The current international situation in the world. Actual problems, threats and challenges of Russia in international relations. Relations of Kazakhstan with military-political organizations
Responsible editor: T. V. Kashirina, D. A. Sidorov
The collection was compiled following the results of the international scientific and practical conference of young scientists "The role of international organizations in the modern world", held at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on February 16, 2019. The conference was organized by the Department of International Relations of the Diplomatic Academy, the official partner of the event was the Center for International Promotion, Assistance The conference was supported by the Foundation for the Support of Public Diplomacy named after A.M. Gorchakov" and Trade House "Biblio Globus". The conference was attended by undergraduate and graduate students, graduate students and teachers of Russian and foreign higher educational institutions.
The attention of the authors is focused on the analysis of current trends and topical problems in the development of international relations and international law. The authors consider in detail the issues of cooperation within the framework of various international organizations, analyze the relationship between the leading players in the global political arena. The materials are presented in the author's edition and are intended for use in the educational process in the training of specialists in the field of international relations and international law.
book chapters
Panchenko P. N. In the book: Modern Russian criminal legislation: state, trends and development prospects, taking into account the requirements of dynamism, continuity and increasing economic efficiency (on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in 1996). Materials of the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference (Nizhny Novgorod, October 4, 2011). N. Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2012. P. 258-269.
The significance of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the generally recognized principles and norms of international law in the development of Russian criminal legislation is analyzed, the prospects for the further development of this legislation and the practice of its application are shown.
Varfolomeev A.A. , Alyonkin S., Zubkov A. Drug control. 2012. No. 2. S. 27-32.
The article substantiates the thesis from the standpoint of international law that the production of drugs on the territory of Afghanistan should be considered as a threat to international peace and security. The authors come to the conclusion that it is expedient for the UN Security Council to qualify the situation in this way, and, accordingly, to turn to the instruments of international legal counteraction provided for by Art. VII of the UN Charter.
Butorina O. V., Kondratieva N. B. In: European Integration: textbook. M.: Business Literature, 2011. Ch. 11. S. 186-202.
The main questions are:
1) EU budget: origin and content
2) Annual and multi-year financial plans
3) Problems of EU fiscal policy
4) Off-budget financial instruments
Denchev K., Zlatev V. Sofia: Agroengineering, 2000.
For almost a hundred years, the "oil and gas factor" has been one of the main elements influencing international relations. Of fundamental importance is the fact that we are talking about the interconnectedness of international relations with the problem of energy security. The enormous importance of energy resources in world politics is causing an aggravation of both hidden and open confrontation between the leading powers for control over regions that are either rich in hydrocarbon raw materials or are located at the intersection of transport routes.
Suzdaltsev A.I. In the book: Modernization of the economy and globalization: In 3 books. Book. 3.. Book. 3. M.: GU-HSE Publishing House, 2009. S. 355-361.
The problem of developing the main criteria for modern Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is associated with several external factors that play a serious role in the region. These factors play their role in the development of a long-term policy towards our only formal ally in the post-Soviet space - the Republic of Belarus, which is discussed in the article.
The textbook contains a description of the structure, tasks and mechanisms of work of the most significant international economic organizations; shows the results of their activities; the analysis of problems and prospects of their development is given; changes in the formation of Russia's policy in relations with these organizations are reflected. A characteristic of the emerging system of global economic regulation is proposed. For students studying the world economy and international economic relations. It is of interest to specialists in international affairs of a wide profile, as well as to everyone who is interested in the issues of international settlement of global systems.
In a predictive study covering the period up to 2035, fundamental trends are characterized, under the influence of which the shape of the world will be formed in 20 years. The task of the forecast is to identify the challenges and opportunities that await the world, which can be used in the interests of Russia, to ensure its role as an active participant in the development of rules for the future world order.
A broad analysis of world development trends in the areas of ideas and ideology, politics, innovations, economics, social sphere, international security is given, the problems of globalization and regionalism are considered. The final section of the book is devoted to strategic recommendations for Russia.
For employees of government and administration, scientific, expert and business communities. It will be useful for international students.
Number of pages - 352 pages
The work under review by the Professor of St. Petersburg State University A.A. Sergunin is devoted to a theoretically and practically relevant problem - Russian-European cooperation in the field of international security, which has received particular development after the signing of the so-called road maps for the common spaces of the Russian Federation and the EU (May 2005). .).
The analysis of modern society, permeated with media, is conducted from the standpoint of an ethnomethodological approach and is an attempt to answer the cardinal question: what are the observed orderings of events broadcast by mass mediators. The study of rituals proceeds in two main directions: firstly, in the organizational and production system of the media, focused on constant reproduction, which is based on the transmission model and the distinction between information / non-information, and, secondly, in the analysis of the perception of these messages by the audience, which is the realization of a ritual or expressive pattern that results in a shared experience. This signifies the ritual nature of modern media.
Humanity is going through a change of cultural and historical eras, which is associated with the transformation of network media into the leading means of communication. The consequence of the “digital split” is a change in social divisions: along with the traditional “haves and have-nots”, there is a confrontation between “online (connected) versus offline (not connected)”. Under these conditions, traditional intergenerational differences lose their significance, belonging to one or another information culture, on the basis of which media generations are formed, turns out to be decisive. The paper analyzes the diverse consequences of networking: cognitive, arising from the use of "smart" things with a friendly interface, psychological, generating network individualism and increasing privatization of communication, social, embodying the "paradox of an empty public sphere". The role of computer games as "deputies" of traditional socialization and education is shown, the vicissitudes of knowledge, which is losing its meaning, are considered. In conditions of excess information, the most scarce human resource today is human attention. Therefore, new business principles can be defined as attention management.
This scientific work uses the results obtained during the implementation of project No. 10-01-0009 "Media rituals", implemented within the framework of the HSE Science Foundation Program in 2010-2012.
International position of modern Kazakhstan.
Since December 16, 1991 Kazakhstan entered the world arena as a full-fledged subject of international law Two weeks before the end of 1991, 18 states recognized the independence of Kazakhstan, among them: Turkey, the United States. China. Germany, Pakistan. In the first year of independence, Kazakhstan was recognized 108 countries of the world, 70 of them opened diplomatic missions.
March 2, 1992 Kazakhstan became a full member of the United Nations. Kazakhstan also became a member of the World Bank of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. UNESCO International Monetary Fund.
In Helsinki, Kazakhstan, along with other countries that emerged after the collapse of the USSR and the SFRY, joined the final act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The geopolitical position of Kazakhstan in the center of the Eurasian continent, the complex ethnic composition, the desire to form an open market system in the economy made it necessary to build a peaceful foreign policy. “The Republic of Kazakhstan builds its relations with other states on the basis of the principles of international law,” the Law on State Independence says.
Kazakhstan occupies a strategically important space connecting Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it was very important, using this factor, to move into a new century in cooperation and friendship with Russia and China.
May 25, 1992 in Moscow, an agreement was signed on mutual assistance, friendship and cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan (in the economy, military and political spheres). Of particular importance is the agreement on the inviolability of borders.
With the People's Republic of China(PRC) was enclosed around 50 contracts and agreements.
Kazakhstan is in close relations with its closest neighbors: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan. Common borders, a high degree of integration during the Soviet era, economic dependence on each other help to maintain traditional ties with these states.
Kazakhstan has made great efforts to resolve the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. Speaking at the UN N.A. Nazarbayev proposed to convenemeeting of Asian heads of stateand discuss measures to increase confidence and ensure security and stability in the region. The UN Secretary General supported the proposal.
In the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991 d. in relation to strategic nuclear weapons, joint control of the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR is envisaged. Kazakhstan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Ban on Tests of Nuclear Weapons, joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. April 26, 1996 In Shanghai (China), the first meeting of five states "having common borders" (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. China, Russia. Tajikistan) was held. Later meetings were held in Moscow, Almaty and Bishkek.
The total territory of these five states occupies 3/5 of the area of Eurasia, and the population is a quarter of the world's population. At a meeting in Shanghai issues of military confidence in the border areas were discussed. AT Moscow (1997) a document was signed on the reduction of the armed forces in the border areas. At the SCO summit in Almaty (1998) identified the main directions of relations and discussed issues of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations.
August 24-25, 1999 The meeting in Bishkek discussed the implementation of the agreements reached, the problems of security in the region, and the Bishkek Declaration was signed.
Kazakhstan is the second largest partner of China in terms of trade among the CIS countries. On the problem of disputed territories (about 1000 sq. km), an agreement was reached: 57% will belong to Kazakhstan, and 43% - to China.
Kazakhstan and Russia signed agreements on the use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, on the extraction, processing and transportation of oil, and a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was adopted.
Relations of Kazakhstan with other states of the world
Kazakhstan does not have access to the open sea and is forced to look for an outlet to the Black and Mediterranean Seas through the Caspian and southern regions. Relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey developed especially on a large scale. Kazakh-Turkish joint ventures appeared, the Ankara hotel was built in Almaty. The delegations of Kazakhstan participated in conferences in Turkey, and Turkish scientists - in Kazakhstan. Kazakh students study in Istanbul and Ankara.
Particular importance is attached to the development of relations with India. Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey strive for economic cooperation, cultural exchange.
Relations of Kazakhstan with the developed powers of the West
With the collapse of the Union, the distribution of forces in the world has acquired a multipolar character, special attention is being paid to relations with the most powerful world power - USA. relations are built on the basis of equality and mutual interests. The United States is one of the main investors in our economy, providing assistance in the field of culture and education. According to the "Bolashak" program, Kazakhstani students study at the universities of the USA, France, Germany. In 1992, N. Nazarbayev and the German Chancellor G.Kol signed a joint statement on the foundations of the relationship. In 1992, in the Elysee Palace, the President of Kazakhstan and the President of France F. Mitterrand signed an agreement on mutual understanding and cooperation. Kazakhstan has established mutually beneficial contacts with Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania.
Relations of Kazakhstan with military-political organizations
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact organization, NATO acquired a dominant position. Kazakhstan is expanding ties with NATO. Kazakhstan's relations with the wounds of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), with the countries of Northeast Asia - Japan, South and North Korea and Mongolia - inspire great hope.
article. Clause 1 of Resolution No. 64 of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated July 23, 2009 “On Certain Issues of the Practice of Considering Disputes on the Rights of the Owners of Premises to the Common Property of a Building”8 states that since the relations of the owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising from the common property in such a building is not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the norms of legislation regulating similar relations, in particular Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
Since 2009, the provisions of the above-mentioned Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the owners of premises located in a non-residential building with the right of common shared ownership of its common property9.
As a result of our excursion into the development of legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary to fix the status of common property in non-residential premises at the legislative level and thereby establish gaps in the legislation.
1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA - scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/EotkopM^ebObjects/tgu-ww.woa/wa/Mam?textid=3030&1eve1 1=mat&^e12=ar11c^
2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.
3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.
4 See, for example: Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District of December 18, 2002 No. F03-A51/02-2/2512; decrees
Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District No. F09-2398/03-GK of 03.09.2003, No. F09-4495/04-GK of 20.01.2005; Decree of the FAS MO dated August 17, 2005 No. KG-A40 / 7495-05. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).
5 See, for example: Lapach V.A. Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. S. 12.; Ilyin D.I. Real Estate Legislation: Problems of the Content of Used Concepts // Journal of Russian Law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil law grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... cand. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. S. 47.; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of the investment and construction project // New Legislation and Legal Practice. 2009. No. 1.
6 Suite Yu.P. Features of ownership of the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.
7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... doc. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 30.
8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.
9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District of October 22, 2009 No. А05-3116/2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District in the case of November 18, 2009 No. А05-9710/2008; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga District in the case of November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807 / 2009; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District dated November 09, 2009 No. Ф09-8894 / 09-С5. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).
INTERNATIONAL STATION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE
DEVELOPMENT
V.N. Fadeev,
Doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology, Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - Criminal Law and Criminology;
penal law Reviewer: Doctor of Economics, Candidate of Law, Professor Eriashvili N.D.
Email: [email protected] en
Annotation. An analysis of the international position of Russia at the present stage of historical development is given. Identified and substantiated trends that negatively affect the socio-political situation, the viability and security of our country in modern conditions and in the future; an assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.
Keywords: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counterterrorism cooperation.
INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT
Doctor of Juridical Science, professor of Criminology department
of Moscow University MVD RF
Abstract. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have a negative impact on the social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.
Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.
The United States, which is facing “threats” from Al-Qaeda and Iran, growing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly does not need new enemies. Nevertheless, their relations with Russia will objectively worsen every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is growing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland do nothing to ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo's independence by the US, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redivision. The world order, laid down after the Second World War, began to crumble before our eyes. The United States continues to equip the world according to its scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.
China has always had and will always have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. Russia remains. Of course, the United States would like to deal with an obedient "Kozyrev" Russia, or at least the one it was under the late Yeltsin - let it "blather", let it "rattling", but they knew that we had almost nothing behind our souls It was.
It's not that the United States didn't expect the oil price boom in recent years - they provoked it themselves - they didn't expect the oil genie to pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today begins to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the US and the West. It should be noted that our relations with Japan in the last years of Putin's rule somehow faded into the background. This does not indicate the loss of our interest in contacts with Japan. This says more about the weakening of the combined influence of Japan on the world stage.
Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were the increasing independence in domestic and assertiveness of Moscow in foreign policy. However, the US and the West also bear a considerable share of the responsibility for mutual cooling and the gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But one gas may not be enough.
But the United States is especially annoyed and the West is alarmed by the “disordered” transformation of Russia, according to their scenario, from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, which sets itself ambitious tasks of modernizing the economy, and hence the army. The United States in relation to Russia will still have to rely on the opinion prevailing in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. There were two winners in World War II - the USSR and the USA and allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In fact, this is not so, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.
The collapse of the USSR is, of course, the greatest defeat of our Fatherland, perhaps in its entire history. A great state has been destroyed - in fact, an empire. But this is the outside. The US and the West did indeed win the Cold War, but in this case, the victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, also belonged to the number of winners in the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psi-
chology of the Vlasovites or other traitors during the war who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of fighting the Bolsheviks.
But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and huge resources. Even if someday, however, hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still remain. Of course, the realities of the XXI century. more than once will force the United States to reconsider its strategy towards Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.
Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here you can’t do without the Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policy of the superpowers. And who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the XX century. the thesis was relevant - whoever controls Eurasia controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of a bridge. And Russia may find itself at the epicenter of superpower interests. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its own bridge and not be under the bridge, Russia will have to be strong and independent both economically and militarily-politically. There is simply no other way. One-sided orientation only to the West or to the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.
It is possible that in the coming years the United States will not be up to Russia. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy toward Russia has always left the impression that making Russia a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed cooperation from Russia, they could provide it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed especially inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the political lead of the United States, and which, in time, even should like it. Washington seemed to be forgetting that no American soldiers stood on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground by atomic bombs. Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia
practically already got rid of the complex of defeat of the USSR. Russia is another country. Therefore, Russia, in a big way, was not defeated; began to carry out transformations and “clean up” after the collapse of the “parental home”. It is not the same. And this, basically, will determine Russia's reaction to the actions of the United States.
Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has been building relations with the United States not as a client state, reliable ally, or true friend, but also not as an adversary, and, moreover, not as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of US opponents is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically opposed. And this is a serious reason for a future confrontation. The US does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and, possibly, Ukraine), will inevitably lead to a military confrontation, albeit based on the deterrence doctrine. But this is a new round of the arms race.
For the US and the West, this is a technological gap from Russia and China; for us, these are unsustainable costs, akin to those that Reagan arranged for us with his concept of “star wars”. To catch up with the weak strong means hopelessly lagging behind. And this path is ordered to us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where the weaknesses of the United States and its allies, where they make mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the downward spiral of the situation.
Russia must understand that in the XXI century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other cataclysms at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we have sat too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War significantly influenced the formation of US policy towards Russia. Although Washington's actions were one of the important factors that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should, more than is usually done, be credited to reformers in Moscow itself.
Let's not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was by no means inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had already appeared in the days of Leonid
Brezhnev. And these are: the lack of free military resources, which was especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense spending, which placed an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the fall in the overall prestige of the USSR, the accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was to be an increase in the influence and prestige of the USSR.
When Gorbachev drastically cut subsidies to Eastern Bloc countries, withdrew his support for retrograde ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states, and initiated “perestroika,” the dynamics of political processes in Eastern Europe changed radically, resulting in the largely peaceful fall of communist regimes and the weakening of Moscow’s influence in the region. Ronald Reagan contributed to this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, not the White House, who ended the Soviet empire.
American influence played an even smaller role in the collapse of the USSR itself. The administration of George H. W. Bush supported the independence aspirations of the Baltic republics, and signaled to Gorbachev that violent action against the legitimately elected secessionist governments in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to run and win relatively free elections, and by refusing to take drastic measures to remove them from power with the help of security forces, Gorbachev effectively secured the Baltic states' exit from the USSR. Russia itself dealt the final blow to it, demanding for itself the same institutional status as that of the other union republics. At a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev said that if Russia were allowed to gain sovereignty, it would be "the end of the empire." And so it happened. After the unsuccessful attempt at a reactionary putsch in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from "dismantling" the Soviet Union.
The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations were aware of all the dangers associated with the collapse of the superpower, and ensured that the collapse of the USSR was "manageable", skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. Thus, they outright rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for large-scale economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after
After he took over Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show Gorbachev due courtesy, "not to poke his nose" in this fact, as then Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, mostly on Washington's terms.
If the administration of George W. Bush had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, then a large-scale “package” of financial assistance could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the long run, would have contributed to a closer “tie” of Russia to the West. However, Bush's position was too weak to take bold steps to help Russia. At that time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the incumbent president for being too focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.
Although domestic political issues were central to his election campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately tried to help Russia. His administration arranged for substantial financial assistance to Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was ready to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin was practically on the "short leash" of Clinton. Actually, this leash Clinton gave to Bush. In the United States, unlike in Russia, with the change of the owner of the White House, foreign policy does not change much. Americans choose the president for themselves, not for the outside world, and even more so, not for Russia.
The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in keeping the "short leash" was its decision to continue to exploit Russia's weakness. It sought to maximize the benefits for the US in terms of foreign policy, economics, and security in Europe and the post-Soviet space until Russia recovered from the shocks of the transition period. The US and the West did not expect that the transitional period in their relationship with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the “hangover syndrome” of the first president. But Russia "sobered up" much earlier than expected in the US and the West; moreover, everything that had happened to her "the evening before", in the morning she began to recall selectively and with indignation.
Behind the façade of foreign friendship, Clinton administration officials believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their view, if Moscow's preferences don't align with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, the Russian economy was in ruins, the army was collapsing, and in many ways she herself behaved like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that were leaving their former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to negotiate terms that would protect its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic policy, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often only welcomed the pressure from the IMF and the US, justifying the tight and highly unpopular monetary policy that they actually pursued on their own.
Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, dubbed "Mr. Yes" for his acquiescence to the West, began to chafe at his "cruel affair" with the Clinton administration. Once he told Talbott, who held in 1993-1994. Ambassador-at-Large to the Newly Independent States: “It's already not too nice when you guys tell us: we will do such and such, whether you like it or not. So at least don't rub salt in the wounds by saying that it's in our best interest to obey your orders."
But these requests of even Yeltsin's most devoted US reformers were ignored in Washington, where such an arrogant approach was gaining more and more popularity. Talbott and his aides called this approach “feeding Russia spinach”: Uncle Sam paternally regales Russian leaders with political “foods” that Washington considers “healthy for the new Russia,” no matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin's reformers, like in kindergarten, followed the rule: "The more you tell them it's for their own good, the more they choke." By signaling that Russia should not have an independent foreign - or even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration certainly generated strong rejection among sensible politicians in Moscow. Until they were in power, this US neo-colonialist approach, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, according to most even Western economists today, was absolutely not suitable for Russia and was so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, individual Yeltsin
radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time, the Communist Party interfered with them, then Yevgeny Primakov.
However, politicians such as former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and experts on Russia, recognized the fallacy of Washington's course and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed its willingness to turn a blind eye to the Yeltsin administration's "drastic" measures against its Supreme Soviet if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. "Encouraging a departure from the principles of democracy in a country with such an authoritarian tradition as Russia's is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline," Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeded from the “fatally erroneous assumption” that Russia was no longer a world power and would not become one for a long time to come, its actions would jeopardize peace and democracy in the region.
However, Clinton ignored Nixon's advice and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon reached a stalemate, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree dissolving it, which eventually led to violence and tank shelling of the parliament building. After that, Yeltsin "pushed through" a new constitution that gave the head of state the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislature. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step made it possible to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of a “drift” towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's propensity for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Other aspects of the arrogant foreign policy of the Clinton administration only increased the displeasure of sensible politicians in Russia. NATO expansion - especially its first wave to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself such a big problem. Most Russians were ready to agree that NATO expansion is an unpleasant event, but so far there is almost no threat to their country. But this was the case until the crisis over Kosovo in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite the categorical objections of Moscow and without the sanction of the Security Council.
According to the UN, the Russian elite and people soon came to the conclusion that they were being deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against the Orthodox peoples.
Of course, the Russian elite, which considers itself the custodian of the traditions of the Great Power - especially those in a state of "decline" - never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces that seriously thought about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with a thousand-year history. They felt that Russia seriously faced the Hamlet question: "to be or not to be." And this understanding by Putin's team is much more important today than the ideas of nationalization “according to Zyuganov” and Zhirinovsky's foreign policy ambitions combined.
Today, Russia is getting out from under the "umbrella" of the United States and even offers itself an energy umbrella to Europe. This is a welcome trend for us. But it will undoubtedly provoke sharp opposition from the US and NATO. And we will soon feel it. The next cycle of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away by the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalkeeper. Perhaps we will score pucks in other people's nets, but how many will we let in our own? We have already almost lost our domestic market. The WTO will finally complete this "dirty deed". What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if the domestic market, which in normal countries works up to 90% of the domestic economy, we give to foreigners?
Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, protection of our national interests always and everywhere, subtle diplomatic play on the contradictions between the powerful of this world, dosed assistance, taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this is what should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, until The US and the West will not be up to us. At the same time, silently and imperceptibly, we must modernize our economy and military forces. Russia has only 7-10 years to do this. And time has gone. In this regard, we must not talk away what should have been done yesterday.
The absence of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not yet allow for warning of possible threats. And there can be no clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West have already become accustomed to disregarding Russia (what is Russia, they do not reckon with the UN either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, you can not hesitate and pro-
show excessive "flexibility of the back", otherwise we will constantly find ourselves turned to events "backwards". And in order to get out of this pose with dignity, one must have a filigree technique or know 1001 tales of Shahrazade. Something Vladimir Putin has learned.
There are enough examples. Despite Russia's outrage over the Kosovo events, in late 1999, Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the invasion of Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was concerned about Chechen ties to al-Qaeda and the fact that Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by these security interests, and not by a sudden “flash of love” for the United States, Putin proposed cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative fell on prepared soil, as it already had its own background. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the US administration had more than enough data to understand the mortal danger Islamic fundamentalists posed to the US.
At one time, Clinton and his advisers, irritated by Russian opposition in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key positions in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgic, incapacitated, financially weak state, and sought to provide the United States with maximum benefits at the expense of Russia. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR by taking as many post-Soviet states as possible under Washington's wing. Therefore, they "pressed" Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia. They encouraged Georgian opportunist President Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO and instructed American embassies in Central Asia to counter Russian influence.
That is why in 1999 the US rejected Putin's offer of Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation, viewing the Russian proposal as a gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to reassert his influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not understand at the time that by doing so it was missing a historic chance to force al-Qaeda and the Taliban
go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly disable major operations. Such cooperation began only after the September 11, 2001 attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 American citizens.
When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 - eight months after Vladimir Putin became president of Russia - his administration faced new, relatively obscure figures in the Russian leadership. Struggling to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not consider relations with Russia as a priority: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin to be corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been correct at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin developed successfully. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally "vouched" for the democratic convictions and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.
The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and evoked in Russia an emotional wave of support and sympathy for the United States. Putin reaffirmed the earlier offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted the US Air Force the right to fly over Russian territory, supported the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington to establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped military formations of the Northern Alliance. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted in the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as an aspiring politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation was based on a convergence of fundamental interests, not a common ideology or mutual sympathy.
Despite such interaction, relations between the two countries remained tense in other areas. Bush's announcement in December 2001 of the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - one of the last surviving symbols of Russia's superpower status - once again hurt the Kremlin's pride. Similarly, our animosity towards NATO only intensified when the North Atlantic Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which are Estonia and
Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the position of the Russian-speaking minority.
Around the same time, Ukraine became a new serious source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the support of the United States for Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was associated not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Muscovite state in the 17th century, very close to Russia in cultural terms. plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia rightly believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative border between the two union republics - stretches far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas populated by millions of Russians, which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.
The Bush administration's approach to dealing with Ukraine—namely, its pressure on a fractured Ukraine to apply for NATO membership and financial support for non-governmental organizations actively helping pro-presidential political parties—should continually fuel our concern that whether the United States has moved to a new variant of containment policy towards Russia. Few Bush administration officials or congressmen have thought about the consequences of Russia's opposition in a region as important to its national interests as Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries the strongest emotional load.
Georgia soon became another "battlefield" between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main tool for restoring Georgia's sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where indigenous peoples we back have been fighting for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded the return of two self-proclaimed republics under the control of Tbilisi: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders who sympathize with Russia. He portrayed himself as a pro-democracy activist enthusiastically supporting US foreign policy. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to the Allied contingent in 2004
Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%) when he was elected president, and also took control of parliament and television, did not cause much concern outside of Georgia itself. The obvious arbitrariness with which he subjected the leaders of the business community and political rivals to repression did not raise questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterweight to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (it was alleged that as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that the Saakashvili regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian opposition members causes concern in the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-Katsishvili seems to have been ignored in Washington.
The farce of early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the bloody massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, the falsification of the election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his implacable opponents, Badri Patar-Katsishvili, should have finally , cross out the credibility of Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties have constantly supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the United States urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main "client state" in the Transcaucasus and near-Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo has been chosen as such a client state.
The United States is supplying arms and training the Georgian military, allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance towards Russia; the Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers stationed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and stationed on the territory of Georgia itself.
Of course, the behavior of Russia itself in relation to Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow granted Russian citizenship to most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly imposed economic sanctions against Georgia.
At the time, Washington's blind support for Saakashvili was supposed to reinforce the perception that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which, in August 2008, a military conflict was provoked on the Georgian side with
Russia. The US is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.
Despite rising tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary to the US. There is still a chance to prevent further deterioration of relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where US and Russian interests coincide, especially in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Skillful diplomacy will also be required in cases where the goals of both countries are the same, but tactical approaches differ, for example, in relation to the Iranian nuclear program.
But most importantly, the US must recognize that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today, Washington is simply not in a position to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 1990s. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is precisely anti-terror and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the defining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where there are thousands of nuclear warheads. Russia's support for sanctions - and, if necessary, the use of force - against "destructive states" and terrorist groups would also be a major help for Washington.
The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic practices in the post-Soviet region, but it is already naive to expect Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy. Therefore, Washington will continue to strive to ensure that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and independently making foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will have to understand that its options for this task are limited.
Russia, benefiting from high energy prices, while pursuing a prudent financial policy, having reined in the "oligarchs", no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the growing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are beginning to “flow” into Russia willingly. As long as stability and relative material well-being are maintained in Russia itself, a newfound sense of pride in one's country will
restrain the discontent of the people by tightening state control and gross manipulations in the political sphere.
The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in Russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, sharply limits the ability of the United States to create a "base of support" for its recommendations regarding internal processes in the country. In the current environment, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow in no uncertain terms that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. Nor does it help the cause that the reputation of the United States itself as a moral model has been seriously damaged in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion of Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with apprehension even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. In general, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.
While Moscow itself looks at the West with suspicion, Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes is outraged by Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries that are completely dependent on energy supplies from Russia.
Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy lever as a political tool. Unfortunately, only Gazprom is in the hands of the government so far. But, apparently, in the future, if necessary, the matter may reach the oil companies, in particular, Rosneft today has become a giant on a global scale.
Undoubtedly, Gazprom supplies energy carriers to friendly states at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain special political and economic relations with it by selling oil and gas to them at below-market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the "NATO" choice of neighboring countries, but Russia is not obliged to subsidize them after that. It must always be borne in mind that when Washington reacts with noble indignation to Russia's "politicized" use of its energy resources, it does not look too sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions against others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.
The United States constantly accused Russia of obstructionist actions on Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly voiced position was that it would accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from an agreement with Kosovo. But also to recognize one
Russia had no intention of declaring Kosovo's independence earlier. After Kosovo's self-declaration of independence, the situation changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies "spit" on international law on the UN Security Council, on Russia. This should untie Russia's hands. From the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, in particular Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and later Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede, Moscow will only benefit. Many in Russia are content that Kosovo's fate has set a precedent for unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and eventual integration with Russia. And here there is no need for Russia to hold on to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.
A number of other disagreements on foreign policy issues only exacerbate tensions. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and the same position was taken by some key US NATO allies, in particular France and Germany. Russia has been supplying conventional weapons to some states that the US considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis without violating international law. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians feel the same way about American military supplies to Georgia.
Contrary to its interests, Russia should stop participating in the policy of soft "curbing" of Iran and North Korea. On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the US and Europe would like, and, in the end, still supports the imposition of sanctions against both countries.
There are a lot of disagreements between the US and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the US. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging war against America, and is no longer spreading a “competing” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as it was in the days of the USSR. In addition, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any of the neighboring countries. Finally, Russia has decided not to fan separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the existence of a significant and very active Russian minority in that country.
The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adapt to American preferences anymore, especially to the detriment of its own interests.
PLAN-SUMMARY
conducting classes on public-state training
TOPIC 1: Russia in the modern world and the main directions of its military policy. The tasks of personnel to maintain combat readiness, strengthen military discipline and law and order in the summer period of training.
Educational goals:
- to instill in military personnel a readiness for worthy and selfless service to the Fatherland;
- to form in them a feeling of love and devotion to the Motherland, pride in belonging to the great Russian people.
Learning goals:
- to encourage the desire of military personnel to effectively fulfill their official duties, to improve their professional skills;
- to acquaint military personnel with the main trends in the development of the international situation and Russia's military policy.
Questions:
1.Main trends in the development of the international situation.
- Threats to Russia's Security
and its military policy.
Time: 4 hours
- The concept of national security of the Russian Federation, 2000.
- Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2000.
- The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, 2000.
- Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation on military construction for the period up to 2005.
- Cheban V. Modern international situation and military security of Russia. Reference point. - 2002. - No. 5.
Conduct method: story-talk
The current stage of development of the international situation is characterized by a sharp increase in the relationship between states in the military field. This confirms the signing in May 2002 of the Treaty between the US and Russia on the reduction of strategic offensive nuclear potentials.
However, despite the reduction in the military power of world powers, the importance of military force in international relations continues to be significant.
An assessment of the current international situation, from the point of view of ensuring the security of Russia, is associated with significant uncertainty regarding potential sources of threats, violations of stability in the world in the future, as well as the forms in which these threats can be embodied.
In general, there are four main groups of factors that influence the formation of the international situation in the world (see Chart 1).
To first group include factors influencing the reduction of the risk of unleashing a large-scale war, including a nuclear one, as well as the formation and strengthening of regional centers of power. Today, three "rings" of states have formed around Russia, occupying different positions in relation to Russia's national interests. The first "ring" - the near abroad - is formed by independent states that emerged from the Soviet Union. The second "ring" - the middle abroad - the Nordic states and former member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The third "ring" - far abroad - consists of states in the West, South and East.
At the same time, the main geopolitical centers of power are the USA, Germany, Japan, India and China. Each of these centers has clearly defined its own interests in the world and in specific regions, which often do not coincide with the interests of Russia.
Second group are factors influencing the ongoing expansion of the NATO bloc. The transformation of NATO reflects the desire of the United States to maintain control over the countries of Europe, to limit their sovereignty and economic interests. The new "NATO Strategic Concept" does not contain a word about "common human interests" or equal security for all countries, and it is focused on preventive action beyond the borders of NATO member countries. In this regard, the European command has been expanded. Its area of responsibility additionally includes Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Now on the European continent, NATO has an advantage over Russia on a scale of 3:1 in armored vehicles, 3:1 in artillery, 2:1 in combat aircraft and helicopters. The states of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, fell into the zone of responsibility of the Central Command.
However, it should be noted that thanks to the effective foreign policy of Russia, it was possible to somewhat reverse the attitude towards it. Today we can safely talk about not 19, but about 20 partner countries participating in meetings during the discussion of issues in NATO relating to security in the world.
Third group factors include the continuing crisis trends in the economic and social development of the states of the world community, as well as the rivalry of states for the division of spheres of influence in the economy and politics. Today, countries compete with each other on all parameters of economics and politics. Competition has become global. In the late 90s, Russia had to give way to many niches in the world market. Today, the efforts of a number of states aimed at weakening Russia's positions in the political and economic fields are being stepped up. Attempts are being made to ignore its interests in solving major problems of international political and economic relations. Conflict situations are being created that are ultimately capable of undermining international security and stability and slowing down the ongoing positive changes in international relations.
In general, the analysis of the economic situation in the world indicates the emerging trend of creating three trade and economic zones under the auspices of the United States, Japan and Germany, diminishing Russia's influence on the common economic space, blocking its attempts and opportunities to enter the world market of high technologies.
To fourth group factors include the global spread of terrorist and extremist movements and groups. The problem of terrorism has recently become particularly acute. After September 11, 2001, it became completely clear that the Cold War was over and that another war was on the agenda - against international terrorism. Russia, based on international conventions and treaties, cooperates with foreign states in the field of combating terrorism and acts as one of the most reliable guarantors of international stability. It was Russia's principled position that made it possible to form a strong antiterrorist coalition. In the context of allied relations, the leadership of Russia, together with the leadership of a number of CIS countries, made a corresponding decision. Our state, which has long been confronted with terrorism, did not have the problem of choosing whether to support or not support efforts to destroy its lair in Afghanistan. Moreover, these actions really contributed to the strengthening of security on the southern borders of the country and to a relative extent contributed to the improvement of the situation on this issue in many CIS countries.
Thus, the position in the world and the role of Russia in the world community is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. The era of bipolar confrontation is over. It was replaced by mutually exclusive tendencies towards the formation of a multipolar world and the establishment of the dominance of one country or group of countries on the world stage. In recent decades, Russia has been able to use the additional opportunities for international cooperation that have emerged as a result of fundamental changes in the country. It has made significant progress along the path of integration into the system of world economic relations and has joined a number of influential international organizations and institutions. At the cost of considerable efforts, Russia has managed to strengthen its position in a number of fundamental areas.
- The geopolitical situation in the world at the beginning of the 20th century was rapidly
changes and is characterized by constant clashes of political, economic and military interests of countries and coalitions of states. In this situation, many are concerned about the question: Is there a direct threat to the security of Russia, where does it come from, what is its nature, what should be the protection measures?».
Currently, Russia borders on 16 states, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60 thousand 932.3 km (land - 14 thousand 509.3 km; sea - 38 thousand 807 km; river - 7 thousand 141 m; lake - 475 km ). The area of the exclusive economic zone is 8.6 million square meters. km. The border inherited from the USSR, formalized in international terms, is 9,850 km. At the same time, the border, which is not internationally formalized, is 13,599 km. Of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation, 45 are border regions. Of these, 24 subjects were border regions for the first time. What processes are taking place along the perimeter of our borders?
In the north relations between Russia and Norway are complicated by the unresolved issue of the boundaries of the continental shelf and between economic zones.
The gradual departure from the traditional neutrality of Finland and Sweden is alarming, especially since a number of political circles in Finland have made territorial claims to Russia for part of Karelia, and certain circles in Finland are striving to unite with the Karelians, Sami and Veps, who are close in language.
The Baltic states also put forward their territorial claims to Russia. Estonia lays claim to the Kingisep district of the Leningrad region, demands a change in borders in accordance with the Tartu Treaty of 1920, according to which Izborsk and Pechory were recognized as Estonian territory. Latvia claims its rights to the Pytalovsky district of the Pskov region.
In the West sources of tension can be firstly demands put forward in Lithuania, Poland and Germany to demilitarize the Kaliningrad region. One of the options for the possible development of the situation in the region is the establishment of control over the Kaliningrad region by international organizations under the pretext of providing it with comprehensive assistance, followed by giving it the status of a free economic zone. At the same time, the option of its complete separation from Russia with further reorientation to Germany or Lithuania is not ruled out. In this context, Russia is assigned the role of a secondary partner in resolving this issue, and in the future it is expected to be ousted from the space of the Baltic Sea.
Secondly, further advancement of the NATO bloc to the east. The Baltic states are persistently striving to join NATO, the leadership of the bloc provides them with comprehensive military assistance and forms new groupings.
Thirdly, the territorial claims of Lithuania to certain areas, in particular to the Curonian Spit, the area around Lake Vyshtitis, may meet with support among some of the highest political circles of the West. In this regard, the aggravation of regional conflicts can lead to a sharp deterioration in relations between the NATO countries, the Baltic States and Russia.
Fourth, The unfavorable situation for Russia in this strategic direction is exacerbated by the active involvement of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in NATO's sphere of military influence through the Partnership for Peace program.
In the South-West primarily concerned about the rise of separatism and Islamic extremism. The presence of constantly smoldering and ready to flare up again at any moment hotbeds of conflict situations in the Chechen Republic, between Georgia and Abkhazia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the growth of pro-Islamic sentiments in the Transcaucasus and the Central Asian republics of the CIS create dangerous prerequisites for the implementation of the ideas of "true Islam" on the basis of militant nationalism.
A conflict situation, fraught with serious complications, is also developing around oil and gas production on the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea and the transportation of extracted raw materials.
On South a characteristic feature of the situation is the desire to weaken Russia's position in the region against the backdrop of the dominance of the tendency of exacerbation of interstate and intrastate contradictions of an ethnic, religious and inter-clan character. This is manifested in outside support for anti-Russian actions, both through the CIS states bordering on us, and through anti-federal forces on the territory of Russia. Already today, the actions of international extremist Islamic organizations in Central Asia have an impact on the Volga and Ural regions of Russia. The reasons for the emergence of a conflict situation here are interstate and intrastate contradictions in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Turkey, with the support of international monopolies and some Transcaucasian states, is hindering the Russian project, which provides for the delivery of oil and gas to Europe from Central Asia and the Caucasus through the port of Novorossiysk, trying to implement its own, according to which oil and gas pipelines will pass through its territory with access to the Mediterranean Sea. In the future, the threat may increase if the emerging trend towards confrontation with the Islamic world along the “arc of instability” from Yugoslavia to Tajikistan develops.
The emergence of direct threats to Russia's security in this area, according to many researchers and experts, should be expected in 2007-2010.
In the East The national interests of Russia are contradicted by claims from Japan, China and the United States to divide spheres of influence and seize a leading role in the region, the territorial claims of these countries to our state, and the predatory plunder of maritime wealth in the Russian economic zone.
In Japan's foreign policy, there is a clear tendency to use economic and political leverage in order to resolve the territorial problem in a favorable way for Japan. She considers the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, Khabomai, belonging to Russia, and calls the rest of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin disputable.
The development of relations between the Korean states conceals a serious danger. A military conflict between North and South Korea could lead to a clash of interests between the United States, China and Russia.
Separately, it is necessary to analyze the position of China, which continues to strengthen its role in the world and the region and build up its military and economic potential. One can assume the formation in the long term of China as a superpower of the second rank. Recent events in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have forced China to coordinate more closely with Russia its efforts to counter the ideas of a unipolar world and US attempts to implement them. However, in relations with Russia, Beijing seeks to obtain unilateral benefits and advantages. China is rapidly gaining economic and military strength. However, it is aggravated by the problems of rapidly growing overpopulation and lack of natural resources. Today, China's population of more than one billion is growing at 1.1% per year, while the economy is growing even faster, at more than 10% per year. For these reasons, in some border regions of Primorye, there were 1.5-2 times more Chinese than the Russian-speaking population. Despite the agreements concluded with Russia, China continues to put forward claims to a number of Russian territories (part of the territory of the Chita and Amur regions, Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories). Refusal to satisfy territorial claims or an attempt to oppress the huge Chinese diaspora in the Far East, which is practically not subject to Russian laws, can serve in the future, under certain circumstances, as a pretext for resolving controversial problems by force.
In addition, in 5-10 years the emergence of serious contradictions between China and Russian allies in the Central Asian region, as well as between China and Mongolia, is not ruled out.
The above and other processes that today
are observed in the world community and near the borders of Russia, allow you to make
some conclusions characterizing the state of its national security and the main directions of military policy at the beginning of the 20th century.
Firstly, dynamic, sometimes radical changes are taking place in the contemporary international environment. On the ruins of a bipolar world based on a confrontation between two superpowers, new structures of international relations are being formed. Real material and spiritual prerequisites are being created for a motivated intervention by the United States, Turkey and other countries in areas located in close proximity to Russia.
Secondly, In general, the international situation in the world remains difficult. The construction of a new world order is accompanied by an intensification of the struggle for spheres of influence, sources of raw materials and sales markets, which can lead to the emergence of new hotbeds of tension and conflicts that directly affect the national interests of Russia and affect the stability in the country.
Thirdly, The most real threats to Russia's security are: the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to Russia's borders, the possible escalation of armed conflicts in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and territorial claims against Russia by a number of states. Any conflict near large oil reserves and transport routes can be used for a military invasion of Russian territory.
Fourth, Russia does not "fit" into the current model of globalization on Western terms. In this situation, one should not forget that the priority of using military force to solve controversial problems remains an essential feature of modern reality. In the United States and a number of NATO countries there are certain circles of politicians and the military who rely not on peaceful negotiations, but on brute military force, which was clearly demonstrated in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999.
Fifth, in the period up to 2010, the main threat to Russia will be military conflicts in the near abroad. Here, armed conflicts can escalate in the Caucasus with their internationalization due to the intervention of NATO countries, as well as in Ukraine, Belarus and Transnistria, where the instability of the domestic political situation creates a favorable situation for military intervention in the internal affairs of these states or other countries under the guise of peacekeeping. Subsequently, until 2015, coordinated local wars and armed conflicts may arise in the spheres of Russia's traditional influence with the threat of their escalation into a regional war.
Thus, based on the current situation in the world and the fact that the highest priority of the state policy of Russia is the protection of the interests of the individual, society and the state, it is necessary to identify the main goals of Russia's military policy at the present stage(see diagram 2).
- Ensuring the reliable security of the country, maintaining and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, strong and authoritative positions in the world community, which to the greatest extent meet the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the influential centers of the modern world and which are necessary for the growth of its political, economic , intellectual and spiritual potential.
- Influencing global processes in order to form a stable, fair and democratic world order based on universally recognized norms of international law, including primarily the goals and principles of the UN Charter, on equal and partnership relations between states.
- Creation of favorable external conditions for the progressive development of Russia, the rise of its economy, the improvement of the living standards of the population, the successful implementation of democratic reforms, the strengthening of the foundations of the constitutional order, and the observance of human rights and freedoms.
There is a deep-rooted belief in the US that the day is not far off when the country will collapse.
J. Friedman, political scientist
The modern world is characterized by a significant increase in the chaos of world politics. Unpredictability in this area becomes higher than in the economy
Ya. Novikov, General Director of Concern VKO "Almaz-Antey"
In order to answer the question of the possibility of analyzing and forecasting the current international situation, it is important, first of all, to agree on what we mean by the term "international situation", i.e. about the subject of research, and try to give it at least the most general description, describe its structure, character and main modern features. In this case, the main possible directions for the analysis and forecast of MC become clear.
In this work, the term "international situation" refers to such a state of the entire system of international relations in a certain period of time, which is characterized by a number of parameters and criteria, numbering thousands of indicators:
The composition, level of development and policy of the main sovereign subjects of the Moscow Region - primarily local human civilizations, nations and states, as well as their unions, coalitions and other associations;
The composition, influence and policy of the main non-state actors of the IR - both international and national - which include the entire spectrum of such actors: humanitarian, public, religious, etc.;
The main trends in the development of mankind and its LFC, as well as in individual regions.
These trends (such as globalization) can be contradictory and have different impacts;
The influence of subjective factors, which are mainly derived from the development of national human capital and its institutions. These factors associated with the “cognitive revolution” and the politics of the ruling elites are, in fact, the area in which the most important resource of humanity and the art of using it merge;
Finally, there are relations and interactions between all these factors and trends, which create a unique international situation and the military-political, financial, economic, social, and other conditions arising from it.
Thus, the subject of analysis and strategic forecast are numerous factors and trends and their interaction and mutual influence, forming a complex dynamic and multifactorial system. So, if we consider modern defense and military defense only from the point of view of the military spending of individual countries, then the ratio of the military budgets of Russia and the United States will be 1: 12, and Russia and France, and England 1: 1.1 and 1: 1.2, respectively. If this ratio is measured by the ratio of Russian military spending and the military spending of the Western LFC and its allies, then this ratio will be already 1: 21.
Thus, in a recent RAND report on a comparison of the military potentials of China and the United States, a huge number of indicators are given - basic, additional, auxiliary, etc., and criteria. As an example, we can only compare the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the United States and China in terms of:
range;
type of basing;
BR types;
Years of testing;
warheads;
Numbers, etc., as well as a short-term forecast of their condition for 2017.
But the analysis of MD and HPE presupposes not only quantitative, but also qualitative comparison and comparison of a wide variety of parameters, including, for example, such complex ones as the survivability of nuclear forces after the use of a counterforce nuclear strike. Thus, in 1996, such a US attack against China was assessed as the almost complete destruction of China's strategic nuclear forces.
It is hard to imagine that such a volume of work is being done in Russia today, anywhere. If there are forecasts for the development of individual countries and regions (by no means all and far from all, and far from all of the main parameters), if there are some forecasts for the development of world trends, then there is no general, systemic forecast for the development of the IR, and hence HPE. This means that when assessing Russia’s necessary defense spending, for example, on the State Armaments Program (SAP) for the period 2018-2025, the approaches of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense differ by 100% (12 and 24 trillion rubles), which from the military-political point of view vision requires the most serious justification.
Taking into account that in the same years, GDP growth in the country, according to the Ministry of Finance, will not be significant, and the share of military spending in GDP (4.15%) will remain at the same level, this means that the country’s financial capabilities are severely limited: it is necessary either to increase the share of military spending in GDP to the level of warring countries (Israel ~ 7% or Iraq ~ more than 20%), either reduce spending on social needs and development, or - which is the most difficult, but also the most effective - to increase the efficiency of military spending, revisiting priorities. At the same time, we already have examples of such an approach: in 2014, the military themselves said that they managed to reduce SAP-2025 from 55 trillion to 35 trillion rubles due to the unification of products.
Thus, the determination of resources and the implementation of other measures to counter external challenges and threats are largely predetermined by the most accurate analysis and forecast of the future MD and HPE that form these challenges. When in the mid-30s of the 20th century in the USSR, and especially after 1938, a course was taken to maximize the pace of military construction, the share of military spending and the degree of militarization of the country obviously exceeded all peaceful norms. Naturally, such political decisions were made primarily on the basis of an assessment of the future state of the MOD and HPE in the world.
In order to try to visualize and more simply imagine the complexity and scope of such an analysis, it is necessary to try to understand what MO is even in the most general terms. To do this, you can use the technique of drawing up a connection diagram (sometimes called a "mind map" - "mind map", which was made popular by the English psychologist Tony Buzan) - an associative map, which is a method of structuring the state of individual systems and concepts ( rice. 7 ). In it, in the most general approximation, an idea is given of the state of abstract MO in a certain period of time. Naturally, the dynamics and scale of changes occurring in all groups of factors, actors and trends and between them, turns this state into a kind of temporary “episode” of life that requires constant dynamic adjustment.
Rice. 7. The abstract structure of ML in the 21st century
It is obvious that the positions of not only individual actors and states, but also the LSF can change, and tendencies can accelerate, slow down or die off.
On this “thought map” of ideas about the Defense Ministry in the 21st century, only the main groups of factors and trends that form the Defense Ministry and - as part of it and its consequence - the military-political situation, as well as other areas of the Defense Ministry - socio-cultural, financial, economic, trade , industrial, etc., which are a specific consequence and result of the development of IR.
The international situation is developing according to a variety of scenarios, which are realized in one or another specific scenario. Thus, the Defense Ministry of 1946–1990 was characterized by its development according to the “cold war” scenario, although there were periods when, within the framework of this scenario, it developed according to the “detente of international tension” option (1972–1979), or the option of “exacerbation of the Defense Ministry”. None of these options completely denied the peculiarities of the development of the indicated scenario of the MO (“cold war”), but in their specific versions, of course, it had an impact on the formation of HPE and SO.
Accordingly, if we want to analyze the current state, and even more so to make a strategic forecast for the development of the IR, then we must take into account not only the current state of (at least the main) factors and trends, but also the degree of mutual influence and interaction between them, the possibility and the probability of development of MO according to one or another scenario.
Obviously, such a huge informational and analytical work can only be done by a sufficiently large and qualified team, bringing together specialists in various fields - from "regionalists" and "country experts" to experts in the field of science, technology, technology, psychology, finance, etc. . It is very important that this team has not only the appropriate information capabilities and tools, but also a sufficiently deep theoretical base, methodology and specific techniques.
So, in this case, in recent years, the method of strategic forecasting of scenarios and options for their development of the LFC, MO, VPO and SO has been widely used at the MGIMO Center for Strategic Studies, which has been the subject of quite a lot of work.
Based on this experience, we can say that our team was only at the very beginning of the development of the theoretical and methodological foundations for the development of IR. It is also necessary to recognize that various scientific teams are currently undertaking a variety of attempts at such strategic analysis and forecasting. In some cases (as in the United States, for example), there are huge combined teams of intelligence services, corporations, and individual efforts of university scientists. In other examples (as in Russia), relatively small teams of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments are used, working, as a rule, in accordance with the allocated grants on a medium-term basis.
In any case, it should be recognized that due to the crisis in the departmental and academic humanities - international and military - science, the quality of analysis and forecasting of the development of the MOD and HPE has sharply decreased. A vivid example is the absence of a well-known intelligible forecast of the real nature of relations with the West in 1985–2015, when the authors of such well-known (it should be admitted, few and private) forecasts noted the “prosperous development of the Moscow Region”. In many ways, this, as well as the lack of professionalism of the political elites, led to major foreign policy mistakes comparable to the crimes that were the result of the foreign policy course of M. Gorbachev, E. Shevardnadze, A. Yakovlev and B. Yeltsin. This course led to the collapse of the world socialist system - in fact, a local human civilization led by the "Russian core" of the USSR - as well as the Warsaw Pact, the Comecon and, ultimately, the USSR, and then underestimation of the real intentions of the West towards Russia.
Another strategic failure in foreign policy (now Russia) was its naive orientation towards "Western partners" to the detriment of its national interests and the interests of its remaining friends and allies in the 90s of the XX century and at the beginning of the new century, partly preserved today.
Finally, the most important mistake, not only foreign policy, but also civilizational, was a one-sided orientation towards the Western system of values, norms and rules, which were originally created as unequal and unfair - be it in finance or sports - for other countries. This mistake led to catastrophic consequences for the Russian humanities, in fact, depriving it of its theoretical and methodological foundations, scientific personnel, and social and political "interest" (need). Only in the most recent years have some old institutions begun to be revived and new ones (the Russian Historical and Geographical Society, for example) institutes to be created.
Thus, the Soviet-Russian politics and diplomacy made at least several strategic mistakes on a global scale over 30 years, some of which even led to a “geopolitical catastrophe”. This was largely due to the fact that there was no political and scientific mechanism for their prevention, as, however, it has not been fully created even today. Moreover, it is very likely that such scientific schools were deliberately liquidated in the 80s and 90s so that the policy had no national scientific basis.
At present, the situation in the field of analysis and strategic forecasting in the international and military-political spheres looks even less satisfactory than before (when the ruling elite of the USSR often simply ignored the opinion of experts from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff and part of the teams of the Russian Academy of Sciences) due to the general degradation of scientific schools and declining research levels. At the same time, for some reason, some experts state that “Over the twenty years of practical implementation in our country of the American theory of ensuring national security in the Russian Federation, a fairly extensive network of forces and means has been created to analytically support decision-making by government bodies in the field of national security (Fig. 8 ) . As proof, they cite the classical scheme, which in fact has little content and, in my opinion, is the most general, poorly developed and interconnected, unsystematic and extremely ineffective. This, of course, inevitably affects the quality of forecasts, planning and implementation of the decisions made. In its most general form, this system is as follows.