In what year did America release nuclear weapons? American nuclear missiles: how they work. The US is preparing for a nuclear war with Russia

The new US nuclear doctrine, published in April 2010, declares that “ The primary purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack on the US, its allies and partners. This purpose will remain so as long as it exists nuclear weapon " United States " will consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to protect the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners».

However, the United States are not prepared today to endorse a universal policy recognizing that deterring a nuclear attack is the sole function of nuclear weapons" With regard to nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states that, in Washington’s assessment, are not fulfilling their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “ There remains a small set of additional contingencies in which nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical attack. biological weapons against the USA, its allies and partners».

However, it is not disclosed what is meant by the above-mentioned unforeseen circumstances. This should be regarded as a serious uncertainty in US nuclear policy, which cannot but influence the defense policies of other leading states of the world.

To carry out the tasks assigned to nuclear forces, the United States has strategic offensive forces (SNF) and non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). According to US State Department data published on May 3, 2010, the United States nuclear arsenal as of September 30, 2009 consisted of 5,113 nuclear warheads. In addition, several thousand obsolete nuclear warheads, removed from stockpiles, were awaiting dismantling or destruction.

1. Strategic offensive forces

The US SNA is a nuclear triad consisting of land, sea and air components. Each component of the triad has its own advantages, so the new US nuclear doctrine recognizes that “preserving all three components of the triad in the best way will ensure strategic stability with acceptable financial costs and at the same time provide insurance in case of problems with the technical condition and vulnerability of the existing forces.”

1.1. Ground component

The ground component of the US SNA consists of strategic missile systems equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). ICBM forces have significant advantages over other components of the SNA due to their highly secure control and management system, calculated in several minutes of combat readiness and relatively low costs for combat and operational training. They can be effectively used in pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes to destroy stationary targets, including highly protected ones.

According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the ICBM forces had 550 silo launchers at three missile bases(silos), of which for the Minuteman-3 ICBM - 50, for the Minuteman-3M ICBM - 300, for the Minuteman-3S ICBM - 150 and for the MX ICBM - 50 (all silos are impact protected wave 70–140 kg/cm 2):

Currently, ICBM forces are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), created in August 2009.

All Minuteman ICBMs– three-stage solid-fuel rockets. Each of them carries from one to three nuclear warheads.

ICBM "Minuteman-3" began deployment in 1970. It was equipped with Mk-12 nuclear warheads (W62 warhead with a capacity of 170 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3M" began deployment in 1979. Equipped with Mk-12A nuclear warheads (335 kt W78 warhead). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "Minuteman-3S" began deployment in 2006. Equipped with one Mk-21 nuclear warhead (300 kt W87 warhead). The maximum firing range is up to 13,000 km.

ICBM "MX"- three-stage solid-fuel rocket. Began deployment in 1986. Equipped with ten Mk-21 nuclear warheads. The maximum firing range is up to 9,000 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of the entry into force of the START-3 Treaty (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons) On February 5, 2011, the ground component of the US SNA had about 450 deployed ICBMs with approximately 560 warheads.

1.2. Marine component

The naval component of the US SNA consists of nuclear submarines equipped with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Their established names are SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are the most survivable component of the US SNA. According to current estimates, in the near and medium term there will be no real threat to the survivability of American SSBNs».

According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the naval component of the US strategic nuclear forces included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, of which 6 SSBNs were based on the Atlantic coast (naval base Kingsbay, Georgia) and 8 SSBNs were based on the Pacific coast (naval base Kitsan, Washington). Each SSBN is equipped with 24 Trident-2 class SLBMs.

SLBM "Trident-2" (D-5)- three-stage solid-fuel rocket. It began to be deployed in 1990. It is equipped with either Mk-4 nuclear warheads and their modification Mk-4A (W76 warhead with a yield of 100 kt), or Mk-5 nuclear warheads (W88 warhead with a yield of 475 kt). The standard configuration is 8 warheads, the actual configuration is 4 warheads. The maximum firing range is over 7,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time the New START Treaty entered into force, the US naval component of the SNA had up to 240 deployed SLBMs with approximately 1,000 warheads.

1.3. Aviation component

The aviation component of the US SNA consists of strategic, or heavy, bombers capable of solving nuclear problems. Their advantage over ICBMs and SLBMs, according to the new US nuclear doctrine, is that they “ can be demonstratively deployed in the regions to warn potential adversaries in crisis situations about strengthening nuclear deterrence and to reaffirm to allies and partners American commitments to ensure their security».

All strategic bombers have dual-mission status: they can carry out strikes using both nuclear and conventional weapons. According to expert estimates, at the end of 2010, the aviation component of the US SNA at five air bases in the continental United States included approximately 230 bombers of three types - B-52N, B-1B and B-2A (of which more than 50 units are in stock reserve ).

Currently, strategic air forces, like ICBM forces, are subordinate to the US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).

Strategic bomber B-52N- turboprop subsonic aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1961. Currently, only long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) AGM-86B and AGM-129A are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 16,000 km.

B-1B strategic bomber- supersonic jet aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1985. Currently it is intended to perform non-nuclear missions, but has not yet been removed from the count of strategic carriers of nuclear weapons under the START-3 Treaty, since the relevant procedures provided for by this Treaty have not been completed. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km (with one in-flight refueling).

- subsonic jet aircraft. It began to be deployed in 1994. Currently, only B61 aerial bombs (modifications 7 and 11) of variable power (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and B83 (with a power of several megatons) are intended for its nuclear equipment. The maximum flight range is up to 11,000 km.

ALCM AGM-86В- subsonic air-launched cruise missile. It began to be deployed in 1981. It is equipped with a W80-1 warhead of variable power (from 3 to 200 kt). The maximum firing range is up to 2,600 km.

ALCM AGM-129A- subsonic cruise missile. Began deployment in 1991. Equipped with the same warhead as the AGM-86B missile. The maximum firing range is up to 4,400 km.

According to expert estimates, at the time of the entry into force of the START-3 Treaty, there were about 200 deployed bombers in the aviation component of the US SNA, which counted the same number of nuclear warheads (according to the rules of the START-3 Treaty, one warhead is conditionally counted for each deployed strategic bomber, since in their daily activities, they all do not have nuclear weapons on board).

1.4. Combat control of strategic offensive forces

System combat control(SBU) The US SNA is a set of primary and reserve systems, including primary and reserve stationary and mobile (air and ground) controls, communications and automated data processing systems. The SBU provides automated collection, processing and transmission of data on the situation, development of orders, plans and calculations, bringing them to the executors and control of implementation.

Main combat control system designed for timely response of the SNS to a tactical warning about the launch of a missile nuclear strike across the USA. Its main bodies are the stationary main and reserve command centers of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command and reserve command centers of the United Strategic Command of the US Armed Forces, command posts of air armies, missile and air wings.

It is believed that in any scenario of the outbreak of a nuclear war, the combat crews of these control points will be able to organize measures to increase the combat readiness of the SNS and transmit the order to begin their combat use.

Backup combat control and communications system in emergency situations unites a number of systems, the main of which are reserve control systems for the US armed forces using air and ground mobile command posts.

1.5. Prospects for the development of strategic offensive forces

The current development program of the US SNA does not provide for the construction of new ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers in the foreseeable period. At the same time, by reducing the total reserve of strategic nuclear weapons during the implementation of the START-3 Treaty, “ The United States will retain the ability to “reload” a certain amount nuclear charges as a technical hedge against any future problems with delivery systems and warheads, as well as in case of a significant deterioration in the security environment" Thus, the so-called “return potential” is formed by “demiring” ICBMs and reducing the number of warheads on SLBMs by half.

As follows from the report of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, presented to the American Congress in May 2010, after the fulfillment of the terms of the START III Treaty (February 2018) in combat strength The US SNA will have 420 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 14 Ohio-class SSBNs with 240 Trident-2 SLBMs and up to 60 B-52H and B-2A bombers.

Multi-year, $7 billion, improvement of the Minuteman-3 ICBM under the Extension program life cycle Minuteman-3" with the goal of keeping these missiles in service until 2030 is almost completed.

As noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, " Although there is no need to make a decision in the next few years on any subsequent ICBM, exploratory studies on this issue should begin today. In this regard, in 2011–2012. The Department of Defense will begin studies to analyze alternatives. This study will examine a range of different ICBM development options with the goal of identifying a cost-effective approach that will support further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while ensuring sustainable deterrence.».

In 2008, production of a modified version of the Trident-2 D-5 LE (Life Extension) SLBM began. In total, by 2012, 108 of these missiles will be purchased for more than $4 billion. The Ohio-class SSBNs will be equipped with modified SLBMs for the remainder of their service life, which has been extended from 30 to 44 years. The first in the Ohio series of SSBNs is scheduled to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2027.

Since it takes a long time to design, build, test and deploy new SSBNs, the US Navy will begin exploratory studies to replace existing SSBNs starting in 2012. Depending on the results of the study, as noted in the new US nuclear doctrine, the feasibility of reducing the number of SSBNs from 14 to 12 units in the future may be considered.

As for the aviation component of the US SNA, the US Air Force is studying the possibility of creating strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which from 2018 should replace the current bombers. Moreover, as proclaimed in the new US nuclear doctrine, “ The Air Force will evaluate alternatives to inform 2012 budget decisions on whether and how to replace existing long-range air-launched cruise missiles that are due to expire at the end of the next decade.».

In the field of nuclear development combat equipment The main efforts in the United States in the coming years will be aimed at improving existing nuclear warheads. The development of a highly reliable nuclear warhead, begun in 2005 by the Department of Energy as part of the RRW (Reliable Replacement Warhead) project, has now been suspended.

As part of the implementation of the non-nuclear prompt global strike strategy, the United States continues to develop technologies for guided warheads and non-nuclear warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs. This work is being conducted under the leadership of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Advanced Research Projects Agency), which eliminates duplication of research conducted by the branches of the armed forces, spends money more efficiently and ultimately speeds up the creation of high-precision combat equipment for strategic ballistic missiles.

Since 2009, a number of demonstration launches of prototypes of intercontinental-range delivery vehicles being created have been carried out, but no significant achievements have been achieved yet. According to expert estimates, the creation and deployment of high-precision ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear equipment can hardly be expected before 2020.

2. Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced its NSNW (non-strategic nuclear weapons) arsenal. As emphasized in the new US nuclear doctrine, today the United States maintains only a limited number of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, and no a large number of in U.S. warehouses ready for global deployment in support of Extended Deterrence for allies and partners».

As of January 2011, the United States had approximately 500 operational non-strategic nuclear warheads. Among them are 400 B61 free-fall bombs of several modifications with variable power (from 0.3 to 345 kt) and 100 W80-O warheads of variable power (from 3 to 200 kt) for cruise missiles sea-based(SLCM) long-range (up to 2,600 km) "Tomahawk" (TLAM/N), adopted for service in 1984.

About half of the above air bombs are deployed at six US air bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. In addition, about 800 non-strategic nuclear warheads, including 190 W80-O warheads, are inactive in reserve.

American F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers certified to perform nuclear missions, as well as aircraft of US NATO allies, can be used as carriers of nuclear bombs. Among the latter are Belgian and Dutch F-16 aircraft and German and Italian Tornado aircraft.

Tomahawk nuclear SLCMs are designed to arm multi-purpose nuclear submarines (NPS) and some types of surface ships. At the beginning of 2011, the US Navy had 320 missiles of this type in service. All of them are stored in the arsenals of naval bases on the continental United States in 24-36 hour readiness for loading onto nuclear submarines and surface ships, as well as special ammunition transports, including transport aircraft.

As for the prospects for American NSNW, the new US nuclear doctrine concludes that it is necessary to take the following measures:

— the Air Force must maintain a “dual-mission” fighter-bomber (that is, capable of using both conventional and nuclear weapons) after replacing the existing F-15 and F-16 aircraft with the F-35 all-purpose strike aircraft;

— continue to fully implement the Life Extension Program of the B61 nuclear bomb to ensure its compatibility with the F-35 aircraft and improve its operational safety, security from unauthorized access and control of use in order to increase confidence in it;

— remove the Tomahawk nuclear SLCM from service (this system is considered redundant in the US nuclear arsenal, and moreover, it has not been deployed since 1992).

3. Nuclear cuts in future

The new US nuclear doctrine states that the President of the United States has directed a review of possible future reductions in US strategic nuclear weapons below the levels established by the START III Treaty. It is emphasized that the scale and pace of subsequent reductions in US nuclear arsenals will be influenced by several factors.

Firstly, “Any future reductions should strengthen deterrence against potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with Russia and China, and reaffirm American security assurances to allies and partners.”

Secondly, “the implementation of the program “Maintaining the Readiness of the Nuclear Arsenal” and the funding of nuclear infrastructure recommended by the US Congress (over 80 billion dollars are allocated for this - V.E.) will allow the United States to abandon the practice of maintaining a large number of undeployed nuclear warheads in reserve in case of technical or geopolitical surprises and thereby significantly reduce the nuclear arsenal.”

Third, “Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how quickly the United States is willing to further reduce its nuclear forces.”

Given the above, the US administration will seek discussions with Russia on further reductions in nuclear arsenals and increased transparency. As stated, “this could be achieved through formal agreements and/or through parallel voluntary measures. Subsequent reductions must be larger in scale than provided for in previous bilateral agreements, covering all nuclear weapons of both states, and not just deployed strategic nuclear weapons.”

Assessing these intentions of Washington, it should be noted that they practically do not take into account Moscow’s concerns caused by:

— the deployment of the American global missile defense system, which could in the future weaken the deterrence potential of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces;

- the enormous superiority of the United States and its allies in conventional armed forces, which may increase even more with the adoption of the developed American systems long-range precision weapons;

— the reluctance of the United States to support the draft treaty banning the deployment of any types of weapons in space, submitted by Russia and China to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2008.

Without finding mutually acceptable solutions to these problems, Washington is unlikely to be able to persuade Moscow to enter into new negotiations on further reductions in nuclear arsenals.

/V.I. Esin, Ph.D., leading researcher at the Center for Problems of Military-Industrial Policy, Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, www.rusus.ru/

Every year, the systems installed here are becoming more and more like museum exhibits. At the top, new international agreements are being concluded, according to which these wells are being closed one after another. But every day, new US Air Force crews descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen...

Another day of service Another watch carries suitcases with secret documentation, fastened with steel cables to their overalls. People will descend into the bunker on 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the Montana grasslands. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to activate their apocalyptic weapons.

Joe Pappalardo

An inconspicuous ranch about fifteen meters off a rough two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain-link fence, an out-of-the-way garage, and a basketball backboard right above the driveway.

However, if you look more closely, you can notice some funny details - a red and white lattice microwave radio relay tower rises above the buildings, there is a helicopter landing pad on the front lawn, plus another conical UHF antenna sticking out on the lawn like a white fungus. You might think that some kind of university agricultural laboratory or, say, a weather station has settled here - the only thing that confuses us is the red banner on the fence, notifying that anyone who tries to enter the territory without permission will be met with lethal fire.

Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines everyone entering. The slightest suspicion and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive entrance door slides vertically upward - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.

After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall there are exits to cabins with bunk beds. The walls are covered with standard official posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies.

Malmstrom Air Force Missile Base controls 15 launchers and 150 silos. Her entire farm spreads over an area of ​​35,000 km 2 . The bunkers with control panels were buried so deep and scattered so far apart to survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and maintain the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each starting position without missing.

One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. The dispatcher responsible for safety (Flight Security Controller, FSC) sits here - a non-commissioned officer, commander of the launcher security. The three-meter chest next to him is filled with M4 and M9 carbines. In this arsenal there is another door, which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter under any circumstances, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes straight six floors underground without stopping.

In a calm voice, FSC communicates over the phone the codes for calling the elevator. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have exited and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel elevator door is opened manually in much the same way as the blinds used in small shops to protect windows and doors at night are rolled up. Behind it is a small booth with metal walls.

It will take us less than a minute to descend 22 m underground, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open up before us. The elevator door is built into the smoothly curving black wall of the round hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, there are thick columns of shock absorbers, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.

Behind the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanged exactly as the lifting gates of an ancient castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly leaned outward, the metal handle of which was held by 26-year-old Air Force captain Chad Dieterle. Along the perimeter of this shockproof plug, which is a good one and a half meters thick, there are stenciled letters INDIA. Dieterle's 24-hour watch as commander of India's Launch Control Center (LCC) is now halfway through, and the launch site itself was established here at Malmstrom Air Force Base back when the brave Air Force captain's parents went to school.

The mines and the launch control panel, located at a depth of 22 m underground, are guarded around the clock. The “Rocket Monkeys,” as they call themselves, train in a training silo, the same one that houses real rockets. They replace cables leading to gyroscopes and on-board computers. These computers are hidden in bulky boxes that protect the electronics from radiation.

LCC India is connected by cables to fifty other mines scattered within a 10-kilometer radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The Air Force command refuses to disclose the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all living things within a radius of ten kilometers.

Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his assistants can send these weapons to anywhere in the world within half an hour. Hiding in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the vastness of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.

Small but effective

The American nuclear arsenal - approximately 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered using 94 bombers, 14 submarines and 450 ballistic missiles - remains to this day the basis of all national system security. Barack Obama never tires of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration regarding nuclear policy clearly postulates: “As long as there are stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in state of full and effective combat readiness."

Since the end of the Cold War, total nuclear warheads in the world have radically decreased. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are developing their own nuclear programs and constructing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite the high-flown rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, it is not right for America to part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with the planes, submarines and missiles that could deliver them to the target.

The missile component of the American nuclear triad has existed for 50 years, but year after year it is the focus of intense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons - START III. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries should be limited to fewer than 1,550 warheads within a seven-year period. strategic purpose. Of the 450 American missiles on combat duty, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose support from the “hawks” and simply skeptical senators, The White house proposed adding $85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved by the next meeting of Congress). “I will vote to ratify this treaty ... because our president clearly intends to ensure that the remaining weapons are truly effective,” says Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander.

Intercontinental ballistic missile silo. These mines hide their terrible nature behind a completely inconspicuous appearance. Some truck driver will pass by on the highway and not even look back. He will never know that nuclear weapons are hidden in these 30-meter-deep mines, maintained in a state of continuous combat readiness.

Nuclear missile umbrella

So why strategic rocket troops, symbol of the end of the Cold War, remain at the center of 21st century defense strategy, policy and diplomacy? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (airplanes, submarines and ballistic missiles), then intercontinental ballistic missiles remain the means of the most rapid response to enemy aggression, and indeed the most rapid weapon, allowing for a preventive strike. Submarines are good because they are practically invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere on the globe, and can do this in a matter of minutes.

The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the whole world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America has an obligation to keep any enemy target at gunpoint and at risk, no matter where it is located, no matter how strong the defense covers it, no matter how deeply hidden it is,” he said Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who just in January left his post as head of Global Strike Command, the structure that controls nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.

Starting positions strategic missiles represent a major engineering achievement. All of these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been fully operational 99% of the time. What's even more interesting is that the Pentagon built these launch positions to last just a few decades. When MinutemanIII missiles are retired, all silos and launchers at the Malmstrom base will be preserved and buried for a period of 70 years.

So, Air Force manage the most powerful weapon in the world, and the equipment to control these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. And yet these old launch systems do their job much better than you might think. “To build a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph of engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought everything through, generously building in several layers of redundant reliability.”

Thousands of dedicated officers at three Air Force bases - Malmstrom Air Force Base, F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota spare no effort to ensure that silo launchers are in constant combat readiness.

The Minuteman III model was stationed in mines in the 1970s and its retirement date was set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the life of the series by another decade. In response to this demand, the Air Force leadership drew up a schedule for the reorganization of existing missile bases. A significant portion of the billions of dollars that were recently promised by the White House should go towards this.

Norm is perfection

Let's return to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch house. Not much has changed inside since the Kennedy administration. Of course, paper teletype printers have given way to digital screens, and servers installed above provide the underground team with Internet access and even live television broadcasting when the situation is calm. However, the electronics here - huge blocks inserted into wide metal racks and studded with many glowing lights and illuminated buttons - are reminiscent of the scenery from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Some things really just beg to be found in an antique shop. With an embarrassed smile, Dieterle pulls out of the console a nine-inch floppy disk, part of the ancient but still functional Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.

Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep the silo launchers operational. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent more than $7 billion on modernizing this type of military. All the work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model would safely reach its retirement date, which was set for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the service life of this series for another ten years.

The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow modernized, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any ground movement can break underground communication lines.

The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers manned by missile crews at Malmstrom Air Force Base. “Take a regular house that's been around for 40 years,” says Col. Jeff Frankhauser, base maintenance team commander, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. This is the same situation with us.”

This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles scattered at launch sites over 35,000 km2 of mountains, hills and plains in Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not in one massive missile strike disable all starting positions and command posts, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

This elegant doctrine of mutual deterrence implied the mandatory existence of a developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. The fist-thin bundles are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and laid in sheaths, inside which increased pressure is maintained. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the operations team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.

The communications system, which extends throughout the surrounding expanse, is a constant source of concern for Malmstrom Base personnel. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams at control panels, 135 operating workers and 206 security guards - go to work, maintaining this entire facility in order. Some command posts are a three-hour drive from the base. They are grieved by heroes offended by fate, who are called “Farsiders” at the base. Every day, jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units scurry along the surrounding roads to retrieve missiles from underground, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, 6,000 of which are dirt roads, enriched with gravel.

The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can wander freely along the fence, but if you go beyond it, the security service can open fire to kill you.

The slogan reigns here: “Our norm is excellence,” and to ensure that no one ever forgets this strict principle, a whole army of inspectors looks after the staff. Any mistake may result in removal from duty until the offender retakes the proficiency test. Such meticulous control applies to all services of the missile base.

The cook will receive a strict punishment from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood above the stove in a timely manner. And this is correct - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of a launch platoon with the same success as a team of enemy special forces could do. Caution to the point of paranoia is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance, it may seem that we are playing it safe,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010, he served at the Malmstrom base as commander of the 341st Missile Battalion), “but look at this matter seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads "

Everyday life in a bunker

To launch a nuclear ballistic missile, just turning the key is not enough. If the India launch center receives the appropriate command, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Givler, must check the encryption sent from the White House with the one stored in the center's steel safes.

Then each of them will take his triangular switch, fixing his gaze on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the “ready” position to the “start” position. At the same moment, two rocket men at another launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.

Each mine is only suitable for one launch. In the very first seconds, electronic components, ladders, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt. A ring of smoke will rise above the hills of Montana, comically accurately repeating the outline of a mine vent. Relying on a column of reactive gases, the rocket will burst into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half hour, and the warheads will begin to fall on their assigned targets.

The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these rocket men and the full extent of the responsibility assigned to them are clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner lies a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain so that the light does not shine in the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.

And it’s time for us to return to the world that rocket scientists call “real.” Dieterle pulls the handle of the black shockproof plug until it begins to turn smoothly. He smiles reservedly in parting, and the door slams behind us with a heavy thud. We go up, and there, below, Dieterle and others like him remain, in tense, eternal anticipation.

The Yankees themselves never produced nuclear materials, but purchased them from the Union. Then these traders stopped updating the means of delivering nuclear weapons. And now the United States is not a formidable nuclear power, but a horde of screamers...

The truth about US nuclear weapons

Despite the fact that scientific and technological progress makes its own adjustments to our lives, and to the tactics of warfare, and life itself does not stand still, the factor nuclear deterrence no one has canceled it - and it is unlikely to be canceled in the coming decades. It was nuclear weapons, despite their power and irreversible consequences, that throughout the Cold War served as the final red line beyond which a compromise between the USSR and the USA lay.

And now, when we see tensions growing again along the West-Russia line, the factor of nuclear deterrence is again acquiring key importance. And of course, we are interested in knowing what condition America’s nuclear forces are in, how their condition corresponds to that deliberately ostentatious role superpowers, which senior US officials have never been shy about declaring.

Despite the declared Lately statements by American officials about “reducing reliance on nuclear weapons”, it is still, as evidenced by the “Report on the Strategy for the Use of Nuclear Weapons of the United States of America” sent to the American Congress in June 2013 by the US Secretary of Defense. critical role in "ensuring national security USA, their allies and partners."

And in a special fact sheet from the White House accompanying the above report, it is noted that US President Barack Obama has pledged to provide significant investments to modernize the US nuclear arsenal.

According to the State Department, the United States is currently deploying 809 nuclear weapons carriers out of 1015 available. Are in combat readiness 1688 combat blocks. For comparison, in Russia there are 473 carriers out of 894 available, which carry 1400 warheads. In accordance with the current START-3 agreement, by 2018 both countries must reduce their nuclear forces to the following indicators: 800 nuclear weapons carriers must be in service, 700 of which can be deployed at a time, and the total number of nuclear warheads ready for use. should not exceed 1550 units.

So, over the next few years, the United States will have to write off and dispose of a fairly large number of nuclear warheads, aircraft and missiles. Moreover, such a reduction should hit hard on delivery vehicles: by 2018, the United States will be forced to decommission about 20% available carriers of nuclear weapons. The reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, in turn, will occur on a smaller scale.

At the time of the beginning of the transformation, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States had a fairly large number of warheads and their delivery vehicles. In accordance with the agreement in force at that time START-1(signed in 1991), in US service were 1238 carriers and almost 6000 nuclear charges.

Current agreement START-3 has much more rigid boundaries. Thus, the permissible number of deployed warheads is approximately 4 times less than what was allowed by the START-1 treaty. In this regard, over the past 12 years, the American command has had to decide how exactly and at the expense of which component of the nuclear triad to carry out the reduction.

Using its right to independently decide quantitative and qualitative issues regarding the state of its nuclear forces, the United States has already determined what its nuclear shield will look like by 2018. According to available data, the main means of delivery will remain ballistic missiles located in silo launchers.

By the specified date, the United States intends to keep on duty 400 product models LGM-30G Minuteman-III. 12 type strategic submarines Ohio will carry 240 UGM-133A Trident-II missiles. It is planned to reduce their ammunition load from 24 missiles to 20. Finally, the aviation part of the nuclear triad will remain 44 a B-52H bomber and 16 B-2s. As a result, about 700 media will be deployed simultaneously.

And everything seems to be fine. If not for one “but”. Nuclear weapons in the USA, everything down to the last warhead, were produced... back during the Cold War, that is before 1991 when the Soviet Union existed!

According to available information, over the past 25 years, the United States has not produced a single (!) new nuclear warhead, which cannot but have a corresponding impact on the capabilities of the nuclear triad, since such products can lose their quality during long-term storage.

It is also necessary to remember that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the American military and designers, believing that the United States would henceforth never have an adversary equal to the USSR, and that Russia had forever left the orbit of a superpower, did not pay due attention to the development of new nuclear weapons carriers .

Moreover, the production of the main strategic bombers of the US Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress ended half a century ago, and the latest generation bombers Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit were built in a series of only 21 units, which, of course, cannot be considered a striking force.

So: last nuclear warhead was manufactured in the USA back in 1991. And that’s all, in America they decided that from now on nuclear weapons are a thing of the past, and now the “nuclear club”, created as a counterbalance to the USSR, is no longer needed...

By the way, it is also worth noting that the latest nuclear tests in the United States were carried out in 1992 year. And this despite the fact that the average age of an American nuclear warhead is more than 30 years, that is, many of them were produced and deployed before Reagan’s presidency. Who can guarantee that these warheads are still capable of doing what they were designed to do? No one can give such a guarantee for the current US nuclear triad...

A nuclear or thermonuclear “bomb” is an extremely complex product that requires careful and constant maintenance. In the warhead of a nuclear charge, radioactive fissile materials constantly decay, as a result of which the content of active material decreases. Worse yet– the radiation released in this case (in the hard spectrum) leads to serious degradation of the remaining components of the system, from fuses to electronics.

There is another serious problem in the US nuclear industry that they prefer not to talk about. Scientists nuclear weapons specialists are aging and retiring at a rate that alarms the Pentagon. Already by 2008, more than half of nuclear specialists in the US national nuclear laboratories were over 50 years old (in 2015 - 75%, and more than 50% were over 60 years old), and among those under fifty, there were very few competent specialists. And where will they come from if nuclear charges and warheads have not been produced for more than 25 years - and new ones have not been designed for more than three decades?!

Recently, the government was forced to remove all fissionable materials from the Los Alamos laboratory - they were stored there in unsuitable conditions, and some of the materials disappeared altogether in an unknown direction. And recently, a congressional commission unveiled another most unpleasant fact for the Pentagon: the United States no longer has the technological capabilities, as well as the factory capacity, to produce some elements for warheads. It has gotten to the point where older charges serve as a source of spare parts to keep others in some working condition.

American nuclear weapons delivery systems are also far from young. The last B-52, which forms the backbone of US strategic aviation, it’s funny to say, was put into service during Cuban missile crisis(!), more 50 years(!) back. They no longer produce engines or spare parts - to maintain at least some of the machines in good condition, aviation technicians dismantle decommissioned bombers for spare parts. There was even a project to convert the B-52 to fit the engines and part of the avionics from the civilian Boeing 747 - but this too was eventually written off as “scrap”; connecting the civilian and military platforms together turned out to be an unsolvable matter.

The United States had high hopes for the B-1B supersonic bomber - but the development of air defense systems made it a pointless target even before deployment in Air Force units, and now they, for the most part, rust uselessly in parking lots.

Then the United States decided to rely on a stealth bomber B-2 Spirit- however, their price (more than $2 billion per unit) turned out to be unaffordable even for the US military budget. And most importantly, after the collapse of the USSR, the then newest MiG-29 fighters with the N-019 radar were delivered to the USA from the former GDR, and during tests it turned out that their radars normally detect “invisible” B-2s even against the background of the ground. This allowed us to assume that the newer MiG-31 and Su-27 radars are also capable of selecting such a target, and at a much greater range and with greater accuracy. In other words, “invisibility” turned out to be nothing more than that, and the Pentagon became unclear: why pay 2.5 billion for such aircraft. As a result, the Spirit project was closed, and now only American propaganda has plans for this machine, still trying to present it as one of the pinnacles of American achievements and the overseas military-industrial complex.

What we have as a result: nuclear triad, despite the cheerful and full of optimism statements by high-ranking officials of the Pentagon and the White House, the United States is in a deplorable state - and there is a tendency to exclusively deteriorate. Nuclear warheads and charges are becoming obsolete morally and physically, scientists and engineers are retiring, and there is no equivalent replacement for them; the means of delivering charges, this applies to the entire nuclear “triad,” no longer meet modern requirements - and more and more every year. The funding included in the military budget is not enough even to maintain the current, very deplorable state of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. What can we say about new ones? technical solutions ahead of their time - this has not been discussed for a long time. How much longer in this situation can America remain in reality, and not on paper, nuclear power? Ten years? Twenty? Hardly that long...

Real condition armed forces USA. NuclearweaponAndtechnique

Daily Show "US Nuclear Arsenal"

More details and a variety of information about events taking place in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of our beautiful planet can be obtained at Internet Conferences, constantly held on the site. All Conferences are open and completely free. We invite everyone interested...

At the latest televised debate, Republican candidate and businessman Donald Trump said Russia was “expanding its nuclear forces,” adding that “they have much newer capabilities than we do.”

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, founder of Arms Control Wonk, refutes this statement - “although Russia has been updating its missiles and warheads recently, this statement about Russian capabilities is not true.”

On paper, new, more sophisticated and terrifying weapons include Russia's nuclear arsenal. The Russian RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile, developed in the mid-2000s, can hit anything in the US, with some reports suggesting there are ten self-guided nuclear warheads.

Ten of these launched warheads will return to the earth's atmosphere at supersonic speeds, about 5 miles per second. China has developed similar platforms and the United States simply does not have the ability to defend itself against such destructive nuclear weapons.

By comparison, the US Minuteman III ICBM enters the atmosphere at supersonic speeds, but carries only a single warhead and was produced back in the 1970s. The question of who is better is more philosophical than a direct comparison of capabilities.

Professor Lewis says US Strategic Command leaders, who manage the US nuclear arsenal, have been surveyed for decades saying if given a choice between US and Russian weapons, they would choose their own missiles and nuclear weapons every time.

In an interview with Business Insider, Lewis says the US arsenal, while lacking the capacity to devastate an entire continent, is much better suited to US strategic needs.

Russian and American arsenals

“The Russians used a different design solution in the design of ICBMs than we did.” states the professor - “Russia has built nuclear weapons with increasing dynamics of modernization,” or, in other words, these weapons will need to be updated every ten years.

On the other hand, “US nuclear weapons are beautiful, complex and designed for high performance. Experts say the plutonium core will last for 100 years. Moreover, the US stockpile of Minuteman III ICBMs, despite their age, are advanced systems.

“Russia's nuclear weapons are new, but they reflect their design philosophy, which says 'there's no reason to build perfect because we'll just upgrade in 10 years.'

"The Russians like to mount missiles on trucks," Lewis said, while the US prefers ground-based silos, which offer precise targeting and no mobility. During the height of the Cold War, the United States at one point tried to adapt ICBMs to trucks, but the US requirements for the safety and durability of weapons far exceeded Russian requirements.

The US can't produce systems like the Russians because we're not going to put missiles on a cheap truck,' argues Professor Lewis. Russian philosophy relies on tricks to eliminate the threat, trying to invest less money.

“The US is investing and developing robust systems that will actually provide protection,” Lewis explained. This is the main difference between American and Russian developments.

"The sergeants are the core American army, compared to Russia, where the main forces are still conscripts. The US prefers precision over destructive potential.”

“We love precision,” Lewis says. For the United States, the ideal nuclear weapon is a tiny nuclear charge that will fly right through the window and blow up a building. ‘And the Russians prefer to launch 10 warheads not only on the building, but on the entire city.

A clear example of this is the air campaign in Syria, as a result of which the Russians were accused of using cluster bombs, incendiary munitions and bombing hospitals and refugee camps. This careless and cruel attitude is a defining feature of the Russian military.

Another example is the Russian Status 6 torpedo, which can travel at 100 knots at a range of 6,200 miles and can not only produce nuclear explosion, but also leave behind a radioactive field for the coming years. The US does not welcome this kind of destruction.

How the United States plans to maintain Russia's nuclear power.

Professor Lewis explained that the US really cannot defend itself against Russia and the most advanced nuclear weapons. Russian nuclear ICBMs will fly into orbit, deploy, separate into warheads, and detonate individual targets while traveling at Mach 23. The US simply cannot develop a system that would destroy ten of these nuclear warheads hurtling towards the US at incredible speeds.

One of possible solutions It would be to destroy the missiles before they leave the atmosphere, which would mean shooting them down over Russia, which could also lead to other problems. Another option would be to destroy the missiles from satellites in space, but according to Lewis, the US would then have to increase satellite launches by 12 times before they have enough space assets to defend the US.

Instead of wasting time, trillions of dollars and escalating the arms race, the United States is relying on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Lewis also explained that during the days of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the United States was puzzled about how to raise its nuclear arsenal. The Kennedy administration decided to build enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union if necessary. The administration called the doctrine “assured destruction,” but critics noted that the nuclear agreement would work both ways, so a better name would be “mutually assured destruction,” which was contrary to Kennedy's policy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin once said that Russia could destroy the United States in ‘half an hour or less’ using its nuclear weapons. But the fact is that the Minutemen III missiles will blow up the Kremlin seconds later.

The US believes that it is more reliable to have a nuclear triad available at any time. Submarines, land-based silos and bombers all have nuclear missiles. No attack from Russia could neutralize all three weapons simultaneously.

Accurate, expertly controlled nuclear weapons provide a credible deterrent for the United States without putting billions of lives at risk.

The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of “possibility of possibilities”. This concept is based on the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts in relation to the United States, uncertain in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will focus its military attention on how to fight, and not on who and when the enemy will be. Accordingly, the US military is tasked with having the power to not only counter the wide range of military threats and military capabilities that any potential adversary may possess, but also to ensure victory in any military conflict. Based on this goal, the United States is taking measures to long-term maintain its nuclear forces in combat-ready condition and improve them. The United States is the only nuclear power that has nuclear weapons on foreign soil.

Currently, nuclear weapons are available in two branches of the US armed forces - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).

The Air Force is armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman-3 with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and nuclear bombs free fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.

The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​equipped with MIRVs, and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

To equip these carriers, the US nuclear arsenal has nuclear munitions (NFM), produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (updated) during the refurbishment process in the late 1990s - early 2000s:

– four types of multiple warheads: for ICBMs – Mk-12A (with a W78 nuclear charge) and Mk-21 (with a W87 nuclear charge), for SLBMs – Mk-4 (with a W76 nuclear charge) and its upgraded version Mk-4A (with W76-1 nuclear charge) and Mk-5 (with W88 nuclear charge);
- two types of warheads of air-launched strategic cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a W80-1 nuclear charge and one type of sea-launched non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahawk" with a nuclear warhead W80-0 (ground-based missiles BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty RIAC, their YaZ W84 are mothballed);
- two types of strategic air bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical air bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).

The Mk-12 warheads with W62 nuclear weapons that were in the active arsenal were completely disposed of in mid-August 2010.

All of these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the B61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts, due to its increased ability to penetrate the ground, consider as a third generation nuclear warhead.

The modern US nuclear arsenal is divided into categories according to the state of readiness for use of its nuclear warheads:

The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers or located at weapons storage facilities at air bases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called “operational deployed”.

The second category is nuclear warheads that are in “operational storage” mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) to missiles and aircraft. According to American terminology, these nuclear warheads are classified as “operational reserve” and are intended for “operational additional deployment.” Essentially they can be considered as "return potential".

The fourth category is backup nuclear warheads placed in “long-term storage” mode. They are stored (mainly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with limited service life - the tritium containing components and neutron generators have been removed. Therefore, transferring these nuclear warheads into the “active arsenal” is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace the nuclear warheads of the active arsenal (of similar, similar types) in the event that massive failures (defects) are suddenly discovered in them; this is a kind of “safety reserve”.

The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Pantex plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).

An analysis of publicly published data on the types of nuclear warheads included in the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that nuclear warheads B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), nuclear warhead W76 - as binary charges with gas (thermonuclear ) boost (BF), and W88 as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). In this case, the nuclear weapons of aircraft bombs and cruise missiles belong to charges of variable power (V), and the nuclear weapons of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of similar nuclear weapons having different powers (DV).

American scientific and technical sources provide the following possible ways to change power:

– dosing of the deuterium-tritium mixture when feeding it into the primary unit;
– change in the release time (in relation to the time process of compression of the fissile material) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
– mechanical blocking of X-ray radiation from the primary node to the secondary node compartment (in fact, exclusion of the secondary node from the process of a nuclear explosion).

The charges of all types of aircraft bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1) use explosives that have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In other types of nuclear weapons (W76, W78 and W88), for reasons related to the need to ensure low mass and dimensions of their nuclear weapons while maintaining sufficient high power, explosives with a higher detonation speed and explosion energy continue to be used.

Currently, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types, ensuring their safety and excluding unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various types of emergency situations that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, aerial bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads during their storage, maintenance and transportation.

These include mechanical safety and arming devices (MSAD), code locking devices (PAL).

Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, lettered A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionality and design.

To enter codes into PAL installed inside the nuclear power supply, special electronic remote controls are used. PAL enclosures have increased protection from mechanical influences and are located in the nuclear power supply in such a way as to make them difficult to access.

In some nuclear warheads, for example, with W80 nuclear warheads, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed, which allows arming and (or) switching of nuclear warhead power upon command from the aircraft in flight.

In nuclear aerial bombs Aircraft monitoring and control (AMAC) systems are used, which include equipment installed in the aircraft (with the exception of the B-1 bomber) capable of monitoring and controlling systems and components that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to activate the control unit (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft immediately before dropping the bomb.

The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their incapacitation (SWS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first variants of the SHS were devices that were capable of disabling individual internal components of the nuclear warhead upon command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of persons from the nuclear warhead maintenance personnel who had the appropriate authority and were located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it became clear that the attackers (terrorists) may gain unauthorized access to it or seize it.

Subsequently, SHS were developed that are automatically triggered when there is an attempt of unauthorized actions with a nuclear warhead, primarily upon penetration into it or penetration into a special “sensitive” container in which a nuclear warhead equipped with an SHS is located.

Specific implementations of SHS are known that make it possible to ensure partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads upon command from the outside, partial decommissioning by means of explosive destruction, and a number of others.

To ensure safety and security from unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant pit shells (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitive high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), providing increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disable systems (Command Disable System - CDS), devices to protect against unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nevertheless, general level The safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, as some American experts believe, does not yet fully correspond to modern technical capabilities; seven of the eight types of nuclear charges in the existing US arsenal are not fully provided with all of the above set of safety and protection measures.

In the absence of nuclear tests, the most important task is to ensure control and develop measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads that have been in operation for a long time, which exceeds the initially determined warranty periods. In the USA, this problem is solved with the help of the nuclear arsenal maintenance program (Stockpile Stewardship Program - SSP), operating since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), within the framework of which nuclear components of nuclear warheads requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the original technical specifications and specifications, and non-nuclear components are being modernized and replacing those nuclear warhead components that have expired their warranty service life.

Nuclear safety equipment is tested for signs of actual or suspected aging by the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of the five Engineering Campaign companies. The company regularly monitors the arsenal's nuclear warheads by carefully inspecting 11 nuclear warheads of each type each year, looking for corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely disassembled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using data obtained from regular monitoring through the SSP program, UD problems are identified and addressed through LEP programs. In this case, the main goal is to “increase the lifespan of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components in the arsenal by at least 20 years, with an ultimate goal of 30 years” in addition to the original expected service life. These terms are determined based on an analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental research on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of components and devices, as well as generalization of data obtained during the implementation of the SSP program for the main components of the nuclear power supply by determining the so-called failure function, which characterizes the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of the nuclear power supply.

The possible service life of nuclear charges is determined primarily by the service life of plutonium initiators (pits). In the USA, in order to resolve the issue regarding the possible lifespan of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads included in the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and used to assess changes in the properties of Pu-239 over time, characterizing the process of its aging. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of data obtained during full-scale testing and a study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested under the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of accelerated aging experiments and computer modeling of processes , occurring during its aging.

Based on the results of the research, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which allow us to assume that nuclear reactors remain operational for 45-60 years from the date of production of the plutonium used in them.

The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to retain in its nuclear arsenal for quite a long time the types of nuclear warheads discussed above, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which have subsequently undergone modernization, and to ensure a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without nuclear testing .