About the nuclear materials market. The State Department accused Russia of leaking nuclear materials to the black market. All this requires intensive efforts from the international community to strengthen the nonproliferation regime - both within the framework of the existing set of measures and through the development of

What is happening with the programs to protect Russian nuclear materials? Is it possible to control Minatom and how closed is it from Russian society?

Question: How big is the Russian black market for radioactive materials and what are the latest trends in this illegal business? Who are the sellers and who are the potential buyers in this black market?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Let's first define what we mean by the “black market for radioactive materials.” Very often the concepts nuclear and radioactive materials are used interchangeably, which is incorrect. In fact, radioactive materials are a very broad category that includes fissile materials (used both for military purposes and for the production of nuclear fuel); and radioactive isotopes, mainly used in industry and medicine; and finally, radioactive waste generated during various operations with fissile materials. The first category of materials is usually called nuclear materials. Among them, weapons-grade nuclear materials are especially distinguished, that is, those materials that can be used to produce a nuclear bomb with virtually no additional processing. Such materials include plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium with a uranium-235 content of more than 90 percent. Uranium of lower enrichment, but with a uranium-235 content of at least 20 percent, can also be used to create weapons, but in this case the amount of uranium to create a bomb increases many times. For example, if 90 percent uranium requires only 8 kg, then 20 percent uranium will require at least about 60 kg.

As far as the “black market” is concerned, until recently it was mainly about the “black market” of nuclear materials that can be used to produce weapons. The possibility of leakage of such nuclear materials has been and remains the greatest concern, since it is the complexity of their production that is the main obstacle for countries or terrorist organizations seeking to create nuclear weapons. Possible buyers may include states, terrorists, international organized crime groups, separatist ethnic or religious groups, etc.

Low enriched uranium and other uranium group elements, as well as isotopes, unlike the previous category, are available on the commercial market. Of course, nuclear fuel will not be sold to everyone. On the other hand, not a single nuclear power plant will buy nuclear fuel cheaply from an unknown dealer. It's the same story with isotopes. A “black” market for nuclear waste seems unlikely, although concerns about the creation of the so-called “black market” have recently intensified. "dirty" or radiation bomb, in which ordinary explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. It should be borne in mind, however, that the degree of contamination of the area caused by the use of a “dirty bomb” is significantly exaggerated - the danger to the life and health of the population is many orders of magnitude less, and only a relatively small area can be contaminated.

Therefore, let's limit ourselves to considering the black market for nuclear materials. Like any market, it is determined by the presence of supply and demand and their relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was discovered that the system of control and protection of nuclear materials was closely linked to a certain political and economic system, including the absence of private enterprise, the monopoly of foreign trade, strict control of border crossings, etc. The system, designed to resist an external enemy (foreign spies or armies), was not designed for what any employee of a nuclear enterprise, accustomed to relative financial well-being and prestige in Soviet times, and suddenly finding himself in a depressing financial situation, could carry out of the enterprise gates a couple of kilograms of uranium in the hope of selling it. In Soviet times, even if this had happened, such an employee, firstly, would not have found a buyer, and secondly, he would quickly find himself “under the hood” of the KGB. It was necessary to urgently rebuild the system of control over nuclear materials, adapting it to the market and democracy, especially since the market, especially at first, was wild, and democracy was boundless; under such conditions, the existing control systems in the West might not be able to withstand it. Moreover, articles periodically appeared in the press about the fabulous sums that could be earned for nuclear materials. In addition, the Soviet control system was not designed for the emergence of such a threat as nuclear terrorism. Who at that time could have imagined the emergence of the Chechen problem, Al-Qaeda, etc.?

But let's return to supply and demand. The years 1992-1995 accounted for the largest number of known and later confirmed cases of theft of nuclear materials from Russian facilities. The most serious cases include: the theft of 1.5 kg of 90% enriched uranium in Podolsk from the Luch enterprise in 1992, the theft of 1.8 kg of 36% enriched uranium from the naval base in Andreeva Bay in 1993, confiscation in 1995 in Moscow of 1.7 kg of 21% enriched uranium, previously stolen from the Elektrostal plant. In all cases, the theft was carried out by direct employees of the facilities or with their assistance. It is characteristic that the above cases and a number of other less significant incidents lead to the conclusion that most often the materials were stolen from enterprises associated with the production of nuclear fuel, or from naval bases where nuclear submarines are stationed. Moreover, the loss of materials was most often discovered after the criminals were caught. Another characteristic feature of these cases is that the thieves did not have a pre-order for the materials and stole them with the intention of finding a buyer on their own. Apparently, finding a buyer was not so easy, and bungled attempts to sell the goods were prevented even before the nuclear materials crossed the border.

What stands out is a whole series of incidents involving highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Western Europe, primarily the so-called “Munich” and “Prague” cases of 1994-1995. Both relate to special operations of the police, who ordered the material. The West claims that the nuclear materials in both cases were of Russian origin. Russia denies these claims. The determination of the source of materials has not yet been completed.

In most black market operations, as it turns out during the investigation, criminals pass off low-enriched uranium or radioactive isotopes, or even substances that have nothing in common with nuclear materials, as weapons-grade materials. This was the case in a very recent case in December 2001, when six members of the Balashikha criminal group were arrested, trying to pass off low-enriched uranium fuel pellets as highly enriched uranium. By the way, this is almost the first case in Russia in which organized crime appears. Apparently, trading in nuclear materials is too dangerous and not very profitable. Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev stated in an interview some time after this incident that uranium tablets were stolen from the Elektrostal plant long before the criminals were detained and that the special services had been spying on the Balashikha group for many years. Among those detained was an FSB officer, but whether he was introduced into the group or was part of it on his own initiative remains unclear.

After 1995 and until 2000, there were virtually no reports of theft or loss of nuclear materials in Russia. If any cases arose, they were more likely to concern radioactive materials. A large role in the decline in such cases was played by the measures taken by the Russian government, with financial and technical assistance from the West, to strengthen both the physical protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and to introduce an adequate accounting and control system. However, some attribute the decline in activity on the nuclear black market to criminals becoming more professional, or to tighter restrictions on this type of information. It is difficult to assess the validity of such assessments - the lack of information may support one or the other point of view.

The only high-profile case of the period 1995-2000 is associated with the report of the head of the FSB of the Chelyabinsk region in 1998 about the successful suppression of the theft of 18.5 kg of material that could be used to create nuclear weapons by a group of employees of one of the nuclear enterprises in the region. This is the only message that mentions enough material to make a nuclear warhead. In most other cases where weapons-grade nuclear materials are involved, we were talking about grams, a maximum of one or two kilograms. However, this case is not completely clear. Some experts assess it quite skeptically and talk about the desire of the local FSB to curry favor (especially since, at least in the open press, no further information appeared, and the case, apparently, was not transferred to court). Others, on the contrary, argue that the authenticity of this report was confirmed through unofficial channels in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. This case was also cited in a recent CIA report, but for some reason it was already presented not as an attempt, but as an accomplished theft, although with the caveat that the case was not officially confirmed.

In general, assessing all reports related to the theft or illicit trade of nuclear or radioactive materials is not an easy task. The IAEA has been keeping records of such cases since 1993, including sending requests to the countries involved in the reports, asking them to confirm or refute the information. However, there are no mechanisms for forcing such data to be reported or verified. Therefore, even the most complete and official databases of transactions on the black market of nuclear and radioactive materials cannot claim to reliably reflect absolutely all cases. However, general trends in these data can be tracked. Including where the materials came from and where, who the contractor was, who the customer was. Unfortunately, Russia and the former republics of the Union occupy an “honorable” first place in the IAEA database.

One of the trends in recent years is an increase in cases, compared with the early and mid-90s, of illegal trade in nuclear materials or masquerading as nuclear materials in the Asian direction and a decrease in the number of cases in Europe. What is this, a change in the direction of material transfer flows? Strengthening radiation control and the capabilities of intelligence services in Asian countries, which have finally begun to catch dealers in the nuclear business? Moving the market closer to potential buyers, be they countries or terrorist organizations?

As I said above, very often they try to pass off radioactive materials and isotopes as nuclear materials. However, one should not take comfort in the fact that they cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb. Many of them are dangerous in themselves and can cause serious illness or even be fatal. If you remember, in 1995, on Basayev’s instructions, a container with the radioactive isotope cesium-137 was buried in Izmailovsky Park. There was also a case where radioactive substances were used to eliminate business rivals. Recently in Georgia, several hunters found old Soviet-era batteries using a cesium isotope in the forest and received a very high degree of contamination, including skin burns.

Of course, the number of victims will not be comparable to the losses from a nuclear bomb explosion and, as noted above, one can often (especially in the press) find greatly inflated estimates. For example, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, one company tried to sell the New York City mayor's office a program for calculating damage from a “dirty bomb,” which, according to experts, overestimated the damage by two to three times. Still, it is worth keeping in mind that if the damage is multiplied by the psychological effect, the result can be significant. Even if no one dies from radiation, many people may simply be trampled while fleeing.

Despite the fact that the picture seems to be relatively prosperous, it is worth keeping in mind that we only know of successfully stopped operations or discovered losses. There is no guarantee that any part of the illegal transactions resulted in the transfer of nuclear materials. It is impossible to determine whether such transactions took place and what the ratio between solved and unsolved cases was.

Question: What are the main dangers in the security system around Russian nuclear facilities?

Answer. Elena Sokova: The most urgent measures to ensure the protection of nuclear materials in Russia were taken back in the mid-90s. They mainly concerned those facilities where nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials are stored or produced. Even according to CIA estimates, this category, while not ideal, is quite reliably protected. Still, there is still a lot to do here until the situation is brought to its optimum. Physical protection and accounting and control of remaining nuclear materials remain on the agenda. The US Department of Energy estimates that the proportion of buildings and businesses that have the necessary security systems (including even fences) is only 37 percent of the total number of facilities that need to be upgraded to international standards. Much remains to be done before it can be said that the technical and organizational conditions have been provided to prevent the leakage of materials and protect against attacks on nuclear facilities.

Among the most important tasks for the near future is the consolidation of nuclear materials at a limited number of facilities. It is clear that the fewer objects, the faster and more efficiently it is possible to bring the protection of each of them to the required level.

It is also necessary to strive for the speedy introduction and strict implementation of a modern system of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Precisely due to the absence in Soviet times of accurate inventory data on the amount of nuclear materials at enterprises, we cannot say for sure whether all cases of theft were identified and whether the reserves seized in the early and mid-90s are hidden somewhere in the garage.

Unfortunately, violations of the rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials still occur. At the end of last year, a letter from the head of Gosatomnadzor became known, where he describes a case of incorrect indication in the accompanying documents of the amount and condition of spent fuel from submarines sent for reprocessing at Mayak in the Chelyabinsk region. It turned out that the sent nuclear fuel, unlike what was indicated in the documents, was from a damaged reactor; moreover, some elements were missing up to half of the fuel. The Mayak personnel were put at risk, and a search for the “missing” fuel was urgently organized.

There is also concern about the huge amount of accumulated spent nuclear fuel, both from nuclear power plants and submarine reactors. Research institutions conducting experiments with nuclear materials, where controls and protections are often much weaker than in fuel cycle facilities and military production, deserve close attention. And finally, it is necessary to establish strict and strict control over radioactive isotopes in industry and medicine.

It is necessary to put things in order with the intake of metals. Quite often, the target of thefts is precious and non-ferrous metals from nuclear facilities, including submarines. The loss of a small platinum record could jeopardize the safety of the entire crew and cause disaster. The theft of a bucket from a special excavator clearing radioactive rubble not only causes material losses, but also slows down the already slowly ongoing work to clean up radioactive areas. Last fall, in the city of Ozersk, where the Mayak plant is located, enterprising metal assemblers dismantled 100 meters of railway tracks on one of the branches of the access roads to the plant.

Question: Do you agree with the statement that Minatom is much more closed from Russian society than from Western donors (in particular, there is sometimes more classified information on the desks of US Department of Energy officials than in the Russian parliament)?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Minatom is closed both from its own and from strangers. As far as the military program is concerned, secrecy is justified and practiced by all countries possessing nuclear weapons. Another thing is the accountability of the activities of nuclear enterprises and Minatom itself to the government, including the Duma, and to society. The possibilities for independent government control are unjustifiably limited and curtailed. GosAtomnadzor has lost a significant number of its supervisory rights compared to what it had in the early 1990s. Even what remains is not fully used.

Financial transparency of Minatom's activities is minimal. For so many years now they have been trying to achieve transparency from Minatom in the use of funds from the Megatons-to-Megawatts deal with the United States. The case of spent fuel from Kozloduy (Bulgaria), when Minatom was forced to disclose both the amount of the transaction and the price per kilogram, and even provided information on how much funds were transferred to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, proves that it is, in principle, possible to achieve transparency. So far these are isolated cases. The information openness of Minatom in relation to the public, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. The other day, Minister Rumyantsev himself admitted this at a meeting with environmental organizations.

I don’t think Minatom is any more open to the West. Another thing is that between Russian and American departments there is an exchange of information that, in principle, is not subject to disclosure. Paradoxically, it often happens that governments share information that they hide from their public. This happens quite often - for example, one of the annexes to the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms is classified because the data it contains could be used by terrorists. From this point of view, it is true that the United States sometimes knows more about the Russian nuclear industry than Russian citizens.

Question: Russia is increasingly being called in the West, both in official circles and in the press, a large radioactive hole. What do you think?

Answer. Elena Sokova: Hole is probably not the right word. One meaning of the word “hole” is associated with a pit where everything falls. In this sense, such a name is quite applicable, especially if we talk about radioactive waste and even more so about plans for the import of spent nuclear fuel. There are already plenty of such pit-dumps in Russia. The recent report on the construction of a nuclear waste repository, including foreign ones, on one of the Kuril Islands is especially alarming.

Another meaning of the word "hole" is an opening through which everything flows out. So far, most of the stolen nuclear materials have been identified and intercepted before they left Russian territory. To ensure both Russian and international security, it is necessary to close even the smallest holes at Russian nuclear facilities and ensure reliable protection of nuclear materials, their accounting and control. As reports from recent months show, there are still many holes, including in the barriers of closed cities. One of these holes was freely used by Duma deputy Mitrokhin with a group of environmentalists and cameramen to penetrate the territory of the closed city of Zheleznogorsk. One of the Chechens arrested in Sverdlovsk who was selling weapons and explosives turned out to have a valid pass to the territory of the city of Lesnoy, where nuclear warheads are assembled.

In recent years, according to Minatom reports, the financial condition of the industry has improved. But has funding for work in this area increased? The increased attention to these issues in Russia since 9/11, as well as the renewed cooperation in this area between the United States and Russia, is encouraging. However, the scale of the problem is so great that it will take years and significant amounts of money. It is unlikely to do without constant control at the highest political level and concentration of efforts and resources.

"Die Welt": There is a lot of talk about the possibility that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of international terrorism. How real is this danger?

Mohammed Al Baradei: At the moment, such a danger is potential. However, there is a real danger that radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists. With it they can make a dirty bomb. Of course, it would be impossible to destroy many people with such a weapon, but it is capable of causing great panic and fear.

"Die Welt": How big is the danger that certain nuclear powers could transfer the "bomb" into the hands of terrorists?

Baradei: I don't know of a single state that would be willing to supply terrorists with nuclear weapons.

"Die Welt": The American delegation that recently visited North Korea reported that 800 nuclear fuel rods were missing. Can you assume that Pyongyang is creating nuclear weapons?

Baradei: North Korea has long had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. But the likelihood that the regime is regenerating spent fuel rods is now very high. North Korea believes that it is under threat, under siege. This sense of threat, coupled with Pyongyang's technological capabilities, raises the issue of nuclear nonproliferation.

"Die Welt": If Pyongyang really decided to use fuel rods to create a "bomb", how long would it take?

Baradei: It depends on whether the regime has complete documentation and whether the production process itself has already begun, which we do not know. North Korea has many engineers and scientists specializing in nuclear energy. It cannot be ruled out that they have already been working on this for some time. In any case, we can talk about several months, but not years.

"Die Welt": What conclusions did you draw from the fact that Libya recently opened its nuclear program? Can we consider that there is an international network through which states and terrorist organizations can provide themselves with the necessary funds to produce weapons?

Baradei: Libya confirmed our assumptions: there is a well-developed black market in which nuclear materials and necessary equipment are offered around the world. Its scale, however, turned out to be greater than expected. What also scared us was how sophisticated this network is. It is similar to a network of organized crime and drug cartels.

"Die Welt": Some observers claim that the center of this network is in Pakistan.

Baradei: I can't say anything about this. The Pakistani government is investigating a case in which some scientists allegedly provided prohibited services in the nuclear field. It further states that it will deprive all knowledge smugglers of the right to study in the field of nuclear technology.

"Die Welt": Iran recently agreed to an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this regard, the country admitted that it had already made great progress in creating an atomic bomb. For hawks in the US, this is proof of the “ineffectiveness” of the IAEA.

Baradei: This is nonsense. It is not possible to inspect enrichment equipment if it is used at the laboratory level. No control system in the world can do this. This in no way means that Iran used the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as a cover. The country is able to carry out its military program both within and outside the framework of the treaty, and no one will know about it. What is crucial is having a system capable of uncovering nuclear programs that are in production. Here we need any information.

"Die Welt": Are you concerned about the safety of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal?

Baradei: Yes. This is a dangerous legacy. From this one arsenal you can steal a large amount of uranium or plutonium and, God forbid, real weapons. Securing these weapons arsenals is a matter of financial resources, and they are in short supply.

"Die Welt": The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows for the peaceful use of atomic energy, but it allows countries to easily reach the threshold of possessing atomic weapons. Is it possible to somehow adapt the agreement to current realities?

Baradei: In dealing with Iran, Iraq and Libya, we found that the treaty has a number of shortcomings and loopholes. They must be eliminated. Here I have four things in mind: First, we must limit the right to enrich uranium and plutonium in nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. Second, we must overhaul export control rules to impose stricter restrictions on the sale of equipment and fissile materials. Third, the IAEA needs greater oversight powers. Fourthly, we are obliged to reconsider the clause allowing the state to withdraw from the treaty within three months. In my opinion, nuclear proliferation should be as despised as slavery or genocide. There should be no right to transfer nuclear equipment.

"Die Welt": Iran can be forced to open its nuclear program, but Israel cannot?

Baradei: No. As for large states, this also applies to small countries. Absolute security for one country means, perhaps for another, absolute danger. It is impossible to demand that Libya and Iran give up nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and Israel should be allowed to keep all the types of weapons that it currently possesses.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Nuclear black market

In 1995, on behalf of the United Nations, Jacques Attali, an adviser to former French President François Mitterrand, conducted more than a hundred interviews and consultations for a report on the illegal trade in radioactive materials. Thus was born a seventy-page report that alarmed not only the UN. According to Attali, there are several countries in the world that are now offering on the black market about 30 kg of material suitable for creating atomic weapons. Nine kilograms is enough to build a simple atomic bomb.

Attali considered the source of dangerous smuggling, first of all, to be the territory of the former Soviet Union. According to him, many Russian nuclear weapons depots are closed only with a barn padlock. Russian naval officers even managed to steal 4 kg of enriched uranium from a decommissioned nuclear submarine in Murmansk. The thieves, however, were arrested, but only three kilograms of uranium were found. And in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy of the former USSR, the situation is obviously getting more and more out of control. At the Mayak production center in Chelyabinsk, it is believed that up to 13% of material suitable for atomic weapons is “missing.” And the idea that terrorists or interested governments can buy everything they need for an atomic bomb on the black market is no longer a figment of a sick imagination.

Attali argues that non-nuclear powers, terrorists, mafias and even cults could acquire atomic weapons. The level of international control is completely insufficient. While the United States alone has 7,200 scientists researching animal diseases, the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna has only 225 inspectors. Attali, who previously was the head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also reports that nothing will stop a terrorist group with several hundred million dollars today from creating an atomic bomb. This way, the worst-case scenarios in the style of James Bond films, which are still perceived as science fiction, can become reality.

The Federal Intelligence Service, which itself has found itself in a difficult position due to the so-called “plutonium scam,” has seen intelligence on the nuclear black market as one of its most important tasks since the collapse of the USSR. Pullach's 1995 internal annual report cited alarming figures: "In 1995, the BND recorded 169 separate cases worldwide involving offers to sell radioactive materials, indications of contraband, seizure of radioactive or contaminated substances, criminal use of radioactive materials, or threats of use of radioactive materials." materials or atomic charges. Information was obtained from intelligence, official and open sources. Up to 44% of cases in 1995 involved the confiscation or theft of radioactive materials, i.e., the entry of radioactive material into the market or its removal from the market. The remaining 56% covered commercial offers, indications of trade in atomic materials or threats of its use. Often in these cases photographs, descriptions of the material or certificates were attached that prove its existence.” (compare with the BND report “Nuclear Black Market, 1995”, p. 3).

While there were no plutonium seizures worldwide in 1995, according to the BND, there were two seizures of high-quality enriched uranium (20–30% enrichment level), which had previously been the fuel of Russian nuclear submarines. The BND considers information about “stray atomic weapons” “as unlikely or unprovable.” The BND believes: “As before, it should be assumed that all nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenals are sufficiently protected, and the stealth of nuclear warheads undetected is not possible.” (ibid., p. 4) Facilities associated with the production and storage of nuclear weapons are “relatively well” protected from direct attacks. This openly contradicts Jacques Attali's report. And the Stockholm Peace Research Institute SIPRI opined in a spring 1997 study that nuclear materials are "often insufficiently protected." A possible weak point, according to the BND, is transport. “Due to significant socio-economic difficulties, the safety of nuclear warheads and weapons-grade material may deteriorate in the future. The rise of organized crime specifically in Russia is a cause for further concern.”

In two cases in 1995, it was proven that the persons responsible for storing enriched nuclear material - a storekeeper and a scientist - turned out to be thieves themselves. Representatives of the Russian authorities, in conversations with the BND, confirmed that security and control over nuclear facilities is constantly deteriorating. These deteriorations range from personal and technical unsuitability to resistance to inspectors of the Russian inspection agency Gosatomnadzor.

It will not reassure the reader to read the BND study, which says: “Deficiencies in accounting allow staff to unnoticedly use materials that have not been officially recorded. At control points of nuclear cities or institutes there are often not enough nuclear radiation detectors. Technical control systems are mostly outdated and cannot function properly.” According to the BND, international assistance will not help either. “International joint projects and financial assistance are arriving on time, but due to the immense number of poorly protected nuclear facilities in Russia, they can only contribute conditionally and to a weak extent to solving the common problem.”

Since the desired level of close intelligence cooperation in the field of nuclear smuggling with the new democratic countries in the East has not yet been achieved, the BND will, in the near future, jointly with Western partner services, investigate cases of nuclear smuggling and its transit routes in Eastern Europe. In a BND document intended for official use, the reasons for such a restrained position of the BND in cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe are indicated primarily by the Russian “atomic detectives” themselves. In August 1994, the BND learned that once again two nuclear material dealers had been arrested in Russia. But these traders turned out to be two employees of the Russian counterintelligence FSK, i.e., a special service whose tasks include combating illegal nuclear trade.

Since 1980, the BND has annually received information about those interested in purchasing material for atomic bombs, especially in the Near and Middle East. About the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, it says: “Some specific reports in 1995, based on their content and the reliability of their sources, leave little doubt about Iran’s purchasing interest.” But a report in Focus magazine in October 1995 that eleven “nuclear warheads have disappeared from Russia,” which, in fact, should have been destroyed after being transported from Ukraine to Russia, turned out to be a “duck.” Iran was again identified as the alleged buyer of these eleven allegedly missing warheads.

Over the years, the BND has received two significant reports that terrorist groups were considering using radioactive weapons to achieve their goals. In the first case, the Japanese sect “Aum Shinrikyo,” known after the gas attack in the Tokyo metro, received technology to create nuclear weapons and began exploration of uranium deposits on land owned by the sect in Australia. In addition, according to confirmed American information, one member of the sect tried to buy nuclear weapons in Russia. Another case concerns the Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev, who stockpiled radioactive cesium-137 in Moscow and threatened terrorist attacks against Russian nuclear reactors.

But the BND rules out that terrorist groups will soon increase their interest in atomic weapons to the level of priority. For terrorists, radioactive materials, “as before, promise more disadvantages than advantages.” Sectarian, fanatical or religious groups seem to be much more dangerous because they are more unpredictable. It is with particular foreboding that Pullah watches “a new generation of terrorists in Iran, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt - fundamentalists and extremists who are ready for unconditionally suicidal terrorist actions.”

In addition, Italian prosecutors are investigating mafia groups that trafficked radioactive material. It was stolen in Russia, sold in Germany, temporarily stored in Italy, and then resold to North Africa. Forty-four-year-old forensic investigator Nunzio Sarpietiro from the Sicilian city of Catania in early 1997 did not sleep at night. He was on the trail of uranium-235, suitable for creating an atomic bomb. Sarpiero said: “Unfortunately, everyone in Sicily is very worried, because in connection with our investigation, we not only found undeniable evidence of trafficking in radioactive materials, but also established that it was material that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.” According to Italian data, the uranium originated from Russia and was initially brought by couriers, “who usually did not know at all what they were carrying, to the Frankfurt am Main area. There the material was bought by mafiosi, according to Sarpietro - a atomic investment of money with bomb interest rates.

In July 1996, two Portuguese couriers Belarmino V. and Carlos M., who wanted to sell uranium-235 to the mafia, were arrested in Syracuse. From Sicily the material was supposed to reach North Africa, presumably Libya. And from Wiesbaden in 1995, it was no longer uranium and plutonium that arrived in Sicily, but osmium and mercury, both also suitable for creating atomic bombs.

People often forget how couriers transporting such goods risk their health. Mistakenly believing that they were transporting weakly radioactive osmium-187, used in radiation medicine, four people in 1992 transported two grams of very highly radioactive cesium-137 from Lithuania to Switzerland via Wiesbaden. These people: three Poles and one naturalized German, were arrested. The health of two of them suffered terribly. They were transporting cesium-137 in a completely unsuitable container the size of a thimble. A few weeks later, five Poles smuggled also highly radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 from Russia to Germany. In January 1993, two Poles were detained at a border crossing with four kilograms of cesium. In March 1993, the Lithuanian Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant “lost” 270 kg of uranium fuel rods.

In May 1994, for the first time in Germany, six grams of plutonium-239 suitable for an atomic bomb were found on the illegal market in a garage in the city of Tengen. According to the BND, the plutonium was enriched to a level of 99.75%. As we know today, the plutonium came from the Russian Arzamas-16 nuclear complex. There, in a military nuclear laboratory with the abbreviated name S-2, experiments with plutonium are carried out. Plutonium belongs to the class of transuranium elements and is considered the most toxic substance on Earth. Experiments on dogs revealed that 27 micrograms of this substance, i.e. 27 millionths of a gram, when injected, lead to lung cancer in humans. Intelligence and the military have experimented a lot with this toxic substance in past years. According to one of the BND employees, American doctors in 1945, during a military experiment still kept secret, injected plutonium into 12 people to test the effect of this heavy metal on human metabolism.

The scientific magazine New Scientist predicts the world's plutonium availability at about 1,700 tons by the year 2000—enough for a still unpredictable number of bombs. And the reduction of nuclear arsenals agreed between the superpowers will leave almost 200 tons of plutonium remaining. In the spring of 1997, specialists from the American think tank Rand Corporation quite seriously proposed to the American government that the plutonium released after disarmament in the East and West should be stored in a “plutonium prison” in Greenland, guarded jointly by Russian and American troops. Even if the future of the Start-2 and Start-3 disarmament treaties becomes clearer, humanity will still have to live with the danger of the illegal plutonium trade.

To no one's surprise, more and more criminals are claiming they can get their hands on plutonium. Already in 1984, 42 people were accused in Italy for contacts with various intelligence services. They were accused of offering to sell three atomic bombs and 33 kg of plutonium to representatives of Syria, Iraq and the PLO. The deal fell through because even samples of plutonium were not delivered. But in the case of the find in Tengen, the situation is completely different. For the first time, a so-called weapon suitable for an atomic bomb was actually discovered on the German black market. "weapons" plutonium.

On July 23, 1994, Bernd Schmidbauer, the Minister of State responsible for coordinating the intelligence services of the Federal Chancellery, said about the discovery in Tengen to the Welt newspaper: “There is a close relationship between drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, human trafficking and nuclear smuggling.” In Germany, the buyer market for such material is not yet known. When asked whether nuclear terrorists could blackmail humanity, Schmidbauer replied: “We must seriously take this possibility into account. We cannot turn a blind eye to this danger. So we're trying by all means to be proactive, which means scouting out the structures that are behind these deals and finding out what material is moving, finding out what the market for potential buyers might look like.”

But the plutonium scam demonstrates how easily the reputations of secret agents secretly trying to investigate such transactions can be damaged by the intrigues of other intelligence agencies.

The first nuclear ship Scientific work on the creation of the first test nuclear engine for a submarine, carried out by the US Atomic Energy Commission, was largely completed back in 1948. At the same time, corresponding orders were received by industry. At first