Combat use of t 90 in Chechnya. The lessons of the mountains, the lessons of local conflicts. Shooting well is not just shooting well

Representatives of the Russian defense industry insist on the need to purchase the T-90 tank, the generals have doubts. The escalation of mutual accusations reached the terms "enemies of the state" and "saboteurs".

The scandalous statement by the commander of the ground forces about the qualities of the T-90 tank raised a wave of disputes about the future of both the Russian defense industry and the army. The negative assessment of the T-90 tank by the commander of the ground forces, Colonel General Alexei Postnikov, caused sharp comments from manufacturers of domestic equipment. Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky, a former tanker who ended his service in the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, believes that such statements are made, if not from malicious intent, then from incompetence. But the track record of Alexei Postnikov, behind whom, for example, served as chief of staff of the famous Taman division, makes one pay close attention to the words of the general. Why is the Russian military criticizing the latest Russian tank?

Pedigree T-90

Three Leopards for T-90 The commander of the ground forces, Alexei Postnikov, speaking at the Federation Council on March 15, said: “The samples of weapons and military equipment that we receive according to the nomenclature of the Ground Forces, including armored vehicles, rocket and artillery weapons, do not yet fully correspond to Western models.” He cited the T-90S main battle tank as an example. “The vaunted T-90S is the seventeenth modification of the T-72 tank at a price of 118 million. For this money, you can buy three Leopards.

Domestic tank building reached its peak in the mid-60s of the twentieth century. It was then that the T-64 was adopted, which became the basis for numerous modifications and changed the ideas that had developed in military science about the use of armored vehicles. The T-64A, which received a 125-mm cannon, sent the division into heavy, medium and light tanks into the past and became the world's first main battle tank. This machine combined firepower, mobility and protection and was at one time the most advanced tank in the world.

The T-72 was created at the Uralvagonzavod enterprise by installing a more powerful engine and a perfect automatic loader on the T-64. With later changes to the design of protection, surveillance and fire control systems, the T-72 became the most massive tank of the last quarter of the 20th century - more than 30 thousand vehicles were produced in total.

The modernization of the T-64 to install a gas turbine engine led to the creation of the T-80, which further improvements turned into the Ukrainian T-84 Oplot. And the deep modernization of the T-72 turned it into the T-90, which is now considered the most modern Russian tank (not counting promising developments that have not yet been adopted for service).

The modernized best tank in the world of the 60s is forced to compete with the machines, the development of which began a decade later. Modern equipment installed on the descendants of the T-64 cannot eliminate the layout flaws. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, believes that Western achievements in tank building should not be rejected, they should be integrated and used. “The Ministry of Defense should solve the problems of protecting the country,” the expert says, “there is no hope for export contracts in the near future, the industry should not quarrel with the Ministry of Defense.”

T-90 against relatives

The T-90 tank is one of the products that domestic enterprises are trying to actively sell on the global arms market. Currently, export modifications of the T-90 are supplied to India and Algeria. India has established a licensed assembly of the T-90; under the terms of the contract, more than 1,000 vehicles will be produced in this country.

Experts doubt the successful fulfillment of contractual obligations by Algeria against the backdrop of political unrest and the resulting economic crisis. In India, the T-90 also had problems, and they are associated with lobbying for a local development - the Arjun tank. The Indian tank is not objectively superior to the T-90, but it is a local development, and the Indian information campaign aimed at discrediting the T-90 is gaining momentum.

The T-90 has even more competitors on the world market. The closest competitors in terms of price / quality ratio are the Ukrainian T-84 Oplot and the Chinese VT1A (which is the result of the refinement of the same T-72). Ukrainians declared themselves on the world tank market back in the mid-90s, supplying Pakistan with 320 T-80UD. Russia then refused to cooperate with its neighbors, who at that time did not produce tank guns. Having mastered the production of barrels on their own, the Ukrainians fulfilled the Pakistani contract, and with the proceeds they developed their own T-84, which, in direct competition with the T-90, won a tender to supply 200 tanks to Thailand.

The Chinese have not yet met with the T-90 in a direct competition, but have already been able to sign a contract with Morocco for the supply of 150 vehicles.

T-90 against strangers - advantages and disadvantages

Most often, the T-90 is compared with the main battle tanks produced by technologically advanced countries - M1 Abrams (USA), Leopard 2 (Germany), Leclerc (France), Challenger 2 (UK) and with a series of Israeli Merkava tanks.

German, British and American vehicles have similar layout and design solutions, so the T-90 can be compared with three tanks at once.

The most striking advantages of the Russian machine are its lower weight and dimensions, which make it possible to easily transport the T-90 on railway platforms along general railway lines; the ability to overcome deeper water barriers; smaller crew due to the automatic loader used instead of the loader, due to which the amount of armored space is reduced; smaller longitudinal and cross-sectional area, reducing the likelihood of a hit. A well-known advantage of the T-90 is also the ability to launch guided anti-tank missiles with the help of a standard gun, capable of hitting targets at a distance of 5 km (against 2.5 km, from which Western competitors are able to open fire).

The disadvantages of the T-90 are low survivability due to insufficient overlap with dynamic protection elements and the location of fuel tanks and ammunition in the same volume as the crew; an outdated manual transmission, designed for the less powerful engine and lighter weight of the T-64, working at the limit and making the tank uncomfortable to drive; outdated and less effective fire control system.

The Nizhny Tagil designers managed to solve the problem of insufficient overlapping of the frontal armor of the turret with dynamic protection elements on the export T-90S and T-90 SU, where there are no searchlights of the optical-electronic jamming system. The Russian ground forces receive a tank with the elements of dynamic protection removed, the place of which was taken by electronic components. The Russian military is annoyed by such a design decision, especially against the backdrop of the example of the Ukrainian T-84, in which searchlights are installed on top of dynamic protection units, on outriggers.

Separately, it is worth noting the Leclerc and tanks of the Merkava family. The French developers have moved away from the canons of the Western tank building school and took into account the experience of our designers. Leclerc also has an automatic loader, a crew of three, low weight and high mobility. But their own design developments in new directions without a lack of experience, the use of high-tech modern electronic systems made the tank too expensive and not reliable enough, which reduced France's chances of selling tanks to foreign customers.

Merkava is an exception to all the rules and a departure from the norms of world tank building. The development of the tank was headed not by an engineer, but by a tanker who had experience in fighting in urban conditions. The result was a heavy, well-defended fortress, specially designed to fight against urban guerrillas. At the same time, experts question the effectiveness of the Merkava in a battle against a modern army. At the Paris exhibition in 2010, representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, headed by Deputy Minister Vladimir Popovkin, showed interest in the car, for which they made a separate presentation.

Is the Department of Defense itself to blame?

Experts believe that the reason why the T-90 cannot be brought up to modern requirements is both the position of the Russian military and the attitude of the government towards the purchase of weapons.

“There are no clear and precise tasks for industry from the Ministry of Defense,” Viktor Murakhovsky believes, “the approved armament program, designed for ten years, involves funding in the amount of 20 trillion rubles, which leaves an average of two trillion a year. In 2011, 580 billion were allocated, which is 3.5 times less than those provided for by the program. That is, the program is already breaking down.”

According to the expert, out of the 580 billion rubles envisaged for the current year, the Ministry of Defense signed contracts for only 300, and not all of this money went into industry. Factories are forced to take out loans in order to pay wages to people and retain specialists.

“Nizhny Tagil is a single-industry town in which Uralvagonzavod is a city-forming enterprise,” says Alexei Bagaryakov, State Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, “how can people survive if the state does not finance such enterprises? The people in the Urals are harsh, they can even lift them on a pitchfork. Serdyukov (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. - website) should have fired the general for such statements.

It is known that the Ministry of Defense insists on financing a deep modernization of old T-72s. The developed set of measures for reworking an old tank turns it into a "Slingshot" product, bringing it almost to the level of modern tanks. Thousands of T-72s in service with the ground forces need to be upgraded, and the Russian military prefers to spend money on upgrades. Representatives of Uralvagonzavod do not deny the need to refine the T-72, but insist on the primary need to finance the purchase of the T-90.

Another reason for the resistance of the military to signing a contract for the purchase of the T-90 is the fact that the new machine does not have the necessary changes. Representatives of the plant say that all the necessary developments have been carried out, and the money from the sale of the tank will be spent on eliminating the shortcomings of the T-90. But the tank that is now being sold to the troops does not have the necessary modifications, such as a hydrostatic transmission, a new fire control system and the removal of ammunition into separate armored capsules that protect the crew in the event of an explosion.

Of course, during the Second Chechen campaign, there were no T-90s on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. I already wrote about this in my comments on. And of course, the T-90S of the first batch of the "Indian" contract could in no way be used there. Just because the contract was signed on February 15, 2001, the shipment of the first batch of cars under it took place in December of the same year. Yes, taking into account the backlog, to assemble, send to Chechnya, return it back, put it in order and send the car to the customer in 10-11 months then, with completely destroyed cooperation, it was simply impossible. Yes, and as we all remember, the fighting in Dagestan was carried out in August-September 1999, and by the time the contract was signed with India, V.V. Putin had already decided to curtail the operation and reduce the size of the group. Thus, the "Indian" T-90S simply did not have time for that war, with all their desire. However, I vaguely recall a chronicle on TV, where, after a breakthrough from the besieged Grozny, the gang of S. Raduev, BMR-3M cleared the famous minefield. I clearly remember the car hung with DZ "Contact", although representatives of UVZ and UKBTM in private conversations assure me that I was mistaken and it was probably the Ataman BMR-3. Maybe - I do not insist, although I am internally sure that I am right. At the same time, in Chechnya, single copies of the BMP-3 equipped with remote sensing equipment from the Research Institute of Steel and BRM-3 "Lynx" were tested. I am sure of this because in July 2000, after Putin’s famous “wet in the toilet”, these two cars were delivered directly from the combat area to the FSUE NTIIM training ground, in which at that moment I had the pleasure of working, for display at the first exhibition weapons REA-2000. Before the show, these machines were strenuously pointed marafet. Perhaps in Chechnya there was also a BMP-3 with KAZ "Arena", also on an experimental run. However, the only instance of this car arrived at the exhibition already in the "ceremonial" color. This is about the Second Campaign. But for the tragic First Chechen War, and the participation of the T-90 in it, albeit in a single copy, I will not so categorically assert the impossibility of the event. There are two, albeit very indirect, reasons for this:

1. Under the glass of the showcase of the museum of armored vehicles "Uralvagonzavod" there is an interesting document issued in the name of one of the UVZ test drivers - a certificate of approximately two weeks of participation in hostilities in June 1996 on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

Unfortunately, the museum staff does not comment on this document.

2. I have at my disposal a photocopy of the document "Proposals for improving the T-90 tank, taking into account the existing backlog and comments identified during the events in the Chechen Republic."

This document was signed by V.I. Potkin, chief designer of FSUE "UKBTM", and, later, served as the basis for the formulation of the TTZ and the opening of the "Slingshot-1" design and development work (stage 1) to create an improved version of the T-90 tank - the T-tank 92. For reference, the index "T-92" was spelled out directly and clearly in the TTZ: "... create a T-92 tank" - in the design bureau documentation this vehicle was referred to as "Object 189".

So, based on these two, I repeat, very indirect , documents, you can expect short term stay in the combat zone on the territory of the Chechen Republic during The first company in 1996 a single copy tank T-90, the crew of which is possible partly composed of civilian workers manufacturer, i.e. Uralvagonzavod.

Many are interested in the question of the combat effectiveness of the latest Russian tanks in comparison with foreign counterparts. In particular, what are the capabilities of the tank T-90 vs American?

It should be understood that the situation when two tanks converge on the battlefield, like two knights clad in armor, in a fair duel, is becoming less and less common in modern hostilities. Today, in order to survive, a tank must be ready to fight a variety of opponents - from infantry armed with anti-tank missiles to combat aircraft and helicopters. However, some tanks are constantly compared with others.

Some experts believe that a general theoretical comparison of tanks is impossible, and even actual combat does not provide a definitive answer. It is necessary to take into account the tactics of use, crew training, maintenance of equipment, the interaction of units - all this is often more important than the technical properties of the tank itself.

As for, there is no reliable data on their participation in hostilities. Despite the statements of some authors, most likely there were no T-90s during both the First and Second Chechen campaigns on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. It is believed that in August 2008, T-90 tanks took part in the fighting in South Ossetia as part of the 58th Army during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In particular, T-90s were seen during the withdrawal of Russian troops from Gori (Georgia). But in the absence of documentary evidence, this cannot be categorically asserted, because. outwardly, the T-90 is very similar to the T-72B with dynamic protection "Contact", which can cause an error in their "identification".

Not so long ago, the NTV television company aired a program comparing the T-90S and the main tank of the US armed forces, the M1 Abrams. After analyzing the main characteristics of the two combat vehicles, the authors of the program came to the conclusion that the T-90S is clearly superior to the Abrams. Naturally, Western analysts have a completely opposite opinion. For example, Dean Lockwood, weapons systems analyst at Forecast International, notes: “Speaking of the T-90 family, we are actually talking about the chassis from the T-72 and the updated turret and artillery system from the T-80. The T-72 tank was produced in large numbers, the results of its combat use are not particularly impressive, and the T-80 has very limited combat experience. To call the T-90S the best tank in the world is a clear exaggeration. The T-72 was used by Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003, when it was also considered one of the best examples of armored vehicles. But the war showed that it could not stand comparison with the American M1 Abrams and the British Challenger. "Abrams" and "Challenger" could destroy the T-72, remaining out of reach for him. The T-90 has a number of improvements, but it is definitely not a technological breakthrough.”

Let's also try to make some generalizations based on the known characteristics of the Russian T-90 and the American Abrams.

T-90 VS ABRAMS: COMPARISON OF DESIGN AND PROTECTION

First of all, it should be taken into account that the T-90 tank, developed by UKBTM more than 20 years ago and essentially being a deep modernization of the T-72, itself has many modifications: T-90 (model 1992) T-90 "Bhishma", T-90SA , T-90A (sample 2004), T-90AM, T-90SM, which differ significantly from each other both constructively and in terms of combat effectiveness.

The same applies to the American "Abrams", which entered service in 1980. There were its modifications: M1 (with a 105-mm cannon), M1A1, M1A1NE (with "heavy armor"), M1A2, M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program), M1A1 / A2 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit). Moreover, for example, the innovations introduced on the modification of the M1A2 tank increased its combat effectiveness compared to the M1A1 modification in the offensive by 54%, in defense - by 100%.

For this reason, meticulously comparing millimeters and kilograms makes at least some sense only for very specific modifications released in the same period of time. Therefore, we immediately “bracket” the frankly weaker M1 with a 105-mm cannon, which so far exists only in prototypes of the T-90AM / SM.

First of all, it should be noted that the US and the USSR, and later Russia, took two different approaches to the design of their tanks. It can be seen with the naked eye that the T-90 is significantly smaller than the M1. This was achieved thanks to the refusal of the T-90 from the loader, which requires about 1.7 m of the height of the fighting compartment to work. As a result, restrictions on reducing the height of the tank were removed, and the use of a dense layout made it possible to create a highly protected vehicle with a low silhouette and a small area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe longitudinal and cross section with a relatively low mass. As a result, the booked volume of the T-90 is only 12 cubic meters, and the Abrams is 21. True, you have to pay for everything - and the back side of the dense layout was the crampedness of the crew members, as well as the difficulty of replacing each other's crew members if necessary.

Many will say that since the Abrams is heavier, then it is better protected. But not everything is so clear. The reduction in the internal armored volume on the T-90 called for a reduction in the mass of armor to provide the required level of protection. Due to the smaller dimensions, the frontal projection, which is most likely to be hit, is only 5 sq.m for the T-90, and 6 sq.m for the Abrams. This alone makes the T-90 potentially less vulnerable.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the real security of the T-90 and Abrams due to the high level of secrecy on this issue. However, it is known that the armor of the front of the towers was made according to a similar principle - packages of "reflective sheets" were installed in the pockets of the frontal armor. They provide an increase in anti-cumulative resistance, while resistance against kinetic ammunition deteriorates due to a decrease in the density of the barrier (air gaps between packages).

For the T-90, the "reflective sheets" are made of steel, while for the Abrams, starting with the M1A1HA modification, they were made of depleted uranium. Due to the high density of uranium (19.03 g/cm3), these plates, with an extremely small thickness, ensured the “explosive” nature of the destruction of the cumulative jet.

On the T-90, in addition to the usual armor, a built-in dynamic protection complex was also used, which most of the Abrams modifications do not have, with the exception of the M1 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) with increased security, designed for operations in urban environments.

The dynamic protection "Kontakt-5", installed on the T-90, works both against cumulative weapons and against armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectiles. The complex provides a powerful lateral impulse that allows you to destabilize or destroy the BPO core before it begins to interact with the main armor.

Now, according to the manufacturer, the frontal armor of the T-90A tanks can withstand hits by the most massive Western BOPS-M829A1, MS29A2, DM-33, DM-43. In 1995, as part of a special display in Kubinka, the T-90 was fired upon by 6 shells from another tank from a distance of 150-200 m. They fired modern Russian HEAT shells. The frontal armor was not pierced, moreover, after the shelling, the car was able to return to the observation deck under its own power.

On the other hand, according to US officials, the frontal armor of the M1A1 also withstood the shelling of 125-mm guns from Iraqi T-72 tanks, although they fired outdated ZBM9 and ZBM12 BOPS, decommissioned in the USSR back in 1973.

WEAPONS COMPARISONAND AMMUNITION

As for the main armament - a tank gun, the Russian T-90 is armed with a 125 mm 2A46M / 2A46M5 smoothbore tank gun, and the American Abrams is armed with a 120 mm (NATO standard) M256 smoothbore tank gun. Despite the difference in caliber, they are close in their characteristics, and the effectiveness of their fire depends significantly on the ammunition used. The T-90 is capable of firing four types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation shells, as well as guided missiles. The standard ammunition load of the Abrams includes only two types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber and cumulative.

BOPS is mainly used to combat tanks. Since the 1990s, Russian tanks have been armed with obsolete Soviet BOPS ZBM-32 and ZBM-44 with a core of uranium and tungsten alloy, respectively. True, more powerful Russian BOPS have recently been developed, which have better characteristics and can fight the frontal armor of almost any Western tank. These include ZBM-44M and ZBM-48 "Lead". However, for their use on the T-90, it is necessary to replace the automatic loader, since the existing conveyor trays of the rotating conveyor are not designed for the use of projectiles with a length of 740 mm.

The main ammunition of "Abrams" is a 120-mm M829A3 round with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile, which was put into service in early 2003 and has high performance.

It is very significant that the T-90 has a "long arm" - the 9K199 "Reflex-M" guided weapon system with an effective firing range of up to 5000 m. This is 2-2.5 times higher than the return fire range of the BPS of any modern tanks, to In addition, unlike BOPS, guided missiles retain unchanged armor penetration at any distance. As a result, the T-90 gets fundamentally new combat capabilities - to win the battle before entering the zone of effective fire of enemy tanks. Simulation of the oncoming battle of tank companies (10 T-90 tanks against 10 M1A1 tanks) showed that, starting firing guided missiles from a range of 5000 m, T-90s manage to hit up to 50-60% of enemy tanks by a range of 2000-2500 m. True, opponents note that this advantage can not be realized on any terrain - for example, in the European theater, the average probable detection range of a tank-type target is only 2.5 km.

In some publications, there is a statement that the T-90 guided weapon system can at the same time perform the functions of an air defense tank. However, this is an exaggeration. The developer declared only the technical feasibility of hitting non-maneuvering low-speed (up to 70 km/h) air targets. Agree, it would be strange to expect an enemy combat helicopter to helpfully hover in one place, waiting for the T-90 to hit it with a guided missile.

"Abrams" does not have a guided weapon system at all.

The disadvantages of the Abrams also include the fact that its standard ammunition load does not contain a high-explosive fragmentation projectile (and this reduces its ability to destroy area targets), while the T-90 ammunition load has an HE shell with the Ainet remote detonation system. But if necessary, Abrams can use the M83DA1 shotgun projectile or its M908 concrete-piercing version. Also, to combat helicopters, an M830A1 shot with an air blast is provided.

The gun on the T-90 works with an automatic loader. This allows you to shoot at a constant high rate of 6-8 shots. per minute (minimum loading cycle - 6.5-7 s) under any driving conditions, while on the Abrams a high rate of fire with a loading cycle of up to 7 seconds (8 rounds / min) is provided only from a standstill or when driving on level ground and largely depends on the physical condition of the loader.

The disadvantages of the A3 scheme include the fact that the ammunition is located directly in the fighting compartment next to the crew, which is not separated from it by anything. On the T-90, the ammunition load of 42 rounds is placed partially in a rotating conveyor A3 under the floor of the fighting compartment - 22 shots, and the remaining 20 are located almost throughout the entire habitable volume of the tank, including the turret. Therefore, when the ammunition detonates, the crew dies, and the tank fails and cannot be restored.

Ammunition tank "Abrame" is also 42 shots, but in accordance with modern Western fashion, it is placed in a fundamentally different way - in separate compartments, equipped with special ejection panels, which are knocked out in the event of a detonation of shells, and the energy of the explosion goes up. In the aft niche of the tower, separated from the fighting compartments by an armored partition, there are 36 shots. Another six shots are in the armored enclosure, between the fighting compartment and the MTO. In the event of a defeat of the ammunition rack, the Abrams remains mobile and, according to the instructions, must immediately leave the danger zone, and then move to the rear for repairs.

POWER PLANTS COMPARISON

T-90 and Abrams are equipped with fundamentally different power plants. T-90A, T-90CA - a 1000-horsepower diesel engine, and "Abrams" - a 1500-horsepower gas turbine, made in one block with an automatic hydromechanical transmission. The engines provide the T-90 and Abrams with a specific power of 21 hp / t and 24 hp / t, respectively. Due to the higher efficiency of a diesel engine compared to a voracious gas turbine, the T-90 has a significantly larger cruising range - 550 km, compared to 350 km for the Abrams.

On the serial T-90, a mechanical transmission with an outdated scheme of the turning mechanism is installed (the role of which is performed by onboard stepped gearboxes). The Abrams has a hydrostatic transmission and turning mechanisms with digital automatic control systems. Accordingly, the maneuverability of the Russian T-90 is lower than that of the Abrams. The disadvantages of the transmission of the T-90 tank include a low reverse speed - 4.8 km / h, while on the Abrams, due to the hydrostatic transmission, reverse movement up to 30 km / h is provided.

The undoubted advantage of the T-90 power plant is its unpretentiousness and high reliability. In any case, during tests in the Indian Thar Desert, no failure of the T-90 engines was noted, while, for example, a brigade of M1A1 tanks (58 units) lost 16 tanks in three days of movement on the sands during Operation Desert Drill. due to engine failure.

When replacing the engine, the T-90 is characterized by a high labor intensity of work, a team of qualified technicians takes 6 hours to do this, and on the American Abrams it takes only 2 hours.

T-90 VS. ABRAMS - OVERALL ASSESSMENT

So, we can conclude that the undoubted advantages of the T-90 compared to the Abrams include: the ability to fire guided missiles at a distance of up to 5 km; a wide range of ammunition, including HE shells (including those with remote detonation and ready-made submunitions); excellent protection, including dynamic protection "Contact-5" and KOEP "Shtora-1"; high rate of fire throughout the battle due to the use of A3; good mobility, high power reserve, great depth of overcome water obstacles; small dimensions; exceptional unpretentiousness and reliability in operation; good combination of "price-quality".

The Abrams also has its own merits: it organizes full-fledged isolation of the crew from the ammunition load; there is an automated combat control system that provides real-time information; reliable protection; high specific power; good maneuverability (including reverse speed up to 30 km/h).

In conclusion, we present the data of the article by VNIItransmash General Director, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences V. Stepanov, which was published in 2012 and is devoted to the analysis of methods for the comparative evaluation of tanks. It estimates the WTU (military-technical level) indicator of the best modern tanks, including the T-90A, T-90MS, M1A2 and M1A2 SEP. The calculation of the WTU is carried out in terms of firepower, security, mobility and operational capabilities and is a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of a given tank relative to some reference tank. The T-90A was chosen as the standard (i.e. its WTU = 1.0). The WTU indicators of the American M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks were 1.0 and 1.32, respectively. For the new T-90MS, the WTU indicator was determined as 1.42. Thus, according to the author, the comparative assessment, taking into account a possible calculation error of 10%, indicates the closeness of the levels of the best modern foreign tanks and T-90A.

In the 1990s, the Russian army became involved in an endless series of new Caucasian wars, in which tanks played, although not decisive, but still quite a noticeable role, although most often they had to operate in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks - in street battles .

We will not go into the political background of the conflict, but will go straight to the description of military operations. The first significant event was the attempt to storm Grozny, undertaken on November 26, 1994 by the forces of the anti-Dudaev opposition. The decisive role in this operation was played by tanks - 35 T-72A, handed over to the oppositionists from the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District. If not for these tanks, then the assault could not have taken place at all, so we can say that it was they who became the key factor, although not in the sense that tank troops play in general army operations. This operation failed miserably, because Dudayev and his entourage turned out to be perfectly informed about all the plans of the opposition. The attacking groups were met with concentrated fire, and only 4 tanks managed to escape from the city, the rest were either destroyed or abandoned by the crews.

T-72B1 of the 2nd Tank Company, 276th Infantry Rifle Regiment before going out to support the assault groups fighting on Noya Bauchidze Street (in the foreground, tank 441 of Sergeant E. Lyapustin). For all the time of the fighting in Grozny, the tank was never hit by an RPG. January 1995

The failure of this attempt to fight “with little bloodshed in a foreign land” prompted the Russian leadership to take more active steps, and on November 29 the Russian Security Council approved a plan for a military operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. In early December, several military groups were created, which were to enter the territory of Chechnya and, if the Dudaevites refused to lay down, take Grozny by storm. A group of 15 battalions was formed in the Mozdok direction, which had about 230 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 40 tanks. A group of 11 battalions with 160 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and 30 tanks advanced from the Vladikavkaz direction. The strongest grouping of 34 battalions, which had about 700 armored vehicles, including more than 100 tanks, advanced from the Kizlyar direction. Already one enumeration of the forces involved shows that a corps-scale operation was carried out.

However, from the very beginning, everything did not go as planned, only it took the troops 16 days instead of 3 according to plan to advance to Grozny. the capture of the city on January 1 at 00.01. As we can see, the rotten tradition of the Russian-Soviet-Russian army to take cities by the red dates of the calendar has not wavered in the last two centuries. Either Plevna is taken from us by the tsar's birthday, then Kyiv - by November 7, Berlin - by May 1, and now a New Year's gift ... "The brother of the people is preparing a birthday cake from the filling for the sovereign brother..." These lines were written in 1877 year, but I'm afraid they are still relevant today.

Combat positions of 324 infantry regiments near the breeding farm at the time of blocking the road to Grozny. The command of the federal troops at the third stage of the assault on the Chechen capital envisaged complete control over the city from the south. February 1995

About 15,000 soldiers of the federal troops were concentrated against the approximately 10,000 militants defending Grozny. They were supported by 230 tanks and 879 light armored vehicles, several hundred guns. However, street battles were coming, where this superiority in technology was largely offset by the positional advantages of the defenders. At the same time, the West continues to remain in unshakable confidence that the Russians have concentrated huge forces to storm Grozny. For example, a study by the Danish Royal Military College categorically states that more than 38,000 soldiers participated in the assault. Of course, everything is seen much better from Copenhagen.

Before the attack on the city, after a heavy battle, the Khankala airport was occupied, but, unfortunately, the command did not draw the proper conclusions based on the results of this battle. It seems that for unknown reasons, the generals counted only on the symbolic resistance of the Dudaevites. The assault on the city was carried out according to an insufficiently developed plan, once again the command did not have reliable communication with its troops, which cost the attackers dearly. In general, in the troops, the plan for a swift throw of mechanized columns to the city center was regarded as a gamble. Subsequent events showed the validity of this assessment.

Spare parts boxes saved the T-72B1 tank from getting a cumulative jet into the engine compartment. Grozny. January 1995

The assault troops were divided into 4 groups according to directions. At 0600, the Sever group launched an offensive. It was in its composition that the 131st Maikop motorized rifle brigade was included. Having lost several tanks and armored personnel carriers, the column nevertheless broke through to the railway station, where the brigade took up all-round defense. The "North-East" group, using a successful diversionary maneuver, broke into the city relatively freely, where they also took up defense. The groups "East" and "West" did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them. At the same time, if the North-East group set up checkpoints along the route, which provided, albeit difficult, but still communication with the rear, then the North and West groups were surrounded.

The worst thing about all this was that it was the Soviet troops who at one time gained a lot of experience in fighting in the city. Königsberg, Breslau, Berlin showed exactly how to act in such cases. But this experience was completely forgotten. And another gross mistake was made - completely unforced, the Russian troops gave the initiative to the enemy. Instead of systematically clearing the city using superior firepower, the assault teams went on the defensive. At one time, a well-known British admiral, who had fought quite a bit himself, said: “Moderation in war is the greatest idiocy. Ruthlessness, tirelessness, perseverance - this is the key to success. All of these principles have been violated.

A grenade from an RPG hitting the T-72B1 commander's cupola from the top floor of the building pierced the armor and hit the tank commander. Grozny. January 1995

As a result, Dudayev got the opportunity to pull his most combat-ready units to the city center and begin to eliminate the encircled groups. The 131st brigade found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which lost all armored vehicles by about 1600 on January 1. At the same time, it should be said that the new generation tanks (T-72 and T-80) showed noticeably better survivability than the tanks that fought in the Middle East in 1973. One hit by an RPG or ATGM projectile was no longer enough to disable it. As a rule, at least 6-7 hits were required, and a record case was recorded when the tank withstood hits of almost 20 shells. The dynamic protection systems worked exceptionally well. But on the other hand, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles turned out to be completely defenseless. The important role played by self-propelled artillery in such battles was again confirmed, since the weight of the 152-mm projectile of the 2SZM Akatsiya self-propelled guns was noticeably larger than that of tank guns, and had a noticeably greater destructive effect when firing at buildings.

After the regrouping and the arrival of reinforcements, the assault continued. There was no mention of any anniversaries. In general, the organized resistance of the militants in Grozny was finally broken only by March 26th. This assault cost the Russian army about 6,000 men killed and wounded. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles, according to the Main Armored Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, amounted to 49 tanks, 132 infantry fighting vehicles, 98 armored personnel carriers. The number of damaged but repaired tanks remains unknown.

One should not think that the battles in Grozny went on continuously for 3 months, they break up into several stages, separated by breaks in official truces and temporary respite. The first phase ended on January 18 after the capture of the presidential palace, when the northern and central parts of the city came under the control of the Russian army. Only after that did the attack on the southern part of Grozny begin, which was carried out with the most powerful artillery support. There were days when our artillery fired up to 30,000 shells at enemy positions. This is how it should have been done from the very beginning.

In August 1996, fighting broke out again in Grozny, although this time it did not last long. On August 6, the militants broke into the city. They did not try to storm the strongholds of the federal troops, but simply isolated them and subjected them to mortar fire, waiting for the surrender of the defenders. However, the energetic actions of the command of the federal troops managed to prevent the worst scenario. Although the fighting was still stubborn, on August 11 a corridor was broken through to the Government House, lifting the siege from this important point. And by August 13, a decisive turning point was reached. Federal troops began to push the enemy in all directions, and the militants began to withdraw from the city. By the time the armistice was signed on August 14, the city was under the control of federal troops. Losses in this case amounted to only 5 tanks, 22 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 armored personnel carriers. We will not even comment on the chatter of some Western newspapers about hundreds of burned tanks.

Captured T-72A tank captured by federal troops from an illegal armed formation during the fighting in Grozny. For the characteristic towers, painted with white lime, these machines were nicknamed "white crows" by the federals. After the repair, the tank was used by the Sever group in the battles on Minutka Square. January 1995

During the Second Chechen War, Grozny had to be stormed once again, but now armored vehicles were used in the minimum required quantities. The assault began on December 11, 1999. This time the main emphasis was placed on artillery and air support for infantry assault groups. As a result, the anti-tank defense system carefully prepared by the militants turned out to be simply useless. The advance of the federal troops was slow, but at the same time they suffered only small losses. A significant role in this operation was played by the TOS-1 multiple rocket launchers. Realizing that they could not oppose anything to such a gradual advance, on January 31, 2000, the militants tried to break out of Grozny under the cover of a snowstorm. They suffered heavy losses, but part of their forces still managed to escape.

T-72B (M) 74 Guards. omsbr, struck by a shot from an RPG in an unprotected gap between the KDZ of the turret shoulder strap and the fender fuel tank (apparently, they tried to hit the tank with a second grenade into the turret shoulder strap already unprotected by the fuel tank). The crew of the tank was killed. January 1995

Panoramic sight broken by a sniper shot. January 1995