis. In fact, the Germans managed to create a number of effective anti-tank weapons in this area. For example, the Nashorn (German rhinoceros), little known to the general public, had an 88 mm Nashorn cannon that penetrated any Soviet tank at a distance of 1.5 kilometers. 500 self-propelled guns of this type caused a lot of trouble for the Red Army - there are known cases when a Rhinoceros burned a T-34 company.
Here the odious “Ferdinand” is crawling out of cover - a miracle of German genius, a heavy tank destroyer weighing 70 tons. A huge armored box with a crew of six people could not turn around on difficult off-road conditions and crawled towards the enemy in a straight line. Despite the mocking attitude towards “Ferdinand”, the issue with its 200 mm forehead was never resolved until the end of the war - “Fedya” did not break through with any by ordinary means. 90 vehicles turned into a real scarecrow, each destroyed German self-propelled gun was reflected in the reports as “Ferdinand”.
Everyone knows about the 1,400 Czech Pz.Kpfw.38(t) tanks. How many people know about the Hetzer fighter on the chassis of this tank? After all, more than 2000 of them were produced! A light, agile vehicle, with a mass of 15 tons, it had acceptable security, mobility and firepower. The Hetzer was so cool that its production continued after the war, and it remained in service with the Swiss Army until 1972.
Among the numerous designs of German self-propelled guns, the most advanced and balanced was the Jagdpanther. Despite the small number - only 415 vehicles - the Jagdpanthers set the heat on both the Red Army and the allies.
As a result, we see that the Germans also required a huge amount of armored vehicles to conduct combat operations; the losses of our tankers no longer seem so incredible. On both sides there were enough tasks for tanks and self-propelled guns: fortifications, equipment, artillery positions, defensive lines, manpower... All this had to be destroyed, crushed, destroyed, overcome, defended, counterattacked and covered.
Medium tanks were an extremely popular type of military equipment - they were distinguished by their moderate weight and rational combination of combat qualities. The analogues of the “thirty-four” are most often called German T-IV tanks and T-V "Panther", as well as the American M4 "Sherman". Perhaps we’ll start with that.
Universal Soldier
In terms of characteristics, the Sherman is very close to the T-34-85 - heated debates about who was better are still raging. The silhouette of the T-34-85 is 23 centimeters lower. But the Sherman has an upper frontal part of the hull that is 6 mm thicker... Stop! We won’t achieve anything this way; we need to approach things analytically.
Serious studies say that the 76 mm Sherman gun, thanks to the use of BPS, had greater armor penetration, but was inferior to the 85 mm T-34 gun in terms of high-explosive impact. Parity!
The T-34 has thicker side armor, and the armor plates have a rational angle of inclination. On the other hand, the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, the 75 mm cannon of the Panther penetrated like foil both the inclined 45 mm side of our tank and the 38 mm straight side of the American. I'm not even talking about “faust cartridges”...
The combat capabilities of the Shermans are most clearly demonstrated by the fact that Lend-Lease “foreign cars” entered service only with the Guards divisions. In addition to comfortable fighting compartment, the Sherman had lesser-known advantages: for example, unlike other medium tanks, it was armed with a heavy machine gun. Tankers liked the accurate and convenient hydraulic drive of the turret - their shot was always the first. And the Sherman was also quieter (the T-34 thundered so much that it could be heard for kilometers).
In addition to 49 thousand tanks, produced in many modifications (each for a specific task), 2 types of multiple launch rocket systems, 6 self-propelled artillery mounts and 7 types of bridge laying vehicles, tractors and repair and recovery vehicles were created on the basis of the Shermans.
The T-34 is also not simple: the killer SU-100 tank destroyer, the powerful SU-122 assault gun, three types of tractors, the TM-34 bridge layer and the SPK-5 self-propelled crane were created on the chassis of the Soviet tank. Parity!
As we can see, the differences are minimal, each tank is good in its own way. The only thing that the Sherman lacks is that bright and tragic combat: the African sandbox, winter fun in the Ardennes and a limited appearance on the Eastern Front cannot compare with the four-year bloody mess that befell the harsh T-34.
Private Panzerwaffe
In the summer of 1941, everything went badly for the German T-IV - Soviet shells pierced its 30-mm sides like a piece of cardboard. At the same time, the “stump” of its short-barreled 75 mm KwK.37 gun could not penetrate a Soviet tank even at point-blank range.
The radio station and Carl Zeiss optics are of course good, but what will happen if, for example, the transmission on the T-IV crashes? Oh, this will be the second part of the Marlezon ballet! The gearbox will be pulled out through the shoulder strap of the removed turret. And you say you have problems at work...
The T-34 did not have such tricks - the rear part of the tank was disassembled, opening access to the MTO.
It is fair to say that by 1942 technical superiority had returned to the Germans. With the new 75 mm KwK.40 gun and reinforced T-IV armor turned into a formidable opponent.
Alas, T-IV is not at all suitable for the title of best. What is the best tank without a victorious history?! And they collected too few of them: the super-industry of the Third Reich somehow mastered 8686 tanks in 7 years of mass production. Maybe they did the right thing... Suvorov also taught that you need to fight not with numbers, but with skill.
Project disaster
And finally, the legendary “Panther”. Let's face it: a German attempt to create a new medium tank at the height of the war it completely failed. The “Panther” turned out to be bulky and complex, as a result of which it lost the main quality of a Medium Tank – its mass appeal. 5976 vehicles turned out to be too few for a war on two fronts.
From a technical point of view, the Panther was head and shoulders above the T-34, but it was bought at too high a price - 45 tons of rest weight and eternal operational problems. At the same time, by a strange coincidence, the Panther turned out to be under-armed: the skinny barrel of the 75 mm gun seems to be a clear dissonance against the backdrop of the tank’s massive hull. (They promised to correct the shortcoming on the Panther II by installing a normal 88 mm cannon).
Yes, the Panther was strong and dangerous, but its cost and labor intensity of production were close to those of the Tiger tank. At the same time, the capabilities remained at the level of a conventional medium tank.
Results
The best tank, as you already understand, does not exist. There are too many parameters and conditions in this task. The design of the T-34 certainly carried novelty, at the same time, another Designers' Cup should be awarded to the workers of the Ural factories - they accomplished a feat by starting mass (more correctly, super-mass) production of tanks in the most difficult times for our Motherland. As for combat effectiveness, the T-34 is unlikely to even make it into the top ten. Any Nashorn will outshine the thirty-four in terms of quantity damage caused per tank. Here the undisputed leader is the invincible “Tiger”.
T-34, Serbia, 1996.
However, there is one more, most important one - strategic offset. According to this competition, each tank should be considered as an element of contributing to the success of the army on a geopolitical scale. And here the T-34 rapidly rises to the top - thanks to its tanks, the Soviet Union defeated fascism, which determined the further history of the whole world.
1 INSTEAD OF A HEART - A RELIABLE MOTOR
The T-34 owes much of its fame to its excellent performance characteristics. They were powered by a unique V-2 diesel engine with a power of 500 horsepower. By the middle of the war, German guns had learned to reach it from a kilometer away, but the designers did not increase the armor, but relied on maneuverability and reliability. By 1944, the T-34s were working wonders - on full speed, without breakdowns, traveled hundreds of kilometers. Tankers then had a saying: “The armor is crap, but our tanks are fast.”
2 SYMPHONY “LAPTEY”
The most tender part of the tank was the “bast shoes” - that’s what the tankers called the tracks. They were a lot of trouble - they were torn by stuck stones, they rattled while moving. Hence the famous line - “the tanks rumbled across the field.” It could be heard for kilometers. Forced “rationalization” was taking its toll. Until the fall of 1943, there was a catastrophic shortage of rubber. The rubber that came under Lend-Lease went to the aviation and navy. The tanks were equipped with steel rollers without rubber bands. The clang of the tracks on the “bald” rollers is a symphony.
3 THEATER OF FAMILY AND GESTURE
While moving, it was impossible for the crew to talk due to the noise. They communicated like this: the commander, sitting in the tower, put his boots on the driver’s shoulders: if he presses on the left, he turns left. To the right - to the right. If he puts his foot down, stay still. He also commanded the loader with gestures: put your fist under his nose - load him with armor-piercing ammunition. Spread out five - fragmentation. After each shot, the car was filled with powder gases. It happened that during the battle the loaders lost consciousness.
4 “MICKEY MOUSE” WITH “PIE”
“Pie” and “Nut” were the names used by soldiers for the turrets of the first T-34 models with a 76-mm cannon. The Germans gave them the nickname “Mickey Mouse” - for their resemblance when the hatches are open. The cramped conditions in the towers were like lunch in a communal kitchen. T-34 and comfort are incompatible things. The Americans once drove it and made a verdict: “Only Russians can fight on it.”
5 TRICKY HATCH
T-34 know-how - driver's hatch at the front. Others had the door on top. Opponents objected, saying that an extra “hole in the forehead” makes you more vulnerable. In practice, it was the hatch that saved the lives of many mechanics. “Getting out of it is a matter of seconds. Having stood up, I stuck out up to my waist, somersaulted, and was already on the ground,” recalled Guard Sergeant Anatoly Ryzhov.
HALL OF FAME
Cashier aceDmitry Lavrinenkov- this name is inscribed in golden letters in the history of domestic armored forces. He has 52 destroyed enemy vehicles. This is in just six months - that’s how much he had to fight before he died from a mine fragment. The best performance among Red Army tankers. Or maybe the entire Second World War. A native of the Kuban Cossacks, a former cashier in a rural savings bank, he volunteered to go to the front.
Having appeared almost 100 years ago and played a decisive role in many battles, tanks today still remain one of the main types of weapons, without which it is difficult to imagine successful offensive operations on land. This post contains interesting facts about tanks.
The very name “tank” in English means “tank” or “tank”. This strange name They received tanks because the British, who were the first to use tanks in the First World War, carefully concealed the presence of new weapons until the start of the operation. When the first tanks were sent to the front, British counterintelligence started a rumor that Russian government ordered a batch of drinking water tanks from England. And the tanks set off railway under the guise of tanks. It’s interesting that at first we translated this word and called the new combat vehicle “tub.”
The British began building tanks in 1915. By the end of the summer of 1916, the number of vehicles ready for battle reached fifty. These diamond-shaped armored tracked monsters were called Mark I or Mk I and were produced in two versions. Tanks with purely machine gun armament were called “females” and were intended only for combating manpower. The "males" were equipped with a machine gun and two 57 mm cannons. After transporting the tanks to the mainland, they began moving with maximum secrecy to assembly points at the front line. Night crossings along unexplored routes proved to be a serious test for the Mk I - 17 vehicles got stuck in the mud or stopped due to mechanical failures. 32 tanks arrived at their original positions.
Tank Mk I in the Battle of the Somme
The first appearance of tanks shocked the German troops. When one of the German soldiers in the first line of trenches shouted the phrase “The devil is coming!”, his words spread through the trenches like wildfire. From the tank's viewing slots, figures in gray Feldgrau uniforms could be seen running from their positions. Attempts by individual brave men to open fire on the steel monsters were useless.
The tanks were advancing. The still imperfect vehicles crashed into German shelters or got stuck helplessly in shell craters. The crews had to urgently leave the fighting compartment of the stuck vehicles to try to return them to service. However, those Mk Is that escaped this fate performed well.
For example, the “male” tank D17 “Dinnaken” of Lieutenant Hastie was the first to enter the village of Fleurs, slowly following the Germans running away and hiding in the cellars. A British air reconnaissance aircraft flying over the battlefield reported: “The tank is moving along the main street of the village of Fleurs, and the British soldiers are following it in a good mood.”
Other vehicles provided great assistance to the infantry, making passages in wire fences and crushing machine-gun nests. One of the Mk Is stopped over the German trench and cleared it with machine gun fire, and then moved along the trench. With his help, it was possible to capture about 300 enemy soldiers. In total, during the attack on various reasons 10 tanks were disabled. Another 7 received minor damage.
Most of the approximately 20 thousand tanks in service with the Red Army in 1941 were outdated, but the new models of T-34 and KV tanks were significantly superior to the German ones. The T-34 medium tank was later recognized as the best tank of the Second World War. It owes its fame largely to its excellent driving characteristics. They were provided by the V-2 diesel engine with a power of 500 Horse power. Thanks to it, a medium tank with shell-resistant armor was practically not inferior to lighter vehicles in speed: 54 km/h on the highway and 25 km/h over rough terrain. The good ratio of engine power to combat weight of the tank, combined with wide tracks, made it unusually maneuverable and capable of passing through the most viscous mud and huge snowdrifts without any problems. During the Great Patriotic War, the maneuverability of the T-34 largely decided the fate of their confrontation with the German Tigers and Panthers. Norman Davies, professor at Oxford University and author of Europe at War. 1939-1945. Without a simple victory,” assessing the Soviet machine, he wrote: “Maneuverable Soviet T-34s “hunted in packs” like wolves, which gave no chance to the clumsy German “Tigers.” American and British tanks were not so successful in opposing German technology.” But the T-34 was distinguished not only by high speed and maneuverability, but also good armor, powerful weapons, high maintainability. "The T-34 with its good armor, perfect shape and with its magnificent 76.2-mm long-barreled gun it left everyone in awe, and all German tanks were afraid of it until the end of the war,” recalls tank ace Otto Carius. “At that time, the 37 mm gun was still our strongest anti-tank weapon. If we were lucky, we could hit the T-34 turret ring and jam it. If you are even more lucky, the tank will then not be able to operate effectively in battle. Certainly not a very encouraging situation! The only way out was an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. With its help it was possible to act effectively even against this new Russian tank.”
The American TV channel Military Channel published a ranking of the best tanks. American and British experts made assessments based on five parameters: “firepower”, “quality of armor” (security), “agility” (mobility), “ease of production” and the so-called “intimidation factor” ( psychological impact on the enemy). The sum of points for all parameters gave overall assessment tank. It is stipulated that each tank was compared with others and evaluated based on the technical requirements of its time. The T-34 received almost the highest marks for firepower, mobility and protection, which took first place in the ranking. In addition, this model is the easiest to make, so it received maximum points in the “ease of production” category. However, the “intimidation factor” also turned out to be practically unattainable - the tank alone sowed terror and panic among the enemies.
The Soviet KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, which met the Germans immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa, turned out to be a serious threat to the Wehrmacht. The fact is that the armor of these heavy tanks was not penetrated by German anti-tank guns 37 mm caliber, no guns Pz-III tanks, Pz-IV and Pz-38, which were in service with the Panzerwaffe. The Germans had to use a method of fighting against the “KV” that was very similar to the hunting of mammoth by primitive people. German tanks only distracted the attention of the KV crew while the crew behind them installed and aimed an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. Only after this, and only by hitting a shell in the gap between the hull and the turret, was it possible to knock out a Soviet tank.
Tank KV-2
From memories German officers about the problem that only one Soviet tank created for the German army at the beginning of the war: “One of the KVs managed to block the supply route for German troops in the area of the northern bridgehead. He blocked it for several days. First, he burned a convoy of trucks carrying ammunition and food. It was impossible to get close to this monster - the roads passed through swamps. The advanced German units were deprived of supplies. The seriously wounded could not be evacuated to the rear and died. An attempt to destroy a tank with a 50 mm anti-tank battery from a distance of 500 m resulted in heavy losses of personnel and guns. The KV remained unharmed, despite, as it turned out later, 14 direct hits - but they left only blue spots on its armor. An 88-mm anti-aircraft gun was pulled up, the tank allowed it to take a position 700 m away, and then shot it before the crew could fire even one shot. Miners were sent at night. They planted explosives under the KV tracks. The charges exploded as expected, but were only able to tear out a few pieces from the tracks. The tank remained mobile and continued to block the supply route. In the first days, the tank crew was supplied with supplies by the encirclement and local residents, but then a blockade was installed around the tank. However, even this isolation did not force the tankers to leave their position. As a result, the Germans used a trick. 50 German tanks began to fire at the KV from three directions in order to divert its attention. At this time, the 88th anti-aircraft gun was secretly installed in the rear of the KV. It hit the tank 12 times, and three shells penetrated the armor, destroying it.”
However, not all pre-war developments of Soviet designers were successful. For example, the idea of creating heavy multi-turret tanks T-28 and T-35 did not justify itself. The T-28 had three turrets, and the T-35 had five turrets. Unfortunately, they turned out to be too slow, unreliable and vulnerable.
Multi-turreted tank T-35
Another idea that was never completed was the A-40 flying tank. In the summer of 1942, a prototype of the A-40 or LT (“flying tank”) flying tank based on the serial T-60 was produced. The tank was equipped with a biplane wing box with a double-boom tail unit, which had a span of 18 meters and a total wing area of 85.5 square meters. m, according to calculations, the tank was supposed to take off, towed by a TB-3RN heavy bomber. Upon landing, the tank was easily freed from the wings and could immediately enter the battle. The first flight took place on September 2, 1942, but the TB engines suddenly began to get very hot and the tank had to be uncoupled. The A-40, gliding, landed at the nearest airfield, which caused considerable commotion, it was announced combat alert. This is how the story of this unusual tank ended.
Flying tank A-40
Slanted armor
Another secret of the T-34’s success lay in its armor. Its thickness was not a record: on samples from 1940 it was 40-45 millimeters. Mikhail Koshkin’s decision to place the armor plates at angles rather than strictly vertically turned out to be extremely successful. Thus, the bulk of the shells hit the vehicle along a tangential trajectory and could not penetrate it. Rational angles of inclination of the armor increased its effectiveness by one and a half to two times compared to if they were not there. This allowed the creators of the machine to provide huge savings in its weight, creating a structural foundation for the future. Over time, the thickness of the armor plates had to be increased, but the actual cross-country ability and maneuverability of the vehicles did not become worse.The Germans also noted the excellent security of the T-34 with great reluctance.
The T-34, with its good armor, perfect shape and magnificent 76.2 mm long-barreled gun, awed everyone, and all German tanks were afraid of it until the end of the war, recalls tank ace Otto Carius. - At that time, the 37 mm gun was still our strongest anti-tank weapon. If we were lucky, we could hit the T-34 turret ring and jam it. If you are even more lucky, the tank will then not be able to operate effectively in battle. Certainly not a very encouraging situation! The only way out was an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. With its help it was possible to act effectively even against this new Russian tank.
Firepower
The T-34's armament was truly revolutionary. It was equipped with a long-barreled 76-mm gun. The first copies were equipped with the L-11 cannon, and then it was replaced by the more advanced F-34. IN initial period During World War II, no foreign tank could boast of anything even close to this. This gun could destroy any enemy armored vehicle from a long distance without any problems. If the tank ran out of ammunition, it could also use shells from field guns of the appropriate caliber for battle. The armament of the "thirty-four" ceased to satisfy the military only in 1942-1943, when the Germans acquired "Panthers" and "Tigers". And then the tank’s structural reserves came to the rescue. In a short time, production of the T-34 with 85 mm guns was mastered. The installation of heavier guns did not require sacrificing the maneuverability of the vehicles, and as a result, the new “thirty-fours” again became a threat to enemies on the battlefield.Simplicity and high maintainability
Like many other Russian weapons, the T-34 has become a standard for ease of maintenance and reliability. It was actually a virtually indestructible machine. Yes, it could be knocked out and disabled, but with the right skills it could be repaired right on the battlefield with minimal availability of spare parts. The maintainability of the T-34 was largely determined by the design of the armored hull, the top sheet of the stern of which was hinged and the roof was removed. This made it possible to access transmission units or the engine without any problems, as well as replace them. The Thirty-Fours were truly design tanks: from two vehicles that were not suitable for restoration, one combat-ready one was easily assembled. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when there was a catastrophic shortage of new tanks, it was the high maintainability of the existing tanks that largely made it possible to stop the German advance.Ease of operation was also very helpful. At the beginning of the war, very little time was allocated for training crews, and the people sent for training, as a rule, did not have any technical skills. Naturally, the trainees did not become aces, but still they could and did fight.
A little about the disadvantages
Like everything in this world, T-34 tanks cannot be called perfect. One of its main drawbacks is the cramped space in the tower. Ergonomics have been given the utmost priority to ensure superiority in other areas. Thus, the loader had to work standing on boxes with shells and constantly move behind the breech of the gun. At the same time, spent cartridges always fell right under our feet. It was also negatively affected by the fact that the commander often had to work as a gunner and during aiming he was not able to assess the whole picture of the battle.The optics on the T-34 were also very mediocre. It did not allow accurate aiming at long distances and was inferior to the German “Zeiss” models in almost all respects.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that history exists in at least two forms. One is for a narrow circle consisting of professional historians and well-trained amateurs, the other is for the general public. This second story is like a skeleton of genuine historical facts, surrounded by flesh from myths and legends. At the same time, the first story, as a rule, is of little interest to anyone, since it is quite boring, bloody, dirty and completely devoid of pathos. The second story is much funnier, since it tells of events not as they were, but rather as they could have been or as historians and the authorities who pay them see them. Actually, the point of view of the authorities on historical events is decisive; it is not without reason that when it changes, the people learn so many new and interesting things about the events of the recent, and sometimes even the ancient past. Due to the constant change in interpretations of certain historical events, this most politicized of all sciences received offensive nickname A prostitute. As they say, whoever pays for a woman dances her.
There are many examples of legend-making in the history of any country, and Russia was no exception. If we take into account the events of the relatively recent past, then we can say with confidence that the Bolsheviks worked most of all to turn the history of Russia of the 20th century into a legend. The interpretation of historical facts was given exclusively from class positions and in strict accordance with “ Short course History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”, and then – “History of the CPSU”. But even here there was no consistency, since each new leader of the party and state rewrote or at least adjusted the history of the country to suit himself. Yes, in history Civil War from Stalin and Voroshilov there was no place for Trotsky, and the fighting turned into one big victorious raid by Budyonny’s dashing cavalry. During the reign of Brezhnev, the history of the Great Patriotic War was already subject to revision - the center of events shifted from Stalingrad and from the Kursk Bulge to the Malozemelsky bridgehead near Novorossiysk. Well, a sort of “gray eminence” kept his finger on the pulse of the war - the head of the political department of the 18th Airborne Army, Colonel L. I. Brezhnev, with whom not only the stupid Zhukov, but even the “great and terrible” himself “consulted”! This list can be continued almost indefinitely. Moreover, despite the process of “sterilization” of historical legends that began in the late 1980s, they turned out to be surprisingly tenacious and in demand. So, as before, the “proud “Varyag” is sinking almost half of the Japanese squadron, as before, right from the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941, the troops are leaving for the front, we are still driving the enemy “in the tail and in the mane” under Prokhorovka, “tigers” and “panthers” are still burning in droves, but our tanks are the best! By the way, about tanks...
If history as a whole has been turned into one continuous legend, then it goes without saying that the history of technology has not escaped this fate either. This most directly concerns the history of Soviet (if we take it more broadly, also Russian) tank building. Even his very first steps became objects of myth-making. Among them are the first “Russian” armored car (built in France according to a French design), and the world’s first all-terrain vehicle tank designed by Porokhovshchikov (never existed in a completed, assembled form), and much more. Various episodes in the history of Soviet tank building in the future, as well as many facts of the combat use of Soviet tanks, were densely overgrown with legends. At the same time, an interesting feature is observed: the more famous the car, the more legends have been invented about it. So, for example, about the first truly serial Soviet tank MS-1, which did not show itself in any way, no matter how hard we try, we cannot remember a single legend. But about the T-34... Yes, the whole history of the T-34 tank is one big legend! There is no way to deal with all the legends about the “thirty-four” that have accumulated over almost 70 years. The volume of this book is not enough. But you can try to understand at least a few of the most common myths.
Perhaps the biggest legend is associated with the development of the T-34 tank, that is, with the events of 1937-1940. To understand this issue, it first makes sense to give the so-called canonical version.
The “progenitor” of the T-34 tank is the Christie wheeled-tracked tank at a training ground in the USSR. 1931
So, in the monumental work “History of Tank Forces” Soviet army", published in 1975 by the Military Academy of Armored Forces, these events are presented as follows (hereinafter, the style and spelling of the cited documents remain unchanged. - Note auto):
“Work began in October 1937 under the leadership of M.I. Koshkin to design a new medium tank, specified with a wheel-tracked propulsion system, led to the development of the A-20 tank. The group conducting design work on the new tank included: A. A. Morozov, N. A. Kucherenko, P. P. Vasilyev, A. A. Moloshtanov, M. I. Tarshinov, V. M. Doroshenko, A. S. Bondarenko and others. The A-20 tank differed from the BT-7M by a new hull shape with an inclined arrangement of armor plates, developed by designer M.I. Tarshinov, as well as a newly designed drive to the drive rollers (wheels) for wheeled movement. When moving on wheels, three of the four rollers on board were leading. Although such a drive increased the tank's cross-country ability when moving on wheels, the design of the A-20 tank's chassis was complex and cumbersome.
The idea of M.I. Koshkin and A.A. Morozov to limit themselves to one tracked mover was bold and innovative. At the Main Military Council in August 1938, M.I. Koshkin obtained permission to produce in metal, along with the wheeled-tracked one, this version of the new medium tank, branded T-32. The abandonment of bulky and heavy gearboxes in the drive to the drive rollers made it possible to simplify the transmission, increase its reliability, and most importantly, increase armor protection to 30 mm.
The A-20 and T-32 tanks were presented to the State Commission in the summer of 1939 for comparative tests. The commission noted that both of them were “well executed, and in terms of their reliability and durability they are higher than all the prototypes previously released.” The State Commission believed that the T-32 tank should have more powerful armor, but did not draw a conclusion on which version of the tank should be finally settled on. There were a lot of supporters of a tank with a wheeled-tracked propulsion system. The tests that followed in the fall also did not resolve the issue of choosing the type of tank.
Only the accumulated experience of combat operations (including the outbreak of World War II) by the end of 1939 finally convinced the tank of the need to equip the tank with more powerful weapons, projectile-proof armor and a tracked propulsion unit. After this, work was accelerated on the creation of the T-34 tank, which in structural terms was a further development of the T-32 tank.
The “thirty-four”, known throughout the world, was adopted by our army by Government Decree of December 19, 1939, when its prototype had not yet been manufactured. The same decree gave an order for the production of 220 tanks of this type in 1940.”
This, so to speak, is the customer’s view, and a rather old one at that. But perhaps over time some additional information has emerged? Well, let’s use a more recent source - the book “Kharkov Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau named after A. A. Morozov”, published in Kharkov in 1997 and dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the design bureau. From the developer's point of view, the events looked like this:
“In October 1937, Plant No. 183 received from the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army a task to develop a new maneuverable wheeled-tracked tank. To carry out this serious task, M.I. Koshkin organized a new unit - KB-24. He selected designers for this design bureau personally, on a voluntary basis, from among the employees of KB-190 and KB-35. The number of this design bureau was 21 people:
Koshkin M. I., Morozov A. A., Moloshtanov A. A., Tarshinov M. I., Matyukhin V. G., Vasiliev L. P., Braginsky S. M., Baran Ya. I., Kotov M. I., Mironov Yu. S., Kalendin V. S., Moiseenko V. E., Shpeichler A. I., Sentyurin P. S., Korotchenko N. S., Rubinovich E. S., Lurie M. M., Fomenko G. P., Astakhova A. I., Guzeeva A. I., Bleishmidt L. A.
The KB-190 design bureau, led by N. A. Kucherenko, continued work on modernizing the BT-7 tank and finalizing the design documentation for the BT-7M and BT-7A tanks.
In less than a year, the new KB-24 designed a wheeled-tracked tank, which was assigned the index A-20. It was carried out in strict accordance with the technical specifications of the customer - the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army. The A-20 tank differed from the BT-7M primarily in its new hull shape; for the first time in tank building, angled armor plates were used. Subsequently, this principle of constructing armor protection became classic and was widely used in tanks of all countries. The A-20 was also distinguished by a new drive to the drive wheels; three of the four rollers (on board) were drive.
Wheeled-tracked tank BT-2
A small gap in Tank performance characteristics The A-20, compared to the BT-7M, was the reason for the creation of an “initiative” tank at KB-24, called the T-32. Its significant difference was the replacement of the wheel-tracked propulsion unit with a simpler, purely tracked one. The abolition of wheel travel on the T-32 made it possible not only to significantly simplify the design of the tank, but also to enhance armor protection due to the saved weight. This sample was equipped with a more powerful 76 mm cannon.
At the Main Military Council in August 1938, where the results of the task of the ABTU of the Red Army were considered, M.I. Koshkin managed to obtain permission to manufacture in metal, along with the wheeled-tracked A-20 tank, and the purely tracked T-32.
By mid-1939, prototypes of the A-20 and T-32 tanks were manufactured and presented to the State Commission for testing. The commission noted that both tanks were “higher in strength and reliability than all prototypes produced previously,” but neither was given preference.
The secondary tests of the experimental A-20 and T-32 tanks in the fall of 1939, and most importantly, the combat operations taking place in Finland at that time clearly confirmed that tactical mobility in rough terrain, especially in the autumn-winter period, can only be ensured by tracked vehicles. At the same time, the need was determined to further improve the combat parameters of the T-32 tank and especially to strengthen its protection.
In an extremely short time, the design bureau carried out modifications to the T-32 tank by further enhancing armor protection, armament and implementing a number of other design changes. As a result of this work, a model of a tank was created, which received the name T-34 and later became the main tank of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War.”
So, with some minor differences, both publications paint a generally identical picture: in October 1937, plant No. 183 (the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern received this number in the second half of 1936) received from the ABTU of the Red Army the task of developing a new wheeled-tracked tank BT-20. To carry it out, M.I. Koshkin organized a new unit - KB-24. He selected the designers personally, on a voluntary basis, from among the employees of KB-190 and KB-35 (the latter was engaged in servicing the serial production of the T-35 heavy tank). The new tank differed from its predecessors primarily in the shape of its hull. For the first time in tank building, the arrangement of armor plates at an angle was used.
Wheeled-tracked tank BT-7 model 1937
In the process of designing the BT-20 wheeled-tracked tank, M.I. Koshkin and A.A. Morozov (or M.I. Koshkin alone) had a bold and innovative idea to limit ourselves to one tracked propulsion unit and, due to the saved mass, to strengthen armor protection and armament - install a 76 mm cannon. In August 1938, at a meeting of the Main Military Council, M.I. Koshkin managed to overcome the resistance of the military and obtained permission to implement in metal, along with a wheeled-tracked version, a purely tracked version. Moreover, as follows from numerous sources, I.V. Stalin himself gave the go-ahead to the designers.
By mid-1939, prototypes of both tanks had been manufactured and presented to the State Commission, but neither was given preference. However, new tests and experience Soviet-Finnish war confirmed the advantage of purely tracked vehicles.
014 Afanasy Osipovich Firsov
If we squeeze everything stated above down to the dry residue, then the entire history of the creation of the T-34 can be summarized as follows: first, an innovative idea of a talented designer, then a bold initiative and, finally, the best tank in the world, “a masterpiece of world tank building.” And all this, mind you, not thanks to, but in spite of, overcoming at all stages the stubborn resistance of idiot military men who did not understand their happiness.
In general, it is precisely this picture, of course, in a less exaggerated form, that has become the official version creation of the T-34 tank. The situation changed somewhat with the beginning of perestroika. However, even at the end of the 1980s, documents from the period 1930-1940 related to domestic tank building were mostly inaccessible to researchers. Therefore, rumors began to appear.
The first version to emerge was that the copyright for the T-34 tank belonged not to M. I. Koshkin, but to A. O. Firsov. It was alleged that it was the latter who, in the process of modernizing BT tanks, conceived and began developing a new promising vehicle. However, the arrest (according to many, not without Koshkin’s participation) interrupted his participation in the design. The car was finished by others, and the name of Afanasy Osipovich Firsov was consigned to oblivion for many years. It was possible to understand this issue quite quickly; it was enough to compare some facts and dates. But in order for the reader to understand the essence of the issue, it is necessary to at least briefly talk about A. O. Firsov and his activities.
A. O. Firsov was a certified engineer from the pre-revolutionary “batch”, and even from abroad. In 1910, in Germany, he graduated from a higher technical school with a degree in diesel engineering. He worked at shipyards in Nizhny Novgorod and Nikolaev, and from 1930 to 1931 - in the automotive and tractor design bureau of the technical department of the EKU OGPU. In December 1931, he headed the T2K design bureau of the tank department of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after. Comintern. Just at this time, the plant was undergoing the difficult process of mastering the serial production of the BT-2 tank, the design support of which was provided by the T2K Design Bureau. Under the direct supervision of Firsov, the BT-5, BT-7, BT-7A tanks were designed over the course of five years, and work was carried out on a number of prototypes. Last job, begun under his leadership, was the installation of a diesel engine on the BT-7 tank. In the fall of 1936, four diesel tanks were manufactured and received the factory designation A-8. That same fall, A. O. Firsov was removed from the leadership of the design bureau, but he continued to work there as an ordinary designer. In March 1937, Afanasy Osipovich was arrested. After six years in the camps, in 1943, he was shot. In 1956, A. O. Firsov was posthumously rehabilitated for lack of evidence of a crime.
The tactical and technical requirements for the BT-20 wheeled-tracked tank were issued by the ABTU of the Red Army to plant No. 183 on October 13, 1937. Even work on the BT-7IS tank, which served as the basis for the development of the technical specifications for the BT-20, began only in the spring of 1937. But it is the BT-20 that is considered the starting point of the history of the T-34 - in fact, it all began with it. So A. O. Firsov could not have had anything to do with the initial stage of work on the immediate predecessors of the “thirty-four”. This work was already carried out under the leadership of the new chief designer - M.I. Koshkin.
Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin
Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin was born on November 21, 1898 in the village of Brynchagi, Yaroslavl province, into a large peasant family. At the age of 14, he went to work in Moscow, where he got a job in the caramel shop of a confectionery factory (later the Red October factory). In September 1917, Koshkin was drafted into the army. In 1918, he already volunteered to join the Red Army, participated in the battles of Arkhangelsk and Tsaritsyn, and was wounded. In 1919, M.I. Koshkin joined the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In 1921, straight from the army, he was sent to study in Moscow at the Communist University. Sverdlov. Upon graduation in 1924, he worked as director of a confectionery factory in the city of Vyatka. Since 1927 - member of the Vyatka Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and head of the department of agitation and propaganda. In the fall of 1929, among the “party thousand”, he was sent to study at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. This program was carried out with the aim of strengthening the technical intelligentsia with party cadres. M.I. Koshkin was enrolled as a student at the Department of Automobiles and Tractors.
At this time, the department had a very strong teaching staff. Among them are famous scientists Professor V. Yu. Gittis (head of the department), L. V. Klimenko (future head) and others. The department had close ties with industrial enterprises and took part in the development of factory products. Thus, Professor Klimenko simultaneously worked at the Krasny Putilovets plant, where he supervised the design development and organization of production of L-1 passenger cars and U-1 and U-2 row crop tractors. On the other hand, leading factory specialists were involved in teaching at the department.
In the 1930s, a scientific and production base for tank building was formed in Leningrad, and the Department of Automobiles and Tractors was the main link in training qualified personnel for this industry. In those years, such outstanding developers of tanks and their systems as N.L. Dukhov, S.P. Izotov, L.E. Sychev, and many others studied at the department.
After graduating from the institute in 1934, M.I. Koshkin was sent to work at the Leningrad Experimental Mechanical Engineering Plant No. 185 (OKMO Bolshevik Plant) as a designer. From this moment on, moments appear in Koshkin’s biography that can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, numerous sources note a thirst for knowledge and a desire for independent work, which, in general, was quite consistent with Koshkin’s character. In addition, we must not forget that Mikhail Ilyich was a family man, had children, and the need to earn extra money to feed his family forced him to work until late at night, performing economic contractual calculations and experimental studies for industry orders. The hard work was not in vain. A qualified specialist has been formed with good design training, extensive theoretical and calculation practice, organizational skills, and the ability to analyze difficult questions and determination to take responsibility for decisions made. Koshkin’s closed graduation project was dedicated to the original tank transmission and was carried out for a real experimental facility on the instructions of an industrial enterprise.
On the other hand, Koshkin began working in the design bureau of plant No. 185 while still a student, and not without the patronage of S. M. Kirov, who directly advised the head of the design bureau S. A. Ginzburg to “take a closer look at the young specialist.” By the way, Kirov’s participation in the fate of M.I. Koshkin is not accidental. The latter worked in Vyatka for several years, and Kirov was from the town of Urzhum, Vyatka province - almost fellow countrymen.
At KB Koshkin took part in the design of the three-turret wheeled-tracked tank T-29-5 and the tracked tank with anti-ballistic armor T-46-5. A year after the start of his engineering career, he was appointed deputy chief designer, and in 1936 he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Both seem to fit perfectly into the version of “Koshkin is Kirov’s protégé”, if not for one “but”... The fact is that on December 1, 1934, S. M. Kirov was killed, which means his appointment to the position of deputy and the awards took place after his death. However, there is another version that M.I. Koshkin became deputy for political affairs - that is, secretary of the party organization and received his order, so to speak, “for the company.”
Be that as it may, by order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry G.K. Ordzhonikidze dated December 28, 1936, engineer with 2.5 years of experience M.I. Koshkin was appointed head of the tank design bureau of plant No. 183. In January 1937, he arrived in Kharkov .
In this regard, it is necessary to dwell on one more rumor, which appeared quite actively in the early 1990s. The point was that M.I. Koshkin, after his arrival in Kharkov, allegedly contributed to the arrest of A.O. Firsov. Like, I couldn’t stand it in the design bureau former leader, whose authority among employees was very high. At first glance, everything looks quite logical. But only at first glance…
From all the available documents and memories of participants in the events, it cannot be concluded that M.I. Koshkin was a person capable of such an act. Quite the contrary - according to many of his colleagues, veterans of the Kharkov design bureau, he made a lot of efforts to protect the design bureau staff from the repressions that hit the plant in 1937-1938. A hunt began for specialists, the victims of which were many managers and employees of plant No. 183. The director of the plant, I.P. Bondarenko, was arrested and then shot. Many designers and production workers shared his fate. The chief engineer of the KhPZ, F. I. Lyashch, who “brought the machines into disrepair,” the chief metallurgist A. M. Metantsev and many others, “recruited” by the director of the KhPZ, were arrested, the list of charges against which included almost all conceivable and unthinkable atrocities - from “lowering vigilance” to “organizing an explosion at a factory.” At the end of 1937, the head of the diesel department, K. F. Chelpan, was arrested, and the department was headed by his deputy, T. P. Chupakhin. I. L. Trashutin was appointed his assistant for development work, but he was soon arrested as an American spy - in 1933, he defended his master’s thesis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the topic “Optimization of the design of the main parts of a diesel engine.” In such conditions, the fate of A. O. Firsov was predetermined; no additional intervention was required.
Touching on this topic, it is necessary to mention one more rumor. It was argued that M.I. Koshkin himself managed to avoid repression and protect the team from it, because he was a fellow countryman of the “bloody dwarf” - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Nikolai Yezhov. Supposedly they were from the same village. This is complete nonsense! Yezhov was born in 1895 in St. Petersburg, and in the future their paths with Koshkin did not intersect.
Experienced wheeled-tracked tank BT-2 IS on wheels
There is only one reason for the appearance of such rumors - the absence or lack of reliable information. And it’s not that by the 1990s there were few publications on the history of the creation of the T-34 (although a lot is not the right word here), but they were all somehow fragmentary and unfinished. There was no complete picture. Participants in the events also added fuel to the fire in their own way. So, for example, A. A. Morozov, talking somewhere in the early 1970s with a group of Moscow engineers who were on a business trip at the plant named after. Malyshev in Kharkov, said literally the following: “I’m ready to tell you everything about the T-34 tank, but starting from 1940.” Like this! What special thing happened before 1940 that A. A. Morozov could not (or did not want) to talk about 30 years later! Well, isn’t such mystery a breeding ground for various rumors and conjectures? However, when in the early 1990s, archival documents of those years became available to a wide range of researchers, including non-professional historians, such secrecy of the participants in the events became understandable - the facts were largely at odds with the benevolent legend that was being introduced into the mass consciousness with the blessing of ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee. Studying the documents allows us to tell the most complete story of the creation of the T-34 tank. However, this story will not be complete, since individual facts still could not be established. However, first things first.
By the time M.I. Koshkin arrived in Kharkov, three combat vehicles were in varying stages of design. Back in 1935, Plant No. 183 received technical specifications for the development of the BT-9 tank. According to the assignment, it was a wheeled-tracked vehicle with a crew of 4 people, armed with a 45- or 76-mm cannon coaxial with a DT machine gun; the second diesel engine should have been located in the niche of the tower; the third - in the frontal part of the hull; fourth - in anti-aircraft installation. The installation of a stern flamethrower was also provided. The hull and turret were supposed to have armor plates 13–25 mm thick, installed at large angles of inclination. Engine - M-17T or BD-2. Chassis - five road wheels on board, of which 4 are driven, one is steerable. Weight 14-15 tons, speed 75–80 km/h. Provision was made for synchronization of wheel and track drive. The wheel drive transmission scheme was supposed to be modeled after the BT-IS tank designed by N. F. Tsyganov.
In addition, in the winter of 1937, a decision was made to launch mass production of the BT-IS vehicle, and KhPZ received tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for the BT-7IS tank from ABTU. Large volumes of new design were not envisaged; the talk was about upgrading the serial BT-7 to the BT-IS level. It was planned to produce 100 BT-7IS tanks at KhPZ in 1937.
Here it is necessary to remind the reader that work on the creation of wheeled-tracked tanks BT-IS (BT-2IS, BT-5IS) began in the spring of 1935 in the repair shops of the Ukrainian Military District at the suggestion and under the leadership of the self-taught innovator platoon commander of the 4th tank regiment of senior lieutenant N.F. Tsyganov.
Experienced wheeled-tracked tank BT-5IS with sloping side armor
They initially used the components and assemblies of the BT-2 tank, and then the BT-5. To improve the tank's maneuverability when driving on wheels, three pairs of road wheels were made to drive. To supply power to the road wheels inside the vehicle, cardan shafts were installed along the sides of the hull, from which torque was transmitted through gearboxes along vertical shafts. The BT-IS tanks, compared to the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, had higher maneuverability when driving on wheels and increased survivability on the battlefield in case of damage to the chassis, but the reliability of the complex design of the drive to the drive wheels was relatively low. The BT-5IS tanks were produced in 1936 at repair plant No. 48 in Kharkov in a small experimental batch of nine vehicles and became a kind of cross-country standard for wheeled-tracked tanks. In 1937, at Plant No. 48, again under the leadership of N. F. Tsyganov, the development of another experimental tank based on the BT-7 began, this time with improved armor protection. The vehicle manufactured at the end of the year received the designation BT-SV-2 “Turtle” (SV - “Stalin-Voroshilov”). During its design, the French tank FCM 36 with a welded hull served as a role model.
The main fundamental difference between the new tank and the BT-7 was the armored hull, the plates of which were located at large angles of inclination (15° - 58°). The bow had the same width as the entire hull. Thanks to this, the front pipe and sloth brackets of the BT-7 tank were unnecessary. The armored hull drawings were developed by designers Werner and Zhirov with the participation of M. Tarshinov. The suspension of the front road wheels was similar to the others, but with the spring spring tilted back at an angle of 38°.
The body of the BT-SV-2 had absolutely no protruding parts, with the exception of the caps of the vertical suspension springs. All top, bottom and corner sheets of the body were removable and secured with bolts. To make the armored closure of the chassis more rigid, special jumpers (three on each side) were provided between the lower edge of the sheet and the inner wall of the hull. Fuel tanks were located in the side cavities of the tank. The BT-7's aft gas tank was eliminated, and as a result, the tank's feed was also assembled from inclined sheets.
The engine cooling system, unlike the BT-7, operated in two modes: combat and travel. In the combat position, the blinds were hermetically closed from the driver's seat and air was sucked in through a mesh of aft air pockets; in the stowed position, air was sucked in through the side opening blinds, and out through the aft blinds.
The BT-SV-2 turret did not have a niche, so the radio station was moved to the bow of the hull, where the fourth crew member, the radio operator, was located.
It should be noted that the body of the BT-SV-2 was made of ordinary steel sheets with a thickness of 10–12 mm. The real reservation project existed in two versions. The first involved the use of FD brand armor with a thickness of 40–55 mm, which protected against 45 mm shells at all distances; the second was designed for protection against 12.7 mm bullets and assumed the use of 20-25 mm IZ armor.
Wheeled-tracked tank BT-SV-2 “Turtle”
BT-SV-2 underwent factory tests in the winter of 1937 - spring of 1938, and then was tested at the NIBT Test Site by a commission chaired by E. A. Kulchitsky. In total, the tank covered 2068 km. As a result, the reservation principle used on this vehicle was considered quite acceptable. At the same time, it was noted that the chassis of the BT-7 tank, given the actual armor of the BT-SV-2 tank and the increase in the mass of the latter to 24-25 tons, is too weak. It was intended to practically test the reliability of the hull and its influence on the operation of the chassis in combat conditions, to produce a sample tank with real armor and conduct shelling tests. However, due to the arrest of N.F. Tsyganov at the beginning of 1938, all work on this machine was stopped.
Such a detailed story about the BT-SV-2 tank is not accidental, despite the fact that this vehicle was not developed at plant No. 183. We will return to it later, but now it makes sense to figure out what, in the end, happened to tanks BT-9 and BT-7IS. It was these machines that were discussed in the first document discovered in the archives relating to this period. It is dated August 20, 1937 and is called “On the progress of experimental work at plant No. 183.” So here it is:
“The progress of the new design at plant No. 183 does not ensure the creation of the required machine, which would ensure reliable operation for 2,000 - 10,000 km (for BT-7 - 2,000) and would have the same operational-tactical properties and could be in production without alterations for at least 3 years.
The plant management is obliged to produce in 1937 2 BT-9 tanks of a new design according to the specified TTT and BT-IS, which is a modernization of the BT-7 due to the drive device for three pairs of wheels while maintaining the remaining units. But since the plant management missed all the deadlines, it therefore decided to construct only one car. The project was completed hastily within 2 months and was presented to ABTU brigadier engineer Comrade Sviridov on May 21, 1937. The presented project had gross errors, as a result of which it was rejected. The project gives a new car with a widened body, a new chassis, etc. Essentially, this is not a BT-9, since it does not at all correspond to the ABTU TTT on the BT-9 and not the BT-7IS, because the body, radiators, wheels, etc. are changing. Moreover, the design is initially subordinated only to ease of production and commercial considerations and is carried out without TTT.
Tank A-20 undergoing field testing. 1939
What is especially striking is that during this design they do not take into account the requirements of the Red Army and do not use all the experience of tank building and, although the vehicle is being designed anew, the head of the design bureau, Comrade Koshkin, declares: “I solve only one problem of wheel drive and retain everything that only can be saved from old nodes..."
...Already at this time, numerous defects have been noted during the course of the BT-7IS project. Under the pressure of errors, the head of the design bureau, Comrade Koshkin, and the designer, Comrade Morozov, and others were forced to agree to rework the project... They announced and insisted that the guitar drive was outdated, heavy, fragile, difficult to manufacture and unreliable in operation. Comrade Sviridov gave the task to the adjunct of VAMM ( Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after. Stalin. – Approx. author) 3rd rank military engineer Comrade Dick try to give a good design of the guitar, since the guitar has a number of good qualities.
Adjunct Dick's work showed:
1. the guitar can be made durable, reliable and easy to manufacture and operate, if it is directed backwards, shortened by half, the crankcase is made wider and solid, the wheel is placed with the hub directly on the splines, etc.;
2. The drive with a cardan shaft in the longitudinal plane revealed an indisputable advantage over the transverse cardan shaft proposed by the factory, if the longitudinal shaft is passed in the middle or at the bottom of the housing.
The progress of the design work soon showed that it was necessary to sharply raise the issue of reconstructing the entire machine based on experience military units, Polygon, repair plants and serial production of plant No. 183 in the first place, but representatives of the design bureau of department “100”, headed by Comrade Koshkin, did not undertake a thorough reworking and completion of their project and, after some resistance, were forced to correct only individual gross errors:
1. point the balancers back;
2. convert the external gearing to internal;
3. The cardans are closed.
Along with this, the following developments by adjunct Comrade Dick were used:
1. springs have been recalculated and strengthened;
2. slightly improved the external characteristics of the suspension by tilting the springs;
3. The final drive gears were strengthened.
They completely refused to introduce the following improvements:
1. five-speed gearbox;
2. installation of 5 nap wheels, which provides significant advantages for the tank (there is no need to make the wheels and track wider and heavier);
3. turning off individual wheels from the outside or inside;
4. change the final drive;
5. replace transverse cardans with longitudinal ones;
6. set wheel camber to prevent overload and melting of rubber;
7. set the slope of the armor, at least on the upper side;
8. make a hatch in the bottom;
9. install an automatic coupler for towing;
10. increase the rigidity of the bottom.
At the same time, they hope that Comrade Dick, with all the changes, will not have time to complete the project on time and therefore will not be able to defend it. The head of the design bureau of department “100”, Comrade Koshkin, is leading the line to disrupt the work being carried out by Comrade Dick.
Dick should have been given 3 designers on June 25, 1937, but was given 2 later, and Morozov had 6 with a smaller amount of work. Comrade Koshkin tries to demoralize Dick’s designers by talking that Comrade Dick is engaged in fruitless variations and that nothing will work out for him. Therefore, these already weak designers give up. IN Lately, when it is clear that Comrade Dick’s design has positive results, the work went faster and better.
District engineer ABTU KA,
military engineer 2nd rank Saprygin."
As we see, the head of the factory design bureau, M.I. Koshkin, behaved more than strangely, actually entering into confrontation with ABTU. The order for the design of the BT-9 and BT-7IS was not completed, and the work of adjunct VAMM Dick, specially sent to plant No. 183 to develop several versions of the preliminary design of the BT-IS tank, was hampered in every possible way. One can only wonder how all this went unpunished for Koshkin.
A prototype of the A-20 wheeled-tracked tank during testing at the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka in 1939
In turn, ABTU brigadier engineer Sviridov sent a letter with the following content to the acting director of plant No. 183 Lyasch:
“By personal agreement with you, for the detailed development of several versions of the preliminary design of the BT-IS tank, VAMM adjunct military engineer 3rd rank, Comrade Dick, was sent to your plant.
It would seem that the plant should be interested in carefully studying all possible project options for the new tank and therefore will create all the conditions for the fruitful work of Comrade Dick, providing him with the necessary help and support.
However, in reality, Bureau “190”, represented by its chief Comrade Koshkin, took the path of contrasting the work of the bureau with the work of Comrade Dick. As a result, instead of a healthy competition that would benefit the cause, there was a desire to doom Comrade Dick’s work to failure in advance. This was reflected in the understaffing of Comrade Dick’s brigade and the creation of an unhealthy environment around his work.
I don’t want to think that Bureau 190 has finally taken the path of preventing fresh thought from entering the plant, as was the case before.”
It seems that the plant management had no illusions about the ability of its design bureau to ensure the task was completed. Therefore, they resorted to the help of the “Varangian”, whose appearance at the plant was received by M.I. Koshkin more than painfully.
Meanwhile, on August 15, 1937, at a meeting of the USSR Defense Committee, Resolution No. 94 “On new types of tanks for arming the tank forces of the Red Army” was adopted. It said, in particular:
“To equip mechanized formations and mechanized cavalry regiments, it is necessary to have a BT (Christie) type tank weighing 13-14 tons. The tank must have a diesel engine of the KhPZ design with a power of 400 hp. The tank's hull armor is 25 mm thick with inclined turret plates, a 20 mm conical turret. Armament: one 45-mm stabilized or one 76-mm cannon and two DT machine guns. Crew: three people. Cruising range on tracks – 300 km.
In the future, to provide for the transition to a BT with six driving wheels (1939) ... "
On September 28, 1937, the director of plant No. 183, I.P. Bondarenko, received an order from the Main Directorate with the following content:
“The director of plant No. 183. By Government Decision No. 94ss of August 15, 1937, the Main Directorate was asked to design and manufacture prototypes and prepare by 1939 production for serial production of high-speed wheeled-tracked tanks with synchronized movement. Due to the extreme seriousness of this work and the extremely short deadlines set by the Government, the 8th Main Directorate ( People's Commissariat of Defense Industry. – Approx. author) considers it necessary to carry out the following activities.
1. To design a machine, create a separate design bureau (OKB) at KhPZ, subordinate directly to the chief engineer of the plant.
2. By agreement with VAMM and ABTU, appoint 3rd rank military engineer Dik Adolf Yakovlevich as the head of this bureau and assign 30 VAMM graduates to work in the bureau from October 5 and an additional 20 people from December 1.
3. By agreement with the ABTU of the Red Army, appoint Captain Evgeniy Anatolyevich Kulchitsky as the main consultant on the vehicle.
4. No later than September 30, allocate 8 of the best tank designers of the plant to work in the OKB to appoint them as heads of individual groups, one standardizer, a secretary and an archivist.
5. Create a mock-up and model workshop at the OKB and ensure priority execution of work related to new design in all workshops of the plant.
Dates:
a) submit a technical project with preliminary calculations and a layout by 02/01/38 (drive in 3 options);
b) submit a detailed design of the machine according to the 2 approved options by May 1, 1938;
c) produce prototypes according to the 2 approved options by 1.09.38;
d) test and eliminate defects - by 12/1/38;
e) produce serial drawings and prepare production by 05/1/39 in order to produce serial vehicles from 05/1/39.
To participate in the development of TTT, instructing graduate students and selecting necessary materials for design, send to Moscow no later than October 11 the head of the design bureau, Comrade Dick, and the leaders of the groups allocated by the plant.”
It turns out that the People’s Commissariat was also aware of the inability of the factory design bureau and its head to fulfill the government’s instructions within the established, very strict deadlines. As a result, a design bureau was created at the plant, stronger than the main one.
To develop a new tank, ABTU sent to Kharkov captain E. A. Kulchitsky, military engineer 3rd rank A. Ya. Dik, engineers P. P. Vasiliev, V. G. Matyukhin, Vodopyanov, as well as 41 VAMM graduate students. In turn, the plant allocated designers: A. A. Morozov, N. S. Korotchenko, Shura, A. A. Moloshtanov, M. M. Lurie, Verkovsky, Dikon, P. N. Goryun, M. I. Tarshinov, A. S. Bondarenko, Ya. I. Barana, V. Ya. Kurasova, V. M. Doroshenko, Gorbenko, Efimova, Efremenko, Radoichina, P. S. Sentyurina, Dolgonogova, Pomochaybenko, V. S. Kalendin, Valovoy.
A. Ya. Dik was appointed head of the OKB, engineer P. N. Goryun as assistant chief, ABTU consultant E. A. Kulchitsky, section heads V. M. Doroshenko (control), M. I. Tarshinov (hull), Gorbenko (motor ), A. A. Morozov (transmission), P. P. Vasiliev (chassis).
The A-20 wheeled-tracked tank overcomes a slope on wheels. NIBT Test site, 1939
On October 13, 1937, ABTU issued the plant with tactical and technical requirements, developed by the head of the 2nd department of ABTU, Ya. L. Skvirsky, for the design of a new combat vehicle - the BT-20 wheeled-tracked tank. Judging by the document cited above, Dick, Doroshenko, Tarshinov, Gorbenko, Morozov and Vasiliev took part in this process.
“Tactical and technical requirements for the design and manufacture of a new wheeled-tracked tank BT-20.
1. Type – wheel-tracked, with 6-wheel drive according to the Christie type.
2. Combat weight – 13-14 tons.
3. Armament – 1x45 mm, 3 diesel engines, flamethrower for self-defense or 1x76 mm, 3 diesel engines, flamethrower. Every 5th tank must have an anti-aircraft gun.
4. Ammunition – 130-150x45 mm or 50x76 mm, 2500-3000 rounds.
5. Reservations: front – 25, conical turret – 20, side, stern – 16, roof and bottom – 10 mm. The armor is all inclined, with a minimum angle of inclination of the armor plates of the hull and turret of 18°.
6. Speed – the same on tracks and wheels: max. 70 km/h, min. 7 km/h.
7. Crew – 3 people.
8. Power reserve – 300 – 400 km.
9. Engine - BD-2 with a power of 400 - 600 hp.
10. Transmission - similar to the wheeled-tracked tank BT-IS (power take-off for wheel drive after side clutches).
11. Suspension is individual; it is advisable to use torsion springs as springs.
12. Install the Orion shot stabilizer and the horizontal stabilizer of the turret system of engineer Povalov, install headlights for night shooting with a range of up to 1000 m.”
The gap in historical documents about the activities of the OKB covers the period from November 1937 to March 1938. Even the initial draft design of the BT-20 tank has not been preserved. The author knows of only one “black hole” in which all this could have disappeared and remained inaccessible to this day - the NKVD archive (now the FSB archive). Apparently, the fate of the OKB and, in any case, the fate of A. Ya. Dick turned out to be sad.
The deadlines for completing the work were missed. The preliminary design of the BT-20 tank was approved by the ABTU of the Red Army only on March 25, 1938. Two days later, the acting chief engineer of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, Sokolov, sent a memo to the Chairman of the USSR Defense Committee, Molotov, which noted, among other things:
“The government decree obliging Plant No. 183 to create new types of BT and T-35 tanks in 1938, ensuring their transition to production from January 1, 1939, was thwarted by the plant.
The preliminary design of the BT drawn up to date is at odds with government data. The weight is 16 tons instead of 13-14 tons, the thickness of the frontal armor is 16-20 mm instead of 25 mm. Armament - instead of 2 diesel engines - 3 diesel engines, installation of a flamethrower is not provided... (18 people are working on the project).”
The last document is very interesting, and it makes sense to try to analyze it. Firstly, it is completely unclear when this memo was drawn up - before Dick was eliminated or after. That is, it is not clear whether the failure to meet design deadlines was the reason for the disbandment of the design bureau, or whether these same deadlines were missed as a result of the disbandment of the design bureau. The document states that 18 people are working on the project. If the OKB still existed in March 1938, then it is really unclear what everyone else was doing? If the OKB no longer existed, then these 18 people were employees of KB-24, which had already been formed by M.I. Koshkin and consisted of 21 employees. The numbers 18 and 21 are quite consistent. Unfortunately, the history of KB-24 cannot shed light on this issue, since not a single source indicates the date of its formation. One thing is clear - exactly half of KB-24 consisted of former OKB employees!
Comparative sizes of tanks BT-7 and A-20
Also noteworthy is the chief engineer of the Defense Committee's poor knowledge of the essence of the issue. Serial production was supposed to begin not on January 1, but on May 1, 1939, there were three machine guns and TTT. But the fact that the designers did not meet the weight restrictions, while weakening the armor protection of the tank, is truly a serious mistake. All this together (especially the failure to meet deadlines) could have caused Dick to be removed and a case brought against him. If Dick was removed before the design was completed, and his work became the responsibility of Koshkin, then the latter could deflect accusations against him, citing the mistakes of his predecessor. But only under one condition - if he led the work at the final stage, when nothing could be corrected. One can only guess what passions were in full swing in Kharkov in the winter of 1937/38. It is unlikely that M.I. Koshkina could have been satisfied with the role of an extra - the head of a weakened serial design bureau. Moreover, he already had some experience in opposing the work of A. Ya. Dick. Most likely, he found understanding with the new young and no less ambitious director of plant No. 183, Yu. E. Maksarev. Thus, perhaps, a front of opposition to the work, and indeed to the very existence of the OKB, was formed. However, these are all assumptions; we, apparently, will not find out very soon how events actually developed. And will we find out?
Today, with a high degree of probability, it can be argued that M.I. Koshkin either had nothing to do with the design of the wheeled-tracked tank BT-20 (A-20), or had very little to do with it. And certainly not as a designer!
The tactical and technical requirements for the BT-20 tank were developed with the participation of A. Ya. Dick and were largely based on his developments made in the summer and autumn of 1937. First of all, this concerns the design of the guitar, the angles of inclination of the upper part of the sides, the longitudinal arrangement of the cardan shafts of the wheel drive, the inclined arrangement of the springs, etc. Even Dick’s proposal to use five pairs of road wheels in the chassis for better load distribution has found its application, if not on the BT- 20, then on subsequent machines. This is the end of the first legend associated with the history of the creation of the T-34 tank!
Well, the reader will say, even if Koshkin did not develop the A-20 project, but he certainly proposed the project of a purely tracked tank! In any case, the wheeled-tracked tank is an order from ABTU, and the tracked vehicle is an innovative initiative of KB-24 and M.I. Koshkin personally. Well, let's try to figure this issue out.
Experienced medium tank A-32 (first sample) during field tests in the summer of 1939
While passions were boiling in Kharkov, they were also boiling in Moscow, but for a slightly different reason. The People's Commissariat of Defense at all levels discussed the issue of development prospects domestic tanks. And while the need to create a tank capable of withstanding shells from 37- and 47-mm cannons was doubted by almost no one, opinions were divided regarding the type of propulsion. One part of the military and engineers defended a purely tracked propulsion system, the other - a wheeled-tracked one.
At the same time, opponents of the wheeled-tracked propulsion system, who found themselves in the minority, referred to the allegedly sad experience of using BT-5 tanks in Spain, which is not entirely clear, since this experience was very limited - only 50 BT-5 tanks were sent to Spain. References to the very low reliability of the chassis also seemed untenable: in September 1937, “beteshki”, for example, moving to the Aragonese front, made a 500-km march along the highway on wheels without significant breakdowns. By the way, a year and a half later, already in Mongolia, BT-7 6th tank brigade made an 800-km march to Khalkhin Gol on tracks, and also with almost no breakdowns.
The essence of the contradictions, most likely, was something else: to what extent is it necessary? battle tank chassis in two guises? After all, the wheeled propulsion device was used mainly for marching at high speeds along good roads, and such an opportunity appeared quite rarely. Was it worth complicating the design of the tank's chassis for this? And if for the BT-7 such a complication was still relatively small, then for the BT-20, which had a drive for three pairs of road wheels, it was already quite significant. There were probably other reasons: production, operational and political - if the authorities are in favor of a wheeled-tracked propulsion system, then why bother?
But, apparently, the authorities were also tormented by doubts. In any case, in order to make a final decision on which type of tank to give preference, in March 1938, a memorandum was received from the USSR People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov with a proposal to revise NKO Resolution No. 94, which stated, in particular:
“A tank designed to operate together with infantry (cavalry) and as part of independent tank formations must be one. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop two types of tanks: one purely tracked and the other wheeled-tracked. Comprehensively test them during 1939 and after that adopt the one that will meet all the requirements to replace the BT and T-26.”
Attached to the note was a draft decision, which in the section “Development of new tank designs” provided for:
“Create two prototypes of light tanks: one is purely tracked, armed with 45 mm tank gun and a coaxial machine gun with armor that protects against 12.7 mm bullets from all distances, a maximum speed of 50–60 km/h and a weight of no more than 13 tons. The second is a wheeled-tracked one with six driving wheels with the same weapons and armor, speed on tracks and wheels 50–60 km/h and weighing no more than 15 tons. Engine – diesel.”
The first sample of the experimental A-32 tank, rear view
On May 4, 1938, an extended meeting of the USSR Defense Committee took place in Moscow. The meeting was chaired by V. I. Molotov, and was attended by I. V. Stalin, K. E. Voroshilov, other state and military leaders, representatives of the defense industry, as well as tank commanders who had recently returned from Spain. The participants were presented with a draft design of a light wheeled-tracked tank BT-20, developed at plant No. 183. During the discussion of the project, a discussion began again about the feasibility of using wheeled-tracked propulsion on tanks. Participants in the battles in Spain who spoke in the debate, in particular A. A. Vetrov and the head of the ABTU D. G. Pavlov, expressed diametrically opposed points of view on the issue under discussion. No specific decision in favor of this or that type of propulsion was made at this meeting, but five days later, at a meeting of the NCO on the Red Army’s weapons system, the following was written into the minutes: “Comrade’s proposal. Pavlov on the creation of a tracked tank by plant No. 183 is considered expedient with increased armor in the frontal part to 30 mm. The tank turret must be adapted to accommodate a 76 mm gun. Crew – 4 people... Accepted unanimously.” But due to the fact that no decision had been made at the highest level, on May 13, 1938, the leadership of ABTU approved the revised tactical and technical characteristics wheeled-tracked tank BT-20. To provide protection from 12.7 mm armor-piercing bullets, the thickness of the armor plates of the hull and turret was increased, and the plates themselves were located at greater angles than before. The weight was determined to be 16.5 tons, and the vehicle actually moved into the category of medium tanks. The crew was increased to 4 people. The composition of the weapons remained the same, only the flamethrower installation was removed.
In August 1938, the USSR Defense Committee adopted a resolution “On the Tank Weapon System.” This document contained a requirement: in less than a year, by July 1939, to develop new models of tanks whose armament, armor and mobility would fully meet the conditions of a future war.
At the beginning of September 1938, the design and layout of the BT-20 tank were reviewed by a commission of the ABTU of the Red Army, chaired by military engineer 1st rank Ya. L. Skvirsky. The commission approved the project, but at the same time obliged the design bureau and plant No. 183 to develop and manufacture one wheeled-tracked tank with a 45-mm cannon and two tracked tanks with 76-mm cannons.
Thus, we can say with confidence that there was no initiative from Plant No. 183 to create a tracked tank, but there was an official order from the Armored Directorate of the Red Army! The facts here are fundamentally at odds with the legend that has been cultivated for almost half a century about the “engineering and strategic foresight of M. I. Koshkin,” who created a new tank “semi-legally, in the intervals between his main work.”
The natural question here is: what then is the merit of M.I. Koshkin in creating the T-34 tank? The fact is that Mikhail Ilyich was an excellent organizer. This undoubtedly reflected many years of experience in economic and party work. And from the chief designer, who manages a rather large team, what is primarily required is not so much engineering as organizational skills. Judging by the documents and memoirs of veterans, M.I. Koshkin really did not design a single tank. However, having inherited someone else's project, he made enormous efforts to bring it to its logical conclusion, and ultimately paid for it with his life.
After the dissolution of the OKB, M.I. Koshkin managed to create a new team and organize employees to complete the task. Even if, especially from today’s point of view, his leadership methods do not always look democratic. So, for example, many design bureau veterans recalled how Mikhail Ilyich liked to quietly come up from behind with a stick in his hands and, tapping it on the floor, warn that he would stretch it across his back if the work was not done on time... And it helped! At the same time, everyone noted his concern for the living conditions of the designers and their families, the protection of his subordinates from unfounded accusations of sabotage, etc.
The fighting qualities of M.I. Koshkin were fully revealed in the course of subsequent events. In October 1938, the plant presented drawings and models of two options developed in accordance with the decision of the ABTU commission: the wheeled-tracked A-20 and the tracked A-20G, which were reviewed by the Main Military Council of the Red Army on December 9 and 10, 1938. Their consideration by the USSR Defense Committee took place on February 27, 1939. During the discussion of the projects presented by M.I. Koshkin, the majority of the military leaders present, including the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G. Kulik, gave preference to the project of the A-20 tank, which had greater operational mobility. And at the moment when the scales finally tipped in favor of the wheeled-tracked version, M.I. Koshkin, in the presence of I.V. Stalin, expressed his doubts regarding the customer’s requirements to manufacture only one wheeled-tracked tank in metal and proposed to manufacture and present Both machines designed by plant No. 183 were submitted for state testing. It was then that Stalin uttered his famous and in most cases incorrectly interpreted phrase: “There is no need to hamper the initiative of the plant, I believe the plant workers. Let them build both tanks." The plant’s initiative has always meant a tracked tank, but in reality we are only talking about the production of both tanks, and not one. As a result, both projects were approved, and the plant was offered to manufacture and test prototypes of the A-20 and A-32 tanks (the A-20G had received this index by that time).
Tank A-32 moves over rough terrain
In connection with the urgent development of drawings, the question arose about attracting additional design forces. At the beginning of 1939, the three tank design bureaus available at Plant No. 183 (KB-190, KB-35 and KB-24) were merged into one division, which was assigned the code - department 520. At the same time, all experimental workshops were merged into one. M. I. Koshkin became the chief designer of department 520, A. A. Morozov became the head of the design bureau and deputy chief designer, and N. A. Kucherenko became the deputy head.
In May 1939, prototypes of new tanks were made in metal. Until July, both vehicles underwent factory testing in Kharkov, and from July 17 to August 23 - testing grounds. At the same time, the test report indicated that neither one nor the other vehicle was fully equipped. This concerned the A-32 to the greatest extent. It lacked the OPVT equipment provided for by the project and the stowage of spare parts; 6 out of 10 road wheels were borrowed from the BT-7 (they were already “original”), and the ammunition rack was not fully equipped.
As for the differences between the A-32 and the A-20, the commission that conducted the tests noted the following: the first does not have a wheel drive; the thickness of its side armor is 30 mm (instead of 25 mm); armed with a 76 mm L-10 cannon instead of a 45 mm one; has a mass of 19 tons. The ammunition stowage both in the nose and on the sides of the A-32 was adapted for 76-mm shells. Due to the lack of wheel drive, as well as the presence of 5 road wheels, the interior of the A-32 hull was somewhat different from the interior of the A-20. In terms of other mechanisms, the A-32 did not have any significant differences from the A-20.
During the tests, the performance characteristics of both tanks were clarified.
During factory tests, the A-20 covered 872 km (on tracks - 655, on wheels - 217), A-32 - 235 km. During field testing, the A-20 covered 3,267 km (of which 2,176 on tracks), the A-32 – 2,886 km.
The chairman of the commission, Colonel V.N. Chernyaev, not daring to give preference to one of the vehicles, wrote in the conclusion that both tanks successfully passed the tests, after which the question again hung in the air.
On September 23, 1939, a demonstration of tank equipment to the leadership of the Red Army took place, which was attended by K. E. Voroshilov, A. A. Zhdanov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. A. Voznesensky, D. G. Pavlov and others, as well as the main designers of the tanks being presented. In addition to the A-20 and A-32, heavy tanks KB, SM K and T-100, as well as light BT-7M and T-26 tanks were delivered to the Kubinka training ground near Moscow.
The A-32 “performed” very impressively. Easily, even gracefully and at a good pace, the tank crossed a ditch, a scarp, a counter-scarp, a rutted bridge, forded a river, climbed a slope with a rise of more than 30° and finally knocked down a large pine tree with the bow of the armored hull, causing the admiration of the spectators. Based on the results of tests and demonstrations, the opinion was expressed that the A-32 tank, which had a reserve for increasing mass, would be advisable to protect with more powerful 45-mm armor, correspondingly increasing the strength of individual parts.
At this time, in the experimental workshop of plant No. 183, the assembly of two such tanks, which received the factory index A-34, was already underway. At the same time, during October-November 1939, tests were carried out on the A-32 tank, loaded with 6830 kg. The weight of the vehicle was increased to 24 tons by placing metal blanks on the hull and turret.
The plant was in a hurry to assemble new tanks by November 7, putting all its efforts into it. However, technical difficulties arose, mainly with power plants and power transmissions, slowed down the assembly. The units and components were carefully adjusted, all threaded connections were treated with hot oil, and the rubbing surfaces were impregnated with purified grease. Ignoring the protests of military representatives, only imported bearings were installed in the gearboxes. The external surfaces of the buildings and towers were also subjected to unprecedented finishing.
The second prototype of the A-32 tank, loaded to 24 tons, during factory testing. Summer 1939
Meanwhile, on December 19, 1939, Resolution No. 443ss of the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted, “On the adoption of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery tractors and their production in 1940 by the Red Army,” which, in particular, stated:
“Based on the review and test results of new models of tanks, armored vehicles and tractors, manufactured in accordance with the resolutions of the Defense Committee No. 198ss of July 7, 1938 and No. 118ss of May 15, 1939, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:
1. Adopt the Red Army:
... The T-32 tank is tracked, with a V-2 diesel engine, manufactured by the Narkomsredmash plant N 183, with the following changes:
a) increase the thickness of the main armor plates to 45 mm;
b) improve visibility from the tank;
c) install the following weapons on the T-32 tank:
1) F-32 cannon of 76 mm caliber, coaxial with a machine gun of 7.62 mm caliber;
2) a separate machine gun for the radio operator of 7.62 mm caliber;
3) separate 7.62 mm machine gun;
4) 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine gun.
Assign a name to the specified tank – T-34.”
Assembly of the first A-34 was completed in January 1940, the second in February. And immediately military trials began, the progress of which was reflected in the reports.
“The first [vehicle] A-34 passed 200 km of testing. Passability is good. The accompanying BT often gets stuck and the 34th has to be pulled out.
Visibility in traffic is terrible. The windows sweat and become clogged with snow within 7–10 minutes. Further movement is impossible; the glass needs to be cleaned from the outside.
In the tower with this system ( 76 mm gun. – Approx. ed.) cramped.
On February 15, 1940 we returned from the run. The machine was set to install the mask.
A-34 second - we have run it in, the mechanisms are working normally.”
It is worth paying attention to some of the comments in this report regarding the terrible visibility in traffic and the cramped conditions of the tower. We still have to face both in the future.
The second prototype of the A-32 tank, loaded to 24 tons. Factory tests, July - August 1939
After 250 km of travel, the engine of the first A-34 tank failed, having worked for only 25 hours. It had to be replaced with a new one. By February 26, this car had covered only 650 km, and the second – 350 km. It became obvious that it would not be possible to complete the entire scope of testing with a mileage of 2000 km before the government show scheduled for March. And without this, the tanks could not be allowed to demonstrate. It was then that the idea arose to transport both A-34s from Kharkov to Moscow under their own power and thus increase the required mileage. At a special meeting of the plant’s party committee, M.I. Koshkin was appointed responsible for the run.
On the morning of March 5 (according to other sources, on the night from the 5th to the 6th), a convoy of two A-34s and two Voroshilovets tractors, one of which was equipped for housing, and the other was packed to capacity with spare parts, set course to Moscow. For reasons of secrecy, the route of the run was laid out bypassing large settlements and main roads. Bridges were allowed to be used if it was impossible to cross the river on ice and only at night. The mileage schedule took into account not only travel and rest times, but also the train schedule on the intersecting railway lines and the weather forecast along the route. The average speed of the column should not exceed 30 km/h.
Troubles began not far from Belgorod. While moving through the virgin snow, one of the tanks had its main clutch broken off. In a number of publications, this is attributed to the lack of experience of one of the drivers, which seems unlikely, since the tanks were driven by the best test drivers of the plant, who drove hundreds of kilometers on them. Yu. E. Maksarev in his memoirs gives a different interpretation of this fact. According to him, “a representative of the GABTU, sitting at the levers, forced the car to turn around in the snow at full speed and disabled the main clutch.” M.I. Koshkin decided to continue moving with one tank, and a repair team was called from the factory to repair the one that was out of order.
In Serpukhov, the column was met by the Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Engineering (in 1939, all tank factories were transferred from the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry to the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building) A. A. Goreglyad. A serviceable tank arrived in Moscow, or more precisely, at plant No. 37, which was then located in Cherkizovo, near Moscow. For several days, while they were waiting for the lagging car, a real pilgrimage continued to the plant: representatives of STC GABTU, VAMM named after. Stalin, General Staff Red Army - everyone was interested in looking at the new product. During these days, M.I. Koshkin felt ill, his temperature rose - during the run he caught a serious cold.
On the night of March 17, both “thirty-fours” arrived at Ivanovo Square in the Kremlin. In addition to M.I. Koshkin, only two drivers of plant No. 183 were allowed into the Kremlin. Tank No. 1 was driven by N.F. Nosik, and No. 2 by I.G. Bitensky (according to other sources, V. Dyukanov). Next to them, in the place of the shooter, were NKVD officers.
The first prototype of the A-34 tank. Noteworthy is the bent frontal sheet of the hull, which was absent on production vehicles.
In the morning a large group of party members and statesmen– I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, M.I. Kalinin, L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov and others. The head of the GABTU D. G. Pavlov gave a report. Then the floor was given to M.I. Koshkin. Despite the medications he had taken, he could not control the cough that was choking him, which caused dissatisfied glances from I.V. Stalin and L.P. Beria. After the report and inspection, the tanks drove off: one to Spassky, the other to the Trinity Gate. Before reaching the gate, they turned sharply and rushed towards each other, effectively striking sparks from the paving stones. After making several circles with turns in different directions, the tanks stopped at the same place on command. The leader liked the new cars, and he ordered that plant No. 183 be provided with the necessary assistance to eliminate the shortcomings of the A-34, which were persistently pointed out to him by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kulik and D.G. Pavlov. Moreover, the latter boldly told Stalin: “We will pay dearly for producing insufficiently combat-ready vehicles.”
After the Kremlin show, the tanks headed to the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka, where, in particular, they were tested by firing from a 45-mm cannon. After two shells hit the turret from a distance of 100 m, the glass and mirrors of the viewing devices were destroyed, the forehead of the sight came off, and the welds along the contours of the armor of the viewing devices and at the bottom of the turret niche were broken. As a result of the deformation of the shoulder strap, the tower jammed. True, the dummy in the tank remained intact, and the engine, which had been started before the shelling, continued to run. It was decided to increase the thickness of the turret niche bottom from 15 to 20 mm and strengthen the aft hatch mounting bolts.
In addition to shelling tests, sea trials were also carried out. The tanks overcame climbs of 15-16° with snow cover up to 1.5 m. At the same time, low adhesion qualities of the tracks were noted. The impact force of the tanks broke free-standing pine trees with a diameter of up to 700 mm. When testing the tightness of the tank hull against the penetration of burning liquid, better results were obtained compared to other tanks.
In conclusion, it was noted that both A-34 vehicles meet the requirements and are superior to the tanks in service with the Red Army. But without eliminating the noted shortcomings (a list of 86 points), the A-34 tank could not be put into mass production.
On March 31, 1940, the first prototype of the A-34 tank was inspected and a meeting was held, which was attended by People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, his deputy G.I. Kulik, head of ABTU D.G. Pavlov, People's Commissar of Medium Engineering I. A. Likhachev, his deputy A. A. Goreglyad and chief designer M.I. Koshkin. As a result, protocol No. 848 was signed on putting the T-34 (A-34) tank into mass production at plant No. 183 and STZ. At the same time, it was pointed out that during serial production it was necessary to provide for an increase in the reserved volume of the turret in order to more conveniently accommodate crew members. The turret should have been enlarged without changing the angles of the armor plates or increasing the diameter of the shoulder straps. The radio needed to be moved from the tower to the building. The State Commission for Tank Testing was tasked with approving the T-34 drawings for production in 1940 within five days.
A prototype of the A-34 medium tank during testing at the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka. March 1940
The final stage of testing was their return to the plant under their own power in April 1940. Upon arrival of the cars in Kharkov after 3,000 km of run, a number of defects were discovered during disassembly: the brakes and ferrodo on the main clutch discs were burnt, cracks appeared on the fans, and chips were found on the gear teeth of the gearboxes. The design bureau worked on a number of options to eliminate defects. However, it was clear to everyone that the A-34 would not pass the warranty of 3,000 km without defects (even after corrections).
In the summer of 1940, clouds began to gather over the T-34. The fact is that two Pz.III tanks, purchased from Germany after the signing of the non-aggression pact, arrived at the Kubinka training ground. The results of comparative tests of the German tank and the T-34 were disappointing for the Soviet combat vehicle.
The T-34 was superior to the “troika” in armament and armor protection, but inferior in a number of other indicators. Pz.III had a three-man turret, which had enough comfortable conditions for combat work of crew members. The commander had a convenient turret, which provided him great review, all crew members had their own intercom devices. The T-34 turret could hardly accommodate two tankers, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases, as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members – the tank commander and the driver – were provided with internal communications.
German car surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it also turned out to be less noisy - with maximum speed the movements of the Pz.III could be heard at 150–200 m, and the T-34 at 450 m.
The superiority of the “German” in speed was also a complete surprise for our military. On the gravel highway Kubinka - Repishche, the Pz.III accelerated at a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km/h, while the best figure for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h. The BT-7 on wheels, singled out as a standard, reached only 68.1 km/h!
The test report also noted the more successful suspension of the German tank, high quality optical instruments, convenient placement of ammunition and radio stations, and a reliable engine and transmission.
These results had the effect of a bomb exploding. GABTU (since July 1940, the Automotive Armored Directorate of the Red Army became known as the Main Automotive Armored Directorate) provided the test site report to Marshal G.I. Kulik, who approved it and thereby suspended the production and acceptance of the T-34, demanding that all shortcomings be eliminated. The management of plant No. 183 did not agree with the customer’s opinion and appealed it to the headquarters and the People’s Commissariat, proposing to continue producing the T-34 with corrections, reducing the warranty mileage to 1000 km. People's Commissar of Medium Engineering V. A. Malyshev (who replaced I. A. Likhachev in this post) together with the head of the 8th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building A. A. Goreglyad, the director of plant No. 183 Yu. E. Maksarev and the head of the scientific and technical complex of the GABTU I. A. Lebedev turned directly to K. E. Voroshilov, who, like V. A. Malyshev, was deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The Marshal got acquainted with the results of the 3000 km run, tests at the training ground and on the former Mannerheim line, listened to the opinion of I. A. Lebedev, who advocated continuing the production of the T-34, and announced his decision:
“We continue to make cars; to hand over to the army, establishing a 1000-km warranty mileage. The plant will begin to develop a new vehicle - the T-34M, introducing not only strength changes to it, but also a five-speed gearbox.”
The second prototype of the A-34 tank during fire tests. Spring 1940
By that time, the health of M.I. Koshkin, who fell ill with pneumonia in March, had deteriorated significantly. Removing the affected lung did not help either. On September 26, 1940, M.I. Koshkin died. A. A. Morozov was appointed chief designer of the tank design bureau - department 520, despite the fact that the latter did not have a higher education diploma. J.V. Stalin himself spoke in support of his candidacy, and perhaps he was right - A.A. Morozov had extensive experience in tank building, thoroughly knew the T-34 tank and the whole range of issues associated with it. It can be argued that starting from April-May 1938, M.I. Koshkin provided organizational, and A.A. Morozov - design issues related to the development of the A-20, A-32 and A-34 tanks. At the same time, Morozov, while still a member of the Design Bureau, was directly involved in the design of the A-20 wheeled-tracked tank. After the appointment of A. A. Morozov, N. A. Kucherenko and A. V. Kolesnikov became his deputies as chief designer. In 1942, three people - M.I. Koshkin, A.A. Morozov and N.A. Kucherenko became laureates of the Stalin Prize for the creation of the T-34 tank. Each of them made their contribution to the process of the birth of this combat vehicle, it is only a pity that among them there is still no place for A. Ya. Dick.
However, let’s return to the “thirty-four”...
During November-December 1940, the first three production T-34 vehicles underwent intensive testing at the NIBT Test Site of the GABTU of the Red Army. The report of these tests has recently been often referred to in various sources, but, as a rule, it is never quoted in detail. Meanwhile, its contents can give rise to serious reflection about another legend about the T-34. Here is the report:
“According to the directive of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense No. 76791 of October 25, 1940, the testing of T-34 tanks was carried out using the method of running with separation from the base in combination with shooting fire missions.
Due to the lack of approved tactical and technical requirements for the T-34 tank, conclusions and assessments are made based on the identified tactical and technical characteristics.
Long run: Kharkov – Kubinka – Smolensk – Kyiv – Kharkov.
Purpose of the test:
1. Determine the tactical and technical characteristics of the tank as a whole and establish its compliance with the tactical and technical requirements presented by the General Staff.
2. Determine the reliability and reliability of tank components under long-term conditions.
3. Determine the compliance of weapons, ammunition, surveillance and communications equipment with the tactical tasks facing tanks of this class.
4. Determine whether the tank is equipped with a transportable set of spare parts and tools and finally develop the set. Determine the volume and frequency of tank maintenance in field conditions. Determine the repair capabilities of the tank in the field.
The total mileage is 3000 km, of which 1000 km on highways, 2000 km on dirt roads and off-roads with overcoming natural obstacles.
Note: 30% of the total mileage is covered at night, 30% of the mileage on dirt roads and virgin soil is covered in a combat position (with the hatches closed).
Testing the tightness of the tank hull and turret by dousing it with flammable liquid.
The test was carried out from October 31 to December 7, 1940 in late autumn conditions.
The entire route was completed in 14 walking days. Inspections and repairs during the run took 11 days. 8 days were spent on special testing. Preparation and delivery of the car – 2 days. Total – 38 days.
The results of firing for accuracy, obtained after all firing and expressed through the core stripes in deviations in width and height, are higher than the tabulated data for the 76-mm gun mod. 1927
One of the first serial T-34 tanks. This car does not yet have protective strips around the perimeter of the driver's hatch. 1940
The results of shooting for accuracy should be considered low due to the complication of aiming conditions with significant backlash in the rotating and lifting mechanisms.
The results of firing from machine guns show that the dispersion values for a machine gun coaxial with a cannon do not exceed normal data for a DT machine gun.
When the radio operator fires from a machine gun, the dispersion value increases significantly and goes beyond the normal data, and the number of holes decreases.
As a result of live firing exercises with the solution of fire missions, the following shortcomings were identified:
1. crowded crew in the fighting compartment due to the small dimensions of the turret;
2. inconvenience of using ammunition stowed in the floor of the fighting compartment;
3. delay in transferring fire due to the inconvenient location of the turret rotating mechanism (manual and electric drive);
4. lack of visual communication between tanks when solving a fire mission, due to the fact that the only device allowing all-round visibility - PT-6 - is used only for aiming;
5. inability to use the TOD-6 sight due to the overlap of the aiming angle scale with the PT-6 sight;
6. significant and slowly damping vibrations of the tank when moving, negatively affecting the accuracy of fire from a cannon and machine guns.
The maximum rate of fire from the L-11 cannon (from a standstill), obtained during testing, reaches 5-6 rounds per minute. The practical average rate of fire (firing on the move and from short stops) is 2 rounds per minute. The rate of fire is insufficient.
Ventilation (hygienic) of the tank is carried out by a fan of the cooling system and an additional exhaust fan located in the partition of the engine compartment.
Thus the existing ventilation means in the tank are insufficient.
The turret is rotated with the right hand. The location of the flywheel and the rotating mechanism handle does not allow for rapid rotation of the turret and causes severe hand fatigue. When simultaneously operating the rotating mechanism and observing through the PT-6 sight, the flywheel and handle rest against the chest, making it difficult to quickly rotate the turret.
Serial T-34 tank produced in 1940 with a 76-mm L-11 cannon
The forces on the turning mechanism handle increase greatly as the tank's roll angle increases and make work much more difficult.
The electric drive is located on the left side of the tower and provides 360° rotation in both directions. Access to the starting flywheel of the electric drive is made difficult from below by the electric motor housing on the left, an inspection device and the turret housing, and on the right by the forehead and the PT-6 device. Rotation of the turret in any direction is possible only if the head is deviated from the forehead of the PT-6 device, that is, the rotation of the turret is actually carried out blindly.
The window of the aiming angle scale of the TOD-6 telescopic sight is blocked by the terrain angle levers of the PT-6 device and the parallelogram rod. Setting sighting data is possible at elevation angles of 4-5.5° and 9-12°, which actually makes it impossible to fire with the TOD-6 sight. The aiming angle scale barrel is located in the middle part of the sight and is extremely difficult to access.
At an elevation angle of 7° and below to the maximum descent angle, access to the handle of the all-round viewing mechanism is possible with only three fingers due to the fact that the sector of the gun’s lifting mechanism does not allow the hand to wrap around the handle.
The specified position does not provide a quick view of the area.
The all-round viewing device is installed to the right-behind of the tank commander in the roof of the turret. Access to the device is extremely difficult, and observation is possible in a limited sector: horizontal view to the right up to 120°; dead space 15 m.
A limited viewing sector, complete impossibility of observation in the rest of the sector and design flaws - breakage of the device mount, breakage and engagement of the windshield wiper on the top mirror, interference of the armor flap in the grooves, uncomfortable position of the head during observation make the viewing device unsuitable for work.
Side viewing devices of the tower. The position of the instruments relative to the observer is inconvenient. The disadvantages are significant dead space (15.5 m), a small viewing angle (53°), the inability to clean the protective glass without leaving the tank, and a low location relative to the seats.
Driver's viewing devices. When driving on polluted dirt road and virgin soil for 5-10 minutes. viewing devices become covered with dirt until visibility is completely lost. The windshield wiper of the central unit does not clean the protective glass from dirt.
Driving a tank with the hatch closed is extremely difficult.
When firing, the protective glass of the viewing devices bursts. The external finish of the tank is rough, the protruding parts are sharp (lambs on the side instruments), which leads to injury to the driver’s head. The driver's viewing devices are generally unusable.
All PT-6, TOD-6 sighting devices installed on the tank and observation devices in the fighting compartment and control compartment are not protected from precipitation, road dust and dirt. In each individual case of loss of visibility, it is possible to clean the instruments only from the outside of the tank. In conditions of reduced visibility (fog), the PT-6 sight head fogs up after 4-5 minutes until visibility is completely lost.
Serial tank T-34. The driver's hatch cover is equipped with a protective strip that bridges the gap between the cover and the front plate of the body. Another strip is welded around the perimeter of the hatch. This design provided protection against penetration of lead splashes into the tank body during rifle and machine gun fire.
Conclusion: the installation of weapons, optics and ammunition stowage in the T-34 tank do not meet the requirements for modern combat vehicles.
The main disadvantages are:
a) cramped fighting compartment;
b) tank blindness;
c) unsuccessfully placed ammunition stowage.
To ensure the normal location of weapons, shooting and observation devices and the crew, it is necessary:
1) expand the overall dimensions of the tower.
For 76 mm gun
1. replace the shield trigger mechanism a more advanced design that ensures trouble-free operation;
2. protect the bolt handle with a shield or make it foldable;
3. remove the foot trigger, replacing it with a trigger on the aiming mechanisms.
For DT machine guns
1. provide the ability to conduct separate firing from a machine gun coaxial with a cannon;
2. increase visibility and shooting accuracy of the radio operator’s machine gun by installing an optical sight;
3. Cover the outer part of the radio operator’s machine gun and the ball mount with a thick cover to protect it from contamination.
On aiming mechanisms and sights
1. The rotary mechanism (manual) is not suitable, replace it with a new design that provides little effort and ease of operation;
2. ensure that the tower play is removed by a rotating mechanism;
3. position the trigger mechanism for the electric drive of the turret rotation so that it ensures rotation while simultaneously monitoring the terrain;
4. replace the TOD-6 sight with a TMF type sight with a scale of aiming angles in the field of view.
By viewing devices
1. replace the driver’s viewing device, as clearly unsuitable, with a more advanced design;
2. install a device in the turret roof that provides all-round visibility from the tank.
On stowing ammunition
1. Stowing ammunition for a 76-mm cannon in cassettes is unsuitable. The cartridge stack should be positioned so that a number of cartridges can be accessed at the same time. Stacked cartridges and machine gun magazines should be protected from dust penetration.
Workplaces in the fighting compartment
reduce the overall dimensions of the seats; Make the loader's seat folding.
Tower mount
1. The turret stopper is unusable for travel purposes; replace it with a more durable one;
2. seal the turret ring, preventing water from entering the fighting compartment;
3. close the turret shoulder strap with a shield.
The tank hull and turret in this design are not satisfactory. It is necessary to increase the size of the turret by increasing the shoulder strap and changing the angle of inclination of the armor plates.
The useful volume of the hull can be increased by changing the chassis suspension and eliminating the side wells.
The armor of the final drive housings, located low (260 mm) from the ground, reduces the tank's maneuverability.
The location of the radio in the tank body is an advantage compared to placement in the turret. In this case, the wiring diagram is simplified (the wiring bypasses the VCU) and the tank commander is freed from servicing the radio.
The installation of the radio was performed unsatisfactorily for the following reasons:
1. the antenna in the lowered state is not protected in any way from damage by parts and equipment carried on the wing, the antenna input is too long, the design and location of the antenna lifting mechanism handle does not ensure reliable lifting of the antenna;
2. The receiver umformer is mounted under the radio operator’s feet, the current-carrying terminal is damaged and the receiver becomes dirty.
Alexander Alexandrovich Morozov
Here's the report. Frankly, it takes me aback - and such a machine was called “a masterpiece of world tank building”? And what is characteristic is that we are not talking about a prototype, not about prototype, but about serial combat vehicles. However, one can, of course, make allowances for the fact that these are tanks of the first batch, and that in the “thirty-four” tanks of later releases, many of the shortcomings indicated in the report were eliminated. The L-11 cannon was replaced, after all, by the F-34! Well, that's right. However, if you look at when and what was eliminated, the picture will not be too good. Suffice it to say that 453 tanks were produced with the L-11 cannon, that is, a third of those manufactured before the start of the Great Patriotic War. The elimination of many other shortcomings actually began only in the first half of 1942! Well, in 1940 no one thought much about this. In any case, this conclusion follows from the report “On the conduct of experimental work at plant No. 183 in 1940,” compiled by the military representative of the GABTU, military engineer of the 3rd rank Voikov. In particular, it stated: “...during 1940, the plant dealt very little with issues of fine-tuning the A-34 machine and only in November took up these issues...
The production and testing of prototypes by the so-called experimental department (department “500”), as a rule, was never carried out within the deadlines set by the plant management. This is explained by the fact that until very recently the plant management paid very little attention to experimental work, loading the department with various extraneous work.”
It must be said that in 1941 too much attention was not paid to improving the design of the T-34. This happened for two main reasons.
Even under the leadership of M.I. Koshkin, plant No. 183 began designing two options for modernizing the T-34. In the first - A-41 - an attempt was made to correct most of the shortcomings without making a new body and replacing the power unit. The vehicle received a new three-seat turret with a shoulder strap diameter of 1700 mm (versus 1420 mm for the T-34) and new gun F-34 of plant No. 92. According to the designers, the introduction of a new spacious turret was supposed to immediately remove all issues related to the cramped fighting compartment and the blindness of the tank. However, due to the fact that it turned out to be impossible to install a turret with a shoulder strap diameter of 1700 mm without altering the tank hull, this project did not go beyond the “paper” stage.
The second variant, the A-43, better known as the T-34M, was longer, narrower and taller than the T-34. The ground clearance was increased by 50 mm. A new V-5 engine with a power of 600 hp was designed for the A-43. They did not develop a new gearbox, but installed a range multiplier in tandem with the old 4-speed one. As a result, the A-43 had the ability to move at eight speeds forward and two in reverse. The Christie-type spark plug suspension, which migrated to the T-34 with BT, gave way to a torsion bar.
The A-43 received a turret previously designed for the A-41, with a commander's cupola and two round landing hatches. The radio station was moved to the hull, which made it possible to increase the cannon's ammunition from 77 to 100 rounds, and the machine gun's ammunition from 46 to 72 discs. As a result, the new vehicle turned out to be 987 kg lighter than the T-34, but the specific ground pressure increased slightly, since the width of the tracks was reduced by 100 mm.
Comparative sizes of tanks A-20 and T-34
The T-34M project was approved by the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in January 1941. In March, production of two reference samples of the tank began. At the same time, related companies mastered the production of components and assemblies for this machine. A stamped-welded tower with a wall thickness of 45 mm was developed at the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant under the leadership of V. S. Nitsenko. In May 1941, the plant not only produced the first five turrets for the T-34M, but also prepared their mass production (during the evacuation in the fall of 1941, 50 almost completed turrets were taken out of Mariupol).
Almost everything was ready for serial production of the T-34M at plant No. 183. By April 17, three armored hulls were manufactured here, and by the end of the month, torsion bars, rollers and other chassis elements were received from the Kharkov Tractor Plant for assembly. However, the V-5 engine, intended for this tank, was never ready either by May 1 or by the start of the war...
After the start of the Great Patriotic War, all work on the T-34M was curtailed. It's a pity. Had its serial production begun, the Red Army would have finally received a fully combat-ready vehicle, and all the “sacrifices” made by the T-34 tank would not have been in vain. Indeed, due to the intensive development of the T-34M, so little attention was paid to eliminating the shortcomings of the T-34 tank. Why waste time and energy on a car that has no prospects? Well, after the start of the war, the modernization of the T-34 was postponed for another reason - it was necessary to increase the production of tanks in every possible way. In these conditions, aggravated by the evacuation, talking about eliminating design flaws no longer had to.
In light of the above, it would be natural to ask the question: was the T-34 actually a masterpiece of design thought as of 1941, or is it another ideologically consistent myth from the series “Russia is the homeland of elephants”?
Wooden model of the A-43 tank
Indeed, it is traditionally considered to be the most modern tank in the world in 1941. However, it is necessary to decide - modern in design or in concept? Let's try to understand this issue. Briefly, the history of the creation of the T-34 is as follows. The Kharkov Locomotive Plant received the assignment to design the BT-9 wheeled-tracked light tank in 1935. Even then, provisions were made, in particular, for the armor to be placed at an angle, as well as the possibility of installing a 76-mm cannon and a diesel engine. In 1937, the technical specifications were optimized and concentrated around three main characteristics: 45 mm gun + sloped armor + diesel. The new, again light, wheeled-tracked tank A-20 was manufactured in metal in the first half of 1939. At the same time, the A-20G tracked tank was designed and manufactured, differing only in the absence of a wheel drive and the presence of five, rather than four, road wheels on board. The light tank A-20G, renamed A-32, was produced in two copies, one of which was armed with a 45 mm gun, and the other with a 76 mm gun. In the fall of 1939, the A-32, as it had a reserve for increasing mass (its chassis allowed this), was protected with 45 mm armor. In this form, this vehicle was put into service under the designation T-34!
Comparative sizes of T-34 and T-34M tanks
So what was modern in the design of the tank, the design of which actually began in 1935? Yes, practically nothing! As a result of the work, we got a medium-weight tank with the dimensions of a light tank with not just a dense, but an extremely tight layout. Innovations of the Thirty-Four traditionally include tilting armor plates and a diesel engine. Completeness! Both were new in 1935, but not in 1941! One cannot seriously believe that only the designers of the KhPZ knew that the inclination of the armor plates increases their projectile resistance. The rational arrangement of armor plates has already been used to varying degrees on foreign (French FCM 36) and domestic (experimental BT-SV-2) tanks, and the cast hulls of French tanks, for example, had an even more perfect shape. As for diesel engines, they have already been used in tank building, most actively in Japanese. The fact that in Europe they were not seriously involved in the development of powerful tank diesel engines is quite understandable - a large power reserve was simply not needed there. And for tank building, automobile engines were quite enough, which, taking into account the high level of development of the European automobile industry, was sufficient. As is known, gasoline tank engines were used in the West until the 1960s, and they were not particularly complex about this. By the way, Europe was full of diesel trucks, which were not available in the USSR at all. Of course, creating a high-speed tank diesel engine is an achievement. The task was set and it was completed. However, it is inappropriate to talk here about some cutting-edge frontiers of domestic engine building, especially given the fact that the first automotive diesel for a truck appeared only after the war and was a copy of the American GMC engine, while diesel for a passenger car was neither in the USSR nor in Russia never appeared! The “Christie-type” suspension on the T-34 was absolutely archaic already for 1941. The torsion bar suspension found on the KB, the T-50 light tank and the German Pz.III medium tank was considered modern at that time. It turns out that the T-34 had only one real innovation - a 76-mm cannon with a barrel length of 41 calibers. This was actually the first time such a weapon had been installed on a tank. Here the T-34 really had no analogues. But it is quite obvious that armament alone did not solve anything, especially since its power was largely offset by the shortcomings of the tank’s design: the low quality and poor placement of sights and observation devices, and most importantly, the cramped fighting compartment, originally intended for a 45-mm cannon.
Of course, it cannot be said that for 1941 the “thirty-four” was outdated in design, but it cannot be called the most modern either. In any case, the KB and T-50 were more modern. And the German tanks Pz.III and Pz.IV were structurally better developed. The T-34M tank was truly modern.
However, the T-34 turned out to be an almost perfectly balanced tank. His combination of “fire + armor + maneuver” was close to optimal. The latter circumstance allows us to consider the T-34 the world's first universal tank, which dominated the battlefield in 1941 in terms of its combat capabilities. There really were no conceptual analogues in the world at that time. The Germans received their first universal tank only at the beginning of 1942 after installing a long-barreled 75 mm cannon in the Pz.IV. At the same time, the “four” caught up with the T-34 in terms of balance and overtook in combat characteristics. This is the paradox of the T-34 tank: while not being quite modern in design in 1941, it was the most modern in concept. Well, whether it was a “masterpiece of world tank building”, judge for yourself...