The introduction of historical unanimity: what is it and how to fight it? Free Historical Society Konstantin Morozov trial in the SR case

Biography

7.08. 1961 – was born in Kuibyshev (Samara).

1978 - graduated from high school.

1979-1981 - military service in the Soviet army.

1982-1983 - study at the full-time preparatory department (workers' faculty) of the Kuibyshev (Samara) State University.

1983-1988 - study at the full-time department of the history department of the Kuibyshev State University.

1988–1992 - teaching history at the Volga Region Institute of Informatics, Radio Engineering and Communications.

1990s - Admission to the correspondence postgraduate study of the Samara State University.

1992-1993 - Work as a history teacher in a secondary school in Moscow.

1993-1994 – work in the publishing department of the State Archives of the Russian Federation.

1993-1995 - work as a researcher (later scientific secretary) of the Institute of National Problems of Education of the Ministry of Education.

1994-1995 - Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the scientific conference and compiler of the collection: Individual political terror in Russia. Conference materials. M.: "Memorial", 1995.

1995 - defense of a Ph.D. thesis at Samara University on the topic: "The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1907-1914."

Since January 1996 - the work of Art. Lecturer at the Department of History of Moscow State Technical University. N.E. Bauman.

2000 - awarded the academic title of Associate Professor in the Department of History.

1999–2005 – Associate Professor, Department of History, Moscow State Technical University. N.E. Bauman. He read a special course "The Phenomenon and Practice of Political Extremism in Russia (Tuesday half of the 19th - the middle of the 20th centuries)".

1999 - 2000 - worked part-time at the Department of "History of World Civilizations" of the Faculty of History of the Moscow City Pedagogical University. He read a special course "The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (1901-1925)" and conducted seminars on the course "Political parties in the world and in Russia."

Since January 2002, he has been a participant, and then, since August 2002, the head of the NIPTs Memorial program: “Socialists and anarchists are participants in the resistance to the Bolshevik regime. (October 25, 1917 - the end of the 30th of the twentieth century) "

2002 - received a diploma of the winner in the competition of grants of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation for fundamental research in the field of the humanities for a project on the topic “Behavior of a revolutionary during investigation, trial and in prison in the context of the traditions of revolutionary subculture (based on the materials of the 1922 trial of socialist revolutionaries) »

2002-2005 - Responsible compiler of the electronic version of the Glossary of the bio-reference book: “Socialist resistance to the Soviet regime (October 25, 1917 - the end of the 1930s): materials for a biographical dictionary. Issue. 1: Glossary" - http://socialist.memo.ru/lists/slovnik/index.htm .

In the 2004/2005 academic year, he was nominated for participation in the competition for the title of "Best Teacher of the Year" of the Moscow State Technical University. N.E. Bauman.

In 2002-2004 the author of the concept, and in 2004-2005. ch. editor of the scientific, educational and biographical Internet resource “Russian socialists and anarchists after October 1917: history, ideas, traditions of democratic socialism and the fate of the participants in the left resistance to the Bolshevik regime”, carried out with the financial support of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (grant No. 04-01-12025) - http://socialist.memo.ru/).

From January 2006 to 2010 - Head of the "Support for Young Researchers" program of the International Historical and Educational Charitable and Human Rights Society "Memorial" (Moscow), the Center for Independent Sociological Research (St. Petersburg) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Berlin)

Report on the presentation of the site and the activities of the program of researchers of the International Historical, Educational Charitable and Human Rights Society "Memorial" (Moscow), the Center for Independent Sociological Research (St. Petersburg) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Berlin) http://www.memo.ru/ 2006/03/21/soc.htm. Author of the concept and chief editor of the program website.

February 2007 - defense of the dissertation "The trial of socialist revolutionaries and prison confrontation (1922-1926): ethics and tactics of confrontation" for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences (specialty 07.00.02 - Domestic History) Official opponents: d.i. n. B. I. Kolonitsky (SPb II RAS), Doctor of History A. P. Nenarokov (RGASPI), Doctor of History O. V. Khlevnyuk (SARF).

From September 2007 to September 1, 2013 - part-time work as a professor at the Department of the History of Russia in Modern Times, IAI, Russian State University for the Humanities. Reading of the special course “Oppositional terrorism in Russia at the beginning. XX century." and a special seminar "Subculture and everyday life of a Russian revolutionary in the first third of the 20th century". Reading the course "History of Russia. 1891-1917".

In February 2009, at the reporting and re-election meeting of the NIPTs "Memorial", he was re-elected as a member of the Council and was elected deputy. Chairman of the Board of NIPTs "Memorial".

Since September 1, 2009, part-time work as a professor at the Department of Humanitarian Disciplines of the Federal State Institution of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation,

From September 1, 2010, the transition to the full-time position of professor of the department of humanitarian disciplines of the Federal State Institution of the Russian Academy of National Economy and State. service under the President of the Russian Federation.

Since February 2012, the head of the permanent seminar "The Left in Russia: History and Modernity" (see video - http://socialist.memo.ru/about/seminar.htm)

In September 2013, as Chairman of the Organizing Committee, he organized a two-day international scientific conference “The Fate of Democratic Socialism in Russia: Past and Present” (Moscow, Memorial).

Initiator and co-author of the “Open letter to the non-existent community of Russian higher education teachers”, written in response to the scandalous statement of Minister Livanov in November 2013. - http://polit.ru/article/2012/11/26/letter/ More than a thousand teachers signed the letter after its publication on Polit.ru, which became the impetus for the creation of a new independent trade union - http:// unsolidarity.ru/?page_id=2254

One of the initiators of the creation of the Interregional Trade Union of Higher Education Workers "University Solidarity" and since April 2013. to January 2015 co-chairman of the trade union and Ch. site editor - http://unisolidarity.ru

From January 2013 presenter of the author's column "O tempora! O mores!" on the site "University Solidarity", dedicated to the problems of ethics in a modern Russian university - http://unisolidarity.ru/?cat=12

In February 2014, he participated as a founding member in the creation of the Free Historical Society.

In October 2013 and in October 2015, at the reporting and re-election meeting, he was elected (and re-elected) as a member of the Board of the Moscow Memorial Society.

Publications

Labor People's Socialist Party: Documents and Materials / Comp. A.V. Sypchenko, K.N. Morozov. M.: ROSSPEN, 2003. 624p.

Morozov K.N. Journal "Zavety" and the ideological search of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party during the years of a new revolutionary upsurge in Russia // Problems of domestic and foreign history: reports and messages to the interuniversity conference. November 1991. Samara. S.84-89.

Morozov K.N. B.V. Savinkov and the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (1909-1911) // Russia and Reforms. Sat. Art. M., 1993. S.94-113.

Religious consciousness and revolution: Merezhkovsky and Savinkov in 1911 (Preparation of documents and preface for publication - co-authors) // Questions of Philosophy. 1994. No. 10. S. 138-142.

Morozov K.N. Scientific and technological progress in the service of terror: plans for an "air" and "underwater" assassination attempt by the AKP on Nicholas II (1907–1911) // Spirituality. Journal of Humanities Studies. Book. third. Sergiev Posad, 2003. S. 23-51.

Morozov K.N. Political leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1901–1921 // Political parties in Russian revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century / Ed. G.N. Sevastyanova; In-t grew up. stories. M., Nauka, 2005. S. 475-487.

Morozov K.N. The phenomenon of SR terrorism in Russia (1901-1922): typology and specific features // Notebooks of the International University in Moscow: Sat. scientific works. Issue. 6: Modern terrorism: origins, trends, problems of overcoming. M.: Publishing House of the International University in Moscow, 2006. S. 92-115. (2 p.l.)

Morozov K.N. The Relationship between Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries at the Beginning of the 20th Century: Centrifugal and Centripetal Tendencies // Social Democracy in Russian and World History. Generalization of experience and new approaches: Proceedings of the international. scientific conf., 21-22 Apr. 2008, Moscow. - M.: Collection, 2009. S.357-376.

Archival holdings of Russian emigration of the first wave in the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (Nanterre, France) (co-authored with A. Goryunov (Paris) // Society. Intelligentsia. Repressions: Collection of articles dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Prof. S. A. Krasilnikov Novosibirsk, NGU, 2009, pp. 78 – 86.

Morozov KN Litigation of the Socialist Revolutionaries of 1922 as a prologue to Soviet political processes // Judicial political processes in the USSR and the communist countries of Europe. Comparative analysis of the mechanisms and practices of conducting the Collection of materials of the Russian - French seminar (Moscow, September 11 - 12, 2009) Novosibirsk. The science. 2009. S. 21-28.

Morozov KN Actors of the Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries of 1922 in the Context of Its Historical Significance // Judicial Political Trials in the USSR and the Communist Countries of Europe. Collection of materials of the Russian-French seminar (Paris, November 29-30) Novosibirsk. The science. 2011. S. 21-28.

Suslov A., Morozov K. Neopopulism and Neopopulist Parties in Twentieth Century Russia: A Bibliography // International Newsletter of Communist Studies. - Vol.XVII (2011), No. 24. – P.391.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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    Born on August 7, 1961 Kuibyshev

    Graduated from high school. No. 5 in Kuibyshev, then after serving in the army, he studied at the workers' faculty and at the history department of the Kuibyshev (now Samara) State University, from which he graduated in 1988. From 1990 to 1995, he studied at the postgraduate correspondence course of the Samara State university.

    • Topic of Ph.D. thesis: "The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1907-1914" (specialty 07.00.02 - National History), defended in December 1995 at Samara State University. The topic of the doctoral dissertation was "The Trial of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Prison Confrontation (1922-1926): Ethics and Tactics of Confrontation" (specialty 07.00.02 - National History), defended in February 2007 at the Moscow State Pedagogical University. In 1988–1992 - worked as a teacher of history at the Volga Institute of Informatics, Radio Engineering and Communications. In 1993-1995 he worked as a researcher at the Institute of National Educational Problems of the Ministry of Education. In 1996 - 2005 - worked at the Department of History of the Moscow State Technical University. N.E. Bauman in the position of Art. teacher and then assistant professor.
    • Since 2005, he has been working at the Research and Information and Educational Center "Memorial" as the head of the program "Socialists and anarchists - participants in the resistance to the Bolshevik regime. October 25, 1917 - the end of the 30s of the twentieth century. and hands. international program "Support for young Russian researchers". Member of the Council of NIPTs "Memorial" since 2002 (re-elected in 2006), Ch. editor of the historical, educational and biographical website of the NIPTs "Memorial" "Russian socialists and anarchists after October 1917: history, ideas, traditions of democratic socialism and the fate of participants in the left resistance to the Bolshevik regime" (http://socialist.memo.ru/).
    • Professor of the Department of the History of Russian Statehood, Department of History, School of Contemporary Humanitarian Studies, Institute of Social Sciences, RANEPA. Founding member and member of the Council of the Free Historical Society.

    Proceedings

    • B.N.Savinkov and the Combat Organization of the AKP in 1909-1911 / Publ. K.N. Morozova // Past. Historical almanac. M.; SPb., 1995. Issue. 18. S. 243-314.
    • Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1907-1914 M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. 624 p.
    • Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries (June-August 1922): Preparation. Holding. Results / Comp. S.A. Krasilnikov, K.N. Morozov, I.V. Chubykin. M.: ROSSPEN, 2002. 1007 p. (Series "Archives of the Kremlin").
    • Labor People's Socialist Party: Documents and Materials / Comp. A.V. Sypchenko, K.N. Morozov. M.: ROSSPEN, 2003. 624p.
    • Trial of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Prison Confrontation (1922-1926): Ethics and Tactics of Confrontation. M.: ROSSPEN, 2005. 736 p.
    • The son of a "free navigator" and the thirteenth "suicide bomber" of the trial of the S.-R. 1922: Collection of documents and materials from the personal archive of VN Richter / Comp. K.N.Morozov, A.Yu.Morozova, T.A.Semenova (Richter). M.: ROSSPEN, 2005.655 p.
    • Features, paradoxes and results of the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1922 // Patriotic history. 2006. No. 4. S. 12-25.
    • The trial of the Social Revolutionaries in 1922 "in the coverage" of the OGPU // Questions of history. 2006. No. 11. P. 3-20.
    • Party of Socialist Revolutionaries during and after the Revolution of 1905-1907. as a sociocultural phenomenon in the context of the subculture of the Russian revolutionary // Cahiers du Monde Russe. 2007 Vol. 48. N 2-3. P. 301-331.
    • You need to learn to understand the world of the Russian revolutionary // Russian history. 2014. No. 1. S. 166-172.
    • Populism and populist parties in the history of Russia in the 20th century: a bio-bibliographic guide. - M., Publishing house "New Chronograph". 2016. - 544 p.

    We continue the topic of teaching national history by publishing an articleDoctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Humanitarian Disciplines of the Federal State Institution of the Russian Academy of National Economy and State. Service under the President of the Russian Federation and Professor of the Department of History of Russia in Modern Times, Russian State University for the Humanities, Deputy. Konstantin Morozov, Chairman of the Council of the Scientific Information and Educational Center "Memorial".

    In recent months, many of those who were not passed over by the announcement of plans to write a “single history textbook”, having not yet had time to fully comprehend this news, were again puzzled, but already with the question, what exactly do the maneuvers of the authorities mean from a “single history textbook” to “a single historical and cultural standard” and several “unanimous” textbooks? It really was a swift maneuver when, within one week, they first announced the creation of a single history textbook and outlined the deadlines for the entire procedure of the process, and soon, after discussing these plans "at a meeting of representatives of ministries and academic structures", they announced that it was decided to abandon the idea of ​​a single textbook and from the old terms. It turned out that instead of this, the experts will submit by July 1 for discussion the Unified Historical and Cultural Standard, which will contain the concept of the history of Russia and its interpretation. The discussion will take place in July and August, when people go on vacation and, as the deputy “joked” Andrey Petrov, head of the Russian Historical Society: “It will be interesting for citizens to read the concept while lying by the sea.” At the same time of calm, when there is no serious discussion and resonance by definition, the authors of the concept will conduct two sociological surveys to find out the attitude of Russians to controversial moments and figures in the country's history. And in September they will accept the concept, and several teams will start writing new history textbooks. D. Livanov, rebuilding right in front of his eyes, said at the meeting: "It is incorrect to talk about one history textbook, there may be several, but all of them must comply with the historical and cultural standard." And Minister of Culture V. Medinsky declares that new textbooks should instill patriotism and "socially acceptable views."

    What does this unexpected maneuver mean? On the one hand, “representatives of ministries and academic structures,” even at this stage, reacted to the criticism of historians and the public, which had just begun to unfold and threatened to turn into a flurry by November, when they were going to publish the concepts.

    And the first thing they did, they cheated - the discussion during the vacation months will be crumpled, and the concept of "representatives of ministries and academic structures" will be accepted without much public outcry. The second solution is more elegant - it was decided to abandon the "single textbook" and introduce standards according to which several textbooks will be written! What is the elegance and subtlety of this move? The odiousness of the very fact of creating a “single textbook” is removed and the appearance of decency is observed! But the main thing is what will be fixed in the standard, and not at all whether there will be one textbook or three, because they will all be written within the narrow confines of the standard. But the appearance of pluralism and democratic approaches remains. There is no single “Short course of the CPSU(b)”, but several short courses written by different teams and different words, but with a single semantic content and interpretation! Again, the publishers of school textbooks and groups of historians who write textbooks, who suddenly wanted to monopolize the market with one textbook, will calm down!

    So, essentially nothing has changed - the introduction of historical unanimity in Russia and in school textbooks will continue! Moreover - it will be continued faster, smarter and more sophisticated! Instead of a “single history textbook”, we are waiting for several “unanimous” history textbooks that create the appearance of pluralism. And now it would be a mistake to reduce the conversation only to the most unified history textbook, however, now “a single history textbook in many faces”, which does not yet exist, either to its still unpublished concept (we will read it on July 1, and not in November), or to 31 "controversial issue" in the history of Russia, since, on the one hand, this conversation is still ahead when the standard concept appears (and most importantly, the texts of these "different" textbooks). This is also false because there is a more important and socially significant aspect of this topic - that a “single” or “single in many faces” history textbook is a point of intersection of many different problems and interests, and its appearance will mean for our society one more step (and a very big step!) on the way to the "introduction of unanimity" from above, to the strengthening and - most importantly - to the conservation of authoritarian rule and the spirit of unfreedom.

    This spirit of unfreedom and unanimity will be reflected not only in school history textbooks written according to a single standard (Livanov has already considered the proposal for a unified literature textbook, but he will slightly adjust the plans and there will be a standard for literature), but most importantly - in one form or another unanimity will be introduced in universities. To correct the standards and curricula and oblige the majority of university teachers to follow the new rules of the game and “to fluctuate along with the party line” in a situation of civil immaturity, public disorientation and, especially, under the sword of Damocles of mass layoffs of teachers planned for the next five years - alas, it will not difficult! The university bureaucracy will not only not resist the “introduction of unanimity”, but will zealously rush to introduce it in order to preserve the most important and dear to them in their native university - itself! I'm not saying that the majority (probably still the majority!) of university history teachers come from the departments of the unforgettable "History of the CPSU", and many of them will quickly remember their old skills. However, what can we say about them, if even quite "academic" historical bosses are in a hurry to get into line and are already reporting their readiness to "fulfill and exceed the tasks of the party." What is worth only the statement of the Dean of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University S. Karpov, during a discussion of the concept of a future unified history textbook at a meeting of the Russian Historical Society, who stated that (we quote below): “you need to“ not be afraid ”and teach the point of view that corresponds to the geopolitical interests of the country. This should be done not only when it comes to interstate issues, but also about domestic Russian ones, the scientist told Vedomosti. The decision on the geopolitical interests of Russia, in his opinion, should be taken by society and the state. This approach was criticized by political scientist Alexei Makarkin. He notes that geopolitical interests are fickle: with this approach, now the relationship between Russia and the United States should be told from the perspective of the Cold War, but after relations improve again, the textbook will have to be rewritten.

    But what is the irony of the situation: a political scientist (albeit one who received a historical and archival education at the Russian State University for the Humanities) turned out to be smarter and more “historical” than a historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and dean of the “first history department” of all Russia.

    One can no longer talk about the media, especially television: censorship, officialdom and unanimity and myth-making have long been nested there. Although there, including in the field of documentary films, there are people who have tried and are trying to resist lies and myth-making.

    This introduction of unanimity will also affect historical science. There will also be a return to self-censorship, there will be hints (and not only) in academic institutions about what is relevant and what is not relevant for research, how topics should be formulated and how many topics of application to practically the only fund available to historians - the Russian Humanitarian Foundation, it is better not to submit, etc.

    And this is very disappointing, because what Perestroika gave us - the opening in 1989 of a number of state archives, and then the freedom to write and publish historical monographs without external censorship - was a very valuable conquest for historians, and partly reconciled with that poverty in which we found ourselves in the 90s. During these slightly less than a quarter of a century, historians, having got rid of the muzzle, managed to do a lot, especially in research and publication of collections of archival documents on the history of the twentieth century, providing genuine scientific breakthroughs in a number of areas and topics. And these were far from always young historians (as they think), often they were people who dreamed all their lives of independent research and access to closed funds and archives, and did not spare their time and effort to realize what they only dreamed about in the Soviet era. time. And, thank God, the efforts of these historians burning with their work have not been wasted and will not be in vain. Both the research and the documents published in these two decades from the most inaccessible archives will be the frontier and the ammunition on which (and on which) we have to defend ourselves from falsifications, “blank spots” and silence figures that will fall on us even more abundantly in the near future from the "Unified Historical and Cultural Standard" (EICS) and especially the history textbooks that are uniform in content (and not only from them, by the way).

    Around the need to introduce a single history textbook (or several identical textbooks conceptually and in content), there are several myths and cunning jugglings that are quite deliberately created and on which the layman buys! We are told that there is nothing wrong with a single history textbook (or several identical textbooks conceptually and in content)! This is evidence of the consolidation and cohesion of society. And there are such textbooks in many developed countries, including European countries and the United States.

    We are now being shown that this process was allegedly initiated by the historians themselves, who asked him about it at a meeting with V. Putin. Respected historical institutions and many dignitary historians (and not only!) are ready to take part in working commissions, write concepts and compete in the competition for writing the texts of such textbooks. However, I will hardly be mistaken if I say that state-owned historians themselves are not averse to being useful to the authorities!

    And yet, many may get the impression that everything is in order - both the concept of the EICS and the very coverage of controversial issues will be written by historians from the standpoint of science and the latest achievements of modern historical thought.

    So this is both deception and self-deception, a shell, appearance is presented as an essence.

    The participation of heads of historical institutes, deans of history departments, corresponding members and academicians does not at all guarantee scientific character.

    For the first time, the authorities acted more simply and rudely, for which they paid, and the authors themselves (Danilov and Filippov), who undermined their authority in the eyes of historians.

    This time, the authorities acted much more subtly and cleverly, as if putting the very initiative in the hands of historians (and is it possible to refuse the "numerous demands of the people"), including bureaucratic historians in the Russian Historical Society (which in itself is learning lessons from the straightforward Commission on fight against falsifications of history) and by involving historians in discussion, writing, participation, etc.

    But here it is easy to become a victim of deception and self-deception if you do not know a few things.

    First of all, consensus on issues of concern to the nation is achieved by the society itself, in broad, public and sometimes very lengthy discussions. And although historians take an active part in its development, and their role is very important, they are not the main ones in this process. Well, what if there is no consensus in our atomized, disoriented and incapable of finding a common language society? And what if the government itself curtailed and crushed in the public space and especially for the general public (on television) any discussion and reflection on historical, political and socially significant topics for the nation?

    And if the question itself is relevant: did the Russian nation take shape in the 20th century and does it exist now? In the form of the "Soviet people" its individual elements seem to have existed.

    But whether there is a nation today and whether it is ready to develop its own historical self-awareness and agree on the complex issues of its history is a very big question. By the way, pay attention - in the public space, and especially on television, in every kind of show they killed (in my opinion, deliberately) the language of dialogue and the ability to reach consensus. Participants in discussions and TV shows behave aggressively, interrupt each other, are rude, do not perceive other people's arguments! Only the channel "Culture" and discussions on it, perhaps, remained a protected area.

    How, in such conditions, to reach a consensus on painful and aching issues of our history? But that's only part of the problem. Worse, the authorities themselves are trying to prevent not only a consensus, but even a different opinion that is different from their own - they are trying to prevent it from reaching a wide audience, to drive this dissent into a cultural and political ghetto. But these processes of the formation of civil society, the nation and the development of a view of themselves and their historical path began during the years of perestroika and continued until they began to “freeze” both by the shocks that befell the country in the 1990s and by the growing authoritarian power. And these processes have begun again in recent years and are very active! But the paradox is that they are suppressed by authoritarian power! The paradox is that these children of power, born by society, are not needed at all, they are strangers to it, unloved stepchildren!

    And the government actually makes an abortion, interrupts the processes in order to make a substitution and put their own baby - their own view of our society today (this task has long been solved) and yesterday. And the substitution is done skillfully. Instead of a broad public national discussion, as it was, say, in Germany in the 60s-70s, we will be presented with a “wide public discussion” around the “Unified Historical and Cultural Standard” with the participation of several historians included in this game, and historians, politicians and people with alternative points of view will not be allowed close to television.

    So, the historians selected for the meeting with the president then asked him for a single history textbook (of course, without asking permission from their colleagues for such an action), the concept proposed by the historians will be agreed with the authorities and voiced again by the lips of historians! And how does the formula sound - "at a meeting of representatives of ministries and academic structures."

    Historians (albeit in the person of unnamed representatives of academic structures) are becoming the main acting figure in front of the entire Russian society.

    So, in fact, it turns out that "historical unanimity" in Russia is initiated and introduced by historians themselves. The historians themselves will make a muzzle and a collar with their own hands, which will be put on the whole society and, of course, on those historians who look with indignation at the behavior of their colleagues, who did not at all authorize them to do such a thing.

    And for the majority of society it is not at all obvious that there is no smell of science here, just historians-administrators and individual historians-scientists will fulfill the order of the authorities, passing it off as the achievement of the scientific thought of Russian historians. But will historians who are specialists in certain specific topics be involved in the discussions?

    Both the authorities and a considerable part of society still succumb to the magic of sonorous positions and loud abbreviations, and very often in vain. Nor should one think that if a person is a corresponding member or an academician, or a dean of a history department, then at the same time he knows all topics and problems well. This is a deep delusion. History, like most sciences, is highly specialized. It takes a graduate student about five years just to get into the topic. There is no historian, even if he is five times an academician and eight times the director of something that thoroughly knows the history of Ancient Russia and at the same time the political parties of the twentieth century. There is not even a historian who knows thoroughly all the political parties of the beginning. XX century.

    Kozma Prutkov was right - alas, any specialist is like a flux. But the bosses and journalists stubbornly consider academicians, directors, rectors and deans of history departments to be “chief on plates”! Neither the government nor journalists are somehow still aware that for each problem there is a circle of specialists, as they say, “widely known in narrow circles”, and calling an academician who does not understand this topic is simply the height of unprofessionalism the one who calls him! They don’t know specialists, they don’t know how to find them, and their names often do not sound as advantageous as the names of people with a high-profile title or position. Unfortunately, many of the academicians and administrators are sick with vanity and willingly talk about topics they don't understand anything about. It is clear that for a wide audience and journalists, the very title of an academician outweighs the modest title of a specialist scientist in this topic. Alas, but "they are greeted by clothes, they are escorted by the mind!". What contribution to the study and understanding of the burning problems of Russian history (and most of them belong to the 20th century) can the already mentioned S.P. Karpov, an unconditionally recognized specialist in medieval studies (the history of Byzantium, the Black Sea region and Italy in the Middle Ages) make?

    Alas, many don't know, and many don't even think about it, that historians (especially in the history of Russia in the 20th century) are not very happy with academics. With rare exceptions, they do not enjoy authority among historians. I know of only one or two exceptions. It doesn’t add to their popularity that in the 90s and the 2000s several very worthy historians of Russia did not become correspondent members, but the list of correspondent members and academicians was replenished with the names of people whose scientific achievements experts speak with a smirk, or even with annoyance!

    However, the government will soon put under its direct control not only property, but also all institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

    And they will be obliged to fulfill the “state order” under pain of dismissal of all the scientists-employees of these institutes.

    The "introduction of historical unanimity" is about to move forward by leaps and bounds. The fact that the “ministerial” property of the RAS will quickly be mastered is beyond doubt (the blogosphere has already come up with a name for the future structure - “Academservice”), as well as the dashing mergers of academies, institutions and the reduction of people and the final finishing off of science.

    And yet - we have been told for a long time - "To God - God's, to Caesar - Caesar's", let science (and scientists) search for the truth, but school history textbooks should not be scientific, they should educate patriotism and ultimately serve the interests of the state.

    Sometimes it is said frankly, sometimes it is veiled, but in both cases it implies their right to write lies. Yes, they tell us, a lie, but "a lie for good."

    They also talk about the traumatic effect of historical truth, and that it is not necessary for grandchildren and children to be embarrassed by their fathers and grandfathers (and in general - their history, their country) and argue the appropriateness of forgetting everything that traumatizes a person (as psychoanalysts advise raped women ).

    But it’s even somehow embarrassing to say that this will not end well. Why does the government forget that only a quarter of a century ago we saw how one such big lie collapsed, burying the USSR with it. Is it still unclear to anyone how everything ends when history (and history books) are built on lies, white spots, default figures?

    Truly, everything happens according to the now very popular saying - "when you can’t, but really want to, then you can."

    And I want it for a long time and more and more. I want a single textbook and the “correct version” of history. Since the beginning of the zero years. And there is no doubt that the authorities, using some of the historians, staging the scientific nature of the creation of the EICS and its “broad public discussion”, will try hard to create several textbooks written according to this standard! And now, when historians from academic institutions will be given into the hands of a federal agency and the payment for rebelliousness will be dismissal, now they will definitely create what their darling wants!

    But even after the publication of these “unanimous” textbooks, will the authorities be able to rejoice at the introduction of historical unanimity in the country?

    I think not very much and not very long. Will the active part of society and historians, who have been forcibly imposed their vision of history, put up with it? The answer is obvious.

    Such a wave of criticism of these textbooks will spread over the Internet and social networks that it will not pass by school teachers and schoolchildren, so one cannot count on a positive attitude towards these textbooks in society and at school.

    I am sure that there will be alternative versions of the presentation of each of the 31 questions on the Internet and, probably, even a separate alternative Internet manuals for teachers and schoolchildren on these controversial issues. But among the authors of these alternative opinions there will be quite a few well-known and authoritative names. And in essence, there will be nothing to object to.

    The conclusion is that in the presence of a society that has not yet been completely strangled and the Internet, these “unanimous” history textbooks will be discredited even in the eyes of teachers and schoolchildren (especially senior classes) and one cannot expect a great effect from them. Although, of course, the move was invented correctly - hitting four or five textbooks is more difficult and more difficult than hitting one. But to say that these “unanimous” history textbooks, as well as the historical unanimity that is being introduced, will not bring harm, alas, would be too optimistic. Alas, they will. It will not be possible to completely stop the harm from these textbooks.

    How neither historians nor public figures manage to stop or stop the harmful influence of that muddy shaft of lies and falsifications that comes from the TV screens. But why are historians not able to directly broadcast their knowledge and conclusions to the Russian society through the same Internet? And here several very important questions arise related to the transmission of historical knowledge in modern Russia.

    How is it perceived and used, on the one hand, by society (including its widest strata), and, on the other hand, by the authorities, everything that historians have accumulated?

    Now the thesis is very widespread in society that historians are not in demand by the general reader because of their inability to write easily and brightly. This view is heard quite often, making the historian the only one responsible for what he cannot be held responsible for. It seems that this point of view gives a very simplified view of the problem, which is much more complex.

    On the one hand, of course, even at the history departments, the historian is “sharpened” for a special language and style. And the style is not only writing, but also the style of thinking. Whoever breaks out of this style will always get bumps at all stages of his scientific career. Alas, this style is becoming the only style for many. In passing, we note that this is a problem not only for historians, but also for other humanitarians, some of whom, to an even greater extent than historians, speak their own special, "bird language", which is no longer understood not only by the layman, but also by many colleagues. humanities. Yes, and with the style of thinking, and in methodological approaches there are a lot of differences even for the humanities. For example, some historians are reproached for clinging to facts and savoring them, and sometimes they even use such strong phrases as “archival corpse-slaughter”, but they sincerely do not understand how one can “dance not from the stove” of historical reality, but soar away from the sinful earth to heaven of abstract theories. But there are at least three more problems that are related to each other.

    I would start by saying that human society as an object of scientific research is much more complicated than it is perceived both at the level of everyday consciousness and by fellow naturalists and techies who do not consider history to be a science. Humanities in Soviet times were so long and intensely convinced of the inferiority of the humanities, say, in comparison with the natural sciences, that it is still psychologically difficult for us to loudly declare that the humanities, which study such a complex object as human society, are elite sciences and not only not simpler than the natural sciences and technical disciplines, but also somewhat more complicated than them. It is high time to loudly declare that human society is an extremely difficult object to study. How is it possible to study the psychology of large masses of people, even individual people, when most of them can’t figure it out in themselves until death?! What is it like for researchers to study the world, mentality, motives of another person's actions? Absolutely alien, unfamiliar and, moreover, separated from the historian for decades and centuries. In addition, historians are in a more difficult position than, say, physicists, since they are deprived of the opportunity to study society experimentally. Added to this are the attendant political circumstances, when, on the one hand, as they rightly said at the beginning of the 20th century, “if mathematics affected class interests, then they would still argue about its axioms”, and on the other hand, from history instead of science trying to become a servant of politics. All this undermines the authority of history as a science.

    The second problem lies in the degree of readiness and ability (including the intellectual one) of a wide audience to try to understand the most complex and tragic vicissitudes of our history. Alas, the majority are incapable of a serious conversation and of making their own efforts. It is high time to stop laying responsibility only on scientists and say that a considerable part of society, due to its low cultural level, does not want and is not able to perceive everything that lies beyond its horizons. In the same way, most people do not perceive classical music, and instead of Bach's organ music, they prefer the work of Kirkorov or pop groups. In the same way, the majority does not perceive the works of Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov or Shakespeare, but reads cheap detective stories. The same applies to cinema and television programs. For some reason we forget that Pushkin, and Dostoevsky, and Chekhov did not write at all for teenagers of thirteen and sixteen, they wrote for mature people, and cultured people. Forcing today's schoolchildren to read them is an exercise according to the saying - "Do not feed the horse!". Literature lessons turn most people away from classical literature forever. It is time to state that the fact that the majority of society does not understand and does not like classical literature, music, and art is not only to blame for teachers of literature and music, but also for the state of affairs itself.

    It is time to state that a significant part of society and its institutions are not very ready to accept all that historians have developed.

    Some want to be explained everything to them within three minutes between the first and second drinks at dinner. A radio colleague told me in the early 1990s that a historian's "talking" should not exceed two minutes, otherwise the majority of the audience would not absorb it. Now it's gotten even worse. A large part of the people have already switched to clip thinking and demand "bouillon cubes" of information.

    And how to convey in a nutshell all these nuances of historical reality, in which, as you know, the devil is hiding? How can one tell a wide audience about the two paths laid down in February and October for a wide audience in a few minutes, if this is a very confusing and highly debatable issue for historians themselves? Some people like Eduard Radzinsky's "one-man theatre", whose action has nothing to do with science. Others (and there are a lot of them) are ready to listen only to what confirms their beliefs.

    There is a myth that society supposedly makes historians a certain social order for the truth about our past. This is a myth, because the vast majority of society does not need this truth. An honest reconstruction of historical reality is not needed by the townsfolk, it destroys the myth inside which they live and inside which they feel comfortable. Why is the truth dangerous for the layman? Because it makes you take it into account and make decisions that destroy the familiar world. At the household level, a vivid example of this is the situation when spouses sometimes ignore information and suspicions about adultery, as this truth will change the established and familiar reality! A similar mechanism also works at a higher level of rejection of any information that is potentially dangerous for the destruction of the established world and the myth in which a person lives. This is a mechanism for people to protect their world and their myth. Pushkin's words - "Ah, it's not difficult to deceive me, I myself am glad to be deceived!" have not lost their relevance.

    Historical truth is also not needed by politicians, who, again, find it easier to achieve their goals by creating a myth, and not at all to work with historical truth! By the way, most of the journalists, directors, screenwriters and the media in general do not need it either. It is enough to look at how scripts are written and shot, say, documentaries on history or talk shows, when the results of historians' research, as a rule, are not even involved. They all play by their own rules, and the science in these games is used only to assert the power of the next myth.

    However, not everything is so pessimistic. It would be wrong to state categorically that no one reads the works of historians, and that there is no benefit from the research of historians and from the collections of archival documents published by them. Thank God it's not.

    Our research and materials are already widely used in the latent processes of developing one's own view of oneself and one's historical path, without which it is impossible to build a civil society and form a nation.

    Our research and materials (I hope that we ourselves) will still take part in the future broad public national discussion on historical issues of concern to our society.

    And it would be nice if these discussions on individual topics begin now.

    But once again I want to repeat, the main thing is that there is no need for deception and self-deception that high-class historians will sit down under the supervision of the Russian Historical Society headed by Naryshkin and ... they will give out a clot of modern knowledge on all problems. That's not what this is all about.

    And, besides, it should be noted that, even having gathered specialist historians on this particular topic, one still cannot expect an absolute consensus. And because this is how the very nature of science is arranged, and because, as in society, historians have different ideological views and different systems of coordinates.

    Real broad public discussions are needed with the participation of specialist historians (scattered across various institutions, cities and even countries), politicians, society in the broadest sense of the word and all its elites, including politicians (including opposition ones), in general all those interested in understanding the history and fate of their Fatherland.

    Only in this case it is possible to develop a consensus on at least some issues.

    Perhaps these discussions will take more than one year, perhaps the discussions on the hottest topics will reach a dead end, but they can be returned to later, at a different level of society's maturity.

    The main thing is that there will be discussions and attempts to find a consensus, the main thing is that, as one aphorism says, they will “open the eyes of the enemy, and not try to tear them out.”

    Only on this path will Russian society ever find a real consensus on a number of issues of its very dramatic history, and not rushed out over the course of a year and imposed on society from above.

    The author used in the text a fragment of his article: Morozov K.N. Problems of demand for writings and the style of a historian in modern public space // Humanitarian readings of the Russian State Humanitarian University - 2012: [in 2 books. Book 1]: Theory and methodology of humanitarian knowledge: Collection of materials. M.: RGGU, 2013 - 416 p.

    As part of the joint project of the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and the Free Historical Society "The Historical Moment", a discussion was held at the Documentary Film Center on the topic "The First Russian Revolution: Failure or Prologue?" leading researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Kirill Solovyov. Historian and TV presenter Nikolai Svanidze was the moderator of the conversation. Lenta.ru publishes the main theses of the speeches of historians.

    The revolution has a beginning

    Konstantin Morozov:

    The revolution of 1905 is on a par with other European revolutions that led to the fall of decrepit and incapable of responding to new historical challenges of absolute monarchies. The conservation of obsolete social relations, the unwillingness to take into account the interests of the new classes (the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the proletariat) had grave consequences for pre-revolutionary Russia. The fact that the autocracy was an anachronism and hindered the further development of the country was recognized even by the highest aristocracy. It is important to understand that any revolution first occurs in the minds of people and only then is carried out in practice, although the period of its maturation can last a very long time.

    The revolution of 1905 came as a surprise to everyone, although Russia had been moving towards it for a long time. For example, the American historian Richard Pipes considers it to be a prologue to the student riots of 1899. Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky believed that the tsarist regime began to collapse under Alexander III, and publicist Mark Vishnyak counted the end of autocracy from the mid-1870s, when Alexander II stopped the Great Reforms and decided to “freeze” the country. Only the introduction of a constitutional monarchy could save Russia and the ruling dynasty from revolution. But the last Romanovs, in an effort to preserve the unshakable autocratic foundations of their power, eventually lost everything and led the country to the catastrophe of 1917.

    Kirill Solovyov:

    Revolution is, first of all, a diagnosis of the ruling regime. The main driving force of the Russian revolution was the government itself, whose fundamental vices gave rise to discontent in society. The historian Alexander Stepansky rightly said that no one contributed to it as much as Nicholas II (of course, without wanting to). The cause of any uprising is not the force of public pressure, but the sudden weakness of the supreme power, when it suddenly discovers a vacuum and emptiness around itself, and it has no one else to rely on. A similar situation developed in October 1905, when the emperor’s inner circle became the main opposition force, because talk of a constitution in Russia had been going on for many decades, and many representatives of the highest bureaucracy were also striving for change.

    After the revolution, Russia became a qualitatively different country. Elected representation appeared, a free press, and most importantly, the monarchy ceased to be unlimited. Of course, the manifesto of October 17, 1905, in essence, was not a constitution, but a declaration of intent, but Nicholas II himself admitted in private correspondence that he had signed the constitutional act.

    Non-parliamentary Duma monarchy

    Kirill Solovyov:

    Any revolution is like a big explosion, after which the whole system is reassembled by elements. But after the first Russian revolution, the new political mechanism of the Russian Empire was created from old archaic elements, so there were many anachronisms and contradictions in it. Its main distinguishing feature was the constant struggle between the liberals and revolutionaries, on the one hand, who considered the concessions of Nicholas II insufficient, and the conservatives, on the other hand, who considered these innovations excessive.

    Of course, the Duma monarchy in Russia after 1905 was a sick system, although not hopeless. She had every chance to recover, but this was prevented by the First World War, which aggravated all her vices and contradictions to the extreme.

    Konstantin Morozov:

    The country's political system remained unreformed after the first Russian revolution, so one cannot speak of any new quality of it. The State Duma never became a full-fledged parliament, although it was more like it than the current one.

    One step was missing - to allow the Duma to approve the appointment of ministers, but it was precisely for this that Nicholas II lacked the political will. After June 3, 1907, he again tried to "freeze" the situation, refusing to dialogue with society and the further path to turn Russia into a constitutional monarchy. After this, the events of 1917 became inevitable.

    Revolutionary terror and Stolypin repressions

    Konstantin Morozov:

    Opposition terrorism, which strongly manifested itself during the first Russian revolution, arose on the crest of a revolutionary movement that swept Russia in the second half of the 19th century against the backdrop of a confrontation between the authorities and the intelligentsia. Why did the intelligentsia go into the revolution? People of the humanitarian professions could not realize themselves without creative freedom, inseparable from political freedom, which the authorities were in no hurry to provide.

    These contradictions, which had matured over several decades, eventually led to a general bitterness, the result of which was revolutionary terrorism. It was fueled both by state terror in the form of a backlash and by broad public support. Why did the intelligentsia sympathize with the terrorists in many ways? By that time, everyone was tired of the government, which, with its lack of control and inefficiency, caused universal hatred and contempt.

    Kirill Solovyov:

    If we talk about the Stolypin repressions against revolutionaries, about the notorious "Stolypin ties" and "Stolypin carriages", then their scale was incommensurable with the rampant opposition terrorism. During the entire existence of military field justice in Russia, about 2800 people were executed (for that time a colossal figure), but there were several times more victims of revolutionary terror.

    Of course, Pyotr Stolypin largely embodied the ideas of his predecessor, Sergei Witte, although, unlike him, Stolypin was a public politician and looked quite organically on the podium of the State Duma. The tragedy of Stolypin was that he became a victim of his own ideas, since the main obstacle to the systemic transformations he conceived was the same Duma, which was supposed to be their main support. Therefore, the most important reforms (judicial, local self-government) failed or were significantly distorted.

    Unlearned lessons of Russian revolutions

    Kirill Solovyov:

    Revolutions always occur unexpectedly, since most often the power does not collapse under the blow of a powerful social element, but crumbles under the weight of its own mistakes, vices and contradictions. Russia's trouble is that in our society the changes in society have always outpaced the evolution of the ruling regime. Such asynchrony of the country's development constantly created a situation of eternal confrontation between the authorities and society, which at the beginning of the 20th century naturally ended in a revolution.

    Konstantin Morozov:

    The history of Russia has developed in such a way that the ruling dynasty for many decades could not decide on fundamental changes, although the need for them was obvious even to Catherine II and especially Alexander I, who granted the constitution to Poland, Finland and even Bessarabia, but not the entire empire. The endless delay in solving pressing socio-economic and political problems ultimately led Russia to tragedy.

    The main lesson of the Russian revolutions is that the country's leadership must always adequately perceive reality, not trying to ignore it or adjust it to their own selfish interests. The inability of the authorities to respond to new historical challenges can sweep away not only the ruling elite, but also bring down the entire state. The peculiarity of Russia is that the ruling regimes in it did not fall under the pressure of the indignant people, but rotted from the inside for a long time, subsequently disappearing in two or three days. This happened in February 1917, the same thing happened again in August 1991.



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