Features of the Yalta-Potsdam system mo. Yalta and Potsdam conferences. New frontiers in Europe

The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations is the designation of the system of international relations adopted in geopolitics, fixed by the treaties and agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. This system of international relations existed throughout the second half of the 20th century. The conference in Yalta can be considered the beginning of the formation of a new system of international relations. On February 4-11, the "Big Three" Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, tried to reach an agreement on the fate of the world and, first of all, of Europe. In fact, there were two main problems: to choose a political regime for the liberated countries and to draw their borders. The Yalta Declaration on a "Liberated Europe" was very clear, at least with regard to the first one: the liberated countries were to choose their own governments through free elections. In addition, the fate of post-war Germany was decided at the conference. The question arose about the joint occupation of its territory. It was also agreed on the amount of reparations (about 20 billion dollars, half of this amount was due to the USSR). The participants in the Yalta Conference declared that their adamant goal was to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to create guarantees that "Germany will never again be in a position to disturb the peace", "disarm and disband all German armed forces and permanently destroy the German General Staff", " seize or destroy all German military equipment, liquidate or take control of all German industry that could be used for war production; subject all war criminals to just and speedy punishment; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions; eliminate all Nazi and militaristic influence from public institutions, from the cultural and economic life of the German people. The fate of post-war Europe was decided, in particular, such important issues as the fate of post-war Germany, the Polish question and the Balkans were touched upon, and the situation in the Far East was discussed. A new "League of Nations" was formed with a new name for the UN. A provision on post-war cooperation between the USA and the USSR was also stipulated. In principle, Stalin and Roosevelt did not deny such a possibility, but was it possible? Everything was very ambiguous. On the one hand, the adoption of agreed decisions at the conference showed the possibility of cooperation between states with different social systems. There was a strong alliance against a common enemy. In this regard, the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition began to think about creating an organization that could prevent future conflicts like World War II.

The Yalta-Potsdam order did not have a strong contractual and legal basis. The agreements that formed the basis of the post-war order were either oral, not officially recorded, or were fixed mainly in a declarative form, or their full implementation was blocked as a result of the sharpness of contradictions and confrontation between the main subjects of post-war international relations. The system worked for almost the entire second half of the 20th century, providing some balance in the world, but in the end, like any mechanism that has expired, the Yalta-Potsdam system stopped working. The process of the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system began with the end of the Cold War. The policy of M. S. Gorbachev, associated with "perestroika", "glasnost" and "new thinking", was aimed at concessions to the capitalist countries, moreover, the concessions were unilateral. That is why to this day the United States believes that they won the Cold War. Despite the loss of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, its end meant the end of confrontation, the arms race, interference in the internal affairs of the Eastern European states, and hence it follows that the confrontation between the two camps - the capitalist and the socialist, has ended due to the collapse of the latter camp. The end of the bipolarity generated by the Yalta-Potsdam system. But, the collapse of the USSR, namely the Belovezhskaya agreement on December 8, 1991, which changed the situation in the world, became the decisive stage. Together with the Soviet Union, the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations also sank into oblivion. Was it possible to maintain this system of international relations? If we imagine that there was no Belovezhskaya agreement and the Soviet Union did not collapse in 1991, then the Yalta-Potsdam system would still not be able to function for a long time, because it was created under other conditions, when the Soviet Union was in Stalin's "hedgehogs" and represented threat to the capitalist world. The fact is that the Yalta-Potsdam concept functioned throughout the second half of the 20th century, correcting the shortcomings of the former world and the former system, erasing the remnants of the past, but, in the end, this system itself gave rise to new difficulties and created shortcomings. As a result, by the end of the 20th century, the system was outdated and could no longer meet the requirements of the modern world. That is why the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations could not be preserved, since it no longer corresponds to the present. The world has ceased to be bipolar, we live in an age of globalization and integration, and in order to maintain the new world, a new system is needed, formed from the experience of past years, but at the same time adapted to our modern times. Question 8 Swedish model of social states

The term "Swedish model" appeared in the late 60s, when Sweden began to successfully combine rapid economic growth with extensive political reforms against a background of relative social conflictlessness. This image of a successful and serene Sweden contrasted particularly strongly then with the growth of social and political conflicts in the surrounding world. The Swedish model was identified with the most developed form of the welfare state.

Another way of defining the Swedish model came from the fact that two dominant goals were clearly distinguished in Swedish economic policy: full employment and income equalization. Its results have been an active policy in a highly developed labor market and an exceptionally large public sector (in this case, primarily the sphere of redistribution, and not state property), which is engaged in the accumulation and redistribution of significant funds for social and economic purposes.

Economists define the Swedish model as a combination of full employment (the official unemployment rate is below 2% of the active population) and price stability through restrictive economic policies, complemented by selective measures to maintain a high level of employment and investment. This model was introduced by trade union economists in the early 1950s and was used to a certain extent by social democratic governments.

Finally, in the broadest sense, the Swedish model is a model of socio-economic development, it is the whole complex of socio-economic and political realities in the country with its high standard of living and wide scale of social policy.

The main goals of the Swedish model for a long time were full employment and income equalization. This is due to the special strength of the Swedish labor movement. From 1932 to the present (with the exception of 1976-1982 and 1991-1994), the Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDRPSH) has been in power. For decades, the Central Association of Trade Unions of Sweden (TSOPS) worked closely with the SDRPSH, which strengthened the reformist labor movement in the country. In addition, the Swedish model was based on a spirit of compromise and mutual restraint between the labor movement (trade unions and social democrats) on the one hand and large industrial companies on the other. This spirit of harmony was based on the realization that small Sweden can only survive in a competitive big world if all sides work together.

Several national character traits can also be noted: rationalism, self-discipline, careful study of approaches to solving problems, the desire for common agreement and the ability to avoid conflicts.

In the post-war period, the development of Sweden was favored by numerous factors: the preservation of industrial potential in conditions of neutrality, a steady demand for export products, a skilled workforce, a highly organized and ethnically homogeneous society and a political system dominated by one large party that pursued a pragmatic line and formed a strong government. Under such favorable conditions, during a period of relatively high economic growth rates (3-5% per year) from the late 1940s to the late 1960s, the private sector grew and the well-being of the population increased.

The Swedish model provided for the active role of the state. Its implementation was the merit of the Social Democrats, who relied on raising living standards through gradual reforms within the framework of capitalism with a pragmatic attitude towards both goals and means to achieve them, taking into account practical expediency and a sober consideration of real possibilities.

After the foundations of the Swedish model were formulated in the trade union movement in the early 1950s, they became the core of the economic policy of the Social Democrats. The main principle of this policy was: there is no reason for the socialization of the means of production and the rejection of the benefits of an efficient market system of production for the sake of ideological postulates. The pragmatism of this policy is more simply expressed by the well-known saying: "There is no need to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."

What are the results? Sweden's success in the labor market is undeniable. The country maintained exceptionally low unemployment in the post-war period - right up to the 90s, including from the mid-70s, when serious structural problems led to massive unemployment in most of the developed countries of the West.

There have been some achievements in the long struggle in the area of ​​equalizing incomes and living standards. This happened in two ways. First, the wage solidarity policy was aimed at achieving equal pay for equal work. From the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s, wage differences between different groups in the TSOPS were reduced by more than half. They also dwindled between workers and employees. Second, the government used progressive taxation and a system of extensive public services. As a result, equalization in Sweden has reached one of the highest levels in the world.

Sweden has achieved less success in other areas: prices have risen faster than in most developed countries, since the 1970s GDP has grown more slowly than in a number of Western European countries, and labor productivity has grown weakly. Inflation and relatively modest economic growth were the price paid for full employment and equality policies.

At one time, the successful functioning of the Swedish model depended on a number of domestic and international factors. The main and most important prerequisite was a high and constant rate of economic growth, which made it possible to expand private and public consumption. The second prerequisite was full employment and the fact that the state had to provide social security to only a very small part of the citizens. Therefore, the welfare system could be financed by taxation. The third premise was that in the labor market people were employed on a permanent basis throughout the working day. These prerequisites persisted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.

Question Prague Spring.

(January-August 1968) For almost eight months in 1968, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Czechoslovakia) experienced a period of profound change, unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations have become a natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by the reformist forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, for a number of years went almost unnoticed by most analysts and politicians of the West and East, including the Soviet leaders. In 1968, the “Prague Spring” began in Czechoslovakia. The new leadership of this republic, headed by A. Dubcek, proclaimed a course towards “socialism with a human face”. Within the framework of this course was: the abolition of censorship, the creation of opposition parties, the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. But this could not please Moscow, which believed that this could lead to a split in the socialist bloc.

Therefore, it was decided to send troops of the Warsaw Pact countries to Czechoslovakia in order to change the leadership of the republic. And on August 21, Operation Danube began. Within one day, the troops captured all the main objects on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak army offered no resistance. But ordinary citizens offered passive resistance: they blocked the streets, staged sit-ins, and so on. In early September, the operation ended and the troops were withdrawn.


Introduction

Chapter 1. Creation of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system

Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain

Potsdam Three Power Conference

Chapter 2. Development of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system. System stability and nuclear factor

Chapter 3. The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, causes, results

Conclusion

Bibliography


Introduction


Since 1648, the Westphalian system of international relations has undergone a number of modifications, each of which was the result of major military upheavals. After the Thirty Years' War, the first of these upheavals, much larger and more bloody, were the Napoleonic Wars. They ended with the defeat of Napoleon by a coalition of European powers with the dominant role of the Russian Empire, which made the main contribution to the victory of the coalition. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 secured another redistribution of the world and formed the "Holy Alliance" under the actual leadership of Russia. In 1830, the Union collapsed - not least as a result of the anti-Russian intrigues of Austria and England.

The next shock to the Westphalian world order was the Crimean War of 1854-56, which ended in the defeat of Russia and the Congress of Paris in 1856. The Congress secured a new redistribution of the world in the Balkans and in the Black Sea not in favor of Russia: she was forced to return Kars, agree to the neutralization of the Black Sea and cede Bessarabia. However, Russia rather quickly - within 13-15 years - restored the geopolitical status quo.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, which ended in the defeat of France and the triumphant victory of Bismarck's Germany, led to the establishment of a short-lived Frankfurt Peace.

This modification was destroyed by the First World War of 1914-18, in which Turkey and Germany were defeated. The result was the fragile Treaty of Versailles, in which for the first time in history a serious attempt was made to create a universal international organization - albeit on the scale of the European continent - responsible for peace and security in Europe: the League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles was based on a broad and ramified legal framework and included a well-functioning mechanism for the adoption and implementation of collective decisions. This, however, did not save him from complete collapse already on the eve of World War II. In addition, the Treaty of Versailles was not universal enough: it did not include not only such large Asian countries as China, India and Japan, but also the United States, which, as you know, never joined the League of Nations and did not ratify Treaty of Versailles. The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations after the invasion of Finland.

The Second World War also involved in hostilities those countries that were not part of the Versailles Peace. This most terrible war in world history, which ended in the total defeat of Germany, Japan and their allies, created another modification of the Westphalian system of international relations - the Yalta-Potsdam world order, which was both its heyday and the beginning of its decline as an international system of united national sovereignties.

The main difference between the Yalta-Potsdam world order and the Versailles one was the formation - instead of the collapsed multipolar - bipolar world order, in which two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - dominated and competed with each other. And since they were the bearers of two different projects of world development (and even two different historical projects) - communist and capitalist - their rivalry from the very beginning acquired an acute ideological character of confrontation.

Immediately after World War II, this confrontation became known as the Cold War. At the same time, the US and the USSR acquired nuclear weapons, and such a confrontation developed into a very specific and hitherto unknown in world politics regime of interaction between the two subjects of confrontation - the regime of “mutual nuclear deterrence” or “mutual assured destruction”. The peak of the Cold War was the Caribbean Crisis of 1962, when the USSR and the USA were on the brink of nuclear war. This crisis, however, marked the beginning of nuclear disarmament and international detente.

Thus, the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations had a pronounced confrontational character, although the successful cooperation of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War gave certain grounds for believing that the post-war world order would also become cooperative.

The dominance and significant military-strength separation of the two superpowers from all other countries of the world, the ideological nature of the confrontation, its totality (in all parts of the globe), the confrontational type of interaction, the competition between two projects of the world order and historical development forced all other countries of the world to make a tough choice between the two world poles.

Although the Yalta-Potsdam world order did not have a solid legal base, the level of stability and manageability of the international system was very high. Stability was ensured by a regime of mutual nuclear deterrence, which, among other things, made it vital for the two superpowers to have a strategic dialogue on arms control and disarmament and some other global security issues. And manageability was achieved by the fact that in order to resolve complex international issues, it was enough to coordinate the positions of only two main actors - the USSR and the USA.

The bipolar world collapsed in 1991, immediately after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, the erosion of the Yalta-Potsdam world order began. It is from this time that the decline of the Westphalian system, eroded by the processes of globalization, becomes especially noticeable. These processes are inflicting more and more crushing blows on the foundation of the Westphalian system - national state sovereignty.

Chapter 1. Creation of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system, its essence and content


. Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain


After the end of the Tehran Conference, many important events took place on the fronts of the war. The Red Army completed the expulsion of the Nazis from the territory of the Eastern European states and created a springboard for the offensive on Berlin. The hour of the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition was approaching, in which the Soviet Union played an exceptional role, bearing the brunt of the war. The problems of the post-war structure were increasingly brought to the fore. In this situation, the meeting of the "Big Three" acquired special significance.

The goals of the allied powers at the conference were to coordinate plans for the defeat of Nazi Germany and to establish the foundations of the post-war world. Specifically, the conference was supposed to discuss issues related to the final defeat of fascist Germany, its unconditional surrender and future structure. It was also necessary to solve the reparations question; determine the general line of policy of the allied states in relation to the liberated countries of Europe; to resolve the issue of Poland's borders and its place in the post-war system of international relations. At the conference, it was necessary to resolve issues related to the creation of an international organization for the security and cooperation of peoples that had not been resolved at Dumbarton Oaks. In addition, the United States and Great Britain wanted to agree on the terms and conditions for the USSR to enter the war against militaristic Japan.

The Yalta Conference, which took place from February 7 to 11, 1945, occupied an important place in the diplomatic history of the Second World War. This was the second meeting of the leaders of the three great powers of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, the USA and England, and, like the Tehran Conference, it was marked by the predominance of the tendency to develop agreed decisions both in organizing the final victory and in the field of post-war organization. According to US Secretary of State E. Stettinius, the Yalta Conference "was the most important meeting of the leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States during the war", during which "for the first time the three leaders reached fundamental agreements on post-war issues, in contrast to the usual statements about goals and intentions ".

Reports heard at the Crimean Conference on the situation on the fronts, made by the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, General of the Army A.I. Antonov and the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General J. Marshall, confirmed the readiness of the army to inflict "strike from the east, west, north and south" on Germany. The conference participants confirmed that hostilities would be stopped only after the unconditional surrender of fascist Germany.

The main place at the conference was occupied by the political problems of the post-war settlement, and the Soviet side considered it expedient to begin it with a discussion of the question of Germany. In the statement adopted by the heads of government, referring to Germany, the goals of the allied occupation were clearly defined - "the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantees that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the whole world." In addition, methods for achieving these goals were discussed - the elimination of the Wehrmacht, the military industry, taking control of the rest of the industrial potential of Germany, the punishment of war criminals, compensation for losses to the victims of aggression, the destruction of the Nazi Party and its institutions, Nazi and militaristic ideology.

The Agreement on Occupation Zones and the Management of "Greater Berlin" decided that the Soviet Union would occupy the eastern part of Germany, England the northwest, and the United States the southwest. The Allied Powers invited France to take part in the occupation of Germany, and she was allocated part of the British and American zones. "Greater Berlin" was part of the Soviet zone of occupation, but as the seat of the Control Commission, which has the functions of supreme power in Germany, it was subject to occupation by the troops of the three powers, but the admission of their troops to Berlin was not provided.

At the Crimean Conference, Britain and the United States again put forward plans for the dismemberment of Germany. Roosevelt said that breaking up Germany into five or even seven states was a good idea and that he saw no other way out.

Churchill was not so categorical. Nevertheless, as follows from the minutes, he expressed his general agreement with the idea expressed by Roosevelt, although he declined to support any specific plans. His position boiled down to the fact that unconditional surrender gives the Allied Powers the right to "determine the fate of Germany" themselves. In addition, at the suggestion of Churchill, supported by Roosevelt, it was decided to create a special committee on post-war questions in Germany, which was supposed to discuss the issue of dismemberment.

The Soviet delegation resolutely opposed the dismemberment of Germany and was in favor of the creation of a single, democratic, peace-loving German state. It should be noted that this position was defended both before and after the Yalta Conference. Stalin's order, published on February 23, 1942, dedicated to Red Army Day, noted: "It would be ridiculous to identify the Hitler clique with the German people, with the German state." The same order emphasized that the Soviet people and the Red Army "do not and cannot have racial hatred towards other peoples, including the German people." The same idea was present in Stalin's address to the people on May 9, 1945 in connection with the surrender of Nazi Germany. "The Soviet Union," the appeal said, "is triumphant, although it has no intention of either dismembering or destroying Germany."

As a result, the question of the future of Germany was referred to a special commission for study.

The next critical moment was the question of reparations: the British generally refused to talk about specific figures, and the Americans agreed to accept the value of 20 billion dollars proposed by the Soviet side (half of which was in favor of the USSR).

Of particular importance was the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" adopted at the conference, which established the agreed principles of the policy of the three powers in relation to the peoples liberated from the domination of fascist Germany and its former allies. The Declaration confirmed the right of all peoples liberated from fascism to destroy the last traces of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice, to freely choose their own form of government.

The Polish problem occupied an important place at the Crimean Conference. Significant disagreements arose at the meetings of the heads of government on the question of the future of Poland. As for the problem of the formation of the Polish government, the delimitation of positions was quite clear: Stalin sought recognition of the government of the "Warsaw Poles" (shortly before the conference, the provisional government moved to the capital of Poland, liberated by the Red Army), Churchill and Roosevelt - its practical elimination and restoration of the powers of the London government in exile with the possible inclusion of "Warsawians" in it. After lengthy disputes, a compromise agreement was reached, which provided for the "reorganization" of the Polish government with the inclusion of figures from Poland itself and Poles from abroad, that is, representatives of the "Londoners".

At the same time, the question of the borders of Poland was considered. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to force Stalin to change the "Curzon Line" in important areas in favor of Poland. Thus, the US President proposed to leave the city of Lvov and part of the oil fields in the southern part of Eastern Poland to Poland. Churchill first reiterated the British agreement with the new Russian western frontier: "The Soviet Union's claim to this area is based not on violence, but on law." After that, he began to lead Stalin to adjust the borders in the spirit of the proposals of the President of the United States. The Premier said that if the Soviet Union made a generous gesture towards a weaker power, then England would admire Soviet behavior and would welcome it.

Stalin demonstrated complete intransigence and uncompromisingness by declaring: - The "Curzon Line" was determined by Curzon, Clemenceau and those Americans who took part in the peace conference from 1918 to 1919. The Russians were not invited there and therefore did not participate in it. Lenin did not accept the Curzon Line. Now, according to some people, we have become less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau were. We should be ashamed now. What will Ukrainians and Belarusians say about this? They will say that Stalin and Molotov defend Russia worse than Curzon and Clemenceau.

As for the western borders of Poland, no final decision was made, but the heads of the three governments recognized that "Poland must receive significant increases in territory in the north and west." At the same time, the need was recognized to include East Prussia to the west and south of Koenigsberg, Danzig and the “Polish corridor”, the Baltic coast between Danzig and Stettin, lands east of the Oder and Upper Silesia into the Polish state.

At the Yalta Conference, an agreement was reached on a key issue in the creation of the United Nations - the procedure for voting in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation agreed to meet the American proposals and allowed deviations from the principle of unanimity in the peaceful settlement of disputes. This was an important concession on the Soviet side. The Soviet delegation also withdrew its proposal for the participation in the UN of all the union republics and limited itself to two of them - Ukraine and Belarus.

Then it was decided to convene on April 25, 1945. United Nations conference in San Francisco to prepare and adopt the UN Charter.

At a conference in the Crimea, an agreement between the three great powers on the Far East was discussed in detail and signed. It provided for the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan, since this created the decisive preconditions for the defeat of their dangerous enemy in the Far East. US Secretary of State E. Stettinius writes “about the enormous pressure exerted on the president by military leaders in order to achieve Russia's entry into the war in the Far East. At that time, the atomic bomb was still an unknown quantity, and our defeat in the battle of the ledge was fresh in everyone's memory. We still haven't crossed the Rhine. No one knew how long the European war would last, or how great the losses would be.

In an effort to reduce American casualties in the operation, the US Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum addressed to the President, dated January 23, 1945, stated: “The entry of Russia (in the war against Japan) ... is absolutely necessary to provide maximum assistance to our actions in the Pacific. The United States will provide the greatest possible support that our main effort against Japan allows. The objectives of Russia's military efforts against Japan in the Far East should be to defeat Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in cooperation with the United States Air Force based in Eastern Siberia, and to maximally interfere with Japanese shipping between Japan and the Asian continent.

The USSR, giving its consent to go to war with Japan, pursued the goal of destroying the most dangerous center of aggression in the Far East, eliminating the consequences of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, assisting the peoples of Asia, primarily the Chinese people, in their struggle against Japanese aggressors, as well as to fulfill the allied duty towards the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against imperialist Japan two to three months after the end of the war in Europe on the terms:

1.Maintaining the status quo of Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic).

2.Restoration of the rights belonging to Russia, violated by the perfidious attack of Japan in 1904, namely:

a) return of the southern part of about. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands;

b) the internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union in this port and the restoration of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR;

c) joint operation with China of the Chinese-Eastern and South-Manchurian railways, giving access to Dairen, while maintaining China's sovereignty in Manchuria.

USSR transfers of the Kuril Islands

The document went on to say that an agreement regarding Outer Mongolia with the above ports and railways would require the consent of the Chinese side and that "the claims of the Soviet Union must, of course, be satisfied after the victory over Japan."

Thus, at the Crimean Conference, the allies coordinated not only their policy, but also their military plans, successfully resolved the most important issues of warfare and the post-war world order, which contributed to strengthening the anti-fascist coalition at the final stage of the war and achieving victory over Nazi Germany.


2. Potsdam Conference of the Three Powers


After the signing of the Act of Unconditional Surrender in Germany, there was no state power for some time. The four powers recognized the need for joint government of Germany. To this end, on June 5, 1945, representatives of the USSR, the USA and France signed in Berlin the "Declaration on the defeat of Germany" and the assumption of supreme power in relation to Germany by the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The Declaration demanded from Germany, in accordance with its unconditional surrender, a complete cessation of hostilities, the surrender of weapons, the extradition of Nazi leaders and war criminals, and the return of all prisoners of war. The Declaration of the Defeat of Germany served as a legal document for the legislative and administrative activities carried out by the occupying authorities on German territory in the early post-war years.

From April 25 to June 26, 1945, a founding conference on the creation of the United Nations (UN) was held in San Francisco to maintain general peace and security of peoples and develop cooperation between states in various fields. The conference was attended by 50 states, the only issue on the agenda of the conference was the development of the Charter of the United Nations. A sharp struggle unfolded, mainly on questions about the goals and principles of the UN; about the role and place in the UN system of the Security Council and the General Assembly; about their rights and the procedure for their decision-making; about the International Court of Justice; on the international guardianship system.

June conference in San Francisco completed its work with the adoption of the UN Charter. In doing so, it established an international organization for the maintenance of peace and the security of peoples. The UN Charter recognizes the principle of peaceful coexistence between states of two social systems; equality and self-determination of peoples; principles of international cooperation and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; refraining from the threat of force and the use of force. The creation of the UN became possible as a result of the victory of the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition in the war against the fascist bloc and was a major international event.

The last conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain during the war took place on July 17 - August 2, 1945 in the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam (a suburb of Berlin). The USSR delegation was headed by I.V. Stalin, USA - G. Truman, Great Britain - W. Churchill (since July 28 - K. Attlee). The task of the Berlin Conference was to consolidate in its decisions the historic victory of the Soviet Union and other allied countries over fascist Germany, to solve the main problems of the post-war settlement, to work out a program for a just and lasting peace in Europe, to prevent new aggression from Germany and to consider questions associated with the war against Japan.

The Potsdam conference took place against the backdrop of a new alignment of forces in the international arena, which was characterized, on the one hand, by the growth of the prestige and influence of the USSR as the main winner in the war against Nazi Germany, and, on the other, by a qualitative leap in strengthening the military potential of the United States as a result of the acquisition of atomic weapons, which, however, was somewhat offset by the situation in the sphere of ideology: socialist tendencies were strong in Europe, and the American model of free enterprise was not popular. Anti-Soviet tendencies noticeably intensified in the policy of the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain, which was caused by the growth of the international prestige of the USSR, but, in the final analysis, the tendency towards a reasonable compromise prevailed at the conference.

For the Soviet side, the most important thing was to achieve coordinated and clear decisions on the German problem, to make up for what had been lost in this regard at Yalta. It was about fixing the eastern border of Germany, reparations, punishing the leaders of the defeated Reich, concretizing the program for restructuring the political system in Germany. The easiest way was to achieve unity of views on the last point.

In Potsdam, political and economic principles were adopted aimed at the implementation of the demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decartelization of Germany. This program, called "4D", gave quite clear guidelines for the elimination of the "German threat" in the future. First of all, it provided for the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, the liquidation of all German industry that could be used for military production, the abolition of all its land, sea and air forces, the SS, SA, SD, Gestapo, General Staff and all other military organizations.

The Potsdam Accords also proclaimed the need for the denazification and democratization of Germany. The agreement provided for the destruction of the National Socialist Party, the dissolution of all Nazi institutions and organizations, the punishment of war criminals, the prevention of Nazi and militaristic propaganda, and the provision of conditions that preclude the revival of fascism in any form.

Provision was made for the reorganization of German political life on a democratic basis in order to prepare the country for peaceful international cooperation. The agreement provided for the implementation of measures to democratize Germany: the abolition of all racial and discriminatory laws issued by the Nazi government, the restoration of local self-government, the activities of all democratic parties, trade unions and other public organizations, preparations for the final reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and the peaceful cooperation of Germany with others states.

As for decartelization, the Allies decided to liquidate the German monopolies, which were the bearers of militarism and revanchism, and all German industry should be transferred to a peaceful track. The representatives of the three powers agreed that during the period of occupation, Germany should be considered as a single economic entity.

Relatively easily in Potsdam, important points relating to the creation of an International Tribunal for the trial of the main Nazi war criminals were agreed. The solution to this problem was prepared by the extensive preliminary work of the representatives of the four powers, which began as early as 1942.

The Potsdam Conference considered a number of territorial issues related to the end of the war in Europe, including the transfer of the city of Konigsberg and the area adjacent to it to the USSR, which was enshrined in the decisions of the conference. In accordance with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, the issue of establishing the western border of Poland along the line of the river was resolved. Oder - r. Western Neisse. Poland included part of the territory of East Prussia, as well as the city of Danzig (Gdansk). Thus, according to the implementation of the decisions of the Yalta Conference, Poland received "a significant increase in the territory in the north and west."

The conference reached an agreement on reparations with Germany, which established that the reparations claims of the USSR would be satisfied by withdrawals from the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany and from the corresponding German investments abroad. In addition, it was decided that the USSR should receive from the western zones 25% of the industrial capital equipment seized for reparation purposes. At the conference, it was also decided to divide the German navy and merchant fleet equally among the three powers (most of the submarines, at the suggestion of England, were to be sunk). As a result of the division of the German fleet, the USSR received 155 warships, including the Nuremberg cruiser, four destroyers, six destroyers and several submarines.

At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union reaffirmed the commitment made at the Yalta Conference to go to war with Japan. The extreme interest of the United States in helping the USSR in the war against militarist Japan undoubtedly contributed to a more successful solution of the complex problems that arose in Potsdam.

Despite serious disagreements on a number of issues, the conference showed the possibility of a positive solution to complex international problems. In this regard, the testimony of I. Berlin, who was appointed in August 1945 to work at the US Embassy in Moscow, is also very revealing. “The Potsdam Conference,” he wrote, “did not lead to an open rupture between the Allies. Despite gloomy forecasts in some circles in the West, the general mood in official Washington and London was optimistic: the exceptional courage and heavy sacrifices of the Soviet people in the war against Hitler generated a powerful wave of sympathy for their country, which in the second half of 1945 overwhelmed many critics of the Soviet system and its methods; there was a broad and fervent desire for cooperation and mutual understanding at all levels.”

It should be noted that the Potsdam Conference went down in history as an event of great international significance, its decisions were the basis of the post-war peace order in Europe. They have full legal force in terms of international law. Their implementation is mandatory for all participants of the conference, as well as those countries that are directly or indirectly affected by its decisions.


Chapter 2. Development of the Yalta-Potsdam peace system. System stability and nuclear factor


The post-war world order was supposed to be based on the idea of ​​cooperation between the victorious powers and maintaining their agreement in the interests of such cooperation. The role of the mechanism for the development of this consent was assigned to the United Nations, whose Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and entered into force in October of the same year. He proclaimed the goals of the UN not only to maintain international peace, but also to promote the realization of the rights of countries and peoples to self-determination and free development, to encourage equal economic and cultural cooperation, to cultivate respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual. The UN was destined to play the role of a world center for coordinating efforts in the interests of excluding wars and conflicts from international relations by harmonizing relations between states.

But the UN was faced with the impossibility of ensuring the compatibility of the interests of its leading members - the USSR and the USA, because of the sharpness of the contradictions that arose between them. That is why, in fact, the main function of the UN, which it successfully coped with within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam order, was not the improvement of international reality and the promotion of morality and justice, but the prevention of a military clash between the USSR and the USA, stability between which was the main condition for international peace in the world. throughout the second half of the 20th century.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the bipolar confrontation had only just begun to spread to the periphery of the international system. It was not felt at all in Latin America and little in the Middle East, where the USSR and the USA acted more often in parallel than against each other. The Korean War played a key role in the "export of bipolarity", that is, in its spread from Europe to other parts of the world. This created the prerequisites for the emergence of hotbeds of Soviet-American confrontation on the periphery of the international system.

In the mid-1950s, the world military-strategic situation changed radically. The Soviet Union has largely eliminated its backlog from the United States in the field of defense. In the world, there was a change in the correlation of geopolitical positions between the old colonial powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands) and both superpowers. There has actually been an equalization of the significance of European and non-European issues in international relations and dialogue between the two superpowers.

By the autumn of 1962, tensions in the post-war international system were at their peak. The world has actually found itself on the brink of a general nuclear war. From the "third world war" the world was kept only by fear of the use of super-powerful atomic weapons. The Caribbean crisis became the highest point of military-strategic instability in international relations throughout the second half of the 20th century.

The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s were generally characterized by a weakening of international tension at the global level and in the European direction of world politics. In fact, for the first time in the international relations of the 20th century, the principle of the status quo gained universal recognition, despite the ideological differences between East and West. This trend has come to be known as the détente, or simply détente.

The bipolarity of the Yalta-Potsdam system provided it with a certain stability. The two poles, the guarantors of the system, balanced each other, maintained its overall balance, controlled the allies, and regulated the conflicts that arose to one degree or another. Both powers, with all the deepest contradictions, were interested in preserving the "rules of the game" inherent in the existing system.

A characteristic feature of the Yalta-Potsdam system was the tacit mutual recognition by the superpowers of their spheres of influence. More precisely, it was about the recognition by the West of the sphere of influence of the USSR, because outside it, in one form or another, the influence of the West prevailed. Discussing with G. Dimitrov in August 1945 the decisions of the Potsdam Conference regarding Bulgaria and the Balkans as a whole, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov noted: “Basically, these decisions are beneficial to us. In fact, this sphere of influence is recognized for us.” Determination of the boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence took place in a tense struggle, through a series of foreign policy clashes. However, after the end of the split in Europe, the West did not interfere in the events in the "socialist community" even during acute political crises (Hungary - 1956, Czechoslovakia - 1968, etc.). The situation was more complicated in the "third world", in the countries of the intermediate zone. It was anti-colonialism, combined with the desire of the USSR to assert its influence in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that gave rise to a number of serious international conflicts from the mid-1950s.

The nuclear factor played an important role in the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. The United States was the first to possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union became the owner of the atomic bomb in August 1949, this was announced in September. Great Britain - 1952, France - 1960, People's Republic of China - 1964 also became members of the "atomic club".

Thus, the US had an atomic monopoly from 1945 to 1949. But even during this period, American atomic weapons, combined with the means of their delivery (strategic bombers), did not create a real possibility for the US victory in a new world war. Therefore, even then, the atomic bomb rather reinforced American foreign policy, made it tougher and more assertive. At the same time, the Stalinist leadership sought to demonstrate that it was not too accommodating to American atomic pressure, which made Soviet foreign policy less prone to compromise. Nuclear weapons contributed to the genesis of the confrontation between the US and the USSR, to the formation of a bipolar system. A strategic arms race unfolded and became an integral part of the post-war international order.

The situation changed noticeably after 1949, when both the USA and the USSR became the owners of nuclear arsenals. Significant new elements have appeared in the situation since 1957, with the successful launch of the first Soviet artificial Earth satellite, when the Soviet Union began production of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting US territory. Nuclear weapons have become a tool of "deterrence". Neither of the two superpowers could risk a large-scale conflict in the face of a retaliatory strike capable of causing unacceptable damage. The USSR and the USA, as it were, blocked each other, both powers sought to prevent a major war.

Nuclear weapons introduced qualitatively new elements into international relations. Its use threatened the destruction of a huge number of people and colossal destruction. In addition, its impact on the atmosphere and radioactive contamination of the area could have a detrimental effect on vast regions of the globe and on the planet as a whole.

The possibility of using nuclear weapons forced us to reconsider the classic formula of the German military theorist of the 19th century. K. Clausewitz: "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Achieving the set political goals by war turned out to be impossible. Nuclear potentials had a stabilizing effect on the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. They have helped to prevent the dangerous escalation of conflicts that in the past often led to war. Nuclear weapons have had a sobering effect on politicians of all sizes and levels of responsibility. It forced the leaders of the most powerful states to measure their actions against the threat of a global catastrophe that would not spare anyone living on Earth.

At the same time, stability within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam system was unstable and fragile. It was based on the balance of fear and was achieved through conflicts, crises, local wars, through a devastating arms race. This was the undoubted danger of a nuclear-missile arms race. And yet, the Yalta-Potsdam system proved to be more stable than the Versailles-Washington one, and did not give rise to a major war.

Yalta Potsdam Nuclear Deterrence

Chapter 3. The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, causes, results


December 8<#"justify">1.In Western political science literature, one can often come across the assertion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by its defeat in the Cold War. Such views are especially prevalent in Western Europe, and most of all in the United States, where they have replaced the initial amazement caused by the rapid collapse of communist regimes. In such a system of views, the main thing is the desire to take advantage of the “fruits of victory”. Not surprisingly, the US and its NATO allies are increasingly outspoken in winning style. Politically, this trend is extremely dangerous. In scientific terms, however, it is untenable, because it reduces the whole problem to an external factor.

2.Of great interest are the points of view expressed at the major international conference "The Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union and Its Influence on Europe" held in Beijing in May 2000 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The convening of such a conference in China was not accidental. The Chinese leadership, which began its "perestroika" back in 1979 and achieved impressive economic success, was deeply puzzled by the socio-political upheavals in Eastern Europe, and then in the Soviet Union. It was then that Chinese scientists began to implement the "Russian project" in order to find out the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the socialist community, as well as to assess their impact on Europe and the world. Chinese scientists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a tragedy for all mankind, which turned out to be thrown back a whole era back in its development. Moreover, such an assessment is given not from the standpoint of classical Marxism, but on the basis of an analysis of the consequences of the changes that have taken place. In their opinion, it was the largest cataclysm of the twentieth century.

.There is also an opinion that the collapse of the Union did not take place at all in December 1991, but much earlier. So, according to Sergei Shakhrai, "Three doctors - and not a surgeon, but a pathologist - simply gathered at the bedside of the deceased to record his death. Someone had to do this, because otherwise it was impossible to obtain an official certificate or enter into inheritance rights ". Sergei Shakhrai names three factors as the reasons for the destruction of the "Unbreakable Union". The first "delayed-action mine," according to him, was dormant for decades in that article of the Soviet Constitution, which gave the union republics the right to freely secede from the USSR. The second reason is the "information virus" of envy, which manifested itself in full force in the late 80s - early 90s: in the conditions of the most severe crisis in Tbilisi and Vilnius they said: "Stop working for Moscow", in the Urals they demanded to stop "feeding" the republics Central Asia, while Moscow blamed the suburbs for "everything goes into them like into a black hole." The third reason, according to Shakhrai, was the processes of so-called autonomization. By the early 1990s, perestroika fizzled out. The political weakening of the center, the flow of power to the "lower levels", the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev for political leadership - all this was fraught with the transformation of the map of the RSFSR into a "piece of cheese" with huge holes, the loss of 51 percent of the territory of Russia and almost 20 million of its population. The CPSU monolith began to crack: the last straw was the August putsch of 1991. From August to December 1991, 13 of the 15 union republics declared their independence.

The Yalta-Potsdam order, which was based on the regulated confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the status quo in the military-political and political-diplomatic areas, began to collapse. Both powers - for opposite reasons - went over to its revision. The issue of a coordinated reform of the Yalta-Potsdam order arose on the agenda, the participants of which, however, were no longer equal in power and influence.

The Russian Federation, which became the successor state and successor of the USSR, could not perform the functions inherent in the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of bipolarity, because it did not have the necessary resources for this.

Tendencies towards unification and rapprochement of the former socialist and capitalist countries began to develop in international relations, and the international system as a whole began to develop the features of a “global society”. This process was fraught with new acute problems and contradictions.


Conclusion


The destruction of the Soviet Union completely changed the nature of international interaction. The watershed between the two opposing blocs disappeared. The subsystem of international relations, the basis of which was the "socialist camp", ceased to exist. The peculiarity of this grandiose transformation was its predominantly peaceful character. The collapse of the USSR was accompanied by conflicts, but none of them resulted in a major war that could threaten the overall peace in Europe or Asia. Global stability has been preserved. Universal peace and overcoming the half-century split of the international system were secured at the price of the destruction of multinational states.

The democratization of a large group of former socialist countries became the most important feature of international relations for almost a decade. But their other characteristic was the fall in the manageability of the international system, which resulted in a crisis of world-system regulation in the first half of the 1990s. The old mechanisms of international governance were based on "confrontation by rules" between the USSR and the USA and the observance by their allies of "bloc discipline" - rules of conduct based on the principle of "equalizing with the elder" within the framework of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The cessation of confrontation and the disintegration of the WTO undermined the effectiveness of such a system. one

The UN-based regulation, which had previously been ineffective, in the new conditions coped with the tasks of ensuring peace even less successfully. The UN, in the form in which it was formed, was adapted mainly to prevent war between the great powers.

In international relations, the role of force began to grow again. Its importance increased for two reasons. First, the collapse of bipolarity caused the emergence of a number of relatively small, but numerous armed conflicts - primarily on the territory of former multinational states. Secondly, the United States and NATO countries, not fearing the opposition of the Soviet Union, began to use force more widely to defend their interests in regional and local conflicts, doing this under the slogans of supporting democracy and protecting human rights. By the mid-1990s, peacekeeping began to occupy a large place in international relations, which meant the use by the countries of the international community of various, including forceful, measures to stop bloodshed in individual conflicts.

The first half of the 1990s was the final phase of the disintegration of the bipolar system, in other words, the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. Despite the outbreak of dispersed conflict, a new world war did not arise, and the threat of its unleashing was not visible at any of the most tense moments in international development in 1991-1996. This was the first time in centuries that a radical reconfiguration of the international system did not involve extensive armed conflict.1

By the end of the period under review, it became obvious that the Russian Federation does not have the resources to oppose the United States and does not show any intention to oppose the West in international relations. On the contrary, she strove for cooperation with him, even if the conditions thereof did not correspond much to her national interests. At the same time, it was obvious that China, which in the United States began to be regarded as the main competitor in international politics, did not accumulate the potential that would allow it to play the role in international relations, which in 1945-1991. occupied by the Soviet Union - the role of a counterweight to the United States.

The second half of the 1990s was marked by an increase in the interdependence of the states of the world as a result of a sharp increase in the intensity of international financial, economic, trade and related political ties between them, a gigantic increase in the volume of world information flows, and tremendous progress in the means of communication. The elimination of the global political division of the times of bipolarity gave these ties a truly global character. All these trends, which led to the emergence of a new state of the international system, began to be described using the term "globalization".


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1. The formation of a bipolar system of international relations and the beginning of the Cold War.

The position of the great powers after the Second World War. As a result of the war, the balance of power between the great powers changed completely. Germany and Japan, as losing countries, lost the ability to independently pursue foreign policy and turned into objects of international relations. France and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain were weakened and lost their positions as leading powers.

In the post-war period, Europe lost its role as the center of world politics. The very system of international relations has lost its pluralistic character and turned into a global bipolar system with the US and the USSR at the poles. The USSR was in the halo of the main winner of Nazism. The Red Army occupied Central and Eastern Europe, part of China and Korea. However, the United States had a clear economic superiority over the USSR. In addition, the United States after the end of the war had some military superiority, having until 1949 a monopoly on nuclear weapons.

Soviet strategy for ensuring national security. The roots of the American-Soviet post-war contradictions lay both in the difference in ideologies and different strategies for ensuring national security.

The Soviet leadership, based on the experience of the war, saw the main threat on the western borders of the country. Therefore, I. Stalin sought to strengthen the position of the USSR in Eastern Europe, turning it into a "security belt". Under Soviet influence, regimes were established in Eastern European countries that copied the Soviet model and carried out the foreign policy prescribed by Moscow.

Instruments of US military and economic dominance. The US leadership, having resources at its disposal and possessing at that time a nuclear monopoly, relied on the development of strategic aviation and the construction of military bases in strategically important regions.

The United States, unlike the USSR, relied not only on military, but also on economic methods to secure its position in the world. Here, as a support, they began to use global institutions of economic regulation, such as those formed by the decision of the Bretton Woods conference in June 1944, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The USSR took part in the creation of the IMF and other economic institutions. However, then the Soviet leadership abstained from participation in these structures, fearing to fall into economic dependence on the United States.

Growing US-Soviet contradictions. In the first post-war years in the states of Eastern Europe, with the support of Moscow, communist forces began to come to power. The Soviet leadership justified the coming to power of the Communists as a result of the choice of the peoples of these countries in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. In Western Europe, against the background of post-war socio-economic difficulties, the influence of the communists also grew. Washington began to seriously fear the Sovietization of Western European countries.

Additional complications between the West and the USSR arose due to the civil war in Greece and the Soviet-Turkish diplomatic conflict over the regime of the straits. The Soviet Union also made territorial claims against Turkey, wanting to return the territories in Transcaucasia lost during the First World War. The United States was ready to provide military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, since these countries were of strategic importance to them.

The US leadership has become firmly convinced that the Soviet Union, with the help of international communist forces, is striving to seize leading positions throughout the world and is ready to back up its expansionist intentions with military force.

The fears of the West in relation to the USSR were openly stated in the speech of W. Churchill, delivered in Fulton on March 5, 1946. W. Churchill gave the confrontation an ideological coloring, declaring an "Iron Curtain" that divided the free countries of the West and totalitarian regimes in the East.

Truman Doctrine. On March 12, 1947, President G. Truman addressed Congress with a message in which the foreign policy program of the American administration was outlined. The provisions of this program formed the basis of the "doctrine of deterrence" (the Truman Doctrine). The doctrine assumed the widespread provision of economic and military assistance to regimes that opposed the pro-Soviet communist forces. In particular, the United States provided financial assistance to Greece and Turkey.

In April 1947, US presidential adviser B. Baruch, characterizing US-Soviet relations, first used the expression "cold war". The term was picked up by journalists and firmly entered the political lexicon.

"Marshall Plan". The countries of Western Europe, whose economic situation was undermined by the war, were forced to ask for financial assistance from the United States. In June 1947, US Secretary of State D. Marshall proposed a plan for large-scale economic assistance to European countries.

Formally, the USSR and Eastern European countries were invited to join the Marshall Plan. However, the Soviet leadership refused to discuss the issue, calling the project a trick designed to enslave Europe. Eastern European countries and Finland refused to participate in the program under pressure from the USSR.

As a result, 16 European countries that were not part of the Soviet control zone, including West Germany, took part in the Marshall Plan. The plan was carried out from 1948 to 1951. The participating countries received, according to the plan, annual American appropriations of 4-5 billion dollars. Special American commissions were sent to them, which had broad rights to control the use of allocated funds and the economic course of states in general.

The provision of assistance under the Marshall Plan was subject to political conditions. At the request of the United States, all communists were withdrawn from the governments of the recipient states by 1948.

The Marshall Plan turned out to be very profitable for the American economy, since the funds received by the Europeans were directed primarily to the purchase of goods and equipment in the United States.

The result of the implementation of the "Marshall Plan" was the rapid economic revival of the countries of Western Europe. The price of this revival was that Western Europe was firmly entrenched in the orbit of American influence.

Brussels pact. In addition to providing economic assistance, the United States strongly encouraged the plans for the integration of Western Europe in the field of security and economy. March 17, 1948 Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France signed in Brussels "Treaty on joint activities in the economic, social and cultural spheres and in collective self-defense."

The main focus of the treaty was on "collective self-defence". The parties to the pact pledged to provide military support to each other in the event that any of them become the object of attack. The USSR and Germany were considered as possible aggressors.

The Brussels Pact paved the way for a transatlantic collective defense treaty.

The German Question and the Berlin Crisis of 1948 The German question remained the most acute issue of the post-war settlement. After the war, the territory of Germany decreased due to the separated eastern regions. The remaining lands, including Berlin, were divided into four occupation zones.

The Allied policy in the occupied zones was coordinated by the Control Council, which included representatives of the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France. However, this body could not cope with the task of managing the entire German economy. Economic ties between the western zones and the eastern zone did not develop. The Western allies accused the Soviet leadership of not providing food aid to the western regions of Germany.

The Western powers were increasingly inclined towards a separate solution of the German question without Soviet participation. In June 1948, Great Britain, the USA and France agreed to unite their occupation zones for more efficient administration. In the western lands of Germany, a monetary reform began, which provoked a financial crisis in East Germany. In response, the USSR banned the movement of goods from West Germany to East. At the same time, the western part of Berlin was blocked. The Western Allies organized an air bridge to bring everything needed to West Berlin.

The confrontation threatened to turn into hostilities. The parties managed to avoid a military conflict as a result of negotiations. In May 1949, an agreement was reached in New York, according to which all restrictions in the field of communications, transport and trade were abolished in Germany. However, Berlin remained a divided city with different currencies. Two German states arose in West and East Germany.

Formation of Germany and the GDR. In September 1949, a new state, the Federal Republic of Germany, was formed on the territory of the united occupation zone of the Western powers. The Bundestag of West Germany decided to extend the new constitution of the FRG to the territory of the lands that were part of Germany before 1937. All this was negatively perceived by the Soviet Union, which refused to recognize the new German state.

Taking advantage of the actions of Western countries to split Germany, the USSR was not slow to proclaim the formation of a separate German state on the territory of its occupation zone. In October 1949, the German Democratic Republic was formed. The GDR was recognized by the Soviet Union and its allies. In 1950, the GDR signed treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia on the recognition of their post-war borders and the absence of territorial claims against them.

Soviet course of political and economic integration of the countries of Eastern Europe. The response to the Berlin crisis and the separate actions of the Western powers was the adoption of the Soviet draft Danube Convention at a conference in Belgrade in July-August 1948. The Convention established free commercial navigation along the Danube for all states. It was forbidden to sail along the Danube warships of non-Danubian states.

In 1947-49. The USSR signed cross agreements with Eastern European countries. In January 1949, under the auspices of the USSR, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was established as an alternative to the Marshall Plan. This institution was supposed to contribute to the integration of the countries of the socialist camp and the reorientation of their trade from the West to the USSR. The Soviet Union took a course towards the creation of a closed economic and military-political bloc under its leadership.

Attempts by some Eastern European leaders to deviate from the Soviet model or pursue an independent foreign policy were severely suppressed, as happened in the case of Yugoslavia. The conflict between I. Stalin and the Yugoslav leader I. Tito over the project of a confederation of Eastern European countries proposed by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leadership led in 1948 to a rupture of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, restored only after the death of I. Stalin.

Creation of NATO. On April 4, 1949, the United States, Canada and 10 European countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty. For the purpose of collective defense against a possible external adversary, which primarily meant the USSR, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created, which became the world's largest military-political bloc. Under the terms of the agreement, in the event of an attack on one of the NATO countries, other participating countries were to provide it with armed assistance immediately. NATO countries also agreed to settle their disputes peacefully, avoid economic conflicts and develop economic cooperation.

On the basis of the agreement, the joint armed forces of NATO were created, headed by the American General D. Eisenhower. The United States assumed the lion's share of the costs of military development in the countries of Western Europe, which made the North Atlantic Treaty very attractive to the Western European states.

The creation of NATO was the culmination of the West's reaction to the intensified confrontation with the USSR. NATO forces have become the main bulwark of Western defense under the American "doctrine of deterrence." Through this Euro-Atlantic security structure, Washington consolidated its military and political dominance in Western Europe.

The nuclear factor in the bipolar confrontation. The nuclear factor played an important role in the Yalta-Potsdam system. On August 29, 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear bomb, breaking the American monopoly on nuclear weapons. Later, Great Britain (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) became members of the "atomic club".

Nuclear weapons, being weapons of enormous destructive power, introduced qualitatively new elements into international relations. A strategic arms race unfolded and became an integral part of the post-war international order. At the same time, nuclear weapons became an instrument of mutual “deterrence”. Neither of the two superpowers could risk a large-scale conflict in the face of a retaliatory strike capable of causing unacceptable damage.

The beginning of the collapse of the colonial system. The end of the Second World War strengthened the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries. The old colonial powers sought to counteract decolonization. However, the USSR and the USA sought to destroy the colonial empires. At the same time, Moscow supported the left-wing revolutionary groups of the national liberation movements, while Washington supported the right-wing reformist and preferably anti-communist.

In the national liberation movements of a number of countries in the Far East, the leading role belonged to the leftist forces. In the course of the struggle against the Japanese occupation, the communists strengthened their positions in China and Vietnam. After the war, communist forces began to fight against the French colonialists in Vietnam and the US-backed nationalists in China.

In 1949, the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) defeated the Kuomintang troops, driving them to Taiwan. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on the Chinese mainland. In Vietnam in the early 1950s, the national liberation forces defeated the French troops.

In July 1954, at a session of the Ministerial Council, a declaration was signed that provided an opportunity for free development to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Although Vietnam was split, the countries of Indochina gained independence. In 1946, the Philippines gained independence, in 1947 - India, in 1948 - Burma and Ceylon, in 1952 - Egypt, in 1954 - Indonesia. However, this was only the beginning of the collapse of the colonial system.

The process of the collapse of the colonial system became the subject of close attention on the part of the USA and the USSR, which began a struggle for influence on the post-colonial states.

The Palestinian problem and the creation of the State of Israel. During the Second World War, Great Britain significantly expanded its influence in the Middle East region. In particular, the British mandate to govern Palestine remained in style. Meanwhile, in accordance with the "Belfour Declaration" of 1917 on the creation of a Jewish national home in the 1920s and 30s, Jewish emigration went to Palestine. After the Second World War, mass resettlement of Jews from European countries to Palestine began as victims of Nazism.

The British administration in Palestine came under pressure, on the one hand, from the Arabs, who demanded an end to Jewish immigration, and on the other hand, from the Jewish settlers, who began an armed struggle to create their own state. As a result, London decided to relieve itself of responsibility for resolving the Palestinian issue. The problem was referred to the UN General Assembly, which in November 1947 adopted a resolution on the division of the territory of Palestine into the Arab, Jewish parts and a special zone under the trusteeship of the UN. The Arab countries did not recognize the resolution and insisted on the creation of an Arab state in Palestine. Meanwhile, Jewish armed formations began to systematically oust the Arab population from the Palestinian areas.

On May 14, 1948, Great Britain officially renounced the Mandate for Palestine. The next day, the interim Jewish government of Palestine proclaimed the State of Israel. The new state was recognized by the USSR and the USA. The Soviet Union contributed to the creation of a Jewish state, hoping to use the large community of "Russian Jews" in Palestine to strengthen its influence in the Middle East. However, in 1949, I. Stalin radically changed his attitude towards the state of Israel. The departure of Jews from the USSR was stopped. Israel turned to the USA.

In response to Israel's declaration of independence, all neighboring Arab states began a war against it. However, the Arab armies were unable to win a military victory. In September 1949, an armistice was concluded, which left the bulk of Palestine under Israeli control. In December 1949, Israel, in violation of a UN resolution, moved the capital to Jerusalem, which was divided into Arab and Jewish parts and was considered a holy city by both communities.

The confrontation in Palestine continued. Arab countries refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. The country found itself in a hostile environment. The Arab-Israeli confrontation, being a local conflict, involved the leading world powers in the confrontation and had a significant impact on international relations in the second half of the 20th century.

2. Bipolar confrontation in conditions of balancing on the brink of war (1950s - early 1960s).

The American concept of "rolling back communism" and the doctrine of "massive retaliation". In 1952, Republican D. Eisenhower won the US presidential election. The new administration continued its confrontational course towards the USSR.

The Republicans' foreign policy was based on the ideas formulated by US Secretary of State D. Dulles. From his point of view, the foreign policy strategy of the previous administration was too passive and defensive. It was necessary to launch a broad offensive against the positions of the USSR in the world, using the threat of large-scale use of nuclear weapons as a tool, since at that time the United States had a significant advantage in the number of nuclear bombs and their means of delivery (strategic aviation). In addition, the territory of the United States was little accessible to Soviet nuclear strikes.

Based on the concept of "rolling back communism", the US adopted the military doctrine of "massive retaliation". Even in response to a limited attack by the USSR on the United States, it was supposed to strike with all nuclear power. As a result, any local conflict involving the United States could develop into a large-scale war with the use of nuclear weapons. The doctrine legalized the "preemptive strike", since even a small conflict with the USSR assumed the use of all US forces and means against it in order to prevent new strikes from its side.

Formation of opposing military-political blocs. The United States continued its policy of creating military-political blocs directed against the USSR and its allies. In September 1951, the United States, Australia and New Zealand signed the "Pacific Security Pact" on the creation of the ANZUS military alliance. In September 1954, the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines concluded the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila. In general, these treaties were anti-Japanese in nature, but the United States tried to give them an anti-communist orientation. In February 1955, on the US initiative, the Baghdad Pact was signed. Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Iraq joined this military-political union in the Middle East.

In Europe, the United States set a course for the remilitarization of West Germany, considering the FRG as a European outpost in the military-political confrontation with the USSR. In October 1954, the United States and its NATO allies signed the Paris Agreements, which abolished the occupation regime in the FRG. The Paris Protocols authorized the creation of a West German army with its own general staff. The FRG has committed itself never to resort to force to change its borders and not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. West Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and entered the Western European Union, formed on the basis of the amended and supplemented Brussels Pact. The inclusion of the FRG in Western defense structures made it possible, on the one hand, to balance the Soviet military presence in Europe, and on the other hand, to contain the potential revanchist aspirations of Germany itself within the concept of "double deterrence".

Moscow's response to the American policy of creating military-political blocs along the perimeter of the socialist camp was the formation in May 1955 of a military-political union of European socialist states - the Warsaw Pact Organization. The Warsaw Pact was signed by the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The parties to the treaty were obliged in international relations to refrain from the use of force and the threat of the use of force, and also to render assistance to each other in the event of an armed attack. The joint armed forces of the participating countries were created. The creation of the Warsaw Pact provided the legal basis for maintaining the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.

San Francisco Conference 1951 Block confrontation was most clearly manifested not only in Europe, but also in East Asia. The "loss" of China forced the US to look for a replacement in the security system in the Pacific region. The US decided to bet on Japan, which would be economically strong, but militarily controlled and would become a key link in the defense perimeter around continental Asia.

In September 1951, a conference was held in San Francisco with the participation of 52 powers, on the agenda of which was the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. The PRC and Taiwan were not invited to the conference because the participating countries maintained relations with different Chinese regimes. The United States preliminary agreed with the majority of the interested states of the region on the text of the peace treaty with Japan, thereby excluding the possibility of the Soviet Union making significant changes to the treaty. In such a situation, the USSR refused to sign a peace treaty.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the state of war between Japan and the countries that signed it, and also fixed the restoration of the country's sovereignty and the end of the occupation regime. Japan was relinquishing rights to its former imperial continental and insular possessions, including South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. However, since the treaty did not indicate in whose favor the Japanese side renounced these territories, the rights of the USSR to the Japanese territories that actually passed to it were not confirmed.

The peace treaty with Japan removed formal obstacles to the conclusion of the US-Japanese security treaty, which was signed the next day. According to the treaty, Japan, which could not, under the constitution, create large armed forces, delegated to the United States the right to protect its territory. The United States received the right to deploy its armed forces in Japan in order to ensure security in the Far East. Since that time, Tokyo has unconditionally followed Washington in foreign policy. The alliance with Japan became the basis of the American presence in East Asia.

Soviet-Chinese rapprochement. The USSR sought to strengthen its influence not only in Eastern Europe, but also in East Asia. Back in the spring of 1946, Soviet troops were withdrawn from China, but a significant part of Soviet and captured Japanese weapons was transferred to the PLA. Thanks to Soviet support, the communists, led by Mao Zedong, won the civil war against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, who was supported by Washington.

The United States did not recognize the new regime in Beijing, so Mao Zedong was forced to focus on the USSR. The Soviet leadership sent financial assistance and advisers to China, who helped in creating a system of state administration and reforming the economy according to the Soviet model.

In February 1950, the USSR and China signed an agreement on mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a third party and on economic cooperation. By agreement, the USSR handed over to China railways and naval bases on Chinese territory.

Korean War. Soviet-Chinese solidarity was demonstrated during the Korean War. As a result of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided along the demarcation line (38th parallel) into two zones - under Soviet and American control. Governments were formed in both zones, each of which considered only itself legitimate and extended its jurisdiction over the entire peninsula.

In June 1950, the leadership of pro-Soviet North Korea decided to unite all of Korea under its rule by force. The Soviet leadership, fearing US intervention in the conflict and unleashing a nuclear war, opposed this initiative, but this did not stop North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded South Korea, capturing most of its territory by August.

On the day of the North Korean invasion, the UN Security Council was convened, at which, thanks to the fact that the Soviet representative boycotted the meeting, a resolution proposed by the United States was adopted, which condemned the aggression of North Korea and authorized the entry into the war of troops under the auspices of the UN. The US and its allies sent troops to Korea, which by October 1950 had defeated the North Korean forces.

In response to American intervention, China, in agreement with the USSR, sent its troops into North Korea. The USSR provided financial and military assistance to the North Korean regime by sending Air Force units to the Korean front. As a result, the UN troops were driven back to the 38th parallel, where the front stabilized and a stalemate arose.

The commander of the UN troops, American General D. MacArthur, insisted to the US leadership that a nuclear strike be launched against China. However, President G. Truman, not wanting to spread the conflict beyond the Korean Peninsula and bearing in mind the possibility of a nuclear conflict with the USSR, did not support this idea and removed MacArthur from command.

After the death of I. Stalin in March 1953, the USSR came out for the cessation of hostilities. Left without the political support of the USSR, China and North Korea signed a ceasefire agreement with the UN forces on July 27, 1953. Representatives of South Korea refused to sign the document, which was signed on behalf of the UN forces by American General M. Clark. A demarcation zone was created around the 38th parallel, which was guarded from the north by North Korean troops, and from the south by US and South Korean forces.

The Korean War was the first armed conflict of the Cold War era where two superpowers clashed without the use of nuclear weapons. The Korean War convinced Western leaders of military communist expansion. This led to the creation of new anti-Soviet blocs and active US support for anti-communist forces in the Third World.

The Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence". Coming to power in the USSR N.S. Khrushchev meant a new stage in Soviet foreign policy. N. Khrushchev and his supporters believed that in the nuclear age, the peaceful coexistence of states with different systems is not only possible, but necessary. The peace-loving position of the Soviet leadership was due to both the awareness of the possible irreversible consequences of the war in Korea and similar conflicts, and the fact that the USSR at that moment was significantly inferior to the United States in terms of nuclear potential.

The new concept of the foreign policy of the USSR was presented at the XX Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. N. Khrushchev's foreign policy program was based on the idea that peaceful competition should be conducted between the capitalist and socialist systems, not turning into a military confrontation.

Foreign policy initiatives of N.S. Khrushchev. Within the framework of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" the USSR introduced a number of initiatives in the field of international security. In 1954, the Soviet leadership proposed to discuss the draft of the All-European Collective Security Treaty. In particular, the USSR proposed to convene a world conference on worldwide arms reduction.

On the German question, the Soviet Union proposed discussing the prospect of reunification of Germany, which could become a neutral state following the example of Switzerland. The Western allies advocated the unification of Germany under the auspices of the FRG and a referendum on the future status of the country. The parties failed to agree on the German question. The formula "unification plus neutralization" was implemented only in relation to Austria, which, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1955, was recognized as a neutral country.

On the whole, Moscow's initiatives were received with distrust in the West. The US and its allies were willing to exchange some military information, but none of the Soviet proposals were accepted on the merits. However, N. Khrushchev's initiatives became a kind of challenge for Western diplomacy. Soviet foreign policy began to look more progressive and flexible than the policy of the Western powers.

Attempts by the USSR to normalize relations with Germany and Japan. As part of the peace offensive, the USSR made an attempt to normalize relations with West Germany. In 1955, the end of the state of war with Germany was announced. In September 1955, German Chancellor K. Adenauer visited Moscow, and diplomatic relations were established between the countries. The USSR undertook to repatriate to the FRG all former German prisoners of war. However, the West German leadership refused to recognize the GDR and did not officially recognize the post-war German borders in the East, which gave grounds for suspecting him of revanchist sentiments. Moreover, in 1955 the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, W. Hallstein, formulated a doctrine according to which West Germany established and maintained diplomatic relations only with those states that did not have diplomatic relations with the GDR. The German authorities adhered to the "Halstein Doctrine" until the end of the 1960s. An exception was made only in relation to the USSR as a superpower, relations with which were of particular importance. Therefore, Soviet-West German relations continued to be cool.

The USSR also tried to normalize relations with Japan, hoping to undermine the US-Japanese alliance. The United States provided active diplomatic opposition to normalization. Japan, at the suggestion of the United States, began to challenge the right of the USSR to possess the four islands of the Kuril chain. The American administration threatened the Japanese side, in case of concessions in the territorial dispute, to indefinitely occupy the southern islands of the Japanese archipelago.

In October 1956, the USSR and Japan signed a joint declaration to end the state of war and establish diplomatic relations. The USSR agreed to transfer two islands of the Kuril chain to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty. However, in 1960 a new security treaty was concluded between the USA and Japan, which secured the American military presence in the Japanese islands. This gave the USSR grounds to refuse promises of territorial concessions.

Attempts to limit the arms race. In the field of disarmament, the USSR proposed, first of all, to abandon the use of nuclear weapons. In August 1953, the Soviet Union announced that it had a hydrogen weapon, but in December 1953 it called for the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The Soviet leadership also advocated that the states that possessed nuclear weapons should undertake not to use them.

The USSR took concrete steps to reduce its armed forces. In 1955, the Soviet Union began a unilateral phased reduction of its army and abandoned a number of naval bases. In 1957, N. Khrushchev made a proposal to suspend nuclear testing, and a year later announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

The initiatives of the Soviet leadership in the field of disarmament did not find understanding in the West at that time, primarily because of the tough position of the D. Eisenhower administration, which adhered to a forceful approach in international relations. The United States relied on nuclear weapons in the bipolar confrontation and was inclined to perceive Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament as a ploy designed to neutralize American superiority in this area.

A new round of the arms race. Despite the initiatives to reduce the armed forces, the military programs of the United States and its allies demanded that the USSR develop its nuclear missile potential. Since the Soviet Union lagged far behind the United States in the development of strategic aviation, the emphasis was placed on missile technology. The successes of the space program even made it possible to achieve some superiority here.

In 1957, the USSR successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile. The entire territory of the United States became vulnerable to Soviet nuclear weapons. A breakthrough in rocket science allowed the USSR to significantly close the gap with the United States in the nuclear arms race, which received a new impetus.

The American concept of "flexible response". In 1961, Democratic President D. Kennedy came to power in the United States. The new administration, forced to reckon with the changed balance of power and the fact that the entire American territory became vulnerable to nuclear strikes, adopted a new foreign policy doctrine.

The adopted concept presupposed the choice of means of responding to the security challenges of the United States and its allies, depending on the situation. The US leadership was refusing to bet on intimidation with its nuclear arsenal. In a hypothetical conflict with the USSR, a flexible selective approach to the use of force was assumed in order to keep the situation from sliding into a large-scale nuclear conflict. By 1967, the concept of "flexible response" was adopted by all US NATO allies.

Second Berlin Crisis. D. Kennedy's coming to power was perceived in Moscow as an opportunity to review key issues of international security. In June 1961, N. Khrushchev and D. Kennedy met in Vienna, at which the German question was in the center of attention. Since by this time the United States had begun to deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the USSR sought to get the West to refuse to deploy nuclear weapons in the FRG. The USSR also sought recognition by the United States and its allies of the GDR. The Soviet side stated that it considers all of Berlin to be the territory of the GDR and sees no reason to maintain a special status for the western part. D. Kennedy was ready for a compromise on most issues, but firmly advocated maintaining the status quo in West Berlin. As a result, no compromise was reached on the German question.

Meanwhile, the situation around West Berlin was complicated, since a large number of defectors from the GDR rushed to the western part of the city. The Soviet leadership considered the continuation of such a situation unacceptable. However, D. Kennedy directly stated that the United States would fight over West Berlin if the USSR tried to change the status of the city by force. In response, in August 1961, the GDR authorities completed the construction of a concrete wall around West Berlin. Access to the western part of the city from East Germany was allowed only through checkpoints. In fact, the actions of the authorities of the USSR and the GDR consolidated the status quo in the Berlin issue. The problem of a divided Germany remained unresolved.

Caribbean (Cuban Missile) Crisis. The Berlin crisis proved to be a prelude to a more dangerous clash of superpowers. In 1959, as a result of the revolution, F. Castro came to power in Cuba, who began to carry out the nationalization of American companies. In response, the United States launched activities to overthrow the new regime. F. Castro turned to the Soviet Union for help. In January 1962, the Soviet leadership decided to provide military assistance to Cuba, hoping to use the island as a springboard for deploying missiles near the United States, which was a response to the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Turkey near the Soviet borders.

By October 1962, as a result of a secret operation, 42 nuclear missiles and a 40,000-strong contingent of Soviet troops were sent to Cuba. On October 14, American reconnaissance aircraft discovered the rocket launchers. The United States perceived the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba as an invasion by the USSR into the zone of traditional American influence and a blatant threat to its security. Washington demanded that Moscow remove the missiles from Cuba and, in response to the Soviet refusal to do so, organized a de facto naval blockade of the island. The US and the USSR put their troops on high alert. On October 27, 1962, an American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba by Soviet air defenses. Military advisers urged D. Kennedy to launch an invasion of Cuba, which would inevitably mean war with the USSR. The situation was on the brink of nuclear war.

From October 23 to October 28, 1962, difficult negotiations were going on between the USA and the USSR, which ended in a compromise. The United States gave up trying to overthrow F. Castro and, in the secret part of the agreement, agreed to withdraw missiles from Turkey. The USSR removed missiles from Cuba and henceforth refused to place them on the island.

Lessons from the Caribbean Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the culmination of the Cold War, marking the boundary of the brinkmanship policy. The crisis had a sobering effect on the politicians of the USSR and the USA, becoming the starting point for the policy of detente. The parties realized the importance of constant consultations and negotiations in case of crisis situations. In June 1963, a “hot line” telephone line was installed between Moscow and Washington, which made it possible for the leaders of the two countries to communicate around the clock.

Under the influence of the Caribbean crisis, the United States was forced to revise its military doctrine. In the spring of 1963, American military theorists developed the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction." From the standpoint of doctrine, the nuclear potential of the USSR and the United States by that time was already so great that the side that was subjected to the first strike retained part of the potential sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacking side. Unacceptable damage meant the destruction of 25% of the population and 70% of the industrial potential of the country. This made the idea of ​​a "preemptive strike" meaningless and encouraged the parties to exercise restraint. The USSR also made changes to its military plans, keeping track of changes in American military and foreign policy documents.

N. Khrushchev's policy towards the countries of the socialist camp. Domestic political changes in the USSR, which consisted in de-Stalinization and the policy of "thaw", were reflected in the countries of the socialist camp. In them, under pressure from Moscow, a change of the former pro-Stalinist leadership began. In June 1953 diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were restored. The Soviet leadership recognized the special status of Yugoslavia and began to build relations with it as with a country that had chosen a special version of socialist development, within the framework of the concept of "peaceful coexistence". In April 1956, the Cominform was dissolved, which was an instrument of Moscow's dictate in the international communist movement.

However, the processes of de-Stalinization caused a mixed reaction in the socialist countries. In the GDR, Poland and Hungary, the new Soviet course gave rise to hopes for reforms up to and including regime change. In June 1953, mass unrest began in East Berlin and the cities of the GDR, which were suppressed with the help of Soviet troops. In June 1956, strikes and unrest swept across Poland. The conflict was resolved thanks to the concessions of the Soviet leadership, which agreed to significantly expand the independence of Poland and abandon the rigid model of Soviet socialism.

In Hungary, protest moods turned into a full-scale uprising. Here, in October 1956, on the wave of mass demonstrations, a new leadership came to power, which rallied with the rebels and expressed its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. In view of the threat of Hungary leaving the zone of Soviet influence, Soviet troops suppressed the uprising in November 1956. The head of the Hungarian government I. Nagy was arrested and subsequently shot. J. Kadar, loyal to Moscow, was placed at the head of Hungary.

The events in Poland and Hungary forced N. Khrushchev to recognize the need for a more equal partnership with the European allies. In 1957, agreements were signed on the legal status of Soviet troops in the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In 1958, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Romania.

Deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. The leadership of a number of countries of the socialist camp, such as Albania, Romania, China and the DPRK, negatively perceived the course towards de-Stalinization. In China, where the personality cult of Mao Zedong was developing, they did not accept the new "revisionist" course of N. Khrushchev and were suspicious of the attempts of the USSR to improve relations with the West.

The cooling of Soviet-Chinese relations was also due to the ambitions of the Chinese leadership, which wanted to see China as one of the centers of the world communist movement and to push the USSR in these positions. In addition, China began its own nuclear project, while the USSR began to oppose the spread of nuclear technology and for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East.

In 1959, the Soviet-Chinese agreement on cooperation in the nuclear field was broken. In 1960, Soviet specialists left China, which aggravated the economic chaos in the country. China began to make territorial claims to neighboring countries, including the USSR, declaring the inequality of territorial treaties between tsarist Russia and China. In response, Moscow began to strengthen the grouping of troops on the border with China. The Sino-Soviet confrontation weakened the communist bloc and created a new hotbed of tension.

Anti-colonial movement in the politics of the leading powers. In the mid-1950s, a new wave of anti-colonial movements began in the world. The independence of the French colonies in Indochina strengthened the anti-colonial movement in Asia and Africa. In 1960, 17 African countries gained independence. In Algeria, which had the status of a French department, the confrontation between the French authorities and supporters of independence escalated into a violent military conflict. In March 1962, the French government and representatives of the Algerian rebels signed the Evian Accords, according to which Algeria was recognized as an independent republic.

The countries freed from colonial dependence created their own intergovernmental organizations - the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States. These associations were called upon to help new states overcome difficulties in their development and defend their interests in the international arena. A significant number of newly independent states did not want to join the existing military-political blocs, forming a non-aligned movement.

The new post-colonial states often had no experience of independent state development and faced great difficulties in their internal life, which forced them to seek support from the superpowers and made them an arena of rivalry in the struggle for influence over them.

The USSR and the USA competed for influence on the post-colonial states. The Soviet leadership relied on the communist and forces close to them, which was unacceptable to Washington. The policy of the American administration towards national liberation movements since the mid-1950s was based on the Domino doctrine, which was based on the conclusion that revolutionary changes in one country provoke changes in neighboring countries through the "domino effect". Since as a result of such changes, communist forces and forces close to them often came to power, the United States sought to prevent them, which objectively made them opponents of national liberation movements. Such a policy in a number of cases contradicted the national interests of the postcolonial states and forced them to orient themselves towards the USSR. Washington's blockade with colonial powers such as Britain and France also had a negative impact on US positions in Asia and Africa.

Suez Crisis. The position of the US and its European allies towards Egypt led to an armed conflict. In Egypt, after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, the new military leaders asked Western countries for help in modernizing the army and economic projects. However, the countries of the West furnished the aid with political conditions unacceptable for the country, which, in particular, contained demands for concessions to Israel. In such a situation, Egypt began to purchase weapons from the USSR and its allies.

In July 1956, Egyptian President G. Nasser issued a decree on the nationalization of the Franco-British Suez Canal Company. In response, Great Britain, France and Israel launched a joint invasion of Egypt in October 1956 with the aim of capturing the Suez Canal zone. The USSR demanded an end to the aggression, threatening Britain, France and Israel with rocket attacks on their territory. The US also condemned the actions of Britain and France, as the tripartite invasion of Egypt was carried out without the knowledge of Washington and other NATO allies. In addition, the invasion could harm the US desire to improve relations with the Arab countries and lead to their rapprochement with the USSR. Washington threatened Britain and France to cut off oil supplies provided by American corporations.

Under such pressure, in November 1956, Great Britain and France withdrew their troops from Egypt, and Israel in 1957 retreated from the occupied lands. UN troops were deployed along the agreed truce line as part of the first peacekeeping operation in the organization's history.

In the wake of the Suez crisis, the United States took steps to strengthen its position in the Arab world and counter the growing Soviet influence there. In 1957, the Republican administration adopted the "Eisenhower Doctrine", according to which the United States pledged to provide economic and military assistance to the countries of the region if they become objects of "aggression of world communism." The American Congress allocated significant funds for a program to counter the spread of socialist ideas in the Middle East.

3. International relations during the period of "détente" (mid-1960s - 1970s).

Treaty on the limitation of nuclear tests. By the mid-1960s, the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States were already so large that the side that was subjected to the first strike could inflict unacceptable damage on the attacking country. Therefore, the superpowers were forced to build a new scheme for ensuring strategic stability, based on mutual vulnerability. It required the establishment of strict rules of conduct in the space and nuclear world.

The issue of limiting nuclear tests up to their ban has been raised since the second half of the 1950s, since by that time it had been established that atomic explosions in the atmosphere, on the surface of the earth and under water cause radioactive contamination of vast areas. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the stimulus that forced a compromise. In August 1963, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed in Moscow the Treaty on the Prohibition of Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water. The treaty was open-ended and all states could accede to it. Later, more than 100 states joined the treaty, except for France and China, which referred to their lagging behind in the development of nuclear technologies.

Treaty on the Limitation of the Arms Race in Space. The successes of the superpowers in space exploration created the threat of deploying nuclear and other weapons on spaceships and celestial bodies. In 1963, the USSR and the USA initiated a discussion in the UN on the issue of non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. In December 1963, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on all countries to refrain from launching objects with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction into outer space.

In January 1967, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed the Treaty on the Principles of Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which has an open and open character. Outer space was proclaimed open for development by all states on a non-discriminatory basis without national appropriation of space objects. The treaty banned the launching of weapons of mass destruction into space.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The authorities of the USSR and the USA were well aware that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expansion of the "nuclear club" would complicate the strategic situation, complicate the management of international crises, and, in general, lead to a decrease in the role of superpowers. Therefore, in 1965, they initiated discussion within the framework of the United Nations of a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As an incentive that would encourage non-nuclear countries to join the treaty, they were promised assistance in mastering technologies for using the atom in the production of cheap energy.

In July 1968, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed the final version of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years with the possibility of subsequent extension. The USSR, the USA and Great Britain gave guarantees against a nuclear attack to the countries that would join the treaty. The right of non-nuclear countries to the peaceful use of atomic energy was not restricted, provided they observed the conditions of control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Shortly after the signing of the treaty, Germany and Japan joined. However, China and France refused to sign the treaty among the nuclear states, India, Pakistan, Israel, a number of states in Latin America and Arab countries, among others.

American-French controversy. The trend towards "detente" of international tension in the 1960s manifested itself in Europe in the fact that the authorities of a number of leading states of Western Europe began to noticeably change their positions in the inter-bloc confrontation. After Charles de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958, the country's approach to ensuring its national security changed. Charles de Gaulle did not consider the subjugation of the United States the best way to ensure the interests of France. Paris, unlike Washington, was not considered as a serious prospect of a global war with the Soviet Union. In his opinion, there was only a limited threat to France from the USSR, which could be contained by its own nuclear potential.

The desire of France to separate itself from the military-political strategy common with Washington intensified as the United States was drawn into the war in Vietnam. Charles de Gaulle suspected the United States of wanting to appropriate the French "colonial heritage" in Indochina and did not want to become a hostage to another Soviet-American confrontation around Vietnam.

In February 1966, France withdrew from the NATO military organization. Charles de Gaulle motivated his decision by the fact that NATO's policy was contrary to the interests of France and could lead to its automatic involvement in conflicts. France obtained from the United States the withdrawal of allied troops from the country and the liquidation of foreign military bases on its territory. All French armed forces were subordinate to the national command.

Soviet-French rapprochement. Charles de Gaulle sought to make it clear to Moscow that France was not a hypothetical adversary of the USSR on a par with the United States and other NATO countries. In June-July 1966, the President of France paid a visit to the USSR. A Soviet-French declaration was signed in Moscow. In it, the parties agreed on the need to create an atmosphere of detente between the West and the East, and also agreed to hold regular intergovernmental consultations on acute international issues.

In the following months, French officials made a number of visits to Eastern European countries. In their course, undesirable aspects of French policy for the USSR were revealed, since Charles de Gaulle believed that the liberation of Western Europe from American tutelage should be accompanied by the liberation of the states of Eastern Europe from Soviet influence.

Germany's New Ostpolitik. In 1968, the Social Democrats came to power in Germany. The new chancellor, W. Brandt, did not abandon the idea of ​​reuniting Germany, if possible, through the accession of the GDR to the FRG, but believed that the way to solve this problem lay through reconciliation with the USSR and establishing a dialogue with the GDR. The foreign policy strategy of the Social Democratic leadership of the FRG provided for measures to normalize relations with the Eastern European states and improve the situation around West Berlin.

In August 1970, during the visit of Chancellor W. Brandt to Moscow, a Soviet-German treaty was signed, in which the FRG officially recognized the eastern borders of Germany and renounced claims to the former German territories, which after World War II were ceded to the USSR and Poland. In December 1970, a Polish-West German treaty was signed on the recognition by West Germany of the post-war borders of Poland. Finally, in December 1973, the FRG recognized the legitimacy of its border with Czechoslovakia and agreed to consider the Munich Pact of 1938 null and void.

The "New Ostpolitik" made it possible to reach a consensus on the problem of West Berlin. In September 1971, the Quadripartite Agreement between the USSR, the USA, France and Great Britain was signed on the territory of West Berlin, according to which West Berlin was recognized as a separate territorial unit with a special international status under the control of the allied Western powers. The parties pledged to refrain from using force in the West Berlin area, including to change the situation around it unilaterally.

The solution of the problem of West Berlin made it possible to normalize relations between the GDR and the FRG. West Germany abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine. In December 1972, the GDR and the FRG concluded an agreement on the establishment of relations on the basis of equality, respect for independence and territorial integrity. Both states pledged to resolve all their disputes by peaceful means. In September 1973 both German states were admitted to the UN. By 1974, more than 100 states recognized the GDR.

As a result of the "new Ostpolitik", the situation around Germany was normalized in everything that did not concern the question of reunification.

The concept of "strategic parity" of the administration of R. Nixon. The new Republican administration, which came to power in the United States in 1969, headed by President R. Nixon, continued its course towards "détente." In February 1971, R. Nixon openly acknowledged the existence of "strategic parity" in the nuclear sphere between the USSR and the USA. This meant that none of the superpowers had clear advantages in nuclear weapons and could in no way protect themselves from the strike of the main hypothetical enemy.

The concept of "strategic parity" was directly linked to the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction". The superpowers had to come to terms with mutual vulnerabilities and abandon attempts to reduce them otherwise than in a concerted way. The USSR and the USA turned out to be interested in maintaining military-political stability. A sharp breakaway of one of the parties in the field of offensive missile weapons, as well as the creation of highly reliable defensive systems by one of the parties, could lead to a violation of strategic stability.

Soviet-American agreements in the field of arms limitation control over weapons of mass destruction. The new American administration sought rapprochement with the Soviet Union while improving relations with the PRC. In September 1971, an indefinite Soviet-American Agreement was signed in Washington on measures to reduce the danger of a nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. The parties undertook to take measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to inform each other of all incidents related to the possible explosion of nuclear weapons. The agreement regulated the procedure for interaction between the USSR and the USA in the event of a "nuclear alarm".

In May 1972, President R. Nixon paid a visit to Moscow, during which a package of agreements on the limitation of strategic arms (the SALT-1 series) was signed. The package of agreements included the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM). The parties pledged not to create missile defense systems covering the entire territory of the country. The contract was open-ended, but it was possible to withdraw from it. Another element of this series of agreements was the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Sphere of the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The agreement, concluded for a period of 5 years, limited the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could be in service with the USSR and the USA.

Another document signed during R. Nixon's visit to Moscow was the "Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA." It formulated the principles by which both states intended to guide their relations. The United States agreed to the principle of "peaceful coexistence" as the basis of Soviet-American relations. The USSR and the USA pledged to avoid confrontation, to recognize the security interests of each of the parties, not to use force in bilateral relations, not to threaten its use, and also not to seek directly or indirectly to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side.

Richard Nixon's visit to the USSR laid the foundation for the tradition of regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries. During the Soviet-American summits of 1973-74. a number of important agreements were signed. In particular, during L. Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June 1973, an indefinite Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was adopted. This document took into account the experience of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation, providing for the holding of Soviet-American consultations in the event of a threat of a nuclear clash not only between the superpowers, but also with a third country.

Helsinki process. Under the conditions of "détente" in relations between the West and the East, a dialogue on the problems of common European security became possible. In 1972-73. consultations were held in Helsinki with the participation of 32 Western and Eastern European states on the preparation of the All-European Conference. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) itself opened in Helsinki in July 1973. It was attended by representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the United States and Canada. Simultaneously, since October 1973, negotiations were going on in Vienna between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

In August 1975, the Final Act of the OSCE was signed in Helsinki. The "first basket" of agreements declared the principles by which the participating states pledged to be guided in their relations. They were of a compromise nature, including contradictory formulations about the need to respect, on the one hand, the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of states, and, on the other hand, the right of peoples to self-determination. In addition, states pledged not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, not to use force or the threat of force, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The agreements on the "second basket" recorded the consent of the participants to promote the introduction of the most favored nation regime into trade and economic relations between themselves.

The content of the "third basket" was the obligation to cooperate in ensuring the individual rights of citizens. On the issue of ensuring human rights, sharp contradictions emerged between the USSR and Western countries. The USSR and its allies sought to interpret human rights primarily as socio-economic rights (the right to work, free education, social assistance, etc.). Western countries emphasized civil rights and freedoms, such as the right to freedom of conscience and religious beliefs, the right to free access to information, pointing to the lack of such among Soviet citizens. Both interpretations of human rights are reflected in the Final Act.

In general, the Helsinki Accords consolidated the status quo in Europe. They represented essentially a pan-European non-aggression convention. the guarantors of which were, first of all, the USSR and the USA. The final act of the CSCE did not solve all the problems of relations between West and East, but reduced the likelihood of European countries resorting to force to settle disputes.

Events in Czechoslovakia 1968 In the 1960s, reforms were launched in the USSR and a number of Eastern European countries, designed to give more economic freedoms and stimulate economic development. In Czechoslovakia, economic reforms led to discussions about the prospects for socialism in the country. After the change of the country's leadership in 1968, the liberal opposition began to talk about changing the political system. In the summer of 1968, student demonstrations took place in Czechoslovakia demanding the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Under such conditions, the Soviet leadership decided on military intervention. In August 1968, ATS troops entered Czechoslovakia. In the autumn of 1968 opposition demonstrations were suppressed. The conservative representatives of the Communist Party were placed at the head of the country.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a negative reaction not only in the West, but also in the socialist camp, provoking a split here. The leadership of a number of socialist countries was frightened by the possibility of interference in their internal affairs according to the "Czechoslovak scenario." Albania and Romania refused to participate in the invasion. In September 1968, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. China and Yugoslavia condemned the actions of the USSR in Czechoslovakia.

Brezhnev Doctrine. Under the influence of events in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership, fearing the growth of ideological differences in the communist movement, developed the concept of "socialist solidarity". In accordance with this doctrine, the countries of the socialist commonwealth were to provide "fraternal assistance" to other countries of the commonwealth in the event of a threat to the socialist system. Members of the "socialist community" were considered socialist countries that were loyal to Moscow. Albania, Yugoslavia, China and the DPRK were not subject to the principles of "fraternal assistance".

The new Soviet doctrine, which justified intervention in the internal affairs of the countries of the socialist community, was called in the West the “doctrine of limited sovereignty” or the “Brezhnev doctrine”.

Soviet-Chinese confrontation. In the 1960s, the leadership of the PRC, convinced of the impossibility of establishing cooperation with the Soviet Union on an anti-American basis, embarked on the path of confrontation simultaneously with the USSR and the USA. China's leaders proclaimed themselves leaders of the "third world" in the struggle for liberation from American and Soviet hegemony.

In the wake of the "cultural revolution" in China, Beijing's anti-Soviet rhetoric reached its peak. Relations between the CPC and the CPSU were severed. In January 1967, the Chinese authorities organized a siege of the Soviet embassy in Beijing, demanding that the line of the Soviet-Chinese border along the rivers be changed in accordance with world standards. This led to the evacuation of Soviet diplomats from the PRC and the actual rupture of diplomatic relations.

Armed incidents began on the Soviet-Chinese border. In March 1968, armed clashes took place on Damansky Island. There was a threat of a large-scale war between the USSR and China. Moscow tried to enlist support in the confrontation with Beijing from the countries of Asia and the United States. However, the United States opposed any strikes against China. The threat of war was removed as a result of Soviet-Chinese negotiations in Beijing in September 1969. The USSR agreed to withdraw troops from the Soviet-Chinese border.

Normalization of US-China relations. In the second half of the 1960s, the "Soviet threat" began to push Beijing to look for ways to normalize relations with Washington. The United States, for its part, turned out to be interested in improving relations with China, thus striving to strengthen its position in East Asia and consolidate the split in the socialist camp.

In 1971, the PRC, with the support of the United States, was admitted to the UN in fact to replace Taiwan, which "voluntarily" left the organization, seeking to avoid the exclusion procedure. In February 1972, US President Richard Nixon paid an official visit to China, which resulted in the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States and China declared their renunciation of attempts to establish their hegemony in East Asia and opposed the attempts of other powers to do so. The United States promised to support the PRC in the event of a growing threat from the USSR, and China - to continue the line of distancing from Moscow. Thus, the United States abandoned the policy of "double deterrence" at the same time the USSR and the PRC in favor of containing only the Soviet Union.

Despite the agreements reached, diplomatic relations between the United States and China were not established.


61. Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations: from formation to disintegration.
AT theory of international relations There are several systems:

- Westphalian system of international relations(after finishing Thirty Years' War in 1648). It has the idea of ​​a balance of power;

- Vienna System of International Relations(after finishing Napoleonic Wars in 1814). She has an idea European concert;

- Versailles-Washington System of International Relations(according to the results first world war);

- (according to the results Second World War); formed the basis of a bipolar world along the line of confrontation East (bloc of socialist states) - West (capitalist world)

Researchers generally agree that the Yalta-Potsdam system ended in 1990, 3 Oct. unification of Germany. Under Chancellor Hermunt Kohl.
Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations- the designation of the system of international relations adopted in geopolitics, fixed by treaties and agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam Conference .

This trend was fully manifested already at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, when the main role in solving the key problems associated with the formation of a new model of the Defense Ministry was two, now the superpowers of the USSR and the USA.

The Potsdam era set a historical precedent, because never before had the whole world been artificially divided into spheres of influence between two states. The bipolar alignment of forces quickly led to the beginning of the confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps, referred to in history as the Cold War.

The Potsdam era is characterized by an extraordinary ideologization international relations as well as the constant threat of the beginning of a direct military confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

The end of the Potsdam era was marked by the unification of Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under Chancellor Hermunt Kohl.

Peculiarities


  • Was liquidated multipolar organization structure of international relations, a bipolar structure of post-war IRs arose, in which the leading role was played by two superstates- USSR and USA.

  • confrontational nature- systemic, complex confrontation in the economic, political, military, ideological and other spheres,

  • Post-war bipolarity took shape in the era of nuclear weapons

  • The distribution of the world into spheres of influence of two superstates both in Europe and on the periphery, the emergence of "divided" countries (Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China) and the formation of military-political blocs, under the leadership of the USSR and the USA

  • The Yalta-Potsdam order did not have a strong contractual and legal basis. The agreements that formed the basis of the post-war order were either oral, not officially recorded, or were fixed mainly in a declarative form, or their full implementation was blocked as a result of the sharpness of contradictions and confrontation between the main subjects of post-war international relations.

  • The UN, one of the central elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system, became the main mechanism for coordinating efforts in order to exclude wars and conflicts from international life

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On December 8, 1991, the heads of 3 republics - Belarus, Russia and Ukraine - at a meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (Belarus) announced that the USSR was ceasing to exist and signed the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The signing of the agreements caused a negative reaction of the population. On December 11, the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision issued a statement condemning the Belovezhskaya Accord, but this statement had no practical consequences.

On December 12, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, chaired by R.I. Khasbulatova ratified the Belovezhskaya Accords and decided to denounce the 1922 union treaty of the RSFSR (a number of lawyers believe that the denunciation of this treaty was pointless, since it became invalid in 1936 with the adoption of the USSR constitution Dmitry Yuryev. The collapse of the USSR, "succession" and good will Russia. http://www.trinitas.ru/rus/doc/0215/003a/02150011.htm) and about the recall of Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (without convening a Congress, which can be regarded as a violation of the Constitution of the RSFSR in force at that time) . As a result of the recall of the deputies, the Council of the Union lost its quorum.

On December 16, the last republic of the USSR - Kazakhstan - declared its independence. Thus, in the last 10 days of its existence, the USSR, which had not yet been legally abolished, was in fact a state without territory.

On December 17, Chairman of the Council of the Union K.D. Lubenchenko stated the absence of a quorum at the meeting. The Council of the Union, renamed the Meeting of Deputies, appealed to the Supreme Council of Russia with a request to at least temporarily cancel the decision to recall Russian deputies so that the Council of the Union could resign itself. This appeal was ignored.

On December 21, 1991, at a meeting of presidents in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, 8 more republics joined the CIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the so-called Alma-Ata agreement was signed, which became the basis of the CIS.

The CIS was founded not as a confederation, but as an international (interstate) organization, which is still characterized by weak integration and the absence of real power in the coordinating supranational bodies. However, membership even in such an organization was rejected by the Baltic republics, as well as at first by Georgia (it joined the CIS only in October 1993 during the struggle for power between supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze).

The authorities of the USSR and the USSR as a subject of international law ceased to exist on December 25-26, 1991. Russia declared itself the successor of the USSR membership (and not the assignee, as is often erroneously indicated) in international institutions, assumed the debts and assets of the USSR and declared itself the owner of everything property of the USSR abroad. According to data provided by the Russian Federation, at the end of 1991 the liabilities of the former Soviet Union were estimated at $93.7 billion and assets at $110.1 billion. Vnesheconombank's deposits amounted to about $700 million. The so-called "zero option", according to which the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the former Soviet Union in terms of external debt and assets, including foreign property, was not ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

December 25 President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev announced the termination of his activities as President of the USSR "for reasons of principle", signed a decree on the resignation of the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces and transferred control of strategic nuclear weapons to Russian President B. Yeltsin.

On December 26, the session of the upper house of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which retained the quorum of the Council of the Republics, from which at that time only representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were not recalled, adopted a declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR under the chairmanship of A. Alimzhanov, as well as a number of others documents (decree on the dismissal of judges of the Supreme and Supreme Arbitration Courts of the USSR and the Collegium of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, resolutions on the dismissal of the chairman of the State Bank V.V. Gerashchenko and his first deputy V.N. Kulikov). December 26, 1991 is considered the day the USSR ceased to exist, although some institutions and organizations of the USSR (for example, the USSR State Standard) still continued to function for several months, and, for example, the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee was not officially dissolved at all.

There are different opinions of various political scientists about the reasons for the breakdown of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations: the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the military-strategic bloc of the Warsaw Pact, fundamental changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and the states of the former USSR, the formation of a number of independent states in these territories, the unification of Germany, as well as the end of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA.

According to the author of this course work, the main reason for the breakdown of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations is the collapse of the USSR, since this system of international relations was called "bipolar", that is, the world was actually split into two blocks formed on the basis of military and political superiority two superpowers - the USSR and the USA over the rest of the countries, which was determined primarily by the presence of nuclear weapons, which guaranteed multiple mutual destruction. The cessation of the existence of one of the superpowers, in this case the USSR, caused the breakdown of the system of international relations that was formed after the end of World War II.

As for the collapse of the USSR, in this case, as well as in the case of the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system, there is a variety of opinions:

1. In Western political science literature, one can often come across the assertion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by its defeat in the Cold War. Such views are especially prevalent in Western Europe, and most of all in the United States, where they have replaced the initial amazement caused by the rapid collapse of communist regimes. In such a system of views, the main thing is the desire to take advantage of the “fruits of victory”. Not surprisingly, the US and its NATO allies are increasingly outspoken in winning style. Politically, this trend is extremely dangerous. In scientific terms, however, it is untenable, because it reduces the whole problem to an external factor.

2. Of great interest are the points of view expressed at the major international conference "The causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on Europe", held in Beijing in May 2000 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The convening of such a conference in China was not accidental. The Chinese leadership, which began its "perestroika" back in 1979 and achieved impressive economic success, was deeply puzzled by the socio-political upheavals in Eastern Europe, and then in the Soviet Union. It was then that Chinese scientists began to implement the "Russian project" in order to find out the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the socialist community, as well as to assess their impact on Europe and the world. Chinese scientists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a tragedy for all mankind, which turned out to be thrown back a whole era back in its development. Moreover, such an assessment is given not from the standpoint of classical Marxism, but on the basis of an analysis of the consequences of the changes that have taken place. In their opinion, it was the largest cataclysm of the twentieth century.

3. There is also an opinion that the collapse of the Union did not take place at all in December 1991, but much earlier. So, according to Sergei Shakhrai, "Three doctors - and not a surgeon, but a pathologist - simply gathered at the bedside of the deceased to record his death. Someone had to do this, because otherwise it was impossible to obtain an official certificate or enter into inheritance rights ". Sergei Shakhrai names three factors as the reasons for the destruction of the "Unbreakable Union". The first "delayed-action mine," according to him, was dormant for decades in that article of the Soviet Constitution, which gave the union republics the right to freely secede from the USSR. The second reason is the "information virus" of envy, which manifested itself in full force in the late 80s - early 90s: in the conditions of the most severe crisis in Tbilisi and Vilnius they said: "Stop working for Moscow", in the Urals they demanded to stop "feeding" the republics Central Asia, while Moscow blamed the suburbs for "everything goes into them like into a black hole." The third reason, according to Shakhrai, was the processes of so-called autonomization. By the early 1990s, perestroika fizzled out. The political weakening of the center, the flow of power to the "lower levels", the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev for political leadership - all this was fraught with the transformation of the map of the RSFSR into a "piece of cheese" with huge holes, the loss of 51 percent of the territory of Russia and almost 20 million of its population. The monolith of the CPSU cracked: the last straw was the August coup of 1991. From August to December 1991, 13 out of 15 union republics declared their independence. after the "funeral of the USSR", E. Dobrynina..

The Yalta-Potsdam order, which was based on the regulated confrontation between the USSR and the USA, the status quo in the military-political and political-diplomatic areas, began to collapse. Both powers - for opposite reasons - went over to its revision. The issue of a coordinated reform of the Yalta-Potsdam order arose on the agenda, the participants of which, however, were no longer equal in power and influence.

The Russian Federation, which became the successor state and successor of the USSR, could not perform the functions inherent in the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of bipolarity, because it did not have the necessary resources for this.

Tendencies towards unification and rapprochement of the former socialist and capitalist countries began to develop in international relations, and the international system as a whole began to develop the features of a “global society”. This process was fraught with new acute problems and contradictions.



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