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How GRU special forces obtained the secret American Stinger MANPADS. Hero Star for the first Stinger: how it happened Gafar strikes

When in 1986 the United States began supplying Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan mujahideen, the OKSV command promised the title of Hero Soviet Union anyone who captures this complex in good condition. During the years of the Afghan War, Soviet special forces managed to obtain 8(!) serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became Heroes.

"Stinging" for the Mujahideen

Modern fighting unthinkable without aviation. Since the Second World War to the present day, gaining air supremacy has been one of the primary tasks ensuring victory on the ground. However, air supremacy is achieved not only by aviation itself, but also air defense, which neutralizes enemy air forces. In the second half of the 20th century. Anti-aircraft guided missiles are appearing in the air defense arsenal of the world's leading armies. The new one was divided into several classes: long-range, medium-range, short-range anti-aircraft missiles and short-range anti-aircraft missile systems. The main short-range air defense systems, which are tasked with combating helicopters and attack aircraft at low and extremely low altitudes, have become man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems - MANPADS.

Helicopters, which became widespread after World War II, significantly increased the maneuverability of ground and military units. airborne troops in defeating enemy troops in his tactical and operational-tactical rear, pinning the enemy in maneuver, capturing important objects, etc., they have become the most effective means of combating tanks and other small targets. Airmobile actions of infantry units have become a calling card armed conflicts the second half of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, where one of the warring parties, as a rule, are irregular armed formations. The domestic armed forces in our new country encountered such an enemy in Afghanistan in 1979-1989, where Soviet army for the first time it was necessary to conduct a large-scale counter-guerrilla struggle. There could be no question of the effectiveness of combat operations against rebels in the mountains without the use of army and front-line aviation. It was on her shoulders that the entire burden of aviation support for the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) was placed. The Afghan rebels suffered significant losses from air strikes and airmobile actions of infantry units and OKSVA special forces, so the most serious attention was paid to the issue of combating aviation. The armed Afghan opposition constantly increased the air defense fire capabilities of its units. Already by the mid-80s. last century in the arsenal of the rebels there was a sufficient number of short-range anti-aircraft weapons that optimally suited the tactics guerrilla warfare. The main air defense systems of the armed forces of the Afghan opposition were 12.7 mm DShK machine guns, 14.5-mm anti-aircraft mountain mounts ZGU-1, twin anti-aircraft machine gun mounts ZPGU-2, 20 mm and 23 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

MANPADS missile "Stinger"

By the beginning of the 1980s. In the USA, the company "General Dynamics" created the second generation MANPADS "Stinger". Man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems of the second generation have:
an improved IR seeker (infrared homing head), capable of operating at two separated wavelengths;
long-wave IR seeker, providing all-angle guidance of the missile to the target, including from the front hemisphere;
a microprocessor that distinguishes a real target from fired IR traps;
cooled IR homing sensor, allowing the missile to more effectively resist interference and attack low-flying targets;
short reaction time to target;
increased firing range at targets on a collision course;
greater missile guidance accuracy and target hit efficiency compared to first-generation MANPADS;
“friend or foe” identification equipment;
means for automating launch processes and preliminary target designation for gunner operators. The second generation MANPADS also include the Strela-3 and Igla complexes developed in the USSR. The basic version of the FIM-92A Stinger missile was equipped with a single-channel all-angle IR seeker
with a cooled receiver operating in the wavelength range of 4.1-4.4 microns, an efficient propulsion dual-mode solid propellant engine that accelerates the rocket within 6 seconds to a speed of about 700 m/s.

The “Stinger-POST” (POST - Passive Optical Seeker Technology) variant with the FIM-92B missile became the first representative of the third generation MANPADS. The seeker used in the rocket operates in the IR and UV wavelength ranges, which provides high performance for the selection of air targets in conditions of background interference.

Both versions of the Stinger missiles have been used in Afghanistan since 1986.

Of the entire listed arsenal of air defense systems, the most effective for combating low-flying targets, of course, were MANPADS. Unlike anti-aircraft machine guns and guns, they have a long range of effective fire and the probability of hitting high-speed targets, are mobile, easy to use and do not require lengthy preparation of crews. Modern MANPADS are ideal for partisans and reconnaissance units operating behind enemy lines to combat helicopters and low-flying aircraft. The Chinese Hunyin-5 anti-aircraft complex (analogous to the domestic Strela-2 MANPADS) remained the most widespread MANPADS of the Afghan rebels throughout the “Afghan War”. Chinese MANPADS, as well as a small number of similar Egyptian-made SA-7 complexes (Strela-2 MANPADS in NATO terminology) began to enter service with the rebels from the early 80s. Until the mid-80s. they were used by Afghan rebels mainly to cover their targets from air strikes, and were part of the so-called object system Air defense of fortified base areas. However, in 1986, American and Pakistani military advisers and experts supervising Afghan illegal armed groups, having analyzed the dynamics of rebel losses from air strikes and systematic airmobile actions of Soviet special forces and infantry units, decided to increase the combat capabilities of the Mujahideen air defense by supplying them with American Stinger MANPADS. ("Stinging"). With the advent of the Stinger MANPADS among the rebel formations, it became the main weapon of fire when setting up anti-aircraft ambushes near the airfields of army, front-line and military transport aviation of our Air Force in Afghanistan and the government Afghan Air Force.

MANPADS "Strela-2". USSR (“Hunyin-5”. China)

Pentagon and US CIA arming Afghan insurgents anti-aircraft missiles"Stinger" pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. Supplying Afghan rebels modern MANPADS, the Americans “tried” them to supply Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification).

Despite the strictest secrecy, the first reports of funds mass media about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by Pakistani Armed Forces vehicles to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.

Launch of the Stinger MANPADS missile

Gafar strikes

Details of the first use of Stinger MANPADS by Afghan rebels are described by the head of the Afghan department of the Pakistan Intelligence Center (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, in the book “Bear Trap”: “On September 25, 1986, about thirty-five Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, located only one and a half kilometers northeast of the Jalalabad airfield runway... The fire crews were within shouting distance of each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each crew in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held containers with missiles for quick reloading.... Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through an open sight on launcher, the “friend or foe” system signaled with an intermittent signal that an enemy target had appeared in the coverage area, and the “Stinger” captured thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head... When the leading helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Gafar commanded: “Fire "... One of the three missiles did not work and fell without exploding, just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets... Two more missiles went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed... In the following months, he (Gafar) shot down ten more helicopters and planes using Stingers.

Mujahideen of Ghafar to the outskirts of Jalalabad

Combat helicopter Mi-24P

In fact, two rotorcraft of the 335th separate combat helicopter regiment, returning from a combat mission, were shot down over the Jalalabad airfield. While approaching the airfield on the pre-landing straight, the Mi-8MT captain A. Giniyatulin was hit by two Stinger MANPADS missiles and exploded in the air. The crew commander and flight engineer, Lieutenant O. Shebanov, were killed; pilot-navigator Nikolai Gerner was thrown out by the blast wave and survived. The helicopter of Lieutenant E. Pogorely was sent to the Mi-8MT crash area, but at an altitude of 150 m his vehicle was hit by a MANPADS missile. The pilot managed to make a rough landing, as a result of which the helicopter was destroyed. The commander received serious injuries from which he died in the hospital. The remaining crew members survived.

That the rebels used Stinger MANPADS Soviet command I was just guessing. We were able to materially prove the use of Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan only on November 29, 1986. The same group of “Engineer Gafar” staged an anti-aircraft ambush 15 km north of Jalalabad on the slope of Mount Wachhangar (elevation 1423) and as a result of firing with five Stinger missiles The helicopter group destroyed the Mi-24 and Mi-8MT (three missile hits were recorded). The crew of the slave helicopter - Art. Lieutenant V. Ksenzov and Lieutenant A. Neunylov died when they fell under the main rotor during an emergency ejection. The crew of the second helicopter hit by the missile managed to make an emergency landing and leave the burning car. The general from the TurkVO headquarters, who was at that time in the Jalalabad garrison, did not believe the report that two helicopters were hit by anti-aircraft missiles, accusing the pilots of “the helicopters colliding in the air.” It is not known how, but the aviators nevertheless convinced the general that “spirits” were involved in the plane crash. The 2nd alarm was raised motorized rifle battalion 66th separate motorized rifle brigade and 1st company of the 154th separate detachment special purpose. The special forces and infantry were tasked with finding parts of an anti-aircraft missile or other material evidence of the use of MANPADS, otherwise all the blame for the plane crash would have been placed on the surviving crews... Only after a day had passed (the general took a long time to make a decision...) by the morning of November 30 in Search units arrived in the area of the helicopter crash in armored vehicles. There could no longer be any talk of intercepting the enemy. Our company failed to find anything other than burnt fragments of the helicopters and the remains of the crew. The 6th Company of the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, when inspecting the probable missile launch site, quite accurately indicated by the helicopter pilots, discovered three, and then two more starting expulsion charges of the Stinger MANPADS. This was the first material evidence of the United States supplying anti-aircraft missiles to Afghan anti-government armed forces. The company commander who discovered them was presented with the Order of the Red Banner.

Mi-24, hit by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Eastern Afghanistan, 1988

A thorough study of traces of the enemy's presence (one firing position located at the top and one in the lower third of the slope of the ridge) showed that an anti-aircraft ambush had been set up here in advance. The enemy waited for a suitable target and the moment to open fire for one or two days.

Hunt for Gafar

The OKSVA command also organized a hunt for the “Engineer Gafar” anti-aircraft group, whose area of activity was the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangar-har, Laghman and Kunar. It was his group that was battered on November 9, 1986 by a reconnaissance detachment of the 3rd company of the 154 ooSpN (15 obrSpN), destroying several rebels and pack animals 6 km southwest of the village of Mangval in the province of Kunar. The intelligence officers then seized a portable American shortwave radio station, which was supplied to CIA agents. Gafar took revenge immediately. Three days later, from an anti-aircraft ambush 3 km southeast of the village of Mangval (30 km northeast of Jalalabad), a Mi-24 helicopter of the 335th “Jalalabad” helicopter regiment was shot down by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Escorting several Mi-8MTs performing an ambulance flight from Asadabad to the hospital of the Jalalabad garrison, a pair of Mi-24s crossed the ridge at an altitude of 300 m without shooting IR traps. A helicopter shot down by a MANPADS missile fell into a gorge. The commander and pilot-operator left the plane using a parachute from a height of 100 m and were picked up by their comrades. Special forces were sent to search for the flight technician. This time, squeezing the maximum permissible speed out of infantry fighting vehicles, the scouts of 154 ooSpN arrived in the area where the helicopter crashed in less than 2 hours. The 1st company of the detachment dismounted from the “armor” and began to be drawn into the gorge in two columns (along the bottom of the gorge itself and its right ridge) simultaneously with the arriving helicopters of the 335th Airborne Regiment. The helicopters came from the northeast, but the Mujahideen managed to launch MANPADS from the ruins of a village on the northern slope of the gorge to catch up with the leading twenty-four. The “spirits” miscalculated twice: the first time - when launching towards the setting sun, the second time - without finding out that it was not the pair’s trailing helicopter flying behind the lead vehicle (as usual), but four flights of combat Mi-24s. Fortunately, the missile missed the target just slightly. Its self-destructor worked late, and the exploding rocket did not harm the helicopter. Having quickly taken stock of the situation, the pilots launched a massive air strike against the position of the anti-aircraft gunners with sixteen rotary-wing combat vehicles. The aviators did not spare ammunition... The remains of the flight equipment of the station were picked up from the site of the helicopter crash. Lieutenant V. Yakovlev.

At the crash site of the helicopter shot down by the Stinger

The special forces who captured the first Stinger. In the center is Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun.

Fragment of a Mi-24 helicopter

Parachute canopy on the ground

The first Stinger

The first man-portable anti-aircraft missile system "Stinger" was captured by Soviet troops in Afghanistan on January 5, 1987. During aerial reconnaissance In the area of the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun and lieutenant Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th separate special forces detachment (22 special forces) under the overall command of the deputy detachment commander, Major Evgeniy Sergeev, in the vicinity of the village of Seyid Umar Kalai, they noticed three motorcyclists in the Meltakai gorge. Vladimir Kovtun described further actions as follows: “Seeing our helicopters, they quickly dismounted and opened fire with small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS, but at first we mistook these launches for shots from an RPG. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when we left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from grenade launchers.” The twenty-fours covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a battle on the ground.” Helicopters and special forces opened fire on the rebels, destroying them with NURS and small arms fire. Only the leading plane, on which there were only five special forces soldiers, landed on the ground, and the leading Mi-8 with Cheboksarov’s group provided insurance from the air. During the inspection of the destroyed enemy, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovtun seized a launch container, a hardware unit for the Stinger MANPADS and a complete set of technical documentation from the rebel he destroyed. One combat-ready complex, attached to a motorcycle, was captured by captain E. Sergeev, and another empty container and a missile were captured by the group’s reconnaissance officers, who landed from a follower helicopter. During the battle, a group of 16 rebels was destroyed and one was captured. The “spirits” did not have time to take up positions for setting up an anti-aircraft ambush.

MANPADS "Stinger" and its standard closure

Helicopter pilots with special forces on board were several minutes ahead of them. Later, everyone who wanted to become one of the heroes of the day latched on to the glory of helicopter pilots and special forces soldiers. Still, “Special forces captured the Stingers!” - the whole of Afghanistan thundered. Official version the capture of an American MANPADS looked like special operation with the participation of agents who tracked the entire delivery route of the Stingers from the arsenals of the US Army to the village of Seyid Umar Kalai. Naturally, all the “sisters received earrings,” but they forgot about the true participants in the capture of the Stinger, having bought off several orders and medals, but it was promised that whoever captured the Stinger first would receive the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”

The first two Stinger MANPADS captured by special forces of the 186th Special Forces. January 1986

National reconciliation

With the capture of the first American MANPADS, the hunt for the Stinger did not stop. The GRU special forces were tasked with preventing them from saturating the enemy’s armed formations. All winter 1986-1987. Special forces units of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were hunting for Stingers, having the task not so much of preventing their arrival (which was unrealistic), but of preventing their rapid spread throughout Afghanistan. By this time, two special forces brigades (15th and 22nd separate special forces brigades) and the 459th separate company special forces of the 40th combined arms army. However, the special forces did not receive any preferences. January 1987 was marked by an event of “tremendous political importance,” as Soviet newspapers wrote at the time—the beginning of a policy of national reconciliation. Its consequences for OKSVA turned out to be much more destructive than the supply of American anti-aircraft missiles to the armed Afghan opposition. Unilateral reconciliation without taking into account military-political realities limited the active offensive actions of OKSVA.

The firing of two MANPADS missiles at a Mi-8MT helicopter on the first day of national reconciliation on January 16, 1987, on a passenger flight from Kabul to Jalalabad, looked like a mockery. Among the passengers on board the helicopter was the chief of staff of the 177 Special Forces (Ghazni), Major Sergei Kutsov, currently the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, lieutenant general. Without losing his cool, the special forces officer knocked out the flames and helped the other passengers leave the burning side. Only one passenger was unable to use the parachute because she was wearing a skirt and did not wear it...

The one-sided “national reconciliation” was immediately taken advantage of by the armed Afghan opposition, which at that moment, according to American analysts, was “on the brink of disaster.” It was the difficult situation of the rebels that was the main reason for the supply of Stinger MANPADS to them. Beginning in 1986, the airmobile operations of the Soviet special forces, whose units were assigned helicopters, so limited the rebels' ability to supply weapons and ammunition to the interior of Afghanistan that the armed opposition began to create special battle groups to fight our intelligence agencies. But, even well trained and armed, they could not significantly influence combat activities special forces The likelihood of their detection by reconnaissance groups was extremely low, but if this happened, then the clash was fierce. Unfortunately, there is no data on the actions of special rebel groups against Soviet special forces in Afghanistan, but several episodes of military clashes based on the same pattern of enemy actions can be attributed specifically to “anti-special forces” groups.

Soviet special forces, which became a barrier to the movement of “caravans of terror,” were based in the provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan and Iran, but what could the special forces do, whose reconnaissance groups and detachments could cover no more than one kilometer caravan route, or rather, directions. The special forces perceived the “Gorbachev reconciliation” as a stab in the back, limiting their actions in the “reconciliation zones” and in the immediate vicinity of the border, when conducting raids on villages where the rebels were based and their caravans stopped for the day. But still, due to the active actions of the Soviet special forces, by the end of the winter of 1987, the Mujahideen experienced significant difficulties with food and fodder at the “overpopulated” transshipment bases. Although what awaited them in Afghanistan was not hunger, but death on mined paths and in special forces ambushes. In 1987 alone, reconnaissance groups and special forces intercepted 332 caravans with weapons and ammunition, capturing and destroying more than 290 heavy weapons (recoilless rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns), 80 MANPADS (mainly Hunyin -5 and SA- 7), 30 PC launchers, more than 15 thousand anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and about 8 million small arms ammunition. Acting on rebel communications, special forces forced the armed opposition to accumulate most military-technical cargo at transshipment bases in border areas of Afghanistan that are difficult to access for Soviet and Afghan troops. Taking advantage of this, the aviation of the Limited contingent and Air Force Afghanistan began systematically bombing them.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary respite kindly provided to the Afghan opposition by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (then USSR Foreign Minister), the rebels began to intensively increase firepower their formations. It was during this period that the saturation of combat detachments and groups of armed opposition with 107-mm rocket systems, recoilless rifles and mortars was observed. Not only the Stinger, but also the English Blowpipe MANPADS, the Swiss 20-mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft artillery mounts and the Spanish 120-mm mortars are beginning to enter their arsenal. An analysis of the situation in Afghanistan in 1987 indicated that the armed opposition was preparing for decisive actions, for which the Soviet “perestroika”ists, who set a course for the Soviet Union to surrender its international positions, did not have the will.

He was on fire in a helicopter hit by a Stinger missile. Head of the RUVV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General S. Kutsov

Special forces on caravan routes

Limited in carrying out raids and reconnaissance and search operations (raids), Soviet special forces in Afghanistan intensified ambush operations. The rebels paid special attention to ensuring the safety of the caravans, and the scouts had to show great ingenuity when leading to the ambush area, secrecy and endurance in anticipation of the enemy, and in battle - steadfastness and courage. In most combat episodes, the enemy significantly outnumbered the special forces reconnaissance group. In Afghanistan, the effectiveness of special forces actions during ambush operations was 1: 5-6 (reconnaissance officers managed to engage the enemy in one case out of 5-6). According to data published later in the West, the armed opposition managed to deliver 80-90% of the cargo transported by pack caravans and vehicles to its destination. In special forces areas of responsibility, this figure was significantly lower. Subsequent episodes of the capture of the Stinger MANPADS by Soviet special forces occurred precisely during the actions of reconnaissance officers on caravan routes.

On the night of July 16-17, 1987, as a result of an ambush by the reconnaissance group 668 ooSpN (15 arr. SpN) of Lieutenant German Pokhvoshchev, a pack caravan of rebels in the province of Logar was scattered by fire. By the morning, the ambush area was blocked by an armored group of a detachment led by Lieutenant Sergei Klimenko. Fleeing, the rebels threw their loads off their horses and disappeared into the night. As a result of an inspection of the area, two Stinger and two Blowpipe MANPADS were discovered and captured, as well as about a ton of other weapons and ammunition. The British carefully concealed the fact of supplying MANPADS to Afghan illegal armed groups. Now the Soviet government has the opportunity to convict them of supplying anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan armed opposition. However, what was the point in that when more than 90% of the weapons to the Afghan “Mujahideen” were supplied by China, and the Soviet press bashfully kept silent about this fact, “branding shame” on the West. You can guess why - in Afghanistan our soldiers were killed and maimed soviet weapons marked “Made in China”, developed by domestic designers in the 50-50s, the production technology of which was transferred by the Soviet Union to the “great neighbor”.

Landing of the Special Forces RG into a helicopter

Reconnaissance group of Lieutenant V. Matyushin (in top row second from left)

Now it was the rebels’ turn, and they were in no debt to the Soviet troops. In November 1987, two anti-aircraft missiles shot down a Mi-8MT helicopter of 355 obvp, on board which were scouts from 334 ooSpN (15 obrSpN). At 05:55, a pair of Mi-8MTs, under the cover of a pair of Mi-24s, took off from the Asadabad site and went to outpost No. 2 (Lahorsar, level 1864) with a gentle climb. At 06:05, at an altitude of 100 m from the ground, the Mi-8MT transport helicopter was hit by two Stinger MANPADS missiles, after which it caught fire and began to lose altitude. Flight technician Captain A. Gurtov and six passengers were killed in the crashed helicopter. The crew commander left the car in the air, but he did not have enough altitude to open the parachute. Only the pilot-navigator managed to escape, landing with a partially opened parachute canopy on a steep slope of the ridge. Among the dead was the commander of the special forces group, Senior Lieutenant Vadim Matyushin. On this day, the rebels were preparing a massive shelling of the Asadabad garrison, covering the positions of 107-mm multiple launch rocket systems and mortars with crews of MANPADS anti-aircraft gunners. In the winter of 1987-1988. The rebels practically gained air superiority in the vicinity of Asadabad with portable anti-aircraft systems. Before this, the commander of the 334 Special Forces, Major Grigory Bykov, did not allow them to do this, but his replacements did not show strong will and determination... Front-line aviation still attacked rebel positions in the vicinity of Asadabad, but did not act effectively from extreme heights. Helicopters were forced to transport personnel and cargo only at night, and during the day they made only urgent sanitary flights at extremely low altitudes along the Kunar River.

Patrolling the inspection area of the special forces RG by helicopters

However, reconnaissance officers from other special forces units also felt the limitations of using army aviation. The area of their airmobile operations was significantly limited by the safety of army aviation flights. In the current situation, when the authorities demanded “results”, and the capabilities of the intelligence agencies were limited by the directives and instructions of the same authorities, the command of the 154th special forces found a way out of the seemingly deadlock situation. The detachment, thanks to the initiative of its commander, Major Vladimir Vorobyov, and the head of the detachment’s engineering service, Major Vladimir Gorenitsa, began to use complex mining of caravan routes. In fact, reconnaissance officers of the 154th special forces created a reconnaissance and fire complex (ROC) in Afghanistan back in 1987, the creation of which in modern Russian army there is only talk. The main elements of the system of combating rebel caravans, created by the special forces of the “Jalalabad Battalion” on the caravan route Parachnar-Shahidan-Panjshir, were:

Sensors and repeaters of the "Realiya" reconnaissance and signaling equipment (RSA) installed at the borders (seismic, acoustic and radio wave sensors), from which information was received about the composition of the caravans and the presence of ammunition and weapons in them (metal detectors);

Mining lines with radio-controlled minefields and non-contact explosive devices NVU-P “Okhota” (seismic target movement sensors);

Areas where special forces reconnaissance agencies conduct ambushes, adjacent to mining and SAR installation lines. This ensured complete closure of the caravan route, the smallest width of which in the area of crossings across the Kabul River was 2-3 km;

Barrage lines and areas of concentrated artillery fire of outposts guarding the Kabul-Jalalabad highway (122 mm self-propelled howitzers 2S1 “Gvozdika”, in the positions of which the operators of the Realia SAR were located, reading information from the receiving devices).

Area patrol routes accessible to helicopters with special forces inspection teams on board.

The commander of the inspection unit of the Special Forces, Lieutenant S. Lafazan (in the center), who captured the Stinger MANPADS on 02/16/1988.

A combat-ready Stinger MANPADS, captured by reconnaissance officers of the 154th Special Forces in February 1988.

Such a troublesome “management” required constant monitoring and regulation, but the results showed very quickly. The rebels more and more often fell into a trap cleverly arranged by the special forces. Even having in the mountains and nearby villages their observers and informants from among local population, probing every stone and path, they were faced with the constant “presence” of special forces, suffering losses in controlled minefields, from artillery fire and ambushes. Inspection teams in helicopters completed the destruction of scattered pack animals and collected the “result” from caravans crushed by mines and shells. February 16, 1988 inspection reconnaissance group special purpose 154 Special Forces Special Forces Lieutenant Sergei Lafzan discovered 6 km north-west of the village of Shakhidan a group of pack animals destroyed by MON-50 mines of the NVU-P “Hunting” set. During the inspection, intelligence officers seized two boxes with Stinger MANPADS. The peculiarity of NVU-P is that this electronic device identifies the movement of people by ground vibrations and issues a command to sequentially detonate five fragmentation mines OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90 or others.

A few days later, in the same area, scouts from the inspection group of the Jalalabad special forces detachment again captured two Stinger MANPADS. This episode ended the epic of the special forces hunt for the Stinger in Afghanistan. All four cases of its capture by Soviet troops were the work of special forces units and units operationally subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate General Staff USSR Armed Forces.

Since 1988, the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began with... the most combat-ready units that terrified the rebels throughout the “Afghan war” - individual special forces units. For some reason (?) it was the special forces that turned out to be the “weak link” for the Kremlin democrats in Afghanistan... Strange, isn’t it? Having exposed the external borders of Afghanistan, at least somehow covered by Soviet special forces, the short-sighted military-political leadership of the USSR allowed the rebels to increase the flow of military assistance from outside and handed Afghanistan over to them. In February 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from this country was completed, but Najibullah’s government remained in power until 1992. Since this period, the chaos of the civil war reigned in the country, and the Stingers provided by the Americans began to spread among terrorist organizations around the world.

It is unlikely that the Stingers themselves played a decisive role in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, as is sometimes imagined in the West. Its reasons lie in the political miscalculations of the latest leaders. Soviet era. However, a trend towards an increase in losses of aircraft due to its destruction by fire from MANPADS missiles in Afghanistan after 1986 could be traced, despite the significantly reduced intensity of flights. But one cannot attribute the merit for this only to the “Stinger”. In addition to the same Stingers, the rebels continued to receive other MANPADS in huge quantities.

The result of the hunt of the Soviet special forces for the American “Stinger” was eight combat-ready anti-aircraft systems, for which none of the special forces received the promised Golden Star of the Hero. The highest state award was awarded to Senior Lieutenant German Pokhvoshchev (668 ooSpN), awarded the Order of Lenin, and only for the fact that he captured the only two Blowpipe MANPADS. An attempt by a number of public veteran organizations to achieve the awarding of the title of Hero of Russia to reserve lieutenant colonel Vladimir Kovtun and posthumously to lieutenant colonel Evgeny Sergeev (died in 2008) runs into a wall of indifference in the offices of the Ministry of Defense. It’s a strange position, given that currently, of the seven special forces soldiers awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for Afghanistan, no one is left alive (five people were awarded it posthumously). Meanwhile, the first samples of Stinger MANPADS obtained by special forces and their technical documentation allowed domestic aviators to find effective methods of countering them, which saved the lives of hundreds of pilots and passengers of aircraft. It is possible that some technical solutions were used by our designers in the creation of domestic second- and third-generation MANPADS, superior to the Stinger in some combat characteristics.

MANPADS "Stinger" (above) and "Hunyin" (below) are the main anti-aircraft systems of the Afghan Mujahideen in the late 80s.

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Second half of the eighties. The Soviet Union has been waging a protracted and bloody war in neighboring Afghanistan for seven years now, helping the government of the republic cope with armed groups of radical fundamentalists and nationalists supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Iran.

Army aviation plays a vital role in conducting operations against the Mujahideen. Soviet helicopters, having turned into a real headache for the militants, attack their positions and support the actions of motorized riflemen and paratroopers from the air. Air strikes became a real disaster for the Mujahideen, as they deprived them of support - helicopters destroyed caravans with ammunition and food. It seemed that in a little more time the DRA government troops, together with OKSVA forces, would be able to neutralize the armed opposition.

However, the militants soon acquired extremely effective man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. During the first month of their use, the Mujahideen managed to shoot down three Mi-24 helicopters, and by the end of 1986 OKSVA lost 23 aircraft and helicopters that were shot down as a result of fire from the ground - from man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

The Army Aviation Command decided to fly helicopters at extremely low altitudes - in this way they hoped to avoid the vehicles getting caught in the missile homing head, but in this case the helicopters became an easy target for enemy heavy machine guns. It is clear that the situation required a speedy resolution, and the headquarters were racking their brains over what to do and how to secure helicopter flights over the territory of Afghanistan. There was only one way out - to find out what kind of weapons the Mujahideen were using to fight Soviet helicopters. But how was this to be done?

Naturally, the command immediately came to the conclusion that it was necessary to carefully study the man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems used by the militants in order to decide by what means or what tactics they could be countered. It is clear that such MANPADS could not be made in Afghanistan or Pakistan, so the Soviet command immediately “took the trail” of the United States, or rather the Central intelligence agency The United States, which almost from the very beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan provided comprehensive support to the Mujahideen formations.

The Soviet troops were given the difficult task of capturing at least one MANPADS used by the Mujahideen, which would allow them to develop more effective tactics to counter the new weapons. As one would expect, the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces had to carry out this task.

In Afghanistan, special forces performed a variety of tasks. Being the most prepared fighters both in combat and morally and psychologically, Soviet military intelligence officers bore a very significant part of the entire combat load that Soviet troops faced in this southern country. Naturally, tasks like the capture of the Stinger MANPADS could only be entrusted to GRU special forces.

On January 5, 1987, a reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment went on a combat mission. This detachment was formed in February 1985 on the basis of the 8th separate brigade special purpose. It included not only officers and soldiers of this brigade, but also military personnel of the 10th separate special-purpose brigade, then stationed in Crimea, military personnel of the 2nd separate special-purpose brigade from Pskov and the 3rd separate special-purpose brigade from Viljandi. The support units were staffed by officers and warrant officers from the motorized rifle troops. On March 31, 1985, the 186th special forces unit was transferred to the 40th combined arms army, and in organizationally included in the 22nd separate special forces brigade.

It was the scouts of this unit who had to perform a unique, very difficult and dangerous task - to capture MANPADS. Soldiers under the command of Major Evgeniy Sergeev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun set out for a combat mission. On two Mi-8s, Soviet soldiers headed towards Kalat, where they had to comb the area near the road to Kandahar. The Soviet helicopters were flying at a very low altitude, which allowed the military personnel to clearly see three Mujahideen moving along the road on motorcycles.

At that time, only Mujahideen could ride motorcycles on mountain roads in Afghanistan. Local peasants, for obvious reasons, did not and could not have motorcycles. Therefore, Soviet intelligence officers immediately realized who they saw on the ground. The motorcyclists understood everything too. As soon as they saw Soviet helicopters in the sky, they immediately dismounted and began shooting from machine guns, and then fired two launches from MANPADS.

Later, Senior Lieutenant Kovtun realized that the Mujahideen did not hit the Soviet helicopters with their MANPADS only because they did not have time to properly prepare the complex for battle. In fact, they fired from MANPADS like a grenade launcher, offhand. Perhaps this oversight by the militants saved Soviet troops from losses.

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun fired at the Mujahideen with a machine gun. After this, both Mi-8s made a short landing. The scouts landed from helicopters, dispersed across the area and engaged the Mujahideen. However, after a short time, reinforcements approached the latter. The battle became more and more fierce.

Vasily Cheboksarov, who commanded inspection group No. 711, later recalled that the Mujahideen and Soviet soldiers “beat” each other almost point-blank. When machine gunner Safarov ran out of ammunition, he did not lose his head and “knocked out” the Mujahideen with a blow from the butt of his Kalashnikov machine gun. What is surprising is that in such a fierce battle, the Soviet intelligence officers did not lose a single person, which cannot be said about the Afghan Mujahideen.

During the battle, one of the Mujahideen, clutching some kind of long package and a “diplomat” type case in his hands, ran out of cover and ran, trying to hide. Senior Lieutenant Kovtun and two scouts ran after him. As Kovtun later recalled, the militant itself interested him the least, but the oblong object and the diplomat were very interesting. That's why Soviet intelligence officers chased the Mujahideen.

The militant, meanwhile, was running and had already gained a distance of two hundred meters from Soviet soldiers, when Senior Lieutenant Kovtun managed to kill him with a shot in the head. It’s not for nothing that the Soviet officer was a master of sports in shooting! While Kovtun “took” the militant with the diplomat, other intelligence officers destroyed the remaining fourteen militants who took part in the shootout. Two more “dushmans” were captured.

Helicopters, which did not stop firing from the air at the militants, providing support to Soviet intelligence officers, provided enormous assistance in defeating the group of Mujahideen. Subsequently, the officer in command of the helicopters will also be nominated for the main award of the USSR - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but he will never receive it.

The destruction of the Mujahideen detachment was far from the only and, moreover, not the most important victory of the Soviet intelligence officers. Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun, who shot a militant with an oblong package, naturally became interested in what kind of object was wrapped in the blanket that the militant was carrying in his hands. It turned out that this was the Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system.

Soon the scouts brought two more “pipes” - one was empty, and the other was equipped. But the most important thing is that a diplomat containing all the documentation for a portable anti-aircraft missile system fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence officers. It was truly a “royal” find. After all, the bag contained not only detailed instructions for using MANPADS, but also the addresses of American suppliers of the complex.

The captured Stingers were taken to Kandahar, to the brigade headquarters. The scouts continued to carry out combat missions. Naturally, such an event could not go unnoticed by the command. Four intelligence officers from the reconnaissance group that participated in the operation were nominated for the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. On January 7, 1987, the commander of the 186th separate special forces detachment of the 22nd separate special forces brigade, Major Nechitailo, prepared nominations for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

But, for some reason, things didn’t go beyond the show. Although the capture of the Stinger, and even with detailed documentation, was indeed a real feat, and most importantly, it made it possible to solve the long-standing problem of ensuring the safety of Soviet army aviation.

Vladimir Kovtun says:

The brigade commander, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. They decided to introduce me, Sergeev, Sobol, the commander of the plane we were flying on, and one sergeant from the inspection team to Hero. To submit a nomination for a Hero, the candidate must be photographed. They took pictures of the four of us and... In the end, they didn’t give us anything. In my opinion, the sergeant received the “Banner”. Zhenya had a party penalty that had not been lifted, and a criminal case was opened against me. Why they didn’t give the helicopter pilot a Hero, I still don’t know. He was probably also in disgrace with his command.

The result of the operation carried out by GRU special forces soldiers was the capture of operational samples of the most modern and effective American man-portable anti-aircraft missile system at that time. Experts were immediately puzzled by the development of measures to counter the Stingers. Very little time passed and the losses of Soviet army aviation in Afghanistan decreased sharply.

As for the captured Stingers captured by the intelligence officers, they were presented at a press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA as irrefutable evidence of assistance to the Mujahideen from the Western powers. It turned out that the captured Soviet intelligence officers The Stingers were the first of a batch of 3,000 purchased by the Afghan mujahideen in the United States for use against Soviet aircraft.

However, no one denied this help. The US CIA launched the most active activities among groups of Afghan Mujahideen, and the closest US ally in the region at that time - Pakistan - directly participated in the Afghan war, sending its instructors to the Mujahideen formations, placing Mujahideen camps and bases in the border provinces and even places of detention for Afghan and Soviet prisoners of war.

Years and decades have passed, and few today remember the feat of the Soviet military personnel who captured the Stingers. Evgeniy Georgievich Sergeev, who then commanded the reconnaissance group, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, continued to serve in the armed forces and participated in localizing the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In 1995, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Evgeny Sergeev retired from the armed forces due to disability, in recent years he lived in Ryazan, and in 2008, at the age of 52, he died as a result of a long and serious illness resulting from wounds and concussions received in Afghanistan. But a well-deserved award still found Evgeniy Sergeev - by Presidential Decree Russian Federation dated May 6, 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeniy Georgievich Sergeev was awarded high rank Hero of the Russian Federation posthumously.

Vladimir Pavlovich Kovtun rose to the rank of colonel, and in 1999, at a young age, he was dismissed from the ranks of the RF Armed Forces, also for health reasons. But “in civilian life,” the military officer quickly found his soul’s work and took up farming in the Vladimir region.

Reading time: 4 min

Naturally, the command immediately came to the conclusion that it was necessary to carefully study the man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems used by the militants in order to decide by what means or what tactics they could be countered. It is clear that such MANPADS could not have Afghan or Pakistani production, so the Soviet command immediately “took the trail” of the United States, or more precisely, the US Central Intelligence Agency, which almost from the very beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan provided comprehensive support to the Mujahideen formations.

On January 5, 1987, a reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment went on a combat mission. This detachment was formed in February 1985 on the basis of the 8th separate special forces brigade. It included not only officers and soldiers of this brigade, but also military personnel of the 10th separate special-purpose brigade, then stationed in Crimea, military personnel of the 2nd separate special-purpose brigade from Pskov and the 3rd separate special-purpose brigade from Viljandi. The support units were staffed by officers and warrant officers from the motorized rifle troops. On March 31, 1985, the 186th special forces unit was transferred to the 40th combined arms army, and organizationally included in the 22nd separate special purpose brigade.

The militant, meanwhile, was running and had already gained a distance of two hundred meters from the Soviet soldiers when Senior Lieutenant Kovtun managed to kill him with a shot in the head. It’s not for nothing that the Soviet officer was a master of sports in shooting! While Kovtun “took” the militant with the diplomat, other intelligence officers destroyed the remaining fourteen militants who took part in the shootout. Two more “dushmans” were captured.

Vladimir Kovtun says:

As for the captured Stingers captured by the intelligence officers, they were presented at a press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA as irrefutable evidence of assistance to the Mujahideen from the Western powers. It turned out that the Stingers captured by Soviet intelligence officers were the first of a batch of 3,000 that were purchased by the Afghan Mujahideen in the United States for use against Soviet aircraft.

In 1995, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Evgeny Sergeev retired from the armed forces due to disability, in recent years he lived in Ryazan, and in 2008, at the age of 52, he died as a result of a long and serious illness resulting from wounds and concussions received in Afghanistan. But Evgeniy Sergeev still found a well-deserved reward - by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 6, 2012, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeniy Georgievich Sergeev was posthumously awarded the high title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the courage and heroism shown during the fighting in Afghanistan.

. Elite fighters leave no traces and are ready every minute to be deployed to any theater of military operations - today, November 5, military intelligence officers celebrate their centenary. Over these 100 years, they conducted thousands of complex forays behind enemy lines and decided the outcome of more than one major battle. Many special operations are still classified. One of the most striking is the capture of American Stinger portable anti-aircraft systems by GRU special forces during the Afghan war. About this raid - in the material of RIA Novosti.

Operation Cyclone

The first "Stingers" appeared among the Afghan spooks in September 1986, after a CIA special operation designated "Cyclone". Army aviation of the joint contingent of Soviet troops (UCSV) by that time had long been a headache for gangs. Helicopters unexpectedly attacked militants’ caches, covered columns of dushmans on the march with fire, landed tactical troops in problem villages and, most importantly, destroyed caravans with weapons and ammunition coming from Pakistan. Due to the actions of Soviet pilots, many gangs in Afghanistan were on starvation rations, and military cargo intended for them burned in the desert and on mountain passes. The White House considered that supplies of modern MANPADS to militants would force OKSV to curtail flights and the USSR would lose air superiority.

At first, the Stingers really became an extremely unpleasant surprise for Soviet helicopter pilots. In just the first month of using MANPADS, militants shot down three attack Mi-24s, and by the end of 1986, the USSR lost 23 aircraft and helicopters from ground fire. The new weapon forced the Soviet command to completely reconsider the tactics of using army aviation. Helicopter crews have since flown at extremely low altitudes to avoid being captured by the missile's homing head. But this made them vulnerable to heavy machine guns. It was clear that the new tactics were only a half-measure.

Ambush at the airfield

To effectively counter the emerging threat, it was necessary to carefully study samples of MANPADS. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the principle of their operation, and secondly, to prove the direct support of the dushmans from the CIA. The GRU special forces of the General Staff announced a full-scale hunt for the Stinger. The first person to obtain the launch tube was promised to immediately and without further ado be awarded the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. But many months of reconnaissance activities did not produce results - the “spirits” cherished MANPADS as the apple of their eye and developed complex tactics for their combat use. This is how the head of the Afghan Intelligence Center of Pakistan (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, described the successful attack in the book “The Bear Trap.”

“About 35 Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, one and a half kilometers northeast of the runway of the Jalalabad airfield. The fire crews were within shouting distance of each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction, a target may appear. We organized each crew in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held containers with missiles for quick reloading. Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through the open sight on the launcher, the friend-or-foe system signaled intermittently, that an enemy target had appeared in the action zone, and the Stinger had captured thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head. When the leading helicopter was only 200 meters above the ground, Gafar commanded: “Fire.” One of the three missiles did not fire and fell without exploding ", just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets. Two more missiles went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed."

Dushmans used the tactics of mobile sabotage reconnaissance anti-aircraft groups (DRZG) - small detachments, secretly operating near Soviet airfields. Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the launch point in advance, often with the help of local residents. It was difficult to counter such attacks without knowing the technical features of the anti-aircraft missiles used. Surprisingly, the special forces managed to capture a functioning MANPADS by pure chance.

Head to head

On January 5, 1987, a reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the command of Major Evgeniy Sergeev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun went on a free hunt in two Mi-8 helicopters. The special forces planned to comb the suspicious “green stuff” near Kalat on the road to Kandahar and, if necessary, destroy the detected enemy targets. The "turntables" were flying at an extremely low altitude and literally collided nose to nose with three militants on motorcycles.

Kovtun fired at the bandit group with tracers from a machine gun, marking their position for the second side. Both helicopters made a short landing, the scouts dispersed across the area and opened fire on the enemy. A fierce battle ensued. Soon, help approached the dushmans, and one of the “spirits” ran out from behind the shelter with an oblong package in his hands and ran away. He didn't go far - the starley killed the militant with a well-aimed shot in the head. Other dushmans were also unlucky - GRU special forces destroyed all 16 attackers without losses.

Vladimir Kovtun was the first to discover the treasured Stinger, wrapped in a blanket. A little later, the soldiers brought two more “pipes” - empty and loaded. But the real jackpot was the “diplomat” of one of the dushmans, in which the intelligence officers found complete documentation for the MANPADS - from the addresses of suppliers in the USA to detailed instructions for using the complex. Four intelligence officers were nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. However, as often happens, no one received a high award. As the special forces admitted - because of not the most good relations with high authorities. However, the scouts were not upset: for them such tasks are routine.

As a result of a random but brilliantly executed special operation military intelligence Soviet designers received working samples of advanced Western MANPADS. IN as soon as possible developed countermeasures, and Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan began to be shot down much less frequently.

In January 1987, officers and soldiers of the GRU General Staff special forces group captured the first American-made Stinger MANPADS (man-portable anti-aircraft missile system). After successfully completing the task, several participants in the operation were nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but they never received this award.

The film involves many people “from the other side” - former Afghan field commanders Haji Sadar Aka and Muhamad Aref, CIA employee in 1985-1989 Nick Pratt, German cameraman Dittmar Hack, who walked with caravans across the Pakistani border and filmed battles with ours. They tell us who fought against us and how, where and how the Mujahideen were trained and what their main tasks were, as well as the direct role of the CIA in training the Mujahideen. They answer questions calmly, frankly - so many years have passed, what can I say!

The film not only tells about the feat of the Soviet military, but also raises the deeper problems of that war. It shows the broader geopolitical situation, what was happening in the highest echelons of power in the US and the USSR, what the true levers were and what the goals of the two sides were in this war.

Cast: Dmitry Gerasimov (retired lieutenant general, commander of the 22nd special forces brigade in 1985-1988), Oleg Zaryvin (military transport aviation pilot, combat veteran in Afghanistan), Vladimir Kovtun (reserve colonel of the GRU General Staff) , Muhamad Aref (commander of the Mujahideen detachment in Kholm), Haji Sadar Aka (field commander in Logar province), Nick Pratt (CIA employee in 1985-1989, veteran Marine Corps USA), Dittmar Hack (military cameraman).

Country Russia.
Production: AB-TV television company.
Year of release: 2011.

MANPADS missile "Stinger"

The Pentagon and the US CIA, arming Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans “tried” them to supplying Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification).

Despite the strictest secrecy, the first media reports about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by vehicles of the Pakistani Armed Forces to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.

Launch of the Stinger MANPADS missile

Gafar strikes

Details of the first use of Stinger MANPADS by Afghan rebels are described by the head of the Afghan department of the Pakistan Intelligence Center (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, in the book “Bear Trap”: “On September 25, 1986, about thirty-five Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, located only one and a half kilometers northeast of the Jalalabad airfield runway... The fire crews were within shouting distance of each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each crew in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held containers with missiles for quick reloading... Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through an open sight on the launcher, the “friend or foe” system signaled with an intermittent signal that in the zone action, an enemy target appeared, and the Stinger captured thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head... When the leading helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Gafar commanded: “Fire”... One of the three missiles did not work and fell, not exploding just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets... Two more missiles went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed... In the following months, he (Gafar) shot down ten more helicopters and planes using Stingers.

Mujahideen of Ghafar to the outskirts of Jalalabad

Combat helicopter Mi-24P

The Soviet command only guessed that the rebels used Stinger MANPADS. We were able to materially prove the use of Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan only on November 29, 1986. The same group of “Engineer Gafar” staged an anti-aircraft ambush 15 km north of Jalalabad on the slope of Mount Wachhangar (elevation 1423) and as a result of firing with five Stinger missiles The helicopter group destroyed the Mi-24 and Mi-8MT (three missile hits were recorded). The crew of the slave helicopter - Art. Lieutenant V. Ksenzov and Lieutenant A. Neunylov died when they fell under the main rotor during an emergency ejection. The crew of the second helicopter hit by the missile managed to make an emergency landing and leave the burning car. The general from the TurkVO headquarters, who was at that time in the Jalalabad garrison, did not believe the report that two helicopters were hit by anti-aircraft missiles, accusing the pilots of “the helicopters colliding in the air.” It is not known how, but the aviators nevertheless convinced the general that “spirits” were involved in the plane crash. The 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade and the 1st company of the 154th separate special forces detachment were alerted. The special forces and infantry were tasked with finding parts of an anti-aircraft missile or other material evidence of the use of MANPADS, otherwise all the blame for the plane crash would have been placed on the surviving crews... Only after a day had passed (the general took a long time to make a decision...) by the morning of November 30 in Search units arrived in the area of the helicopter crash in armored vehicles. There could no longer be any talk of intercepting the enemy. Our company failed to find anything other than burnt fragments of the helicopters and the remains of the crew. The 6th Company of the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, when inspecting the probable missile launch site, quite accurately indicated by the helicopter pilots, discovered three, and then two more starting expulsion charges of the Stinger MANPADS. This was the first material evidence of the United States supplying anti-aircraft missiles to Afghan anti-government armed forces. The company commander who discovered them was presented with the Order of the Red Banner.

Mi-24, hit by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Eastern Afghanistan, 1988

A careful study of traces of the enemy's presence (one firing position was located at the top and one in the lower third of the slope of the ridge) showed that an anti-aircraft ambush had been set up here in advance. The enemy waited for a suitable target and the moment to open fire for one or two days.

Hunt for Gafar
The OKSVA command also organized a hunt for the “Engineer Gafar” anti-aircraft group, whose area of activity was the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangar-har, Laghman and Kunar. It was his group that was battered on November 9, 1986 by a reconnaissance detachment of the 3rd company of the 154 ooSpN (15 obrSpN), destroying several rebels and pack animals 6 km southwest of the village of Mangval in the province of Kunar. The intelligence officers then seized a portable American shortwave radio station, which was supplied to CIA agents. Gafar took revenge immediately. Three days later, from an anti-aircraft ambush 3 km southeast of the village of Mangval (30 km northeast of Jalalabad), a Mi-24 helicopter of the 335th “Jalalabad” helicopter regiment was shot down by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Escorting several Mi-8MTs performing an ambulance flight from Asadabad to the hospital of the Jalalabad garrison, a pair of Mi-24s crossed the ridge at an altitude of 300 m without shooting IR traps. A helicopter shot down by a MANPADS missile fell into a gorge. The commander and pilot-operator left the plane using a parachute from a height of 100 m and were picked up by their comrades. Special forces were sent to search for the flight technician. This time, squeezing the maximum permissible speed out of infantry fighting vehicles, the scouts of 154 ooSpN arrived in the area where the helicopter crashed in less than 2 hours. The 1st company of the detachment dismounted from the “armor” and began to be drawn into the gorge in two columns (along the bottom of the gorge itself and its right ridge) simultaneously with the arriving helicopters of the 335th Airborne Regiment.

The helicopters came from the northeast, but the Mujahideen managed to launch MANPADS from the ruins of a village on the northern slope of the gorge to catch up with the leading twenty-four. The “spirits” miscalculated twice: the first time - when launching towards the setting sun, the second time - without finding out that it was not the pair’s trailing helicopter flying behind the lead vehicle (as usual), but four flights of combat Mi-24s. Fortunately, the missile missed the target just slightly. Its self-destructor worked late, and the exploding rocket did not harm the helicopter. Having quickly taken stock of the situation, the pilots launched a massive air strike against the position of the anti-aircraft gunners with sixteen rotary-wing combat vehicles. The aviators did not spare ammunition... The remains of the flight equipment of the station were picked up from the site of the helicopter crash. Lieutenant V. Yakovlev.

At the crash site of the helicopter shot down by the Stinger

Fragment of a Mi-24 helicopter

Parachute canopy on the ground

MANPADS "Stinger" and its standard closure

Helicopter pilots with special forces on board were several minutes ahead of them. Later, everyone who wanted to become one of the heroes of the day latched on to the glory of helicopter pilots and special forces soldiers. Still, “Special forces captured the Stingers!” - the whole of Afghanistan thundered. The official version of the seizure of the American MANPADS looked like a special operation with the participation of agents who tracked the entire delivery route of the Stingers from the arsenals of the US Army to the village of Seyid Umar Kalai. Naturally, all the “sisters received earrings,” but they forgot about the true participants in the capture of the Stinger, having bought off several orders and medals, but it was promised that whoever captured the Stinger first would receive the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”

National reconciliation

The one-sided “national reconciliation” was immediately taken advantage of by the armed Afghan opposition, which at that moment, according to American analysts, was “on the brink of disaster.” It was the difficult situation of the rebels that was the main reason for the supply of Stinger MANPADS to them. Beginning in 1986, the airmobile operations of the Soviet special forces, whose units were assigned helicopters, so limited the rebels' ability to supply weapons and ammunition to the interior of Afghanistan that the armed opposition began to create special combat groups to fight our intelligence agencies. But, even well trained and armed, they could not significantly influence the combat activities of the special forces. The likelihood of their detection by reconnaissance groups was extremely low, but if this happened, then the clash was fierce. Unfortunately, there is no data on the actions of special rebel groups against Soviet special forces in Afghanistan, but several episodes of military clashes based on the same pattern of enemy actions can be attributed specifically to “anti-special forces” groups.

The Soviet special forces, which became a barrier to the movement of the “caravans of terror,” were based in the provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan and Iran, but what could the special forces do, whose reconnaissance groups and detachments could block no more than one kilometer of the caravan route, or rather, the direction. The special forces perceived the “Gorbachev reconciliation” as a stab in the back, limiting their actions in the “reconciliation zones” and in the immediate vicinity of the border, when conducting raids on villages where the rebels were based and their caravans stopped for the day. But still, due to the active actions of the Soviet special forces, by the end of the winter of 1987, the Mujahideen experienced significant difficulties with food and fodder at the “overpopulated” transshipment bases. Although what awaited them in Afghanistan was not hunger, but death on mined paths and in special forces ambushes. In 1987 alone, reconnaissance groups and special forces intercepted 332 caravans with weapons and ammunition, capturing and destroying more than 290 heavy weapons (recoilless rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns), 80 MANPADS (mainly Hunyin -5 and SA- 7), 30 PC launchers, more than 15 thousand anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and about 8 million small arms ammunition. Acting on the communications of the rebels, the special forces forced the armed opposition to accumulate most of the military-technical cargo at transshipment bases in the border areas of Afghanistan, difficult for Soviet and Afghan troops. Taking advantage of this, the aircraft of the Limited Contingent and the Afghan Air Force began systematically bombing them.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary respite kindly provided to the Afghan opposition by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (then USSR Foreign Minister), the rebels began to intensively increase the firepower of their formations. It was during this period that the saturation of combat detachments and groups of armed opposition with 107-mm rocket systems, recoilless rifles and mortars was observed. Not only the Stinger, but also the English Blowpipe MANPADS, the Swiss 20-mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft artillery mounts and the Spanish 120-mm mortars are beginning to enter their arsenal. An analysis of the situation in Afghanistan in 1987 indicated that the armed opposition was preparing for decisive actions, for which the Soviet “perestroika”ists, who set a course for the Soviet Union to surrender its international positions, did not have the will.

The first Stinger, as it happened

In 1986, “stingers” appeared in the hands of the dushmans - rockets launched from the shoulder, having enormous speed - it is impossible to escape from such a projectile, plus, the rockets had a “dog sense” - they reacted to mass, heat, sound and, if the plane or the helicopter came into their field of vision, things ended badly.

For a very long time, our army reconnaissance officers could not get this missile, the dushmans protected it incredibly, they only managed to find empty boxes with batteries to maintain the microclimate and that’s all. Therefore, throughout the 40th Army, they announced: whoever takes the first “stinger” will receive the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, they tried to buy the Stinger through dummies for five million Afghanis, but this attempt also came to nothing.

Special forces were also hunting for the Stingers. We hunted seriously. The 7th Special Forces Detachment, which was stationed in Shahjoy, near the Pakistani border, was also involved in this hunt. In the zone of action of the detachment itself it was quiet and peaceful, but a little further, in the area of Kalat, Jilavur it was very restless. One helicopter was shot down there, then two more, then a civilian plane - an Afghan one, a scheduled one. Not far from its remains, the special forces found several starting blocks, a homing head cooler block, glass fragments, and a wrapper with American markings. It was clear what equipment was used to shoot down planes and helicopters. There were many indications that the “stingers” should be looked for in the area of the village of Jilavur.

Major Evgeny Sergeev, deputy battalion commander from the 7th detachment, loved free hunting, free search. He decided to go on a free hunt this time too. First, I decided to scout out the area. I went on reconnaissance missions with four helicopters: two Mi-24s, which the paratroopers called “crocodiles” and two Mi-8s - these are ordinary civilian helicopters that were forced to fight: a large-caliber machine gun was driven into the nose, and “nurses” - unguided rockets - were hung from the wings.

Sergeev was placed in the lead helicopter, took a place at the machine gun, senior lieutenant Kovtun and three soldiers sat with him, in the second helicopter there was the inspection group of senior lieutenant Cheboksarov, in which there were two more officers: Valery Antonyuk and Konstantin Skorobogatiy, plus several special forces soldiers. This is how they went out for reconnaissance, which they decided to combine with a free search: what if they got lucky? At first we moved along the concrete road, and then abruptly went into the gorge. The weather is good: the winter sun is half the blue of the cold sky, shiny snow on which every point is visible.

We walked quite a bit when we discovered three motorcycles ahead. Ordinary farmers in Afghanistan could not ride motorcycles, neither did our guys; they could only ride “darlings” on motorcycles. And the motorcyclists themselves did not hide much, identified themselves, fired at the helicopters and made two hasty launches from a MANPADS (man-portable anti-aircraft missile system). They responded with a blow from the nurses and immediately went to land. The wingman Mi-8 and two "twenty-fours" remained in the air - to cover from above.

When they sat down, Sergeev managed to notice that there was some kind of strange pipe in one of the motorcycles. Isn't it the Stinger? They jumped out onto the snow. Kovtun with two paratroopers ran to the right after the fleeing dushmans, and Sergeev with one of the guys ran straight along the road: it was impossible to let the “darlings” escape.

After a couple of minutes, it turned out that there was another whole group of dushmans sitting nearby, who were not slow in coming to the rescue. A fight ensued. Shooting, roar, bullets - this is a familiar environment for special forces. Kovtun, meanwhile, outlined a target: a long-legged dushman, who very quickly scampered somewhere to the side. He had a pipe in one hand and a case in the other.

Since there is a case, it means that there are some important papers in it, the “sweetheart” saves them, and the pipe is still something incomprehensible.

Suddenly, the runner grabbed the pipe with the hand in which the case was located, and with the other hand began to shoot back. The gentleman was smart. After a couple of minutes, the “darling” began to come off - in the mountains he felt like a doe on free grazing. Kovtun rasped into the “daisy” radio communication device: “Guys!” You can't miss him! And the long-legged “darling” went further and further. Then Kovtun, a master of sports in shooting, stopped and, as he himself said: “He took a full breath, sat down on his knee, took aim...” In general, the “sweetheart” did not go away. The case fell into the hands of Senior Lieutenant Kovtun.

The special forces who captured the first Stinger. In the center is Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun.

They threw two tubes into the helicopter, one empty, the other with filling, a case, they also took one wounded dushman, injected him with promedol so that there would be less pain, and took off - the place was too dangerous. The entire battle took no more than ten minutes. We headed back along the same route.

Already in the helicopter, Kovtun opened the case, and there was all the documentation on the “stinger” - with descriptions and detailed instructions, with phone numbers and addresses of suppliers...

The brigade commander, Colonel Gerasimov, flew to the 7th detachment and said that Sergeev, Kovtun, Sobol and Sergeant Autbaev were nominated for the title of Hero - from the inspection group, the future heroes were photographed, they shook their hands again - and that was the end of the matter.

The first two Stinger MANPADS captured by special forces of the 186th Special Forces. January 1986

When the issue reached the army authorities in Kabul, the story changed. As Vladimir Kovtun said, high-ranking officials told him that the batch of “Stingers” was detected in the States, intelligence tracked its unloading in Pakistan, and then hung on its tail until the “Stingers” left for Afghanistan. As soon as THEY found themselves here, the Kandahar and our detachments were alerted. They waited for the spirits with the “stingers” to be within reach. And as soon as they got here, we, they say, quickly took off and did our job... Based on a tip. But all these are fairy tales of the Vienna Woods, although a lot of people were awarded for these fairy tales to the very top.

Sergeev is on the far left with captured Stingers.

The direct participants in that battle, Sergeev and Outbaev, received the Order of the Red Star, and that was all.
Such tricks with awards happened both during the Great Patriotic War and at the time Afghan events...Alas! Kovtun came out of Afghanistan with seven bullet wounds and three shell shocks - that’s all his awards. Major Sergeev has no less wounds.

Special forces: the hunt for Stingers

On the night of July 16-17, 1987, as a result of an ambush by the reconnaissance group 668 ooSpN (15 arr. SpN) of Lieutenant German Pokhvoshchev, a pack caravan of rebels in the province of Logar was scattered by fire. By the morning, the ambush area was blocked by an armored group of a detachment led by Lieutenant Sergei Klimenko. Fleeing, the rebels threw their loads off their horses and disappeared into the night. As a result of an inspection of the area, two Stinger and two Blowpipe MANPADS were discovered and captured, as well as about a ton of other weapons and ammunition. The British carefully concealed the fact of supplying MANPADS to Afghan illegal armed groups. Now the Soviet government has the opportunity to convict them of supplying anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan armed opposition. However, what was the point in that when more than 90% of the weapons to the Afghan “Mujahideen” were supplied by China, and the Soviet press bashfully kept silent about this fact, “branding shame” on the West. You can guess why - in Afghanistan, our soldiers were killed and maimed by Soviet weapons marked “Made in China”, developed by domestic designers in the 50-50s, the production technology of which was transferred by the Soviet Union to the “great neighbor”.

Landing of the Special Forces RG into a helicopter

Reconnaissance group of Lieutenant V. Matyushin (in the top row, second from left)

Now it was the rebels’ turn, and they were in no debt to the Soviet troops. In November 1987, two anti-aircraft missiles shot down a Mi-8MT helicopter of 355 obvp, on board which were scouts from 334 ooSpN (15 obrSpN). At 05:55, a pair of Mi-8MTs, under the cover of a pair of Mi-24s, took off from the Asadabad site and went to outpost No. 2 (Lahorsar, level 1864) with a gentle climb. At 06:05, at an altitude of 100 m from the ground, the Mi-8MT transport helicopter was hit by two Stinger MANPADS missiles, after which it caught fire and began to lose altitude. Flight technician Captain A. Gurtov and six passengers were killed in the crashed helicopter. The crew commander left the car in the air, but he did not have enough altitude to open the parachute. Only the pilot-navigator managed to escape, landing with a partially opened parachute canopy on a steep slope of the ridge. Among the dead was the commander of the special forces group, Senior Lieutenant Vadim Matyushin. On this day, the rebels were preparing a massive shelling of the Asadabad garrison, covering the positions of 107-mm multiple launch rocket systems and mortars with crews of MANPADS anti-aircraft gunners. In the winter of 1987-1988. The rebels practically gained air superiority in the vicinity of Asadabad with portable anti-aircraft systems. Front-line aviation still attacked rebel positions in the vicinity of Asadabad, but did not operate effectively from extreme heights. Helicopters were forced to transport personnel and cargo only at night, and during the day they made only urgent ambulance flights at extremely low altitudes along the Kunar River.

Patrolling the inspection area of the special forces RG by helicopters

However, reconnaissance officers from other special forces units also felt the limitations of using army aviation. The area of their airmobile operations was significantly limited by the safety of army aviation flights. In the current situation, when the authorities demanded “results”, and the capabilities of the intelligence agencies were limited by the directives and instructions of the same authorities, the command of the 154th special forces found a way out of the seemingly deadlock situation. The detachment began to use complex mining of caravan routes. In fact, reconnaissance officers of the 154 Special Forces created a reconnaissance and fire complex (ROC) in Afghanistan back in 1987, the creation of which is only talked about in the modern Russian army. The main elements of the system of combating rebel caravans, created by the special forces of the “Jalalabad Battalion” on the caravan route Parachnar-Shahidan-Panjshir, were:

— sensors and repeaters of the “Realiya” reconnaissance and signaling equipment (RSA) installed at the borders (seismic, acoustic and radio wave sensors), from which information was received about the composition of the caravans and the presence of ammunition and weapons in them (metal detectors);

— mining lines with radio-controlled minefields and non-contact explosive devices NVU-P “Okhota” (seismic target movement sensors);

— areas of ambushes by special forces reconnaissance agencies adjacent to the mining and radar installation lines. This ensured complete closure of the caravan route, the smallest width of which in the area of crossings across the Kabul River was 2-3 km;

- barrage lines and areas of concentrated artillery fire of outposts guarding the Kabul-Jalalabad highway (122-mm self-propelled howitzers 2S1 "Gvozdika", in the positions of which were the operators of the Realiya SAR, reading information from the receiving devices).

— patrol routes available for helicopters with special forces inspection teams on board.

A combat-ready Stinger MANPADS, captured by reconnaissance officers of the 154th Special Forces in February 1988.

Such a troublesome “management” required constant monitoring and regulation, but the results showed very quickly. The rebels more and more often fell into a trap cleverly arranged by the special forces. Even having their own observers and informants from among the local population in the mountains and nearby villages, probing every stone and path, they were faced with the constant “presence” of special forces, suffering losses in controlled minefields, from artillery fire and ambushes. Inspection teams in helicopters completed the destruction of scattered pack animals and collected the “result” from caravans crushed by mines and shells. The peculiarity of NVU-P is that this electronic device identifies the movement of people by ground vibrations and issues a command to sequentially detonate five fragmentation mines OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90 or others.

This episode ended the epic of the special forces hunt for the Stinger in Afghanistan. All four cases of its capture by Soviet troops were the work of special forces units and units operationally subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

It is unlikely that the Stingers themselves played a decisive role in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, as is sometimes imagined in the West. Its reasons lie in the political miscalculations of the last leaders of the Soviet era. However, a trend towards an increase in losses of aircraft due to its destruction by fire from MANPADS missiles in Afghanistan after 1986 could be traced, despite the significantly reduced intensity of flights. But one cannot attribute the merit for this only to the “Stinger”. In addition to the same Stingers, the rebels continued to receive other MANPADS in huge quantities.

How the Stingers were captured in 154th Special Forces

On February 14, 1988, in the area of Northern Shahidan, during a planned landing on an ambush, the crews of the 335th ABVP discovered a caravan and began to destroy it from the air, and the third company would finish the job on the ground. In the morning, 131 RGSpN 154 OOSpN under the command of Andrei Sokolov (instead of the wounded Sergei Smirnov) during an inspection seized two containers with launchers and two Stinger missiles - the first in Jalalabad. On February 16, 1988, a special-purpose inspection reconnaissance group of the 154 Special Forces Special Forces, Lieutenant Sergei Lafazan, discovered 6 km northwest of the village of Shakhidan a group of pack animals destroyed by MON-50 mines of the NVU-P “Hunting” set. During the inspection, intelligence officers seized two boxes with Stinger MANPADS.

Andrei Sokolov and the chief of reconnaissance of 335 OBVP with the first Stinger

Second Stinger

The commander of the inspection unit of the Special Forces of the 2nd company, Lieutenant S. Lafazan (in the center), who captured the Stinger MANPADS on 02/16/1988.

The third "Stinger" 154 special forces and Lieutenant S. Lafazan

Sergey Veretsky with the 4th Stinger

MANPADS "Stinger" (above) and "Hunyin" (below) are the main anti-aircraft systems of the Afghan Mujahideen in the late 80s.

After the war

On Poklonnaya Hill, in the museum, on the day of the withdrawal of our guys from Afghanistan, an exhibition entitled “Loyal to the Traditions of Feat” was opened; this exhibition was assembled lovingly and touchingly.

Many distinguished guests were present at the opening. It was there that the conversation started about how the first “stinger” was taken, how the guys were unfairly treated, and the main name of that story arose - Major Sergeev.

Major Sergeev was remembered - in the literal sense of the word: he is no longer alive. He was already a lieutenant colonel, although for special forces soldiers ranks mean little. If only for retirement.

Those gathered decided: we need to return to this story, collect documents and send them to the Kremlin, to the awards department. Moreover, they offered to return to all four, presented in 1987 for the title of Hero, but Kovtun refused:

I don't need any title.

Why, Vladimir Pavlovich?

I renounce my rank in favor of a commander who is no longer alive. He deserves more than all of us put together. If there are many submitted, no one will receive the title; if only Sergeev is submitted, the chances will increase several times.

Not long ago, a decree conferring the title of Hero of Russia on Evgeniy Georgievich Sergeev was signed. No wonder they say: the truth is sick, but does not die.

By decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 6, 2012, for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeniy Georgievich Sergeev was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).

In the summer of 2012, at a ceremony at the Cultural Center Armed Forces RF Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Major General I.D. Sergun, on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation, handed over the special insignia of the Hero of the Russian Federation - the Gold Star medal to the widow of E.G. Sergeeva ‒ Natalya Vladimirovna Sergeeva.

The museum on Poklonnaya Hill played a good role in this story and, I am sure, will play even more: as the deputy director of the museum, Viktor Scriabin (a military general who knows what war is), said, a decision was made to create an “Afghan” branch. When materials begin to accumulate, we must assume that we will learn many new names - those who were undeservedly passed over for awards.

Some more time passed. It seemed to me that those who beat themselves in the chest and promised to achieve the Hero star for Vladimir Kovtun would fulfill their promises. But the matter was limited to promises: they forgot about Kovtun again.

Vladimir Pavlovich now works in the Vladimir region, in the city of Alexandrov, he has his own poultry farm. They say it's very good. He develops and implements new technologies, pampers the townspeople with delicious products - in a word, he is busy with the necessary work, and tries not to remember the war. But it is impossible to forget the war, it sits deep in the memory and dreams at night: he sees his guys and commander again, nothing can be done about it. This is human nature.

We must never forget those who went through the fires and waters of the front line and accomplished a feat. Kovtun is worthy of the title of Hero - promised, by the way, twice - and if this does not happen, it will be a shame for everyone who fought in Afghanistan.

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