The unconquered pinnacle of British heavy cruiser construction or the Surrey class heavy cruisers. Fooled Earl Heavy cruiser Exeter

"Exeter" (HMS Exeter pennant number 68) - heavy cruiser of the Royal navy Great Britain during the Second World War. The last cruiser in the English fleet with eight-inch artillery was laid down on August 1, 1928

at Devonport Royal DockYard, launched July 18, 1929, commissioned July 27, 1931.
Became the fifth (since 1680) ship to bear this name (Exeter is the main city of Devonshire). Took part in the Battle of La Plata. Sunk in the Battle of the Java Sea in 1942.

The new type of ship was not “Washington”, since it had a smaller displacement and was weaker armed than typical representatives of this class, which were then built everywhere according to the maximum contractual standards.

Exeter differed from the lead ship in the width of the hull (1 foot wider = 0.3048 m), a new type of superstructure (tower-shaped) and the number of seaplanes and layout of aircraft equipment.

Main characteristics:

Displacement Standard - 8524 tons (8390 long tons), full displacement - 10,658 tons (10,490 long tons).
Length 164.6/175.3 m.
Width 17.7 m.
Draft 6.2 m.
Reservation Belt - 76 mm;
Traverses - 86 mm;
deck - 37 mm (51 mm above the steering gear);
towers - 25 mm;
barbettes - 25 mm;
cellar -76…140 mm.
Engines 4 TZA Parsons.
Power 80,000 l. With.
Propulsion 4 screws.
Speed ​​32 knots.
Cruising range 10,000 nautical miles at 14 knots.
Crew 628 people.

Weapons:

Artillery 3 × 2 - 203 mm/50.
Anti-aircraft artillery 4 × 1 - 102 mm/45, 2 × 4 - 12.7 mm machine guns.
Mine and torpedo armament Two three-tube 533 mm torpedo tubes.
Aviation group 2 catapults, 2 seaplanes.

"(6x280-mm guns in two 3-gun turrets and 8x150-mm guns in single-gun turret-like installations - 4 on each side) and the British cruisers Exeter (heavy, 6x203-mm guns in three 2-gun turrets) , "Ajax" and "Achilles" (light, 8x152 mm guns in four 2-gun turrets; "Achilles" - New Zealand).

The heavy cruiser "Spee", still intact.

If the British cruisers were typical representatives"treaty" ships of the interwar period, then their German opponent is a very unusual design. It was created as part of the Versailles restrictions to replace the obsolete ironclads of the period Russo-Japanese War(The Germans were not allowed to have larger ships). True, the Germans were unable to maintain the limit of 10,000 tons of military personnel, but the result was not bad - the new ships were superior in strength to all the “negotiated cruisers” and were faster than most battleships, i.e. in theory, they could destroy the first and escape from the second. Only 5 ships in 1939 posed a danger to them - 3 British (Hood, Repulse and Renown, respectively 8 and 6x 381 mm guns) and 2 French (Dunkirk and Strasbourg, 8x330 mm ), which had superiority in speed and armor. The ship's power plant was especially unusual - 8 (!) diesel engines provided a speed of 26 knots. The booking was mediocre. The Germans themselves used the traditional term “battleship” for classification (later translated into cruisers), the British came up with the term “pocket battleship” (there was also the term “diesel battleship”). In total, the Germans built 3 ships of this type (Spee is the 3rd), their main purpose was raider operations on enemy sea communications. And so fate decreed that the theoretical calculations would be tested in practice quite soon.

Spee went to sea before the war began and began operations in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans after hopes of peace between Germany and Britain had faded. It cannot be said that his hunt was successful - he destroyed only 9 British “merchants”; none of them carried critically valuable cargo. To capture the raider, the British formed several search groups, one of which - Commodore G. Harwood (flag on the Ajax) - and played its role (in addition to the cruisers mentioned above, the group also included the heavy cruiser Cumberland - 8x203 mm guns , but at the time of the battle it was being repaired in the Falklands). Harwood correctly guessed the time and location of the “meeting” - at the mouth of La Plata and ordered two groups to act in battle - Exeter separately and two light cruisers together, with the aim of dividing enemy fire. To “lure” the battleship, the British used a randomly encountered Dutch merchant, whose silhouette was similar to the German auxiliary supply vessel Ussukuma (carrying spare parts for the Spee, etc.), intercepted and destroyed by them earlier.

At 6:10 am on December 13, the parties discovered each other, and the Germans incorrectly identified the enemy (as a heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers - the single-tube silhouettes of the British light cruisers of the Linder type and the malfunction of the battleship aircraft had an effect) and the Spee commander G. Langsdorff quickly went on rapprochement (they say his torpedo-boat past had an effect). Some people think this is his mistake, but this is not so - the British ships exceeded the battleship in speed (by 4-6 knots) and could have chosen the distance in any case. At 6:18 the ironclad opened fire and the British ships began to respond at 6:20/23. Already at 6:23, Exeter received the first hit (the Germans knew how to shoot!). But Langsdorff made his FIRST MISTAKE at 6:30 - he divided the fire of the main caliber (i.e., he did what the British wanted) - the firing of the 150-mm guns of the battleship, which did not have central aiming, was absolutely ineffective (it was planned that with with their help they will sink stationary or slow-moving merchant ships) and he decided to use one of the two 280-mm turrets against the British light cruisers...

By 7:30 a.m., all of the Exeter's main guns were disabled and it left the battle with a list, fires on board, and a speed dropped to 18 knots. Here Langsdorff made his SECOND MISTAKE - he did not finish off the enemy (“Exeter” will reach the Falklands, where it will undergo the minimum necessary repairs, followed by a thorough 13-month in Britain - and only to get to the East and be sunk by the Japanese in 1942...) - but Harwood would not have passed by the sailors floundering in the water - even dropping life-saving equipment takes time!

"Spee" after the battle - surface holes in the bow are visible

The Spee also received damage (including the fuel system), to correct it Langsdorff decided to call at a neutral port and chose Montevideo - THIRD ERROR (the Argentines treated the Germans better). At 7:40 the battle was practically over, although the sides occasionally exchanged volleys. On the night of December 13-14, the battleship entered the port of Montevideo, where it received permission to stay for 72 hours. Here the British masterfully launched an information war - they created the impression among the Germans that they were joined by the battle cruiser Rinaun, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and 3 other cruisers (in fact, they could only arrive on the 19th, and on the 14th in the evening from the Falklands Only the Cumberland approached, but the morale of the Germans dropped greatly because of these fake news). Langsdorff conducted intensive negotiations with Berlin, but as a result he only made the FOURTH MISTAKE - on the 17th he went to the Montevideo roadstead (on the embankment in anticipation of the spectacle sea ​​battle the whole city gathered, radio commentators were reporting live) and there he left and blew up his ship - they believe that the shell shock received during the battle had an effect (let me remind you - the mouth of La Plata is about 100 km wide, with three main passages, the British are physically unable were to block them with three ships, especially in the dark)... The crew transferred to the auxiliary ship "Takoma", which came to Buenos Aires, where they were interned.

The exploded battleship burned for 3 days

Spee's opponents:

"Exeter" before and after the battle (in the Falklands)

Ajax before and after the fight

The Ajax bell in the port of Montevideo. The cruiser survived the war (though it was under repair for 2 years - with a break for a half-ton German bomb), decommissioned in 1948

"Achilles" received the least damage in the battle

One of the Achilles towers in Auckland (New Zealand), the cruiser also survived the war, was sold to India in 1948, and was decommissioned there only in 1978.

Of course, this turn of events had a negative impact on public opinion in Germany - we must remember that there was a “strange war” - i.e. After Poland there were no special events - the death of a battleship in battle would undoubtedly have been more worthy. On December 19, apparently realizing what he had done, Langsdorf shot himself... The result was completely unimportant - against 9 British merchant ships (50,000 tons) and 2 damaged cruisers (Achilles had practically no damage) - 1,000 interned sailors (72 British and 36 Germans), a lost battleship (one of only 10 German heavy ships in the war) and 3 auxiliary ships (except for the Ussukuma and Tacoma, the British intercepted the Altmark in Norwegian waters in February 1940 with part of the crews of the ships sunk by the Spee " - this incident prompted Hitler to seize Norway). In 1940, the lead ship of the series, the Deutschland, was renamed the Lützow (Hitler did not want to hear that Germany had sunk).

By the way, they say that in his youth Langsdorff’s neighbor was Admiral von Spee himself, which influenced his choice of profession. Let me remind you that Spee himself died with his squadron and two sons in the same South Atlantic (near the Falklands) 25 years before the events described - I will write about this separately.

Of the nearly 1,000 Germans from the crew of the battleship interned in Argentina, some remained there, but there was another example - the chief gunner of the Spee, P. Ascher, managed to return to Germany, and became the 1st officer of Admiral Lutyens’ headquarters on the Bismarck. and died on it in May 1941 - what do you think of the “typical” fate of a “Jewish boy” (and Asher is just like that!) in Nazi Germany?!

In 1956, the British made a film about the fight - The Battle of the River Plate -it has been translated into Russian. The Germans there are almost friends of the British (we must remember what time this is - they were only accepted into NATO, we are the common enemy), the Spee is “played” by the American heavy cruiser Salem, but the Achilles is real (in this At that time he already served in the Indian Navy under the name "Delhi"). The film is full of typical British humor - for example, when inspecting the damage to the Ajax, Harwood shares with his headquarters: “he’s a good shot, he’d get a teddy bear at the village fair.”

Since 1940, attempts have been made to raise individual parts“Spee” (the British were especially interested in radar), the last ones in 2006. Part of what was raised is installed in the port and museum of Montevideo, I photographed some of it... There is even a project to raise the remains of the entire ship - but this is a fantasy of Uruguayan proportions.

P.S. At first glance, the episode is similar to our “Varyag”, but do not forget that the Japanese initially had an overwhelming superiority in forces, technical characteristics of the ships, and they had the peculiarities of the battlefield on their side.

On March 1, 1942, a group of ships was sailing south of Borneo towards the island of Ceylon: the heavy cruiser Exeter and 2 destroyers, Cortenar and Pope. By this time, the cruiser was the last large ship remaining from the allied squadron operating in the Java Sea against the Japanese fleet. Its combat value, however, was extremely low - the Exeter received a 203-mm shell in the boiler room during the first battle. Of its 8 boilers, only two could function normally, and the cruiser could only develop a maximum speed of 15 knots.

At 9.35 am, observers spotted two ships in the south. They were soon identified as the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro. Trying to escape, the allied ships veered off course and increased speed, but soon spotted two more Japanese cruisers. It was "Ashigara" and "Mioko" approaching, accompanied by two destroyers. In fact, the outcome of the upcoming battle was predetermined: the Japanese had five times the Exeter's main caliber guns.

The destroyers simply could not reach the enemy with their guns. However, during the battle they did everything they could: they laid a smoke screen and launched a torpedo attack on the enemies. At 11.40 the main phase of the battle ended. The Exeter sank. 70 minutes later, bombers launched from the aircraft carrier Ryujo sank both destroyers. This is how the military service of the last British heavy cruiser laid down between the world wars, belonging to the extensive “County” or simply “county” group, ended sadly.

Exeter belonged to the final group of heavy cruisers, consisting of two units. The lead one was "York". In these ships, the designers tried to take into account and neutralize the shortcomings identified in their predecessors, the Kents, Londons and Dorsetshires. As a result, the Yorks turned out not to be classic Washington cruisers, but simply similar to them. It was decided to arm the York and Exeter with fewer main caliber guns. Due to this, the gained displacement reserve was used to improve and strengthen armor protection. The designers considered that the installed weapons would be sufficient to conduct modern combat as part of a group of ships. To some extent, these assumptions were confirmed.

An example of this is the battle of the Exeter and two light cruisers Ajax and Aquiles with the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee. In it, the Exeter received severe damage and barely made it to the Falkland Islands, where it was repaired. But he pulled the main caliber of the German raider onto himself, which allowed the light cruisers to approach the Graf Spee within actual fire range and reach it with their shells. The result is known to everyone - the Admiral Count Spee was sunk by its own crew, and the battle itself went down in the annals of history as an example successful application obviously weaker ships against the strongest enemy.

Subsequently, Exeter served in the European Theater of Operations until December 1941. It was decided to send him to the Far East to strengthen him there naval forces due to the increased activity of the Japanese fleet. Alas, his further service was very short-lived.

Admiral Graf Spee became the third German “pocket battleship” built after the cruisers Deutschland (Lützow) and Admiral Scheer. In the early months of World War II, she sank British merchant ships with impunity, becoming the most famous ship of her type. And the results of his first and last battle provide rich material for analyzing the effectiveness of artillery weapons and armor protection of German heavy cruisers.Why is the Battle of La Plata and its results still causing such heated debate?

At the outbreak of World War II, the heavy cruiser Admiral Graf Spee, under the command of Captain Zur See Hans Langsdorff, was in the Central Atlantic. He received the order to open the cruising war only on September 25, 1939 - until that moment, Hitler still hoped to peacefully resolve the conflict with Great Britain. The war was to be fought strictly according to prize rules, so there was no question of unexpected artillery or torpedo attacks.

For almost two and a half months, the Spee and the Deutschland, together with several supply ships, operated with impunity in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. To search for them, the British and French had to allocate 3 battle cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 9 heavy and 5 light cruisers. In the end, Commodore Henry Harewood's Group G (heavy cruiser Exeter, light cruisers Ajax and Achilles) intercepted the Spee off the coast South America, near the mouth of the La Plata River.

This battle became one of the few classic artillery naval battles of World War II, giving visual illustration to the old debate about what is more effective - the caliber of guns or the weight of the salvo?

"Admiral Graf Spee" passes through the Kiel Canal, 1939
Source – johannes-heyen.de

In terms of total displacement, the three British cruisers were approximately twice as large as the Spee, and more than one and a half times greater in weight per minute salvo. To extol the achievements of their side, some British researchers compared the weight of a single salvo of ships without taking into account the rate of fire - these figures reached the Soviet press and for some time disoriented lovers of naval history. According to these data, a ship with a standard displacement of 12,540 tons was twice as large more powerful than three cruisers with a total standard displacement of 22,400 tons.

Diagram of the heavy cruiser "Admiral Graf Spee", 1939
Source – A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Apalkov. German warships, 1939–1945. St. Petersburg, 1995

“Spee” carried only six guns, but 283-mm caliber, firing 4,500 kg of metal per minute. In addition, it had eight 150-mm guns in light mounts, placed four per side (another 2,540 kg of metal per minute, 1,270 kg per side).

Aft tower of "Admiral Count Spee"
Source – commons.wikimedia.org

The Exeter also carried six guns, but only 203 mm, as it was originally considered a B-class scout rather than an A-class. The weight of its one-minute salvo was only 2780 kg - more than two times less than that of the enemy. The same type "Ajax" (Harewood's flag) and "Achilles" each had eight 152-mm guns in two-gun turrets and, at the maximum rate of fire (8 rounds per minute), could fire 3,260 kg of metal per minute (more than the flagship). Thus, the total broadside salvo of the British squadron was 9300 kg, that is, it exceeded the salvo of the Spee, if not two, then at least one and a half times (taking into account the fact that the average caliber of the “German” could fire on board only half of the guns) . Undoubtedly, the Spee was much better protected, but had a speed of 5 knots less. Thus, there was a classic example of an “asymmetrical” battle in which each side had its own advantages.

One against three

The opponents discovered each other on the morning of December 13, 1939, almost simultaneously (about 5:50 GMT), but the Germans quickly realized that in front of them was warships. True, they mistook the light cruisers for destroyers, so the raider willingly moved to approach. In the first minutes, no one opened fire, although the distance was a little more than a hundred cables.

At 6:14, Commodore Harewood gave the order to split up to capture the enemy in a pincer movement. The heavy Exeter moved straight towards the German, passing to his left, while both light cruisers moved in a wide arc, bypassing the enemy on the right and keeping a great distance from him. This maneuver looks strange: keeping a distance of a hundred cables, the British had little chance of hitting the enemy, while the enemy 283-mm cannons remained very dangerous for them. On the contrary, the most effective tactic for them was to quickly close the distance and approach to such a distance that 152-mm shells could penetrate the side of the Spee. In addition, this would allow the British to use torpedo tubes - the Germans were afraid of such a possibility (evidence of this is the behavior of “Luttsov” and “Hipper” in the “New Year’s Battle” on December 31, 1942). Exeter actually fired torpedoes at the beginning of the battle, but Ajax used them only at the end of the battle (about 7:30), when the distance was reduced to 50 cabs; a little earlier, Spee fired one torpedo. Even if the torpedoes had not hit the German cruiser, dodging them would, one way or another, reduce the accuracy of its shooting.

English cruisers Ajax and Exeter (in the background). Montevideo, November 1939

In turn, Exeter, with its longer-range guns, had no need to reduce the distance. The only explanation for his maneuver is that the British exaggerated the defense of the Admiral Graf Spee and tried to get closer to him. However, this in no way justifies the division of forces: alone, the heavy cruiser was significantly inferior to the “pocket battleship”. In addition, by approaching from different directions, the British allowed the enemy to bring into action all eight 150-mm guns instead of four.

First phase of the battle: a crushing blow to Exeter

At 6:18, the Spee opened fire on the Exeter from the main caliber bow turret from a distance of approximately 90 kb. Exeter responded at 6:20 - first from two bow turrets, then, turning slightly to the left, brought the stern turret into operation. At 6:21, Ajax began firing, at 6:23, Achilles. All British ships fired semi-armor-piercing shells (“common”) - for 203 mm guns this was quite justified, but 152 mm shells had no chance of penetrating the “German’s” armor. It would have been more logical to use high-explosive shells, which had a greater damaging effect, but at the beginning of the war the British simply did not have enough of them.

The Germans fired in a “ladder” pattern - they fired the next salvo without waiting for the previous one to fall - but for greater accuracy, they first fired from the towers one by one, and switched to full six-gun salvoes only after they achieved the first coverage. At first, the Spee fired semi-armor-piercing shells, but after the first hits it switched to high-explosive instantaneous shells: the chief gunner of the German cruiser, Paul Ascher, hoped to achieve maximum damage, considering the Exeter’s defense weak and incomplete.

Heavy cruiser Exeter in 1941

The Exeter was hit by the third salvo, receiving significant shrapnel damage to unprotected equipment (in particular, the plane on the catapult was destroyed). The fourth salvo gave one hit in the bow, but the semi-armor-piercing 283-mm shell pierced the hull without having time to explode. The next hit was equally ineffective - perhaps the Germans noticed this and therefore switched to firing high-explosive shells.

The first 283 mm to hit Exeter high explosive shell(at 6:25) exploded, hitting the second turret - its light 25-mm armor was not penetrated, but the turret was still out of action until the end of the battle. The shrapnel killed the people on the bridge (the ship's commander, Captain Frederick Bell, miraculously survived), and the cruiser lost control for some time, and most importantly, the artillery fire control system failed. Hardly even armor-piercing projectile could have caused more damage.

After this, the Spee divided the fire, redirecting the bow turret towards the light cruisers - especially since after 6:30 the Exeter was covered with a smoke screen. Distance to new goal at this moment there were about 65 cabs. At 6:40 a.m., a 283-mm shell exploded at the Achilles's stem, damaging the command and rangefinder post and wounding the ship's commander, Edward Perry (some sources write about the injury of an artillery officer), as well as disabling the radio station, which disrupted communication with the spotter aircraft . Soon after this, the Exeter was hit by two more shells: one of them disabled the first turret (and the charge in the breaker caught fire, and in order to avoid an explosion the British had to flood its cellars), and the second pierced the hull above the belt, destroyed the radio room and exploded under deck on the port side. The second hit disabled the 102 mm gun and caused a fire in the fenders of the first shots.

Battle of La Plata December 13, 1939
Source – S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Volume 1. M.: Voenizdat, 1967

At 6:42 Exeter was hit last shell- the location of the hit is unknown, but, apparently, it was in the bow near the waterline, since by the end of the battle the cruiser had a meter trim on the bow and a list to the left side, and its speed decreased to 17 knots, although the vehicles remained undamaged. Finally, at 7:30, the water shorted the power cables of the aft tower and put it out of action - the cruiser lost all of its artillery.

In response, Spee received only two 203-mm shells from Exeter. One of them pierced through the high tower-like superstructure and did not explode. But the second, from a distance of about 65 cabs, entered the side almost at a right angle (at that moment the Spee turned sharply to the left, from 6:22 to 6:25 changing course by almost 90°), pierced 100 mm of the armor of the upper part of the belt above the armor deck, then pierced the 40-mm upper longitudinal bulkhead and at a very acute angle came into contact with the 20-mm armored deck, where it exploded in the food storeroom. The main fire line was cut off and a local fire broke out, but overall the German ship was lucky: the damage was minor. The “spaced” reservation system worked - it can be argued that it provided protection from 203 mm armor-piercing shells at a distance of at least 65 kb and when hitting at angles close to 90°.

Second phase of the battle: "Spee" against light cruisers

At approximately 6:45, the Spee transferred all its fire to the light cruisers, which had already been firing at it for a long time and scored several hits (though causing virtually no damage). At that moment there were about 90 cabs before them, and this distance increased as the Spee left the British exactly abeam. Seeing this, Harewood, who was on the Ajax, ordered his ships to turn around and catch up with the enemy, still keeping to his right.

At 06:55, Harewood's ships swung 30° to port to engage all of their turrets. At this point, the distance between the opponents was 85–90 cab. According to the British, after this the second salvo produced hits, but the German ship began to maneuver, knocking down the sight. After 7:10, “Spee” again fired for some time at the “Exeter” that appeared from the smoke from a distance of 70 cabs, but did not achieve any hits.

The actions of the German commander were extremely unsuccessful - by maneuvering, Langsdorff prevented not only the enemy from shooting, but also his own gunners. At the same time, Harewood, taking advantage of his speed advantage, was steadily closing the distance, and this brought more benefits to the light cruisers, all of whose 152 mm guns were now in action.

Light cruiser Ajax in 1939
Source – S. Patyanin, A. Dashyan, K. Balakin. All cruisers of World War II. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

Thanks to the high rate of fire and the presence of a spotter aircraft, the British began to achieve an increasing number of hits from a distance of 80 cabs. By 7:10, the Spee was hit by 4 to 6 shells. One hit the 150-mm installation No. 3, destroying it along with the crew, the other hit the stern behind the armored citadel, killed two people, but did not explode (according to English data, it was a training blank). Two more shells hit the tower-like superstructure: one exploded above the upper director of the main caliber (three people were killed, but the damage was again minimal), the other destroyed the right rangefinder and caused damage to the directors of the anti-aircraft and main calibers (the connection of the latter with the towers was disrupted for some time) . The explosion disabled the poorly protected system for supplying shells to the bow group of 150-mm guns.

To get closer to the enemy, after 7:10 Harewood changed course, and now only the bow turrets could fire at his cruisers. At this time, the German ship was also strictly stern to the British. As a result, despite the reduction in distance, the hits stopped. However, at 7:16, Spee began to maneuver, bringing both turrets into action and achieving coverage. The distance between the opponents began to quickly decrease.

The British took aim again: one of their shells hit the rear of the Spee and disabled the remote control equipment for the torpedo tubes, another disabled the 105-mm universal installation, and the third exploded at the base of the catapult, destroying the aircraft standing on it. Two more shells hit the rear turret without causing any damage. Finally, it is known that one of the 152-mm shells hit the surface part of the armor belt (thickness - 100 mm) in the area of ​​the aft turret, but did not penetrate it.

At 7:25, a German 283-mm shell from a distance of about 50 cabs pierced the barbette of the third Ajax turret and hit the barbette of the fourth turret, disabling both (it is not clear whether an explosion occurred). At the same time, the supply to one of the guns in the second turret failed. There were only three intact guns left on the cruiser, but Harewood did not leave the battle.

Mutual maneuvers again disrupted aiming for both sides for a while, but at 7:34 from a distance of 40 cabs, Spee again achieved coverage: fragments from a close explosion demolished the top of the mast along with the antennas on the Ajax (S. Roskill describes this as a hit and dates to 7:38).

"Admiral Graf Spee" enters the Montevideo roadstead after the battle
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers types "Deutschland" and "Admiral Hipper". M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

During this period of the battle, the Spee received three hits at once in the superstructure, which destroyed the galley, but again did not cause serious damage. Another shell hit the bow turret, not penetrating its armor, but, according to some sources, jamming the middle gun - perhaps temporarily.

The ships of both sides began to run out of ammunition, they fired more slowly and more carefully, so no one else scored any hits. On the Ajax there were 7 killed and 5 wounded, on the Achilles there were 4 killed and 7 wounded. At 7:42, Harewood laid a smoke screen, and under its cover the British ships described a zigzag to sharply increase the distance to the enemy. The British tried not to let the German ship out of sight, but at the same time keep a distance of one and a half hundred cables from it, and as a result, they “guided” the enemy almost to Montevideo.

Results of the battle

During the entire battle, “Spee” was hit by two 203 mm and up to eighteen 152 mm shells. The latter is explained big amount and the high rate of fire of six-inch guns: in a minute the British cruisers could fire over a hundred shells and by the end of the battle they had almost exhausted their ammunition. But the Exeter could fire only two dozen 203-mm shells per minute, and it did not participate in the fire battle until the end of the collision.

Not all 152-mm shells had any effect on the Spee. Some of them did not explode, and some simply passed through the high superstructure without much harm to the ship.

Damage received by "Admiral Graf Spee" during the battle of La Plata
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The locations and consequences of hits from 14 out of 18 shells are known (they are described above). At least one shell (possibly more) hit main belt without breaking through it. Three shells hit the main caliber turrets, which had a 140-mm front (one in the bow, two in the stern), also without penetrating the armor and only temporarily disabling one 283-mm gun. Only two 152-mm shells had a more or less serious effect: one of them destroyed the 150-mm gun, the other disabled the supply of 150-mm shells and for some time disrupted the fire control of the main caliber. It is known that the Spee had two holes with an area of ​​about 0.5 m2 each (above the waterline and at its level), which were completely removable at sea. Thus, the main impact of six-inch shells affected only the deck and superstructures of the German ship.

The impact of the 203rd shells turned out to be even less significant. One of them also went right through the superstructure, as the British used semi-armor-piercing shells. Another (most likely not a “common”, but a purely armor-piercing one) hit the “Spee” at a very favorable angle, pierced the belt and the internal bulkhead, but exploded on the 20-mm armored deck.

152-mm shell hits also accounted for most of German casualties: 36 people were killed (including one officer), another 58 were wounded (though most of them were slightly injured). However, the damage to the ship itself practically did not reduce its survivability and had very little effect on its combat effectiveness. At the same time, the fact that the armor was almost completely penetrated suggests that only 203 mm shells posed a real danger to the survivability of the “pocket battleship” (at least in theory).

The impact of German 283 mm shells on British ships was much more noticeable. Although the Spee, even firing on its entire side, could fire no more than twelve main-caliber shells per minute, the Exeter was hit by six such shells (although two of them pierced the ends and did not explode). As a result, the British heavy cruiser lost all its artillery, slowed down and took on a significant amount of water, and its flow could not be stopped for quite some time. 61 people died on the ship (including 5 officers), and another 34 sailors were injured. If Langsdorff had acted more decisively, had not “pulled” his ship from side to side and had not constantly changed targets, it would not have been difficult for him to overtake and sink the “wounded man” (at least with torpedoes).

Exploded and burning "Spee"
Source – Illustrated London News, Dec. 30, 1939

The Spee's shooting at the light cruisers turned out to be much less successful - in fact, the Germans achieved only one hit with the main caliber on the Ajax and two very close falls, mainly causing damage to the control and communication systems of both cruisers (in particular, it was disrupted for some time communication with the spotter). But just one successfully hit 283-mm shell disabled half of the artillery of the flagship Ajax, forcing Harewood to actually stop the artillery battle. It is noteworthy that the 150-mm Spee guns did not make a single hit - partly because their fire control system worked much worse (largely due to the fact that they had limited aiming angles and were forced to constantly change when maneuvering the ship goals).

In general, the Spee spent the second half of the battle (the battle with light cruisers) noticeably worse than the first. The British achieved twice the percentage of direct hits - and this despite the fact that at a distance of 70–80 cabs, German 283 mm guns should have been significantly superior in accuracy to the enemy’s 152 mm guns. Such poor shooting is partly due to unsuccessful and ill-conceived maneuvering. On the other hand, the only German 283-mm shell that hit the target directly caused more damage to the enemy than two dozen British 152-mm shells did to the Spee itself.

The sunken Spee. Photo taken by the British in 1940
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

Langsdorff's mistaken decision to go to Montevideo, which became a deliberate trap, was made not because of losses and damage, but after the Spee commander received a message that 60% of the shells had been spent. Perhaps the psychological effect of the unsuccessful course of the second phase of the battle, which began so promisingly for the Germans, also played a role. On the evening of December 17, 1939, the Spee was blown up and scuttled by its own crew in neutral waters four kilometers from the Uruguayan coast. The ship's commander, Langsdorff, shot himself. This also indicates the emotional instability of the German commander, which prevented him from adequately leading the battle and achieving victory.

Bibliography:

1. V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eskmo, 2012
2. S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Volume 1. M.: Voenizdat, 1967
3. http://www.navweaps.com

The eternal conflict of needs and means of their implementation became especially acute after the start of the construction of the “Washington” cruisers. Ten-thousand-ton high-speed ships were often not inferior to the dreadnoughts of the last war either in length or in cost. Their number depended primarily on the thickness of the wallet, and with this in all countries during the years of the great economic crisis, things were not at all great. The “mistress of the seas” found herself in a particularly unpleasant situation. Britain needed many cruisers, at least 50, which would be replaced by new type demanded a fantastic sum of 100 million pounds sterling for those times. Meanwhile, by 1926, the financial situation had become so critical that two of the four planned “counties” had to be immediately abandoned. The fate of the two ships scheduled for construction also remained in doubt. Then the Admiralty followed a long-trodden path, trying to abandon the “maximum” heavy cruisers in favor of a smaller and more economical option.

However, it's too much to cut combat capabilities units of “economy class” (which, by the way, received the designation “B” instead of class “A”, full-size ten-thousanders) also did not seem reasonable: after all, in the event of war, they would have to face their “big brothers” from among the opponents. It was intended to limit the displacement to 8,000 tons by removing one of the eight-inch towers. However, the accumulated experience seemed to make it possible at the same time to strengthen the armor, providing decent protection against at least six-inch guns.

As a result, the project differed quite significantly from the poorly protected high-sided “counties”. (Both ships received ideologically curious names that reflected their intermediate status. They were called "York" and "Exeter"; on the one hand, these are the names of cities traditionally given to light cruisers, and on the other, both cities had the status of city-counties.) " "Reducedness" was noticeably manifested in their appearance. First of all, the cruisers turned out to be noticeably shorter. Instead of a massive smooth-deck hull, the designers limited themselves to a rather long forecastle. The new cruisers inherited a power plant from their predecessors, but the number of pipes was reduced to two: smoke from both forward boiler rooms was discharged into the front pipe. Maintaining the same power with a smaller displacement made it possible to increase the speed to 32 knots. The figure is quite modest, but it is worth recalling that the British by that time abandoned the “increase” of inflated speeds, achieved only in tests, focusing on the reliability and stability of the mechanisms without any forcing. Therefore, it is not surprising that their ships could well compete in service with the formally much faster Italians and French.

The couple turned out to be not exactly the same type. If the lead "York" retained many of the features of the "County" (in particular, inclined pipes and a "three-story" forward superstructure surrounded by open bridges), then the "Exeter" acquired a look that became characteristic of all subsequent cruisers of the British fleet. Straight pipes and a completely enclosed angular superstructure gave it a more solid appearance, more like a battleship.

Finally, side armor returned to the British cruisers. Albeit not very solid: the thickness of the armor belt was 76 mm, the same as on the old small “C”. The ammunition cellars, which had the now so familiar “box” design, were well protected. Their walls reached a thickness of 112 mm on the lead York, and on the Exeter they were strengthened to 140 mm. As for weapons, one of the useful innovations was supposed to be the installation of multi-barreled 40-mm “pom-poms”, but in order to save weight and money during construction they were replaced by 12.7 mm machine guns that were as traditional as they were of little use.

In general, however, the ships turned out to be quite good (some experts, not without good reason, consider them the best British heavy cruisers), but the main task - saving money - could not be solved. The economy version was only 10% cheaper than the full-size County model. A simple calculation shows that such an investment of money can hardly be called rational: 10 Exeters could oppose the enemy with only 60 main-caliber guns, while nine standard ten-thousanders were 12 more guns. The gain of one combat unit did not in any way compensate for the fact that individually each ship from such a dozen was inferior in firepower to a possible enemy by a quarter or even a third. The Admiralty quickly calculated all this and decided not to repeat the “economic experiments” again. The next heavy cruisers were to become the Northumberland and Surrey, which we have already talked about, full-fledged Washingtons with four two-gun turrets. However, the adoption of the London Naval Treaty put an end to the further construction of eight-inch cruisers for the “mistress of the seas” - the entire limit allotted for them turned out to be already selected. So, by chance, the “inferior” York and Exeter became the last representatives of this class in Britain.

If the British completed the history of their heavy cruisers with the creation of a “stripped-down” version, the Japanese, on the contrary, began the history of their units of this class with a similar project. It must be said that the motives for the appearance of the “Kako” type were not even close to economic. On the contrary, for 1918 (and it was then that the design of a new reconnaissance cruiser began), a displacement of 7,500 tons looked more than impressive. The shipbuilder Yuzuru Hiraga, who had already shown off his talents, and his then young assistant Kikuo Fujimoto, who later also became a famous designer, set themselves a bold task. It was assumed that the new ships should, in all respects, surpass the same notorious “Elizabethans” from Britain, which still remained a “cordial friend” of the Far Eastern monarchy. However, the Japanese were already trying to think a couple of decades ahead and did not exclude the possibility of crossing swords with their current allies, which happened 23 years later. And in this case, the Naval Headquarters would like to have ships that are superior to the combat units of a possible enemy, in this case, the strongest naval power in the world.

That is why the original version of the cruiser with an armament of twelve 140-millimeter guns (in the original arrangement - in six two-gun turrets arranged in two “pyramids” - three each - in the bow and stern) was decided to be strengthened with more powerful guns. Each of the 140-mm twin guns was replaced with a single-gun installation of a fundamentally new caliber, which, by the way, remained unique in history. The fact is that the Japanese at that time were switching to metric system measures and did it, like many other things, consistently and persistently. This is how a 200-mm gun appeared, which in all reference books was designated as eight-inch. The timing for the creation of both the cannon and the ship itself turned out to be very successful: there were only a few months left before the signing of the Washington Agreement.

So the Land of the Rising Sun was the first to receive ships that were as close as possible to the contractual limits. The fact is that the design characteristics: 35-knot speed, 76-mm side armor and six 200-mm guns did not fit into the declared 7,500 tons. Engineers had to repeatedly cut and reshape the project. Both Hiraga and Fujimoto proved that they are very outstanding designers. Instead of copying the already boring British designs, they developed new hull shapes, the famous “falling wave”. At the bow was a graceful upturned stem capable of cutting through ocean swells. Next, the height of the side was chosen for reasons of stability and the required volume of internal premises. It was considered useless to have a high hull at the very stern, so everything unnecessary was “cut off” from the ship so that the waves would not cover the deck. These three key heights were connected by smooth transitions, as a result of which the “Japanese” differed from both main designs of the “white people” ships: with a forecastle and smooth-deck. The solution turned out to be both successful and very aesthetic: the Far Eastern cruisers looked very elegant, as if flying on water. The new hull form was used on almost all subsequent combat units of the Mikado fleet, from battleships to destroyers.

The armor protection characteristics were very similar to those of the Italian Trento, Trieste and Bolzano: the 76 mm side belt was covered on top by a 35 mm deck. If you remember the first exercises of the British, French and Americans, then it can be considered quite decent. The designers tried to squeeze in underwater protection into the project, but they had to limit themselves to a small addition - a boule, abandoning the armored anti-torpedo bulkhead. Problems also arose with the devices for the new 610 mm torpedoes, which turned out to be too long to deploy in the narrow hull. Hiraga generally did not want to see torpedo tubes on large artillery ships, believing that they posed a greater danger to the cruiser itself than to the enemy, given the long distances of future battles. However, the new doctrines of the Naval Staff demanded the opposite: as many torpedoes as possible on cruisers designed to lead their destroyers into the attack. As a result, the devices were made motionless, and shifted relative to each other on the right and left sides in a kind of “ladder”. But on the deck there was even room for a small hangar for seaplanes, a newfangled attribute of new ocean-going ships.

172. Heavy cruiser "York" (England, 1930)

Built by Palmer. Standard displacement 8250 tons, full displacement 10,350 tons, maximum length 175.25 m, beam 17.37 m, draft 6.17 m. Power of the four-shaft steam turbine unit 80,000 hp, speed 32.25 knots. Armor: belt 76 mm, cellars 76 - 112 mm, deck 37 mm, towers and barbettes 25 mm. Armament: six 203/50 mm guns, four 102/45 mm anti-aircraft guns, eight 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, two three-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes. Landed on the ground in March 1941 as a result of an attack by an Italian exploding boat. Subsequently damaged by German aircraft. Dismantled for metal in 1952.

173. Heavy cruiser "Exeter" (England, 1931) (data as of early 1942)

Built at the Devonport Naval Dockyard. Standard displacement 8390 tons, full displacement 10,500 tons, maximum length 175.25 m, beam 17.68 m, draft 6.17 m. Four-shaft steam turbine unit power 80,000 hp, speed 32 knots. Armor: belt 76 mm, cellars 76 - 140 mm, deck 37 mm, towers and barbettes 25 mm. Armament: six 203/50 mm guns, four 102/45 mm anti-aircraft guns, two 40 mm machine guns, two three-tube 533 mm torpedo tubes. Modernized at the beginning of 1941 with the installation of eight 102/45 mm anti-aircraft guns in twin mounts and two eight-barreled 40 mm machine guns. The total displacement increased to 11,000 tons. Sunk in March 1942 in the Java Sea by artillery fire and torpedoes from Japanese ships. Heavy cruiser "Aoba" (Japan, 1927)

Built by Mitsubishi in Nagasaki. Displacement standard 8300 t, normal 9850 t, maximum length 185.17 m, beam 15.83 m, draft 5.71 m. Power of the four-shaft steam turbine unit 102,000 hp, speed 34.5 knots. Armor: belt 76 mm, deck 35 mm, towers and barbettes 25 mm. Armament: six 203/50 mm guns, four 120/45 mm anti-aircraft guns, six twin-tube 610 mm torpedo tubes. In 1927, two units were built: “Aoba” and “Kinugasa”. In 1938 - 1940 instead of fixed torpedo tubes, two four-tube rotary tubes are installed, as well as eight 25-mm and four 13.2-mm anti-aircraft guns. The standard displacement increased to 9000 tons, the speed dropped to 33 knots. By the end of the war, Aoba had forty-two 25 mm machine guns. "Kinugasa" was sunk by aircraft in November 1942, "Aoba" sank in a shallow place at a parking lot in Kure and was dismantled for metal in 1948.

All this was great, except for one thing. The displacement grew by leaps and bounds and eventually reached 8,500 tons with a normal load - exactly a thousand tons more than the design. With full reserves it increased by another thousand tons. Such design and construction overloads are more typical for ships at the beginning of the century, when construction discipline was completely in ruins. To the credit of the designers, it must be said that their brainchild withstood all the abuse of weight and draft, maintaining speed and most of its combat qualities. But, of course, nothing could be done about the immersion of the belt and the lower freeboard. An unpleasant consequence was the rapid rolling, more typical of destroyers, which greatly interfered with the actions of the artillery.

In general, “Kako” and “Furutaka” were so different in a positive direction from their predecessors, not only the Japanese, but also all the major naval powers, that they were more than once proclaimed the first “Washingtonians”. In fact, the Japanese were well aware that their first “difficult” experience was far from perfect. Thus, the notorious half-towers, built in “pyramids,” turned out to be extremely inconvenient in terms of supplying ammunition and were noticeably inferior to full-fledged tower installations, which firmly took their place on 10,000-ton cruisers.

Therefore, the project of the second pair, “Ki-nugasa” and “Aoba”, the construction of which has already begun, has undergone significant changes. The place of the original, but bulky pyramids was taken by three ordinary two-gun turrets: two in the front of the hull and one in the stern. Intensified and flak, a full-fledged catapult appeared. And all this is in addition to more massive superstructures.

And again the price was the overload, which reached 1300 tons compared to the original task! The freeboard has become even lower, stability - even less. All these far from unambiguous changes had to be carried out by Fujimoto, who was replacing Hiraga, who was on a long business trip abroad. Upon his return, the chief gave his deputy a fair beating, although he simply did not have any reserve left for the “weight maneuver.” Moreover, in 1936-1939 the first pair was rebuilt according to the type of the second, spending considerable money. As a result, all four acquired similar look and formed a homogeneous division for the upcoming battles.

And the military fate of the “heavy kids” turned out to be truly difficult: not a single one of the British and Japanese lived to see the end of hostilities in combat-ready condition. All of them very actively participated in the battles, more than once engaging in artillery duels. The Exeter was especially distinguished among the British, at the beginning of the war it was part of a small detachment of three cruisers under the command of Commodore Harwood. On December 13, 1939, the detachment entered into battle off the coast of South America with a dangerous enemy - the German “pocket battleship” Admiral Graf Spee. The Germans considered the albeit “truncated”, but still heavy cruiser the most dangerous enemy and at the beginning of the battle they fired mainly at it. The result of the fight only confirmed the pre-war forecasts of experts. “Exeter” managed to score two hits, which did not cause the “pickpocket” any particular trouble, and he “caught” seven 280-mm shells. Completely deprived of artillery and fire control systems, having taken on several hundred tons of water and having lost almost 100 crew members, the British cruiser was barely able to leave the battlefield at a 16-knot speed, guided by a compass taken from a lifeboat. Having reached the Falkland Islands and patched up a little there, “Exeter” headed home, where a ceremonial reception awaited him: after all, “Spee” was eventually defeated, not by force, but by cunning. In England, the cruiser was not only completely overhauled, but also thoroughly modernized by installing twin 102-mm anti-aircraft installations and menacing 8-barrel “pom-poms”, as well as a radar. The updated ship went to Far East, where at the beginning of 1942 severe trials awaited him. At the end of February, a motley Anglo-Dutch-American-Australian squadron met strong and well-trained Japanese heavy cruisers in the Java Sea. A 203-mm shell fired from long range by the Haguro hit the Exeter's engine room. The speed dropped to 11 knots; The British cruiser again, like 14 months ago, had to limp back to the base for repairs. The team and workers worked tirelessly and were able to eliminate the damage in three days. As it turned out, it was completely in vain. When trying to get out of the sea, which had become a trap for the allies, we had to again engage in battle with old acquaintances - the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nati. By a fateful coincidence, one of the first hits was in almost the same place, with a similar result. This time, the ship, surrounded by the enemy, had nowhere to escape, and after a short unequal battle, the Exeter sank.

His “half-brother” York lasted even less. In the summer of 1940, he reached the Mediterranean Sea and managed to finish off an Italian destroyer, but in March 1941, while stationed in Souda Bay on the island of Crete, he himself became a target for Italian naval saboteurs. The exploding MTM boat hit the target, and the York sat on the ground at a relatively shallow depth so that the entire deck and gun turrets remained above the water. As a result, it became a target for attacks by German bombers, who placed several bombs on a stationary and essentially dead target. The Germans and Italians are still arguing over whose account this tidbit should be attributed, but the British... do not consider the York to be sunk. The “semi-surface” cruiser was ranked in the strange category of “total loses” - combat units that cannot be restored. In fact, of course, he can safely be counted among the dead: neither the Germans, nor the Italians, nor the British themselves showed interest in restoration - after the liberation of the island.

The Japanese “mini-Washingtonians” entered the war no less actively. All four took part in a host of operations during the initial stages of the Japanese offensive, when ships and landing forces captured one territory after another. The “tough nut to crack” - the island of Guadalcanal - became critical for them. Together they formed the core of Admiral Goto’s detachment in the brilliant night battle off Savo Island on August 9, 1942, which ended in the defeat of the Allies, who lost four heavy cruisers, at least three of which can be attributed to the “heavy babies.” But “Kako” became a kind of “scapegoat” for this victory: upon returning home, she received three torpedoes from an American submarine and disappeared under water five minutes later. And two months later, punishment befell his “sistership”. On October 11, the Japanese formation came under a surprise night attack by the Americans at Cape Esperance. The Furutaka took almost a hundred shells of various calibers and a torpedo, after which the crew had to leave its flaming remains.

Unlike the Furutaka, the Kinugasa safely survived the battle at Cape Esperance, becoming the only ship to escape serious damage. But he lasted only a month more. The trips to Guadalcanal became a real “Russian roulette”, in which on November 11, 1942, the cruiser received a loaded revolver drum cell. American aviation deprived him of his progress, and then finished off the helpless ship.

The stubborn “Aoba” resisted the Americans the longest, having undergone many adventures and received a lot of damage. At the ill-fated Cape Esperance, he led a Japanese column and took the sudden first blow. The cruiser emerged from the hail of shells in approximately the same condition as the Exeter after the battle at La Plata and also barely reached the base. The repaired ship continued to be plagued by troubles. First, at anchorage, he was attacked by American “flying fortresses” and received a direct hit from a bomb. The explosion of their own torpedoes caused a huge fire, and the Japanese considered it best to sink the cruiser themselves in a shallow place. After repairs, the badly damaged Aoba was used mainly in secondary roles - for convoy service and the delivery of reinforcements. During the American landing in the Philippines, he was torpedoed by a submarine; The cruiser again lost speed and almost sank. Towed with great difficulty to Manila, she was attacked by aircraft and barely made it to domestic waters at a speed of only about five knots. Already completely “crippled,” “Aoba” was firmly established at the base in Kure, where his superiors considered his restoration inappropriate. The final chord in the fate of the sufferer was made by American carrier-based bombers, which repeatedly attacked the stationary cruiser in the spring and summer of the victorious 1945. In total, the cruiser (it would be appropriate to add “former”) received at least nine direct hits, not counting the mass of close explosions. Its shallow depth and the fact that it sat on the ground on a relatively even keel make it possible to consider it a kind of “twin brother” of the York, also “completely lost for restoration,” but not formally sunk.