Field artillery of the American Civil War. Armament of armies Data from Austrian cannons

1812: Russian artillery.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the armies of the warring states increased significantly, operations became highly maneuverable and fleeting. Now the crews of the field guns were required to combine massive fire against dense enemy battle formations with an increase in the distance of targeted, “piece” firing at individual targets, while the batteries had to have increased mobility. These problems could be solved by updating the material part and improving the organizational structure of the troops.

For this purpose, into service Russian army the so-called “systems of 1805” are adopted. This term meant bronze 12-pound guns of medium and small proportions, 6-pound guns, half-pound, quarter-pound and 3-pound “unicorns”. They differed from previous models in their lighter weight (which affected the maneuverability of the batteries) and increased fire accuracy. This was achieved through a number of improvements in the design of the guns. In particular, the number of different fittings and the angle of the machine's fracture were reduced on carriages, which improved the stability of the guns when fired.

For 3-pounder guns and "unicorns" of field and siege artillery, limbers with boxes for ammunition, usually grapeshot, began to be used. Heavier and more massive 12-pound guns of large proportions, intended for fortress and siege artillery, were equipped with carriages with trunnion sockets, where the trunnions were placed in the stowed position, and the breech was placed on a special cushion. This ensured an even distribution of the weight of the gun over the entire carriage.

The fortress guns of the 1805 model differed from previous models by two- to four-wheeled carriages with rotating platforms resting on a kind of bearings - cast iron balls. Mortars of the early 19th century were divided into three calibers and were used only in fortress and siege artillery. In the combat position, their barrels were mounted on machines, which ensured a constant elevation angle of 45°.

The maximum firing range of field guns reached 2800 m, for “unicorns” - 2500 m, the rate of fire when firing cannonballs and grenades was one shot per minute, and when using buckshot it increased two to three times.

To ensure the range and accuracy of artillery fire, the quality of sighting devices and ammunition is of great importance. Already in 1802, the sight of the Markevich AI system was adopted. It was a copper stand with a slot in the middle, along which a copper bar with two holes for aiming and a scale moved. Markevich's sight provided accurate shooting at distances of up to 1200 m. However, when firing over a long distance, the batteries were forced to use quadrants, which somewhat slowed down the rate of fire of the guns. The fact is that these devices had to be leaned against the muzzle of the gun before each shot, so that, according to the readings of the plumb line and a graduated scale made in the form of a sector of a circle, the gun could be given the required elevation angle.

Artillery ammunition, as before, was divided into four categories. The first group included impact or penetrating projectiles - cannonballs. The second includes explosive spherical bombs weighing more than a pound and grenades - shells of the same shape and purpose, but weighing less than a pound. Typically, buckshot was knitted, with cast iron bullets, and bulk, with lead. A special category were shells special purpose- incendiary, lighting and signaling.

Taking into account the experience of past wars, the Russian command on the eve of the Napoleonic invasion carried out a number of organizational innovations in artillery. Thus, the field artillery was brought into brigades, each of which consisted of two battery companies armed with half-pound “unicorns” and 12-pound cannons, and the same number of light companies equipped with 6- and 12-pound “unicorns.” In addition, the brigade included cavalry a company with 10-pounder "unicorns" and 6-pounder guns and a pontoon company. Later, divisions appeared in Russian artillery, which improved command and control.

Half-pound "unicorn" model 1805. The weight of the gun is 1.5 tons. The barrel length is 10.5 caliber.

12-pounder small proportion gun of the 1805 model. Gun weight - 1.2 tons. Barrel length - 13 calibers.

Model 1801 24-pounder gun in stowed position. The weight of the gun is 5.3 tons, the barrel length is 21 caliber.

12-pounder field gun of large proportions, Model 1805. Barrel length in calibers - 22, gun weight - 2780 kg, firing range 2130-2700 m

Two-pound mortar of the 1805 model. Barrel length in calibers is 3.04, gun weight is 1500 kg, firing range is 2375 m.

In 1812, the Russian field artillery included 53 battery, 68 light, 30 horse and 24 pontoon companies. Both foot and horse companies had 12 guns. The artillerymen were divided into fireworks, bombardiers, gunners and gunners. Each artillery garrison had schools in which gunners learned literacy and basic arithmetic. Those who passed the established exam were awarded the rank of bombardier (senior class private). The most capable of them were promoted to fireworks. According to the degree of knowledge, experience and combat distinction, fireworks were divided into four classes.

IN Patriotic War In 1812, Russian artillerymen covered themselves with unfading glory; there are countless examples of their courage and heroism. The French officer Vinturini recalled: “The Russian artillerymen were faithful to their duty... they lay down on the guns and did not give them up without themselves.”

Russian foot artillerymen wore a general army dark green uniform, but unlike the infantry, they had black collars with red piping and not white, but green trousers with black leather stripes below the knees. The cords and etiquettes on the shako were red; the artilleryman's shako badge was a single-fire grenade with crossed cannon barrels above it.

Horse artillerymen dressed in general dragoon uniforms, but with a black collar with red piping.

Russian artillerymen: non-commissioned officer and private gunner of foot artillery, private gunner of horse artillery.

An important advantage of the Russian cavalry was its excellent cavalry, which, if inferior to anyone, was only inferior to the cavalry of the English army. At the same time, both the horses themselves and their dressage were at their best.

Artillery

And finally, the Russian artillery was most decisively transformed. As a study by the commission of General A. A. Arakcheev showed, artillery had previously been underestimated, and actual artillery fire was 6–10 times superior to small arms fire. And this meant that it was the fire of field artillery that ensured the success of the army that had it in sufficient quantities. But at the same time, major shortcomings in the composition and organization of Russian artillery were revealed. The artillery was extremely varied in caliber, which made it difficult to control fire and supply ammunition. In addition, there were no horses in the permanent batteries. Usually mobilized horses were used, often of questionable condition, which had a bad effect on mobility. In addition, this did not provide sufficient speed for deploying guns into position and removing them from position.

Russian foot artillery

To solve these problems, Arakcheev introduced “artillery” horses, which should “never be separated from the company.” In 1803, following the example of the French artillery, standard charging boxes were introduced on the limbers, which made it possible to sharply reduce the time it took to prepare batteries for firing, since the ammunition necessary for battle moved along with the gun and ended up directly in position and in a convenient container. In 1805, artillery was unified with a sharp reduction in the number of artillery systems and calibers used. The carriages, limbers, harness and charging boxes were also unified. The low-powered regimental artillery was effectively eliminated, and its role was now to be filled by light artillery companies of 6-pounders and 1/4-pound unicorns.

Charging box

Old style 6-pounder gun

Organizationally, the artillery was consolidated into artillery brigades within infantry divisions. Such brigades consisted of battery and light companies. In addition, there were horse artillery companies as part of the cavalry corps and separate companies that were not part of the divisions.
In general, Russian artillery took first place in the world in terms of specific power (weight of a salvo per number of barrels). At the same time, it was distinguished by its harmonious organization and, thanks to the constant high-quality horse composition and the reduction in the weight of the guns, excellent mobility on the battlefield and on the march.

Field artillery charging box

Field artillery charging box

French army

The French army improved throughout the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. And very often she was an innovator in military affairs. For example, it was in the French army that they first switched to the widespread use of shock column tactics. After clashes with the Russian army in 1805–1807, it underwent a smaller scale of reform than the Russian army, as it demonstrated its superiority. Basically, the reform of this period was expressed in the abandonment of semi-brigades and the restoration of the regimental level.

Infantry

The French infantry corps, which was the main strategic and operational unit of the French army, did not have such a clear and fixed structure as the Russian one. In addition, unlike the Russian corps, it was the highest organizational unit (for the Russians it was an army that included several corps) and, including all three types of troops, could conduct completely independent actions in the strategic direction without additional reinforcement. It consisted of 2–5 infantry divisions and 1–2 cavalry brigades or divisions, as well as corps artillery, which partly compensated for the French divisional artillery, which was weaker than in the Russian army.

The infantry division consisted of 3 brigades of 2 regiments each and usually 2 artillery batteries. The regiment consisted of 4 line and one reserve battalion. True, this division was not rigid. For example, in Davout’s 1st Infantry Corps, the regiments consisted of 5 line battalions and 1 reserve, but the brigade consisted of one regiment, that is, in fact, there was no regimental link. The battalion consisted of 6 companies, 1 grenadier, 4 fusiliers and one voltigeur.
Voltigeurs were an analogue of Russian rangers, but, unlike the latter, most often they were not separated into separate brigades, regiments and battalions, but were dispersed as part of line battalions. This did not make it possible to use them separately as fighting forces on the battlefield. But this order made it possible to better organize the interaction of battalion columns and rifle chains in the division’s battle formations. This also allowed the French to use more complex ones than in the Russian army, battle formations divisions.
Voltigeurs were considered light infantry. They were armed with both smooth-bore guns and rifled carbines, as well as cutlasses. Voltigeurs, unlike Russian rangers, did not seriously rely on single actions away from their troops and were mainly trained to act in loose formation in the battle formations of divisions and regiments - therefore they were better prepared for such actions.
Their percentage in French units was somewhat lower than the percentage of rangers in the Russian army, which was compensated by a higher percentage in allied units, for example, in Marshal Davout’s Westphalian Corps.

French line infantry

Fusilier companies were the line infantry of the French army. Linear infantry, as in the Russian army, was intended for a bayonet attack in battalion columns or for salvo fire combat in a deployed linear formation. But unlike the Russian infantry, the French fusiliers deployed not in a 4-rank, but in a 3-rank formation. This difference was due to the better characteristics of the French gun and the level of training of the infantry. In practice, this meant that the French battalion, firing in deployed formation, had approximately a 25% advantage in fire performance. The line infantry were armed with smoothbore rifles with a bayonet. In the training of fusiliers, much more time was devoted to drill training and actions in close formation, mainly with an attack orientation.

French voltigeurs

The French grenadiers were noticeably different from the Russians. Grenadier companies were also elite, but differed in the principle of formation - to be enrolled there, a soldier had to have 4 years of service or 2 campaigns behind him. Four privates and one corporal in the grenadier company were sappers. Their distinctive feature was traditionally a leather apron and a large beard (a tradition that continues today in the French army) - they had to be strong and tall, since they walked in front of the assault columns and had to open doors, windows, gates and walls in populated areas with their large axes points where the enemy was entrenched. However, in practice, those with the thickest beards were often hired as sappers.
In general, the French infantry, in its organization and composition, was maximally adapted to achieve success in active, attacking operations in field battle.

Cavalry

The French cavalry, in contrast to the Russian, was considered primarily as impact force on the battlefield, so its basis was made up of cuirassier and carabinieri units and also horse-jaeger units intended for the battlefield. In addition, there were hussar, dragoon and uhlan regiments. The latter were mostly Polish.
Because of this composition, the French cavalry was used to a limited extent as an independent operational force, but was of greater importance than the Russian on the battlefield. Napoleon again began to use cavalry as a battering ram when breaking through the enemy front, although this was considered unprofitable in the era of the widespread arming of armies with small arms and the high saturation of armies with field artillery. Heavy cavalry made it possible to quickly break the distance and overthrow the enemy. The main thing was to introduce it into battle at the right moment.

"Old Guard", grenadiers

Cuirassiers were practically no different from Russians and also represented men-at-arms, perfectly suited for breaking infantry squares. The weapons were similar, only instead of cuirassier carbines, blunderbusses were used, adapted for firing at infantry at point-blank range at full gallop. The carabinieri of the French army differed from the cuirassiers essentially only in their uniforms and in the same way could successfully attack infantry.
The hussars, whose weapons and uniforms were modeled on the Hungarian cavalrymen, acted as light cavalry capable of pursuing the enemy, engaging with enemy cavalry and performing rapid maneuvers. Actually, the name “hussars” was borrowed from the Hungarian “huzzar”.
The lancers, another part of the light cavalry, were Polish cavalry with their traditional weapons, including the pike. Expectations that the pike would significantly increase the capabilities of cavalry in the fight against infantry did not materialize. But the pike turned out to be useful in battles with cavalry.

Saxon cuirassiers

An important innovation in Napoleon's army was the mounted chasseurs. They were light cavalry, but, like cuirassiers, they were used for action in the thick of battle. Mounted rangers were intended mainly for conducting fire combat both from horseback and on foot.
Napoleon's cavalry demonstrated its capabilities by overthrowing the enemy at Austerlitz and breaking through his front at Wagram.
Cuirassiers and carabiniers were consolidated into heavy cavalry divisions, lancers, hussars and horse huntsmen into light ones. The division included 2–3 brigades of two regiments and sometimes an artillery regiment. But in heavy divisions there were often brigades of the same regiment. Each regiment consisted of 4 squadrons.
The French cavalry corps consisted of 1–2 heavy, 1 light cavalry divisions and sometimes corps artillery. These corps were an important component of attack tactics and were used primarily for rapid frontal attacks and development of success on the battlefield. It was the French who were the first in Europe of that period to use it in battle. large masses cavalry.
Despite having excellent training and weapons, the French cavalry had one big disadvantage. Due to the limited capabilities of the stud farms of Napoleon's empire and heavy losses, the French cavalry had, on average, a worse cavalry composition than the Russian cavalry. This limited the mobility of the French cavalry and prevented them from being used to great depth. Although with a frontal attack on the battlefield special significance it didn't have.

Artillery

French artillery was at the forefront of its fleet and organization even before the French Revolution. Faced with the superiority of enemy artillery in the mid-18th century, the French were the first to undertake a radical and strictly thought-out reorganization. The great engineer and artilleryman General Gribeauval introduced such generally accepted innovations as limbers with standardized charging boxes, new frame sights, vertical aiming screw mechanisms, “long-range” buckshot in tin caps, and returned to cap loading.
In 1803, Napoleon carried out another reform that affected the number of calibers. For example, 8-pounder and 4-pounder guns were replaced with 6-pounder ones, since, according to Napoleon's observations, in battle the guns of both old calibers were used in the same way and the differences between them were not taken into account. A longer howitzer of a slightly reduced caliber was introduced to achieve greater range, which made it possible to unify the ammunition with 24-pounder siege guns.
By the time of the invasion of Russia, French artillery was reduced to 8-gun companies with 6 guns and 2 howitzers, which made it possible to use the battery for a wide variety of purposes, although it complicated fire control and supplying the battery with ammunition. Reserve (or corps) artillery had batteries of 12-pounder and 8-pounder guns and large-caliber howitzers and was intended for long-range combat and the destruction of fortifications and suppression of enemy artillery. Divisional artillery was represented mainly by 6-pound and 4-pound cannons and medium-caliber howitzers (24 pounds) and was used in the division's combat formations at the starting positions for direct fire support. The regimental artillery had a different organization of batteries - 4-guns and was equipped with 3-pounder and 4-pounder guns. She was supposed to accompany the attacking infantry with fire and wheels.
In terms of mobility and firepower per number of guns, French field artillery was somewhat weaker than Russian due to the large number of light 3-pound and 4-pound guns. But it included both heavy long-range guns and regimental artillery, intended for operations in infantry combat formations not only in defense, but also in the offensive (which allowed it to be used more flexibly), and had more powerful artillery systems in heavy artillery.

Armament of armies

Russian army

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian army was faced with enemy superiority in small arms. This fact was all the more unpleasant because since the time of Peter the Russian small arms was at the proper global level. But the very first clashes between the Russian army and the French showed the superiority of the French gun of the 1777 model over Russian guns. But not only did French weapons provide a tactical advantage, they were also more monotonous. And in the Russian army by 1808 the situation was such that 28-caliber guns were in service. At the same time, the guns were both domestically produced and foreign.
In 1805, a new, very reliable gun was adopted. But due to the unification of the cartridge with the old one, it turned out to be heavy and with powerful recoil with a modest range and accuracy of fire.

Infantry pistol model 1809

In 1808, basing its development on captured French guns of the 1777 model and purchased English guns of the 1794 model, Tula gunsmiths managed to develop a model that is not inferior to them. The new gun had, following the example of foreign prototypes, a caliber reduced from 19 mm to 17.8 mm and a reduced weight from 5.16 kg to 4.46 kg. It was possible to increase the initial bullet speed and accuracy of fire. They were also able to increase the number of hits on a standard 1.8 to 1.22 arshin target from 100 steps to more than half the bullets, while when shooting from the old gun the norm was a quarter of the bullets hit. The maximum firing range reached 300 steps. To speed up loading, all types of guns used paper cartridges containing a bullet and a powder charge.

Gun flintlocks

In 1805, new models of screw guns were created for non-commissioned officers and huntsman rifles. These were rifled weapons that provided the ability to fire at a distance of up to 1 thousand steps, and at 500 steps they showed the same accuracy as a gun of the 1808 model at 100. Also, based on the gun of the 1808 model, cavalry guns were developed.
But, despite the successes in rearming the army, only half of the army managed to rearm with the new model guns. Another disadvantage was the use of an old bayonet - shorter than the French ones, and designed for older, longer guns, which was especially noticeable when repelling cavalry attacks. True, the percentage of rangers armed with rifle weapons has increased noticeably. Now screw guns and fittings were available in the Jaeger regiments at the rate of 12 per company and in the cavalry units, except for the hussars, at the rate of 16 per squadron.

6-inch long (left) and 24-pounder (right) French howitzers

In general, the small arms of the Russian army in 1812 can be assessed as somewhat worse than the French, but at the level of the general armament of the “Great Army”, taking into account the armament of the troops of the allied and subject states.
The characteristics of the main guns in service with the Russian army were as follows.
Model 1805 infantry rifle. Its weight (without bayonet) is 5.16 kg, length 145.8 cm (with bayonet 183 cm). Caliber – 19 mm, bullet weight – 30 g, gunpowder weight – 10.7 g. Maximum firing range 250–300 steps, effective aimed shooting range (probability of hitting a standard target more than 1/2) – 75 steps.
Infantry rifle model 1808. Its weight (without bayonet) is 4.47 kg, length 145.8 cm (with bayonet 183 cm). Caliber - 17.8 mm, bullet weight - 23.8 g, gunpowder weight - 9.9 g. Maximum firing range is 300 steps, effective aimed shooting range (probability of hitting a standard target is more than 1/2) - 100 steps.

Model 1808 infantry rifle

Dragoon rifle model 1809. Its weight (without bayonet) is 3.73 kg. Caliber - 17.8 mm, bullet weight - 23.8 g, gunpowder weight - 9.6 g. Maximum firing range is 200 steps, effective aimed shooting range (probability of hitting a standard target is more than 1/2) - 75 steps.

Dragoon rifle model 1809

Model 1805 rifle. Weight 4.26 kg. Caliber - 16.5 mm, bullet weight - 23.8 g. Maximum firing range is 1 thousand steps, effective aimed shooting range (the probability of hitting a standard target is more than 1/2) - 500 steps.
Cavalry fitting of the 1803 model. Weight 2.65 kg. Caliber – 16.5 mm, bullet weight – 23.8 g, gunpowder weight – 7 g. Maximum firing range is 900 steps, effective aimed shooting range (probability of hitting a standard target is more than 1/2) – 300 steps.

Cavalry fitting, model 1803

However, due to the lower rate of fire of small arms (compared to artillery) and the shorter range of smoothbore rifles (compared to buckshot), the role of small arms fire in relation to artillery was small, which smoothed out the effect of the difference in small arms.

Jaeger fitting

In the field of artillery, the picture was more favorable for the Russian army. Thanks to the reform, the most used calibers remained in service. These are respectively 12-pounder and 6-pounder guns and 1/2- and 1/4-pound unicorns. The remaining artillery systems were lightened and standardized across carriages. Maintenance of the guns has been simplified. Artillery companies received a mixed composition of guns and howitzers, selected according to the weight of the artillery system, and this allowed flexible use of firepower and at the same time equal mobility of all guns in the artillery company. The mobility and weight of a volley of artillery companies were considered more important than range. Therefore, from the 12-pounder guns, medium and small-proportion guns were left; 12-pounder large-proportion guns, not suitable for rapid transportation and deployment, remained only for fortress and siege artillery. The same fate befell the 1-pound unicorn.

1/4 – pound unicorn in section

Sectional view of a 12-pounder small-proportion gun

In addition, much attention was paid to maximizing the rate of fire and ease of loading. For this reason, the gap between the core and the walls of the bore was made larger than that of French guns. Also, for guns of small proportions, the barrel was made shorter. This simplified loading the cannon with a cap, which contained a projectile, wad and gunpowder. But at the same time, such measures reduced the accuracy and range of fire due to the worse obturation of the projectile core in the barrel bore.

Lighting shells

Unitary loading shots

Quite a specific weapon of the Russian army were unicorns. The field artillery of other countries included howitzers, which differed from cannons in having a much shorter and thin-walled barrel. They were intended to fire mainly grenades and bombs and had a lower muzzle velocity and a steeper trajectory. In the Russian army, instead of field howitzers, unicorns were used, which, in fact, occupied an intermediate position between a cannon and a howitzer.
The characteristics of the guns in service with the Russian army were as follows.

12-pounder medium proportion gun

12-pounder model 1805 gun

Gun weight - 800 kg (50 pounds), system weight - 1624 kg (101.5 pounds), caliber - 4.76 inches (121 mm), barrel length - 16.5 caliber, harness - 6 horses.
Firing range: cannonball - 2.8 km (1300 fathoms), grenade - 1.1 km (500 fathoms), buckshot - more than 300 meters (150 fathoms).

12-pounder gun of smaller proportion:

12-pounder small proportion gun

Gun weight - 480 kg (30 pounds), system weight - 1210 kg (75.6 pounds), caliber - 4.76 inches (121 mm), barrel length - 13 calibers, harness - 6 horses.
Firing range: cannonball - 2.6 km (1300 fathoms), grenade - 1.1 km (500 fathoms), buckshot - more than 300 meters (150 fathoms).

6-pounder gun

Model 1805 6-pounder gun

Gun weight - 355 kg (22.2 pounds), system weight - 980 kg (61 pounds), caliber - 3.76 inches (95 mm), barrel length - 17 calibers, harness - 6 horses for cavalry and 4 for foot artillery .
Firing range: cannonball - 2.2 km (1 thousand fathoms), grenade - about 900 m (400 fathoms), buckshot - more than 300 meters (150 fathoms).

1/2 pound unicorn
Gun weight - 680 kg (42.5 pounds), system weight - 1810 kg (113 pounds), caliber - 6.1 inches (155 mm), barrel length - 10.5 caliber, harness - 6 horses.
Firing range: cannonball - 2.2 km (1 thousand fathoms), grenade - 1.3 km (600 fathoms), buckshot - 550 meters (250 fathoms).

1/4 pound unicorn:

Gun weight - 345 kg (21.6 pounds), system weight - 950 kg (59.3 pounds), caliber - 4.84 inches (123 mm), barrel length - 10.5 caliber, harness - 4 horses (6 - equestrian).
Firing range: cannonball - 1.3 km (600 fathoms), grenade - about 900 m (400 fathoms).
If we take into account the number of guns in the army and their superiority in rate of fire over small arms (up to 9 rounds/min. versus 4 rounds/min. for smoothbore guns and 1–2 rounds/min. for rifled guns), then it becomes clear that It was the artillery pieces that determined the firepower of the army.

Markevich quadrant

Sight (diopter) of the Markevich system

Kabanov's sight

1/4 – pound unicorn model 1805

Unicorn breech with wingguard and scope mount

As the main tactical system, Russian artillery used those developed by Count Kutaisov “ General rules for artillery in a field battle,” approved by Emperor Alexander I and sent to the troops as instructions. Here is the content of these “Rules”.
"1. In a field battle, shots at 500 fathoms are doubtful, at 300 fathoms they are quite accurate, and at 200 and 100 fathoms they are fatal; for the last three distances our new buckshots can also be used. Consequently, when the enemy is still at first range, you should shoot at him rarely, in order to have time to aim your gun more accurately and make it difficult for him to move with your shots; at the second distance, shoot more often in order to stop or at least prolong his approach, and finally strike with all possible speed in order to knock him over and destroy him.
2. From the beginning of the battle, hide the number of your artillery, but increase it as the case continues, so that your point of attack will be hidden from the enemy, and if he were attacking, he would meet artillery where he might not have expected it.
3. When the real intention of the enemy has not yet been noticed, the batteries should consist of a small number of guns and be scattered in different places. In this situation, you are a small target, and you yourself have more means of harming him with indirect and cross shots and complicating his enterprises.
4. Batteries of a large number of guns should be placed in such cases when it is necessary to make a breach in the enemy’s line or to stop his strong desire to reach some point, or when it is necessary to knock him out of some position.
5. Avoid placing batteries on very elevated, steep places; on the contrary, batteries of unicorns can be placed with great benefit behind small elevations, which would only cover them, for almost all of their shots, except grapeshot, are mounted.

Shortly before his death, his father Alexei Mikhailovich gave young Peter a miniature cannon with a caliber of 1/2 hryvnia (27 mm) and weighing 9 kg, which later became one of the prince’s favorite toys. In 1684, this cannon took part in the “battles” for the amusing earthen fortress of Presburg. As part of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, a bombardment company was formed, which became the founder of Peter the Great's field artillery. Peter himself “served” as a bombardier in this company.

The era of the reign of Peter the Great has always attracted and continues to attract the attention of numerous researchers, thanks to whom fundamental works on the history of Peter’s wars and campaigns have been created. The course of the Great Northern War, its many campaigns, battles and individual battles, has long been described, special work devoted to strategy and tactics, the mechanism of command and control of Russian troops, the order of their recruitment and armament, the history of military units, etc., biographies of many prominent military figures of the Petrine era were written. However, the level of knowledge of the material part of the army of Peter I still remains quite low.

Uniforms, design features of weapons, equipment and horse harness (harness), and other details of the Peter the Great era have not been properly studied. This state of affairs fully applies to the material part of the artillery of the Russian army. This is explained, first of all, by the extremely limited documentary base, which, due to a number of objective reasons and accidents, suffered quite serious losses. Archives of military units and institutions that existed at the beginning of the 18th century, which, one way or another, were connected with material support armies were almost completely lost. In 1737 in Moscow, in a huge fire, like many others, the archive of the Pushkarsky Prikaz, which was in charge of all artillery affairs during the initial period of Peter’s reign, perished, and its surviving materials were scattered among various manuscript collections in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The 20th century, with its cataclysms, also did not contribute to the preservation of what little remained of the documentary heritage on the history of the Russian army and artillery.

Capture of Shlisselburg (Noteborg, also known as the Oreshek fortress)

And yet, the loss of the massive complex of military records management can be compensated to some extent due to the fact that some information of a “military” nature remained in the files of other higher government agencies, for example, in the Near Chancellery, His Majesty's Cabinet, the Senate, as well as in the personal collections of figures of that era, such as Feldzeichmeister General Jacob Bruce. The archive of this outstanding associate of Peter the Great is now gradually being published, thanks to which many documents have already been introduced into scientific circulation that reveal hitherto unknown moments in the history of Russian artillery.

As for the material part of Russian artillery during the Northern War, it should be noted that during that period we continued to borrow the experience of Western European states, which had been occurring for a long time even before the era in question. All of Peter’s military transformations, including in the field of artillery, seem to be the natural completion of the process of “Europeanization,” which began in the 1st half of the 17th century. The course of evolution of the material part of the Russian army and artillery during the Northern War can be divided into two main stages.

The first is the period from 1700 (the beginning of the Northern War) to the middle of the first decade of the 18th century. The structure of the entire army then still retained many of the features of the previous era, combining the Russian national type of organization of “military affairs” with the pan-European one. “Manual” weapons, as before, are almost entirely purchased abroad, mainly in Holland. Artillery is traditionally cast in Moscow, although for several years before the start of the Northern War, a large number of artillery pieces were purchased in Sweden, and were even received as a gift from Charles XI as a sign of gratitude to Peter for his participation in the struggle of Christians against the “infidels.” True, the Swedish king died without having time to send them, but young Charles XII, who inherited the throne, repaid his “father’s” debt, and 300 cast-iron guns were delivered to the Russian state in the summer of 1697.

Fragment from the painting by L. Caravaque “Peter I in the Battle of Poltava”

The second stage began around 1705–1706. In continuation of this, the final transition of the domestic armed forces, including artillery, to the Western European model of development takes place. The main source of borrowing was the enemy army. The Swedes copied the organizational structure of the armed forces, and certain types of weapons, and elements of uniforms, as well as equipment, entrenching tools, wagons, forges, etc. Later, in the 1720s, when the confrontation with Sweden ceased to be so relevant, a model Prussia became a role model.

During the second decade of the 18th century, uniforms were unified, the cut of uniforms was simplified, and weapons, equipment and ammunition were standardized. By the mid-1720s, many of these processes were completed, and it could be stated that appearance uniforms, design features of weapons and equipment, horse harness and regimental equipment are fully consistent with European standards. The artillery of the Russian army during this period also practically did not differ from Western European artillery; there were only minor individual features in the design of carriages and gun barrels, almost indistinguishable at first glance.

Siege of Narva

Regimental artillery

On the eve of the Northern War, the regimental artillery of the Russian army was in charge of the Pushkarsky order. At his disposal at the Cannon Yard in Moscow were: 46 “arquebuses on drag” machines, with a caliber from one to four pounds; 38 arquebuses "on swivel looms", caliber from two to six pounds; 80 new 3-pound arquebuses “cast in 207” (i.e. 1699) on looms; there were several very exotic weapons: 2 shotguns and 6 captured Turkish arquebuses of two- and three-pound caliber.

V. Velikanov in his article (Regimental artillery of the Russian army. 1700 - 1709. Tseykhgauz, No. 44. M. 2011. P.80-87) reports on 80 3-pound regimental guns, cast in 1699 and located in Moscow in the Pushkar order by the spring of 1700, but gives an incorrect link to the source of information - the publication of K. Tatarnikov: “Regimental artillery of the Russian army in the first third of the 18th century. // Poltava: To the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava: collection. articles. M. 2009. P.39-48. It's him. Russian field army 1700-1730: Uniforms and equipment. M. 2008. P.153-164., where such information is absent.

At this time, the rearmament of the regimental artillery, begun on the initiative of Peter I, took place in accordance with the new standards he adopted. The young tsar decided to completely abandon the legacy of his father Alexei Mikhailovich, i.e., the previous 2-pound Russian regimental cannon, and move to a single new model of the 3-pound European cannon. This choice was obviously influenced, among other things, by the fact that by this time 300 guns, donated by Charles XI, had finally been delivered to Russia, half of which were 3-pounder guns, and the rest were 2 1/2-pounder) , as well as another 388 guns purchased in Sweden, 100 of them were “light”, that is, regimental calibers.

Hundreds of old regimental cannons were concentrated on the southern borders of the state, and to rearm the field army on the eve of the war with Sweden, new 3-pound regimental guns began to be manufactured according to a single standard. In February 1699, the Tsar ordered the Pushkarsky order to pour out “100 regimental cannonballs, 3 pounds each, 2 arshins long,” and in the same year in August, the Cannon Yard in Moscow received another similar order. In total, in 1699–1700. The government ordered 340 new regimental guns (and a total of 441 guns, of which 100 were mortars). But before the start of the Northern War, they managed to produce only a quarter of the required quantity, since the work was complicated by a fire in the Cannon Yard on July 26–27, 1699, from which it suffered greatly and its main buildings were destroyed.

The new 3-pound regimental guns, with which the “new instrument” regiments, the newly formed regiments of the Russian army, went on a campaign near Narva in 1700, were probably all of domestic production, only the carriages for them were made according to Western European models. All these new regimental guns the guns were lost after the defeat of the Russian army.Of the almost two hundred (195, or 177, or 145 - different figures are given in the sources) Russian guns taken by the Swedish army of Charles XII near Narva, there were at least more than fifty new regimental 3-pounder guns.

(Velikanov (ibid., p. 81) cites data from a Swedish report on captured artillery, according to which 79 regimental guns and arquebuses were taken near Narva, 64 of them were “same type” 3-pound guns, and the rest were the same various calibers.

Losses were made up for by casting new guns. In view of the threat of an invasion of Russia by the Swedish army of Charles XII, it was necessary to produce them “a lot and at once.” After the capture of the Feldzeichmeister of the Russian artillery, Tsarevich Alexander Archilovich (Imeretinsky), near Narva, Peter secretly assigned Duma clerk Vinius A.A., who was considered a great specialist in foundry, to head the artillery department. In 1701, the Pushkar Order was renamed the Artillery Order, and Vinius received the title of “artillery overseer.” Thanks to his efforts, up to 300 new guns were cast already in 1701, but, most likely, these figures given by Vinius should be considered somewhat exaggerated. According to information from the future Feldzeichmeister-General of the Russian Army, J. Bruce, submitted much later, in 1721, in just 1701, 268 guns were produced, of which 109 (or 110, as Bruce wrote) 3-pound guns, and The latter also included field ones, distinguished by their large weight and long barrel.

Subsequently, the samples for the production of gun barrels for regimental artillery were changed several times; the “new manir” was introduced several times, both in 1701 and 1706, and in 1708. Although all this time the 3-pound guns were shortened, thinned and made lighter, they still continued to remain quite heavy and, as a result, poorly maneuverable, which is why guns of smaller calibers had to be cast for the regimental artillery. In general, after the Narva defeat, as soon as the threat of a Swedish invasion passed for the Russian state and Charles XII “switched” to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony, the production of guns, including regimental ones, was sharply reduced. If in 1701 a total of 268 “barrels” were made, then in 1702 only 130 were fired at the Moscow Cannon Yard, of which 70 were siege and 10 regimental one and a half pound guns, and in 1703 even less – 36, of which 32 siege. And only in subsequent years was it possible to increase the production of artillery guns of various systems; in 1704, 101 were manufactured, of which 32 were siege guns, and for the regimental artillery - 12 one-pound and two two-pound guns. Subsequent military events, which were becoming increasingly widespread and were not always going well for the Russian side, required a new increase in artillery production.
Another large-scale loss of artillery occurred in 1706 during the retreat of the Russian army from Grodno in the conditions of the spring thaw. Of the 103 guns of various field and regimental artillery systems, only 40 were able to reach Kyiv in May. Even the “light” 3-pound guns turned out to be extremely unmaneuverable, heavy and cumbersome.

Based on the experience of this “campaign,” the need to develop new, significantly lighter regimental artillery systems compared to previous ones was more clearly defined. After 1706, at the second stage of the development of Russian artillery, a significant change occurred in its material part, mainly it consisted in bringing all gun systems to the uniformity, increasing maneuverability, rate of fire and reliability.

In 1705–1710 Regimental systems again began to predominate in the production of guns. In 1705, 100 guns were cast, of which 35 were siege guns, and 3-pound guns in Novgorod alone - 21, in 1706 - 219 guns, of which 111 were mortars and 12 were siege guns.

As part of the program for reforming Russian artillery and improving its equipment, V.D. Korchmin proposed in December 1705 a new design for a short 3-pound regimental cannon, as well as a 6-pound mortar, which was intended for firing grenades and grapeshot. Peter himself personally looked at the Korchma mortars, he liked them, and he approved their further production. Initially it was planned to install such mortars, cast from bronze, two on one carriage. Subsequently, mortars of a similar design, but no longer bronze, but forged from iron or cast from cast iron, were intended to be mounted on the same carriage with a 3-pound cannon, to enhance the grapeshot fire of the regimental artillery, since it was believed that the latter did not meet the requirements for it. True, the mortars could easily fire successfully with 6-pound grenades. Similar experiments with artillery pieces were carried out in the Russian army before,
Korchmin apparently borrowed the idea of ​​such artillery systems from the Swedes. After the surrender of Mitava in September 1705, the Russian army took many guns of various types as trophies, including regimental 3-pound guns with two 6-pound mortars on one carriage, as well as a “battery” with three 4-pound “martyrs” on one machine. Probably these captured guns, slightly modified, were immediately adopted by our troops. It is known for certain that in September 1705, the Preobrazhensky Regiment received a cast-iron shotgun “...on a machine, on the sides along the raspberry martyr, cast-iron wells.” At the same time, the guards artillerymen received a whole “battery” of 4 copper mortars on one carriage.

For Bruce, who had been in charge of the entire artillery unit since 1704, all these Korchma innovations came as a complete surprise. Being in the active army, he knew nothing about the plans of the tsar’s favorite and asked to send him drawings of the guns developed by Korchmin, at least for reference. At the beginning of January 1706, Vasily Korchmin submitted a drawing of a 6-pound mortar to the Artillery Order, and a copy was sent to Bruce. However, the artillery chief received it only on April 1, during the retreat from Grodno on the road to Kyiv. The design of the mortar turned out to be quite successful, and its main difference from other systems - the conical charging chamber, ensured a tighter fit of the projectile (6-pound grenade) to the walls of the barrel bore at the moment of ignition of the powder charge, which increased the range and increased the accuracy of shooting. At the same time, Bruce found out that by February 1, 100 mortars and 26 three-pound guns had already been cast in Moscow according to new drawings and “they decided to wipe off the profits and put them on a drill,” and they also began to make machines and forge wheels for them. By the beginning of March 1706, 30 new 3-pound guns with two 6-pound mortars were finally finished and were soon sent to the troops for testing. In May 1706, 20 cannons were sent from Moscow to Smolensk, each with two iron mortars on a common carriage and 20 copper 6-pound mortars mounted in pairs on one carriage. At the same time, 10 more cannons with 20 “iron forged mortars” were equipped to St. Petersburg.

Based on the test results, the new artillery systems were considered quite suitable for re-equipping infantry regiments. With the exception, perhaps, of only copper mortars doubled on one carriage, because This type of artillery armament did not become widespread among the troops; it is known that, for example, in 1709, all these “20 copper martyrs, two per camp” continued to be in Smolensk throughout the year.

N.P. Pavlov, clerk of the Artillery Order, informed Bruce about the characteristics of Korchmin’s guns: “The guns that are attached to mortars ... weigh 9 pounds, and 10 pounds, and 13 pounds, and 17 pounds.” Perhaps Korchmin had not yet finally decided on the parameters of the guns of his design and had developed several options, but, undoubtedly, his guns were significantly lighter compared to those short-barreled 3-pound regimental guns that were cast in 1700–1703. and weighed 19–20 pounds or more. Even if we take into account that in the end, of all the options, a sample weighing 17 pounds was approved, which is considered generally accepted in military historical literature, then even in this case the Korchma 3-pounder gun was significantly lighter than previous systems.

F. Yu. Romodanovsky, who in 1706 replaced Bruce in Moscow in the leadership of the Artillery Order, was ordered to immediately produce 150 new 3-pound guns of the Korchmin system to rearm the entire regimental artillery of the Russian army. But it turned out that the Order does not have reserves of red copper, which is necessary as an additive to bell copper to obtain the required quality of the metal, and there are no funds for its purchase. It was possible to collect a certain amount from private merchants through predatory requisition, but there was only enough copper to cast the first test batch of guns.

In August 1706, the Order of Artillery received an order from Bruce to manufacture a new batch of these guns - the order was for 51 pieces. By the end of October, 50 were ready. The carriages for them were supposed to be of the “new maniru” type, but of the usual two-frame trunk type with four wheels “front and rear”, i.e. with a two-wheeled front end. This is evidenced by the correspondence of Bruce, who instructed the Cannon Yard to begin manufacturing carriages for the entire batch of new guns only after two samples of carriages and wheels arrived in Moscow. However, the dispatch of the “model machines” was delayed; they were late because... were sent from Kyiv only on September 6, but already on November 6, Bruce sent new instructions - “to wait to make carriages” until experimental firing was carried out from the “newly designed” cannon installed on the “newly made machine”. And at the very end of the year, he completely canceled his previous orders, ordering carriages to be made for the cannons “against the previous model.”

It is known that at the same time, by Peter’s decree of July 2, the production of regimental guns was also organized in Kyiv itself. During the period 1706–1707. master of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra Zlatkovsky was supposed to cast 50 3-pound caliber cannons. The machines and wheels for them had to be made according to the “Kyiv” model, and craftsmen and iron were sent from Moscow to forge them. However, Zlatkovsky managed to issue only 34 cannons, since at the end of 1707 all efforts were aimed at strengthening the built Kiev-Pechersk fortification and arming its bastions with fortress artillery.
Peter hurried Bruce to manufacture field guns and send them to the army, since it was urgently necessary to make up for the losses incurred during the retreat from Grodno, and to strengthen the artillery in anticipation of the intensification of the actions of Charles XII and the possible invasion of the Swedes into Russia. This scenario was quite real after the betrayal of the Saxon Elector Augustus II the Strong, who renounced the Polish crown and made peace with Charles. We had to hurry and put up with many shortcomings. So, Bruce ordered all ready-made carriages to be immediately sent from Moscow, even if mortars had not yet been installed on them, believing that everything could be completed later on the spot. There was also not enough iron to forge carriages.

And yet, the carriages were made according to the model sent from Kyiv, although Bruce subsequently corresponded for a long time, directly expressing the opinion that these carriages would not withstand prolonged shooting. Among other things, he talked about another drawback: it was simply dangerous to shoot from the mortars mounted on these carriages, because with a powder charge weighing more than two lots, “the swivels of the swivel”. The indication of swivels indicates that the mortars were mounted on the machine in a completely different way from the one usually depicted in modern literature. They were most likely attached to frames or a combat axis, like naval falconets, or like oars in oarlocks.
At the beginning of 1707, artillery captain V.D. Korchmin handed over to Prince F.Yu. Romodanovsky in Moscow Peter’s oral order and drawings, according to which from now on gun wheels should be made for 24, 18, 12, 8 mi, 6 and 3 pound guns. According to J.V. Bruce, Peter’s decree read: “to make wheels for those machines using the best craftsmanship against the Swedish model.” For the new 3-pound guns manufactured at the Moscow Cannon Yard, wheels began to be made according to the Swedish model.
In 1707, apparently still in winter, a convoy with 50 new 3-pound cannons left Moscow. His arrival to the army in Ostrog was expected in April. Bruce intended to accept the delivered guns into the field artillery, and to exclude from it and send to Kyiv, to the garrison artillery, the same number of similar old guns, if necessary, replenishing the required number with guns taken from the regiments. However, Peter I decided to replace the regimental artillery in all regiments of the Russian army that were on the campaign with these guns. By mid-May this process in the infantry was completed. The only delay occurred with the regiment of Prince Dolgorukov, which, for some unknown reason, did not send its cannons to Ostrog on time.

Thus, two years before the climax of the entire Northern War - the Battle of Poltava - Peter almost completely, at least in the infantry regiments, replaced the regimental artillery with new, more advanced, as it seemed to him, systems. Of course, it can be assumed that in the time remaining before Poltava, Peter, with his irrepressible character, could have made changes to the regimental artillery systems more than once, but they, in our opinion, could not be as global as the complete change in the material part in 1707 . In the conditions of the invasion of Russia by the Swedish army led by Charles XII, which began in 1708, Peter clearly had no time for large-scale reforms and experiments, which means that the regimental artillery of the 1705–1707 model. (Korchmin’s short barrels and double-frame trunk carriages with front and rear wheels) should have been largely preserved.

One noticeable change in the material part was yet to occur; parts of the new regimental guns were removed from the carriages or the 6-pound iron mortars were not mounted at all, leaving only a 3-pound barrel. This can be judged at least by the fact that in the spring of 1708 and even 1709, new regimental guns continued to be supplied to the troops - 3-pound guns without mortars. True, it is known that on March 25, 1708, Bruce sent Field Marshal B.P. Sheremetev to his chief infantry regiment 3 cannons of 3-pound caliber “with all sorts of accessories ... and with small martyrs.” But the main receipts of guns and mortars into the regiments were noted in 1711-1712. Only about half of the infantry regiments for which it was possible to identify archival documents on the presence of regimental artillery were armed in the 1710s with 3-pounder cannons with two cast-iron mortars on a carriage.

Only isolated fragmentary information is known about the presence of guns with mortars on the same carriage in the regiments of the Russian army during the Battle of Poltava. Thus, the modern researcher of the Battle of Poltava P.A. Krotov managed to confirm the presence of mortars on the carriages of regimental guns for the period of this battle in only one regiment - the Ingermanland Dragoons, a very privileged regiment sponsored by A.D. Menshikov himself. According to the excerpts he published from the “Gazette of the Ingermanland Dragoon Artillery Regiment (as in the text of the document)”, the artillery team of the Ingermanland Dragoons was armed with 3 three-pound cannons, and with them 4 mortars, with an ammunition supply of 100 “martyr repaired cannonballs”.

The dismantling of mortars from the carriages of regimental guns also allows us to assume the records of ammunition consumption of the regimental artillery of three Russian divisions on the day of the Battle of Poltava. They contain only cannonballs and buckshot for 3-pound cannons, no 6-pound grenades, no 6-pound grapeshot charges. It is true that the lack of information about the consumption of 6-pound shells does not mean that the mortars were removed from the carriages; they simply could not be fired. But besides this, there is one more evidence. P. A. Krotov established that the Russian artillery shortly before the Battle of Poltava included “20 6-pound cast iron mortars.” Moreover, carpenters and blacksmiths assigned to the artillery for the mortars produced 20 iron-bound machines in the period from May 28 to June 4. After which these guns were apparently transferred to the regimental artillery in the infantry regiments; in L.N. de Allart’s division alone there were 10 of them. Krotov, however, suggested that these “mortars” were nothing more than 3-pound cast-iron cannons with a steel nozzle on the muzzle for firing 6-pound grenades. There were similar artillery systems in Russia, but as experimental ones and not in such quantities, and certainly not in these years.

After the death of Peter, in the 1750s, according to Bishev’s project, prototypes of the so-called canon mortars were made, just like 3-pound copper cannons with steel mortars in the muzzle. It was assumed that these guns would be capable of successfully firing all known types of projectiles: cannonballs and grapeshot, like ordinary regimental guns, as well as grenades, like mortars. The cannon exhibited in the Artillery Museum, attributed as developed by Korchmin in 1706, apparently is Bishev’s canon mortar, made by him from the old regimental 3-pound cannon of Korchmin’s system and a new steel mortar attachment. In 1740, Goetsch proposed adopting a similar system. His universal weapon “mortar-canon” was manufactured in the St. Petersburg Arsenal in 1740-1743. At close ranges it was supposed to fire 2-pound bombs, and at long ranges with 3-pound cannonballs, combining the capabilities of a siege mortar and a regimental cannon. The barrel channel of this gun was made in two stages: it began with a bomb cauldron of 230 mm diameter for firing 2-pound bombs, and continued with a 76 mm cannon channel, which served as a charging chamber for this mortar. The barrel length of this gun was 1500 mm, weight 661.7 kg. Vingrad was cast as a flat tide. The carriage was ordinary - double-framed, bound with iron. The tests of this mortar-canon that took place in 1743 showed its complete unsuitability. The gun was rejected and transferred for storage to the St. Petersburg Arsenal.

In 1744, A.K. Nartov, with the help of the foundry master of the St. Petersburg Arsenal, Semyon Kopiev, produced an experimental 3-pound cannon with a muzzle that expanded in the form of a mortar cauldron, allowing it to fire 8-pound caliber grenades. In this gun, Nartov first realized his idea of ​​“shooting different bombs and cannonballs from out-of-caliber cannons,” as stated in the guidebook of the Artillery Museum. But due to the complexity and high cost of manufacturing such guns, this artillery system did not become widespread.

Nevertheless, the idea of ​​​​creating a universal weapon did not leave many artillery inventors. In 1752, artillery captain Ivan Bishev proposed adopting a whole system of three cannon mortars for field and naval artillery. According to his drawings, in the St. Petersburg Arsenal, master S. Kopyev cast three experimental mortar cannons in the St. Petersburg Arsenal in 1753, the cannon calibers of which were 12 pounds, 18 and 24 pounds. Bishev's guns, unlike Goetsch's canon mortars, had both trunnions and a tray molded to the breech of the barrel.

Testing of Bishev's guns continued from 1754 to 1756, when he proposed a new design for regimental 3- and 6-pound mortar guns. During the tests, it turned out that the ballistic properties of using these guns as mortars were quite satisfactory, but their cannon use when firing buckshot and cannonballs was significantly inferior to conventional guns in terms of both range and accuracy of fire.

The problem was that when the cannonball flew out of the cannon channel into the mortar cauldron, there was a sharp drop in the pressure of the powder gases and their uneven impact on the cannonball, which was not centered in the mortar cauldron by the channel walls, due to which the vector of the initial velocity of the cannonball deviated from the axis of the gun channel.

In addition, firing large-caliber grenades and bombs caused strong recoil and damage to gun carriages built on the model of cannon field guns.
In addition to everything else, manufacturing barrels of such a two-stage complex curved configuration was a complex technical task and required the creation of special machines. For these reasons, the Bishev gun system was not adopted for service. At the same time, the development of artillery guns of other systems began, proposed for adoption by General Feldzeichmeister Count Shuvalov: unicorns, secret howitzers, and guns similar in purpose to the Bishev mortar canons.

In 1756, Shuvalov proposed: a 12-pound cannon with an expanding cylindrical muzzle designed to fire 1-pound bombs, and a 6-pound cannon of a similar design. The results of their tests turned out to be disappointing, but thanks to Shuvalov’s stubbornness, an experimental batch of such guns was manufactured, they were even adopted by the observation corps, but the canon mortars never took part in military operations.

These same “cast iron mortars” were ordinary 6-pound short-barreled mortars with a cylindrical or conical charging chamber of the Korchmin system, developed by him for installation on the carriages of 3-pound regimental guns, removed from these carriages during the military campaign. This statement is also supported by the fact that it is unlikely that such weapons, i.e. 3-pound guns, and even with a muzzle attachment, as Krotov says, were sent to the active army without carriages. And 6-pound mortars also would not have been sent from the Cannon Yard without at least the simplest machines. The fact that these 20 mortars were not 3-pound cannons with attachments can be judged by the fact that artillery craftsmen could not have made 20 carriages with wheels and limbers for such guns, with a total barrel weight of 10 pounds, within a week. Well, they had no opportunity for this in the field conditions of the march to Poltava. Even for the Moscow Cannon Yard, such a task, given the availability of high-quality dry wood, iron for bindings, etc., should have taken several weeks, if not months. The simplest thing that can be assumed is that the craftsmen made tripod machines, long known not only in the Russian army, for the 6-pound mortars removed from the regimental gun carriages. These were exactly the kind of mortars that were installed on them, albeit copper ones, designed for firing grenades. These original prototypes of mortars were in service with the grenadier and dragoon regiments. They are in the collection of the St. Petersburg Artillery Museum; A.P. Barbasov wrote about them back in 1959.

However, the machines for 6-pound mortars could not only be in the form of a tripod; we can definitely say that machines of different designs made it possible to carry these artillery pieces on the hands, i.e. mortars were portable or “hand-held”. The widespread use of 6-pound portable mortars not only in the ground army, but also in the navy is documented. In 1709 alone, 100 “cast-iron manual 6-pound martyrs, approved in wooden machines,” were sent from Moscow to St. Petersburg to the Admiralty. A year before Poltava, 18 small iron martyrs, with a 6-pound grenade, were sent from the Moscow cannon yard “on a military campaign in the field artillery,” and another 50 such guns with an ammunition supply of 15,000 grenades were sent to St. Petersburg. In total, on the eve of the Battle of Poltava, the field army should have consisted of at least 230 iron 6-pound mortars. But how many of them were hand-held, and how many were installed on the carriages of regimental guns, is not yet possible to establish.

Many modern researchers believe that the artillery system, consisting of a 3-pound cannon and two 6-pound copper mortars on one two-wheeled “shaft” carriage, was the main one in Russian artillery in 1700–1709. - the main stage of the Northern War. However, it is not. Such an artillery system, more precisely, a combination of a 3-pound cannon and two bronze mortars on a gun carriage, corresponds to a later period, and perhaps appeared or was finally established only during the reign of Elizabeth, who restored all the old traditions of her great father. Under Peter, these guns were mounted separately: two copper mortars on one carriage, and a 3-pound gun on the other, on which two iron mortars could also be mounted on swivels. Probably, as an experiment, these guns were also placed on drogues, but this hardly became a generally accepted practice. According to the artillery staff of Peter I from 1723, only two-frame carriages with limbers were provided for all regimental guns, and the “heirs” of Peter I and Bruce - Minich, Ginther, Prince of Hesse-Hamburg in the management of artillery did not allow the use of shaft carriages, moreover in 1730, all regimental artillery was completely taken away from the regiments.

The later stage, 1707–1709, is characterized by other types of systems inherent in our domestic artillery, created by Russian artillerymen taking into account the experience of conducting combat operations at the first stage of the Northern War. These are the ones we need to try to recreate.

Based on the above, we can propose a reconstruction of the regimental artillery for this stage of the war in the following form:
3-pound short Korchmin cannon on a shaft carriage with possible options for replacing the 3-pound barrel with gun barrels of a smaller caliber - one- or two-pound;
a half-pound howitzer on a trunk carriage with a set of barrels: short, long and a shotgun; reproduce the installation of the barrels of these howitzers on a shaft carriage of the type created for the 3-pounder gun.
Thus, almost the entire model range of regimental artillery guns of the Russian army of the Northern War era will be displayed, with the exception of a 3-pound gun with two 6-pound mortars on a trunk carriage and a similar system on a shaft carriage. The latter, as we know, could not be used at the first stage of the war in 1700–1709, the events of which were decisive for the entire course of the Northern War.

During the era of the Northern War, the Russian army used guns and so-called “drogs” for transportation, i.e. a carriage with shafts that did not require the use of a limber, but it is unlikely that they were widespread. At the first stage of the war there is no information about their use; they appear only in the middle of the first decade. So, in August 1706, Bruce ordered clerk Pavlov to take 6 cannons from brigadier Gorbov (commander of the future Perm Dragoon Regiment) in Moscow in the yard and make carriages for them on two wheels, “and the shafts would be from the same machines.” They were built primarily for small-caliber guns, i.e., one- or two-pound, and even smaller, which is confirmed by information about the receipt of five copper cannons “half-pound core” into Gorbov’s dragoon regiment in 1707, with all the necessary equipment for them accessories and ammunition. This document does not mention carriages, but it is easy to understand that we are talking about guns taken from the foreman’s yard and placed on the ditch. Such artillery systems turned out to be quite maneuverable and could successfully accompany, for example, dragoon regiments, and not only on the march, but also on the battlefield. Perhaps this design of carriages was borrowed from the artillery of the Saxon army, side by side with which they fought Russian troops with the Swedes in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1705–1706.

In October of the same 1706, Bruce, on the orders of A.D. Menshikov, released nine 2-pound cannons with all accessories, “on machines and from wheels,” to his troops who were in Poland along with their “allies” Poles and Saxons. Whether they were on shaft carriages, like Brigadier Gorbov’s cannons, is not known for sure, but it is quite likely, although they were made earlier than Gorbov’s. It is possible that Menshikov specifically asked Bruce to make the most lightweight artillery systems for his dragoon regiments in order to replace with them the half-pound howitzers, which were in service with the regiments from 1702–1704 and which turned out to be too heavy and clumsy for maneuver warfare.

We can agree with the assumption made by R. Palacios that the drogues are the so-called “summer” carriage, i.e. The gun moved on wheels during the warm season. With the onset of winter and the establishment of permanent snow cover A short carriage was removed from the road, on which the gun barrel itself was fixed. Then this carriage was mounted on a sled, and the result was a gun on a “winter” carriage.

Subsequently, they tried to use this design of carriages with shafts to lighten larger artillery systems: 3-pound, and even six- and 12-pound guns, as well as half-pound howitzers. According to the surviving 1730 inventory of old “Petrine” field artillery guns, it was the half-pound howitzers that had shaft-mounted carriages, however, their design was such that it was believed that “they would break when fired.” Although post-Petrine artillerymen most likely accurately believed that these howitzers would fire grenades, in fact, as regimental guns of dragoon regiments, they were mainly intended to fire grapeshot, and many were even shotguns, including, apparently, and the famous Korchma “long howitzers” with a conical charging chamber, which some of our domestic “jingoistic” historians are inclined to attribute to the prototype of the legendary “unicorns”.

In the first years of the Northern War, the dragoon regiments of the Russian army did not have regimental artillery at all. Since 1702, at least part of the dragoon regiments and formations were given one-pound and half-pound howitzers, and later, from 1706, the dragoons used guns of various calibers, even half-pound ones, as regimental artillery.

Faced during hostilities with the problem of low maneuverability of howitzers of the old systems, they were replaced in 1704 with new half-pound howitzers specially designed for regimental artillery - the barrels were shortened and significantly lightened, supposedly even up to 26 pounds. Subsequently, one of the samples of such howitzers, which weighed only 22 pounds, remained in service with Russian artillery for almost half a century.

The short half-pound howitzers created turned out to be very successful, combining their main quality - lightness with a very powerful grapeshot effect, which, of course, was the main thing for the regimental artillery of the dragoon regiments. However, these guns had significant drawbacks: due to the short length of the barrel, the firing range was short, and the trajectory of the projectile was too overhead, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of fire against the enemy’s linear formations. After the loss of a significant part of the “dragoon” howitzers recaptured by the Swedes in 1705, attempts were made to create a new type of gun, with an increased barrel length, which would significantly increase its combat capabilities. However, by this time howitzers had already been practically “removed” from the arsenal of the dragoon regiments.
It is believed that the design of a “long” half-pound howitzer was developed in 1707 by V. Korchmin under the leadership of J. Bruce. In addition to the longer barrel length (it reached 10 calibers; according to other sources, only the length of the barrel bore reached 10 calibers), the new howitzer had another important feature - a conical charging chamber. All this made it possible to increase the range and power of fire and make the flight path of the projectile (and these could already be grenades and cannonballs, and not just buckshot) more flat, and therefore more effective against the enemy’s linear formations.

It is not worth attributing the priority of the invention of the conical charging chamber to Bruce or Korchmin; they knew about it long before them. It is known for certain that in 1706 in Kyiv, the master of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra cast, by “arrangement,” five one-pound howitzers intended for field artillery, and the weight of the barrels was only 34 pounds, and the charging chamber was conical. But the Bruce-Korchmin design was distinguished by its longer barrel length, however, the weight of the gun increased significantly, according to various sources - either by 10 pounds, i.e., up to 36, or even up to 44 pounds.

Later, the weight of a long half-pound howitzer was reduced to almost 32 pounds, but it was intended for firing mainly with buckshot, and not with grenades and cannonballs, and was called a “shotgun” or “shotgun.” It was precisely these guns that were ideally suited as regimental artillery for dragoon regiments, but there were not enough of them, and Peter I ordered the old 6-pounder guns to be drilled out to a half-pound caliber with a conical charging chamber, thus turning them into shotguns.

However, there were generally few howitzers in the artillery of the Russian army. Thus, at the Moscow Cannon Yard from 1700 to 1708, only 26 of them were cast, while 3-pound guns - 329, and mortars - 305. In subsequent years, howitzers were cast in both Kazan and Kiev, although in small quantities quantities. In 1715, according to the new states, it was decided to leave only 5 howitzers in service with the entire field artillery of the Russian army; they were not left in the regimental artillery at all.
Along with the attached artillery, the dragoons were armed with 2-3-pound hand mortars.

Field artillery

In combat operations at the first stage of the war, the 8-pounder gun was almost never used in field artillery. Peter I adopted the German system of dividing guns by caliber: 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 pounds, and the 8-pound guns were from the French system: 4, 8 and 12 pounds. Moreover, for a long time it was believed that these guns were first adopted by Peter only out of necessity in 1711, from among the Swedish trophies previously taken in Mitau, but after the unsuccessful Prut campaign they remained in the Russian army and lasted for many more decades. According to other sources, back in 1703, the Moscow Cannon Yard received an order for the manufacture of such guns. It is known for certain that in August 1707, Peter ordered the casting of 12 eight-pound cannons in Moscow according to the drawings developed by Bruce.
By the end of the year the guns were ready, but the carriages and wheels were apparently completed only the following year. At least since 1708, the participation of these guns in the campaigns of the Russian army has been recorded. One way or another, it is certain that in the first years of the Northern War there were no 8-pound guns in the Russian artillery.

After the Narva defeat, only guns of 3, 6 and 12 calibers were ordered for field artillery; only later did 8-pound guns begin to be used, and in some campaigns they even prevailed. So, in 1709, near Poltava, the field artillery of the Russian army had two 12-pound, 12 eight-pound and 14 three-pound guns, but there were no six-pound guns. In 1712, during the campaign near Elbing, there were an equal number of 8-pound and 6-pound cannons - 8 each, two more 12-pound caliber, 23 - 3-pound, and one 2-pound. In 1730, the old Peter's cannons remained in service with the Russian field artillery: 12-pounders - 3; 8-pounders - 12; 6 pound and 3 pound 6 each.
In field artillery, as in regimental artillery, attempts were constantly made to improve the design of guns, and first of all, to lighten them. At the beginning of 1706, Peter instructed Bruce to make “thin-sized” barrels for 12-pound and 6-pound cannons, which were “much heavy” when we had them. The length of the first was supposed to be 25 calibers, and the second - 30. On March 1, 1706, Bruce was reported from the Moscow Cannon Yard that a royal decree had been received to cast 12 pieces of 6-pound and 12-pound cannons according to newly sent drawings. Already in April, 11 12-pound and 10 six-pound guns of “new casting” were sent from Moscow to Smolensk, and from there by water to Kyiv. The weight of the barrels was different, for 12-pound guns - 100, 101, 102 and 105 pounds, for 6-pound guns - 60, 61, 63 and 65 pounds.

Thus, the statements of many historians (Ratch, Khmyrov, Belyaev, etc.) are not confirmed that already in 1706 it was possible to reduce the weight of field guns: for 12-pound guns by 30 pounds, bringing it to 79 pounds, and for 6-pounders - up to 30 poods instead of 56. True, at that time in Russia there were so many experiments with artillery that it is impossible to list everything. For example, there were attempts to drill barrels to larger calibers, i.e. 3-pound to 6-pound, and 6-pound to 8 or 12-pound. But these were just experiments.

At this time, Bruce was also improving the carriage, especially the wheels, which received the most complaints. Three types of wheels were developed, for 12, 6 and 3 pounder guns, and from now on they had to meet only this standard. “Skewed” or “skewed” “rear” wheels and “front” wheels were made, i.e. for the front or special type four-wheeled carriages, rapid-fire charging boxes for transporting already equipped gun cartridges (Peter personally approved them and even took part in the development in mid-1708, and by the end of the year 50 new boxes had already been sent to the army), as well as artillery decks, dissolutions and other carts, artillery accessories, entrenching tools and much more.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Russian artillery was at a high technical level, in no way inferior to the French. The military experience gained by Russia in the campaigns of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as well as the reforms carried out by Count Arakcheev since 1805, made Russian artillery a formidable force.

Army fireworks and guards foot artillery gunner

All artillery of the ground forces was divided into field, siege And serfdom. In the War of 1812 it acted predominantly field artillery, which consisted of army artillery And guards artillery. They, in turn, were divided into horseback And on foot. The crews of the foot artillery accompanied the guns on foot, and in the horse artillery they were mounted on horses and trained not only to service the guns, but also to fight on horseback.

Armament of Russian field artillery
The Russian field artillery was armed with guns and unicorns. The guns could fire any type of projectile, but only at visible targets. Unicorn was an artillery system that combined the characteristics of a cannon and a howitzer. Therefore, shooting from a unicorn could be carried out both direct fire and from behind cover. The maximum firing range of the guns reached 2200 - 2500 m. The firing range of the unicorns was somewhat less - up to 2000 m.

Cannons and unicorns of the same caliber, but having different barrel lengths, were called cannons/unicorns of medium/small proportion.

Cannonballs, grenades, buckshot and incendiary cannonballs were used for shooting - brandkugel. The cannons fired mainly with cannonballs and grapeshot, and the unicorns fired with grenades.

12-pounder guns and 20-pounder unicorns served 13 people, and horse-drawn teams of 6 horses were used for transportation. The lighter 6-pounder guns and 10-pounder unicorns were carried by a team of 4 horses and had 10 servants.

Table of guns in service with Russian field artillery in 1812:

Name of guns	Caliber (mm)	Implement weight (kg)	Number of shells in the charging box
12-pounder medium proportion gun
12-pounder small proportion gun
6-pounder gun
20 pound unicorn
10 pound medium proportioned unicorn
10 lb small proportion unicorn
3 pound unicorn

Organization of Russian field artillery
By the beginning of 1812, artillery Russian Empire was organized into brigades. In total there were 27 army and 1 guards artillery brigades. Each brigade consisted of 6 companies: 2 battery, 2 light, 1 horse and 1 “pioneer” (engineer). Each company had 12 guns. Thus, one artillery brigade had 60 guns. In total, the Russian army in 1812 had 1,600 guns. The main tactical unit in artillery was considered to be a company.

Division of mouth into battery operated, lightweight And horse-drawn was explained by the special tactical tasks of each of them, as well as by the types of artillery weapons.

Battery companies were intended to create large batteries and mass fire. Therefore, each battery company was armed with four half-pound unicorns, four 12-pounder cannons of medium proportion and four 12-pounder cannons of small proportion. In addition, each battery company had two three-pound unicorns, which, if necessary, were attached to the Jaeger regiments.

Half-pound unicorn model 1805

Light companies used to support infantry regiments. For this purpose, each regiment was usually assigned half a company (6 guns). The light companies were armed with six 12-pounder and six 6-pounder guns.

Horse companies were intended to support mounted regiments and were armed with six 10-pound unicorns and six 6-pound cannons.

Russian field artillery tactics
In battle, Russian field artillery was guided by the tactics proposed by the talented Russian artilleryman A.I. Kutaisov in “General rules for artillery in a field battle.” These “Rules” summarized the wealth of experience accumulated by Suvorov and Napoleon during numerous wars.

It was not recommended to place artillery in open, elevated places. Before the battle, they tried to place unicorns behind small fortifications, since they could fire from a canopy. For ease of firing, a distance of 15 steps was maintained between the guns. The skeleton of the defensive position was considered first line artillery. It was located 800-1000 m from the enemy, and was carefully camouflaged to match the color of the area. Behind the first line batteries at a distance of 100 m were the first line infantry in battalion columns. To prevent unexpected enemy attacks on artillery firing positions, an infantry or cavalry unit was specially allocated - artillery cover.

When defending positions, artillery fire was concentrated on the advancing enemy infantry and cavalry, and, with the support of their own attacking units, on the enemy artillery. Particularly important targets were bombarded with massive fire both during the offensive and in defense, but in an offensive battle the main task of the artillery was considered to be the fight against enemy artillery.

The greatest efficiency when firing cannonballs was achieved at a distance of 600 m. If the enemy approached 300 m, the gun began firing buckshot. Almost no lethal fire was fired at targets located further than 1000 m. In this case, the artillery fired sparsely, only hindering the enemy’s maneuvers.

The infantry and cavalry began the offensive only after the enemy was suppressed by artillery fire. When pursuing the retreating enemy, the artillery stuck to the front lines of the infantry to prevent the enemy from counterattacking. During the retreat, the artillery was supposed to protect the movement of the troops, and the remaining units were supposed to protect the artillery.

Horse artillery was used mainly as a reserve. The presence of a sufficient number of reserve artillery made it possible to concentrate the required amount of artillery in in the right place and at the right time.

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Chronicle of the day: First Western Army: assault on the Dinaburg fortress

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, part of the French corps of Marshal Oudinot began an assault on the Dinaburg fortress. The battle lasted 12 hours, the French launched two assaults, but both were repulsed by Russian troops. Gunfire on both sides continued throughout the night until dawn.

Second Western Army: Karpov's brigade repulsed the attack
General Bagration's army concentrated near the city of Slutsk. The rearguard of Ataman Platov, who was in Nesvizh, left the city and headed to Romanov. The last to retreat was the brigade of Major General Karpov. The French, noticing the retreat of the brigade, attacked it with three squadrons of Polish lancers. Karpov's brigade repelled the enemy attack, completely destroying one squadron in hand-to-hand combat and putting the other two to flight. After this victory, Karpov’s Cossacks headed to Romanov to join Platov’s main forces.

Person: Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov

Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov (1784-1812)
The life path of Alexander Kutaisov shows very well how strong the difference can be between two generations, between father and son. Being the son of a famous courtier without family or tribe, who as a boy was captured during the storming of a Turkish fortress, and became one of the closest people to Emperor Paul I (no joke, the emperor trusted him to shave himself!), Alexander Kutaisov from birth could hope for a successful, and most importantly - a quick career. And these expectations were fully justified: in 1793 Alexander Kutaisov was already a sergeant, in 1796 - a sergeant, then a captain, in 1799 - a colonel under A.A. Arakcheev (at the age of 15!), in 1806 - major general. However, this did not corrupt him at all, but quite the opposite - it gave him additional means to work on himself.

In 1806, the young general found himself in battle for the first time and immediately received praise from his superiors, then participated in a number of major battles in 1806-1807, where he became known as one of the most skillful and courageous artillerymen.

After completing the campaign to Galicia A.I. Kutaisov decides to go to Europe to fill some gaps in his education. On the eve of the 1812 campaign, he developed “General Rules for Artillery in Field Battles,” which became in fact the first artillery regulations.

With the outbreak of the War of 1812, Kutaisov became the chief of all artillery of the 1st Western Army; during the rearguard battles, he was wounded and became famous for his heroic behavior in key operations up to the Battle of Borodino, especially during the defense of Smolensk. By the way, it is he who is credited with the idea of ​​saving the Smolensk icon Mother of God upon surrender of the city.

In the Battle of Borodino, he commanded all the artillery of the Russian army and before the start of the battle he sent out an order with the following content: “Confirm from me in all companies that they do not move from their positions until the enemy sits astride the guns. To tell commanders and all officers that by courageously holding on to the closest shot of grapeshot, we can only achieve the point that the enemy will not yield a single step of our position. Artillery must sacrifice itself; let them take you with the guns, but fire the last shot of grapeshot at point-blank range, and the battery, which will be captured in this way, will cause harm to the enemy, which will completely atone for the loss of the guns.” Sinister les cosaques

June 26 (July 8), 1812

The development of artillery technology in the second half of the 19th century, which took place in the general mainstream of the industrial revolution, is clearly visible in the example of field artillery. In just over half a century, incredible changes have taken place in this field, comparable in quantity and quality to four centuries of previous firearms development.

The first half of the century before last was the final stage in the development of smooth-walled artillery; At this time, no significant changes occurred, except for the invention of shrapnel by the English officer Shrapnel. In particular, the field artillery of the Russian army for a long time consisted mainly of guns of the 1805 system, otherwise “Arakcheevskaya” (developed by a special commission chaired by Count Arakcheev). These included 12-pounder (120mm) "large" and "small proportion" guns, 6-pounder (95mm) guns, ½-pound (152mm) and ¼-pound (120mm) unicorns. All of these were smooth-bore (smooth-walled) muzzle-loading guns, cast primarily from a copper alloy. The maximum firing range did not exceed 2770 meters with a solid cannonball and 1300 with a grenade, the rate of fire was 1.5-2 rounds per minute.

A third of a century later, the guns of the 1838 system generally retained the same data. But the ammunition load changed (battery guns gave way to incendiary grenades, short-range grapeshot to grapeshot grenades), and a new sight was introduced. Before the Crimean War, they managed to put into service another 6-pound cannon of a new design in 1845 and a 12-pound cannon with slightly improved characteristics.

The Crimean War served as a kind of watershed - all the backwardness of this artillery equipment immediately became visible to the naked eye. In terms of effective firing range, field artillery was inferior even to the new rifled small arms. The high consumption of grapeshots during the defense of Sevastopol is typical - the enemy infantry approached the artillery positions undisturbed, and fire on them had to be conducted only briefly. Therefore, the qualitative renewal of artillery became one of the main directions of reforms carried out under the leadership of Minister of War D.A. Milyutina. Attempts to improve the accuracy of fire of smooth-walled artillery with unusual designs such as eccentric cores or discoidal projectiles did not give the expected result. The best solution could be helical rifling, which would provide elongated projectiles with rotation around their axis and, accordingly, stability in flight.

Rifled artillery

Individually rifled guns were made back in the 17th century, including breech-loading ones. For example, a ceremonial 46-mm rifled arquebus with a screw (piston) bolt, made in the Moscow Armory in 1661-1673. The other gun, a 25-mm smooth-walled one, had some kind of wedge breech. In 1816 in Bavaria, Lieutenant Colonel Reichenbach proposed a design for a bronze rifled gun for firing oblong shells, and 10 years later Major Reike was already firing iron shells with a lead shell from a rifled cannon. More important and extensive experiments with rifled guns loaded from the breech were carried out in the 1840-1850s by the Sardinian officer G. Cavalli.

The French, having begun experiments with rifled guns in 1848, 10 years later adopted a rifled muzzle-loading gun, the projectile of which was equipped with two rows of protrusions leading it along the rifling of the barrel.

Rifled artillery was first used during the Italian War of 1859, when it, used by the French, demonstrated clear advantages over smooth-walled Austrian artillery. In the same year, the Austrians introduced similar rifled artillery, but during the war of 1866 it turned out to be weaker than the Prussian rifled artillery - breech-loading and longer-range.

In Prussia, research into breech-loading rifled guns began in 1851, using the experiments of the Swedish Baron Warendorf, who began them in the 1840s under the influence of Cavalli. And in 1859, rifled guns and projectiles with a lead shell were adopted to guide the projectile along the rifling and obturation of powder gases, that is, to prevent their breakthrough between the projectile and the walls of the barrel.

In the same year, the British introduced Armstrong's rifled breech-loading guns. It is worth noting that to increase the strength of the barrel when fired, Armstrong used fastening it with rings put on in a heated state (the theory of fastening barrels would later be developed by the Russian artilleryman Gadolin). It is interesting that the British then temporarily switched to muzzle-loading rifled guns, which aroused more interest among them. So, in the 1850s, Whitworth experimented with polygonal guns (they would return to this idea much later), Lancaster experimented with an elliptical bore.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had a significant impact on the development of artillery. The French field artillery had bronze La Gitta guns, the Prussian field artillery had steel breech-loading Krupp guns with a firing range of 3500-4000 meters versus 2800 meters for the French. The success achieved by the Prussians spoke for itself.

Breech

In the breech-loading circuit, locking systems were needed that would ensure rapid loading and strong locking of the barrel for the duration of the shot; The race among various systems was won by wedge and piston valves. In 1860, Kleiner proposed a double wedge valve, which turned out to be too complex and unreliable. In 1865, a wedge bolt appeared on Krupp cannons, the front surface of which was perpendicular to the axis of the bore, and the rear surface was inclined to it. When the bolt was pushed into the transverse slot of the breech, it was pressed against the breech end of the barrel.

In France, Trell de Beaulieu proposed a rotating bolt with an intermittent screw surface, which corresponded to stops in the breech of the barrel. This is how the type of piston bolt appeared, adopted first for naval and then for other types of guns.

With a combat charge of gunpowder in a burning cap, obturation (and ensuring the safety of the gunners) was a serious problem. With the Krupp wedge shutter, the Broadwell seal spread in the form of tightly fitting rings in the barrel chamber and tiles in the shutter. Another version of the ring was developed by Piorkovsky (“Germanic” ring). The French piston bolt carried a Bang seal (Banja) in the form of a plastic ring gasket, compressed under the pressure of powder gases between steel surfaces and covering the breech. Such seals retained their importance later for large-caliber cap-loading guns.

But in field artillery, the cardinal solution to the problem was a metal sleeve pressed by the pressure of powder gases to the walls of the barrel's charging chamber. When a projectile was combined using a metal casing, the combat powder charge and the capsule initiating the combat charge resulted in a unitary shot (cartridge), which became the basis for increasing the rate of fire of field guns.

Within Russian borders

In Russia in 1860 they still managed to adopt latest system smoothbore artillery. But already during the Crimean War, they began to make screw rifling in the barrels of 12-pound copper cannons - a temporary measure that could not give noticeable success. Nevertheless, I liked this method of obtaining rifled guns. In 1863, a muzzle-loading 4-pound cannon, made “according to the French system,” was adopted for service - only the copper was replaced with more durable bronze. A cast-iron grenade of a cylindrical-arrow shape with zinc protrusions was developed for it by N.V. Maievsky. They also created a grape grenade and a grape shot. Bezak iron carriages were produced in small quantities. (The transition to such carriages, which made it possible to increase the power of guns, began in the 1860s in field artillery different armies; Only the wheels were left wooden.)

It would seem that the Russian army “pulled up” its artillery. However, the Austro-Danish-Prussian War of 1864 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 showed how much the artillery of European states (and especially German) was ahead of the Russian one.

Under the leadership of N.V. Maievsky and A.V. Gadolin developed 9- and 4-pounders (calibers 107 and 87 millimeters, respectively) breech-loading rifled bronze field guns with a wedge breech of the Kreiner system (later changed to a Krupp breech), which became part of a new artillery system known as the “1867 system.” Cast iron shells received a lead shell. In 1868, iron carriages by A.A. were adopted. Fisher. V.F. Petrushevsky developed a new tubular sight. Elongated cylindrical-shaped shells were “stronger” than spherical shells of smooth-walled artillery, but correspondingly heavier. However, better obturation of powder gases, correct flight and better shape of the projectiles made it possible to increase the firing range.

The firing range of rifled guns was almost three times greater than that of smooth-walled guns, and the accuracy of fire of rifled guns at a range of about a kilometer was five times better. Artillerymen could now hit not only long-range and in-depth targets, but also small targets. On the other hand, the artillery itself could be echeloned in depth. But this required better fire maneuver, which means an even greater increase in firing range (the experience of the Franco-Prussian War). And an increase in range means a significant increase in the pressure of powder gases in the barrel, which bronze did not allow. In Russia A.S. Lavrov did a lot of work to increase the strength of bronze guns; artillery bronze obtained using his method was even called steel bronze abroad. But a significant increase in the firing range and at the same time achieving high survivability of the guns could only be achieved by switching to cast steel.

Steel revolution

“The nineteenth century is iron,” wrote Alexander Blok. Indeed, the industrial and technological revolution of the 19th century took place under the banner of the rapid development of iron metallurgy, steel and cast iron became the main material in all branches of technology. And none of them depended on metallurgy as much as artillery. Experiments on steel guns were carried out at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, but the industry was not ready for the production of iron-steel artillery. New technologies for producing steel and processing steel blanks were required. This significantly stimulated the development of the metallurgical industry. German, British and French enterprises took first place.

In 1847, A. Krupp presented a 3-pound gun made of cast crucible steel manufactured at his factory. In 1855, G. Bessemer patented a converter method for producing steel (by the way, Bessemer took up metallurgy precisely in search of materials for new tools). In 1864, P. Martin's regenerative furnace appeared. High-quality steel from laboratories goes into mass production, primarily in weapons.

In Russia, the most successful method of factory production of cast crucible steel was proposed by engineer P.M. Obukhov. His steel, produced in 1851 at the Yugovsky plant, had such important qualities as elasticity and toughness. In 1860, at the Zlatoust plant, he manufactured a 12-pound steel cannon, which withstood 4,000 rounds in testing. In 1863, Obukhov, together with N.I. Putilov founded a steel mill in St. Petersburg. In 1868, Putilov founded his own factory (in the 1890s, artillery workshops would be set up here and an “artillery technical office” would be created). In the meantime, it was difficult to establish its production, the military department was forced to turn to orders from Krupp factories. From 1861 to 1881, 2652 guns of various systems were manufactured at Russian factories for the Russian army, and 2232 at Krupp factories. It was not for nothing that A. Krupp wrote in 1864 to General E.I. Totleben that his factory “uses the labor of seven thousand workers, most of whom work for Russia.”

As far as possible

IN Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, the Russian army entered with the 1867 system. Turkish artillery had generally worse training, but better material part, including steel long-range guns. In addition, the widespread use of fortifications in this war raised the question of a field gun that would fire overhead fire (along a steeper trajectory than that of field guns) with a high-explosive projectile.

Steel barrels and bolts for the new Russian artillery system were developed by Krupp. In Russia, Maievsky, Gadolin and Engelhardt contributed to the work. The “system of 1877” entered service with the Russian army, which included, among other things, a 9-pound battery gun, a 4-pound light and mountain cannon. The new guns had progressively rifled barrels (the steepness of the rifling increased from the breech to the muzzle of the barrel) and new shots. Steel made it possible to increase the firing range by increasing the pressure in the bore and the length of the barrel. Let's say that the field guns of the 1838 system had a barrel length of 16.5-17 calibers, and the 1877 system had a barrel length of 19.6-24 calibers. The muzzle velocity of the 4-pounder (87 mm) gun of 1877 increased by 40% compared to the gun of 1867 (from 305 to 445 meters per second), the firing range almost doubled (from 3414 to 6470 meters). The 1877 system was called “long-range” - in the 1870-1880s, “long-range” artillery was introduced everywhere. At the same time, the shells also became longer and more powerful.

Rifled artillery, and even more so long-range artillery, required resolving ballistic problems. The works on ballistics of the French artilleryman Valier and the Italian Siacci became widely known. In Russia, the works of the founder of the Russian scientific school of ballistics, Professor of the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy N.V., played an important role. Maievsky (Mikhailovsky Academy became one of the scientific centers of Russia) and his followers P.M. Albitsky, V.A. Pashkevich, N.A. Zabudsky. Academician P.L. played a special role in the introduction of mathematical methods into artillery science. Chebyshev.

Why burn and explode?

For six centuries since its inception, firearms relied on the use of black powder. It was also used to fill grenades and bombs, and was used in exploding charges, etc.

In Russia in the mid-19th century, gunpowder was produced at the state-owned Okhtensky, Shostkinsky, and Kazan factories. Their productivity was no longer enough to meet the growing needs (they talked about the consumption of gunpowder during the defense of Sevastopol). And here we had to turn to orders abroad, for example in Germany, or to Finnish manufacturers (Finland enjoyed significant autonomy in the Russian Empire). In order to increase supplies, private gunpowder production was allowed in 1876.

In the artillery of the 19th century, one might say, they got the maximum possible from black powder. Since 1876, the production of slow and more evenly burning gunpowder in the form of prismatic grains began; since 1884, brown coarse-grained smoky gunpowder began to be made instead of black. But the disadvantages of black powder could not be overcome.

In the 1880-1890s a new era begins. All over the world, intensive work was carried out to create smokeless gunpowder; organic chemical compounds replaced the mechanical mixture. The main hopes were placed on pyroxylin. In 1845 I.F. Sheinbein in Switzerland and A.A. Fadeev in Russia began to study the possibilities of using pyroxylin in military affairs. In 1868, Schulze created his own version of pyroxylin gunpowder in Germany. But the instability of pyroxylin and its ability to self-ignite made such gunpowder too dangerous.

Finally, in 1886 in France, P. Viel created a stable, homogeneous, slow-burning pyroxylin gunpowder, which attracted attention in all countries. In 1889, in England, Abel and Dewar obtained nitroglycerin gunpowder.

In the same 1889, a special commission of the Main Artillery Directorate began organizing the production of smokeless gunpowder at the Okhtensky plant, and in 1890, under the leadership of Professor N.P. Fedorov produced the first batch of gunpowder, which was accepted into artillery in 1894. The great Russian chemist D.I. made a great contribution to the creation of smokeless powders. Mendeleev and his students - I.M. Cheltsov, P.P. Rubtsov, S.N. Vukolov. In 1891, under the leadership of Mendeleev, pyrocolloidal gunpowder was created.

The strength of smokeless pyroxylin powder is three times higher than that of smoky powder. Smokeless powder burns more slowly and more evenly, and the ratio between the maximum and average gas pressures in the barrel is much less. The pressure curve of the powder gases in the barrel bore is smoother, which made it possible to lengthen gun barrels and increase initial speeds shells and flat trajectory, and this gave better shooting accuracy. The greatest firing range achieved in general during that period was obtained at the 1892 shooting in Germany from a 24-centimeter Krupp cannon with a barrel length of 40 calibers - 20,226 meters. But this was not available for field guns - the combination of caliber and barrel length here was limited by the requirements of maneuverability, especially taking into account the capabilities of a horse-drawn team. Therefore, by the end of the 19th century, calibers of about 3 inches (75-77 millimeters) were chosen for field guns, which turned out to be optimal for a good half century. The new gunpowder produced significantly less soot and did not form clouds of thick smoke, which made it possible to increase the combat rate of fire not only of individual guns, but also of batteries.

While smokeless gunpowder was being produced in Russia, it had to be purchased from France. The Russian textile industry simply could not supply the powder makers with the required quantity of cotton ends; they even had to be purchased in England. By the end of the century, domestic factories had reached the required level of production. The main suppliers of gunpowder for field artillery were the Okhtensky and Kazan plants. True, the stated needs themselves were greatly underestimated, but this became clear much later.

As for the explosive charges of bombs and grenades, black powder has been replaced by other products organic chemistry- highly potent high explosives. Back in 1854 N.N. Zinin proposed using nitroglycerin to equip shells. Experiments with such equipment were carried out by V.F. Petrushevsky. In 1869, shells filled with Nobel's dynamite were tested by firing. The result was unsuccessful, as were the tests in 1886-1887 of Graydon's dynamite. The sensitivity of dynamite and nitroglycerin to shocks did not allow such use (because of this, the American Navy even experimented with Zalinsky pneumatic dynamite guns in the 1880s). In 1890, shells filled with pressed pyroxylin were adopted into service in Russia. In 1889, staff captain S.V. Panpushko began experiments in equipping projectiles with melinite (aka picric acid, trinitrophenol) - an explosive obtained by the Frenchman E. Turpin. After the death of Panpushko in an explosion, on the instructions of the GAU, the experiments were resumed by staff captain P.O. Gelfreich. Projectiles for field guns, loaded according to his method, were tested by the Commission on the Application explosives. In 1895, melinite high-explosive grenades were introduced only for fortress and siege artillery. Until the beginning of the 20th century, field artillery did not receive shells with highly explosive substances, for a number of reasons, including technological problems.

It is worth noting that new explosives, out of habit, were still called gunpowder for some time - this applied to both propellant substances (which retained the name “gunpowder”) and high explosives (“picrine gunpowder”, “dynamite gunpowder”), and initiating (primer compositions were called “impact powder”). Now is the time to move on to talking about field artillery ammunition.

Goodbye cores

In the mid-19th century, field artillery had several types of shells. In the last period of the dominance of smooth-walled artillery, solid cannonballs were forgotten, the guns fired bombs, grenades, and buckshot. The first were high-explosive shells, differing only in weight - up to a pound of shells were called grenades, and more than a pound - bombs. Buckshot shots filled with round bullets served to combat manpower at short range. With the development of artillery in the 19th century, grapeshot was gradually abandoned (later it had to be returned), but interest in shrapnel grew. In 1803, British Colonel Shrapnel added round bullets to the powder charge of a hollow shell and equipped it with a ignition tube, hoping to set the time of detonation.

At the end of the 1870s, Russia began to mass produce diaphragm shrapnel developed by V.N. Shklarevich. If, during an explosion, shrapnel with a central chamber of bullets scattered to the sides, then the diaphragm pushed the bullets forward, and they scattered within the cone - the result was a grapeshot shot, but at a distance.

In the artillery system of 1877, the shells were lengthened, increasing the mass of the explosive charge in the grenades and the number of bullets in the shrapnel. In addition, the lateral load of the projectile increased - the ratio of the mass of the projectile to the area of ​​the largest cross-section, and this reduced the drop in speed under the influence of air resistance, which contributed to the range and increase in the flatness of the trajectory. The parts guiding the projectile along the rifling also changed. The lead sheath, which would simply be torn off with increased pressure of the powder gases in the barrel bore, was replaced by two leading copper belts. In the 1880s, it was established that one leading copper belt at the bottom of the projectile and a centering thickening of the projectile body itself closer to its head were sufficient - this combination has survived to this day.

Colonel Babushkin's double-walled (ring) grenade was used for the 9-pound guns: a set of toothed rings was placed in the grenade body, that is, it was a projectile with semi-finished fragments. True, the introduction of a steel grenade, the body of which was crushed into fragments more evenly than a cast iron one, solved the issue of fragmentation action more easily.

The production of shells in Russia was carried out mainly at state-owned factories. The increased need for them forced them to turn to private enterprises in the 1880s. It was assumed that competition would reduce the prices of shells. But private companies simply entered into an agreement and kept prices high, so that the treasury overpaid 2-3 million rubles a year for the shells.

Both fuses and tubes were quickly changed artillery shells. The more correct flight of elongated rifled artillery shells provided the tubes with more reliable operation. In 1863, Colonel Mikhailovsky’s shock tube with an inertial striker was adopted for grenades of rifled guns (in 1884, the more reliable shock tube of Lieutenant Colonel Filimonov). For shrapnel, several types of spacer tubes have changed. The remote tube problem was successfully resolved only by using a spacer ring. Depending on the installation of the tube, the fire was transferred to the powder firecracker (and from it to the explosive charge of the projectile) after a certain section of the ring burned out. In Russian artillery, a tube with a spacer ring was adopted in 1873. However, in the 1880s, it had to be replaced with more reliable tubes based on Krupp’s, and also 12-second ones, in accordance with the increase in the firing range of the guns of the 1877 system (although military artillerymen asked for longer-range tubes). The introduction of high explosives required the addition of detonator caps to the tubes - the new explosives were insensitive to the fire beam and were initiated by detonation. In Russia, in connection with the development of a rapid-fire field gun, a 22-second double-action remote tube appeared. It allowed settings for “impact” (detonation when hitting an obstacle) or “shrapnel” (with setting the detonation time).

Shooting without kickbacks

New combat conditions required strengthening of artillery, and this implied an increase not only in the firing range and “power” of shells, but also in the combat rate of fire. Meanwhile, until the last decade of the 19th century, only multi-barrel canisters like the 10.67-mm Gatling-Gorlov or Gatling-Baranovsky cannons, which were in service with Russian artillery in the 1870s, were called rapid-fire cannons.

The breech-loading circuit and cast steel barrels fully allowed this, but it was also necessary to eliminate the recoil of the gun after a shot, which reached 3-5 meters. The crew had to roll up and aim the gun again. In the 1880s, various carriages were designed to reduce recoil. A.P. Engelhardt introduced an elastic connection between the stroke and the machine of the carriage and the opener, which furrowed the soil. Then carriages appeared with a coulter buried in the ground and connected to the carriage through a spring or buffer (Engelhardt, Arisaka, Krupp, Vickers). Such carriages were classified as rapid fire systems. True, the gun jumped when fired.

The introduction of unitary cartridges and smokeless powders made a qualitative increase in the rate of fire a real possibility. The path to this was shown by V.S. Baranovsky, ahead of his time by a quarter of a century. Back in 1872, he developed a gun that combined a steel barrel, a unitary cartridge with a metal sleeve, a piston bolt with a percussion mechanism, recoil devices that absorbed part of the recoil energy, a screw mechanism for horizontal aiming, a vertical aiming mechanism, and an optical sight. In 1877, its 2.5-inch guns were adopted by the Military and Naval Departments. The system required improvement, but the death of Baranovsky during testing of the gun in 1879 interrupted the work. In the 1890s, designers returned to the principles of the “elastic carriage” laid down by Baranovsky, dividing the carriage into a machine and a cradle that connected the machine to the barrel through recoil devices (recoil brake and knurler).

The development of field artillery was greatly influenced by the adoption in France in 1897 of the 75-mm field gun of the Depor system, which had a barrel length of 36 calibers and a remarkably high rate of fire - up to 14-16 rounds per minute. A long recoil, recoil devices with a hydropneumatic recoil brake, a high-speed eccentric bolt, sighting devices with an independent aiming line - all this made the French cannon an outstanding weapon of its time.

In Russia, in 1893, they approved the replacement of 4-pound guns with a wedge breech with guns with a piston breech (piston guns). “87-mm light gun mod. 1895" still had separate loading, its ballistic properties did not change. But Engelhardt's carriage with a burrowing opener and buffer slightly increased the rate of fire.

On the eve of the New Century

In 1892-1894, several rapid-firing cartridge-loading guns were tested in Russia - 61- and 75-mm Nordenfeld, 60- and 80-mm Gruzon and 75-mm Saint-Chamon. In 1896, a 76-mm cannon from the Aleksandrovsky plant was tested. And at the end of the same 1896, the GAU developed tactical and technical requirements for a field rapid-fire cannon with an elastic carriage and cartridge loading.

Four domestic factories (Obukhovsky, Aleksandrovsky, Putilovsky, Metallichesky) and four foreign companies (Krupp, Schneider, Hotchkiss, Saint-Chamon) took part in the competition. In 1900, nine systems were submitted for testing. According to the test results, first place was given to the cannon of the Putilov plant. The gun had a 31-caliber barrel fastened with a casing, a high-speed piston bolt, and an arc sight. The presence of a protractor was also important - indirect shooting, already practiced by Russian artillerymen, received “instrumental” support. Designed by A.P. Engelhardt's carriage had anti-recoil devices (hydraulic recoil brake and rubber knurl) in the frames. Combat rate of fire is 10 rounds per minute. The gun received the designation “three-inch field rapid-fire gun mod. 1900."

In the same 1900, the rapid-fire cannon received a baptism of fire - one battery was sent to China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion. Russian field artillery met the 20th century in battles.

Despite the fact that the rapid-fire cannon was modern, it was not without shortcomings - primarily in the design of the carriage. Meanwhile, representatives of foreign companies demanded re-testing of the modified systems. The best again turned out to be a significantly modified sample from the Putilov plant. A “three-inch gun mod. 1902" with rollback along the axis of the barrel. To production new gun Putilovsky, Obukhovsky, Petersburg (together with Perm) plants were connected. “Three-inch”, developed in the “artillery office” of the Putilov plant L.A. Bishlager, K.M. Sokolovsky, K.I. Lipnitsky, turned out to be one of the best field guns of the early 20th century. Russian field artillery made an important technical breakthrough, becoming one of the leading ones.

But there were also shortcomings in the new artillery complex, which began to be corrected based on bloody experience Russo-Japanese War. And chief among them was the idea of ​​a single projectile, which came from France. The rate of fire, high projectile speeds, and hence the flatness of the trajectory - the new remote tubes gave rise to the illusion that all the tasks facing field artillery could be solved with one type of gun and one type of projectile, simplifying the procurement of guns and ammunition, supplying the army, training and use in battle. It was a combination of a high-velocity field gun and shrapnel. This corresponded to theories of short-term maneuver warfare with combat clashes on the plains and open targets in the form of dense infantry chains, but did not correspond in any way to the wars that would soon break out.

In addition, Russian shrapnel was equipped with a 22-second tube, which limited the firing range of a field gun to 5100-5500 meters, while its excellent ballistics made it possible to fire at ranges one and a half times greater.

The transition from smooth-walled guns to rifled guns, from muzzle-loading to breech-loading, from bronze to steel, the introduction of elastic carriages, smokeless gunpowder, steel shells, high explosives, reliable spacer and shock tubes, metal sleeves, new sights - these revolutionary changes fit into half a century, qualitatively changing both the artillery itself and military affairs in general.

Russian field artillery entered the 20th century not only with the most modern 3-inch field gun. Back in 1885, a 6-inch (152 mm) field mortar of the Krupp system on an A.P. carriage was adopted. Engelhardt. This was an important stage in the development of field artillery, the full significance of which, despite the obsolescence of the mortar itself, was appreciated already during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The field artillery of other armies also had two calibers and two types of guns. Thus, in the German army, the 7.7-cm field gun of 1896 was supplemented by a 10.5-cm field howitzer of the same year, in the British 76-mm (15-pounder) gun of 1896 - with a 127-mm (5-inch) howitzer of 1897 of the year. Its advantages and disadvantages new system artillery weapons will appear very soon.

(To be continued)

Illustrations by Mikhail Dmitriev