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What kind of crew is the T 34. History of tank forces. Licensed production at factories in Poland and Czechoslovakia



Classification:	Medium tank
Combat weight, t:
Layout diagram:	Classical
Crew, persons:

Manufacturer:
Years of production:
Years of operation:
Number of issued, pcs.:	More than 35000

Case length, mm:
Length with gun forward, mm:
Case width, mm:
Height, mm:
Ground clearance, mm:
Booking
Armor type:	Rolled steel homogeneous
Body forehead (top), mm/deg.:
Body forehead (bottom), mm/deg.:
Hull side (top), mm/deg.:
Hull side (bottom), mm/deg.:
Hull stern (top), mm/deg.:
Hull rear (bottom), mm/deg.:
Bottom, mm:
Housing roof, mm:
Turret front, mm/deg.:
Gun mask, mm/deg.:
Tower side, mm/deg.:
Tower feed, mm/deg.:
Tower roof, mm:
Armament
Caliber and brand of gun:	85 mm ZIS-S-53
Gun type:	Rifled
Barrel length, calibers:
Gun ammunition:
Angles VN, degrees:
	Telescopic articulated TSh-16, periscopic PTK-5, side level.
Machine guns:	2 × 7.62 mm DT-29
Mobility
Engine's type:	V-shaped 12-cylinder diesel liquid cooled with direct injection
Engine power, l. With:
Highway speed, km/h:
Speed over rough terrain, km/h:
Cruising range on the highway, km:
Cruising range over rough terrain, km:
Specific power, l. s./t:
Suspension type:	Christie pendant
Specific ground pressure, kg/cm²:
Climbability:
Wall to be overcome, m:
Ditch to be overcome, m:
Fordability, m:

Armor tilt effect

Mass production

Serial production at Soviet factories

Armored hull of the T-34-85 tank

Housing layout

Housing design

Armored tower tank T-34-85

Armament

Engine and transmission

Combat use

The Great Patriotic War

After 1945

Vehicles based on T-34

Interesting Facts

T-34-85 in computer games

Soviet medium tank of the Great Patriotic War period. Adopted by the Red Army by GKO Decree No. 5020 ss, dated January 23, 1944.

It is the final modification of the T-34 tank, model 1943. The new, spacious, three-seat gun turret was developed using design and technological solutions implemented in the experimental T-43 tank. The installation of a more powerful 85-mm cannon, combined with a number of design modifications, significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the T-34-85 tank compared to its predecessor, the T-34-76. The new turret provided an increase in the volume of the fighting compartment, the ability to accommodate a more powerful 85-mm cannon, a better distribution of functions between crew members and its security. With the overall armor protection slightly increased, thanks to the turret, (compared to the T-34-76 tank), but insufficient, compared to the enemy’s heavy tanks, in 1944, the T-34-85 tank practically did not lose its former mobility and maneuverability - the main thing the advantages of a medium tank in fights with heavy Tiger tanks and Panther medium tanks. As a combat vehicle, the T-34-85 tank was a classic example of a combination of design and technological solutions, which in their entirety ensured the best compliance with the tactical and technical requirements for a “cruising” tank during the “Turning Period” of World War II. The main, most objective criterion that determines the quality of the T-34-85 medium tank is the absolutely positive attitude of the crews of Soviet tank crews towards it.

The T-34-85 was produced in the USSR from January 1944 to 1950, before the start of mass production of the T-54. Under license from the USSR, 3,185 tanks of this type were produced in Czechoslovakia in 1952-1958 and 1,980 tanks in Poland in 1953-1955.

In total, over 35 thousand units of T-34-85 tanks (including those produced in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Poland) were produced, and taking into account the previously produced T-34-76, the total production was about 70-80 thousand units. This allows us to say that the T-34 tank was the most popular tank in the world.

Since 1944, the T-34-85 was the main medium tank of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, and after its completion, it formed the basis of the tank forces of the Soviet Army until the mid-1950s, before the mass entry into the tank forces of the Soviet Army of the latest medium T-54 tanks. Officially, the T-34-85 tank was removed from service in the Russian Federation only in 1993. After the war, T-34-85s were supplied in significant quantities to a number of countries in Europe and Asia, where they were used in armed conflicts, including the Korean and Six Day Wars and a number of others. As of 2010, the T-34-85 is still in service with a number of countries.

Story

In 1943, due to the massive appearance of new models of armored vehicles with enhanced armor among the Germans, the effectiveness of 76.2 mm guns became sharply insufficient. In the battle on the Kursk Bulge, in the battles of large masses of tanks, the German offensive was stopped, but only at the cost of huge losses of its own armored vehicles, the bulk of which by that time were T-34 and lightly armored light tanks T-60 and T-70. At the same time, the main losses the German side suffered were not from the fire of Soviet tanks, but from the action of anti-tank artillery, from mines and bomber aircraft.

This forced us to look for ways to improve the combat qualities of the T-34. After developing several options, the T-34-85 was launched into mass production in 1944, armed with a new 85 mm cannon. The crew increased from 4 to 5 people, the tank received a new turret with reinforced armor and more convenient for the crew and commander. As a result, the weight increased by several tons, which led to a slight decrease in dynamic characteristics.

Armor tilt effect

The analysis showed that the slope of the armor is important only for cases where the caliber of the projectile does not exceed the thickness of the armor, that is, in this case, for calibers less than 45 mm. As the caliber increases, the protective effect of the tilt decreases rapidly. For 88 mm shells, the slope of the T-34 armor had virtually no effect on armor penetration.

Reasons for creating the final modification of the T-34 tank

In 1942, as large-scale production was mastered and the ongoing modernization of the T-34-76 tanks was carried out, in order to reduce the labor intensity of production and improve combat qualities, the leading design bureau of the T-34 tank, plant No. 183, began developing a project for a new medium T-43 tank.

The T-43 tank project was developed in the direction of increasing, compared to the T-34 tank, combat survivability by increasing the thickness of the armor plates of the hull and turret, and combat effectiveness by increasing the volume of the fighting compartment by developing a new, more spacious turret. During the development of the project, the level of unification of components and parts with the serial T-34 tank was 78.5 percent; the configuration and dimensions of the hull remained essentially the same as on the T-34; engine, transmission, chassis elements, gun - the same as on the T-34. At the same time, in the T-43 project some design developments were implemented on the pre-war project of the T-34M tank. In particular, due to the increase in the combat weight of the T-43 tank, compared to the T-34 tank, a torsion bar suspension of road wheels was implemented for the first time for a medium tank.

However, by mid-1943, when the need arose to install an 85-mm cannon on the T-43 medium tank (four versions of the 85-mm cannon developed for the medium tank were ready for testing), it turned out that the new T-43 tank was not has reserves for this to increase combat weight. Even with its “native” 76-mm cannon, the T-43 tank weighed more than 34 tons. A further increase in the mass of this tank led to a decrease in such an important indicator of combat effectiveness as mobility. In addition, the transition of factories to large-scale production of the new tank would inevitably cause a decrease in production volumes, which was considered unacceptable in wartime conditions. In addition, the torsion bar suspension of the road wheels, relatively large diameter, was not yet reliable enough for the operating conditions of a medium tank... Because of this, the design bureau of plant No. 183 decided not to create a new tank but to modernize the existing T-34 to the final modification.

Mass production

In December 1943, plant No. 112 began preparing for serial production of the T-34 tank, with the D-5T cannon, in the new “Sormovo” turret.

January 1, 1944 The T-34 tank has been equipped with the S-53 cannon, with the possibility of installation in turrets with both standard (1420 mm) and extended (1600 mm) turret shoulder strap diameters, ( State Defense Decree No. ..., dated January 1, 1944)..

January 23, 1944 The T-34-85 tank was adopted by the Red Army, ( GKO Resolution No. 5020 ss, dated January 23, 1944). In this regard, all T-34 tanks, with a 76-mm cannon, produced in 1944 and previous releases, received the designation T-34-76.[A].

1944 First half of the year., serial production of medium tanks T-34-76 (model 1943) continued to be carried out by: plant No. 112 “Krasnoe Sormovo”; "Ural Heavy Engineering Plant" (UZTM), Sverdlovsk; No. 183 “In the Name of the Comintern”, Nizhny Tagil; plant No. 174, Omsk.

The leading plant for the production of T-34-85 tanks in 1944÷1945 was plant No. 183

The Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) did not resume tank production; The Ural Heavy Engineering Plant "Uralmash", (UZTM), Sverdlovsk, produced exclusively self-propelled guns based on the T-34 tank; The Ural Kirov Plant (UKZ), Chelyabinsk, completed the production of T-34-76 tanks and completely switched to the production of heavy tanks and self-propelled guns based on them.

In January 1944. Plant No. 112 produced the first 25 units. T-34-85 tanks, with a D-5T cannon, in a new “Sormovo” turret.

Since February 1944 Plant No. 112 began a gradual transition to the production of T-34-85 tanks, with the S-53 cannon.

In February 1944. Plant No. 112 produced 75 units. T-34-85 tanks, with a D-5T cannon.

Since March 1944 The production of S-53 guns has begun, in commissioning mode.

In March 1944. Plant No. 112 produced 150 units. T-34-85 tanks, with a D-5T cannon.

In April 1944. Plant No. 112 produced the final batch, 5 units. T-34-85 tanks, with a D-5T cannon, completed the production of T-34-76 tanks, and began mass production of T-34-85 tanks, with a S-53 cannon.

Notes:

In total, between January and April 1944, plant No. 112 produced 255 units. T-34-85 tanks. with D-5T cannon, of this quantity, 5 units. - commander's, with radio station RSB-F.

When the S-53 cannon was first installed in the Sormovo turret, it became clear that the turret needed to be modified in order to increase the lower elevation angle.

Since May 1944 The continuous production of S-53 guns has begun.

Since June 1944 Plants No. 112 and No. 174 began serial production of T-34-85 tanks. with the S-53 cannon, and completed serial production of the T-34-76 tanks.

Serial production of T-34-85 tanks was carried out by: plant No. 112, Krasnoye Sormovo, from January 1944 to 1950 inclusive, a total of about 12,221 units; plant No. 183, (Nizhny Tagil), from March 15, 1944, to 1946 inclusive, about 14,434 units in total; plant No. 174, (Omsk), from June 1943 to 1946 inclusive, a total of about 3994 units.

The total number of T-34-85 tanks built by USSR factories in the period 1944÷1950 is approximately 30649 (35399÷35415) units.

Until now, according to Soviet and (foreign) sources, only approximate information is provided on the number of T-34-85 tanks produced:

During 1944, in total approximately 10647÷10663 units were produced; of this amount: 10499 units. - linear; 134 units - commanders; 30 units - flamethrowers. In particular:

Plant No. 183 produced approximately 6,585 units in total;

Plant No. 112 produced approximately 3062 units in total;

Plant No. 174, produced approximately 1000 units in total;

During 1945, a total of approximately 12,551 units were produced; of this amount: 12110 units. - linear; 140 units - commanders; 301 units - flamethrowers. In particular:

Plant No. 183 produced approximately 7,356 units in total;

Plant No. 112 produced approximately 3,255 units in total;

Plant No. 174, produced approximately 1940 units in total;

During 1946, in total approximately 2701 units were produced; exclusively linear tanks T-34-85. In particular:

Plant No. 183, produced approximately 493 units in total;

Plant No. 112 produced approximately 1,154 units in total;

Plant No. 174 produced approximately 1054 units in total;

From 1947 to 1950, serial production of exclusively linear T-34-85 tanks was carried out only by plant No. 112. In particular:

In 1946, plant No. 112, produced approximately 2701 (5500) units;

In 1947, plant No. 112, produced approximately 2300 (4600) units;

In 1948, plant No. 112, produced approximately 1850 (3700) units;

In 1949, plant No. 112, produced approximately 450 (900) units;

In 1950, plant No. 112, produced approximately 150 (300) units;

Data from foreign sources are indicated in brackets.

In the T-34-85 tank, the quality and reliability of components and assemblies have reached the highest level, while the design and layout have retained exceptional manufacturability, high maintainability, rapid restoration and commissioning of tanks damaged during combat operations.

The structural and weight reserves for further increasing the combat effectiveness of the T-34-85 tank were far from completely exhausted. In particular:

Torsion bar damping of the road wheels was not implemented, by analogy with the experimental T-43 tank and the serial T-44, which would have provided: improved dynamic characteristics of the vehicle; increasing the volume of the fighting compartment due to the elimination of the side shafts of the spring shock absorbers of the track roller suspension.
The transverse installation of the engine was not implemented, by analogy with the serial T-44 tank, which would have provided the possibility of rearranging the hull in order to shift the turret rotation axis back, in order to unload the front road wheels, in order to strengthen the frontal part of the hull and increase the volume of the hull's fighting compartment.

Note: The serial medium tank T-44 was a symbiosis of the serial T-34-85 and the experimental T-43. Strengthening the armor protection of the hull of the T-44 tank, compared to the T-34, was achieved, in particular, by: reducing its construction height; elimination of fender niches, and therefore due to a decrease in the useful volume of the hull, compensated by a decrease in the number of crew members.

During mass production, the factories made changes to the design of the T-34-85 tanks in order to: reduce production costs; increasing reliability; combat survivability and combat effectiveness.

As production progressed, the shape and size of the beam of the bow of the hull, connecting the upper and lower frontal sheets, changed, and on later production vehicles it was completely removed - the upper and lower frontal sheets were butt welded.

During 1944, the following were introduced: mounting 5 spare tracks on the upper frontal plate of the hull; box-shaped, hinged front mudguards; installation of small smoke bombs (MSG) on the stern plate of the hull.

Serial tanks T-34-85 (like their predecessors, T-34-76), built by different factories, with absolute unification of components and parts, at the same time had minor, individual - factory, design differences due to local technological features production. In particular: various options for mounting spare fuel tanks on the sides of the hull; various options for protective strips of the turret shoulder strap; in the chassis, support rollers were used only with rubber tires (the shortage of rubber was eliminated thanks to supplies from the USA), both stamped and cast, with developed ribbing and lightening holes; various options of caterpillar tracks; gun turrets differed in the configuration and location of welded and casting seams, the number and location of viewing devices, ventilation fungi, and mounting units; handrail brackets; location and design of the commander's cupola.

T-34-85 tanks with a D-5T cannon, built at plant No. 112, Krasnoye Sormovo, had the following design features:

The gun mantlet was cylindrical at the base of the barrel, the width of the embrasure window was smaller, a TSh-16 telescopic articulated sight was installed, and there was no electric drive for turning the turret. The trunnions of the gun cradle have a large offset forward, relative to the turret rotation axis, the commander's cupola is shifted forward, there is no antenna output on the turret roof, and only one ventilation mushroom was installed on the first turrets.

Since June 1944, Plant No. 112 began producing T −34-85 tanks with the S-53 cannon, while the first tanks had external features similar to tanks with the D-5T cannon. In particular, the configuration of the early Sormovo turret, U-shaped mounting eyes, location of fuel tanks, etc.

In December 1944 Plant No. 112 submitted a number of proposals to improve the turret layout for consideration by GABTU. In particular:

about replacing the double-leaf commander's hatch with a single-leaf one;
on the introduction of a frameless ammunition rack for 16 rounds in the turret niche;
about duplication of turret rotation control;
about improving the ventilation of the fighting compartment by dispersing the fans, by moving one of the two installed in the rear of the turret roof to its front part. At the same time, the front fan was an exhaust fan, and the rear one was a discharge one;

In January 1945, from the above proposals from plant No. 112, only a single-leaf hatch cover for the commander’s cupola was introduced.

T-34-85 tanks, with fan fungi on the turret, were produced exclusively by plant No. 112 after the war. There was no viewing slot on the right side of the hull.

Conventional numbers and list of sources used: M. Baryatinsky. Article: "Tank Great Victory" Magazine: “Modelist-Constructor” No. 5. 2002 I. Shmelev. Monograph: “Tank T-34”. Magazine: "Technique and Armament". No. 11÷12. 1998 G. Smirnov. Section: "Tales about weapons."

Licensed production at factories in Poland and Czechoslovakia

At the end of the 1940s. In accordance with the decision of the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, to assist in the development of serial production of T-34-85 tanks, design and technological documentation, technological equipment, and equipment were transferred from the USSR, and Soviet specialists were seconded. In 1949, the ČKD Plant, Prague, acquired a license for the production of the T-34-85 tank and the SU-100 self-propelled guns.

In 1951, the Polish plant Burnar Labedy acquired a license to produce the T-34-85.

T-34-85 tanks, Polish and Czechoslovak production, had minor design differences. Serial production was carried out: in Poland, for 5 years; in Czechoslovakia, for 6 years.

By May 1, 1951, the first 4 units were collected. Polish T-34-85, some of the components and assemblies for them were delivered from the USSR. From 1953 to 1955, 1185 vehicles were produced in Poland, and a total of 1380 vehicles.

In the winter of 1952, the first T-34-85 of Czechoslovak production was produced by the CKD plant, Praha Sokolovo, according to other sources, by the Stalin plant in the city of Rudy Martin.

In Czechoslovakia, T-34-85 tanks were produced until 1958, a total of 3185 units were produced, a significant part of which were for export. On the basis of the T-34-85 tank in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic the following were developed and produced: the MT-34 bridge layer; evacuation tractor CW-34, and a number of other vehicles.

In 1953, the Polish T-34s were upgraded twice and designated accordingly: T-34-85M1 and T-34-85M2. During the modernization: a pre-heater was installed; the engine was adapted to operate on various types of fuel; devices have been installed to facilitate tank control; the location of the ammunition has been changed; a remote control system for the directional machine gun was installed, which made it possible to reduce the number of crew members to 4 people; Underwater driving equipment has been installed. In Poland, on the basis of the T-34 tank, several samples of engineering and repair and recovery vehicles were developed and produced.

Design features of the Polish-made T-34:

different arrangement of ammunition - 55 rounds;
the number of crew members has been reduced to 4 people, thanks to a new system for aiming and loading the frontal machine gun;
additional mechanisms have been installed to make it easier to control the tank;
equipment has been installed to ensure overcoming water obstacles along the bottom;
the configuration of the tower has been slightly changed;
the angular speed of rotation of the tower has been increased, up to (25÷30)°/sec;
installed: another radio station - “10RT-26E”; another tank intercom - TPU-47; other observation devices for the commander - TPK-1, or TPK-U25;
a night vision device has been installed for the driver;
The volume of additional fuel tanks has been increased, providing an increase in cruising range to 650 km;
the engine is adapted to operate on various types of fuel, equipped with a heater that facilitates starting at low temperatures;

Design features of the Czechoslovak-made T-34:

Slightly different tower configuration;
different shape and location of additional fuel tanks.

List of sources used:

I. Shmelev. T-34 tank. Monograph. Magazine: "Technique and Armament". 11-12.1998
Website: M. Baryatinsky. Medium tank T-34-85. /Armor Collection 4.99.

Design and layout of the T-34-85 tank

With the adoption of the final modification of the T-34-85 tank, all production T-34 tanks of previous releases (samples of 1940–1943) received the single designation T-34-76. Unlike its predecessor T-34-76, T-34-85, with the S-53 cannon (ZIS-S-53), had a three-man turret of increased size (the ring diameter was increased from 1420 to 1600 mm), which made it possible to increase the volume fighting compartment, place a more powerful gun, an additional crew member and free the tank commander from the role of gunner, for more effective coordination of the crew’s actions.

The first T-34-85 tanks, built by plant No. 112, Krasnoe Sormovo, with a D-5T cannon, had a two-man turret, which was somewhat structurally different from the turret developed by plant No. 183. The D-5T gun took up a lot of space, which did not allow placement additional charger.

Note: T-34-76 tanks (T-34, model 1943), the final series of production, had a three-man turret with a commander's cupola. The gunner was called “tower commander” or “turret commander”.

Armored hull of the T-34-85 tank

Housing layout

The internal volume of the case is conventionally divided into four sectional compartments: the control compartment, in the front part of the case; fighting compartment, in the middle part of the hull; power plant compartment, in the rear of the hull; power transmission compartment, in the aft part of the hull. The fighting compartment, power plant and power transmission compartments are separated from one another by removable steel partitions.

IN department of management posted:

The driver is on the left and the machine gunner is on the right;
height-adjustable driver's seat and machine gunner's seat;
levers and pedals of drives for controlling units and systems of the power plant and power transmission;
devices that control the operation of the engine and electrical equipment;
frontal machine gun in a ball mount;
two compressed air cylinders for air starting the engine;
part of the ammunition;
two manual carbon dioxide fire extinguishers;
first aid kit;
part of spare parts.

In front of the driver there are: two compressed air cylinders for air starting the engine; panel with control devices; left and right control levers; gearbox slide; manual fuel supply handle; fuel pedal; brake pedal with latch; main clutch pedal.

To the left of the driver, on the side wall, there is an electrical panel on which are located: an electric starter start button; tachometer; speedometer. Two manual carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are mounted under the electrical panel.

IN fighting compartment of the hull and armored turret , posted:

Along the path of the tank, to the left of the gun, is the gunner, followed by the tank commander; to the right of the gun is the loader;

IN fighting compartment of the corps , posted:

at the bottom, a nozzle heater for the heating system is installed;
the bulk of the ammunition was stored in the boxes;
Along the bottom of the fighting compartment (under the ammunition boxes) there are drive rods for controlling the tank mechanisms.
On the sides of the fighting compartment section, behind the vertical bulwarks made of sheet steel, there are lower, between the spring shock absorber shafts of the track roller suspensions, and upper fuel tanks.

IN power plant department located:

in the middle of the compartment, along the longitudinal axis, there is a sub-engine frame for mounting a “V-shaped” diesel engine “B-2”;
On the sides of the engine there are water radiators, batteries, an oil cooler - mounted on the left water radiator, oil tanks and middle fuel tanks.
in the roof of the power plant compartment, there is a hatch for access to the engine and a hatch for the passage of air to the radiators - an air inlet closed by blinds;
Tank control rods run along the bottom of the compartment.

IN power transmission compartment located:

power transmission units;
electric starter;
two air cleaners and aft fuel tanks.
in the roof above the power transmission compartment there is an air vent hatch, closed with blinds with a mesh;
The upper aft armor plate is folding and has a hatch for access to the power transmission units.
a box for tools and spare parts, installed on the horizontal shelf on the starboard side.

Housing design

The tank hull is welded and consists of the following main parts: frontal part; sides; aft; bottoms and roofs.

The armor plates of the hull are made of rolled armor, connected to each other by electric welding, and have thicknesses and angles of inclination, respectively: upper frontal - 45 mm, 60°; lower frontal - 45 mm, 53°; upper stern - 45 mm, 48°; lower stern - 45 mm, 45°; upper side - 40°. The front bottom sheet is 20 mm thick, the rest - 13 mm. Roof thickness 20 mm.

Frontal part of the body. Consists of upper and lower frontal armor plates.

It is noteworthy that as the T-34-85 tanks were produced, the beam of the bow of the hull connecting the upper and lower frontal plates decreased in size, and on later production vehicles it was removed - the upper and lower frontal sheets were butt welded.

On the upper frontal plate on the right, an embrasure is cut for the ball mounting of the frontal (course-oriented) machine gun and armor protection is welded (armor cap of the embrasure), on the left, a hatch is cut for the entry and exit of the driver, closed with a lid. In the driver's hatch cover there are two windows for installing viewing observation devices, covered with armored covers, opened by a mechanical drive from the internal handle. On the sides of the towing hooks there are threaded holes, closed with armored plugs on the threads. Through these holes, access to the shanks of the “worms” of the track tensioning mechanism is provided.

Hull sides. They consist of lower vertical and upper inclined armor plates, to which horizontal shelves (fender covers) are welded. To the lower sides of the inclined armor plates, on the outer side, horizontal fenders are welded, which, together with the horizontal shelves of the hull, form dirt-proof wings, serve as a place for the location of spare parts boxes and as a support for paratroopers.

On the left side fender there is a box with tools and spare parts for the gun.

On the starboard fender: a box for tools and spare parts is installed; spare tracks for caterpillars are fixed; one or two tow ropes are laid.

On the left inclined armor plate of the hull there are installed: in front - brackets for the headlight and signal typhon; in the aft part there are mounting brackets for two spare, unarmored tanks, one for fuel, the other for oil.

On the right inclined armor plate of the body there are installed: in front - a radio antenna output bracket; in the aft part there are mounting brackets for two spare unarmored fuel tanks.

Fuel and oil located in spare, unarmored fuel tanks are consumed before the tank enters battle.

Each lower vertical sheet has holes for the passage of the torsion axes of the suspension of the track rollers' balancers, and cutouts for the balancer's trunnions. On the outer sides, brackets are welded to the lower vertical sheets for attaching rubber stops that limit the upward movement of the track rollers. On the inside of the vertical armor plates, shafts are welded for the spring shock absorbers (springs) of the track roller suspensions. Between the shafts for the shock-absorbing springs of the suspensions of the 2nd and 3rd pairs of road wheels, on the sides of the fighting compartment section, there are compartments for the front - lower and upper, onboard fuel tanks, between the shafts for the shock-absorbing springs of the suspensions of the 3rd and 4th pairs The support rollers, on the sides of the power plant section, are equipped with compartments for medium fuel tanks. Behind the shock-absorbing spring shafts of the 5th pair of road wheels there are compartments for aft fuel tanks. The fuel compartments are closed from the inside of the tank, with vertical bulwarks made of sheet steel.

Hull stern. Consists of upper and lower stern plates and final drive housings.

The top stern sheet, removable, is bolted to the side sheets and can be hinged back. In the middle part of this sheet there is a round hatch for access to the power transmission (transmission compartment units), closed with a lid on hinges and bolts, and on the sides there are two oval holes for exhaust pipes, protected from the outside by armored caps and brackets are installed, with locks, for mounting smoke bombs. The wires to the electric igniters of the smoke bombs are carried out in steel protective tubes fixed to the upper stern sheet.

Bottom of the case. At the bottom of the body there are: hatches for access to suspension parts, to the drain plugs of tanks and the gearbox housing; hatch for access to the engine water and oil pumps; In the front part of the bottom, on the right, there is a hatch for the crew to exit the tank in conditions where the situation does not allow exit through the upper hatches. On the inside of the bottom of the hull there are brackets for fastening the power plant and power transmission units, as well as the seats for the driver and machine gunner.

Housing roof. Consists of three parts: the roof of the fighting compartment; roofs of the power plant compartment; power train roofs.

The roof over the fighting compartment (turret sheet), is welded to the front and side sheets, has a cutout with a diameter of 1600 mm. On the inside, along the perimeter of the linear cutout, the annular housing of the tower ball support is welded.

There are hatches in the roof above the fighting compartment: in the corners, hatches above the shafts for the suspension springs of the 2nd and 3rd pairs of road wheels; in front, on the right and on the left, there are two round hatches for access to the filler plugs of the front and middle fuel tanks. All hatches are closed with armored covers.

The roof of the power plant compartment, removable, is bolted to the side sheets and partitions, consists of a middle sheet located above the engine, having a hatch for access to the engine, and two side sheets with air inlets, closed by louvres made of armor plates. The blinds are controlled from the fighting compartment. Each air inlet is covered with an armored cap with cutouts for air passage. Through these cutouts and the air intake, air is drawn in by the fan and used to cool and power the engine. In the side sheets of the roof of the power plant compartment there are two hatches above the shafts for the suspension springs of the 3rd and 4th pairs of road wheels and one hatch each for access to the filling necks of the oil tanks. All hatches are closed with armored covers.

In the roof of the power transmission compartment there are air exhaust louvres covered with a mesh. The blinds are controlled from the fighting compartment. On the right side of the roof of the power transmission compartment, there is a hatch, closed with an armored cover, for access to the filling neck of the aft fuel tanks.

Armored turret of the T-34-85 tank

The history of the creation of a turret for the T-34-85 tank

1943 End of August. People's Commissar of Tank Building V. A. Malyshev and Head of GBTU Marshal arrived at Tank Plant No. 112 armored forces Y. N. Fedorenko and responsible employees of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. At a meeting with plant managers, Malyshev said: “The victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a high price. Enemy tanks fired at ours from a distance of 1,500 m, while our 76-mm tank guns could hit “Tigers” and “Panthers” at a distance of 500-600 m. Figuratively speaking, the enemy has arms one and a half kilometers away, and we are only half a kilometer away. It is necessary to immediately install a more powerful gun in the T-34.".

Initially, it was planned, on a competitive basis, to consider the option of installing an 85 mm cannon with anti-aircraft ballistics, D-5T, on the T-34 tank, which by this time had been successfully used on heavy tanks KV-85, IS-1 and SU-85 , based on the T-34 tank, in the D-5S version. However, due to the large dimensions of the D-5T gun, it was obvious that a new, more spacious turret would need to be designed for it. In this regard, the chief designer of the TsAKB, V. G. Grabin, proposed his project for modernizing the “thirty-four”, for the installation of his, more compact S-53 cannon, in the standard turret of the serial T-34 tank (model 1943), and handed over it for approval by the People's Commissar of Armaments D.F. Ustinov and the People's Commissar of Tank Construction V.A. Malyshev. The project involved the start of production of prototypes at plant No. 112.

The S-53 gun implemented design solutions developed before the war for the F-30 gun, intended for the KV-3 design heavy tank. However, V. A. Malyshev and many specialists from the Scientific Tank Committee (NTK) and the People's Commissariat of Armaments doubted the merits of the “Grabinsky project”. In this regard, Malyshev urgently ordered M.A. Nabutovsky, the head of the tower group of plant No. 183, with a group to fly to plant No. 112 and figure everything out...

1943 October. To speed up the work on linking the 85 mm cannon in the turret of the T-34 tank, on the initiative of V. A. Malyshev, the turret group of plant No. 183, led by Nabutovsky. sent to TsAKB. Nabutovsky arrived to Malyshev, and he ordered to organize a branch of the design bureau of plant No. 183 at the artillery plant where Grabin's TsAKB worked. After a short collaboration with Grabin, Nabutovsky was sent to the design bureau of F. F. Petrov...

As a result, a joint conclusion was made that to install the S-53 and D-5 guns on the T-34 tank, a new, more spacious turret with a wider shoulder strap is required.

M. A. Nabutovsky, at a special meeting in the presence of D. F. Ustinov, Ya. N. Fedorenko and V. G. Grabin, made a counter proposal to design new turrets for the T-34 tank, to accommodate S-53 guns in them and D-5T, based on the design of the turret of the experimental medium tank T-43, project of plant No. 183. M. A. Nabutovsky criticized V. G. Grabin’s idea. From the speech of M. A. Nabutovsky: “Of course, it would be very tempting to put a new gun in a tank without significant modifications. This solution is simple, but absolutely unacceptable for the reason that with this installation of the gun, its fastening will turn out to be weak, and a large unbalanced moment will arise. In addition, this creates crowded conditions in the fighting compartment and will significantly complicate the work of the crew. Moreover, if shells hit the frontal armor, the cannon will fall out.” Nabutovsky stated: “By accepting this project, we will let the army down”….. Grabin broke the silence that followed: “I’m not a tanker, and I can’t take everything into account. And to implement your project will take a lot of time, reducing production.” Ustinov asked: “How long does it take to submit the design bureau project of plant No. 183 for approval at this meeting?” Nabutovsky asked for a week, the director of plant No. 112, K.E. Rubinchik, provided him with his entire design bureau. Ustinov scheduled the next meeting in three days. A. A. Moloshtanov arrived to help M. A. Nabutovsky...

When designing, the 3-seater turret of the experimental T-43 medium tank was taken as a basis. The design of the turrets began simultaneously: the design bureau of plant No. 122 "Krasnoe Sormovo", headed by V.V. Krylov, for the 85-mm D-5T cannon, and the turret group of plant No. 183, led by A.A. Maloshtanov and M. A. Nabutovsky, for the 85-mm S-53 cannon.

IN within three days of round-the-clock work, the technical documentation for the new turret for the S-53 gun was ready.

As a result, for the T-34 tank, two new turrets were developed, very similar to each other, reminiscent, but not copying, the turret of the experimental T-43 tank, with a shoulder strap “clear” diameter of −1600 mm.

1943 October. An order was given to the TsAKB ( Chief designer V. G. Grabin), “On the development of a special 85-mm gun for the T-34 tank.”

1943 October. The D-5T gun was tested on the T-34 tank, in a new turret developed by plant No. 112:

For better balancing, the gun trunnions were moved forward significantly; however, the breech of the gun was located very close to the rear plate of the turret, which made the loader’s work difficult. Even when the tank was moving at low speed, trained loaders could not avoid collisions between the head of the projectile and the breech of the gun. The D-5T gun took up a lot of space, so the new turret could only accommodate two people. As a result, the D-5T cannon was not adopted for service with the T-34 tank.

1943 October - November. Fulfilling the NKV order to create an 85-mm cannon for the T-34 tank, TsAKB and plant No. 92 produced three prototypes of new tank guns: S-53, (leading designers of TsAKB: T. I. Sergeev, G. I. Shabarov); S-50, (leading designers of TsAKB: V. D. Meshchaninov, V. A. Tyurin, A. M. Volgaevsky); LB-1 (LB-85), (plant No. 92, designer A.I. Savin). During the tests, which continued until the end of 1943, preference was given to the S-53 cannon.

The S-53 gun was distinguished by its simplicity of design, reliability and compactness, and provided the ability to accommodate three crew members in the new, more spacious turret. The recoil brake and knurl are located under the base of the bolt, which made it possible to reduce the height of the line of fire and increase the distance between the breech and the rear wall of the turret. The production cost of the S-53 gun turned out to be even lower than for the 76-mm F-34 gun, not to mention the D-5T.

1943 Beginning of December. Plant No. 122 sent two experienced tank T-34, with new turrets, was sent to the Moscow Artillery Plant, where S-53 guns were installed in them and mostly successful tests were carried out, during which shortcomings in its design emerged. In this regard, at artillery plant No. 92, during the next meeting, with the participation of: D. F. Ustinov, V. A. Malyshev, V. L. Vannikova, Ya. N. Fedorenko, F. F. Petrova, V. G. Grabina and others, it was decided, for now, to install the D-5T cannon on the Sormovo T-34 tanks and at the same time modify the S-53 cannon.

Serial production of the S-53 cannon was supposed to be launched at plant No. 92, from March 1, 1944, and until then, plant No. 112 “Krasnoe Sormovo” was allowed to install the D- cannon in the new turret, designed by plant No. 112. 5T.

According to the plan, plant No. 112 was supposed to produce 100 units by the end of 1943. T-34 tanks, with a D-5T cannon, that is, before the official adoption of the T-34 tank, with an 85-mm cannon in a new turret, into service. However, the first vehicles were produced only at the beginning of January 1944.

Plant No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" was asked to: ensure the production of T-34-85 tanks with the D-5T gun in quantities:

In January 1944 - 25 units;
In February 1944 - 75 units;
In March 1944 - 150 units;
From April 1944 - completely switch to the production of T-34-85 tanks, instead of T-34-76.

1944 January. 1. The S-53 cannon was adopted for service on the T-34 tank, both with standard (1420 mm) and extended (1600 mm) shoulder straps.

1944 January... Moloshtanov and Nabutovsky, with all the documentation on the layout of the new S-53 cannon in the new turret for the T-34 tank, arrived at plant No. 183.

Turret design, with S-53 cannon (ZIS-S-53)

The turret of the T-34-85 tank, developed on the basis of the design of the turret for the experimental medium tank T-43, was 5-sided, with rounded ribs, and had an armor thickness increased to 90 mm in the frontal part. For some reason, Soviet tank crews classified the turret configuration of the T-34-85 tank as “Conical”, and the turret of the T-54 tank as “Hemispherical”.

It is noteworthy that when creating the new D-5T tank gun, and the S-53, which won the competitive tests, the ballistics of the 85 mm 52-K anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model were taken as the basis.

The 52-K anti-aircraft gun, during test firing that took place from April 25 to April 30, 1943, at the NIIBT training ground in Kubinka, pierced the 100 mm frontal armor of a captured Tiger from a distance of 1000 m. In addition, the development of a new tank gun based on the 52-K anti-aircraft gun reduced the time to master the production of shells.

In fact, the configuration of the tower body is formed by a frontal, rounded, embrasure part, five flat inclined faces, mating linear surfaces of variable radius, and a flat, horizontal 6-sided roof.

The tower is cast, hexagonal in plan, with inclined side walls. An embrasure for installing a cannon is cut into the front wall, covered with swinging armor.

Technologically, the tower is divided into three parts: linear part; body part; roof of the tower, connected to each other, along the perimeters, by welds.

Running part (upper tower shoulder strap) - a large-sized casting, cylindrical at the bottom, conjugated at the top, with a 6-sided base for mounting the body part.

The cylindrical part serves as a holder for the support ring of the upper shoulder strap of the ball joint welded into it.

Hull part - large-sized casting, formed by a frontal (embrasure) part (thickness 90 mm) and 5 inclined flat edges (walls): two front - side (thickness 75 mm, slope 20°); two rear - side, (thickness 75 mm, slope 20°) and one rear edge, (thickness 52 mm, slope 10°), connected to each other by radius fillets.

In the frontal part there is an embrasure window for installing a gun, which is covered with a swinging armor protection (mask) of the gun. On the inside, brackets with bosses are welded to the frontal part, to which horizontal trunnions for the gun cradle are bolted. On the left bracket there is a stopper for fastening the gun “On the march”, and a lifting mechanism for the gun.

The side walls of the turret have embrasures for firing from personal weapons, covered with armor plugs. Outside, on the side walls of the tower, welded: handrails for paratroopers; mounting hooks or eye brackets. On the rear wall of the tower, on the outside, fastenings for tarpaulin are welded.

Tower roof: flat, 6-sided, cut from a flat armor plate (thickness 20 mm). There are hatch cutouts in the roof:

for installing two periscopic observation devices, for the loader and gunner;
ventilation, for the installation of two fighting compartment fans, covered with armored caps with windows for air passage;
antenna output;
hatch for entry and exit of loader and gunner;
cutout for installing a commander's cupola;

Commander's turret. Serves to provide all-round visibility to the tank commander. Cylindrical in shape, cast from armor and welded around the perimeter to the roof of the gun turret. There are five slots in the walls of the turret, covered with transparent triplex armored glass, through which, with the help of viewing devices, the commander has an all-round view, both with a rotating and stationary gun turret. The turret roof rotates on a ball bearing. On its roof there is a hatch for the tank commander and a periscope observation device, similar to the devices installed on the roof of a gun turret, is installed.

Due to the individual production characteristics of different factories, and depending on the time of production, the turrets, T-34-85 tanks equipped with S-53 and ZIS-S-53 guns differed in: the number, configuration and location of casting and welds; the shape of the commander's cupola (in January 1945, only the single-leaf commander's cupola hatch cover was introduced into production); the shape and location of the protective strips of the turret shoulder strap. The post-war towers of plant No. 112 had a spaced arrangement of ventilation hoods, the front fan was an exhaust fan, the rear one was a discharge fan.

Turret layout, with S-53 cannon (ZIS-S-53)

The main armament of the tank is installed inside the turret: a cannon and one coaxial machine gun. Vertical aiming of the gun is done manually, using a sector lifting mechanism located to the left of the gun. The vertical elevation angle of the gun is 22°. The vertical descent angle is 5°, while the unhittable (dead) space for the cannon and coaxial machine gun on the surface of the earth is 23 meters. The height of the gun's line of fire is 2020 mm. The rotation of the turret is carried out by a rotation mechanism located to the left of the gun, using a manual drive, with an angular speed of 0.9°, per revolution of the flywheel, or an electromechanical drive, with an angular speed of 25÷30°/sec. The main stowage for 16 (on some vehicles - 12) shots is located in the aft niche and on the racks. On the right wall of the tower, 4 shots are secured in clamps. To ensure the “rollback” of the gun, after firing, free space is provided behind the breech. Inside the turret, on the left side, there are reinforced: a bracket for the turret rotation mechanism and mounting brackets for the radio station and tank intercom devices (TPU). Inside the tower, on the left rear and aft walls, there are mounting brackets for the transceiver and the radio power supply. The following seats are attached to the turret and rotate with it: the tank commander; gunner and loader. The loader's seat is suspended on three belts, two of them are attached to the turret ring, and the third to the gun cradle. The seat height adjustment is made by changing the length of the belts. The tower does not have a floor that rotates with it, which is attributed to its design disadvantage. When firing, the loader worked standing on the lids of cassette boxes with shells placed on the bottom of the hull. When turning the turret, he is forced to move after the breech of the gun, kicking the fallen spent cartridges, which, during intense fire, accumulated and made it difficult to access the shots placed in the ammunition rack on the bottom of the hull.

Armament

Ammunition for the S-53 cannon
Shot brand	Projectile type	Projectile brand	Shot weight, kg	Projectile weight, kg	Explosive mass, g	Fuse brand	Muzzle velocity, m/s	Direct shot range at a target 2 m high	Year of adoption
Armor-piercing shells
	armor-piercing blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, tracer					MD-5 or MD-7
	armor-piercing sharp-headed, tracer
	armor-piercing sharp-headed with protective and ballistic tips, tracer								post-war period
	armor-piercing sub-caliber, coil type, tracer
	armor-piercing sub-caliber streamlined, tracer								post-war period
High-explosive fragmentation shells
	steel solid-body anti-aircraft fragmentation grenade					KTM-1 or KTMZ-1
	steel fragmentation grenade with adapter head					KTM-1 or KTMZ-1
	steel solid-body fragmentation grenade, with reduced charge					KTM-1 or KTMZ-1
Practical equipment
	practical solid, tracer

Penetration table
Projectile Distance, m

(meeting angle 90°)
(meeting angle 60°)

(meeting angle 90°)
(meeting angle 60°)

(meeting angle 90°)
(meeting angle 60°)
1It should be remembered that at different times and in different countries Various methods for determining armor penetration were used. As a consequence, direct comparison with similar data from other guns is often impossible.

Engine and transmission

The T-34-85 tank was equipped with a 12-cylinder four-stroke uncompressor diesel engine V-2-34. The rated engine power was 450 hp. at 1750 rpm, operational - 400 hp. at 1700 rpm, maximum - 500 hp. at 1800 rpm. Cylinder diameter 150 mm. The piston stroke of the left group is 180 mm, the right one is 186.7 mm. The cylinders were arranged in a V-shape at an angle of 60°. Compression ratio 14 - 15. Dry engine weight with electric generator without exhaust manifolds 750 kg. Fuel - diesel, grade DT or gas oil grade "E" according to OST 8842. The capacity of the fuel tanks is 545 l. Outside, on the sides of the hull, two fuel tanks of 90 liters each were installed. External fuel tanks were not connected to the engine power system. The fuel supply is forced, using a twelve-plunger fuel pump NK-1. Lubrication system - circulation, under pressure. Oil circulation was carried out by a three-section gear oil pump. The capacity of internal oil tanks is 76 l, external - 90 l. The cooling system is liquid, closed, with forced circulation. There are two tubular radiators, installed on both sides of the engine and tilted towards it. Radiator capacity 95 l. To clean the air entering the engine cylinders, two Multicyclone air cleaners were installed on the tank. The engine was started by an ST-700 electric starter with a power of 15 hp. or compressed air (two cylinders were installed in the control compartment). The transmission consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch (steel on steel), a gearbox, final clutches, brakes and final drives. The gearbox is five-speed, with constant mesh gears. Onboard clutches are multi-disc, dry (steel on steel), brakes are floating, band, with cast iron linings. Final drives are single-stage.

Combat use

The Great Patriotic War

Despite a number of very serious improvements to the T-34, it combat characteristics in the second half of the war could not be considered completely satisfactory against the backdrop of improvements in German tanks and anti-tank weapons.

Lowly vulnerable in 1941 to almost any German tanks and anti-tank weapons (even in the old version, which was weaker armed and armored), the T-34 at the end of the war was no longer able to withstand on equal terms heavy German tanks and assault guns (which, however, were all they had far from an absolute advantage in all combat situations, not to mention the fact that they belonged to a different class in terms of mass, high cost of production, and often lost in mobility, not to mention their quantitative disadvantage and technological difficulties at the end of the war, which affected, for example, on the quality of their armor). The T-34 also turned out to be insufficiently protected from German infantry anti-tank weapons, which by that time included the latest anti-tank rocket launchers, although German tanks suffered no less from fire from American-made bazooka-type grenade launchers. As a result, in 1945, approximately 90% of hits to the T-34 resulted in armor penetration. This had to be compensated for by their massive and competent use, and the leading role in the fight against enemy tanks passed to a noticeable extent to heavy tanks, such as the IS-2, and self-propelled guns; nevertheless, the T-34, while remaining the Soviet main tank, played an invaluable positive role in the second half of the war, which is partly explained by improved control of tank forces, better interaction with other branches of the military, especially with aviation, as well as very good mobility and still remaining Quite decent armor and firepower. Not the least role was played by the increased reliability of the tank by this time, and, of course, mass production. By the end of the war, the T-34 was the most numerous tank in the USSR army.

After 1945

After World War II, the T-34-85 was actively exported to many countries around the world and was used in a number of military conflicts. Tanks remained in service with some countries, such as Iraq, until the end of the 20th century.

Korean War (1950-1953, China, North Korea). The Korean War became a real test for the T-34 crews, who had to operate in the conditions of enemy air supremacy, against American army units well equipped with anti-tank weapons and Marine Corps. North Korean T-34-85s were used most intensively in the first two months of the war, but after the losses suffered, their participation in battles was rarely noted and only in small groups of 3-4 tanks. Over the entire period of the war, 119 tank battles took place, of which 104 were conducted by US Army tanks and another 15 by USMC tank crews. During these battles, North Korean tankers on the T-34-85 managed to knock out 34 American tanks (16 M4A3E8 Sherman, 4 M24 Chaffee, 6 M26 Pershing and 8 M46 Patton), 15 of which were lost irrevocably. In turn, the Americans claim to have destroyed 97 T-34-85s in tank battles (another 18 are supposedly recorded).

American aircraft inflicted significant losses on the North Korean T-34-85. Against the backdrop of this fact, the incident that occurred on July 3, 1950, when four F-80C Shooting Star jet fighter-bombers, led by the commander of the 80th Air Force, Mr. Amos Sluder, looked unexpected, went to the Pyeongyo-Ri area to attack enemy vehicles moving to the front line. Having discovered a column of approximately 90 vehicles and tanks, the Americans went on the attack, using unguided rockets and fire from onboard 12.7-mm machine guns from low altitude. An unexpected response came from the North Korean T-34s, which opened fire on the low-flying aircraft with 85-mm guns! A successfully fired shell exploded in front of the pilot's plane and damaged the fuel tanks with shrapnel, causing a fire on board. Mr. Verne Peterson, who was walking as a wingman, reported to Major Sluder on the radio: “Boss, you’re on fire! You better jump." In response, the commander asked to indicate the direction to the South, where he was going to continue to pull, but at the same moment the plane collapsed and fell to the ground like a burning torch. Major Amos Sluder became the first 5th Air Force pilot to die in action on the Korean Peninsula.

Suez Crisis (1956, Egypt)
Hungarian uprising (1956, USSR, rebels)
Vietnam War (1957-1975, Northern Vietnam). Used in small quantities in Laos and South Vietnam. No meetings of the T-34-85 with American units were recorded.
Operation Bay of Pigs (1961, Cuban Army)
1962 military coup in Yemen (1962, Republican forces). On September 26, 1962, 6 T-34-85 tanks were used by the Free Officers to blockade the residence of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr. Having taken the Bashayar Palace into a semicircle, the tanks began shelling the upper floors of the building, causing a fire. After ten hours of siege, the palace garrison and the imam's family fled using a secret exit from the basement. Another 20 T-34-85 tanks took up positions in the capital's Sharar Square to prevent possible actions by the monarchists.
Six-Day War (1967, Egypt, Syria). Egypt lost 251 T-34-85s, accounting for almost a third of its total tank losses.
Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974, Greek Cypriots)
Angolan Civil War (1975-2002, government army)
Civil war in Afghanistan (1978-1992, government army, mujahideen)
Sino-Vietnamese War (1979, Vietnam)
Lebanon War (1982, Palestine Liberation Organization)
War in Croatia (1991-1995) (1991-1995, Croatia, Yugoslavia?)
Bosnian War (1992-1995, Bosnian Serbs)

Countries that had a tank in service

After World War II, the T-34 was in service with the next 40 countries, and in 1996 it was still in service with the countries marked with an asterisk*. (Zaloga & Kinnear 1996:34).

Countries of Europe and America

Middle Eastern and Asian countries

African countries

Serial variants, modernization and modifications of the T-34-85 tank

T-34-85 Modification 1943 A small-scale modification of the T-34 with an 85-mm D-5-T85 cannon and a new solid-cast three-man turret. It was produced from January to March 1944 by plant No. 112, due to the fact that the placement of the S-53 cannon in the turret of the original version turned out to be unsatisfactory.
T-34-85. Serial modification of the T-34 tank, produced in large series in 1944-46. A new cast turret with an increased ring diameter was installed. Armor protection increased to 90 mm (front of the turret and hull). The main armament is an 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon, a radio station is installed in the turret. Subsequently, the tank was modernized several times ( last time in 1969). In the 50s it was mass-produced in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
OT-34-85 is a modification of the T-34-85 with the installation of an ATO-42 piston flamethrower instead of a machine gun.

T-34-85 Modification 1947- The tank is equipped with a new V-2-34M engine, a new radio station and optical instruments.
- The tank has a new V-54 engine (520 hp), the internal design of the vehicle has been slightly changed, and a new chassis.

PT-34- Modification created on the basis of the T-34 Model 1943 as a tank trawl.

Comparison of the main Soviet medium tanks of the Second World War
	T-34 Modification 1940	T-34 Modification 1941	T-34 Modification 1942	T-34 Modification 1943

					85 mm ZIS-S-53	85 mm ZIS-S-53
	76 shells	77 shells	77 shells	100 shells	60 shells	58 shells

Power reserve

Yugoslav modernization of the T-34-85 tank

After the war, on the initiative of the leadership of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOLA), an attempt was made to establish mass production of a modernized, Yugoslav version of the T-34-85. As a result of modernization, the following design changes were made:

In the front part of the hull, bevels are implemented in order to reduce the area of the frontal surface of the upper frontal sheet. The bevels weakened the body and complicated the technology of its production, but it was expected. that Yugoslav factories will master the technology of welding armor plates;
The roof of the tower was made convex, the commander's cupola was eliminated, but four periscopic viewing devices were installed, the cylindrical bases of the hatches were mated to the roof by welding, weakening the structure of the tower;
The volume of the rear niche of the turret has been increased in order to increase the ammunition capacity;
The turret ventilation scheme has been changed; the fan hood is located on the roof of the aft part of the turret;
The ZIS-S-53 gun is equipped with a muzzle brake;
A Yugoslavian-made diesel engine was installed, changes were made to the transmission;

A total of 7 tanks were modernized...

In 1950, modernized tanks took part in the May Parade and were subsequently used as training tanks. In the early 1950s, modernization work was curtailed. One tank is preserved in the open exhibition of the military museum in Kalemegdan (Belgrade).

Vehicles based on T-34

During the war, the famous “self-propelled guns” SU-85, SU-100 and SU-122 were built on the basis of the T-34-85. The SU-85 and SU-100, designed to fight enemy tanks, were armed with 85 and 100 mm rapid-fire cannons, respectively. The SU-122, classified as an assault gun, carried a 122 mm howitzer with a low rate of fire (the separately loaded gun also had a manual piston-type shutter, which negatively affected the rate of fire) and was mainly used as shock artillery against infantry and tanks (with some restrictions it could can also be used as a self-propelled howitzer). Vehicles based on the T-34-85 remained in service with some countries until the end of the 20th century.

In Egypt, the T-34-85 was equipped with a 100 mm M1944/BS-3 gun and was called the “T-100 tank destroyer”

On October 26, 2006, during anti-government protests in Budapest, demonstrators managed to start the engines of the museum's T-34-85 and BTR-152, and used them in clashes with the police.

T-34-85 in computer games

T-34-85 can be seen in the following computer games:

Call of Duty, Call of Duty: United Offensive and Call of Duty: World at War
"T-72: Balkans on Fire";
"Company of Heroes: Eastern Front" (amateur modification);
"Sudden Strike 3: Arms for Victory";
online game “Red Orchestra: Ostfront 41-45”;
MMO game "World of Tanks"
Real-time strategy "Order of War".
"Tanks of the Second World War: T 34 against the Tiger"
"ArmA 2"
"ArmA 2: Operation Arrowhead"
"Blitzkrieg"
"Caribbean crisis"
"T-34 vs Tiger"

Early T-34 tanks were equipped with a 76-mm cannon mod. 1938/39 L-11 with a barrel length of 30.5 calibers and an initial armor-piercing projectile speed of 612 m/s. Vertical aiming – from –5° to +25°. Practical rate of fire in a tank is 1-2 rounds/min. The gun had a vertical wedge semi-automatic breech with a device for disabling semi-automatic action, since in the pre-war years the GABTU leadership believed that there should not be semi-automatic equipment in tank guns (due to gas contamination in the fighting compartment). A special feature of the L-11 gun was its original recoil devices, in which the fluid in the recoil brake was in direct contact with atmospheric air through a small hole. The main drawback of this weapon was also associated with this circumstance: if it was necessary to alternately fire quickly at different angles of elevation of the barrel (which was not uncommon in a tank), the hole was blocked, and the liquid boiled when fired, bursting the brake cylinder. In order to eliminate this drawback, a reserve hole with a valve was made in the L-11 recoil brake for communication with air when firing at a declination angle. The L-11 gun, in addition, was very complex and expensive to produce. It required a wide range of alloy steels and non-ferrous metals; the manufacture of most parts required milling work of high precision and cleanliness.

L-11 gun:

1– trunk; 2 – mask installation; 3 – axle; 4 – gun travel position stopper; 5 – gear sector of the lifting mechanism; 6 – sight forehead; 7 – pillow; 8 – sleeve catcher; 9 – DT machine gun

A relatively small number of T-34 tanks were produced with the L-11 cannon - according to various sources, from 452 to 458. In addition, they armed several vehicles during repairs in besieged Leningrad and 11 tanks in Nizhny Tagil in January 1942. For the latter, guns from those taken from Kharkov during the evacuation were used. Since the L-11 gun did not become a massive tank gun of the Great Patriotic War, and the T-34 tanks on which it was installed were mostly lost in its first month, there is no point in dwelling in detail on its combat characteristics. So let’s immediately move on to the most popular (about 37 thousand guns were produced) domestic tank gun F-34.

76 mm gun mod. 1940 F-34 with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers was installed on the T-34 from March 1941. Gun weight 1155 kg. The maximum rollback length is 390 mm, vertical guidance from –5°30" to +26°48". The shutter is wedge, with semi-automatic mechanical copy type. The gun's recoil devices consisted of a hydraulic recoil brake and a knurler and were located under the barrel. The cannon was fired using foot and manual mechanical triggers.

The F-34 gun has been modernized twice. During the first improvement, the shutter and semi-automatic copier were changed, triggers, the compensator in the recoil brake, the safety lock for locking the bolt in a traveling manner, and the bracket with the buffer have been eliminated. In the second case, instead of a barrel with a free pipe, a monoblock barrel with a breech was installed, connected to the pipe using a coupling.

For firing from the L-11 and F-34 guns, unitary cartridges from divisional guns mod. 1902/30 and arr. 1939 and from the regimental gun mod. 1927:

– with a high-explosive long-range fragmentation grenade (steel OF-350 and steel cast iron OF-350A) and a KTM-1 fuse;

– with an old Russian-style high-explosive grenade (F-354) and KT-3, KTM-3 or 3GT fuses;

– with an armor-piercing tracer projectile (BR-350A, BR-350B, R-350SP) and an MD-5 fuse;

– with an armor-burning projectile (BP-353A) and a BM fuse;

– with bullet shrapnel (Sh-354 and Sh-354T) and Hartz shrapnel (Sh-354G), with tubes – 22-second or T-6;

– with rod shrapnel (Sh-361) and T-3UG tube;

– with buckshot (Sh-350).

In October 1943 it was put into service and began to be included in the ammunition load of the T-34 tank. unitary cartridge with a sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer projectile (BR-354P).

From the data given in the table it is clear that the 76-mm F-34 cannon installed in the T-34 tank at a range of up to 1500 m was guaranteed to hit the armor of all German tanks of 1941-1942 without exception, including Pz.III and Pz.IV. As for the new German heavy tanks, it could penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger and Panther tanks from a distance of no more than 200 m, and the side armor of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand self-propelled guns - from a distance of no more than 400 m.

However, in practice things were somewhat different. For example, a memorandum on the results of shelling tests of the Pz.VI tank, sent to Stalin on May 4, 1943, said:

“The shelling of the 82-mm side armor of the T-VI tank from the 76-mm F-34 tank gun from a distance of 200 meters showed that the armor-piercing shells of this gun are weak and when they meet the tank’s armor, they are destroyed without penetrating the armor.

76-mm sub-caliber shells also do not penetrate the 100-mm frontal armor of the T-VI tank from a distance of 500 m.”

As for the Panther tanks, based on the results of the battles on the Kursk Bulge, it was concluded that they are hit by a 76-mm armor-piercing projectile, with the exception of the frontal part. After the end of the fighting, one Panther was subjected to test fire from the 76-mm cannon of the T-34 tank. A total of 30 shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 100 m, of which 20 shots were fired at the upper and 10 shots at the lower frontal plate of the hull. The top sheet had no holes - all the shells ricocheted; the bottom sheet had only one hole.

Thus, it can be stated that in 1943, with the increase in the thickness of the armor of German tanks, the effective firing range at them sharply decreased and did not exceed 500 m even for a sub-caliber projectile. At the same time, 75- and 88-mm long-barreled German guns could hit the T-34 at distances of 900 and 1500 m, respectively. Moreover, we are talking here not only about the “Tigers” and “Panthers”.

The swinging part of the F-34 cannon with a telescopic sight:

1 – calyx; 2 – sight; 3 – telescope holders; 4 – rollback indicator line; 5 – frontal stop; 6 – eyecup; 7 – lateral correction handwheel; 8 – aiming angle handwheel; 9 – release lever; 10 – sector of the lifting mechanism; 11 – handle of the handwheel of the lifting mechanism

The most popular German tanks, Pz.III and Pz.IV, have undergone significant changes. Moreover, this happened not in 1943, but in the spring of 1942. It’s just that in the spring and summer of 1943, Soviet tank crews had to deal with modernized tanks of these two types in large numbers.

Medium tanks Pz.III modifications L, M and N interested Soviet specialists from the People's Commissariat of Ammunition primarily due to the design of the frontal armor of the hull and turret. They quite reasonably suggested that it would be a serious obstacle to domestic armor-piercing shells, since “...the front sheet of high-hardness armor with a thickness of about 20 mm is installed with a significant gap relative to the main armor with a thickness of 52 mm... Thus, the front sheet will act as “cocking armor”, the impact of which will partially destroy the head of the armor-piercing projectile and arm the bottom fuse so that the explosive can be triggered even before the main armor of the turret box is penetrated... Thus, with the total thickness of the frontal armor of the turret box of the T-3 tank being 70–75 mm, this two-layer barrier can be impenetrable to most armor-piercing chamber ammunition equipped with an MD fuse -2".

This assumption was confirmed during tests at the Sverdlovsk test site, when out of three shells fired from the 85-mm 52K anti-aircraft gun and two fired from the 122-mm A-19 hull gun, none penetrated the frontal armor of the German Pz.III tank. In this case, either the charge was detonated even before the armor of the turret box was penetrated, or when it hit the main armor after passing through the screen, the projectile was destroyed. Note that we are talking about 85- and 122-mm shells. What can we say about 76 mm!

In connection with the increased armor protection of the Pz.IV tank, it was noted:

“The T-4 medium tank has undergone modernization of its armor by thickening the front of the turret box to 80-85 mm, in some cases by applying an additional armor plate with a thickness of 25-30 mm. However, we have also encountered tanks carrying a monolithic sheet of frontal armor 82 mm thick, which allows us to make the assumption that a new modification of this tank has been adopted for production by the German industry... Thus, the thickness of the frontal armor of the T-4 and Artshturm-75 tanks ( StuG III assault gun. – Approx. aut.) is currently 82–85 mm and is virtually invulnerable to the most widespread armor-piercing shells of 45 mm and 76 mm caliber in the Red Army...”

Analyzing the results of the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, in his letter sent on August 20, 1943 to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, wrote:

“Commanding tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The Germans, opposing our T-34 and KB tanks with their own T-V tanks(“Panther”) and T-VI (“Tiger”) no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefield.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by the fire of German tanks.

T-34 tank with a 76-mm F-34 cannon during testing at the Gorokhovets training ground. November 1940

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and there were shortcomings on the tanks of the first production, such as the imperfection of the transmission group ( main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodations have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then, unfortunately, the same cannot be said about our tanks...

Now the T-34 and KB tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

And indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which they was not difficult to achieve in 1941 and in 1942...

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the issue of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks..."

Reading this letter, it is difficult to generally disagree with the opinion of P. A. Rotmistrov. Indeed, by the summer of 1943 and even earlier, our tanks had lost their advantage over the German ones. The design of the T-34 tank was improved rather sluggishly. And while some innovations can still be recalled with regard to armor protection and the engine-transmission unit, the same cannot be said with regard to weapons. Since March 1940, it has remained unchanged - the F-34 cannon. So the reproach against the designers is quite fair. It is completely incomprehensible why the same V.G. Grabin did not even try to improve the ballistic characteristics of this gun. Why was it impossible, for example, to bring them to the level of the F-22 cannon by lengthening the F-34 barrel to 55 calibers? With the previous shell, such a weapon could penetrate 82 mm armor from a distance of 1000 m! This would equalize the chances of success in a duel between the T-34 and the Pz.IV, for example, and would significantly increase them when meeting with the Tiger or Panther.

Serial T-34 tank with a 76-mm F-34 cannon and a cast turret. 1941

For some reason, some authors almost blame P. A. Rotmistrov for writing this letter. Like, he wanted to justify himself for the failure at Prokhorovka and placed all the blame on the designers. One might think that P. A. Rotmistrov single-handedly made the decision to attack the 2nd SS Panzer Corps head-on! This decision was made by the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin with the participation of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters A.M. Vasilevsky. Headquarters, represented by I.V. Stalin, approved this decision, which did not correspond to the situation. So, what questions for Rotmistrov? However, let's return to the T-34.

Tank T-34 produced in 1941. The all-round viewing device is no longer in the turret hatch cover

As is known, the fire maneuverability of any tank is determined by the angular speed of rotation of the turret. The turret of the T-34 tank rotated around its vertical axis using a rotation mechanism located on the left side of the gun. The turret rotation mechanism was a reduction worm gear. To quickly transfer fire from one target to another, an electromechanical drive was used, and a manual drive was used to accurately aim the gun at the target. The electric drive of the turret rotation mechanism had three rotation speeds. The electric motor was controlled by turning the rheostat (controller) handwheel mounted on it. To turn the tower to the right, the handwheel was turned to the right, to turn it to the left, to the left. When turning, the rheostat handwheel had three positions in each direction, corresponding to three turret rotation speeds, which had the following values: 1st speed - 2.1 rpm, 2nd - 3.61 rpm, 3rd - 4, 2 rpm Thus, the time for a full rotation of the tower at maximum speed was a record 12 seconds! In the neutral position (manual drive), the handwheel was locked using a button. Everything seems to be fine. But then it is not entirely clear what P. A. Rotmistrov meant when he spoke of the “extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower.” The fact is that the turret rotation mechanism of the T-34 tank had an extremely unsuccessful design with separated control drives.

Let's imagine a tank gunner in battle. His face is pressed to the forehead of the sight, that is, he does not look around and manipulates the gun’s aiming organs blindly. The right hand rests on the vertical guidance flywheel, the left hand rests on the flywheel for the manual turret rotation drive. According to the recollections of some tankers, they crossed their arms, rotating the right flywheel of the turret rotation mechanism. Perhaps it was more convenient. To switch to the electric drive, the gunner had to stretch out his hand (it was difficult to do this with his left hand, but with his right hand) and use it to feel for the small handwheel of the controller located on the top of the rotation mechanism. At the same time, it was necessary to remember to switch from a manual drive to an electromechanical one by pressing a small button next to the handwheel. As they say, “everything is clear to the court” - not a single one normal person in the heat of battle he will not do all this. Therefore, the gunners of the “thirty-fours” mainly used only the manual drive for turning the turret. To a large extent, their choice was made easier by the fact that on tanks produced in the winter of 1941/42, for example, there was no electric drive for turning the turret at all - electric motors were not supplied to the factories.

To fire from the L-11 cannon, the TOD-6 telescopic sight and the PT-6 periscopic panoramic sight were used; for firing from the F-34 cannon - the TOD-7 telescopic sight and the PT-7 periscopic panoramic sight, later replaced by the TMFD-7 telescopic sight and the PT-4-7 periscopic panoramic sight. In addition to the standard periscope sight, some tanks were equipped with a PT-K commander's panorama.

Turret rotation mechanism

The TMFD-7 telescopic sight had a 2.5x magnification and a field of view of 15°. It provided greater pointing accuracy, but working with it was inconvenient, since the eyepiece part moved with the gun, which means the gunner had to either slide from his seat, giving the gun barrel an elevation angle, or stand up from it, giving the declination angle. The periscope sight, unlike the telescopic sight, was mounted not on the gun, but in the roof of the turret. It provided all-round visibility with a fixed eyepiece. The head prism of the sight was connected to the gun by a parallelogram drive. The PT-4 sight had lower pointing accuracy due to errors introduced by the parallelogram traction device and the differential mechanism. Since September 1943, T-34 tanks began to be equipped with PT-9 periscope sights without an all-round viewing mechanism.

In tanks produced in 1940-1942, the ammunition consisted of 77 rounds, which were placed on the floor of the fighting compartment and on its walls. 20 high (for 3 shots) and 4 low (for 2 shots) suitcases were installed on the floor of the tank - a total of 68 shells. There were 9 shots placed on the walls of the fighting compartment: on the right side - 3, in a common horizontal stacking, and on the left - 6, in two horizontal stacks, 3 shots each.

In tanks produced in 1942-1944 with an “improved” turret, the ammunition load consisted of 100 rounds (armor-piercing - 21, high-explosive fragmentation - 75, sub-caliber - 4). To store shots on the floor of the fighting compartment, 8 boxes for 86 shots were equipped. The remaining 14 shots were placed as follows: 2 armor-piercing tracers - in cassettes on the lid of the box in the right rear corner of the fighting compartment, 8 high-explosive fragmentation rounds - on the left side of the fighting compartment, and 4 sub-caliber ones - in cassettes on the right side.

Thus, in the “first shot fenders” of the early T-34 tank with the “pie” turret there were 9 shots, and with the “improved” turret - 14. For the rest, the loader had to climb into suitcases or boxes. It was more difficult with the first ones, since their design provided access to only one upper shot. In the boxes, the shots were placed horizontally, and with the lid open, access to several shots was provided at once.

In addition to the design features of the gun, such an important parameter as the rate of fire largely depends on the ease of operation of the loader. And here German medium tanks had a noticeable advantage over their opponents, primarily over Soviet tanks, mainly due to the use of a forward-mounted transmission layout. This arrangement, thanks to the combination of the control and transmission compartments, made it possible to allocate a larger part of the hull for the fighting compartment than with the transmission located aft.

From the data in the table it can be understood that the smallest volume of the fighting compartment and control compartment of the T-34 among all compared tanks is due to the sequential non-combined arrangement of the engine and transmission compartments, which occupied 47.7% of its length.

View inside the turret of the T-34 tank through the turret hatch. To the left of the breech of the F-34 cannon, the tube of the TMFD-7 telescopic sight is clearly visible, above it is the forehead and eyepiece of the PT-4-7 periscope sight and the flywheel of the turret rotating mechanism. Above the latter is the tank commander’s TPU apparatus No. 1. To the left and below the TPU apparatus, the frame of the on-board viewing device is visible, which, judging by the image, was very difficult for the tank commander to use

A very important parameter that directly affects both the accuracy of fire and its rate of fire is the width at the shoulders of the gunner’s and loader’s workstations. Unfortunately, the author does not have accurate data on this matter for the T-34 tank. However, it is quite obvious that this width of our vehicle, with the volume of the fighting compartment noticeably smaller than that of the German Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks, cannot be greater. Moreover, the clear diameter of the turret ring, or, as it is sometimes called, the service circle, for the T-34 was 1420 mm, for the Pz.III – 1530, and for the Pz.IV – 1600 mm! The width of the gunner's workstations on both German tanks was 500 mm. For the T-34, due to the above, it could not exceed this value, but most likely was somewhere in the range of 460–480 mm. The gunner, willy-nilly, had to sit facing the direction of the tank, and his workplace, in the end, was determined by the width of the shoulders of a man of average height. It was worse for the loader. Apparently, it was believed that within the volume allotted to him, he could position his body relatively freely. Based on the dimensions of the turret, we can calculate the width at the shoulders of the loader’s workplace, which was somewhere in the range of 480x600 mm (for Pz.III - 600x900 mm, for Pz.IV - 500x750). If we consider that the length of a 76-mm shot is approximately 600 mm, then it generally becomes unclear how the loader could perform his duties in the T-34 turret. The appearance in 1942 of a new turret of the so-called “improved shape” (improved in terms of manufacturing technology) with a smaller slope of the walls, most likely made it possible to somewhat expand the jobs of the gunner and loader. But not by much - the diameter of the turret ring remained the same.

Security

The design of the hull and turret of the T-34 tank was based on the solutions used in the creation of the experimental light tank BT-SV-2 “Turtle”; the concept was based on the idea of anti-ballistic armor. Strictly speaking, both were used as the basis for the design of the still light A-20 tank, and then, by inheritance, migrated to the T-34. Without going into details of the design of the hull and turret of the T-34, let’s try to figure out how well its armor protection met its purpose.

The first shelling tests of the tank known to the author took place at the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka at the end of March 1940. The A-34 tank No. 2 was tested. Firing the sides of the hull and turret of this tank from a distance of 100 m from domestic (four shots) and British (two shots) 37-mm cannons with sharp-headed armor-piercing shells did not have any effect on the tank - the shells bounced off the armor, leaving only dents 10–15 mm deep. When the turret was fired from a 45-mm cannon with two armor-piercing shells from the same distance, the glass and mirrors of the turret's on-board viewing device were destroyed, the foreheadplate on the sight was torn off, and the welds along the armor contour of the viewing device and at the bottom of the turret niche were broken. As a result of the deformation of the shoulder strap during rotation of the tower, jamming was observed. At the same time, the dummy placed in the tank remained intact, and the engine, which was started in the tank before the shelling, continued to operate steadily. After the shelling, the tank crossed an area with deep snow and an unfrozen, swampy stream. Based on the results of the shelling, it was decided to increase the thickness of the turret niche bottom from 15 to 20 mm and strengthen the aft hatch mounting bolts.

Comparative sizes of T-34 and KV-1

Armor protection level serial tanks, which began to leave the factory floor a little over a year later, was in principle the same as that of the prototypes. Neither the thickness of the armor plates nor their relative positions have changed significantly. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War was encouraging - it turned out that T-34 tanks in standard combat situations were practically not hit by fire from standard Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons. In any case, such a picture took place in initial period war. It was also confirmed by tests carried out in Stalingrad on September 19, 1941 at the training ground where the 4th Tank Brigade of Colonel M.E. Katukov was formed. The impetus for carrying out these tests was the development at Seversky Plant of the process of simplified heat treatment of armor parts. The first hull, manufactured using the new technical process, was fired from 45 mm anti-tank and 76 mm tank guns.

“During the tests, the armored hull was subjected to the following firing pattern:

A. seven armor-piercing 45-mm and one high-explosive 76-mm projectile were fired into the starboard side;

b. eight armor-piercing 45-mm shells were fired into the right fender liner;

V. three armor-piercing 45-mm shells were fired into the upper sheet of the stern;

three armor-piercing and one high-explosive 76-mm shells were fired into the upper sheet of the nose.

Firing from a 45-mm anti-tank gun was carried out from a distance of 50 m. The sides and fenders were fired at an angle of 50° and 12° to the normal, the bow and stern - normal to the natural position of the hull. Tests have established that the overall structural strength of the hull when fired by armor-piercing shells of 45 mm caliber was generally completely preserved and only partial destruction of the seams was observed when shells hit them near them, and only hits from 76 mm armor-piercing shells caused minor damage to the seams and short-term chips.” .

In general, everything is clear, there is nothing to comment here. However, the invulnerability of the armor protection of the T-34 tank should not be exaggerated. Usually, in favor of this very invulnerability, enemy reviews of clashes with T-34 tanks in the summer of 1941 are cited. However, these reviews (we will look at some of them below) should be treated with a certain amount of criticism. On the one hand, due to their somewhat excessive emotionality, and on the other, because in most cases in the Soviet press they were not presented in full, that is, endlessly. And, as a rule, there was only one end - the Soviet T-34 (or KB) tank was knocked out. If anti-tank artillery could not do this, then divisional or anti-aircraft artillery did. In order to be convinced of this, it is enough to look at the data from the report on the damage to Soviet damaged tanks that arrived at repair plants during the Battle of Moscow in the period from October 9, 1941 to March 15, 1942.

Note: the final figure does not coincide with the number of defeats due to the presence of more than 1 defeat in many tanks (especially medium and heavy types).

The total number of hits exceeds the number of defeats by an average of 1.6–1.7 times.”

103 Tank body:

1 – final drive housing; 2 – caterpillar finger striker; 3 – balancer limiter stand; 4 – balancer support bracket; 5 – cutout for the balancer pin; 6 – hole for the balancer axis; 7 – guide wheel crank bracket; 8 – armored plug above the worm shank of the track tension mechanism; 9 – beam of the bow of the hull; 10 – towing hook; 11 – towing hook latch; 12 – booms for attaching spare tracks; 13, 16 – protective strips; 14 – armor protection of the machine gun; 15 – driver’s hatch cover; 17 – headlight bracket; 18 – signal bracket; 19 – handrail; 20 – saw bracket; 21 – brackets for external fuel tank

Subsequently, as the number of medium and heavy tanks grew in number, the number of hits exceeded the number of defeats. So, for example, to destroy one T-34 tank at real battle ranges in the summer of 1942, it required five 50-mm armor-piercing sub-caliber shells to hit it.

It should be noted that most of the holes and dents from shells occurred on the sides and rear of the hulls and turrets of Soviet tanks. There were practically no marks from hits on the frontal armor, which indicated the reluctance of German artillerymen and tank crews to fire at Soviet tanks from frontal angles. It was especially noted that, despite the tilt of the side armor plates of the T-34 tank at 40°, they were penetrated by 47-mm Czech and 50-mm German shells anti-tank guns: “despite the large angle of inclination of sliding traces on the armor, relatively few were found. Most of the holes (14 out of 22) are normalized to one degree or another.”

Cleaning welds on the hull of the T-34 tank

Some clarification is necessary here. The fact is that already in 1941 the Germans began to actively use armor-piercing shells with armor-piercing tips. For 50-mm shells, a head made of high-hardness steel was additionally welded, and 37-mm shells were subjected to uneven hardening during manufacture. The use of an armor-piercing tip allowed the projectile, upon contact with the armor, to turn towards the inclination - to normalize, due to which its path in the armor was shortened. Such 50 mm shells also penetrated the frontal armor of the T-34, while the hole channel was inclined, as if the tank was being fired at from an elevated position. It would be useful to recall that the production of such shells was mastered in the USSR only after the war. However, let's return to the report.

Of the holes of unknown caliber, the majority were “small-diameter holes, with an annular roller, made by the so-called. "sub-caliber" ammunition. Moreover, it has been established that this type of ammunition is equipped with ammunition for 28/20 mm PTR, 37 mm anti-tank gun, 47 mm Czechoslovak anti-tank gun, 50 mm anti-tank, casemate and tank guns.”

The report also noted the use by the Germans of new shells, called “cumulative”, the traces of which were holes with melted edges.

In some publications you can find information that since 1942, “thirty-fours” were produced with 60 mm frontal hull armor. Actually this is not true. Indeed, at a meeting of the State Defense Committee on December 25, 1941, Resolution No. 1062 was adopted, which ordered, starting from February 15, 1942, the production of T-34s with frontal armor 60 mm thick. This decision, apparently, can be explained precisely by the use by the Germans of an ever-increasing number of 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns with a barrel length of 60 calibers, armor-piercing (with an armor-piercing tip) and armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles which penetrated the frontal armor of the T-34 on distances up to 1000 m, as well as the use of sub-caliber shells for 50-mm L/42 tank guns of Pz.III tanks, which achieved a similar result from a distance of up to 500 m.

Since metallurgical plants could not quickly produce the required amount of 60-mm rolled armor, tank factories were ordered to shield the frontal parts of the hull and turret with 10-15-mm armor plates, which were used at plant No. 264 in the production of armored hulls of T-60 tanks. However, already on February 23, 1942, the State Defense Committee reversed its decision, partly due to difficulties with the manufacture of 60-mm armor plates, partly due to the rather rare use of sub-caliber shells by the Germans. Nevertheless, tanks with shielded hulls and turrets were produced at STZ and Plant No. 112 until the beginning of March 1942, until their stock was used up. At the Krasnoye Sormovo plant, eight turrets with 75 mm armor were cast and installed on tanks.

T-34 tank armor scheme

The same plant, in addition, in the fall of 1942 produced 68 T-34 tanks, the hulls and turret of which were equipped with bulwarks. It was assumed that they would protect the tanks from German cumulative shells. However, it was not possible to verify this - in the very first battle, almost all combat vehicles shielded in this way were hit by conventional armor-piercing shells from enemy 75-mm anti-tank guns. Soon, work on protecting tanks from cumulative ammunition was stopped, since the Germans used them extremely rarely.

In 1942, the situation with the security of the “thirty-four” became somewhat more complicated. The Wehrmacht began to receive in increasing quantities the medium tanks Pz.III with a 50-mm cannon with a barrel length of 60 calibers and Pz.IV with a 75-mm cannon with a barrel length of first 43 and then 48 calibers. The latter pierced the frontal parts of the T-34 tank turret at a range of up to 1000 m, and the front of the hull at a range of up to 500 m. The latter circumstance is quite understandable: repeated shelling tests of the hulls of T-34 tanks at the NIBT Test Site showed that the upper frontal plate, which had a thickness of 45 mm and an inclination angle of 60°, the projectile resistance was equivalent to a vertically located armor plate with a thickness of 75–80 mm.

To analyze the resistance of the armor of the T-34 tank, a group of employees of the Moscow Central Research Institute No. 48 assessed their lethality and the reasons for failure.

As initial data for assessing the lethality of T-34 tanks, the group's workers took information from repair bases No. 1 and No. 2, located in Moscow, as well as GABTU materials received from the repair base at plant No. 112. In total, information was collected about 154 tanks that suffered damage to their armor protection. As the analysis showed, the largest number of defeats - 432 (81%) occurred on the tank's hull. 102 defeats (19%) occurred on the tower. Moreover, more than half (54%) of the damage to the hulls and turrets of T-34 tanks were harmless (potholes, dents).

The group's report noted that “The main means of fighting the T-34 tank was enemy artillery with a caliber of 50 mm and above. Out of 154 vehicles, there were 109 hits to the upper frontal part, of which 89% were safe, and dangerous hits occurred with a caliber of more than 75 mm. The share of dangerous hits from 50 mm guns was 11%. The high armor resistance of the upper frontal part was obtained, among other things, due to its inclined location.

Only 12 lesions (2.25%) were found on the lower frontal part, that is, the number is very small, and 66% of the lesions are safe. The sides of the hull had greatest number defeats - 270 (50.5% of the total), of which 157 (58%) were on the front part of the hull sides (control compartment and fighting compartment) and 42% - 113 defeats - on the stern. The most popular calibers were 50mm and above - 75, 88, 105mm. All hits from large-caliber shells and 61.5% of hits from 50-mm shells turned out to be dangerous.”

The obtained data on the lethality of the main parts of the hull and turret made it possible to assess the quality of the armor. Percent major defeats(breaks, breaks with cracks, spalls and splits) was very small - 3.9%, and based on the nature of the damage, the quality of the armor was considered quite satisfactory.

The sides of the hull (50.5%), the forehead of the hull (22.65%) and the turret (19.14%) were most exposed to fire.

General form welded turret of the T-34 tank produced in 1940-1941

Well, how did German tank crews evaluate the security of the T-34? Information about this can be gleaned from the “Report on the tactical use of German and Soviet tank units in practice,” compiled in 1942 based on the combat experience of the 23rd Panzer Division during Operation Blau. Regarding the T-34, it noted:

“Armor penetration of shells from the 5-cm KwK L/60 long-barreled tank gun.

Panzergranate 38 (armor-piercing projectile model 38) vs T-34:

turret side and turret box - up to 400 m;

tower forehead - up to 400 m;

the front of the hull is not effective, in some cases it can pierce the driver’s hatch.

Armor penetration of the Panzergranate 39 projectile of the long-barreled 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 gun against the T-34:

The T-34 is hit from any angle in any projection if fire is fired from a distance of no more than 1.2 km.”

By the end of 1942, the share of 75-mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns in the Wehrmacht's range of anti-tank weapons increased sharply (to 30%). the frequently used ranges of anti-tank combat did not pose a serious obstacle for him. By the summer of 1943, Pak 40 guns became the basis of the Wehrmacht's tactical anti-tank defense zone.

This, as well as the appearance of new German heavy tanks “Tiger” and “Panther” on the Eastern Front led to the fact that, in the figurative expression of the veteran of the 3rd Guards Tank Army M. Mishin, our tankers “suddenly began to feel completely naked...” . As noted in reports on the combat operations of Soviet tanks on the Kursk Bulge, the armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile of the 75-mm cannon of the Panther tank, which had initial speed 1120 m/s, penetrated the frontal armor of the T-34 tank at a distance of up to 2000 m, and an armor-piercing projectile from the 88-mm cannon of the Tiger tank, which had an initial speed of 890 m/s, pierced the frontal armor of the T-34 tank from a distance of 1500 m.

T-34 tank with L-11 cannon Three holes are clearly visible on the side of the turret

This can be seen from the “Report on testing the armor protection of the T-34 tank by fire from an 88-mm German tank gun,” compiled by NIBTPolygon employees in May 1943:

“Shelling of the T-34 hull from a distance of 1500 m.

1) Armor-piercing projectile. Front sheet. Thickness – 45 mm, tilt angle – 40 degrees, meeting angle – 70 degrees.

Chink in the armor. The driver's hatch is torn off. There are 160–170 mm cracks in the armor. The shell ricocheted.

2) Armor-piercing projectile. Nose beam. Thickness 140 mm, tilt angle – 0 degrees, meeting angle – 75 degrees.

Through hole, entrance hole with a diameter of 90 mm, exit hole - 200x100 mm, cracks in the weld seam 210-220 mm.

3) High-explosive fragmentation projectile. Front sheet. Thickness – 45 mm, tilt angle – 40 degrees, meeting angle – 70 degrees.

Minor pothole. The entire left side of the front plate attachment to the side plates was destroyed.

Established: An 88 mm tank gun penetrates the bow of the hull. When it hits the frontal part, the projectile ricochets, but due to the low quality of the armor, it forms a hole in the armor. The hull armor has low viscosity - spalls, delaminations, cracks. The welded seams of the hull are destroyed when shells hit the sheets.

Conclusions: an 88-mm German tank gun pierces the frontal part of the T-34 tank from 1500 m...

To increase the armor resistance of the T-34 armored hull, it is necessary to improve the quality of the armor and welds.”

For the first time since the beginning of the war, the level of armor protection of the T-34 tank, which had until now been the dominant component of its combat survivability, lost its superiority over the level of armor penetration of the main anti-tank weapons of the Wehrmacht. In such a situation, the question of increasing the security of our medium tanks could not help but arise.

"Thirty-fours" equipped with additional frontal armor at the STZ. Kalinin Front, 1942

In principle, there were still opportunities to strengthen the armor of the Thirty-Four at that time. Advances in the field of armor protection and weight reserves in the vehicle’s design that were not used at that time (about 4 tons) made it possible to increase the level of projectile resistance of its main parts. Thus, the transition from 8C steel to high-hard FD steel made it possible to significantly reduce the range of through penetration of the frontal part of the T-34 hull by an armor-piercing projectile of the 75-mm Pak 40 cannon. There were other options for enhancing armor protection, but the effect achieved through the implementation of any of these options was would be proportional to the time required for the corresponding restructuring of production. As a result, until the end of 1943, nothing radical was done to improve the armor of the T-34 tank.

The turret of this tank was torn off by an internal explosion. Unfortunately, the 76-mm ammunition detonated quite often. Spring 1942

From the point of view of security, the side arrangement of the fuel tanks cannot be considered successful, especially in the fighting compartment and without enclosures. It was not because of a good life that the tankers tried to fill their tanks to capacity before the battle - diesel fuel vapors explode no worse than gasoline, but diesel fuel itself never does. And if “thirty-fours” with torn off turrets, depicted in numerous photographs, are the result of an explosion of ammunition, then tanks with sides torn off due to welding are the result of an explosion of diesel fuel vapors.

During the Great Patriotic War, automatic fire extinguishing systems were not used on domestic tanks. T-34 tanks were equipped with RAV hand-held tetrachlorine fire extinguishers, which did not prove their worth due to the insufficient quantity and high toxicity of the fire extinguishing agent, as well as the impossibility of the crew using them in case of a fire in the engine compartment without exiting the tank.

Mobility

As you know, the mobility of a tank is ensured by the engine, transmission and chassis used on it. The design of the controls and the convenience of the driver are also important. Let's try to figure out how these issues were resolved at the Thirty-Four.

The T-34 tank was equipped with a 12-cylinder four-stroke uncompressor diesel engine V-2-34. Rated engine power – 450 hp. at 1750 rpm, operational - 400 hp. at 1700 rpm, maximum – 500 hp. at 1800 rpm. The cylinders were arranged in a V-shape at an angle of 60°.

The use of a diesel engine on the T-34 tank was an important and undeniable advantage. Soviet designers were truly the first in the world to create and bring to mass production a powerful, high-speed tank diesel engine. One of the most important motivations for its creation was, of course, higher efficiency compared to gasoline engines. Increased fire safety is rather a formal reason, since this parameter is ensured not so much by the type of fuel as by the location of the fuel tanks and the effectiveness of the fire extinguishing system. The latter statement is supported by the fact that 70% of the T-34 tanks irretrievably lost during the war burned out.

It should be emphasized that the V-2 diesel engine, from a design point of view, was an outstanding example, so successful that it was used in various modifications on dozens of combat and special vehicles in post-war years. Its significantly improved version of the B-92 is mounted on the most modern Russian tank, the T-90. At the same time, the B-2 engine had a number of disadvantages. Moreover, they were not at all connected with the design of the engine as such, but rather with the inability, or very limited ability, of the domestic industry of those years to “digest” such a complex unit.

One of the disadvantages of the layout of the T-34 tank is the placement of fuel tanks on the sides of the fighting compartment. The explosion of diesel fuel vapor was so strong (only empty tanks exploded) that it turned out to be fatal for this tank. This vehicle, which had additional armor for the hull and turret, had the entire left upper side plate of the hull torn off due to welding

In 1941, virtually no engine component worked reliably. With great difficulty, it was possible to ensure that the engines operated for 100-120 operating hours, with the guaranteed operating time of 150 operating hours required by GABTU. Moreover, we are talking about engine hours worked on the stand under almost ideal conditions. In conditions of real front-line operation, the engines did not work out even half of this resource. As you know, the engine in a tank operates in an extremely overstressed mode, especially from the point of view of air supply and air purification. The air cleaner design used on the B-2 engine until the fall of 1942 provided neither one nor the other.

More or less acceptable reliability was achieved only at the end of 1942 after the installation of the Cyclone air purifier. Thanks to the use of modern English and American machines received under Lend-Lease, the quality of manufacturing parts has also increased. As a result, the engine life increased, although plant No. 76 still guaranteed a life of only 150 engine hours.

The most important indicator of a tank's power plant is power density. For the T-34 tank this value was not constant. For vehicles produced in 1940-1941, which weighed 26.8 tons, it was 18.65 hp/t, and for tanks produced in 1943 and weighing 30.9 tons, it was 16.2 hp/t. Is it a lot or a little? Suffice it to say that in this indicator the T-34 was superior to all German tanks without exception. For Pz.III modifications E, F and G, with which Germany began the war against the Soviet Union, this figure ranged from 14.7 to 15.3 hp/t, and for the latest modifications L, M and N in 1943 year, the specific power was 13.2 hp/t. A similar picture was observed in the Pz.IV tank. Modification E in 1941 had a specific power of 13.4 hp/t, and versions G and H in 1943, respectively, 12, 7 and 12 hp/t. For the Panther this figure averaged 15.5 hp/t, and for the Tiger it was 11.4 hp/t. However, comparing the T-34 with the last two is not entirely correct - these are machines of a different class. The T-34 was superior to almost all Allied tanks. Only the English cruiser tanks Crusader (18.9 hp/t) and Cromwell (20 hp/t) and the American light tank Stuart (19.2 hp/t) had greater specific power. .

High specific power provided the T-34 tank with a high maximum speed of 55 km/h versus 40 km/h on average for the Pz.III and Pz.IV. However, the average speeds on the highway for all these cars were approximately the same and did not exceed 30 km/h. This is explained by the fact that the average speed is determined not so much specific power, how much is the order of movement of the column on the march and the endurance of the chassis. As for the average speed of movement over terrain, for almost all tanks, regardless of their mass and type of power plant, it ranges from 16 to 24 km/h and is limited by the endurance limit of the crew.

A few words need to be said about such an indicator as the power reserve. Many people perceive it literally - as a certain distance from point A to point B, which a tank can cover at one gas station. In fact, the power reserve is an important indicator of the autonomy of the tank and, rather, is the path that the tank is able to travel from refueling to refueling. It depends on the capacity of the fuel tanks and fuel consumption. The T-34 produced in 1940-1943 had a cruising range of 300 km on the highway and 220–250 km on a country road. Fuel consumption is respectively 160 l and 200 l per 100 km.

Early T-34 tanks had six internal fuel tanks with a total capacity of 460 liters and four external fuel tanks with a total capacity of 134 liters. By the end of the summer of 1943, the number of fuel tanks was increased to eight, and their capacity increased to 545 liters. Instead of four side tanks, two rectangular stern tanks were installed, and since 1943, two cylindrical tanks with a capacity of 90 liters were installed on each side. External fuel tanks were not connected to the engine power system.

Engine V-2

In terms of power reserve and fuel consumption, the T-34 was noticeably superior to its opponents. For example, the capacity of the three gas tanks of the average German tank Pz.IV was 420 liters. Fuel consumption per 100 km when driving on the highway is 330 liters, off-road - 500 liters. The range on the highway did not exceed 210 km, on the ground - 130 km. And only in tanks of the latest J modification did it reach the “thirty-four” level. But to do this, it was necessary to install another gas tank with a capacity of 189 liters, eliminating the power unit of the electric drive for turning the turret!

The disadvantages of a diesel engine include difficult starting in winter time. For example, in the winter of 1941, during the Battle of Moscow, when the air temperature sometimes dropped to -40°C, in order to ensure constant combat readiness of the vehicles, an order was given not to turn off the engines on medium and heavy tanks for a long time. It goes without saying that such a measure led to even greater consumption of the already limited engine life.

No matter how powerful the engine is on the tank, mobility is ensured not only by it, but also by the transmission working in tandem with it. And if the latter is not very successful, then this largely neutralizes all the advantages of the engine. This is what happened with the “thirty-four”.

The transmission of the T-34 tank consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch (steel on steel), a gearbox, side clutches, brakes and final drives.

The gearbox is three-way, four-speed with sliding gears. Onboard clutches are multi-disc, dry (steel on steel); The brakes are floating, band, with ferrodo lining. Final drives are single-stage.

The four-speed gearbox of the T-34 tank had an extremely poor design. In it, to engage the required pair of gears on the drive and driven shafts, the gears moved relative to each other. It was difficult to select the right gear while driving. Gear teeth colliding during shifting broke, and even ruptures of the gearbox housing were noted. After joint testing of domestic, captured and Lend-Lease equipment in 1942, this gearbox earned the following assessment from NIBTPolygon officers:

“The gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, do not fully satisfy the requirements for modern combat vehicles, being inferior to the gearboxes of both allied and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology "

Since March 1943, the T-34 began to be equipped with a five-speed gearbox with constant mesh gears. Here it was no longer gears that moved, but special carriages that moved along the shaft on splines and engaged the required pair of gears that was already in mesh. The appearance of this box greatly facilitated gear shifting and had a positive effect on the dynamic characteristics of the tank.

View of the T-34 tank engine from the turret side. Behind the air cleaner “pancake” you can see a filler tee with a steam-air valve, intended for pouring water into the cooling system. On the sides, between the suspension shafts, oil tanks are visible

The main clutch also created its share of problems. Due to rapid wear and tear, as well as due to an unsuccessful design, it almost never turned off completely, it “drove”, and it was difficult to change gear in such conditions. With the main clutch not turned off, only very experienced driver mechanics were able to “stick” the desired gear. The rest did it simpler: before the attack, 2nd gear was engaged (starting gear for the T-34), and the rev limiter was removed from the engine. When moving, the diesel engine was spun up to 2300 rpm, and the tank, accordingly, accelerated to 20–25 km/h. The change in speed was carried out by changing the number of revolutions, or simply by releasing the “gas”. There is no need to explain that such a soldier’s cunning reduced the already small engine life. However, it was a rare tank that lived to see its “heart” exhaust even half of this resource.

In 1943, the design of the main clutch was improved. In addition, they introduced a servomechanism for the main clutch release pedal, which significantly facilitated the work of the driver, which already required considerable physical effort. During the long march, the driver lost several kilograms in weight.

The maneuverability of the tank is significantly influenced by the ratio of the length of the supporting surface to the track width - L/B. For the T-34 it was 1.5 and was close to optimal. For medium German tanks it was less: for Pz.III - 1.2, for Pz.IV - 1.43. This means their agility was better. “Tiger” also had a better indicator. As for the Panther, its L/B ratio was the same as that of the T-34.

View of the transmission of the T-34 tank. An electric starter is installed on top of the gearbox, and side clutches are installed on the sides.

The chassis of the tank, applied to one side, consisted of five double road wheels with a diameter of 830 mm. Track rollers, produced by different factories and at different times, differed significantly in design and appearance: cast or stamped, with rubber bands or with internal shock absorption (in the summer of 1942, STZ produced rollers without any shock absorption at all).

The absence of rubber bands on the road wheels contributed to the noise that unmasked the tank. Its main source was the tracks, the ridges of which had to fit exactly between the rollers on the drive wheel. But as the track stretched, the distance between the ridges increased, and the ridges hit the rollers. The absence of a muffler on the T-34 added to the noise.

An organic drawback of the T-34 was the Christie-type spring suspension, which caused the vehicle to oscillate strongly while driving. In addition, the suspension shafts “ate up” a significant part of the reserved volume.

* * *

Concluding the conversation about the design and operation features of the T-34 tank, it is necessary to dwell on one more question. The fact is that the parameters discussed above often complement each other, and, in addition, they are significantly influenced by other factors. For example, it is impossible to consider weapons and security without taking into account surveillance and communications equipment.

Back in 1940, such a significant drawback of the tank was noted as the unsuccessful placement of observation devices and their low quality. For example, an all-round viewing device was installed to the right behind the tank commander in the turret hatch cover. Access to the device was extremely difficult, and observation was possible in a limited sector: horizontal view to the right up to 120°; dead space 15 m. The limited viewing sector, the complete impossibility of observation in the remaining sector, as well as the awkward position of the head during observation made the viewing device completely unsuitable for work. For this reason, already in the fall of 1941, this device was withdrawn. As a result, only the PT-4-7 periscope sight could be used for all-round observation, but it allowed observation in a very narrow sector - 26°.

Welded tower produced by STZ. The details are clearly visible - the embrasure plug for firing from personal weapons, the armor of the on-board viewing device, the PT-4-7 sight in the combat position (the armor cover is folded back)

The observation devices on the sides of the tower were also inconveniently located. In order to use them in a cramped tower, it was necessary to be able to dodge. In addition, until 1942, these instruments (and those of the driver too) were mirrored, with mirrors made of polished steel. The image quality was even better. In 1942, they were replaced with prismatic ones, and the “improved” tower already had viewing slots with triplex glass blocks.

In the front hull plate on both sides of the driver's hatch at an angle of 60° to the longitudinal axis of the tank there were two mirror viewing devices. A central mirror periscope viewing device was installed in the upper part of the hatch cover. From the beginning of 1942, a driver's hatch of a simpler shape with two prismatic viewing devices appeared. To protect against bullets and shell fragments, the prisms were covered from the outside with hinged armor covers, the so-called “cilia.”

View of the upper frontal plate of the hull with a ball mount for the directional machine gun and the driver's hatch

The quality of prisms made of yellowish or greenish plexiglass in observation instruments was disgraceful. It was almost impossible to see anything through them, especially in a moving, swaying tank. Therefore, driver mechanics, for example, often opened their hatch to the palm of their hand, which allowed them to somehow orient themselves. In addition, the driver's viewing instruments quickly became clogged with dirt. The appearance of a hatch with “eyelashes” made it possible to at least somehow slow down this process. While moving, one “eyelash” closed, and the driver conducted observation through the other. When it became dirty, the closed one opened.

Perhaps the reader will ask: “Well, what do weapons and security have to do with it?” It’s just that in battle, the insufficient number, poor location and poor quality of observation devices led to the loss of visual communication between vehicles and untimely detection of the enemy. In the fall of 1942, the report of NII-48, based on an analysis of damage to armor protection, noted:

“A significant percentage of dangerous damage to T-34 tanks on the side parts, and not on the front, can be explained either by poor knowledge of the tank commands with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection, or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot timely detect the firing point and make a turn of the tank to a position that is least dangerous for breaking through its armor.”

T-34 produced by STZ with a cast turret manufactured at plant No. 264. Summer 1942. To the right of the fan cowl you can see the loader's periscope viewing device, borrowed from the T-60 tank

The T-34 tank's visibility situation improved somewhat only in 1943 after the installation of a commander's cupola. It had viewing slits around the perimeter and an MK-4 observation device in the flap of the rotating lid. However, the tank commander was practically unable to conduct observation through it in battle, since, being at the same time a gunner, he was “chained” to the sight. In addition, many tankers preferred to keep the hatch open in order to have time to jump out of the tank in case of being hit by an enemy shell. The MK-4 device, which the loader received, was much more useful. Thanks to this, the visibility from the right side of the tank has really improved.

Another Achilles heel of the T-34 tank was communication, or rather, the lack thereof. For some reason, it is believed that all “thirty-fours” from the very beginning of their production were equipped with radio stations. This is wrong. Of the 832 tanks of this type available in the border military districts on June 1, 1941, only 221 vehicles were equipped with radio stations. In addition, 71-TK-Z is capricious and difficult to set up.

Things were no better in the future. For example, from January to July 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant shipped 2,140 T-34 tanks to the active army, of which only 360 were equipped with radio stations. This is something like 17%. Approximately the same picture was observed at other factories. In this regard, the references of some historians to the fact that the degree of radioization of the Wehrmacht is greatly exaggerated looks quite strange. This is confirmed by the fact that not all German tanks had transceiver radio stations; most had only receivers. It is stated that “The Red Army had an essentially similar concept of “radio” and “linear” tanks. The crews of “linear” tanks had to act while observing the commander’s maneuvers, or receive orders with flags.”. Interesting thing! The concept may be the same, but the implementation is different. Comparing the transmission of commands by radio with a flag alarm is like comparing a rickshaw with a taxi. The concept is also the same, but everything else...

Control department of the T-34 tank. Radio operator position. At the top in the center is a ball mount for a directional machine gun. On the right is the radio station

Most German tanks had at least transmitters through which they could receive orders in battle. Most of the Soviets had nothing on them, and the unit commander had to lean out of the top hatch in battle and wave flags without any hope that anyone would see him. That’s why the order was given before the attack: “Do as I do!” True, it is not entirely clear what should have been done if the tank that gave such an order was knocked out?

As a result, according to the Germans, Russian tanks often attacked in a “herd”, moving in a straight line, as if afraid of losing their way. They were slow to open return fire, especially when firing from the flanks, and sometimes they didn’t open it at all, never determining who was firing at them and from where.

Internal communications also left much to be desired, especially on tanks produced in 1941-1942. Therefore, the main means of transmitting commands to the driver was the commander’s legs placed on his shoulders. If the commander pressed on his left shoulder, the mechanic turned left and vice versa. If the loader showed a fist, it means he needs to load with an armor-piercing weapon, if the palm is spread out, he needs to load with a fragmentation weapon.

The situation improved somewhat only in 1943, when quite modern 9P radio stations and TPU-3bis intercoms began to be installed on 100% of tanks.

In February - March 1944, T-34-85 tanks began to enter service with the troops. In particular, around this time they were received by formations of the 2nd, 6th, 10th and 11th Guards Tank Corps. Unfortunately, the effect of the first combat use of the new tanks was low, since the brigades received only a few vehicles. The majority of them were “thirty-fours” with 76-mm guns. In addition, very little time was allocated in combat units for retraining crews. This is what M.E. Katukov, who commanded the 1st Tank Army, which fought heavy battles in Ukraine, wrote in his memoirs in the April days of 1944: “We experienced joyful moments in those difficult days. One of these is the arrival of tank reinforcements. The army received, albeit in small quantities, new “thirty-fours”, armed not with the usual 76-mm, but with an 85-mm cannon. The crews that received the new “thirty-fours” had to be given only two hours of time to master them. We couldn't give more then. The situation on the ultra-wide front was such that new tanks with more powerful weapons had to be brought into battle as soon as possible.”

One of the first T-34-85s with the D-5T cannon was received by the 38th Separate Tank Regiment. This unit had a mixed composition: in addition to the T-34-85, it also contained OT-34 flamethrower tanks. All combat vehicles of the regiment were built at the expense of the Russian Orthodox Church and bore the name “Dimitri Donskoy” on their sides. In March 1944, the regiment became part of the 53rd Combined Arms Army and took part in the liberation of Ukraine.

T-34-85s were used in significant numbers during the offensive in Belarus, which began at the end of June 1944. They already made up more than half of the 811 “thirty-fours” that took part in this operation. The T-34-85 was used en masse in combat operations in 1945: in the Vistula-Oder, Pomeranian, and Berlin operations, and in the battle of Lake Balaton in Hungary. In particular, on the eve of the Berlin operation, the staffing of tank brigades with combat vehicles of this type was almost one hundred percent.

It should be noted that during the rearmament of tank brigades, some organizational changes occurred in them. Since the crew of the T-34-85 consisted of five people, the personnel of the anti-tank rifle company of the brigade’s submachine gun battalion were called upon to complete the crews.

Until mid-1945, the Soviet tank units stationed in the Far East were armed mainly with outdated light tanks BT and T-26. By the beginning of the war with Japan, the troops received 670 T-34-85 tanks, which made it possible to equip the first battalions in all separate tank brigades and the first regiments in tank divisions with them. The 6th Guards Tank Army, transferred to Mongolia from Europe, left its combat vehicles in the previous deployment area (Czechoslovakia) and already received 408 T-34-85 tanks from factories No. 183 and No. 174. Thus, vehicles of this type took a direct part in the defeat of the Kwantung Army, being the striking force of tank units and formations.

In addition to the Red Army, T-34-85 tanks entered service with the armies of several countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The first tank of this type in the Polish Army was the T-34-85 with the D-5T cannon, transferred on May 11, 1944 to the 3rd training tank regiment of the 1st Polish Army. As for the combat units, the first to receive these tanks—20 units—was the 1st Polish Tank Brigade in September 1944 after the battles near Studzianki. In total, in 1944-1945, the Polish Army received 328 T-34-85 tanks (the last 10 vehicles were transferred on March 11). The tanks came from factories No. 183, No. 112 and repair bases. During the fighting, a significant part of the combat vehicles was lost. As of July 16, 1945, there were 132 T-34-85 tanks in the Polish Army.

All these machines were quite worn out and required major repairs. To carry it out, special brigades were created, which, at the sites of recent battles, removed serviceable components and assemblies from damaged Polish and even Soviet tanks. It is interesting to note that during the renovation, a number of “synthesized” tanks appeared, when the early T-34 had its turret plate changed and a turret with an 85 mm gun installed.

The 1st Separate Czechoslovak Brigade received the T-34-85 at the beginning of 1945. It then included 52 T-34-85 and 12 T-34. The brigade, being operationally subordinate to the Soviet 38th Army, took part in heavy battles for Ostrava. After the capture of Olomouc on May 7, 1945, the remaining 8 tanks of the brigade were transferred to Prague. The number of T-34-85 tanks transferred to Czechoslovakia in 1945 varies from 65 to 130 units in different sources.

At the final stage of the war, two tank brigades were formed in the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. The 1st Tank Brigade was armed by the British, and its MZAZ light tanks landed on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia in July 1944. The 2nd Tank Brigade was formed with the help of the Soviet Union at the end of 1944 and received 60 T-34-85 tanks.

A small number of T-34-85s were captured by German troops, as well as troops of states allied with Germany. There were only a few of these tanks used by the Wehrmacht, which is understandable - in 1944-1945, the battlefield in most cases remained with the Red Army. The facts of the use of individual T-34-85s by the 5th SS Viking Panzer Division, the 252nd Infantry Division and some other units are reliably known. As for Germany's allies, in 1944 the Finns, for example, captured nine T-34-85s, six of which were used by the Finnish army until 1960.

As often happens in war, military equipment sometimes changed hands several times. In the spring of 1945, the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, which fought as part of the 18th Army on the territory of Czechoslovakia, captured a T-34-85 medium tank from the Germans. It is interesting to note that at that time the brigade's equipment consisted of light T-70 tanks, medium T-34 tanks and a battalion of captured Hungarian tanks. The captured vehicle became the first T-34-85 tank in this brigade.

After the end of World War II, the T-34-85 for quite a long time - almost until the mid-50s - formed the basis of the tank fleet of the Soviet Army: the T-44 tank entered service in limited quantities, and the T-54 was adopted by industry too slowly. As the troops became saturated with modern armored vehicles, T-34-85 tanks were transferred to training units and also placed in long-term storage. IN educational units in a number of military districts, in particular in Transbaikal and Far Eastern, these combat vehicles were in use until the early 70s. The author currently has no information about the presence of the T-34-85 in the troops, but there has not yet been a formal order from the Minister of Defense to remove the tank from service with the Russian Army.

As part of the Soviet Army, T-34-85 tanks did not take part in hostilities in the post-war years. There are known facts of combat use of “thirty-fours” in some “hot spots” in the CIS, for example, during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Moreover, sometimes even memorial tanks were used for this purpose.

Outside the Soviet Union, the T-34-85 participated in combat operations on almost all continents until very recently. Unfortunately, it is not possible to indicate the exact number of tanks of this type transferred to one country or another, especially since these deliveries were carried out not only from the USSR, but also from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

After 1945, the T-34-85 was at various times in service in Austria, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, East Germany, Egypt, Israel (captured Egyptian) , Iraq, Cyprus, China, North Korea, Congo, Cuba, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, North Yemen, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Finland (captured Soviet), Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, South Africa (trophy Angolan), Yugoslavia, South Yemen. As of 1996, tanks of this type were still available in the armies of Cuba (400 units, mainly in coastal defense), Albania (70), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Angola (58), Guinea-Bissau (10), Mali (18 ), Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The arena for the most widespread use of the Thirty-Four after World War II was Asia.

At 5 a.m. on June 25, 1950, T-34-85s of the 109th Tank Regiment of the Korean People's Army (KPA) crossed the 38th parallel and the Korean War began.

The creation of armored units of the KPA began back in 1945, when the 15th training tank regiment was formed, which was armed with American Stuart and Sherman tanks received from the Chinese, as well as two Soviet T-34-85s. The training of Korean military personnel was carried out by 30 Soviet tank instructors. In May 1949, the 105th Tank Brigade was formed on the basis of the regiment. By the end of the year, all three of its regiments (107th, 109th and 203rd) were fully equipped with “thirty-fours”, 40 vehicles each. By June 1950, the KPA had 258 T-34-85 tanks. In addition to the 105th brigade, 20 vehicles were in the 208th training tank regiment, and the rest in the newly formed 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 45th and 46th tank regiments (in reality - battalions, 15 tanks each) and in the 16th and 17th tank brigades (actually regiments of 40-45 vehicles each). The superiority of the North Korean troops, in terms of the quantity and quality of armored vehicles, was complete, since the South Korean army did not have a single tank at all, and the 8th American Army, stationed in South Korea and Japan, had at that time only four separate tank battalions, armed with M24 Chaffee light tanks.

The mountainous nature of the central part of the Korean Peninsula did not allow the use of large masses of tanks, so tank regiments were assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 4th infantry divisions KPA, striking in the direction of Seoul. The success of the tank attacks was complete! The South Korean infantry units were completely demoralized. Not only had many of the soldiers never seen a tank before in their lives, but they also very quickly became convinced that their anti-tank weapons - 57-mm cannons and 2.36-inch bazookas - were powerless against the T-34-85. On June 28, 1950, Seoul fell.

A week later, a significant event occurred - on July 5, 33 T-34-85 tanks of the 107th KPA regiment attacked the positions of the 24th Infantry Division of the US Army. The Americans tried to repel the tank attack with fire from 105 mm howitzers and 75 mm recoilless guns. However, it turned out that high-explosive shells were ineffective, and there were only six 105-mm cumulative shells. They managed to knock out two tanks from a distance of 500 yards. During this battle, American infantry fired 22 shots at tanks from 2.36-inch bazookas - all to no avail!

On July 10, 1950, the first tank battle took place between a T-34-85 and an M24 from Company A of the 78th Tank Battalion. Two M24s were shot down, the T-34s had no losses. 75 mm American shells did not penetrate their frontal armor. The next day, Company A lost three more tanks, and by the end of July it practically ceased to exist - it only had two tanks out of 14 left! Such results completely demoralized the American tank crews and greatly upset the infantrymen, who now did not see any effective anti-tank weapon in the M24. The infantrymen experienced some relief only after they began using the 3.5-inch “super bazookas.” In the battles for Daejeon, the 105th Brigade lost 15 T-34-85s, seven of which were destroyed by super-bazooka fire.

The Thirty-Four met a worthy opponent only on August 17, 1950. T-34-85s of the 107th Tank Regiment attacked the positions of the 1st US Marine Brigade on the Pusan bridgehead. The North Korean tank crews, accustomed to victories, saw the well-known M24s in front of them and confidently went into battle. However, they were mistaken - it was the M26 Pershing from the 1st Tank Battalion of the US Marine Corps. Three T-34-85s were shot down by combined fire from 90-mm Pershing and Super Bazooka guns. From that moment on, a turning point occurred in tank battles. North Korean tank crews, well trained in offensive operations, turned out to be unprepared for combat with American tanks in conditions of positional warfare. The higher level of combat training of American crews had an effect. By September 1950, a balance of power had been established in the Busan bridgehead. Having landed at Inchon, the Americans turned the tide of events in their favor.

From Inchon there was a short route to Seoul, in the area of which there were only 16 T-34-85s from the 42nd Tank Regiment with unfired crews and 10-15 tanks of the 105th Brigade. In the battles of September 16-20, almost all of these vehicles were destroyed.

The first battle of the T-34-85 with the Shermans took place on September 27. 10 "thirty-fours" attacked M4AZE8 of the 2nd platoon of company C of the 70th tank battalion. Three Shermans were hit in a matter of seconds. Then one T-34-85 ironed a transport convoy, smashing 15 trucks and jeeps into splinters, and was hit at point-blank range from a 105-mm howitzer. Another four T-34-85s fell victim to bazooka fire, and two North Korean tanks knocked out the main forces of the 70th tank battalion that approached from the rear.

By the end of the year, North Korean troops lost 239 T-34-85 tanks, most of which were knocked out by bazooka fire and aircraft. In battles with tanks, according to American data, 97 T-34-85s were shot down. With return fire, North Korean tanks destroyed only 34 American combat vehicles. At the same time, the T-34-85 was clearly superior to the M24 Chaffee in all respects. In terms of their characteristics, the “thirty-four” were similar to the M4AZE8, but had more powerful weapons. If the T-34-85 easily hit the Sherman at a direct shot distance with conventional armor-piercing shells, the American tank achieved a similar result only when using sub-caliber and cumulative shells. The only ones that were too tough for the T-34-85 in Korea were the M26 Pershing and M46 Patton, which had more powerful armor protection and weapons.

In 1959, the first tank unit of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was formed - the 202nd Tank Regiment, armed with the T-34-85. In 1967-1975, these tanks were used in battles against American troops along with the more modern T-54, T-55, PT-76 and proved themselves to be good. In any case, the last batch of thirty-fours arrived from the USSR in 1973. T-34-85 from the 273rd Tank Regiment of the Vietnamese People's Army took part in the last battle of this war - the capture of Saigon in April 1975.

Subsequently, T-34-85 fought in Kampuchea, and in 1979 they took part in repelling the attack of Chinese troops on the northern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Some of the "thirty-four" were converted by the Vietnamese into ZSU. Instead of standard turrets, they were equipped with open-top armored conning towers with twin Chinese 37-mm Type 63 automatic anti-aircraft guns. According to other sources, these combat vehicles were manufactured in China.

The last Asian theater of operations where the T-34-85 fought was Afghanistan. Moreover, combat vehicles of this type were used in the 80s by both regular units of the Afghan army and the Mujahideen.

T-34-85 tanks were used in the most significant quantities during numerous wars in the Middle East.

The first 230 Thirty-Fours arrived in Egypt in 1953-1956. These were Czechoslovak-made tanks. Some of them were destroyed during the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention against Egypt in October - November 1956. Israeli tank crews, who fought in Shermans and AMX-13s, knocked out 26 T-34-85s. There were no military clashes between Egyptian and Anglo-French tanks.

A new large batch of T-34-85 - 120 vehicles - was delivered to the banks of the Nile from Czechoslovakia before the end of 1956. It was followed by the second (in 1962-1963), and in 1965-1967 - the third, another 130 tanks. In the early 60s, deliveries of "thirty-fours" from the USSR and Czechoslovakia began to Syria.

During the Six Day War of 1967, these tanks were in the first line of tank units along with the T-54. As you know, the Arabs were defeated in this war. On the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli troops knocked out and captured 251 T-34-85 tanks. Syrian losses were significantly lower, both due to the smaller number of armored vehicles involved and due to the conditions of their use - the Golan Heights is not the Sinai. It is interesting to note that in the Golan, former opponents fought against Israeli troops under the Syrian flag: German Pz.lVAusf.l tanks, received in the late 40s from Czechoslovakia and France, and T-34-85.

In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, T-34-85s were used on a much smaller scale and were used mainly for auxiliary tasks. Like the Israeli Shermans, many of them underwent modernization and alterations on the eve of this war.

In an effort to strengthen the tank's armament, the Egyptians managed to install a Soviet 100-mm BS-3 field gun on it. At the same time, the turret shoulder strap remained the same. True, only the front and lower parts of the standard turret have been preserved.

Instead of everything else, a rather cumbersome superstructure of a simple shape was built from light armor plates. A significant part of the armor plates on the sides and roof of this new turret were folding, which, on the one hand, facilitated the work of the crew in servicing the gun during firing, and on the other, solved the issue of ventilation of the fighting compartment. The combat weight of the vehicle has increased slightly, but the dynamic characteristics have remained virtually unchanged. Not stopping there, Egyptian designers installed a 122-mm D-30 howitzer in a turret similar in design, but slightly larger in size! It goes without saying that both of these vehicles could not be used as tanks. We were talking only about their use as self-propelled artillery units. Unfortunately, there is no data on the number of vehicles converted in this way, as well as on their participation in hostilities. The leading role in tank battles went to the modern T-55 and T-62.

Unlike the Egyptians, the Syrians took a different, simpler path. They decided to install the D-30 howitzer on the roof of the front part of the hull, while firing backwards. The tower was naturally dismantled. Five steel boxes for shells were attached to the sides of the hull. A folding working platform for the gun crew was mounted above the frontal armor plate. Inside the hull there were places for storing ammunition and crew seats. Before installation on a tank prepared in this way, the lower machine with wheel travel was removed from the gun and the shield was cut off. The conversion of tanks was carried out at the artillery school in Catanach and the armored school in El Kaboun.

Due to the weight being reduced to 20 tons, the dynamic characteristics of the vehicle even increased. The specific pressure on the ground has also become less. Naturally, the ballistic characteristics of the D-30 remained the same. The disadvantage of such a howitzer installation, which had all-round firing in the towed version, is the limited guidance sector. Formally, here too the gun could rotate 360°, but fire was conducted only in the 120° guidance sector at the rear of the tank. The ammunition load of the T-34-122 self-propelled gun consisted of 120 shells (80 inside the vehicle and 40 in boxes on the sides of the hull).

The first to receive these self-propelled guns at the beginning of 1972 were the artillery battalions of the 4th and 91st tank brigades (18 vehicles each) of the 1st Armored Division. By the beginning of the 1973 war, both Syrian armored divisions (1st and 3rd) were armed with the T-34-122. During combat operations, these vehicles were primarily used to conduct surprise fire raids on areas and provide direct fire support to troops. At the end of the war, they had to repel attacks by Israeli tanks, mostly without success, mainly due to insufficient training of crews to fire at moving targets.

These self-propelled guns went into battle again in Lebanon in 1976, and then in 1982. Another drawback of these vehicles was reflected here - on narrow mountain roads the self-propelled guns often could not turn around to fire. This was the last war in which the T-34-122 took part. Soon, modern self-propelled artillery units 2S1 and 2SZ arrived from the USSR, which began to replace the “thirty-four” in the artillery units of armored divisions. At the same time, the latter were transferred to the reserve.

In addition to Egypt and Syria, in the Middle East the T-34-85 was used by both sides during the war between North and South Yemen in 1962 - 1967. During the Lebanese Civil War, they were used by both various Lebanese warring factions and units of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which received 60 tanks from Hungary. Finally, Iraqi T-34-85s were used during the war with Iran in the 80s.

The African continent was also a battlefield for the T-34. They first took part in hostilities in Western Sahara in 1970. Ethiopia used them in Eritrea and against Somalia in 1977-1978. However, T-34-85s were also present in the Somali army that invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden province.

According to Western data, the first T-34-85s entered the FAPLA (Angolan Army) units in 1975, even before the country’s formal declaration of independence. In 1976, 85 tanks of this type were delivered there, which took part in battles with units of the UNITA movement and units of the South African army. At the same time, they were very effectively used against the South African Panhard AML-90 armored vehicles. Several tanks subsequently ended up in the possession of rebels in Namibia, where they took part in the fighting against South African troops in 1981. At the same time, some of the tanks were hit by fire from 90-mm cannons of Ratel-90 armored vehicles, and a number of them were captured by the South Africans.

The only Latin American country that ever possessed T-34-85 tanks was Cuba. In 1960, it signed the first agreements on the supply of weapons and military equipment with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Soon the first batch of tanks - about three dozen T-34-85s - arrived in Cuba.

Meanwhile, preparations were in full swing for the invasion of Cuba by the “2506 Brigade,” formed from “gusano” emigrants to overthrow Fidel Castro. The brigade had up to 10 M4 Sherman tanks (according to other sources - M41) and 20 M8 armored vehicles. The landings began on April 17, 1961, in the Bay of Cochinos near Playa Larga and Playa Giron, and at first the invading forces were resisted only by small units of the people's militia, the Milisianos. By noon on April 17, when the intentions of the “gusanos” became clear, F. Castro arrived at the position for direct command of the troops. An infantry regiment, a tank battalion and a division of 122-mm howitzers were moving towards the landing area.

On the evening of April 17, the Milisianos, with the support of several T-34-85 tanks that arrived in time, tried to advance in the direction of Playa Larga. Unable to deploy into battle formation in the swampy terrain, the tanks moved in a column along the highway, preventing each other from firing. The “Gusanos” let them get closer and knocked out the lead “thirty-four” with three bazookas at once. The remaining tanks retreated, and the infantry also returned to their original positions. By the morning of April 18, the entire tank battalion from Santa Clara arrived at the battlefield under its own power, and two more tank companies were transferred from Managua on trailers. After several hours of artillery preparation, eight battalions of the army and police went on the offensive. T-34-85 tanks and SU-100 self-propelled guns moved behind the infantry combat formations, supporting them with continuous fire. By 10.30 in the morning they took Playa Larga and went ashore, where they transferred fire to the landing boats trying to approach the shore.

On April 19 at 17.30, units of the Cuban army and people's militia stormed the village of Playa Giron - the last point of defense of the “2506 brigade”. The first company to enter the village was a company of T-34-85 tanks; in the lead vehicle was Fidel Castro himself, who personally led the attack. The last two Shermans of the counter-revolutionaries were shot down in Playa Girón. Government troops lost only one T-34-85 during the entire operation.

In combat operations on the European continent after World War II, the T-34-85 was used three times. The first time was in 1956 in Hungary. In Budapest, the rebels captured five tanks of the Hungarian People's Army, and they then took part in battles with units of the Soviet Army that entered the city.

In 1974, during the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, T-34-85 tanks supplied to Greek Cypriots from Yugoslavia and Poland fought with Turkish troops.

The last case of combat use of T-34-85 tanks took place during the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991 - 1997. Combat vehicles of this type were used here by all warring parties, since before the collapse of Yugoslavia they were available in the territorial defense forces of almost all union republics. The Thirty-Fours performed well in combat, although they were the most outdated tanks in this war. The crews tried to compensate for the weakness of their armor by hanging steel sheets or sandbags on the sides. True, the T-34-85 was mainly used not as tanks, but as self-propelled artillery mounts, firing from the spot.

A story about the use of T-34-85 tanks in Yugoslavia would not be complete without mentioning the attempt to thoroughly modernize them, undertaken in this country in the late 40s. The main reason for this event was the desire to modernize the tank and, in this form, to launch its own mass production in Yugoslavia, and not to purchase licenses for its production from the USSR, relations with which then sharply deteriorated.

The changes did not affect, perhaps, only the chassis, suspension and engine. The transmission has undergone some improvements. The most significant innovations were made to the design of the hull and turret. The upper part of the hull was slightly expanded, and it received side chines in the bow. Because of this, the directional machine gun had to be moved closer to the axis of the vehicle. The roof of the engine compartment was replaced with a new one, and the three standard cylindrical fuel tanks were replaced with semi-cylindrical ones. The tank received a completely new streamlined cast turret. Since the Yugoslav industry of those years was not able to produce such large castings, the turret was welded from six cast parts.

The ZIS-S-53 gun has also undergone modernization. A muzzle brake of the original shape was installed on it. According to other sources, the tank was equipped with a 75-mm cannon, developed on the basis of the German KwK39. A 7.62-mm Browning M1919A4 anti-aircraft machine gun was mounted on the rotating double-leaf loader hatch.

It should be noted that all these improvements actually increased the projectile resistance of the hull and turret, but they could not significantly improve the vehicle’s performance. For this reason, as well as due to technical difficulties, mass modernization of the “thirty-four” was never launched. Only 7 tanks were produced, which took part in the parade on May 1, 1950 in Belgrade.

This tank is the most recognizable symbol of the Great Patriotic War. The best tank in its class during World War II. One of the most mass tanks in the world. The vehicle that formed the basis of the armored armies of the USSR that passed through all of Europe.

What kind of people led the "thirty-four" into battle? How and where were you taught? What did the battle look like “from the inside” and what was the everyday life of Soviet tank crews like at the front?

Tank crew training...

Before the war, a career tank commander trained for two years. He studied all types of tanks that were in the Red Army. He was taught to drive a tank, shoot from its cannon and machine guns, and was given knowledge on tank battle tactics. A general specialist came out of the school. He was not only the commander of a combat vehicle, but also knew how to perform the duties of any crew member.

In the thirties, the military enjoyed enormous popularity in the USSR. Firstly, the Red Army, its soldiers and officers, symbolized the power of the relatively young Soviet state, which in just a few years had transformed from a war-ravaged, impoverished, agrarian country into an industrial power capable of standing up for itself. Secondly, officers were one of the wealthiest segments of the population.

For example, an instructor at an aviation school, in addition to full maintenance (uniforms, lunches in the canteen, transport, dormitory or money for rent), received a very high salary - about 700 rubles (a bottle of vodka cost about two rubles). In addition, service in the army gave people from peasant backgrounds a chance to improve their education and master a new, prestigious specialty.

Alexander Burtsev, a tank commander, says: “I remember that after three years of service they returned from the army as different people. The village idiot left, and a literate, cultured man returned, well dressed, in a tunic, trousers, boots, physically stronger. He could work with equipment and lead. When a serviceman came from the army, as they were called, the whole village gathered. The family was proud that he served in the army, that he became such a person.”

The coming new war - the war of engines - also created new propaganda images. If in the twenties every boy dreamed of checkers and cavalry attacks, then by the end of the thirties this romantic image was forever supplanted by fighter pilots and tank crews. Piloting a fighter jet or shooting an enemy from a tank cannon – this is what thousands of Soviet boys now dreamed of. “Guys, let’s join the tank crews! It's an honor! You go, the whole country is under you! And you are on an iron horse!” – phrases describing the mood of those years, recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznov.

...and during the war

However, during the heavy defeats of 1941, the Red Army lost almost all the tanks it had in western districts. Most of the regular tank crews also died. The acute shortage of tank crews became obvious already in the summer of 1942, when the industry evacuated to the Urals began producing tanks in the same volumes.

The country's leadership, realizing that tankers would play a decisive role in the 1943 campaign, ordered the fronts to send at least 5,000 of the best privates and sergeants with at least seven classes of education to tank schools every month. Every month, 8,000 of the best soldiers with at least three classes of education were recalled from the front to the training tank regiments, where rank and file personnel were trained - gunners-radio operators, driver-mechanics and loaders. In addition to front-line soldiers, yesterday’s high school graduates, tractor drivers and combine operators sat on the school bench.

The course of study was shortened to six months, and the program was cut to the minimum. But I still had to study 12 hours a day. We mainly studied the material parts of the T-34 tank - chassis, transmission, cannon and machine guns, radio station.

All this, as well as the ability to repair a tank, was learned both in classes and at practical exercises. But there was a catastrophic lack of time. Platoon commander Vasily Bryukhov recalls: “After graduating from college, I fired three shells and a machine-gun disc. Is this preparation? They taught us a little driving on the BT-5. They taught us the basics - to get moving, to drive in a straight line. There were classes in tactics, but mostly “on foot like a tank.” And only at the end there was a show of “tank platoon on the offensive.” All! Our preparation was very poor. When we were released, the head of the school said: “Well, sons, we understand that you quickly skipped through the program. You don’t have any solid knowledge, but you’ll learn in battle.”

From school to the front

Freshly promoted lieutenants were sent to tank factories in Gorky, Nizhny Tagil, Chelyabinsk and Omsk. A battalion of T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines of each of these factories every day. The young commander filled out the tank acceptance form. After this, he received a penknife, a silk scarf for filtering fuel, a revolver and a tank watch the size of a fist, which was installed on the dashboard. However, tankers often carried them with them. Not everyone had a wristwatch or pocket watch at that time.
Ordinary crew members were trained in three-month courses in reserve tank regiments located at the factories. The commander quickly got acquainted with the crew and made a fifty-kilometer march, which ended with live firing.

After this, the tanks were loaded onto platforms, and the train rushed them west - towards their fate.

Inside the T-34

The legendary medium tank, which entered service in 1940, was in many ways a revolutionary design. But, like any transitional model, it combined novelties and forced decisions. The first tanks had an outdated gearbox. The noise in the tank was incredible, and the tank intercom worked disgustingly. Therefore, the tank commander simply put his feet on the driver’s shoulders and controlled him using predetermined signals.

The T-34 turret was only for two. Therefore, the tank commander performed the duties of both commander and gunner. By the way, the commander and the loader were somehow able to talk, but most often their communication also took place through gestures. The commander put his fist under the loader’s nose, and he already knows that he needs to load with armor-piercing, and his outstretched palm with fragmentation.

Gunner-radio operator Pyotr Kirichenko recalls: “Shifting gears required enormous effort. The driver moves the lever to the desired position and begins to pull it, and I pick it up and pull it along with him. The transmission will shake for a while and only then turn on. The entire tank march consisted of such exercises. During the long march, the driver lost two or three kilograms in weight: he was all exhausted. In addition, since his hands were busy, I took the paper, poured samosad or shag into it, sealed it, lit it and inserted it into his mouth. This was also my responsibility."

Battle on the T-34 (reconstruction)

There are a few minutes left before the attack begins. The commander’s hands begin to shake, his teeth chatter: “How will the battle turn out? What's behind the hill? What strength do the Germans have? Will I live until evening? The radio operator gunner is nervously gnawing on a piece of sugar - he always craves food before an attack. The loader smokes, inhaling deeply. The cigarette in his hand is shaking. But the signal to attack sounds in the headphones of the commander’s tank helmet. The commander switches to the intercom, but the noise is so loud that nothing can be heard. Therefore, he simply lightly hits the driver, who is sitting directly below him, with his boot on the head - this is the conditioned signal “Forward!” The car, its engine roaring and its tracks clanking, starts moving. The commander looks through the periscope - the entire battalion has moved to attack.

The fear is gone. All that was left was cold calculation.

A mechanic drives a car at a speed of 25-30 kilometers - in a zigzag, changing direction every 50 meters. The life of the crew depends on his experience. It is the mechanic who must correctly assess the terrain, find cover, and not expose the side to enemy guns. The radio operator set up the radio for reception. He has a machine gun, but he can only aim through a hole the diameter of an index finger, in which the earth and sky flash alternately - such shooting will only scare the Krauts, it has little real use. The loader in the panorama observes the right sector. His task is not only to throw shells into the breech, but also to indicate to the commander the targets on the right along the tank’s course of movement.

The commander looks forward and to the left, looking for targets. The right shoulder rested against the breech of the gun, the left against the armor of the turret. Closely. The hands are folded crosswise: the left one is on the gun lifting mechanism, the right one is on the turret rotation handle. So he caught an enemy tank in the panorama. He kicked the driver in the back - “Stop!” and just in case, he shouted into the intercom: “Short!” To the loader: “Armour-piercing!”
The driver selects a flat area of terrain, stops the car, and shouts: “Path!” The loader delivers the projectile. Trying to shout out the roar of the engine and the clang of the shutter, he reports: “Armor-piercing is ready!”
The tank, having stopped abruptly, sways for some time. Now everything depends on the commander, on his skills and simply on luck. A stationary tank is a tasty target for the enemy! My back was wet from tension. The right hand rotates the rotating mechanism of the turret, aligning the aiming mark with the target in the direction. Left hand turns the gun lifting mechanism, matching the range mark.

"Shot!" – the commander shouts and presses the gun release pedal. His voice is drowned in the roar of the shot and the clang of the shutter. The fighting compartment is filled with powder gases that corrode the eyes. The fan installed in the turret does not have time to blow them out of the tank. The loader grabs the hot, smoking cartridge and throws it out through the hatch. Without waiting for a command, the mechanic takes the car off the road.

The enemy manages to fire back. But the shell only ricochets, leaving a groove on the armor, like a hot spoon in oil. The impact on the tank makes my ears ring. The scale flying off the armor sticks into your face and grits your teeth. But the battle continues!

T-34 against the "Tigers"

The T-34 was superior to German medium tanks in all respects. It was a maneuverable and fast medium tank, equipped with a long-barreled 76 mm cannon and a diesel engine. A special source of pride for the tankers was the distinctive feature of the “thirty-four” – sloping armor. The effectiveness of inclined armor was also confirmed by combat practice. Most German anti-tank and tank guns of 1941-42 did not penetrate the front armor of the T-34 tank. By 1943, the T-34 had become the main combat vehicle of the Soviet tank armies, replacing the obsolete T-26 and BT.

However, by 1943, the Germans created modernized old T-IV medium tanks and began producing heavy tanks T-V "Panther" and T-VI "Tiger". The long-barreled guns of 75 and 88 mm caliber installed on the new vehicles could hit the T-34 at a distance of 1.5-2 thousand meters, while the 76 mm gun of our medium tank could hit the Tiger only from 500 m, and the Panther from 800 meters. Using the T-34's advantage in maneuverability and tactical tricks, our tankers often emerged victorious in battles with a technically superior enemy. But it also happened the other way around...

If the tank is hit...

It’s good that if a shell hit the engine compartment, the tank simply stalled and the crew had time to jump out. If the shell pierced the armor of the turret or the side of the fighting compartment, then the armor fragments most often wounded one of the crew members. The spilled fuel flared up - and the tankers had all their hope only in themselves, in their reaction, strength, dexterity, because everyone had only two or three seconds left to escape.

It was even worse for those whose tank was simply immobilized, but not on fire. Ion Degen, a tanker, says: “In battle, there was no need for the commander’s order to leave the burning tank, especially since the commander could have already been killed. They jumped out of the tank intuitively. But, for example, you couldn’t leave the tank if your track was broken. The crew was obliged to fire from the spot until they were hit.”

And it also happened that a tank driver was prevented from leaving a burning car by some small thing, sometimes even by uncomfortable clothes. Tanker Konstantin Shits recalls: “Our commander of one of the companies was Senior Lieutenant Sirik, such a prominent man. Once they captured rich trophies at the station, and he began to wear a good, long Romanian coat, but when they were hit, the crew managed to jump out, and because of this coat he hesitated and burned..."

But when they were lucky, the tankers jumped out of the burning tank, crawled into the craters and immediately tried to move to the rear.
Having survived the battle, the “horseless” tankers entered the battalion reserve. But I couldn’t rest for long. Repairmen quickly restored the unburned tanks. In addition, factories constantly replenished units with new equipment. So literally two or three days later the tanker was included in a new, unfamiliar crew and they went into battle again on a new tank.

It's always harder for commanders

It was even harder for company and battalion commanders. They fought until the last tank of their formation. This means that commanders transferred from one damaged vehicle to a new one several times during one operation, or even one day.

Tank brigades were “reduced to zero” in two to three weeks of offensive battles. After that, they were taken away for reorganization. There, the tankers first of all put the remaining equipment in order and only then themselves. The crew, regardless of rank, refueled the vehicle, loaded it with ammunition, cleaned the gun and aligned the sight, and checked the equipment and mechanisms of the tank.

The loader cleaned the shells of grease - washed them in diesel fuel, and then wiped them dry with a rag. The driver adjusted the tank's mechanisms and poured fuel, oil and water into buckets. The gunner-radio operator and the commander helped them - no one disdained dirty work. The fate of the tank depended on the crew, but the life of the crew was also directly related to the condition and combat effectiveness of the tank.

We have prepared the car for the upcoming battle or march - now you can wash, shave, eat and, most importantly, sleep. After all, the tank was not only a fighting vehicle for the crew, but often also a home.

Life of tankers

A tank tarpaulin measuring 10 by 10 meters was tied to the tank turret. The crew covered the tank with it on the way to the front. Simple food was laid out on it. The same tarpaulin served as a roof over the tank crews’ heads when it was not possible to stay overnight in houses.

In winter conditions the tank froze and became a real “refrigerator”. Then the crew dug a trench and drove a tank on top of it. A “tank stove” was suspended under the bottom of the tank, which was heated with wood. It was not very comfortable in such a dugout, but it was much warmer than in the tank itself or on the street.

The habitability and comfort of the “thirty-fours” themselves were at the minimum required level. The seats of the tankers were made rigid and, unlike American tanks, they had no armrests. However, tankers sometimes had to sleep right in the tank - half-sitting. Senior Sergeant Pyotr Kirichenko, gunner-radio operator of the T-34, recalls:
“Although I was long and thin, I still learned to sleep in my seat. I even liked it: you recline your back, lower your boots so that your feet don’t freeze on the armor, and sleep. And after the march it’s good to sleep on a warm transmission, covered with a tarpaulin.”

The tankers lived like Spartans under duress. During the offensive, they did not even have the opportunity to wash or change clothes. Tank driver Grigory Shishkin says:
“Sometimes you don’t wash for a whole month. But sometimes it’s normal to wash once every 10 days. They did the bathhouse like this. They built a hut in the forest and covered it with spruce branches. There is also spruce branches on the floor. Several crews gathered. One drowns, another chops wood, the third carries water.”

During periods of intense fighting, even food was often delivered to tankers only at the end of the day - breakfast, lunch, and dinner at once. But at the same time, the tankers were supplied with dry rations. In addition, the crew never neglected the opportunity to carry food supplies in the tank. During the offensive, this supply became practically the only source of food, which was replenished from trophies or thanks to the help of civilians. “Tank crews have always had good supplies. And, of course, food trophies were an additional ration for us... And tank NZ was always eaten before the battles - what if we burn out, so why should the goodness disappear? – says tanker Mikhail Shister.

In the evening after the battle, you could drink “People’s Commissar’s hundred grams.” But before a battle, a good commander always prohibited alcohol for his crew. Crew commander Grigory Shishkin about this feature of the tankers: “The main thing is that everyone around them drinks. The sappers begin: “Hey, you black-bellied ones, what aren’t they giving you?!” At first the guys were offended, but then they realized that I was trying for them. After the fight, drink as much as you want, but before the fight, under no circumstances! Because every minute, every second counts. If you made a mistake, you’ll die!”

We rested, lost the fatigue of past battles - and now, the tankers are ready for new battles with the enemy! And how many more of these fights were ahead on the way to Berlin...

T-34: tank and tankers

German vehicles were crap against the T-34.

Captain A. V. Maryevsky

“I did it. I held out. Destroyed five buried tanks. They couldn’t do anything because these were T-III, T-IV tanks, and I was on the “thirty-four”, whose frontal armor their shells did not penetrate.”

Few tankers from the countries participating in World War II could repeat these words of the commander of the T-34 tank, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar, in relation to their combat vehicles. The Soviet T-34 tank became a legend primarily because those people who sat behind the levers and sights of its cannon and machine guns believed in it. In the memoirs of tank crews, one can trace the idea expressed by the famous Russian military theorist A. A. Svechin: “If the importance of material resources in war is very relative, then faith in them is of enormous importance.”

Svechin served as an infantry officer in the Great War of 1914 - 1918, saw the debut of heavy artillery, airplanes and armored vehicles on the battlefield, and he knew what he was talking about. If soldiers and officers have faith in the technology entrusted to them, then they will act bolder and more decisively, paving their way to victory. On the contrary, distrust, readiness to mentally or actually throw a weak weapon will lead to defeat. Of course, we are not talking about blind faith based on propaganda or speculation. Confidence was instilled in people by the design features that strikingly distinguished the T-34 from a number of combat vehicles of that time: the inclined arrangement of armor plates and the V-2 diesel engine.

The principle of increasing the effectiveness of tank protection due to the inclined arrangement of armor plates was clear to anyone who studied geometry at school. “The T-34 had thinner armor than the Panthers and Tigers. Total thickness approximately 45 mm. But since it was located at an angle, the leg was approximately 90 mm, which made it difficult to penetrate,” recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Alexander Sergeevich Burtsev. The use of geometric structures in the protection system instead of brute force by simply increasing the thickness of armor plates gave, in the eyes of the T-34 crews, an undeniable advantage to their tank over the enemy. “The placement of the Germans’ armor plates was worse, mostly vertical. This is, of course, a big minus. Our tanks had them at an angle,” recalls the battalion commander, Captain Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov.

Of course, all these theses had not only theoretical, but also practical justification. In most cases, German anti-tank and tank guns with a caliber of up to 50 mm did not penetrate the upper frontal part of the T-34 tank. Moreover, even the sub-caliber shells of the 50-mm anti-tank gun PAK-38 and the 50-mm gun of the T-III tank with a barrel length of 60 calibers, which, according to trigonometric calculations, should have pierced the forehead of the T-34, in reality ricocheted off the highly hard sloping armor without causing any harm to the tank. A statistical study of combat damage to T-34 tanks undergoing repairs at repair bases No. 1 and 2 in Moscow, carried out in September-October 1942 by NII-48, showed that out of 109 hits to the upper frontal part of the tank, 89% were safe, with dangerous injuries accounted for guns with a caliber of 75 mm and higher. Of course, with the advent of a large number of 75-mm anti-tank and tank guns by the Germans, the situation became more complicated. 75-mm shells were normalized (turned at right angles to the armor when hit), penetrating the inclined armor of the forehead of the T-34 hull already at a distance of 1200 m. 88-mm anti-aircraft gun shells and cumulative ammunition were equally insensitive to the slope of the armor. However, the share of 50-mm guns in the Wehrmacht until the Battle of Kursk was significant, and faith in the sloping armor of the “thirty-four” was largely justified.

Any noticeable advantages over the T-34 armor were noted by tankers only in the armor protection of British tanks, “... if a blank pierced the turret, then the commander of the English tank and the gunner could remain alive, since practically no fragments were formed, but in the “thirty-four” the armor crumbled, and those in the tower had little chance of survival,” recalls V.P. Bryukhov.

This was due to the exceptionally high nickel content in the armor of the British Matilda and Valentine tanks. If the Soviet 45-mm high-hardness armor contained 1.0 - 1.5% nickel, then the medium-hard armor of British tanks contained 3.0 - 3.5% nickel, which ensured a slightly higher viscosity of the latter. At the same time, no modifications to the protection of the T-34 tanks were made by the crews in the units. Only before the Berlin operation, according to Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Petrovich Schwebig, who was the deputy brigade commander of the 12th Guards Tank Corps for technical matters, screens made of metal bed nets were welded onto tanks to protect against Faust cartridges. Known cases of shielding of “thirty-fours” are the fruit of the creativity of repair shops and manufacturing plants. The same can be said about painting tanks. The tanks arrived from the factory painted green inside and out. When preparing the tank for winter, the task of the deputy commanders of tank units for technical matters included painting the tanks with whitewash. The exception was the winter of 1944/45, when the war raged across Europe. None of the veterans remembers camouflage being applied to the tanks.

An even more obvious and confidence-inspiring design feature of the T-34 was the diesel engine. Most of those who were trained as a driver, radio operator, or even commander of a T-34 tank in civilian life in one way or another encountered fuel, at least gasoline. They knew well from personal experience that gasoline is volatile, flammable and burns with a bright flame. Quite obvious experiments with gasoline were used by the engineers whose hands created the T-34. “At the height of the dispute, designer Nikolai Kucherenko in the factory yard used not the most scientific, but a clear example of the advantages of the new fuel. He took a lit torch and brought it to a bucket of gasoline - the bucket was instantly engulfed in flames. Then the same torch was lowered into a bucket of diesel fuel - the flame went out, as if in water...” This experiment was projected onto the effect of a projectile hitting a tank, capable of igniting the fuel or even its vapors inside the vehicle. Accordingly, T-34 crew members treated enemy tanks to some extent with contempt. “They had a gasoline engine. This is also a big drawback,” recalls gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Pyotr Ilyich Kirichenko. The same attitude was towards tanks supplied under Lend-Lease (“Very many died because a bullet hit them, and there was a gasoline engine and nonsense armor,” recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Yuri Maksovich Polyanovsky), and Soviet tanks and a self-propelled gun equipped with a carburetor engine (“Once SU-76s came to our battalion. They had gasoline engines - a real lighter... They all burned out in the very first battles...” recalls V.P. Bryukhov). The presence of a diesel engine in the engine compartment of the tank gave the crews confidence that they had much less chance of suffering a terrible death from fire than the enemy, whose tanks were filled with hundreds of liters of volatile and flammable gasoline. The proximity to large volumes of fuel (the tankers had to estimate the number of buckets of it each time they refueled the tank) was masked by the thought that it would be more difficult for anti-tank gun shells to set it on fire, and in the event of a fire, the tankers would have enough time to jump out of the tank.

However, in this case, the direct projection of experiments with a bucket onto tanks was not entirely justified. Moreover, statistically, tanks with diesel engines had no advantages in fire safety compared to vehicles with carburetor engines. According to statistics from October 1942, diesel T-34s burned even slightly more often than T-70 tanks fueled with aviation gasoline (23% versus 19%). Engineers at the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that was directly opposite to the everyday assessment of the ignition potential of various types of fuel. “The Germans’ use of a carburetor engine rather than a diesel engine on the new tank, released in 1942, can be explained by: […] the very significant percentage of fires in tanks with diesel engines in combat conditions and their lack of significant advantages over carburetor engines in this regard, especially with the proper design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers.” By bringing a torch to a bucket of gasoline, designer Kucherenko ignited vapors of volatile fuel. There were no vapors above the layer of diesel fuel in the bucket favorable for igniting with a torch. But this fact did not mean that diesel fuel would not ignite from a much more powerful means of ignition - a projectile hit. Therefore, placing fuel tanks in the fighting compartment of the T-34 tank did not at all increase the fire safety of the T-34 in comparison with its peers, whose tanks were located in the rear of the hull and were hit much less frequently. V.P. Bryukhov confirms what was said: “When does the tank catch fire? When a projectile hits a fuel tank. And it burns when there is a lot of fuel. And at the end of the fighting there is no fuel, and the tank hardly burns.”

Tankers considered the only advantage of German tank engines over the T-34 engine to be less noise. “The gasoline engine, on the one hand, is flammable, and on the other hand, it is quiet. T-34, it not only roars, but also clacks its tracks,” recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Arsenty Konstantinovich Rodkin.

The power plant of the T-34 tank initially did not provide for the installation of mufflers on the exhaust pipes. They were placed at the rear of the tank without any sound-absorbing devices, rumbling with the exhaust of a 12-cylinder engine. In addition to the noise, the tank's powerful engine kicked up dust with its muffler-less exhaust. “The T-34 raises terrible dust because the exhaust pipes are directed downward,” recalls A.K. Rodkin.

The designers of the T-34 tank gave their brainchild two features that distinguished it from the combat vehicles of allies and enemies. These features of the tank increased the crew's confidence in their weapon. People went into battle with pride in the equipment entrusted to them. This was much more important than the actual effect of the slope of the armor or the real fire hazard of a tank with a diesel engine.

Tanks appeared as a means of protecting the crews of machine guns and guns from enemy fire. The balance between tank protection and anti-tank artillery capabilities is quite precarious, artillery is constantly being improved, and the newest tank cannot feel safe on the battlefield. Powerful anti-aircraft and hull guns make this balance even more precarious. Therefore, sooner or later a situation arises when a shell that hits the tank penetrates the armor and turns the steel box into hell.

Good tanks solved this problem even after death, receiving one or more hits, opening the way to salvation for people within themselves. The driver's hatch in the upper frontal part of the T-34 hull, unusual for tanks from other countries, turned out to be quite convenient in practice for leaving the vehicle in critical situations. Driver mechanic Sergeant Semyon Lvovich Aria recalls:

“The hatch was smooth, with rounded edges, and getting in and out of it was not difficult. Moreover, when you got up from the driver’s seat, you were already leaning out almost up to your waist.” Another advantage of the driver’s hatch of the T-34 tank was the ability to fix it in several intermediate relatively “open” and “closed” positions. The hatch mechanism was quite simple. To facilitate opening, the heavy cast hatch (60 mm thick) was supported by a spring, the rod of which was a gear rack. By moving the stopper from tooth to tooth of the rack, it was possible to firmly fix the hatch without fear of it falling off on potholes in the road or battlefield. Driver mechanics readily used this mechanism and preferred to keep the hatch ajar. “When possible, it’s always better with an open hatch,” recalls V.P. Bryukhov. His words are confirmed by the company commander, senior lieutenant Arkady Vasilyevich Maryevsky: “The mechanic’s hatch is always open to the palm of his hand, firstly, everything is visible, and secondly, the air flow with the top hatch open ventilates the fighting compartment.” This ensured a good overview and the ability to quickly leave the vehicle if a projectile hit it. In general, the mechanic was, according to the tankers, in the most advantageous position. “The mechanic had the greatest chance of surviving. He sat low, there was sloping armor in front of him,” recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar; according to P.I. Kirichenko: “The lower part of the hull, as a rule, is hidden behind the folds of the terrain, it is difficult to get into. And this one rises above the ground. Mostly they fell into it. And more people died who were sitting in the tower than those below.” It should be noted here that we are talking about hits that are dangerous for the tank. Statistically, in the initial period of the war, most of the hits fell on the tank hull. According to the NII-48 report mentioned above, the hull accounted for 81% of hits, and the turret - 19%. However, more than half total number the hits were safe (non-through): 89% of hits in the upper frontal part, 66% of hits in the lower frontal part and about 40% of hits in the side did not lead to through holes. Moreover, of the hits on board, 42% of the total number occurred in the engine and transmission compartments, the damage to which was safe for the crew. The tower, on the contrary, was relatively easy to break through. The less durable cast armor of the turret offered little resistance even to 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun shells. The situation was worsened by the fact that the T-34's turret was hit by heavy guns with a high line of fire, such as 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as hits from long-barreled 75-mm and 50-mm guns of German tanks. The terrain screen that the tanker was talking about was about one meter in the European theater of operations. Half of this meter is ground clearance, the rest covers about a third of the height of the T-34 tank’s hull. Most of the upper frontal part of the hull is no longer covered by the terrain screen.

If the driver's hatch is unanimously assessed by veterans as convenient, then tankers are equally unanimous in their negative assessment of the turret hatch of early T-34 tanks with an oval turret, nicknamed the “pie” for its characteristic shape. V.P. Bryukhov says about him: “The big hatch is bad. It is heavy and difficult to open. If it jams, then that’s it, no one will jump out.” He is echoed by the tank commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Evdokimovich Glukhov: “The large hatch is very inconvenient. Very heavy". The combination of hatches into one for two crew members sitting next to each other, a gunner and a loader, was uncharacteristic of the world tank building industry. Its appearance on the T-34 was caused not by tactical, but by technological considerations related to the installation of a powerful weapon in the tank. The turret of the predecessor of the T-34 on the assembly line of the Kharkov plant - the BT-7 tank - was equipped with two hatches, one for each of the crew members located in the turret. For its characteristic appearance with the hatches open, the BT-7 was nicknamed “Mickey Mouse” by the Germans. The Thirty-Fours inherited a lot from the BT, but the tank received a 76-mm gun instead of a 45-mm cannon, and the design of the tanks in the fighting compartment of the hull changed. The need to dismantle the tanks and massive cradle of the 76-mm gun during repairs forced the designers to combine two turret hatches into one. The body of the T-34 gun with recoil devices was removed through a bolted cover in the rear niche of the turret, and the cradle with a serrated vertical aiming sector was removed through the turret hatch. Through the same hatch, fuel tanks mounted in the fenders of the T-34 tank hull were also removed. All these difficulties were caused by the side walls of the turret sloping towards the gun mantlet. The T-34 gun cradle was wider and higher than the embrasure in the front part of the turret and could only be removed backwards. The Germans removed the guns of their tanks along with its mask (almost equal in width to the width of the turret) forward. It must be said here that the designers of the T-34 paid a lot of attention to the possibility of repairing the tank by the crew. Even... ports for firing personal weapons on the sides and rear of the turret were adapted for this task. The port plugs were removed and a small assembly crane was installed into the holes in the 45 mm armor to remove the engine or transmission. The Germans had devices on the tower for mounting such a “pocket” crane - a “piltse” - only appeared in the final period of the war.

One should not think that when installing a large hatch, the designers of the T-34 did not take into account the needs of the crew at all. In the USSR before the war, it was believed that a large hatch would facilitate the evacuation of wounded crew members from the tank. However, combat experience and tankers’ complaints about the heavy turret hatch forced A. A. Morozov’s team to switch to two turret hatches during the next modernization of the tank. The hexagonal tower, nicknamed the “nut,” again received “Mickey Mouse ears” - two round hatches. Such turrets were installed on T-34 tanks produced in the Urals (ChTZ in Chelyabinsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and UVZ in Nizhny Tagil) since the fall of 1942. The Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky continued to produce tanks with the “pie” until the spring of 1943. The problem of removing tanks on tanks with a “nut” was solved using a removable armor jumper between the commander’s and gunner’s hatches. The gun began to be removed according to the method proposed to simplify the production of a cast turret back in 1942 at plant No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" - the rear part of the turret was lifted with hoists from the shoulder strap, and the gun was pushed into the gap formed between the hull and the turret.

The tankers, in order to avoid the situation of “searching for the latch with bare hands,” preferred not to lock the hatch, securing it... with a trouser belt. A.V. Bodnar recalls: “When I went on the attack, the hatch was closed, but not latched. I hooked one end of the trouser belt to the hatch latch, and wrapped the other a couple of times around the hook that held the ammunition on the turret, so that if something happened, you hit your head, the belt would come off and you would jump out.” The same techniques were used by commanders of T-34 tanks with a commander's cupola. “On the commander’s cupola there was a double-leaf hatch, locked with two latches on springs. They even healthy man It was difficult to open it, but a wounded man definitely couldn’t. We removed these springs, leaving the latches. In general, we tried to keep the hatch open - it would be easier to jump out,” recalls A. S. Burtsev. Note that not a single design bureau, either before or after the war, used the achievements of soldiers’ ingenuity in one form or another. Tanks were still equipped with latched hatches in the turret and hull, which the crews preferred to keep open in battle.

The daily service of the "thirty-four" crew was replete with situations when the same load fell on the crew members and each of them performed simple but monotonous operations, not much different from the actions of a neighbor, such as opening a trench or refueling a tank with fuel and shells. However, the battle and march were immediately distinguished from those forming in front of the tank with the command “To the car!” people in overalls of two crew members who had primary responsibility for the tank. The first was the commander of the vehicle, who, in addition to controlling the battle on the early T-34s, acted as a gunner: “If you are the commander of the T-34-76 tank, then you shoot yourself, you command by radio, you do everything yourself” (V.P. Bryukhov).

The second person in the crew, who bore the lion's share of responsibility for the tank, and therefore for the lives of his comrades in battle, was the driver. The commanders of tanks and tank units rated the driver in battle very highly. “... An experienced driver is half the success,” recalls N. E. Glukhov.

This rule knew no exceptions. “The driver-mechanic Grigory Ivanovich Kryukov was 10 years older than me. Before the war he worked as a driver and had already fought at Leningrad. Was injured. He felt the tank perfectly. I believe that it was only thanks to him that we survived the first battles,” recalls tank commander Lieutenant Georgy Nikolaevich Krivov.

The special position of the driver in the “thirty-four” was due to relatively complex control, requiring experience and physical strength. To the greatest extent, this applied to the T-34 tanks of the first half of the war, which had a four-speed gearbox, which required the gears to move relative to each other with the engagement of the required pair of gears on the drive and driven shafts. Changing gears in such a box was very difficult and required great physical strength. A. V. Maryevsky recalls: “You couldn’t turn on the gear shift lever with one hand, you had to help yourself with your knee.” To make gear shifting easier, boxes were developed with gears that were constantly in mesh. Changing the gear ratio was no longer carried out by moving gears, but by moving small cam clutches sitting on the shafts. They moved along the shaft on splines and engaged with it the required pair of gears that were already in mesh from the moment the gearbox was assembled. For example, the pre-war Soviet motorcycles L-300 and AM-600 had a gearbox of this type, as well as the M-72 motorcycle produced since 1941, a licensed copy of the German BMW R71. The next step towards improving the transmission was the introduction of synchronizers into the gearbox. These are devices that equalize the speeds of cam clutches and gears with which they engage when a particular gear is engaged. Shortly before downshifting or upshifting, the clutch engaged with the gear by friction. So it gradually began to rotate at the same speed as the selected gear, and when the gear was engaged, the clutch between them was carried out silently and without shock. An example of a gearbox with synchronizers is the German Maybach type gearbox. T-III tanks and T-IV. Even more advanced were the so-called planetary gearboxes of Czech-made tanks and Matilda tanks. It is not surprising that the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, on November 6, 1940, based on the results of tests of the first T-34, sent a letter to the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, which, in particular, said: “In the first half of 1941, factories should develop and prepare planetary transmission for T-34 and KV for serial production. This will increase the average speed of the tanks and make it easier to control.” They didn’t have time to do any of this before the war, and in the first years of the war the T-34s fought with the least advanced gearbox that existed at that time. “Thirty-fours” with a four-speed gearbox required very well-trained driver mechanics. “If the driver is not trained, then instead of the first gear he can put in the fourth, because it is also backward, or instead of the second - the third, which will lead to a breakdown of the gearbox. You need to bring the switching skill to automaticity so that you can switch with your eyes closed,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. In addition to difficulties in changing gears, the four-speed gearbox was characterized as weak and unreliable, often breaking down. The gear teeth colliding during switching broke, and even ruptures of the gearbox housing were noted. Engineers from the NIIBT test site in Kubinka, in a lengthy report in 1942 on joint tests of domestic, captured and Lend-Lease equipment, gave the T-34 gearbox of the early series a simply derogatory assessment: “The gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, are not fully satisfy the requirements for modern combat vehicles, inferior to the gearboxes of both allied and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology.” Based on the results of these and other reports on the shortcomings of the T-34, the State Defense Committee issued a decree of June 5, 1942, “On improving the quality of T-34 tanks.” As part of the implementation of this decree, by the beginning of 1943, the design department of plant No. 183 (the Kharkov plant evacuated to the Urals) developed a five-speed gearbox with constant gear meshing, which tankers who fought on the T-34 speak with such respect.

The constant engagement of gears and the introduction of another gear made it much easier to control the tank, and the gunner-radio operator no longer had to pick up and pull the lever together with the driver to change gear.

Another element of the T-34 transmission, which puts combat vehicle Depending on the training of the driver, there was a main clutch that connected the gearbox to the engine. This is how A.V. Bodnar, who trained driver mechanics on the T-34 after being wounded, describes the situation: “Very much depended on how well the main clutch was adjusted for freewheeling and disengagement and how well the driver could use it when starts moving. The last third of the pedal must be released slowly so as not to rip, because if it rips, the car will slip and the clutch will warp.” The main part of the main dry friction clutch of the T-34 tank was a package of 8 driving and 10 driven disks (later, as part of the improvement of the tank’s transmission, it received 11 driving and 11 driven disks), pressed against each other by springs. Incorrect disengagement of the clutch with friction of the discs against each other, their heating and warping could lead to failure of the tank. Such a breakdown was called “burning the clutch,” although formally there were no flammable objects in it. While ahead of other countries in putting into practice such solutions as the 76-mm long-barreled gun and inclined armor, the T-34 tank still noticeably lagged behind Germany and other countries in the design of the transmission and turning mechanisms. On German tanks, which were the same age as the T-34, the main clutch had discs running in oil. This made it possible to more effectively remove heat from the rubbing discs and made it much easier to turn the clutch on and off. The situation was somewhat improved by the servomechanism that was equipped with the main clutch release pedal, based on the experience of combat use of the T-34 in the initial period of the war. The design of the mechanism, despite the “servo” prefix that inspires some reverence, was quite simple. The clutch pedal was held by a spring, which, in the process of pressing the pedal, passed the dead center and changed the direction of the force. When the tanker pressed the pedal, the spring resisted pressure. At a certain moment, on the contrary, she began to help and pulled the pedal towards herself, ensuring the desired speed of movement of the scenes. Before the introduction of these simple but necessary elements, the work of the second tank crew in the hierarchy was very difficult. “During the long march, the driver lost two or three kilograms in weight. I was all exhausted. This, of course, was very difficult,” recalls P.I. Kirichenko. While on the march, the driver’s mistakes could lead to delays along the way due to repairs of one duration or another, or, in extreme cases, to the abandonment of the tank by the crew, then in battle, failure of the T-34 transmission due to driver errors could lead to fatal consequences. On the contrary, the skill of the driver and vigorous maneuvering could ensure the survival of the crew under heavy fire.

The development of the design of the T-34 tank during the war went primarily in the direction of improving the transmission. In the 1942 report of engineers from the NIIBT test site in Kubinka, cited above, there were the following words: “Recently, due to the strengthening of anti-tank equipment, maneuverability is at least no less a guarantee of the invulnerability of a vehicle than powerful armor. The combination of good vehicle armor and the speed of its maneuver is the main means of protecting a modern combat vehicle from anti-tank artillery fire.” The advantage in armor protection lost by the final period of the war was compensated by the improvement in the driving performance of the Thirty-Four. The tank began to move faster both on the march and on the battlefield, and maneuver better. To the two features that tankers believed in (the slope of the armor and the diesel engine), a third was added - speed. A.K. Rodkin, who fought on the T-34-85 tank at the end of the war, formulated it this way: “The tank crews had this saying: “Armor is garbage, but our tanks are fast.” We had an advantage in speed. The Germans had gasoline tanks, but their speed was not very high.”

The first task of the 76.2 mm F-34 tank gun was “to destroy tanks and other mechanized enemy vehicles.” Veteran tankers unanimously call German tanks the main and most serious enemy. In the initial period of the war, the T-34 crews confidently went into battle with any German tanks, rightly believing that a powerful gun and reliable armor protection would ensure success in battle. The appearance of the Tigers and Panthers on the battlefield changed the situation to the opposite. Now German tanks received " long arm", allowing you to fight without worrying about camouflage. “Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can take their armor head-on only from 500 meters, they stood in the open,” recalls platoon commander Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznoye. Even sub-caliber shells for the 76-mm cannon did not provide advantages in a duel of this kind, since they penetrated only 90 mm of homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, while the frontal armor of the T-VIH "Tiger" had a thickness of 102 mm. The transition to an 85 mm gun immediately changed the situation, allowing Soviet tankers to fight new German tanks at distances of over a kilometer. “Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. A powerful 85-mm gun allowed the T-34 crews to fight with their old friends T-IV at a distance of 1200 - 1300 m. We can find an example of such a battle on the Sandomierz bridgehead in the summer of 1944 in the memoirs of N. Ya. Zheleznov. The first T-34 tanks with the 85-mm D-5T gun rolled off the assembly line of plant No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" in January 1944. Mass production of the T-34-85 with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 gun began in March 1944, when tanks of a new type were built at the flagship of the Soviet tank building during the war, plant No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil. Despite a certain rush to re-equip the tank with an 85-mm gun, the 85-mm gun, which was included in the mass production, was considered reliable by the crews and did not cause any complaints.

Vertical guidance of the T-34's gun was carried out manually, and an electric drive was introduced to rotate the turret from the very beginning of the tank's production. However, tankers in battle preferred to rotate the turret manually. “The hands lie crosswise on the mechanisms for turning the turret and aiming the gun. The turret could be turned by an electric motor, but in battle you forget about this. You turn the handle,” recalls G. N. Krivov. This is easy to explain. On the T-34-85, which G.N. Krivov talks about, the manual rotation handle for the turret simultaneously served as a lever for the electric drive. To switch from a manual drive to an electric one, it was necessary to turn the turret rotation handle vertically and move it back and forth, forcing the engine to rotate the turret in the desired direction. In the heat of battle, this was forgotten, and the handle was used only for manual rotation. In addition, as V.P. Bryukhov recalls: “You need to know how to use an electric turn, otherwise you’ll jerk, and then you have to turn it further.”

The only inconvenience caused by the introduction of the 85 mm gun was the need to carefully ensure that the long barrel did not touch the ground on potholes in the road or battlefield. “The T-34-85 has a barrel four or more meters long. In the slightest ditch, the tank can peck and grab the ground with its barrel. If you shoot after this, the trunk opens with petals in different directions, like a flower,” recalls A.K. Rodkin. The total length of the barrel of the 85-mm tank gun of the 1944 model was more than four meters, 4645 mm. The appearance of the 85-mm gun and new rounds for it also led to the fact that the tank stopped exploding with the turret falling off, “... they (shells. -A.M.) do not detonate, but explode one by one. On the T-34-76, if one shell explodes, then the entire ammunition rack detonates,” says A.K. Rodkin. This to some extent increased the chances of survival for the T-34 crew members, and from photographs and newsreels of the war the picture that sometimes flashed in the footage of 1941 - 1943 disappeared - a T-34 with the turret lying next to the tank or turned upside down after falling back onto the tank .

If German tanks were the most dangerous enemy of the T-34s, then the T-34s themselves were an effective means of destroying not only armored vehicles, but also enemy guns and manpower that were hindering the advance of their infantry. Most of the tankers, whose memories are given in the book, have at best several units of enemy armored vehicles, but at the same time, the number of enemy infantrymen shot from a cannon and machine gun is in the tens and hundreds of people. The ammunition load of the T-34 tanks consisted mainly of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Standard ammunition of the "thirty-four" with a "nut" turret in 1942 - 1944. consisted of 100 rounds, including 75 high-explosive fragmentation and 25 armor-piercing (of which 4 sub-caliber since 1943). The standard ammunition of the T-34-85 tank included 36 high-explosive fragmentation rounds, 14 armor-piercing rounds and 5 sub-caliber rounds. The balance between armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation shells largely reflects the conditions in which the T-34 fought during the attack. Under heavy artillery fire, tankers in most cases had little time for aimed shooting and fired on the move and in short stops, counting on suppressing the enemy with a mass of shots or hitting the target with several shells. G. N. Krivov recalls: “Experienced guys who have already been in battle tell us: “Never stop. Strike on the move. Heaven and earth, where the projectile flies - hit, press.” You asked how many shells I fired in the first battle? Half the ammunition. Beat, beat..."

As often happens, practice suggested techniques that were not provided for in any charters or methodological manuals. A typical example is the use of the clang of a closing bolt as an internal alarm in a tank. V.P. Bryukhov says: “When the crew is well-coordinated, the mechanic is strong, he himself hears what kind of projectile is being driven, the click of the bolt wedge, it is also heavy, more than two pounds...” The guns mounted on the T-34 tank were equipped with semi-automatic opening shutter This system worked as follows. When fired, the gun rolled back; after absorbing the recoil energy, the knurl returned the body of the gun to its original position. Just before the return, the lever of the shutter mechanism ran into the copier on the gun carriage, and the wedge went down, the ejector legs associated with it knocked the empty shell casing out of the breech. The loader sent the next projectile, which with its mass knocked down the bolt wedge, which was held on the ejector legs. The heavy part, under the influence of powerful springs sharply returning to its original position, produced a fairly sharp sound that covered the roar of the engine, the clanging of the chassis and the sounds of combat. Hearing the clang of the shutter closing, the driver, without waiting for the command “Short!”, chose a fairly flat area of terrain for a short stop and an aimed shot. The location of the ammunition in the tank did not cause any inconvenience to the loaders. Shells could be taken both from stowage in the turret and from “suitcases” on the floor of the fighting compartment.

The target that appeared in the crosshairs of the sight was not always worthy of being fired from a gun. For those running or caught in open space German infantrymen the commander of the T-34-76 or the gunner of the T-34-85 fired from a machine gun coaxial with the cannon. The front-mounted machine gun installed in the hull could only be used effectively in close combat, when the tank, immobilized for one reason or another, was surrounded by enemy infantry with grenades and Molotov cocktails. “This is a melee weapon when the tank is hit and stops. The Germans are approaching, and you can mow them down, be healthy,” recalls V.P. Bryukhov. While on the move, it was almost impossible to shoot from a course machine gun, since the telescopic sight of the machine gun provided negligible opportunities for observation and aiming. “And I, in fact, didn’t have any sight. I have such a hole there, you can’t see a damn thing through it,” recalls P.I. Kirichenko. Perhaps the most effective machine gun was used when it was removed from the ball mount and used for firing from a bipod outside the tank. “And it began. They pulled out the frontal machine gun - they came at us from the rear. The tower was turned around. The machine gunner is with me. We placed a machine gun on the parapet and fired,” recalls Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuzmichev. In fact, the tank received a machine gun, which could be used by the crew as the most effective personal weapon.

Installing a radio on the T-34-85 tank in the turret next to the tank commander was supposed to finally turn the gunner-radio operator into the most useless member of the tank crew, the “passenger”. The ammunition load of the machine guns of the T-34-85 tank, compared to earlier tanks, was more than halved, to 31 discs. However, the realities of the final period of the war, when the German infantry acquired Faust cartridges, on the contrary, increased the usefulness of the machine gun shooter. “By the end of the war, he became needed, protecting against the Faustians, clearing the way. So what, what is hard to see, sometimes the mechanic would tell him. If you want to see, you will see,” recalls A.K. Rodkin.

In such a situation, the space freed up after moving the radio into the tower was used to place ammunition. Most (27 out of 31) discs for the DT machine gun in the T-34-85 were placed in the control compartment, next to the shooter, who became the main consumer of machine gun ammunition.

In general, the appearance of Faust cartridges increased the role of the “thirty-four” small arms. Even shooting at Faustniks with a pistol with the hatch open began to be practiced. The standard personal weapons of the crews were TT pistols, revolvers, captured pistols and one PPSh submachine gun, for which a place was provided in the equipment stowage in the tank. The submachine gun was used by crews when leaving the tank and in battle in the city, when the elevation angle of the gun and machine guns was not enough.

As the German anti-tank artillery strengthened, visibility became increasingly an important component tank survivability. The difficulties that the commander and driver of the T-34 tank experienced in their combat work were largely due to the meager capabilities of observing the battlefield. The first "thirty-fours" had mirrored periscopes on the driver and in the tank's turret. Such a device was a box with mirrors mounted at an angle at the top and bottom, and the mirrors were not glass (they could crack from shell impacts), but made of polished steel. The image quality in such a periscope is not difficult to imagine. The same mirrors were in the periscopes on the sides of the turret, which were one of the main means of observing the battlefield for the tank commander. In the above-quoted letter from S.K. Timoshenko dated November 6, 1940, there are the following words: “The driver and radio operator’s viewing devices should be replaced with more modern ones.” During the first year of the war, tankers fought with mirrors; later, instead of mirrors, prismatic observation devices were installed, i.e., a solid glass prism ran the entire height of the periscope. At the same time, limited visibility, despite the improvement in the characteristics of the periscopes themselves, often forced T-34 drivers to drive with the hatches open. “The triplexes on the driver’s hatch were completely ugly. They were made of disgusting yellow or green plexiglass, which gave a completely distorted, wavy image. It was impossible to disassemble anything through such a triplex, especially in a jumping tank. Therefore, the war was waged with the hatches slightly open,” recalls S. L. Ariya. A. V. Maryevsky also agrees with him, also pointing out that the driver’s triplexes were easily splashed with mud.

In the fall of 1942, NII-48 specialists, based on the results of an analysis of damage to armor protection, made the following conclusion: “A significant percentage of dangerous damage to T-34 tanks was on the side parts, and not on the frontal parts (out of 432 hits to the hull of the tanks studied, 270 were on its sides. - A.I.) can be explained either by the tank crews’ poor familiarity with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection, or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot timely detect the firing point and turn the tank into a position that is least dangerous for breaking through its armor.

It is necessary to improve the familiarity of tank crews with the tactical characteristics of the armor of their vehicles and provide the best overview of them(emphasis added) - A.I.).”

The task of providing better review was resolved in several stages. Polished steel “mirrors” were also removed from the commander’s and loader’s observation devices. The periscopes on the cheekbones of the T-34 turret were replaced by slits with blocks of glass to protect against fragments. This happened during the transition to the “nut” turret in the fall of 1942. New devices allowed the crew to organize all-round monitoring of the situation: “The driver is watching forward and to the left. You, commander, try to observe all around. And the radio operator and loader are more on the right” (V.P. Bryukhov). The T-34-85 was equipped with MK-4 surveillance devices for the gunner and loader. Simultaneous observation of several directions made it possible to timely notice danger and adequately respond to it with fire or maneuver.

The problem that took the longest to solve was providing a good view for the tank commander. The point about introducing a commander’s cupola on the T-34, which was already present in S.K. Timoshenko’s letter in 1940, was implemented almost two years after the start of the war. After much experimentation with attempts to squeeze the freed tank commander into the “nut” turret, turrets on the T-34 began to be installed only in the summer of 1943. The commander still had the function of a gunner, but now he could raise his head from the sight eyepiece and look around. The main advantage of the turret was the possibility of all-round visibility. “The commander’s cupola rotated around, the commander saw everything and, without firing, could control the fire of his tank and maintain communication with others,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. To be precise, it was not the turret itself that rotated, but its roof with a periscope observation device. Before this, in 1941 - 1942, the tank commander, in addition to the “mirror” on the cheekbone of the turret, had a periscope, formally called a periscope sight. By rotating its vernier, the commander could provide himself with a view of the battlefield, but a very limited one. “In the spring of 1942, there was a commander’s panorama on the KB and the T-34s. I could rotate it and see everything around, but it was still a very small sector,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. The commander of the T-34-85 tank with the ZIS-S-53 cannon, relieved of his duties as a gunner, received, in addition to the commander's cupola with slits along the perimeter, his own prismatic periscope rotating in the hatch - MK-4, which even allowed him to look behind him. But among tankers there is also the following opinion: “I didn’t use the commander’s cupola. I always kept the hatch open. Because those who closed them burned down. We didn’t have time to jump out,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.

Without exception, all tankers surveyed admire the sights of German tank guns. As an example, let us cite the memoirs of V.P. Bryukhov: “We have always noted the high-quality Zeiss optics of sights. And until the end of the war it was of high quality. We didn't have such optics. The sights themselves were more convenient than ours. We have a reticle in the form of a triangle, and to the right and left of it are marks. They had these divisions, corrections for wind, for range, and something else.” Here it must be said that in terms of information there was no fundamental difference between the Soviet and German telescopic sights of the gun. The gunner saw the aiming mark and, on both sides of it, “fences” for angular velocity corrections. The Soviet and German sights had a range correction, but it was introduced in different ways. In the German sight, the gunner rotated the pointer, aligning it opposite the radial distance scale. Each type of projectile had its own sector. Soviet tank builders passed this stage in the 1930s; the sight of the three-turret T-28 tank had a similar design. In the “thirty-four” the distance was set by a sight thread moving along vertically located range scales. So, functionally, the Soviet and German sights did not differ. The difference was in the quality of the optics itself, which especially deteriorated in 1942 due to the evacuation of the Izyum optical glass plant. Among the real disadvantages of the telescopic sights of the early “thirty-fours” is their alignment with the gun barrel. Pointing the gun vertically, the tanker was forced to rise or fall in his place, keeping his eyes on the eyepiece of the sight moving with the gun. Later on the T-34-85, a “breakable” sight, characteristic of German tanks, was introduced, the eyepiece of which was fixed, and the lens followed the gun barrel due to a hinge on the same axis with the gun trunnions.

Shortcomings in the design of observation devices had a negative impact on the habitability of the tank. The need to keep the driver's hatch open forced the latter to sit behind the levers, “also taking on the chest the flow of freezing wind sucked in by the fan turbine roaring behind him” (S. L. Aria). In this case, the “turbine” was a fan on the engine shaft that sucked air from the fighting compartment through a flimsy engine bulkhead.

A typical complaint about Soviet-made military equipment from both foreign and domestic specialists was the Spartan environment inside the vehicle. “As a disadvantage, we can highlight the complete lack of comfort for the crew. I climbed into American and British tanks. There the crew was in more comfortable conditions: the inside of the tanks was painted with light paint, the seats were semi-soft with armrests. There was none of this on the T-34,” recalls S. L. Ariya.

There really were no armrests on the crew seats in the turret of the T-34-76 and T-34-85. They were only in the seats of the driver and radio operator. However, the armrests themselves on the crew seats were a detail characteristic primarily of American technology. Neither English nor German tanks (with the exception of the Tiger) had crew seats in the turret with armrests.

But there were also real design flaws. One of the problems faced by the creators of tanks in the 1940s was the penetration of gunpowder gases into the tank from increasingly powerful guns. After the shot, the bolt opened, ejected the cartridge case, and gases from the gun barrel and the ejected cartridge case entered the fighting compartment of the vehicle. “... You shout: “armor-piercing!”, “fragmentation!” You look, and he (loader. -A.M.) lies on the ammunition rack. He got burned by the powder gases and lost consciousness. When the battle was tough, rarely did anyone survive it. Still, you get burned,” recalls V.P. Bryukhov.

Electric exhaust fans were used to remove powder gases and ventilate the fighting compartment. The first T-34s inherited from the BT tank one fan in the front of the turret. It looked appropriate in a turret with a 45 mm gun, since it was located almost above the breech of the gun. In the T-34 turret, the fan was not above the breech, which was smoking after the shot, but above the gun barrel. Its effectiveness in this regard was questionable. But in 1942, at the peak of the shortage of components, the tank lost even this - T-34s left the factories with empty turret caps, there were simply no fans.

During the modernization of the tank with the installation of a “nut” turret, the fan was moved to the rear of the turret, closer to the area where powder gases accumulated. The T-34-85 tank already received two fans in the rear of the turret; the larger caliber of the gun required intensive ventilation of the fighting compartment. But during the intense battle, the fans did not help. The problem of protecting the crew from powder gases was partially solved by blowing the barrel with compressed air (Panther), but it was impossible to blow through the cartridge case, which spreads choking smoke. According to the memoirs of G.N. Krivov, experienced tank crews advised to immediately throw the cartridge case through the loader’s hatch. The problem was radically solved only after the war, when an ejector was introduced into the design of the guns, which “pumped out” gases from the gun barrel after the shot, even before the automatic shutter was opened.

The T-34 tank was in many ways a revolutionary design, and like any transitional model, it combined new items and forced, soon outdated, solutions. One of these decisions was the introduction of a radio operator gunner into the crew. The main function of the tankman sitting at the ineffective machine gun was to maintain the tank radio station. On early "thirty-fours" the radio station was installed on the right side of the control compartment, next to the gunner-radio operator. The need to keep a person on the crew involved in setting up and maintaining the functionality of the radio was a consequence of the imperfection of communications technology in the first half of the war. The point was not that it was necessary to work with a key: the Soviet tank radio stations installed on the T-34 did not have a telegraph mode and could not transmit dashes and dots in Morse code. The gunner-radio operator was introduced because the main consumer of information from neighboring vehicles and from higher levels of control, the tank commander, was simply not able to carry out maintenance of the radio. “The station was unreliable. The radio operator is a specialist, but the commander is not such a specialist. In addition, when the armor was hit, the wave was disrupted and the lamps failed,” recalls V.P. Bryukhov. It should be added that the commander of the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon combined the functions of a tank commander and gunner and was too heavily loaded to deal with even a simple and convenient radio station. The allocation of a separate person to work with the walkie-talkie was also typical for other countries that participated in the Second World War. For example, on the French Somua S-35 tank, the commander performed the functions of gunner, loader and tank commander, but there was also a radio operator who was freed even from servicing the machine gun.

In the initial period of the war, the “thirty-four” were equipped with 71-TK-Z radio stations, and not all vehicles. The last fact should not be confusing; such a situation was common in the Wehrmacht, whose radio coverage is usually greatly exaggerated. In reality, unit commanders from the platoon and above had transceivers. According to the staff of February 1941, the light tank company had Fu transceivers. 5 were installed on three T-IV and five T-III, and on two T-IV and twelve T-III only Fu receivers were installed. 2. In a company of medium tanks, five T-IV and three T-III had transceivers, and two T-II and nine T-IV were only receivers. On T-I transceivers are Fu. 5 were not installed at all, with the exception of special commander kIT-Bef. Wg. l. The Red Army had an essentially similar concept of “radio” and “linear” tanks. The crews of “linear” tanks had to act while observing the commander’s maneuvers, or receive orders with flags. The space for the radio station on the “linear” tanks was filled with disks for DT machine gun magazines, 77 disks with a capacity of 63 rounds each instead of 46 on the “radium” tank. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 671 “linear” T-34 tanks and 221 “radio” tanks.

But the main problem with the communications equipment of T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942 was it was not so much their quantity as the quality of the 71-TK-Z stations themselves. Tankers assessed its capabilities as very moderate. “She covered about 6 kilometers while moving” (P.I. Kirichenko). Other tankers express the same opinion. “Radio station 71-TK-Z, as I remember now, is a complex, unstable radio station. It broke down very often, and it was very difficult to put it in order,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. At the same time, the radio station to some extent compensated for the information vacuum, since it made it possible to listen to reports transmitted from Moscow, the famous “From the Soviet Information Bureau ...” in the voice of Levitan. A serious deterioration of the situation was observed during the evacuation of radio equipment factories, when from August 1941 the production of tank radios was practically stopped until mid-1942.

As evacuated enterprises returned to operation by the middle of the war, there was a trend toward 100 percent radioization of tank forces. The crews of the T-34 tanks received a new radio station, developed on the basis of the aviation RSI-4, -9R, and later its modernized versions, 9RS and 9RM. It was much more stable in operation due to the use of quartz frequency generators. The radio station was of English origin and was produced for a long time using components supplied under Lend-Lease. On the T-34-85, the radio station moved from the control compartment to the combat compartment, to the left wall of the turret, where the commander, relieved of the duties of a gunner, now began servicing it. Nevertheless, the concepts of “linear” and “radium” tank remained.

In addition to communication with outside world Each tank had intercom equipment. The reliability of the early T-34 intercom was low; the main means of signaling between the commander and the driver were boots mounted on the shoulders. “The internal communication was not working properly. Therefore, communication was carried out with my feet, that is, I had the boots of the tank commander on my shoulders, he pressed on my left or right shoulder, respectively, I turned the tank to the left or to the right,” recalls S. L. Ariya. The commander and the loader could talk, although more often communication took place with gestures: “I put a fist under the loader’s nose, and he already knows that he needs to load with armor-piercing, and his outstretched palm with fragmentation.” The TPU-Zbis intercom installed on the T-34 of later series worked much better. “The internal tank intercom was mediocre on the T-34-76. There you had to command with your boots and hands, but on the T-34-85 it was already excellent,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. Therefore, the commander began to give orders to the driver by voice over the intercom - the T-34-85 commander no longer had the technical ability to put boots on his shoulders - the gunner separated him from the control department.

Speaking about the communications equipment of the T-34 tank, it is also necessary to note the following. The story of a German tank commander challenging our tankman to a duel in broken Russian travels from films to books and back again. This is completely untrue. All Wehrmacht tanks since 1937 used the range 27 - 32 MHz, which did not overlap with the range of radio stations of Soviet tank radio stations - 3.75 - 6.0 MHz. Only on command tanks was a second shortwave radio station installed. It had a range of 1 - 3 MHz, again, incompatible with the range of our tank radios.

The commander of a German tank battalion, as a rule, had something to do other than challenges to a duel. In addition, command tanks were often of obsolete types, and in the initial period of the war - without weapons at all, with mock-up guns in a fixed turret.

The engine and its systems caused virtually no complaints from the crews, unlike the transmission. “I’ll tell you frankly, the T-34 is the most reliable tank. It happens that he stopped, something was wrong with him. The oil broke. The hose is not securely fastened. For this purpose, a thorough inspection of the tanks was always carried out before the march,” recalls A. S. Burtsev. A massive fan mounted in the same block with the main clutch required caution in engine control. Errors by the driver could lead to the destruction of the fan and failure of the tank.

Also, some difficulties were caused by the initial period of operation of the resulting tank, getting used to the characteristics of a particular instance of the T-34 tank. “Every vehicle, every tank, every tank gun, every engine had its own unique features. They cannot be known in advance; they can only be identified during everyday use. At the front we found ourselves in unfamiliar cars. The commander does not know what kind of fight his gun has. The mechanic doesn't know what his diesel can and can't do. Of course, at the factories the tanks' guns were shot and a 50-kilometer run was carried out, but this was completely insufficient. Of course, we tried to get to know our cars better before the battle and used every opportunity to do this,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.

Tank crews encountered significant technical difficulties when mating the engine and gearbox with the power plant during tank repairs in the field. It was. In addition to replacing or repairing the gearbox and engine itself, the gearbox had to be removed from the tank when the onboard clutches were dismantled. After returning to place or replacing, the engine and gearbox had to be installed in the tank relative to each other with high precision. According to the repair manual for the T-34 tank, the installation accuracy should have been 0.8 mm. To install units moved using 0.75-ton hoists, such precision required time and effort.

Of the entire complex of components and assemblies of the power plant, only the engine air filter had design flaws that required serious modification. The old type filter, installed on T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942, did not clean the air well and interfered with the normal operation of the engine, which led to rapid wear of the V-2. “Old air filters were inefficient, took up a lot of space in the engine compartment, and had a large turbine. They often had to be cleaned, even when not walking along a dusty road. And “Cyclone” was very good,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. Cyclone filters performed well in 1944 - 1945, when Soviet tank crews fought hundreds of kilometers. “If the air cleaner was cleaned according to regulations, the engine worked well. But during battles it is not always possible to do everything correctly. If the air cleaner does not clean enough, the oil is not changed on time, the rig is not washed and allows dust to pass through, then the engine wears out quickly,” recalls A.K. Rodkin. “Cyclones” made it possible, even in the absence of time for maintenance, to complete an entire operation before the engine failed.

Tankers invariably speak positively about the duplicated engine starting system. In addition to the traditional electric starter, the tank had two 10-liter compressed air cylinders. The air starting system made it possible to start the engine even if the electric starter failed, which often occurred in battle due to shell impacts.

Track chains were the most frequently repaired element of the T-34 tank. The tracks were a spare part with which the tank even went into battle. The caterpillars sometimes tore during the march and were broken by shell hits. “The tracks were torn, even without bullets, without shells. When soil gets between the rollers, the caterpillar, especially when turning, is stretched to such an extent that the fingers and the tracks themselves cannot withstand it,” recalls A. V. Maryevsky. Repair and tension of the caterpillar were inevitable companions to the combat operation of the vehicle. At the same time, the caterpillars were a serious unmasking factor. “The Thirty-four, it not only roars with diesel, it also clacks with its tracks. If a T-34 is approaching, you will hear the clatter of the tracks first, and then the engine. The fact is that the teeth of the working tracks must fit exactly between the rollers on the drive wheel, which, when rotating, grabs them. And when the caterpillar stretched, developed, became longer, the distance between the teeth increased, and the teeth hit the roller, causing a characteristic sound,” recalls A.K. Rodkin. Forced wartime technical solutions contributed to the increased noise level of the tank, primarily rollers without rubber bands around the perimeter. “... Unfortunately, the Stalingrad “thirty-fours” arrived, whose road wheels were without tires. They rumbled terribly,” recalls A.V. Bodnar. These were the so-called rollers with internal shock absorption. The first rollers of this type, sometimes called “locomotive” rollers, were produced by the Stalingrad Plant (STZ), and even before really serious interruptions in the supply of rubber began. The early onset of cold weather in the fall of 1941 led to idle time on the ice-bound rivers of barges with rollers, which were sent along the Volga from Stalingrad to the Yaroslavl tire plant. The technology involved the production of a bandage using special equipment on a ready-made skating rink. Large batches of finished rollers from Yaroslavl got stuck in transit, which forced STZ engineers to look for a replacement, which was a solid cast roller with a small shock-absorbing ring inside it, closer to the hub. When interruptions in the supply of rubber began, other factories took advantage of this experience, and from the winter of 1941 - 1942 until the autumn of 1943, T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines, the chassis of which consisted entirely or mostly of rollers with internal shock absorption. Since the fall of 1943, the problem of rubber shortages has finally become a thing of the past, and T-34-76 tanks have completely returned to rollers with rubber tires.

All T-34-85 tanks were produced with rollers with rubber tires. This significantly reduced the noise of the tank, providing relative comfort to the crew and making it difficult for the enemy to detect the T-34s.

It is especially worth mentioning that during the war years the role of the T-34 tank in the Red Army changed. At the beginning of the war, "thirty-fours" with an imperfect transmission, which could not withstand long marches, but were well armored, were ideal tanks for direct infantry support. During the war, the tank lost the advantage in armor it had at the start of hostilities. By the autumn of 1943 - early 1944, the T-34 tank was a relatively easy target for 75-mm tank and anti-tank guns; hits from 88-mm Tiger guns, anti-aircraft guns and PAK-43 anti-tank guns were definitely lethal for it.

But elements were steadily improved and even completely replaced, which before the war were not given due importance or simply did not have time to bring to an acceptable level. First of all, this is the power plant and transmission of the tank, from which they achieved stable and trouble-free operation. At the same time, all these elements of the tank retained good maintainability and ease of operation. All this allowed the T-34 to do things that were unrealistic for the “thirty-four” in the first year of the war. “For example, from near Jelgava, moving through East Prussia, we covered more than 500 km in three days. The T-34 withstood such marches normally,” recalls A.K. Rodkin. For T-34 tanks in 1941, a 500-kilometer march would have been almost fatal. In June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of D.I. Ryabyshev, after such a march from its permanent deployment sites to the Dubno area, lost almost half of its equipment on the road due to breakdowns. A.V. Bodnar, who fought in 1941 - 1942, evaluates the T-34 in comparison with German tanks: “From the point of view of operation, German armored vehicles were more advanced, they failed less often. For the Germans, walking 200 km did not cost anything; on the T-34 you will definitely lose something, something will break. The technological equipment of their vehicles was stronger, but their combat equipment was worse.”

By the fall of 1943, the Thirty-Fours had become an ideal tank for independent mechanized formations designed for deep breakthroughs and detours. They became the main combat vehicle of tank armies - the main tools for offensive operations on a colossal scale. In these operations, the main type of T-34 action was marching with the driver's hatches open, and often with the headlights on. The tanks covered hundreds of kilometers, intercepting the escape routes of the surrounded German divisions and corps.

Essentially, in 1944 - 1945 the situation of the “blitzkrieg” of 1941 was mirrored, when the Wehrmacht reached Moscow and Leningrad on tanks with far from the best characteristics of armor protection and weapons at that time, but mechanically very reliable. In the same way, in the final period of the war, the T-34-85 covered hundreds of kilometers in deep envelopments and detours, and the Tigers and Panthers trying to stop them failed en masse due to breakdowns and were abandoned by their crews due to lack of fuel. Perhaps only the weapons broke the symmetry of the picture. Unlike the German tank crews of the “Blitzkrieg” period, the crews of the “thirty-four” had in their hands an adequate means of combating enemy tanks with superior armor protection - an 85-mm cannon. Moreover, each commander of the T-34-85 tank received a reliable radio station, quite advanced for that time, which allowed him to play against the German “cats” as a team.

The T-34s that entered the battle in the first days of the war near the border and the T-34s that burst into the streets of Berlin in April 1945, although they had the same name, were significantly different both externally and internally. But both in the initial period of the war and at its final stage, tank crews saw the “thirty-four” as a machine they could believe in. At first, these were the slope of the armor that reflected enemy shells, a fire-resistant diesel engine and an all-destructive weapon. During the period of victories, it means high speed, reliability, stable communication and a gun that can stand up for itself.

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What kind of crew is the T 34. History of tank forces. Licensed production at factories in Poland and Czechoslovakia

Story

Armor tilt effect

Reasons for creating the final modification of the T-34 tank

Mass production

Licensed production at factories in Poland and Czechoslovakia

Design and layout of the T-34-85 tank

Armored hull of the T-34-85 tank

Housing layout

Housing design

Armored turret of the T-34-85 tank

The history of the creation of a turret for the T-34-85 tank

Turret design, with S-53 cannon (ZIS-S-53)

Turret layout, with S-53 cannon (ZIS-S-53)

Armament

Engine and transmission

Combat use

The Great Patriotic War

After 1945

Countries that had a tank in service

Serial variants, modernization and modifications of the T-34-85 tank

Yugoslav modernization of the T-34-85 tank

Vehicles based on T-34

T-34-85 in computer games

Security

Mobility

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