Fierce fighting in the Luga line. Battles for the Luga defensive line. Organizational and combat actions in late July - early August
"A rifle, a rolling pin, five grenades,
Thundering marching step
Behind us is the city of Leningrad,
Our home and our hearth!"
Petr Oifa
There were (if you move from Kingisepp to Novgorod along the line): 191 sd, 2 DNO, LPU im. Kirov (Leningrad Infantry School), 90 sd, 1 joint venture 3 DNO (the other two regiments left for Tulox, where for the most part they remained; we will talk about them later, in the section on the Finns), LSPU (Leningrad rifle and machine gun school) , 111, 177, 235, 237, 70 sd, 1 ogsbr, regiment 128 sd. They were supported by 21, 24 TD, a battalion of tanks ABT KUKS, and later 1 TD. Obviously, the following units are curious: a mountain rifle brigade (it had no training, they had just been formed, but the symbolism is probably of interest, especially since they were beaten, apparently, a lot), a battalion of tank courses (there seems to be there was everything that was not suitable for the front line, but what else could be driven, including rarities, plus it was they who had the only T-34 and KV tanks by the beginning of the war in the LenVO) and, of course, the militias, who were armed with everything what they could find. Among the opposing German units, the MD SS "Dead Head" and the SS division "Policeman" are interesting (the SS fought with enthusiasm, but extremely ineptly and, oddly enough, suffered much more losses than ordinary infantry; Manstein also mentions this).
Now about the fights. 191st Rifle Division covered the direction to Ivangorod and Kingisepp. They stood on the northern shore of the Narva reservoir, covered the Gdov-Kingisepp road (somewhere in the area opposite Porkhovo-Lesobirzh). They fought off attacks 1 pd, then 58, 93 pd and 6 d. Retreated to the north bank of the river. Lugi, then (together with 11, 48, 118, 125, 268 rifle divisions that had withdrawn from Narva) fought for Kingisepp and retreated at the Koskolovo-Poluchye-Babino, Kopanitsa-Koporye lines, then transferred to Ropsha. At the same time, in the area of St. Sala - the village of Sala was the Kingisepp UR, occupied by 263 and 266 opab, which fought for a long time with the Germans, who were marching from the west behind the retreating 8th army. That is, there must be pillboxes. And periodically scorched and blown up. True, this already seems to be a border zone. (Novoporkhovo-Dubrovka-Sala area. In modern terms, it turns out to be something like First May-Sala-Koshkino). Further, during the withdrawal, which began around 12.8.41 after the Germans broke through from the bridgehead at Ivanovsky, the Marines (2 brmp), 118 rifle divisions and 2 DNO covered the Kingisepp-Kotly and Kingisepp-Leningrad roads (this made it possible for them to withdraw from under Kingisepp and Narva to the aforementioned six divisions). Battle areas: Alekseevka-st. Kerstovo-Zapolye, north of the village. Kerstovo, Voynosolovo, Bol. Ruddilovo, Boilers; 2 VNR in the areas of Opolye-Onstopel-Zagoritsy-Khotynitsa, Gurlevo-Kuty, Ilyesha, Korchany, Ratchino, Kaibolovo-Gorka, Velkotta-Lousno, Voronkino, Irogoshcha, Koporye.
Prior to that, 2 DNO was defending to the left of the 191st Rifle Division in the area of the Ivanovsky bridgehead. Fights for Sredne Selo and further to Ivanovsky, Zabelye-Yurki-M. Peleshi began as early as 14.7, when our command (whatever they now say in their memoirs) frankly overslept the transfer of the German 41st MK to the Kingisepp direction; although, if they were reported, but they did not react in time, then this is no better. There were also troubles due to the fault of the railway workers, and as a result, 2 DNO barely had time to counterattack the Germans, who were traveling from Sredne Selo to Weimarn. They never liquidated the bridgehead, although they greatly reduced it and forced the Germans to get stuck here for several weeks. Even to the left, the cadets fought for Bolshoy Sabsk (they just took up positions on time, and as a result, the Germans, although they took a bridgehead, but at the cost of a lot of blood, although there were several times fewer cadets than the militias in 2 DNO). A little later, the cadets retreated to Redkino-Yazvische. In August, the militias and cadets rolled back to: 2 DNO - Middle Selo-Manuilovo-Weimarn, Zabelye-Lopets-Vypolzovo, M. Peleshi-Pustoshka-Morozovo-Kryakovo-Kotino (in the latter case, 4 DNOs thrown here after the German August breakthrough took part, 1 Guards DNO and 2 Brmp), cadets - Redkino-Yazvische-Myshkino-Maksimovka-Slepino-Vyazok-Volna-Izvoz (90th Rifle Division, introduced in July to the left of the cadets, also departed for Izvoz). The direction of movement of the Germans was Myshkino-Izvoz-Mouth-Krasny Luch-Yablunitsa-Moloskovitsy and further to the north and east. 1 joint venture 3 DNO fought in the Khotnezha-Lemovzha-Koryach area, fought for a short time (about a month of standing and three days of actual fighting), but fiercely, then went to the east, and there, as someone was lucky: someone went to Pushkin, someone ended up in 41 sk near Vyritsa. During the retreat, they fought in Verest and Muraveino.
Farther. There was a machine-gun school down the Luga, but nothing is known about it, except that it was. God bless him. The right flank of the 177th Rifle Division in the Tolmachevo-Luga region was covered by the 111th Rifle Division, where exactly it was is unknown (considering that it joined the right flank in Muraveyno with 1 joint venture 3 DNO, LSPU probably became part of it for reinforcement. What As for the left flank, the location of Leskovo village is not known to me. Most likely, they covered the direction of the Ant-Red Mountains. However, the 111th Rifle Division near Luga did not fight particularly hard. Basically, they were hooligans in the German rear (especially since before that they had been pretty decently beaten near Pskov and the personnel had become very thin). It was more interesting on the site 177 sd. They took positions in the foreground as early as the tenth of July and fought for a whole month with 269 infantry divisions and (first) 1st and 6th divisions, and then 8th divisions and 4th divisions of the SS "Policeman", retreating from Plyussa to Luga. A whole month of continuous attacks and counterattacks! They were supported by tanks of 21 TD and 3 SMEs, as well as a lot of any artillery, mostly large calibers (from 122 mm and above), which periodically bled the Germans. Twice this turned into the defeat of German convoys on the march (first in the Zaplusya region, and then in the village of Navolok; apparently, 8 TD suffered both times). At the end of July, the Germans tried to bypass the 177th rifle division past the lake. Cheremenets, but they were spotted in time. A short powerful artillery attack, and then a counterattack by the 235th Rifle Division (before that, it simply occupied the defense along the eastern bank of the Luga and was actually on the reorganization after the battles for Pskov) with the support of a small number of tanks - and the Germans rolled back through Navolok, Repya, Yugostitsy, Filimonova Gorka-Toroshkovichi on Borki-Oakwood.
Later, the 111th, 177th and 235th Rifle Divisions left through the city of Luga to Tolmachevo and tried to reach Pushkin through Vyritsa. It turned out only partially (but more on that later).
In the area of Peredolskaya-Kchera there was 1 DNO. I do not know the exact location of their line of defense, but they defended themselves in Bol. Ugorodakh, Bol. and Mal. Sosenkakh, on the line Bol. Voynovo-St. Golubkovo-Lyubenets-Unomer, then retreated to Shchepino - Ozhogin Volochek - Lyubino Pole - Tereboni (that is, their left flank retreated, bending towards the Luga River, and thus exposed the right flank of 237th and 70th rifle divisions). Then, when everything was already clear here, the remnants of 1 DNO went to st. Oredezh (the Sokolniki-Oredezh-Beloye line), then they covered the flank of the 41st sk in the Gobzhitsa-Bankovo area (a fierce battle; unfortunately, all the corpses after the battle were collected by the Germans, of course, who could find them; they buried their own, Soviet soldiers were thrown into silos pits and buried; what happened to them next is unknown). The Germans crossed Luga and Oredezh in the Tolmachevo and Torkovichi regions, and before that, apparently, in the Terebonei region. Everywhere they tried to drown them (with varying success), especially since they sailed on rubber boats, and aviation was called only after a couple of unsuccessful landing attempts.
Phew, everything seems to be with Luga. Soviet units were shot down from all positions, less combat-ready units were defeated (like militia divisions, which, however, they did not really have time to prepare for battles and which nevertheless fought better and more stubbornly than fully equipped PribOVO units, defeated in the very first week of fighting), more the persistent ones were outflanked and forced to retreat to Leningrad by forests (for example, 70 and 177 rifle divisions). The Germans are rushing with might and main to the city along the Koporsky plateau, leaving from the west to Gatchina and cutting off the 8th army in Estonia, and along the Moscow-Leningrad highway. So far, apparently, they are not interested in the right bank of the Volkhov, and this is very good for the Soviet troops in this area, because the 48th Army (which had previously covered the Shimsk-Novgorod direction) practically no longer exists, it is not even able to dislodge the Germans from Novgorod, although he is trying (by the way, it was in these battles at the end of August 1941 that the first known case of throwing at the embrasure occurred; a certain political instructor A. Panfilov rushed, who received the Hero for this, but only for some reason in the spring of next year; however, I I still strongly disapprove of this "kind" of attack, which stemmed mainly from the complete lack of necessary military skills like the ability to throw grenades, so this case is given just for interest). But I digress. So, the 48th army is in agony and will soon die quietly without resurrection until almost the end of the war. The Gansyuks are mastering the E-95 highway with might and main (at the same time, in the Chudov region, they got stuck for 4 days with local fighter battalions and the remnants of the 70th division) and eventually arrive in Tosno, in parallel with this they make their way from the west through Gatchina. Thus, the battles smoothly flow from the distant approaches to Leningrad to the near approaches (already more interesting, right? It’s much closer to go, and the names will be more familiar). But be patient a little, you must first finish with the 41 sk surrounded under Luga and the units of type 1 DNO and 24 etc. that joined it.
So, 41 sk, which fell into a tactical encirclement near Luga as a result of the above-described German flank breakthroughs near Kingisepp and Novgorod, valiantly made its way to the north (however, there was nothing left for it, because the order to withdraw was given to it, as always, with a delay in a few days, and besides, at the headquarters of the Northern Front they thought that the corps would be able to break through; hmm, I wonder where such a conclusion came from, if the Germans already outnumbered it by two or three times? but oh well) and he made his way through Dolgovka, Mshinskaya, Krasny Mayak, Bekovo (they did not go to Bekovo), turned onto Druzhnaya Gorka, Krasnitsy, Sluditsy. And at that time, the remnants of 1 DNO went along another railway (this is the one to Oredezh) (these were large remnants, and small remnants went almost everywhere), and so, these remnants went through Kremeno, Chascha, Novinka and came to the same Sluditsy. And now they are all standing there near Vyritsa and thinking what to do, since Siverskaya has been occupied by the Germans for two weeks now, and the Germans have been standing in Vyritsa for several days (almost did not have time), and the Germans are gradually encircling them with three divisions . On 09/09/41, another 2 SS pbr came to Rozhdestveno to fight 41 sk, including 300 Dutchmen from the Netherlands legion (they fought, it turns out, somewhere in the Vyritsa-Sluditsa area, or maybe not, just separate groups of Red Army soldiers were caught in the forests). But Comrade Voroshilov was still sure that everyone around was just pretending to be weak, and he ordered the 41st Rifle Corps to break through to Mina-Gorka, and from the north, they say, they would hit the 90th Rifle Division (which had previously suffered heavy losses in the battles near Pskov, near Bolshoi Sabsk and Siverskaya ) and an armored train (I repeat once again in syllables: “bro-not-on-ride”, the most natural, on wheels - what kind of strength, huh !?). Hmm, well, in general, nothing happened, the tanks and tractors ran out of fuel, and everyone had to go out as infantry. It was 09/14/41. Further, part of the fighters and commanders leaked in the area of the Mina-Gorka highway and went to Pushkin, but part could not, and then in October 1941 went to their own on the Volkhov (it was 111 rifle divisions). There were groups that went to Pogostya, and so on (the front is large).
Now everything seems to be finally with Luga.
On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war. The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began - an aggressive war against the USSR. Its goal was to liquidate the Soviet state, exterminate millions of people, and turn the survivors into servants of the Reichskommissariat - the German province. Documents that have long since become known testify to the barbaric, merciless nature of Germany's war against the USSR, the essence of which can be described in two words: conquer and destroy.
In the plans for waging war against the Soviet Union, the German command assigned a special place to the capture of Leningrad. Already in the first drafts of the operational plans of the general states of the Wehrmacht and the ground forces, the capture of Leningrad and the capture of the coast of the Baltic Sea was considered as the first goal of the offensive. It was enshrined in the Barbarossa plan.
In accordance with the plan, the troops of the German army were concentrated in three groups: Army Group North, Army Group Center and Army Group South. Army Group North was supposed to, advancing from East Prussia, in cooperation with Army Group Center, destroy the Soviet troops fighting in the Baltic. “Only after ensuring this urgent task, which should end with the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt,” the directive says, “should offensive operations be continued to capture the most important center of communications and the defense industry, Moscow.”
We draw the reader's attention to three things. Firstly, the directive is not about coercion to surrender, not about the encirclement, not about the blockade, but I clearly and unequivocally speak about the capture of Leningrad. Secondly, the capture of Leningrad is defined as an urgent, that is, the first task, on the solution of which the course and outcome of the war against the USSR largely depends. And, thirdly, the Nazis intended to take Moscow only after Leningrad fell.
Based on the task and assessment of the forces of the Soviet troops in the Baltic, their troops, the German command concentrated in the grouping of its forces aimed at capturing Leningrad, forces that significantly exceeded the number and armament of the Soviet troops in the Baltic. This was one of the main reasons, along with other objective and subjective factors, for the defeat of the Red Army in the North-West direction and the approach of Army Group North to Leningrad.
Considering the dangerous situation developing in the Leningrad direction, on July 4, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to enlist the troops of the Northern Front for the defense of the southwestern approaches to Leningrad. The next day, July 5, signed by the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, the Military Council received a new directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters on the construction of defensive lines "to cover the city of Leningrad and the most important directions from the southwest and south: Gdov-Kingisepp-Leningrad, Luga-Leningrad, Novgorod-Leningrad, Vyshny Volochek-Leningrad". It was ordered to complete the construction of the defensive line by July 15.
But in fact, the command of the Northern Front already in the first days of the war began to prepare defensive lines.
On June 24, it was decided to build three defensive lines. The main one - along the Luga River to the lake. Ilmen (Luga border). The second - along the line Peterhof - Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) - Kolpino. The third line along the Avtovo line - the district railway - st. Predportovaya - Middle Slingshot - st. Rybatskoe. The Directorate for the construction of rear defensive lines was created.
On June 27, 1941, the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council of Working People's Deputies adopted a resolution on the involvement of city residents in labor service. It was decided to stop the construction of a number of facilities in the city, and to direct the released labor force, mechanisms and vehicles to defensive work. In total, in July-August 1941, about 500 thousand people took part in the work. More than 133 thousand people were employed daily.
Great work on the construction of defensive structures was carried out by the working people of the Leningrad Region. Every day in July-August, 150 thousand people worked on the construction of these facilities, and in some periods, 250 thousand people who were not employed at defense industry enterprises. On July 12, 1941, the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the regional executive committee sent a telegram to the district party committees and district executive committees of the districts on whose territory the Luga defensive line was being built, in which they ordered the district committees and executive committees to “raise without exception the entire population of collective farms and other organizations for defensive installations” .
The work went on continuously. Machine operators in the depths of the defense tore off deep ditches, “arranged forest blockages. In the forefield and in front of the main strip, sappers set up minefields and barbed wire. At the Izhora, Kirov, Baltic, Metallic and other plants, long-term firing points were made - armored and reinforced concrete, as well as various anti-tank gouges.
The most difficult was the construction of the Luga defensive line with a length of about 250 km. It was created from the Narva Bay, passed along the banks of the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Shelon and ended at Lake Ilmen. Ditches and scarps, trenches, anti-tank ditches were built, command and observation posts were equipped. Special brigades prepared a double frame of logs, the space between the walls was filled with stones, and thick logs were laid on top in three rolls. The entire structure was covered with stones, earth and carefully covered with turf. Bunkers were built in this way. They did not stand out against the background of the surrounding area and withstood a direct hit by a large-caliber projectile.
The work went on day and night. Machine operators in the depths equipped tank traps. From the beginning of the delivery of concrete blocks, they began to build gun bunkers from them.
A significant number of engineering structures were built at the Luga line, including 517 anti-tank obstacles (201 km of anti-tank ditches, 241 km of scarps, 15 km of gouges, etc.), 826 firing structures.
The German three-volume book of documents and materials "The Second World War" tells how Army Group "North" ran into a defensive line that was erected at the turn of the Luga by the workers of Leningrad.
To defend the frontiers, the Military Council of the Northern Front on July 5 decided to create the Luga task force under the command of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev, an experienced military leader who commanded a division back in the 1920s. By the beginning of hostilities, the group included two rifle divisions, two divisions of the people's militia, the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S.M. Kirov in full force, the rifle and machine gun school, the 41st rifle corps of the 11th army, the formations and units of which were significantly weakened in previous battles. In addition, the group included a regiment of artillery advanced training courses for commanders, a division of the 28th Corps Artillery Regiment and batteries of the 1st and 3rd Leningrad Artillery Schools, and an anti-aircraft division of the Leningrad School of Instrumental Reconnaissance of Antiaircraft Artillery. These artillery units and units were combined into a special artillery group under the command of Colonel G.F. Odintsov. Before the enemy approached, the group managed to occupy the eastern sector in the Luga area with the forces of rifle divisions. By June 10, troops had just begun to advance to the lower reaches of the river.
At the beginning of July 1941, fascist German troops crossed the Velikaya River, captured the city of Ostrov, and on July 9 captured Pskov, invaded the Leningrad Region. So, on July 10, the Battle of Leningrad began, military operations on the territory of the Leningrad Region.
An alarming time has come for Leningrad. The Luga defensive line was not yet completely ready. The divisions of the people's militia, intended for its defense, completed the formation.
The fighting on the Luga line began on July 12, 1941, when the formations of the 41st motorized corps of the Army Group "North", crowding the units of the Red Army retreating from Pskov, reached the front edge of the forefield of the Luga strip on the Plyussa River and entered into battle with the advanced units of the Luga operational group. On July 13, the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the supply zone, occupying the village and the Plyussa railway station. But the forward detachments of the 177th Infantry Division of Colonel A.F. Mashonin and parts of the 24th Panzer Division, Colonel A.G. Motherland, after two days of fighting, knocked the enemy out of the forefield and restored positions along the Plyussa River. An important role in repulsing the attacks of the 1st and 6th German tank divisions was played by the artillery group of Colonel G.F. Odintsova.
Already on the second day of the offensive, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Göpner, realized that on Luga, i.e. the shortest direction to Leningrad, due to the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, it will not be possible to advance without significant losses and in a short time. On July 12, he turned his 41st mechanized corps to the northwest to reach Leningrad through the Koporskoe plateau. The 6th and 1st Panzer divisions are being transferred covertly, by country and forest roads, to the Kingisepp area. On July 14, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division crossed the Luga River and captured a bridgehead near the village of Ivanovskoye, 20-25 km southeast of Kingisepp. The 2nd division of the people's militia, the hero of the Soviet-Finnish war, Colonel N.S., arrived here in time. Ugryumova heroically attacked the enemy, whose offensive was stopped, but failed to knock him off the bridgehead and throw him across the river.
For several days, a fierce battle continued for cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School named after S.M. Kirov with units of the 1st Panzer Division, who crossed the Luga River and on July 15 captured a bridgehead in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Bolshoi Sabsk. The cadets steadfastly held on to every piece of land, to every trench, preventing the enemy from widening the gap. On July 17, the German command threw the main forces of the division into the positions of the cadets. As a result of a fierce battle, the Nazis lost at least 800 soldiers, but did not advance a single step. For the courage and stamina shown by the cadets in the battles near Bolshoi Sabsk, the school was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
By the stubborn defense of the Soviet troops, the advance of the enemy at the turn of the Luga River was stopped by July 19. The command of the Army Group "North" ordered to stop the attack on Leningrad. The plan of the German command to break through to Leningrad on the move through Luga and the Koporskoe plateau was thwarted. For the first time during the Second World War, the Wehrmacht was forced, albeit temporarily, to go on the defensive.
The time gained thanks to the steadfastness of the troops on the Luga line of defense was used to strengthen the construction of defensive lines around Leningrad. The military councils of the North-Western and Northern Fronts took measures to speed up defensive work in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad, to increase the combat capability of units and formations, and to intensively prepare to repel an attack on Leningrad.
On July 23, the Military Council of the Northern Front, in order to improve command and control of troops, divided the Luga operational group into three independent sectors (later - sections) - Kingisep, Luga and Vostochny, subordinating them directly to the front. The troops of the Kingisep sector under the command of Major General V.V. Semashko received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from the south along the Gdovskoye highway to Narva and through Kingisepp to Leningrad.
Connections of the Luga sector under the command of Major General A.N. Astana covered the roads to Leningrad from the southwest.
The troops of the Eastern Sector, commanded by Major General Starikov, defended the Novgorod direction.
All measures to strengthen the defense of Leningrad were carried out at a time when, in the second half of July - early August, hostilities were going on in various directions. The German command sought to break through to Luga before the start of the general offensive on Leningrad, defeat the Soviet troops in the Baltic states, and capture Estonia and the islands in the Baltic Sea.
On August 10, German troops launched an offensive in the Luga and Novgorod-Chudov directions. After a powerful artillery preparation, the 56th motorized corps attacked the troops of the Luga defense sector. But the Soviet troops operating under the overall command of General A.N. Astanin (commander of the Luga defense sector), with a strong defense, they prevented the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad through Luga. However, in the Novgorod direction, German troops broke through in the Shimsk area and began to develop an offensive against Novgorod. On the right flank of the Luga line, our troops left Kingisepp on August 16. On the same day, the enemy occupied Narva.
All available reserves were used to protect the approaches to Leningrad. On the Luga line, the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the people's militia, cadets of the Leningrad military schools, students of junior political instructors fought with the enemy. But these forces could not ensure the stability of the defense in order to contain the superior forces of the enemy. On August 23, Soviet troops began to withdraw from the positions of the Luga defensive line due to the threat of encirclement by the German troops that had broken through. On August 24, our defending units left the city of Luga. However, this decision was too late. The troops of the 4th Panzer Group cut the Vitebsk railroad south of Vyritsa and on August 28 united near the Sluditsy station with the troops of the 16th Army, advancing on Leningrad from the southeast.
The struggle of our troops in the encirclement was led by Major General A.N. Astanin, colonels A.F. Mashonin, G.F. Odintsov, S.V. Roginsky, A.G. Rodin. However, a significant part of the defending troops could not connect with the main forces of the Leningrad Front.
At the same time, the Luga frontier became one of those first frontiers where a serious failure of the "blitzkrieg" occurred. Later, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Erich Hoepner, wrote: "How difficult the battle was with a heavily fortified enemy, it can be seen from the fact that we had to take 1263 field fortifications and remove 26588 mines." German troops paid with great blood for every inch of the Leningrad land captured. One of the German staff tank officers then called the path of the German offensive through the Luga line "the road of death."
G.K. Zhukov, noting the importance of the heroic battles of the Soviet troops at the Luga defensive line, emphasized that here, as well as in the Dno region, at the Staraya Russa-Kholm line, in the Kingisepp-Siversky Army Group North, they met stubborn resistance, suffering heavy losses and " without additional reinforcement, she could no longer attack Leningrad.
The feat of the defenders of the Luga frontier was noted in 1977 by awarding the city of Luga with the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, and in 2009 by awarding it the title of "City of Military Glory". The defensive positions of our troops on the Luga frontier have truly become frontiers of heroism and glory.
Mikhail Ivanovich Frolov , Head of the Scientific and Educational Center for Historical Research and Analysis, Leningrad State University named after A.S. Pushkin,
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
Defeat of German imperialism in World War II. Articles and documents. - M., 1961. S. 201.
The Northern Front was formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the command and control troops of the Leningrad Military District.
Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). F.48-A, Op.1554. D.9. L.77.
Kovalchuk V.M. 900 days of blockade of Leningrad 1941-1944. - SPb., 2005. S.19-20.
History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. - M., 1974. - P.206.
History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. P.207.
Ibid S.215-216.
On the defense of the Neva stronghold. Leningrad party organization during the Great Patriotic War. - L., 1965. - P. 130.
Luga, Shimsk, Kingisepp, Leningrad region, USSR |
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the advance of the GA "Sever" was delayed for a month (in the Luga region for 45 days), the line was broken by German troops in the area of Shimsk and Kingisepp, the Soviet troops were surrounded, left the line and retreated |
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Opponents |
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Germany |
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Commanders |
|
K. E. Voroshilov |
Wilhelm von Leeb |
M. M. Popov |
Georg von Küchler |
K. P. Pyadyshev |
Erich Hoepner |
A. N. Astanin |
Ernst Bush |
F. N. Starikov |
Erich von Manstein |
S. D. Akimov |
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V. V. Semashko |
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Side forces |
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Luga operational group: more than 100 thousand people |
GA "North" |
55,535 people |
unknown |
(Luga fortified position) - a system of Soviet fortifications (defensive line) with a length of about 300 kilometers, built in June - August 1941 on the territory of the Leningrad Region, from Narva Bay, along the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Shelon to Lake Ilmen in order to prevent the breakthrough of the troops of the German army group " North" to the northeast in the direction of Leningrad. On June 27, military builders began work. To defend the line on July 6, the Luga Operational Group was created, headed by Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev. 15 days after the start of construction, on July 12, the 4th German Panzer Group entered into battle with cover units of the Luga Operational Group in the area of the Plyussa River. Although the work on the creation of the frontier was not completed, the stubborn defense of the Soviet troops forced the Wehrmacht command to stop the attack on Leningrad. The successful counterattack near Soltsy, the defense of Tallinn and the Battle of Smolensk had a serious impact on the course of hostilities on the Luga line, allowing the Soviet troops to hold back the advance of the German units for another month, strengthen the defense and form new formations.
In the period of August 8-13, the line was broken through along the flanks, in the region of Novgorod and Kingisepp. The counterattack near Staraya Russa and the defense of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area diverted the significant forces of Army Group North and slowed down the development of the offensive against Leningrad. On August 26, 43,000 Soviet soldiers defending the Luga sector were surrounded, but continued to fight until mid-September. Around 20,000 soldiers were taken prisoner.
background
The strategic importance of Leningrad
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. This plan provided for an attack on the USSR by three army groups in three main directions: GA "North" on Leningrad, GA "Center" on Moscow and GA "South" on Kyiv and Donbass. After the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, the GA "Sever" was to turn its armies to the east, surrounding Moscow from the north. In Directive No. 32 of June 11, 1941, Hitler determined the end of the "victorious campaign to the East" as the end of autumn.
Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, wrote in his diary on July 8, 1941:
By the beginning of World War II, Leningrad was the leading industrial and cultural center of the country, with a population of 3,191,300 people. In 1940, in terms of the value of the gross output of industrial products, it was in second place after Moscow, and was the flagship of shipbuilding. The port of Leningrad occupied an important place in the country's foreign trade. 30 percent of military production was concentrated in Leningrad. Having taken Leningrad, the Germans would have taken possession of the Baltic Fleet, which prevented the most important transportation of Germany from the Scandinavian countries, primarily iron ore from Sweden. The fall of the city on the Neva would allow the Wehrmacht troops to unite with the Finnish army and break out into the operational space east of Lake Ladoga. Such a breakthrough in the direction of Vologda could continue to disrupt the railway communication and block transportation from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. With the fall of Leningrad, German troops would have had unhindered access to the expanses of the north of the Soviet Union, and they could have been thrown at Moscow from the north, which would have changed the entire strategic situation on the Soviet-German front.
The approaches to the northern territories of the CCCP were covered by the Northern and Northwestern fronts.
- The Northern Front was created on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the Leningrad Military District and covered the territory of the Kola Peninsula, Karelia and the Leningrad Region, protecting Leningrad from the north. The front was commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, chief of staff - Major General D. N. Nikishev.
- The North-Western Front was created on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the Baltic Special Military District, with the outbreak of war, the troops of the front fought on the territory of the Baltic Soviet republics. Front Commander - Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff - Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov. The border battles and battles of the troops of the front, which began on June 22, 1941, were lost by the end of June 25. By the beginning of July, the troops of the Northwestern Front were unable to detain the enemy and retreated to a depth of up to 500 km in the northwestern regions of Russia, ending up in the south of the Leningrad Region. For inept command and control of the troops, the command of the North-Western Front in full force was removed from their posts. At the same time, the Wehrmacht command, although it achieved a significant advance of its troops, could not achieve the encirclement and defeat of the Soviet troops.
In the first days of July, due to the lack of forces and means on the North-Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command pointed out the need to involve the troops of the Northern Front in the defense of Leningrad from the south-west, which had previously been entrusted with the task of defending the city only from the north. The border between the fronts was established along the Pskov-Novgorod line, while the defense of the territory of the Estonian SSR was left to the troops of the North-Western Front.
On July 4, Lieutenant General P. P. Sobennikov took command of the front. Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin was appointed a member of the military council, and General N.F. Vatutin, deputy chief of the General Staff, who had been at the front since June 22, 1941, became chief of staff. Under these conditions, the main task of the Soviet troops in this theater of operations was to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad and Novgorod, and also to cover Tallinn, which was the main base of the Baltic Fleet.
On July 8, 1941, the main command of the German armed forces set the troops of Army Group North the following task: to cut off Leningrad from the east and southeast with the strong right wing of the tank group from the rest of the USSR. And on July 10, the troops of the Army Group "North" from the turn of the Velikaya River launched an offensive against Leningrad in the directions of Pskov - Luga and Ostrov - Novgorod. On the same day, formations of the Karelian Army of Finland launched an offensive against the positions of the 7th Army of the Northern Front in Karelia. The date of July 10, 1941 and the line of the Velikaya River are considered by most researchers to be the beginning of the battle for Leningrad and its starting point.
Location
The development of events on the North-Western Front before the start of the Battle for Leningrad.
The initial plan of fortifications, developed by a group of the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev, was a strip of fortifications from the Gulf of Finland along the banks of the Luga, Mshage, Shelon rivers to Lake Ilmen, almost 250 km.
The Luga defense zone looked on the map as one line from the western coast of the Narva Bay in the area of st. Preobrazhenka along the Luga River, to Kingisepp, further to Porechye, Sabsk, Tolmachevo. Around the city of Luga, a detour was planned along lakes and swampy areas with an exit then again to the Luga River, southeast of the city. Then the line went to Peredolskaya, Mshaga, Shimsk to Lake Ilmen. In the center, Pyadyshev outlined the main defense center, which included the city of Luga, with the cut-off position of Luga - Tolmachevo. Another cutoff position was planned to the east and northeast of Tolmachevo. It crossed the main roads leading to Leningrad from Pskov, Porkhov, Novgorod, and the Oktyabrskaya railway. B. V. Bychevsky |
On July 4, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff, General G.K. Zhukov, handed over to the Military Council of the Northern Front the directive of the Headquarters of the High Command on the preparation of defense on the outskirts of Leningrad No. 91 / NGSH. This directive ordered to occupy the line of defense of Narva, Luga, Staraya Russa, Borovichi, to create a foreground with a depth of 10-15 km. Thus, in fact, by its decision of July 4, the Headquarters retroactively approved the measures that had been proposed and were already being implemented by the command of the Northern Front.
July 5, 1941, signed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District. A new directive from the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command on the preparation of a defensive line on the outskirts of Leningrad arrives. It ordered the construction of a defensive line on the front of Kingisepp, Tolmachevo, Ogoreli, Babino, Kirishi and further along the western bank of the Volkhov River. It was indicated to pay special attention to the strong cover of the Gdov-Leningrad, Luga-Leningrad and Shimsk-Leningrad directions. Start building the frontier immediately. Completion of construction - July 15, 1941.
As a result, the main line of defense and two cut-off positions were created in August. The main lane ran from the Gulf of Finland along the right bank of the Luga River to the Muraveino state farm, and then through the settlements of Krasnye Gory, Darino, Leskovo, Smerdi, Streshevo, Onezhitsa, along the right bank of the Luga River from Onezhitsa to Osvina, and then through the settlements of Ozhogin Volochek , Unomer, Bear along the Kiba River, from the village of Medved to Pegasino along the left bank of the Mshaga River, and then to Golino along the left bank of the Shelon River.
- The first cut-off position consisted of two bands. The first, 28 km long, ran from Malaya Rakovna to Vychelovki along the right bank of the Luga River, then along the right bank of the Udraika River to Dubtsev, then to Radoli along the Batetskaya River. The second lane, 20 km long, went from Kolodno, Chernaya to Zaklinye along the Chernaya River.
- The second cut-off position stretched from the Muraveino state farm to Ploskovo along the right bank of the Luga River, then along the Oredezh River, Khvoylo Lake, Antonovo Lake, Pristanskoye Lake, the Rydenko River and along the Ravan River to Fedorovka, further along the Tigoda and Volkhov rivers to Kirishi. The length along the front was 182 km.
Construction
Organization of construction
As early as June 22, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. A. Meretskov, who urgently arrived in Leningrad, recommended to the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, to proceed with the selection and reconnaissance of possible defensive lines between Pskov and Leningrad, with immediate deployment on them defensive work with the involvement of free troops, and most importantly - the local population. This task was entrusted to Popov's deputy, Lieutenant General K. P. Pyadyshev, under his leadership a large group of specialists and military engineers worked on calculations for the construction of defensive structures.
On the morning of June 24, Pyadyshev reported on the composition, procedure and timing of the work of reconnaissance groups, on the approximate organization and sequence of defensive construction. The main boundary was the Luga River almost along its entire length and further Mshaga, Shimsk to Lake Ilmen, with a developed and fortified forefield, originating from the Plyussa River. On the near approaches to Leningrad, it was planned to create two more lines of defense. At the same time, the creation of the Luga defensive zone, which stretched for 250 km, was especially time-consuming and difficult. It was supposed to consist of two defensive lines and one cut-off position, which ran along the banks of numerous lakes and rivers.
On June 25, the Military Council of the Northern Front approved the basic concept of building defensive lines on the outskirts and in the city itself. The plan called for the construction of three lines:
- the first - from the Gulf of Finland along the Luga and Mshaga rivers to Shimsk to Lake Ilmen;
- the second was equipped along the outer ring of the district railway, along the Peterhof - Krasnogvardeisk - Kolpino line and was engaged in the troops of the second echelons of the armies;
- the third passed directly on the outskirts of the city.
At the same time, it was planned to create seven defense sectors in the city itself.
It immediately became clear that the amount of work on the Luga frontier is so great that it cannot be completed by the army alone within the prescribed period, and on June 27 the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council of Workers' Deputies decided to involve the population of the city and a number of suburban areas in labor service.
The plan for the defense of Leningrad drawn up by the headquarters, which provided for the broad participation of the population in its implementation, was approved by the party and Soviet leaders of the city and region, and on June 27, the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee, who returned to Leningrad from Moscow party A. A. Zhdanov, who by telephone agreed on this plan with Stalin.
By decision of the Military Council, construction management No. 1 was formed to manage the construction of the Luga border by June 28. The task of the management was the construction of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as the bunker. The backbone of the administration was made up of officers and cadets of military engineering schools, as well as construction specialists from Leningrad. Construction management at work sites was carried out by the departments of construction supervisors and individual construction sites. They were created on the basis of the Higher Naval Engineering and Construction School, the Military Engineering School, as well as a number of construction organizations. At the end of July - August 1941, the Military Council of the Front takes measures to improve the management of construction at work sites, and systems of bodies for managing military engineering work are formed:
- The engineering department of the front was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B.V. Bychevsky, he was entrusted with the management of the work of troops and sapper units that were in contact with the enemy.
- Directorate for the construction of rear defensive lines (USTOR). It was headed by the assistant commander of the district for fortified areas, Major General P. A. Zaitsev.
General management of the entire complex complex of defensive construction, coordination of the work of the Engineering and Construction Departments of the Front, including the attraction of material and labor resources of Leningrad and the region, was carried out by a member of the Military Council of the Front, Secretary of the City Party Committee A. A. Kuznetsov. This achieved better interaction than at the first stage between the Engineering and Construction Departments of the Front. Troika became the working body of the Military Council of the Northern Front to speed up construction in the most dangerous areas.
From that time on, the division of defensive lines and the organization of construction was based on the sectoral principle. In total, 8 sectors of defensive work were created: 5 on the distant and 3 on the near southern and southwestern approaches to Leningrad. In each of the sectors, a headquarters for defensive construction was created, the list of engineering units, construction organizations and builders was determined. The procedure for resolving tactical issues between the chiefs of troops, commandants and heads of sectors of defensive work was established. Twenty days later, the military-engineering apparatus for directing defensive construction grew significantly and amounted to almost 700 people.
Use of the capacities of urban enterprises
On June 27, 1941, the Military Council of the front adopted a resolution to stop the construction of the Leningrad Metro, the Verkhnesvirskaya Hydroelectric Power Station, the Enso Hydroelectric Power Station, the Enso-Leningrad power transmission line and other facilities, which made it possible to send the most qualified personnel of military and civil builders to the construction of long-term firing points. By the beginning of the war in Leningrad there were 75 construction and assembly organizations of union and republican subordination, in which over 97 thousand people worked. In total, more than 133 thousand builders worked with the workers of the capital construction departments of enterprises and repair and construction offices in Leningrad. They had at their disposal cars, machinery, cement, fittings and other building materials available at enterprises, institutions and households. The main personnel in the work that required the highest qualifications were 12 construction battalions numbering up to 7 thousand people, the Leningrad District Military Construction Directorate, construction trusts No. 16, 35, 38, 40, 53, 58, Soyuzekskavatsiya, construction No. , Trust No. 2 of the NKVD in the Leningrad Region. The most complex work was assigned to the Leningrad metro builders. However, the most difficult and time-consuming earthworks were carried out by mobilized workers and employees from among the civilian population. They provided 88% of all labor costs. The number of builders (excluding engineering and construction units and construction organizations) working on the outskirts of the city in mid-August was over 450,000 people. Despite the fact that the entire working population of the city on August 1 was 1,453,000 people.
The Military Council of the Northern Front also made a number of decisions on the material support of the engineering measures of the front, and through the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, orders were placed at factories for the manufacture of anti-tank mines, barbed wire, concrete blocks for firing points and other protective engineering equipment. Within a day or two, the Leningrad factories began to supply the troops with essential engineering equipment. Crowbars, shovels, axes, camp kitchens began to be mass-produced, which were immediately sent to the construction of defensive lines. At the Izhora, Kirov, Baltic, Metallic and other plants and workshops, prefabricated armored pillboxes, reinforced concrete gun and machine-gun armor caps, anti-tank gouges, anti-tank hedgehogs were manufactured. At the factory. Avrov and in the workshops of Drevtrest, the first 100 thousand mines were made in wooden cases, since it was impossible to quickly establish the production of metal cases for mines. Leningrad scientists received an order from the engineering department of the Leningrad Front for the development of 25 special topics. Various types and types of electric barriers, first developed and used on the borders of the Leningrad Front, then became widespread on other fronts. Thus, 320 km of high-voltage lines were installed and 25 electrical substations were built to implement the project of the 40-kilometer section of electric barriers Luga - Kingisepp. Materials and equipment from 42 plants and enterprises of Leningrad were mobilized for this special construction. A group of specialists led by P. G. Kotov developed and manufactured bunkers from ship armor at ship repair enterprises in Leningrad. In total, 600 such bunkers were made for the defense of Leningrad in 1941. At the same time, on July 11, the GKO adopts a resolution on the mass evacuation of the Leningrad industry; 80 factories and 13 central design bureaus are to be relocated to the cities of the Urals and Siberia. The evacuation of the most important enterprises of Leningrad begins, primarily plants, factories and a number of important research institutes.
Construction conditions and life of builders
On June 27, labor service was introduced for residents of the city and suburban areas. All able-bodied citizens of both sexes were involved in the construction of defensive structures: men aged 16 to 50 years and women aged 16 to 45, with the exception of those working at defense industry enterprises. Working hours were set: for non-working able-bodied citizens - 8 hours a day; employees and workers - 3 hours a day after work, students of functioning educational institutions - 3 hours a day after study. The duration of continuous work of citizens involved in labor service was set no more than 7 days, with a break after that of at least 4 days. Despite this, many going to work participated in the construction for more than 7 days, until the entire scope of work on their site was completed.
Field baths and showers were organized by local enterprises and institutions for those working on the Luga border. Help also came from local residents. It was they who in the early days provided assistance with food, baked bread. Construction teams were subjected to daily bombing, German pilots fired machine guns at unarmed builders. In August, artillery shelling began. From bullets, bombs and shells, people took refuge in the trenches and trenches they had just dug. As soon as the planes left, construction work resumed.
There was such a practice when the construction of the first line of defense was carried out by military personnel, and the second and subsequent ones were built by mobilized workers, employees, students and high school students. By mid-July, over 200,000 people were already digging trenches, communication channels, rifle and machine-gun trenches, anti-tank ditches, building bunkers, bunkers, command, observation and sanitary posts, arranged forest blockages and anti-tank pits.
The main organizational form of sending Leningraders "to the trenches" was "echelons". They were formed by enterprises or groups of plants, factories, artels and workshops. Their leaders were entrusted with the main responsibility for equipping people, organizing work, providing inventory and overalls. At the head of the echelon were his chief and commissar. Upon arrival at their destination, the leaders of the echelon received a specific task from the military command to build an appropriate fortification. In turn, the echelons were subdivided into hundreds, brigades and units. Each worker was assigned a daily work rate. At earthworks, it was 3 cubic meters. m.
At the Luga frontier, a special detachment was created, which consisted of volunteers - physically strong, experienced military builders. It was intended for the operational erection of firing structures in places of the construction zone being shot through by the enemy. In order to somehow protect themselves from fragments and bullets, they had to put up metal shields, create temporary piles of logs. The command transferred the detachment from one sector to another. Virtually none of the tasks did not do without losses. For heroic actions, six builders were awarded the Order of the Red Star, the rest of the detachment members were awarded combat medals.
On July 28, the daily newspaper "Leningradskaya Pravda at the Defense Construction Site" began to appear, which covered the life of the builders of defensive lines, and disseminated the valuable experience of individual brigades and sections.
Foreground
In addition to building a defensive line, engineering units and subunits operated in barrage detachments, which were created by the command of the Northern Front in order to gain time to prepare defenses at the Luga line and were directed mainly to the Luga-Pskov highway (now the Pskov highway). On June 25-27, barrier detachments from the 191st Infantry Division began work in the Gdov direction. At the turn of the Plyussa River, mining began on the foredfield of the Luga position by sappers of the 106th separate motor-engineering battalion, cadets of the Leningrad Engineering School and pontooners of the 42nd pontoon-bridge battalion. Since by this time the troops had not yet arrived in the foreground, mining, the destruction of roads and structures was carried out without taking into account the specific requirements of the troops and reference to the upcoming hostilities.
Side forces
Army Group North
On June 22, the Sever GA, opposing the Baltic Military District, consisted of three armies:
- 16th Army under the command of Colonel General Bush
- 18th Army under the command of Colonel General von Küchler
- 4th Panzer Group under the command of Colonel General Göpner
29 divisions, including 20 infantry, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 security, provided air support for the German 1st Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Keller, which had 430 combat aircraft, including 270 bombers and 110 fighters. It included: 1st air corps (1st, 76th and 77th bomber squadrons, armed with Ju 87, Ju 88, He 111 aircraft); 54th Fighter Squadron (Bf 109, Bf 110); group of the 53rd fighter squadron; two reconnaissance squadrons (50 aircraft). To reinforce Army Group North, additional forces were allocated from the reserve of the Wehrmacht High Command, including: 5 batteries of self-propelled artillery mounts; 6 cannon divisions of 105-mm guns; 2 cannon divisions of 150 mm guns; 11 divisions of heavy field howitzers; 2 mixed artillery battalions; 4 mortar divisions of 210 mm guns; 7 anti-aircraft batteries; 2 railway batteries; 3 armored trains and other units and divisions. In total, the Sever GA included: 655,000 people, 7673 - guns and mortars, 679 - tanks and assault guns, 430 - combat aircraft.
The level of training of the German troops was very high. The headquarters of army groups, as well as divisions and corps, had good operational training, and were fully prepared to control units during the planned hostilities. The command of Army Group North, the 16th and 18th field armies, the 4th tank group, corps and divisions had rich combat experience gained on the battlefields of the First World War and in combat operations in Western Europe.
According to the German command, in three weeks of fighting, the total losses of the three formations amounted to about 30 thousand people. Losses of equipment were somewhat smaller and amounted to about 5%. Thus, by mid-July, the Wehrmacht managed to maintain the backbone of its combat units, with which they entered the war with the USSR.
Considering that the troops of the 8th Army that retreated to Estonia were finally defeated and demoralized, the German command sent only 2 infantry divisions (61st and 217th), from the 18th Army of von Küchler, to capture Tallinn. However, the calculations of the German command to quickly break the resistance of the Soviet troops did not materialize. For the quick capture of Tallinn - the main naval base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - he did not have enough forces. In the battles, the German units suffered heavy losses, and their forces were constantly dwindling. So, for example, according to the testimony of prisoners, in the companies of the 217th Infantry Division by mid-July there were 15-20 people left. As a result, the German command was forced to urgently transfer 3 more infantry divisions to this line, intended for operations in the main Leningrad direction.
On July 30, 1941, Hitler signed OKW Directive No. 34, in which Army Group North was ordered to continue the attack on Leningrad, surround it and establish contact with the Finnish army. Army Group "Center" - go on the defensive. The tasks indicated above for Army Group North were also confirmed in the "additions to Directive No. 34 of August 12, 1941." Thus, a new moment was that, along with a direct attack on Leningrad, the troops of Army Group North were to surround the city from the southeast and east, occupying the passage between the lakes Ilmen and Ladoga. To accomplish the latter task, in August, the 39th motorized corps of Colonel General Schmidt was transferred from Army Group Center to the 16th Army.
Luga Task Force
The enemy of the Army Group "North" were the troops of the north-western direction of K. E. Voroshilov, united in the direction of the upcoming German offensive by the directorates of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov and the North-Western Front, Major General P. P. Sobennikov. Initially, the Northern Front was intended to control troops operating in the Arctic and Karelia. However, the development of the situation at the front forced the command to involve the Northern Front for the defense of Leningrad from the south-west, and also to begin the transfer from the Karelian Isthmus to the Luga direction of the 10th mechanized corps (without the 198th motorized division), the 237th and 70th rifle divisions. However, SGK Directive No. 00260 of 07/09/41 ordered the commander of the Northern Front to immediately transfer the 70th, 177th rifle divisions and one tank division (from the 10th mechanized corps) to the commander of the North-Western Front, which on July 14 were supposed to launch a counterattack against the 56th mechanized corps of Manstein advancing in the direction of Novgorod. As a result, from the 10th mechanized corps, only the 24th tank division operated at the Luga line, in which on July 10th there were 118 BT-2 and BT-5 tanks, 44 armored vehicles BA-10 and BA-20, only on July 13, 3 KV tanks appeared in the 24th Panzer Division.
On July 5, to manage the preparation of the fleet for the defense of the city, the headquarters of the Naval Defense of Leningrad and the Lake District was formed, the commander was Rear Admiral F. I. Chelpanov. The Onega, Chudskaya, Ilmenskaya and Ladoga military flotillas, marine brigades, detachments of sailors began to form, and the construction of additional coastal batteries began. In addition, on July 6, to the south-west of Leningrad, the following were advanced by the Northern Front:
- the 191st Rifle Division, which deployed along the eastern bank of the Narva River;
- 177th Rifle Division, which took up defense in the area of the city of Luga;
- Leningrad Infantry School. S. M. Kirov (2000 people), who occupied Kingisepp;
- Leningrad rifle and machine gun school (1900 people), concentrated in the city of Narva;
- The 1st separate mountain rifle brigade (5800 people), mobilized in Leningrad and also heading for Luga.
- in Leningrad, from June 29, 1941, 3 divisions of the people's militia were formed, each with 10 thousand people.
To control troops on the Luga line, by order No. 26 of July 6, 1941, the Luga Operational Group (LOG) was formed by the headquarters of the Northern Front, which received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through in the northeast in the direction of Leningrad. The command of the group is entrusted to Lieutenant General Konstantin Pavlovich Pyadyshev.
fighting
On July 9, after the capture of Pskov, the tank and motorized formations of the German troops did not wait for the approach of the main forces of the 16th and 18th armies, but resumed the offensive: the 41st motorized corps of General Reinhardt on Luga, and the 56th motorized corps - General Manstein to Novgorod.
The 191st and 177th rifle divisions, the 1st division of the people's militia, the 1st separate mountain rifle brigade, cadets of the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov and the Leningrad rifle and machine gun school managed to take up the defense in the Luga position. The 24th tank division was in reserve, and the 2nd division of the people's militia was advancing to the front line. Formations and units defended on a wide front. Between them there were gaps of 20-25 km, not occupied by troops. Some important areas, such as Kingisepp, turned out to be undisguised. The 106th Engineer and 42nd Pontoon Battalions set up anti-tank minefields in the foredfield area. Intensive work was still underway at the Luga position, the construction of the line was still far from complete. Tens of thousands of Leningraders and the local population participated in the work.
Attempt to take Luga on the move
On July 10, two tank, motorized and infantry divisions of the 41st motorized corps, with air support, attacked parts of the 118th rifle division north of Pskov. Having forced her to retreat to Gdov, they rushed to Luga. The 90th and 111th rifle divisions, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, retreated with battles. A day later, the Germans reached the Plyussa River near the village of the same name and started a battle with the cover troops of the Luga task force. By this time, the 177th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel A.F. Mashoshin managed to take the line in the Luga region and in the foredfield. The German divisions ran into stubborn resistance. Important settlements and centers of resistance changed hands several times. On July 13, the enemy managed to wedge into the security zone, but on the morning of the next day, the forward detachments of the 177th Rifle and units of the 24th Tank Division, supported by powerful artillery fire, knocked him out of the forefield and again took up positions along the Plyussa River. The artillery group of Colonel G. F. Odintsov played an important role in repelling the onslaught of enemy tanks. One howitzer battery of senior lieutenant A. V. Yakovlev destroyed 10 enemy tanks. German troops in the Luga direction were stopped.
On July 13, the High Command of the North-Western Direction decided to reorganize command and control of troops on the south-western approaches to Leningrad. The 8th Army and the 41st Rifle Corps of the 11th Army from the troops of the North-Western Front were transferred to the Northern Front, and received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad. This decision reflected the real state of affairs, since the 8th Army and the 41st Rifle Corps were actually already fighting in the Northern Front. The commander of the Northern Front included the 41st Rifle Corps (111th, 90th, 235th and 118th Rifle Divisions) in the Luga Operational Group. The remnants of the units of the 41st Rifle Corps were assembled, provided with uniforms, armed, brought into formations, and sent to reinforce the troops of the Luga Operational Group, the 111th Rifle Division occupied the defense zone on the right, and the 235th Rifle Division on the left flank of the 177th rifle division.
Capture of bridgeheads near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoy Sabsk
When General Reinhardt tried to move his tanks and battalions of armored personnel carriers away from the Pskov-Luga road in a detour, trying to hit the defending Soviet units from the rear, he was faced with the fact that the terrain to the right and left of the highway was practically not suitable for armored vehicles. Conducting large-scale operations became impossible. Tanks have lost their main advantage - speed and maneuverability. At the same time, ground and air reconnaissance of the 4th Panzer Group established that on the left flank, in the lower reaches of the Luga River, rather insignificant forces of Soviet troops were located. And Goepner deployed the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions to the north, leaving the 269th Infantry Division in the Luga direction. On July 14, having passed a forced march of about 160 kilometers, the 6th Panzer Division, with the help of a special unit of the Brandenburg regiment, captured two bridges across the Luga near the village of Ivanovskoye intact.
The maneuver of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group from the Luga to the Kingisepp direction was timely discovered by the reconnaissance of the Northern Front. At the same time, the reconnaissance group of V. D. Lebedev, which operated behind enemy lines, especially distinguished itself. She reported on the intensive movement of German tanks and motorized columns from Strug Krasny and Plyussa to Lyady and further to the Luga River. The regrouping of German troops was also monitored by air reconnaissance. The front command took urgent measures to cover the Kingisepp sector. The dispatch to this direction of the 2nd division of the people's militia, formed from the volunteers of the Moscow region of Leningrad and the tank battalion of the Leningrad Red Banner Armored Improvement Courses for commanders (LBTKUKS), was accelerated. The 2nd BOTTOM, which arrived in time here, attacked the enemy, but could not knock it off the bridgehead. The attack of the militia and tankers was observed by Popov and Voroshilov, who personally came to the place of the breakthrough. In the midst of the battle, in order to better assess the situation, Popov himself went on reconnaissance on the T-34 tank, the tank received three hits with armor-piercing shells in the turret, but the armor withstood and the tank left the battlefield.
On the same day, July 14, a reinforced motorized battalion from the 1st Panzer Division went to the Luga River near Bolshoi Sabsk, and by 22 o'clock created a bridgehead on the eastern bank. For several days, until July 17, a fierce battle continued between a detachment of cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School named after S. M. Kirov and units of the 1st Panzer Division of the enemy. The cadets held firm thanks to a timely prepared system of full-length zigzag trenches. Significant assistance was provided to the defending troops by coastal batteries, which with their fire destroyed concentrations of German infantry, destroyed crossings, and struck at tank and mechanized units and artillery batteries. Later, General Reinhardt, leaving barriers at Bolshoi Sabsk, began to concentrate the forces of the 41st Corps on the bridgehead near the village of Ivanovskoye in order to break through to the Kingisepp-Krasnoe Selo highway, and along it to Leningrad.
In order to defeat the units of the 56th motorized corps, which broke into the area southwest of Shimsk, the commander of the North-Western Front, with his directive No. 012 of July 13, 1941, ordered the troops of the 11th army of General V.I. near the city of Soltsy. On July 14, part of the formations of the North-Western Front (including three divisions transferred from the Northern Front) launched a counterattack on the 56th motorized corps of General Manstein from the north. Units of the 183rd Rifle Division of the 27th Army advanced on Sitnya from the south. From the air, the advancing formations were supported by four air divisions of the North-Western and Northern fronts. The plan of the commander of the 11th Army was to strike in converging directions on the flank and rear of the enemy to surround his troops, cut and destroy them. In four days of fighting, the 8th Panzer Division was defeated, although it managed to break out of the encirclement, but it took a whole month to restore its combat capability. Parts of the 56th motorized corps were thrown back 40 km to the west. The rear of the corps suffered heavy losses. The German command, frightened by the counterattack of the Soviet troops, on July 19 ordered to stop the attack on Leningrad and resume it only after the main forces of the 18th Army approached the Luga. The counterattack of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front temporarily eliminated the threat of a German breakthrough to Novgorod. However, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on July 19, and by July 27, they fought back to the prepared positions of the Luga line. But the local victory also had a downside. Throwing fresh formations into battle, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov simultaneously deprived himself of the only combat-ready reserve.
Organizational and combat actions in late July - early August
On July 21, 1941, Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev was issued a warrant for arrest. It said that he was suspected of criminal activity under Art. 58-10, part 1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. September 17 sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was found guilty of:
The Luga task force, gradually saturated with troops, was divided into the Kingisepp, Luga and Eastern sectors (since July 29 - sections) of defense by operational directive No. 3049 of the headquarters of the Northern Front of July 23, 1941, the headquarters of the Luga task force was disbanded, and its officers and generals were sent to staffing the headquarters of the sections, with their direct subordination to the headquarters of the Northern Front.
On July 31, the Eastern sector was transformed into the Novgorod Army Operational Group, which in early August was subordinate to the North-Western Front. By the directive of the General Staff of August 4, the Novgorod Army Operational Group was transformed into the 48th Army, headed by Lieutenant General S. D. Akimov.
To exclude the possibility of landing bypassing defensive positions, on July 28, the Ilmenskaya flotilla was created from the ships of the river shipping company on Lake Ilmen. Commander - captain of the 3rd rank V. M. Drevnitsky. By order of the front commander No. 0278, the flotilla was subordinated to the 48th Army. Her ships carried guard duty in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the Novgorod and Staraya Russian directions, and participated in the landing of tactical assault forces. From August 14, the flotilla covered the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of the population from Novgorod with artillery fire, and then acted on the Volkhov River.
Successful defensive battles in July 1941 in the Solets and Shimsky directions instilled some optimism in the command of the North-West direction. Near Staraya Russa, a counterattack was being prepared on the flank of the advancing Army Group North, and on the Luga defensive line, the entrenched units were to firmly hold their positions and prevent the Nazis from further advancing to Leningrad. Despite the significant strengthening of the Luga frontier by infantry and tank units, the density of Soviet troops remained quite low. For example, the 177th Rifle Division of the Luga sector of defense, covering the most important direction to the city of Luga and having three enemy divisions in front of it, took up defense on a front of 22 km. Exactly the same front was defended by the 111th Rifle Division of the same defense sector. Even the difficult terrain did not compensate for the stretching of the troops along the front and their one-echelon arrangement of formations.
At the end of July, a document was prepared at the headquarters of the 24th Panzer Division summarizing the experience of the first month of the war, including characterizing the actions of the German troops:
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The Smolensk defensive operation of the troops of the Western Front had a great influence on the outcome of the struggle of the Soviet troops in July in the Leningrad direction. Having stopped Army Group Center east of Smolensk at the end of July, the troops of the Western Front deprived the enemy of the opportunity to carry out the planned strike of the 3rd Panzer Group from the area north of Smolensk on the flank and rear of the troops of the North-Western Front.
The unexpectedly formed pause, each of the parties sought to use as much as possible. While the Germans were developing a plan to resume the attack on Leningrad, the Soviet command was strengthening the city's defenses. Of course, both at Hitler's headquarters and at the headquarters of Army Group North understood that the faster their troops resumed the offensive, the less time the Russians would have to strengthen their defenses. However, the start of the offensive was delayed six times, mainly due to difficulties in supply and regrouping, and also because of disagreements about how to proceed.
By August 8, the German command regrouped its troops and created three strike groups:
strike force |
Commanding |
Subdivisions |
Impact direction |
Northern ("North") |
Erich Hoepner |
41st Motorized Corps(1st, 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions, 36th Motorized Division, 1st Infantry Division) 38th Army Corps(58th Infantry Division) 1st Aviation Corps |
from the Ivanovskoye and Sabsk bridgeheads across the Koporskoe plateau in the direction of Leningrad |
Central ("Luga") |
Erich von Manstein |
56th Motorized Corps(3rd Motorized Division, 269th Infantry Division, SS Infantry Division "Policeman") |
along the highway Luga - Leningrad in the direction of Leningrad |
Southern ("Shimsk") |
Ernst Bush |
1st Army Corps(11th, 22nd Infantry Divisions and part of the 126th Infantry Division) 28th Army Corps((121st, 122nd Infantry Divisions, SS Motorized Division "Totenkopf" and 96th Infantry Division in reserve) 8th Aviation Corps |
in the Novgorod-Chudovsk direction, bypass Leningrad from the east and connect with the Finnish troops |
By the beginning of August, Army Group North had lost 42 thousand people, and only 14 thousand people received replenishment. Back in mid-July, the command of the Army Group North came to the conclusion that the resistance of the enemy and the lack of its own forces would not allow capturing Leningrad immediately. This task can be solved only by the consistent defeat of the Russian forces. OKW Directive No. 33 of July 19 stated:
The 16th Army would be able to cover the right flank of the 4th Panzer Group only after it had completed the defeat of the encircled Soviet formations near Nevel or had thrown them back to the east. According to Field Marshal von Leeb, the offensive should have been postponed until July 25th. This did not suit Hitler at all, who sought to put an end to Leningrad as soon as possible, and on July 21 the Fuhrer flew to Leeb's headquarters, the German general outlined his thoughts to Hitler: until sufficient infantry forces approached, Göpner's tank group could hardly count on success.
As a result, the German command decided to break into the Soviet defenses on the flanks, and a minimum of forces were left in the Luga direction to tie down the Soviet troops. The main idea of the German attack on Leningrad was to encircle and destroy its defenders on the distant approaches to the city. Cutting off the Luga grouping of Soviet troops from the fortifications directly near Leningrad, Army Group North opened up the possibility of unhindered advancement, both to Leningrad itself and bypassing the city to join the Finnish army on the Svir River.
Breakthrough of the line near Kingisepp
The northern grouping of General Erich Göpner can be conditionally called "tank", since it was here that all the tank divisions of Army Group North were concentrated. These divisions were supposed to "open" bridgeheads on the Luga River, using primarily their shock, and not maneuvering qualities. Due to transport problems in the 16th Army, the time for the transition to the offensive of Army Group North was postponed five times from July 22 to August 6. When the last appointed date came - August 8, 1941 - the weather worsened, it began to rain, and not a single plane could take off. German troops were deprived of the planned powerful air support. However, Goepner vigorously objected to a further delay in the start of the operation, and the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group from the bridgeheads on the Luga River near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoy Sabsk began without air support. The attack ran into strong resistance from the Soviet troops, supported by artillery. For three days, units of the 90th Rifle Division, units of the 2nd People's Militia Division and the remnants of a detachment of cadets from the Leningrad Infantry School held back the onslaught of Göpner's 4th Panzer Group. Count Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 6th Panzer Division, named the following reasons for the unsuccessful offensive:
1. The strength of the newly equipped Russian positions, the scale of which turned out to be unexpected and unknown to us, and their main area lay in the offensive zone of the division. Several anti-tank ditches, barriers of all kinds, countless mines, pillboxes made of thick logs or concrete, often armed with small-caliber automatic cannons, connected to each other with barbed wire, turned this line in the swampy forest into a reinforced position like the so-called "Stalin Line". These positions were still created from the beginning of the war, as the locals later told us. 2. The enemy was fully aware of the significance of this fight. The divisions were opposed by troops made up partly of Leningrad civilians, who compensated for their lack of training with even greater bitterness. 3. The reason for the tactical failure of the division offensive on August 8 should be sought, first of all, in the fact that, as it was later established, the enemy intended to launch a powerful offensive on the division’s sector on that same day in the afternoon. On the night of August 7-8, the enemy was specially reinforced with artillery and infantry and undertook a regrouping, which the division command had not yet been able to find out about on the morning of August 8. Therefore, the combat use of the division no longer fully corresponded to the current state of affairs. The main blow came against the main blow. The shock from the received rebuff and from considerable losses was sensitive. |
The offensive was carried out again on August 11, by 11 o'clock, in an area covered with forest and spruce, the German troops managed to find a weak spot in the Soviet defense, through which the tanks had already broken through. Under strong pressure from superior enemy forces, the defenders of this section of the Kingisepp sector began to retreat to the east and north. After breaking through in depth, the 1st and 6th Panzer Divisions stood with their front to the east to form an internal front for encircling Soviet troops near Luga, and the 1st Infantry and 36th Motorized Divisions - for an external encirclement front. Three days of fighting cost the advancing 1600 people killed. The 8th Panzer Division was also introduced into the battle from the bridgehead near Bolshoi Sabsk. On August 14, the divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps crossed the forest and reached the Krasnogvardeysk-Kingisepp road. Thus, by the end of August 14, the Luga line in the Kingisepp sector was broken through - according to both sides. On August 16, German units occupy Kingisepp and Narva; units of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army leave Estonia and cross to the right bank of the Narva River. The 11th, 12th, 18th and 19th separate railway batteries of 180-356 mm caliber operating in this area provided great assistance to the defending troops. On August 21, a 356-mm battery destroyed a German crossing over the Luga River in the Porechie region with its fire. On August 22, German troops reached the firing range of coastal batteries, and they opened fire, supporting the troops of the 8th Army. During the fierce battles for Kingisepp, the 8th Army lost all its regimental and battalion commanders, as well as their headquarters.
Fights near Luga
The front line on the outskirts of the city of Luga was shaped like a horseshoe - Soviet troops occupied an arched ledge with Luga in the center. The Luga group was the holding center of the German offensive. Here the 56th motorized corps (269th infantry division, the SS division "Policeman" and the 3rd motorized division) dealt a pinching blow, simulating a blow at the shortest distance to Leningrad and not allowing the Soviet command to withdraw troops to the rescue of the neighboring sectors of the defense of the Luga line . At the same time, the shackling by battles did not allow the troops near Luga to quickly break away from the enemy and break out of the emerging encirclement in time.
On August 10, units of the SS division "Policeman", as well as units of the 269th Infantry Division, launched an offensive to the west of the Pskov-Luga highway. The frontal offensive, at first, did not lead to success and was associated with huge casualties, the SS division alone lost 2000 people killed and wounded. The commander of the SS division "Policeman", General Arthur Mülferstedt, trying to morally support his subordinates in the area of emerging success, appeared on the battlefield and was killed by a mortar mine.
On August 11, SS units made their way to the settlement of Stoyanovshchina. Here they were met by counterattacks from the tanks of the 24th Panzer Division. Despite the presence in the ranks of the attacking KV tanks, the counterattack was repelled by the Germans. The Luga group of Soviet troops had only three KV tanks, there were too few of them to be used as tank ambushes, since the German units could simply bypass the dug-in tanks from the rear. It was impossible to place all three KV tanks at the front, there would still be gaps between them that could not be shot through. Therefore, the only option remained counterattacks, in which KV somehow knocked out or got stuck. As a result of the battles from August 10 to 14, the Soviet troops lost 2 KV tanks and 27 BT tanks.
After successfully securing positions near Stoyanovshchina, an attack by SS "Police" units followed in the direction of the highway, in the rear of the units defending it. Thus, the Soviet defenses across the highway were rolled up and the breakthrough was expanded. These battles continued until 19 August. But even after that, the Germans did not dare to advance along the highway. On August 23-24, German troops broke through between the lakes Bolshoye Toloni and Cheremenetskoye (east of the highway) and reached the Luga River upstream of the city of Luga. This made it possible to attack the city from the east and capture it already on August 24th. The SS men announced the capture of 1937 prisoners, the destruction of 53 tanks, 28 guns, 13 anti-tank guns, the engineer battalion of the SS division “Policeman” removed or defused 6790 mines of all types containing 46 tons of explosives. German sappers noted with annoyance that many Soviet mines were in wooden cases, which excluded their detection by a standard mine detector.
Breakthrough of the line in the Novgorod region
The southern grouping of the German troops of General Bush can be conditionally considered "infantry." Unfavorable terrain conditions did not allow the use of tanks in this direction, and the main blow here was dealt by six infantry divisions. Air support was provided by Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, which included about 400 aircraft, in addition, the corps had a significant amount of anti-aircraft artillery, which was actively used in battles on the ground. The 1st Army Corps under the command of General of the Infantry Kuno-Hans von Both was supposed to attack Novgorod directly. The width of the offensive front of the corps was only 16 km. The corps was reinforced by the 659th and 666th assault gun batteries and several heavy artillery battalions.
Unlike Goepner, the commander of the 16th Army, General Bush, decided not to give up air support in the attack on Novgorod. When the weather deteriorated sharply on the evening of August 7, the offensive was abandoned the next morning, the units that had taken their original positions were withdrawn. When the weather did not change the next day, the start of the offensive was again postponed. Finally, on August 10, the weather improved and at 05:20, after air and artillery strikes, the infantry went on the offensive, as a result of the fighting on that day, the Germans managed to almost completely open the defense system of the 48th Army and determine its weak point - the positions of the mountain rifle brigade. The next morning, August 11, fighting resumed. The Germans again struck the main blow in the area of the mountain rifle brigade. Due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons and air cover among the Soviet troops, the pilots of the Richthofen corps destroyed equipment with impunity, shot the defenders from machine guns, operating freely along the entire front. The wire communication, the control system were completely disrupted and artillery positions were destroyed. The aviation of the North-Western Front was unable to provide assistance to its infantry, during the day the aircraft made only 44 sorties, 4 bombers and 40 fighters.
The breakthrough of the defense of the 48th Army in the Novgorod direction was completed on August 13. The decisive role that day was played by the fact that a detailed defense plan for the 128th Infantry Division fell into the hands of the Germans. It marked minefields, false positions, artillery and machine-gun nests, the main centers of resistance and the distribution of forces between various defense sectors. The division commanders actively used their sappers to eliminate vast minefields, the sappers were followed by the vanguards of the advancing regiments. 88-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to destroy pillboxes.
On August 14, the command of the 70th and 237th rifle divisions, taking into account the current difficult situation (semi-encirclement by the enemy, capture of passing roads and lack of fuel, ammunition, food), it was decided to withdraw and on the night of August 16-17, covertly, divisions began to withdraw in the direction of Leningrad. German intelligence managed to find the escape routes of the units. The persecution began, first of all, by aerial bombardment and shelling. On August 19, during shelling, the acting commander of the 237th division, Colonel V. I. Tishinsky. The commander of the 70th division, Major General A.E. Fedyunin, died of wounds (according to other sources, he shot himself) surrounded on August 21. The 70th division, which emerged from the encirclement in small groups, numbered 3197 people on August 25, and the 237th division on August 29, 2259 people.
On the morning of August 15, the Germans made an attempt to capture Novgorod on the move, but it failed. Dive-bombers of the 8th Air Corps attacked Novgorod. Later, in reporting documents, the German command recognized the key role of aviation in the assault on Novgorod. The next day, the German flag fluttered over the Novgorod Kremlin. However, the battle for the city did not end there, until August 19, the remnants of the 28th Panzer Division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade continued to fight for its eastern part.
While the battles for Novgorod were going on, the 1st Army Corps was advancing towards Chudovo. The 11th Infantry Division took up defensive positions on the Volkhov to protect the right flank of the corps, and the battle group of the 21st Infantry Division captured Chudovo on August 20, cutting the Oktyabrskaya railway. The next day, units of the 1st Army Corps repulsed several Soviet counterattacks. The first task of the German offensive in this direction was completed. Thus, on August 20-22, the enemy advance units reached the near approaches to Leningrad and came into combat contact with units of the Krasnogvardeisky UR. After that, the 1st and 28th corps of the 16th army advance on Leningrad, and the formations of the 39th motorized corps advance in the direction of Lake Ladoga in order to join the Finnish troops there. Moving rapidly along the Moscow-Leningrad highway, the enemy occupies the city of Lyuban on August 25, and on August 29 reaches the near approaches to Leningrad in the Slutsk-Kolpino region (26 kilometers from Leningrad). So the German troops approached the city from the direction from which they could least be expected.
These days, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in order to help the troops of the Northern Front, directively orders to launch an offensive in the direction of Morino (the railway station in the Staraya Russa-Dno section) with the forces of the 34th Army allocated from the reserve of the Headquarters and the left wing of the 11th Army. On August 12, these formations went on the offensive and pushed the enemy back 40 kilometers. On August 15, 3 German infantry divisions of the 10th Army Corps were surrounded near Staraya Russa. In order to stop the offensive of the North-Western Front and eliminate the results of their advance, the command of the Army Group "North" urgently removes two motorized divisions from the Luga direction from the 56th Corps, the 3rd motorized division and the motorized division of the SS "Totenkopf", as well as 8- th Air Corps and transfers them to the aid of the 10th Army Corps of the 16th Army. At the same time, the 8th Panzer Division remains part of the 41st Motorized Corps and participates in the offensive against the Kingisepp sector. By the end of August 20, the offensive was stopped, the 34th Army was pinned down on the entire front.
By August 25, the 34th and 11th armies were pushed back to the line of the Lovat River. The offensive is over. The Germans announced the capture of 18 thousand prisoners, the capture or destruction of 20 tanks, 300 guns and mortars, 36 anti-aircraft guns, 700 vehicles. Here, the Germans first captured the launcher RS ("Katyusha"). Despite the fact that the attackers suffered heavy losses and were finally driven back to their original position, the German command changed its assessment of the Soviet troops south of Lake Ilmen. The counterattack of the 34th Army played a crucial role in the initial phase of the battle for Leningrad. With this blow, the mobile formations of the Wehrmacht tank groups were pulled away from the Luga line. Both the Luga group and the Shimsk group, aimed at the Luga line, were deprived of the success development echelon in the face of motorized divisions. In the conditions of extremely tight deadlines, within which it was possible to use mobile formations in Army Group North before their castling in September 1941 in the Moscow direction, even minimal delays gave a transition from quantity to quality. From this point of view, the role of the counterattack near Staraya Russa in the battle for Leningrad can hardly be overestimated.
Encirclement of the Luga Group of Forces
On August 24, the troops of the Luga Operational Group (since August 25, the Southern Operational Group) of General A. N. Astanin received combat order No. 102 of the headquarters of the Northern Front: leaving cover on the Luga River, regroup, and destroy the German units that had broken through south of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area. On the same day, Soviet troops left the city of Luga. On August 28, all supply routes were cut, the encircled units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel and food. Parts of the 41st Rifle Corps were in the "boiler": 70, 90, 111, 177th and 235th Rifle Divisions, 1st and 3rd DNO, 24th Panzer Division, about 43 thousand people in total . There were a large number of wounded in the troops: up to two thousand, of which about 500 were seriously wounded. Astanin received an order: to destroy or bury the material part, and the troops to leave the encirclement in small groups, in given directions. This order was carried out by Astanin. Attempts to break out of the encirclement in the northern direction did not bring success. On August 30, it was decided to split into several groups and go out to connect with the troops of the Northern Front near Leningrad in the Kirishi and Pogostye regions. The detachments were led by the commanders of formations and temporary associations - General A. N. Astanin, colonels: A. F. Mashoshin (commander of the 177th rifle division), A. G. Rodin (deputy commander of the 24th tank division, actually headed the 1st DNO), S. V. Roginsky (commander of the 11th Infantry Division) and G. F. Odintsov. The units that made their way from the "cauldron" gradually joined the defenders of Leningrad.
The front command made an attempt to organize the supply of the encircled grouping by air. According to the request of the headquarters of the Astanin group of September 4, 1941, 10 tons of crackers, 3 tons of concentrates, 20 tons of gasoline, 4 tons of diesel fuel, 1600 76-mm and 400 122-mm shells, as well as some other items - salt, autol and others. The transfer was carried out on the afternoon of September 5, 1941 by six P-5 aircraft and one Douglas. However, it quickly became clear that the enemy was patrolling the encirclement area with fighters. Of the seven aircraft, five did not return, including the Douglas. By September 11, hardly half of what was requested was delivered: 5.3 tons of crackers, 1 ton of concentrates, 5.2 tons of gasoline, 2.2 tons of diesel fuel, 450 rounds of 76 mm caliber. 122-mm shots were not delivered at all, medicines and trenching tools were delivered in addition to the application. The capabilities of the Soviet Air Force to supply the "boilers" by air in 1941 were quite modest, it should also be noted that since September 8, the connection between Leningrad and the mainland was interrupted, only communication over Lake Ladoga and by air remained. Transport aviation was involved in the supply of Leningrad itself, perhaps in other conditions the supply of the Astanin group would have become more effective.
The encircled Soviet troops continued to wage intense battles in the wooded and marshy area until September 1941, the release of the "cauldron" was finally abandoned only on September 14-15, when the fighting was already in full swing on the near approaches to Leningrad. The existence of a group of Soviet troops in the rear of Army Group North had a negative impact on the German offensive against Leningrad. The troops fighting near Luga, until August 31, fettered significant enemy forces, did not allow the German troops to use the shortest and most convenient communications - the railway and the Pskov-Leningrad highway. In addition, the troops of the Luga section, occupying central positions south of Leningrad, divided the enemy troops into three separate isolated groupings, preventing him from creating a single, continuous front.
About 13 thousand people were able to get out of the Luga "cauldron" to their own. According to published German data, 20 thousand people were taken prisoner. Most of the prisoners were captured by the 8th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht: 7083 prisoners were taken before September 11 (1100 of them on September 9), and 3500 people on September 14. About 10 thousand Soviet soldiers died in battles, trying to get out of the encirclement, small groups joined the partisans, or, having recovered from their wounds, left much later. Also known is a large group of fighters from the 24th Panzer Division, which headed towards Moscow.
For Soviet prisoners of war, the Germans set up a transit and filtering camp "Dulag-320". Basically, soldiers of the 41st Rifle Corps, which defended the Luga defensive line, were kept there. Among the prisoners of war, the Germans identified and shot the command staff, political workers and ordinary communists, representatives of the Soviet government, Jews, and gypsies. According to eyewitnesses, this camp was surrounded by barbed wire, guards stood on watchtowers. In 1941 there were not only barracks, but even sheds. The prisoners sat right on the ground, and then on the snow. Typhus and dysentery raged in the camp, up to two hundred people died from disease and hunger per day. Later, other camps arose, the prisoners held in them were driven out to build roads and dismantle the ruins.
Grade
It should be noted that there were significant shortcomings in the organization of defense at the Luga line: one-echelon formation of troops in armies, operational groups and fronts, weak reserves, insufficient density of troops, even distribution of forces and means along the entire front, and weak saturation of defense with engineering structures. Naturally, such a defense could not withstand the massive attacks of the tank troops, and the German troops managed to break through the Soviet defensive orders.
During the construction of the Luga defensive line, mistakes were also made, both tactical and technical. Tactical - low density of firing structures, insufficient depth of separation, embrasures of predominantly frontal action, insufficient camouflage of structures. Technical - insufficient wall thickness; the dimensions of the casemates, which do not always provide normal working conditions for the gun crew, lack of ventilation; lack of lighting; lack of communication and the ability to monitor the battlefield. All these mistakes made the defense system in a number of areas unstable.
There were many shortcomings at all levels and sections from the first to the last day of work, starting with reconnaissance and ending with the installation of weapons at firing points, and the shortcomings that occurred in the first days of work were noted a month later; as a result, far from everything was built. Even the provision of information on the progress of work to higher headquarters was badly done. The lack of a general developed tactical task caused conflicting requirements in the military units for the construction of firing points. Sometimes, the lack of tools reached the point of absurdity - for example, on August 2 in the village of Glubokaya (Kingisepp sector) there were 2 axes for 2500 workers, but in general, the workers were provided with a sufficient amount of tools. There are cases when instructions were received from Leningrad on construction on territory already occupied by the enemy. Calculations for the use of the local population were not always justified, since sometimes the population was evacuated even before the start of work. Due to the hot summer, many wetlands dried up, and the line in these places required additional reinforcement, which was not foreseen in the plans. Reconnaissance and construction planning was carried out more slowly than reinforced concrete and armored prefabricated firing points and gouges arrived at the railway stations.
Some of the buildings that were built were never used. For example, defensive structures were built along the western bank of the Volkhov from Lake Ladoga to Gostinopolye, directed by the front to the east. It was impossible to use these structures for defense against the enemy advancing from the west, on the contrary, they could be used by the enemy when reaching the Volkhov line, so they were destroyed by order of Major General A. M. Vasilevsky.
The directive of the Military Council of the North-Western Direction dated July 29, 1941 No. 013 / op also stated that the positions of troops on the front line were not equipped with trenches of the proper depth, dugouts, communication lines, barbed wire. Artillery, mortar and machine-gun positions were poorly chosen and camouflaged. The minefield is random and ill-conceived. The issues of ensuring the maneuver of troops, both along the front and in the depth of their location, have not been thought out.
Nevertheless, with all the shortcomings, the fortifications of the Luga line were highly appreciated by the enemy. During the battles near Luga, the German troops had to move from an offensive march directly to severe military operations, which were affected not only by the terrain and weather conditions, but also by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops. German soldiers noted skillful camouflage and skill in using terrain features, numerous and varied fortifications. Considering that the Luga defensive structures were being built for many months, they were forced to use all their skills, abilities and technical means to overcome them. The defense of Luga was also assessed by German fortification specialists. On September 23, 1941, "about the experience of the Russians in the accelerated construction of fortifications in the Luga region," the inspector general of the sapper and fortress troops of the Wehrmacht, Alfred Jacob, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder.
Information about Soviet fortifications and how to deal with them was distributed in the German army; in early September, the troops received a document about the fortifications near Luga. It examined in detail all types of defensive structures used at the Luga line. Separately, such an innovation as prefabricated pillboxes, built from large concrete blocks, was noted, which made it possible to build them in a short time.
Results
From July 10, when the offensive began in the Luga direction, and until August 24, when the German troops captured Luga, 45 days passed. Until July 10, that is, before approaching the Luga defensive line, the average daily rate of advance of the Germans was 26 kilometers per day; then it fell to 5 kilometers per day, and in August to 2.2 kilometers per day. The delay of the German troops allowed the leadership of the defense of Leningrad to solve a number of priority tasks:
- formation of new military formations, their training. The 272nd, 281st rifle and 25th cavalry divisions were formed.
- Starting from June 29, a mass militia is being created. In a short time in Leningrad, 160 thousand people signed up for the people's militia. 10 divisions, 16 separate machine-gun and artillery battalions, 7 partisan regiments were formed. Part of the militias replenished the thinned ranks of units and formations. To carry out this complex and important work, the administration of the Leningrad People's Militia Army was created under the command of Major General A. I. Subbotin. Already in the second decade of July, two divisions of the people's militia joined the ranks of the defenders of the Luga line.
- to defend Leningrad from the south, two new armies are being formed - the 42nd and 55th. The management of the 42nd Army was created by August 3 on the basis of the abolished 50th Rifle Corps of the 23rd Army. Major General V. I. Shcherbakov was appointed commander of the army. On the basis of the also abolished directorate of the 10th mechanized corps, the directorate of the Slutsk-Kolpinsky operational group was first created, which on September 2 was transformed into the directorate of the 55th army. Major General of the Tank Forces I. G. Lazarev was appointed its commander.
- Simultaneously with the improvement of the fortifications of the Luga line, by decision of the Military Councils of the North-Western Direction and the Northern Front, defensive lines are being built in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad. In July, the construction of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area began. For this, the population of Leningrad and the region is again mobilized - up to 500 thousand people.
- for the period from June 29 to August 27, 1941, 488,703 people were evacuated from Leningrad; in addition, during this period, the population of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Karelian-Finnish SSR was evacuated to Leningrad - 147,500 people.
In general, the protracted nature of the struggle for Leningrad, unexpected for the German command, had a significant impact on the entire further course of the Great Patriotic War.
Memory
On April 30, 1944, the Heroic Defense of Leningrad exhibition opened in Leningrad. The exhibition was very popular among Leningraders and guests of the city. Only in the first three months after the opening, the exhibition was visited by more than 150 thousand people. The exhibition covered in detail, including the battles on the Luga frontier. On October 5, 1945, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to transform the exhibition into a museum of republican significance - the Leningrad Defense Museum. In terms of attendance, the museum ranked second after the Hermitage. More than 37 thousand exhibits illustrating the course of the battle for Leningrad and the life of the besieged city were placed in 37 halls on 40 thousand m². The 4th hall was dedicated to the struggle on the distant approaches to Leningrad, it housed photographs, maps and illustrations depicting individual moments and scales of defense construction. Including, the panel of the artist V. A. Serov "Construction of defensive structures" was placed. On the central wall - a panel by the artist Rosenblum and A.S. Bantikov "Seeing the militia", here is the banner of the Sverdlovsk division, portraits, maps, combat operations and weapons of the militia. The exhibition was complemented by an electrified model of the Luga fortified area.
However, in 1949 the museum was closed due to the growing “Leningrad case”, and by March 1953 the Leningrad Defense Museum was gone. Funds, scientific and auxiliary materials, scientific archives and household property were transferred to the State Museum of the History of Leningrad, part of the exhibits and the library - to the Museum of the October Revolution, the other part - to various military units and museums. Some manuscripts from the museum were also transferred to the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At the same time, some of the exhibits turned out to be damaged, some were lost.
As of the mid-2010s, there are several museums presenting the battles on the Luga frontier: the Luga and Kingisepp local history museums, the revived Leningrad Defense Museum, the exposition "Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War" of the Museum of the History of St. Luga line, a separate section of the exposition in the department of the history of the engineering troops of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineer Troops and Signal Corps. It should also be noted the section of the museum of the Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Red Banner School named after S. M. Kirov dedicated to the battles at the Luga line and the folk museum in the House of Culture in the village of Bolshoi Sabsk.
There are many monuments, memorials, commemorative signs on the battlefields:
In Novgorod, one of the sculptural bas-reliefs of the monument-stele "City of Military Glory" is dedicated to an episode of the city's defense, when during the counterattack, on August 24, 1941, A.K. Pankratov was the first in history to cover an enemy machine gun with his body.
In August of this year, we celebrated one of the significant dates of the Great Patriotic War - the 72nd anniversary of the battles at the Luga defensive line. These hardest battles of the Red Army formations with the superior forces of the German Wehrmacht in July-August 1941, during which our soldiers and commanders showed selflessness, heroism, the ability to fight tactically competently, played a huge role in the defense of Leningrad. And not only in his defense, in the fate of our entire Fatherland.
On June 26, when Finland entered the war, and hostilities began on the Northern Front, formed on June 24 from formations, units and institutions of the Leningrad Military District, the situation deteriorated sharply. From the north and north-west, Leningrad was threatened by a grouping of the Finnish army, and from the south-west, the main forces of Army Group North were rushing towards the city on the Neva - the 4th tank group, consisting of the 1st, 6th, 8th tank, 3rd, 36th motorized, 269th infantry divisions and the SS division "Dead Head".
During the first 18 days of the offensive, the 4th Panzer Group of the Nazis fought over 600 kilometers (more than 30 km per day). On July 9, enemy troops occupied Pskov. Our troops could not hold back the rapid advance of the Nazis and began to retreat from the Pskov-Ostrovsky region to the city of Luga. And through Luga along the Kyiv highway passed the shortest way to Leningrad.
The plans of the German command included the task of seizing Leningrad and Kronstadt on the move and at the same time preventing the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the East. After the capture of Leningrad, Army Group North was planned to turn to Moscow. The naval and air forces of Germany were to destroy the Baltic Fleet.
On June 23, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, on the advice of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, ordered the start of work on the creation of an additional defense line in the Luga area. This work was headed by the deputy commander of the district, Lieutenant-General K. P. Pyadyshev, holder of three orders of the Red Banner, participant in the First World, Civil and Soviet-Finnish wars.
The creation of a defensive line along the Luga River began with a reconnaissance conducted from 23 to 26 June. Then the Northern Front organized the Office of Military Field Construction, and the construction of the Luga fortification began. On July 4, the Military Council of the front received a directive from the Stavka on the creation of the Luga defensive line and its immediate occupation by troops:
In the construction of the Luga defensive line, not only military units took part, but also the local population, Leningraders, for the most part, women and teenagers (men went into the army and the militia) under the guidance of sappers. More than half a million civilians took part in these works.
The fortifications consisted of two defense lines with a length of up to 175 km and a depth of 10-12 km. Mines were laid in front of the front line and in the depths of the defense, anti-tank ditches were torn off, forest blockages were arranged, and the area was swamped.
A small river with a beautiful Russian name Luga. 350 kilometers long, 30-70 meters wide. But it was the Luga River that had to become the first formidable frontier on which Soviet soldiers met the Nazi invaders, who were rushing to Leningrad. Here, long before the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 "Not a step back!", Russian soldiers and warriors of other nationalities stood to death. But the forces were clearly unequal.
The Luga operational group included the 70th, 111th, 177th and 191st rifle divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd divisions of the people's militia, the Leningrad rifle and machine gun school, the Leningrad Red Banner named after S. M. Kirov infantry school, 1st mountain rifle brigade, artillery group from parts of the Luga camp collection (regiment of artillery advanced training courses for command personnel, division of the 28th artillery regiment, artillery batteries of the Leningrad artillery schools, anti-aircraft division of the Leningrad school of instrumental reconnaissance of anti-aircraft artillery). For air cover, aviation from the entire Northern Front was brought in under the command of Major General Aviation A. A. Novikov.
The first attempt to capture Leningrad on the move was made by the command of Army Group North on July 10. But the divisions of the Wehrmacht, approaching the Luga defensive position, met with stubborn resistance. Day and night, hot battles did not subside. Important settlements and centers of resistance changed hands several times. Having failed to overcome the defenses of the Soviet troops and having suffered heavy losses during the counterattack of the Red Army in the area of the city of Soltsy, where the 8th Panzer Division and an engineer regiment were defeated in four-day battles on July 13-17, the German command on July 19 was forced to suspend the attack on Leningrad until approach of the main forces. Although the fighting on the defensive line continued almost continuously.
The successes of the first weeks of the war instilled confidence in the minds of the German generals about the weak resistance of the Soviet troops, and they hoped, starting the offensive on July 10, to overcome the distance to Leningrad in 4 days. However, already on the second day of the offensive, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, General Gepner, realized that in the Luga direction, the shortest to Leningrad, it would not be possible to break through without heavy losses.
Only after the approach and deployment of additional forces did the enemy launch a decisive offensive on August 8 in the Kingisepp direction, and on August 10 in the Novgorod and Luga directions. Having pulled up reserves and using a clear superiority in tanks and aircraft, the enemy approached the front line of the main line of defense with battles.
The troops of the Luga sector of defense repulsed the attacks of the enemy, who delivered his main blow to the southwestern outskirts of the city of Luga and tried to break through along the Luga-Leningrad highway. Fierce battles were fought on the main line of defense of the 177th Infantry Division. In this area, the enemy was detained for another fifteen days. The soldiers of the 177th Infantry Division and other units and formations waged battles with a brutal enemy for every settlement, for every piece of land. The Nazis conducted massive artillery fire on the battle formations of our troops, and aircraft continuously struck. It was an unparalleled persistent and active defense.
The 177th Rifle Division was the youngest of all divisions in the Leningrad Military District. But it was she who made the Luga line impenetrable for the Nazis until they bypassed it in the regions of Novgorod and Kingisepp. Tanks and infantry did not cut on August 28 the only road connecting the city of Luga with Krasnogvardeysk and Leningrad near the village. Siversky. Units of the 177th division were forced to break out of the encirclement through tens of kilometers of swamps, bogs, windbreaks, along with the wounded and guns. They made their way methodically and systematically, without losing self-control and giving the Germans the last battle in the Sorochkin area.
Without ammunition, the fighters of the Luga line, even in complete encirclement, did not lay down their arms. There they perished, being shot from the air by the "Messerschmidts" of the 1st Air German Army. Few broke through to Leningrad. According to some reports, no more than 500 people left the encirclement from the 177th rifle division. Until now, the remains of missing soldiers and commanders of the Red Army lie in the forests, Mshinsky swamps. The remains of the Heroes who, at the cost of their lives, did not allow the enemy to capture Leningrad.
The selfless actions of the defenders of the Luga line stopped the German offensive, which made it possible to create a stronger defense on the near approaches to Leningrad and stop the enemy. The formations of the Red Army delayed the Nazis in this important strategic direction for almost 50 days. Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky compared the Luga line with the battle near Smolensk, and Luga with Brest, Mogilev, Libava.
Naturally, we must be aware that our troops, who at that time did not have the experience of such large-scale military operations, opposed a much more organized, trained and equipped enemy, who had marched through half of Europe in a victorious march. But what the Soviet soldiers and officers did is worthy of respect and admiration. This is a colossal example of courage and patriotism for us living today.
In the battles on the Luga frontier, my uncle, my father's elder brother, Evgeny Nikolaevich Antonov, died. But not only these tragic events for our family prompted me to turn to the topic of the battles near Luga. This is also the significance of the Luga defense for the fate of our country. It was the defenders of the Luga line who laid the foundation for the heroic 900-day defense of Leningrad and subsequently the defeat of the Nazi troops near the walls of our city in January 1944.
The battle on the Luga line was one of the decisive in the first months of the war and to a large extent frustrated the plans of the German command for a blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, these events of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are not as well known today as they deserve. This gap must be filled. Here, I believe, poets, writers and their colleagues in the creative community should have their say.
LETTER TO YOUNGER BROTHER
To my uncle - Evgeny Nikolaevich
Antonov and the soldiers of the 177th rifle division who fell on the Luga line,
dedicated
I died in the forty-first among the Mshinsky swamps,
No more than two companies remained from the regiment.
The fighters walking along the gate, including me,
Shot "Messerschmitt" in the light of a clear day.
And I was twenty, like many guys,
Who didn't say goodbye to their mothers.
No more to see, relatives, to me you,
We carried out, brother, the order.
For a long time near Luga they fought with the enemy,
They fought desperately for every house.
And nearby the earth trembled from explosions,
But we understood that it was impossible to go back, brother.
Here the obelisks stand on bumps,
Bushes and birches keep our peace.
Farewell salute to us - Sunset.
You sometimes remember me, brother.
Know that I'm in a hard war
Fell, remaining faithful to the country.
Take care of our parents
One remains the backbone of the family.
You will give birth to children, give them a command,
Let them live for themselves and for us.
And teach them, my beloved brother:
Before enemies - not a step back.
April 2013
Andrey ANTONOV, Leningrad
Regional branch of the Writers' Union of Russia
To protect the distant approaches to Leningrad, it was necessary to build a defensive line from the Gulf of Finland along the Luga River to Lake Ilmen, occupy it on the entire 250-km front with troops and create solid anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers in front of the defense.
Commander of the Northern Front Lieutenant General Popov M.M., fulfilling the decision of the Stavka, on July 6 created Luga Task Force under the command of Deputy Front Commander Lieutenant General Pyadysheva K.P. The group was to include: 4 rifle divisions (70, 111, 177 and 191); 1st, 2nd and 3rd divisions of the people's militia; Leningrad Rifle and Machine Gun School; Leningrad Red Banner named after S.M. Kirov Infantry School; 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade; an artillery group from parts of the Luga camp assembly under the command of Colonel Odintsov G.F. To cover the troops of the group from the air, aviation from the entire Northern Front was involved under the command of Major General Aviation Novikov A.A.
By July 9, the Luga task force occupied the eastern and central defense sector from the city of Luga to Lake Ilmen. The area on the lower reaches of the Luga River remained unoccupied, on which the troops had just begun to advance.
During the 18 days of the offensive, armored and motorized units of the enemy overcame the line that ran along the Western Dvina and occupied the Pskov fortified area. It became clear that Army Group "North" intended to strike with the main forces through Lugu to Krasnogvardeysk, in order to then immediately take possession of Leningrad and unite with the Finnish troops.
The Luga fortified position was not yet ready. The Narva and Kingisepp directions were covered by the 191st Rifle Division. The 70th, 111th, and 177th Rifle Divisions were just advancing into the combat area, while the people's militia divisions were generally in the process of being formed. In this situation, the Military Council of the Northern Front decided, in order to strengthen the Luga direction, to transfer the reserve 237th rifle division from the Petrozavodsk direction, and 2 divisions of the 10th mechanized corps from the Karelian Isthmus. It was risky, as the northern sector of defense was weakened, but there was no other way out.
After the capture of Pskov, the tank and motorized formations of the German troops did not wait for the approach of the main forces of the 16th and 18th armies, but resumed the offensive: with the 41st motorized corps on Luga, and the 56th motorized corps on Novgorod.
The 90th and 111th Soviet Rifle Divisions, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, fought back to the forefield of the Luga defensive zone and on July 12, together with the 177th Rifle Division, stopped the advance of the enemy. An attempt by two tank and one German infantry divisions to break through to the city of Luga in this direction was not successful.
On July 10, two tank, motorized and infantry divisions of the 41st motorized corps of the 4th tank group of German troops, with the support of aviation, attacked parts of the 118th rifle division north of Pskov. Having forced her to retreat to Gdov, they rushed to Luga from another front. A day later, the Germans reached the Plyussa River and started a battle with the covering forces of the Luga Operational Group.
The 191st and 177th rifle divisions, the 1st division of the people's militia, the 1st mountain rifle brigade, cadets of the Leningrad Red Banner Infantry School named after S.M. Kirov and the Leningrad Rifle and Machine Gun School. The 24th tank division was in reserve, and the 2nd division of the people's militia was advancing to the front line.
Fight to the last grenade, to the last bullet...
Formations and units defended on a wide front. Between them there were gaps of 20-25 km, not occupied by troops. Some important areas, such as Kingisepp, turned out to be undisguised. The 106th Engineer and 42nd Pontoon Battalions set up anti-tank minefields in the foredfield area. Intensive work was still carried out at the Luga position. Tens of thousands of Leningraders and the local population took part in them.
The German divisions, approaching the forefield of the Luga defensive position, ran into stubborn resistance. Day and night, hot battles did not subside. Important settlements and centers of resistance changed hands several times. On July 13, the enemy managed to wedge into the supply zone, but on the morning of the next day, the forward detachments of the 177th Rifle and units of the 24th Panzer Division, supported by powerful artillery fire, knocked him out of the forefield and again took up positions along the Plyussa River. A large role in repelling the onslaught of enemy tanks was played by the artillery group of Colonel Odintsova. One howitzer battery of a senior lieutenant Yakovleva A.V. destroyed 10 enemy tanks.
The German command decided to change the direction of the main attack. The main forces of the 41st Motorized Corps were ordered to move on Kingisepp. Covertly, along country and forest roads, German tank and motorized units at a fast pace began to bypass the grouping of troops of the Northern Front, located in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Luga. Soon they reached the Luga River, 20-25 km southeast of Kingisepp. On July 14, the advance detachment of the Germans crossed the river and created a bridgehead on its northern bank near the village of Ivanovskoye.
The maneuver of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group from the Luga to the Kingisepp direction was timely discovered by reconnaissance of the front. At the same time, the reconnaissance group was especially distinguished Lebedeva V.D. operating behind enemy lines. She reported on the intensive movement of German tanks and motorized columns from Strug Krasny and Plyussa to Lyady and further to the Luga River. The regrouping of German troops was followed by our air reconnaissance. The front command took urgent measures to cover the Kingisepp sector. The dispatch to this direction of the 2nd division of the people's militia was accelerated, formed from volunteers from the Moscow region of Leningrad and a tank battalion of the Leningrad Red Banner armored improvement courses for command personnel, which began to form hastily on July 15, 1941.
The aviation of the front began to strike at the enemy's crossings and at his approaching columns. For this, the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the 7th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Corps were also used, which were operationally subordinate to the Commander of the Air Force of the Front, Major General Novikov A.A.
On July 14, Commander-in-Chief of the North-West Direction Voroshilov K.E. together with the commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General Popov M.M. arrived in the Kingisepp area, where units of the 2nd division of the people's militia tried to "knock down" the German troops from the captured bridgehead on the Luga River. The militias were supported by a combined tank regiment and a separate tank battalion of KV tanks.
From July 16 to July 21, tank units were used in battles in the Kingisepp area. The tanks were thrown into battle on the move, attacked the enemy head-on, without reconnaissance, without the support of infantry and artillery, and suffered a complete fiasco - the enemy's bridgehead could not be eliminated. On the Luga line, the fighting was fierce and bloody, especially on July 17, when for 15 hours our units held back the enemy’s onslaught and counterattacked themselves.
Nevertheless, in general, in mid-July, German troops were detained at the Luga line, which allowed the Soviet command to continue building fortifications on the near approaches to Leningrad. From mid-July, tank units of the 1st and 10th mechanized corps, as well as armored trains and railcars, began to be involved in supporting the actions of the Luga Operational Group.
Having carried out a counterattack under Salts, the Red Army pushed the enemy back from Shimsk to the west by more than 40 km, eliminating the danger of the Nazis capturing Novgorod. On July 25, the Germans resumed their attacks in the area of the Serebryanka station. The battles for Serebryanka lasted 5 days, the station changed hands several times. It was one of the most difficult and responsible periods in the first 15 days of defense. Fierce fighting reached hand-to-hand combat. Our troops left the area up to 9 km deep. Soviet units suffered heavy losses ...
On July 23, 1941, in order to improve the command and control of the troops of the Luga Operational Group, the Military Council of the Front divided it into 3 independent sectors - Kingisepp, Luga and Eastern, subordinating them directly to the front.
The troops of the Kingisepp sector under the command of Major General Semashko V.V. received the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from the south along the Gdovskoye highway to Narva and through Kingisepp to Leningrad. Connections of the Luga sector (they were headed by Major General Astanin A.N.) blocked all roads that led to Leningrad from the southwest. The Novgorod direction was defended by the troops of the eastern sector, commanded by Major General Starikov F.N. At the direction of the Headquarters, from July 29, 1941, the sectors began to be called sections.
On July 29, German units occupied the villages Volosovichi, Nikolskoye, Ryuten and attacked along the Luga Highway. By evening, the German column "head" reached the village of Bunny. Soviet 24th Panzer Division, like other tank units, in the Luga direction was used in small groups, in different sectors, to contain the advancing enemy, and not to go to the rear and destroy him. At the same time, there were favorable conditions and opportunities for this, since the enemy moved only along certain sectors where there were good roads.
Each combined arms commander wanted to use tanks in his area to "push out" the enemy and to provide moral support to his infantry. As a result, the division was torn apart. In fact, it acted in five directions.
Parts of the division did not have a unified command, supply and recovery. The divisional headquarters was broken into pieces, as were the divisional units. Orders were given by higher commanders, as a rule, orally with a personal visit to the troops or through the chief of staff. There was no written confirmation of verbal orders. The time for preparing and executing orders was always limited, which made them practically impossible to fulfill, not to mention the reserve of time. Often the orders were cancelled.
The tasks of a tank division were set, as for a rifle formation - to advance, to seize (frontal strike), and only one task was set to go behind enemy lines (to the Velikoye Selo area). Despite the fragmentation of the parts of the division, all tasks were completed. The mobile group of Colonel Rodin fought in a deep wedge forward, having exposed flanks, since units of the 3rd and 483rd motorized regiments retreated on its flanks, and the enemy, sensing their instability, pressed them harder. Major Lukasik's group, having virtually no support on the flanks, held the enemy back to the last opportunity.
The task of encircling the enemy in the area Great Village was also carried out, but due to the fact that only 11 tanks came out to the rear of the German troops without infantry and artillery support, the enemy broke through the ambush, set fire to the village with a strong artillery raid and escaped from the encirclement.
In early August, the 177th division received reinforcements from the volunteers of the Baltic Shipyard. This battalion took up defensive positions on the southern outskirts of the city of Luga, on Langina Gora to a military camp with a length of about 5 km. Many of those young militias remained lying in the Luga soil. And today in these places you can see pillboxes, bunkers, trenches ... After a powerful artillery preparation, the 56th motorized corps of the 4th tank group attacked the troops of the Luga defense sector on August 10, trying to capture Luga and move to Leningrad. But the 177th Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel Mashoshin A.F., in cooperation with the 24th Tank Division, with the support of artillery, operating under the overall command of Major General Astanin A.N. (commander of the Luga defense sector), held back the onslaught of enemy troops and inflicted heavy losses on them.
In the area of Novaya and Staraya Seredka, the enemy even launched a psychic attack, but the Soviet soldiers did not flinch. The guns of five artillery battalions with intense fire destroyed and dispersed the Germans, who were marching in close formation. The enemy's attack stalled. Despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the situation in the Luga region continued to deteriorate. This was due to the events that played out on the flanks. On the right, units of the Kingisepp sector of defense continued to withdraw, and on the extreme left flank, under heavy attacks from two German corps of the 16th German Army, the 48th Army of the North-Western Front retreated.
The enemy intensified the onslaught - he switched to a decisive offensive in the Kingisepp, Novgorod and Luga directions. On August 16, the Germans captured Novgorod and the Batetskaya station. The enemy broke through to the Oredezh River, and in the western direction approached the Kingisepp-Leningrad road. Thus, by mid-August, an extraordinary moment had come for the Northern Front. From the south, Army Group North was advancing on Leningrad, breaking through the Luga fortified position on the flanks, and from the north, the Finnish army, developing an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. At the same time, the balance of forces was still in favor of the enemy. Most of the divisions of the Northern Front suffered heavy losses. “The difficulty in the situation that has arisen lies in the fact,” it was reported to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov B.M., “that neither the division commanders, nor the army commanders, nor the commanders have any reserves at all.”
On August 24, in accordance with the order of the command, our troops left the city after the enemy broke through in the Kingisepp direction and went to Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) and Tosna. Parts of the Luga operational group fought courageously for several more days near the village of Tolmachevo and Mshinskaya station. Our soldiers held back the enemy offensive until August 27, and two days later, Major General Astanin A.N. began to withdraw troops to the north.
In mid-September, the Luga Operational Group, renamed the Southern Group, was divided into several detachments and went out to join forces with the troops of the front near Leningrad in the Kirishi and Pogostye regions. Each of the detachments was led by experienced commanders - General Astanin A.N., Colonels Mashoshin A.F., Rodin A.G., Roginsky S.V. and Odintsov G.F. In the most dangerous places, brigade commissar Gaev L.V., who died heroically, was invariably with the fighters. Detachments, having destroyed many Germans in battles, escaped from the enemy ring and joined the ranks of the defenders of Leningrad.
However, many defenders of the Luga defensive line died during the retreat: they drowned in swamps, were shot by fascist aircraft at low level flight. In the second half of September, the surviving troops reached the Slutsk region and the Volkhov River. One and a half months of fighting on the Luga line slowed down the enemy's offensive, slowed down the pace of his advance towards Leningrad. The Germans were never able to take Luga by storm.
The experience of the battles of maneuverable and mobile groups in the Luga direction in the first weeks of the war showed that the enemy's motorized mechanized units included a large number of wheeled 8-ton vehicles for transporting infantry. In addition, the enemy was armed with a significant number of large-caliber mortars, a small number of medium tanks and several heavy ones. Most of the transporters were armored, on a combined course (the front wheels on the "load belt", controlled). The transporters towed 75mm or 37mm guns. The presence of artillery of a caliber above 105 mm was not observed.
The enemy had a significant number of motorcycles with sidecars of the BMW type. The crew consisted of three people armed with machine guns and machine guns. Each formation or detachment had an HS-126 spotter aircraft as support for correcting mortar and artillery fire and for conducting nearby aviation reconnaissance.
On the march, the German units conducted active ground reconnaissance, mainly on motorcycles. Sometimes, as part of enemy reconnaissance groups, an anti-tank gun and tankettes were included. The side guard service was carried out mainly by motorcyclists.
The enemy's motorized mechanized units operated only along the roads, boldly went deep into the rear and were located mainly in settlements. Cars on halts were disguised in sheds, barnyards, under sheds or located next to the house, disguised as buildings. Part of the German soldiers were in the houses, the rest immediately set about tearing cracks, adapting ditches or digging shelters near the walls of sheds and houses. For disguise, German soldiers even dressed in civilian clothes of the local population.
In general, the German units were tied to roads, the quality of which depended on the speed of their advance. There was no continuous front, and the space between the roads was completely free from the actions of the advancing German troops. Motorized units, moving in separate directions, did not secure their rear. Patrol service on the roads was carried only by motorcyclists. At night, the German mechanized units did not conduct active hostilities, the battle was accepted only during the day in open areas, and then, based on this practice, settlements were planned for location for the night.
In firefights, German units used, as a rule, large-caliber mortars and artillery, firing at direct fire, sometimes using anti-aircraft artillery as anti-tank artillery. Machine-gun fire was used by the Germans very rarely. Long-range artillery fire was corrected by spotter aircraft, and these same aircraft carried out constant reconnaissance of the location of Soviet units. During the offensive, the Germans deployed artillery from the front, attacking with tanks from the flanks.
With a forced withdrawal, the German units began to look for the weakest flanks of the counterattacks. In case of an unsuccessful attack for the Germans from the move, they immediately switched to artillery preparation, and when KB tanks appeared, the fire of all fire weapons was concentrated against them. Such tactics allowed the German troops to achieve the desired result with a minimum of expended forces and means, to push and surround the Soviet troops along the entire front, inflicting heavy losses on the defending Soviet units.