Losses of the USSR in the Finnish War 1939. Winter War through the eyes of the Finns

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 or, as they say in Finland, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union is one of the most significant episodes of the Second World War. Timo Vihavainen, a professor of Russian studies at the University of Helsinki, shares his point of view on this issue.

The battles of the Soviet-Finnish War, which lasted 105 days, were very bloody and intense. The Soviet side lost more than 126,000 people killed and missing, 246,000 wounded and shell-shocked. If we add Finnish losses to these figures, 26,000 and 43,000, respectively, then we can safely say that in terms of its scale, the Winter War became one of the most large battlefields of World War II.

For many countries, it is quite common to evaluate the past through the prism of what happened, without even considering other options for the possible development of events - that is, history turned out the way it did. As for the Winter War, its course and the peace treaty that ended fighting, became unexpected results of a process that initially, as all parties believed, would lead to completely different consequences.

Background of events

In the fall of 1939, Finland and the Soviet Union negotiated high level on territorial issues, within the framework of which Finland had to transfer to the Soviet Union some areas on the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as lease the city of Hanko. In return, Finland would receive twice the size but less valuable territory in Soviet Karelia.

Negotiations in the fall of 1939 did not lead to results as acceptable to the Soviet Union as happened in the case of the Baltic countries, despite the fact that Finland was ready to make some concessions. For example, the lease of Hanko was considered a violation of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality.

Finland did not agree to territorial concessions, maintaining its neutrality along with Sweden

Earlier, in 1938 and later in the spring of 1939, the Soviet Union had already unofficially recognized the possibility of transferring the islands in the Gulf of Finland, or leasing them. In a democratic country, such as Finland, these concessions were unlikely to be feasible in practice. The transfer of territories would mean the loss of homes for thousands of Finns. No party would probably want to take on political responsibility. There was also fear and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, caused, among other things, by the repressions of 1937-38, during which thousands of Finns were executed. In addition, by the end of 1937, the use of the Finnish language was completely stopped in the Soviet Union. Finnish-language schools and newspapers were closed.

The Soviet Union also hinted that Finland would be unable, or perhaps unwilling, to remain neutral if Germany, now an international troublemaker, violated the Soviet border. Such hints were not understood or accepted in Finland. To ensure neutrality, Finland and Sweden planned to jointly build fortifications on the Åland Islands, which would quite effectively protect the neutrality of the countries from a possible German or Soviet attack. Due to a protest filed by the Soviet Union, Sweden abandoned these plans.

Kuusinen's "People's Government"

After negotiations with the official Finnish government, Risto Ryti, stalled, the Soviet Union formed the so-called "people's government" of Finland. The “People's Government” was headed by the communist Otto Ville Kuusinen, who fled to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of this government, which provided an excuse not to negotiate with the official government.

The government asked the Soviet Union for “help” in creating the Republic of Finland. During the war, the government's task was to prove that Finland and the Soviet Union were not at war.

Apart from the Soviet Union, no other country recognized the people's government of Kuusinen

The Soviet Union concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the self-formed “people's government”

Finnish communist Otto Ville Kuusinen fled to Soviet Russia after the civil war of 1918. His government was said to represent the broad masses of the Finnish people and the rebellious military units that had already formed the Finnish " people's army" Finnish communist party stated in her address that there is a revolution going on in Finland, which, at the request of the “people's government,” should be helped by the Red Army. Thus, this is not a war and certainly not an aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland. According to the official position of the Soviet Union, this proves that the Red Army entered Finland not to take away Finnish territories, but to expand them.

On December 2, 1939, Moscow announced to the whole world that it had concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the “people's government.” Under the terms of the agreement, Finland received huge areas in Eastern Karelia, 70,000 square kilometers of old Russian land that never belonged to Finland. For its part, Finland transferred to Russia a small area in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus, which reaches Koivisto in the west. In addition to this, Finland will transfer some islands in the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union and lease the city of Hanko for a very decent amount.

It was not about propaganda, but about a state treaty that was announced and put into effect. They planned to exchange documents on ratification of the treaty in Helsinki.

The cause of the war was the struggle between Germany and the USSR for spheres of influence

After the official Finnish government did not agree to territorial concessions, the Soviet Union began the war by attacking Finland on November 30, 1939, without declaring war, and without any other ultimatums to Finland.

The reason for the attack was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939, in which Finland was recognized as a territory within the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. The purpose of the attack was to implement the pact on this part.

Finland and Germany in 1939

Finnish foreign policy was cool towards Germany. Relations between the countries were rather unfriendly, which was confirmed by Hitler during the Winter War. In addition, the division of spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and Germany suggests that Germany was not interested in supporting Finland.

Finland sought to remain neutral until the outbreak of the Winter War and for as long after it as possible.

Official Finland did not follow friendly German policies

Finland in 1939 in no way pursued a policy friendly to Germany. The Finnish parliament and government were dominated by a coalition of farmers and social democrats, which relied on an overwhelming majority. The only radical and pro-German party, the IKL, suffered a crushing defeat in the summer elections of 1939. Its representation was reduced from 18 to 8 seats in the 200-seat parliament.

German sympathies in Finland were an old tradition, which was primarily supported by academic circles. At the political level, these sympathies began to melt in the 30s, when Hitler's policy towards small states was widely condemned.

Sure victory?

With a high degree of confidence we can say that in December 1939 the Red Army was the largest and best equipped army in the world. Moscow, confident in the fighting ability of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance, if any, would last many days.

In addition, it was assumed that the powerful leftist movement in Finland would not want to resist the Red Army, which would enter the country not as an invader, but as an assistant and give Finland additional territories.

In turn, for the Finnish bourgeoisie, the war, from all sides, was extremely undesirable. There was a clear understanding that no help should be expected, at least not from Germany, and the desire and ability of the Western allies to conduct military operations far from their borders raised great doubts.

How did it happen that Finland decided to repel the advance of the Red Army?

How is it possible that Finland dared to repel the Red Army and was able to resist for more than three months? Moreover, the Finnish army did not capitulate at any stage and remained in combat capability until the last day of the war. The fighting ended only because the peace treaty came into force.

Moscow, confident in the strength of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance would last many days. Not to mention that the agreement with the “people's government” of Finland will have to be canceled. Just in case, strike units were concentrated near the borders with Finland, which, after an acceptable waiting period, could quickly defeat the Finns, who were armed primarily with only infantry weapon And light artillery. The Finns had very few tanks and aircraft, and actually had anti-tank weapons only on paper. The Red Army had a numerical superiority and almost a tenfold advantage in technical equipment, including artillery, aviation and armored vehicles.

Therefore, there was no doubt about the final result of the war. Moscow no longer negotiated with the Helsinki government, which was said to have lost support and disappeared in an unknown direction.

For managers in Moscow, the planned outcome was finally decided: a larger Finlyandskaya democratic republic- ally of the Soviet Union. They even managed to publish an article on this topic in Brief political dictionary"from 1940.

Brave Defense

Why did Finland resort to armed defense, which, soberly assessing the situation, had no chance of success? One explanation is that there were no other options other than surrender. The Soviet Union recognized the puppet government of Kuusinen and ignored the Helsinki government, which was not even presented with any ultimatum demands. In addition, the Finns relied on their military skills and the advantages that the local nature provided for defensive actions.

The successful defense of the Finns is explained both by the high fighting spirit of the Finnish army and by the great shortcomings of the Red Army, in whose ranks, in particular, major purges were carried out in 1937-38. The command of the Red Army troops was carried out unqualified. On top of everything else, she acted poorly military equipment. The Finnish landscape and defensive fortifications turned out to be difficult to pass, and the Finns learned to effectively disable enemy tanks using Molotov cocktails and throwing explosives. This, of course, added even more courage and bravery.

Spirit of the Winter War

In Finland, the concept of the “spirit of the Winter War” has been established, which means unanimity and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the defense of the Motherland.

Research supports claims that already in Finland on the eve of the Winter War there was a prevailing consensus that the country must be defended in the event of aggression. Despite big losses, this spirit remained until the end of the war. Almost everyone, including the communists, was imbued with the “spirit of the Winter War.” The question arises as to how this became possible when the country went through a bloody civil war in 1918 - just two decades ago - in which the right fought against the left. People were executed en masse even after the main battles had ended. Then at the head of the victorious White Guard was Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, a native of Finland, former lieutenant general Russian army, who was now leading Finnish soldiers against the Red Army.

The fact that Finland decided on armed resistance at all, purposefully and with the support of the broad masses, quite likely came as a surprise to Moscow. And for Helsinki too. The “Spirit of the Winter War” is not a myth at all, and its origins require explanation.

An important reason for the emergence of the “Spirit of the Winter War” was deceitful Soviet propaganda. In Finland, they treated Soviet newspapers with irony, which wrote that the Finnish border was “threateningly” close to Leningrad. Just as absolutely incredible were the allegations that the Finns were staging provocations on the border, shelling the territory of the Soviet Union and thereby starting a war. Well, when, after such a provocation, the Soviet Union broke the non-aggression treaty, which Moscow did not have the right to do under the treaty, distrust grew more than before.

According to some estimates of the time, confidence in the Soviet Union was largely undermined by the formation of the Kuusinen government and the vast territories it received as a gift. Although they assured that Finland would remain independent, Finland itself had no special illusions about the veracity of such assurances. Trust in the Soviet Union fell further after urban bombings that destroyed hundreds of buildings and killed hundreds of people. The Soviet Union categorically denied the bombings, although the people of Finland witnessed them with their own eyes.

The repressions of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were fresh in my memory. For the Finnish communists, the most offensive thing was to observe the development of close cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which began after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

World

The result of the Winter War is well known. According to the peace treaty concluded in Moscow on March 12, Finland's eastern border moved to where it remains today. 430,000 Finns lost their homes. For the Soviet Union, the increase in territory was insignificant. For Finland, the territorial losses were enormous.

The prolongation of the war became the primary prerequisite for the peace agreement concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940 between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois government of Finland. The Finnish army put up desperate resistance, which made it possible to stop the enemy advance in all 14 directions. Further prolongation of the conflict threatened the Soviet Union with severe international consequences. The League of Nations on December 16 deprived the Soviet Union of membership, and England and France began negotiating with Finland on the provision of military assistance, which was supposed to arrive in Finland through Norway and Sweden. This could lead to a full-scale war between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, who, among other things, were preparing to bomb oil fields in Baku from Turkey.

Difficult truce conditions were accepted due to despair

It was not easy for the Soviet government, which had entered into an agreement with the Kuusinen government, to re-recognize the Helsinki government and conclude a peace treaty with it. Peace, however, was concluded and conditions for Finland were very difficult. Finland's territorial concessions were many times greater than those negotiated in 1939. The signing of the peace agreement was a bitter ordeal. When the terms of peace were made public, people cried in the streets and flags were lowered in mourning over their houses. The Finnish government, however, agreed to sign a difficult and intolerable “dictated peace” because the situation militarily was very dangerous. The amount of assistance promised by Western countries was insignificant, and it was clear that from a military point of view it could not play a decisive role.

Winter War and its aftermath hard world are some of the most tragic periods in Finnish history. These events leave their mark on the interpretation of Finnish history in a broader perspective. The fact that this was an unprovoked aggression, which was carried out vilely and without a declaration of war by its eastern neighbor, and which led to the rejection of the historical Finnish province, remained a heavy burden in the Finnish consciousness.

Having put up military resistance, the Finns lost a large territory and tens of thousands of people, but retained their independence. This is the difficult image of the Winter War, which resonates with pain in the Finnish consciousness. Another option was to submit to Kuusinen's government and expand the territories. For the Finns, however, this was tantamount to submission to the Stalinist dictatorship. It is obvious that, despite all the officiality of the territorial gift, it was not taken seriously at any level in Finland. In today's Finland, if they remember that state treaty, it is only that it was one of the insidious, lying plans that the Stalinist leadership was in the habit of proposing.

The Winter War gave birth to the Continuation War (1941-1945)

As a direct consequence of the Winter War, Finland joined Germany in attacking the Soviet Union in 1941. Before the Winter War, Finland adhered to the Northern European policy of neutrality, which it tried to continue after the end of the war. However, after the Soviet Union prevented this, there were two options left: an alliance with Germany, or with the Soviet Union. The latter option enjoyed very little support in Finland.

Text: Timo Vihavainen, Professor of Russian Studies, University of Helsinki

The Soviet-Finnish military conflict, which began on November 30, 1939, cannot be considered outside the context of the historical events that took place in Europe after the Munich Agreement and the German invasion of Poland - on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

In an increasingly escalating situation, the Soviet leadership simply could not help but think about the state of its borders, including in the northwestern direction, since Finland was an unconditional military supporter of Nazi Germany. Back in 1935, General Mannerheim visited Berlin, where he held negotiations with Goering and Ribbentrop, which resulted in an agreement to grant Germany the right in the event of war to station its troops on Finnish territory. In exchange, the German side promised Finland Soviet Karelia.

In connection with the agreements reached, as a springboard for future hostilities, the Finns built an impenetrable chain of barrier structures on the Karelian Isthmus, called the “Mannerheim Line”. In Finland itself, the Finnish fascist organization “Lapuan Movement” actively raised its head, whose program included the creation of “Greater Finland”, which included Leningrad and all of Karelia.

Throughout the second half of the 30s, secret contacts between the highest Finnish generals and the Wehrmacht leadership were carried out; in August 1937, Finland hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines, and in 1938, immediate preparations began for the introduction of a German expeditionary force into Finland. By the beginning of 1939, with the help German specialists a network of military airfields was built in Finland, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than were available in Finnish Air Force. By the way, their identification mark, as well as tank troops, became a blue swastika. On the Finnish side, on the border with the USSR, all kinds of provocations, including armed ones, were constantly organized on land, in the sky and at sea.

In connection with the current situation and in order to secure the northwestern borders of the USSR, the Soviet leadership began to make attempts to persuade the Finnish government to mutually beneficial cooperation.

On April 7, 1938, the resident of the INO NKVD in Helsinki, Boris Rybkin, also the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland, Yartsev, was urgently summoned to Moscow and received in the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. Stalin said that there was a need to start secret negotiations with the Finnish side, the main goal of which should be an agreement on moving the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad. It was proposed to interest the Finns by offering to transfer significantly larger territories in exchange, but in a different area. In addition, given that in the central part of Finland almost all the forest has been cut down and wood processing enterprises are idle, the Finns were promised additional supplies of wood from the USSR. Another goal of the negotiations was to conclude a bilateral defense treaty in case Germany attacked the USSR through the territory of Finland. At the same time, the Soviet side will give guarantees of independence and territorial integrity Finland. All upcoming negotiations, Stalin emphasized, must be exclusively secret.

On April 14, 1938, Rybkin arrived in Helsinki, immediately called the Finnish Foreign Ministry and asked to connect him with Foreign Minister Holsti, to whom he approached with a proposal for an immediate meeting, which took place on the same day. On it, Rybkin outlined to the minister everything that Stalin had said and added that if Germany was allowed to unhindered the landing of its troops on the territory of Finland, then the Soviet Union was not going to passively wait for the Germans to arrive in Rajek (now Sestroretsk, 32 km from Leningrad), but would abandon its armed forces deep into Finnish territory, as far as possible, after which battles between German and Soviet troops will take place on Finnish territory. If the Finns resist the German landing, the USSR will provide Finland with all possible economic and military assistance with the obligation to withdraw its armed forces immediately after the end of the military conflict. Rybkin emphasized the need for special secrecy when considering this issue.

Holsti reported to Prime Minister Cajander about the conversation with Rybkin, but after discussing the situation, they decided to continue negotiations, but take the most wait-and-see approach to them, without promising anything. Rybkin went to Moscow with a report to Stalin, who at that time was satisfied at least with the very fact of starting negotiations with the Finnish side.

Three months later, on July 11, on the initiative of the Finnish side, Rybkin was received by Prime Minister Kajander, but no progress took place in the negotiation process, and, moreover, by entrusting its further management to cabinet member Tanner, the Finnish leadership demonstrated that it was not paying due attention to Soviet proposals, lowering their level and finally choosing delaying tactics.

However, on August 5, 10, 11 and 18, meetings between Rybkin and Tanner took place, during the latter of which the Soviet proposals were finally fleshed out.

1. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can conclude a secret military agreement with the USSR, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's written commitment to be ready to repel a possible attack and, for this purpose, to accept Soviet military assistance.

2. Moscow is ready to give consent to the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, necessary for the security of both Finland and Leningrad. But on the condition that the USSR will be given the opportunity to take part in their strengthening.

3. As a return favor, Moscow hopes that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to build defensive air and naval bases on the Finnish island of Sur-Sari (Gogland).

If the Finnish side accepts these conditions, the USSR guarantees Finland the inviolability of its borders and, if necessary, will provide it with weapons to favorable conditions and is ready to conclude a profitable trade agreement with it that would favor the development of both Agriculture, and industry.

Tanner reported on the Soviet proposals to Prime Minister Kajader, and he found them unacceptable, which was reported to Rybkin on September 15: the Finnish side itself is not curtailing the secret negotiations, they are even ready to purchase some weapons, but the proposals on the Åland Islands and the island of Gogland are rejected without counter offers.

Stalin recommended that Rybkin continue the negotiation process, which he did until December 1938, and only when it finally became clear that the positions of the parties were too different, it was decided to recall him to Moscow and continue negotiations at the official level.

Such negotiations with Finland began in Moscow in March 1939. However, the exchange of views proceeded sluggishly, the Finnish government was increasingly inclined towards close cooperation with Nazi Germany, and no progress was achieved.

But the aggravation of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of World War II forced the Soviet leadership to again urgently urge the Finnish side to continue negotiations, which began in Moscow on October 12. At them, the Kremlin sharply demanded that Finland fulfill the previously proposed conditions, and, above all, move the border from Leningrad in exchange for another territory. Stalin stated so directly: “We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line be 70 km. These are our minimum demands, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad, so the border line must be moved " ( territorial waters Finland reached almost the outer roadstead of the Leningrad port).

The Finnish government, and above all, President Kallio, who takes an irreconcilably tough pro-German position, hoping for help from Germany, which was secretly supplying the Finns with weapons, instructed their delegation, after its repeated departures and returns, supposedly for consultations in the chosen delaying tactics, to interrupt the negotiations on November 13 finally and leave, rejecting all fundamental Soviet proposals.

And a mutual assistance pact has already been proposed at various stages; rent, purchase or exchange for Soviet territory of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for significantly most Soviet territory in Eastern Karelia near Rebola and Porosozero (5529 sq. km versus 2761 sq. km); establishment of a Soviet air and naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, etc.

But everything is in vain. Even despite the fact that the USSR had already signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and reached agreements on spheres of influence. By the way, when the returning Finnish delegation crossed the border, the Finnish border guards opened fire on the Soviet border guards. After all this, at the military council, Stalin said: “We will have to fight with Finland,” and it was decided to ensure the security of the north-western borders by force, and therefore, until the end of November, people rushed to the border in a hurry Soviet troops.

On November 26 at 15.45, an incident occurred near the border near the village of Maynila with artillery shelling by Soviet troops, as a result of which, according to the official report, 4 Red Army soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded.

On the same day, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to the Finnish side and demanded, in order to prevent future similar incidents, to withdraw its troops from the border line by 20 - 25 km.

In a response note, the Finnish government denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the shelling of Mainila and suggested that “the matter is about an accident that occurred during training exercises on the Soviet side...” As for the withdrawal of troops, the note proposed “to begin negotiations on the issue on mutual withdrawal to a certain distance from the border."

In a new note dated November 28, the Soviet government qualified the Finnish response as “a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between both countries to the extreme.” The note indicated that the proposal for a mutual withdrawal of troops was unacceptable for the USSR, since in this case parts of the Red Army would have to be pulled back to the suburbs of Leningrad, while Soviet troops did not threaten any vital center of Finland. In this regard, the Soviet government "considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact..."

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Irie Koskinen was summoned to the NKID, where Deputy People's Commissar V. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls entirely on the Finnish government, “the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland.” This was a break in diplomatic relations, which meant the penultimate step separating peace from war.

Early the next morning the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations on the part of the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 a.m. on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”

The war began, later called the Winter War, which at that moment promised to be uncomplicated and end in two to three weeks. But due to underestimation of the enemy, who managed to increase the size of his armed forces from 37 to 337 thousand, his own insufficient combat readiness, excessive illusions about the “class solidarity of the Finnish workers,” who would almost come out with flowers to greet the soldiers of the Red Army, the war lasted 105 days , can hardly be considered completely successful for the Soviet side, and ended only on March 12, 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty.

In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel; on the impregnable “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus, 169 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 130 thousand Finns.

Finnish casualties in the war: 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. Our losses are significantly greater: 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing.

As a result of the war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters without any compensating exchange. km of Finnish territories (and it was proposed to give 5529 sq. km in exchange for only 2761 sq. km), including a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. As a result, after the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

The USSR also demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation, Finland had to transfer 350 sea and river Vehicle, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages and cars.

And it is very important that the Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army received reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. There was already a little over a year left until June 22, 1941, and Stalin knew about it.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 became a fairly popular topic in the Russian Federation. All authors who love to walk through the “totalitarian past” love to remember this war, to remember the balance of forces, the losses, the failures of the initial period of the war.

Reasonable reasons for the war are denied or hushed up. The decision about war is often blamed on Comrade Stalin personally. As a result, many of the citizens of the Russian Federation who have even heard about this war are sure that we lost it, suffered huge losses and showed the whole world the weakness of the Red Army.

Origins of Finnish statehood

The land of the Finns (in Russian chronicles - “Sum”) did not have its own statehood; in the 12th-14th centuries it was conquered by the Swedes. Three attacks were committed on the lands of the Finnish tribes (Sum, Em, Karelians). Crusades- 1157, 1249-1250 and 1293-1300. The Finnish tribes were conquered and forced to convert to Catholicism. The further invasion of the Swedes and crusaders was stopped by the Novgorodians, who inflicted several defeats on them. In 1323, the Orekhovsky Peace was concluded between the Swedes and Novgorodians.

The lands were ruled by Swedish feudal lords, the control centers were castles (Abo, Vyborg and Tavastgus). The Swedes had all the administrative, judicial branch. The official language was Swedish, the Finns did not even have cultural autonomy. Swedish was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated layer of the population, Finnish was the language of ordinary people. The church, the Abo episcopate, had great power, but paganism retained its position among the common people for quite a long time.

In 1577, Finland received the status of a Grand Duchy and received a coat of arms with a lion. Gradually, the Finnish nobility merged with the Swedish one.

In 1808, the Russian-Swedish war began, the reason was Sweden’s refusal to act together with Russia and France against England; Russia won. According to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty of September 1809, Finland became the property of the Russian Empire.

For a little over a hundred years Russian empire turned the Swedish province into a practically autonomous state with its own authorities, currency, post office, customs and even army. Since 1863 Finnish language, along with Swedish, became state. All administrative posts, except the Governor-General, were occupied by local residents. All taxes collected in Finland remained there; St. Petersburg almost did not interfere in the internal affairs of the grand duchy. Migration of Russians to the principality was prohibited, the rights of Russians living there were limited, and Russification of the province was not carried out.

In 1811, the principality was given the Russian Vyborg province, which was formed from lands transferred to Russia under the treaties of 1721 and 1743. Then the administrative border with Finland approached the capital of the empire. In 1906, by decree of the Russian Emperor, Finnish women, the first in all of Europe, received the right to vote. The Finnish intelligentsia, nurtured by Russia, did not remain in debt and wanted independence.

Beginning of independence

On December 6, 1917, the Sejm (Finnish Parliament) declared independence, and on December 31, 1917, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland.

On January 15 (28), 1918, a revolution began in Finland, which grew into civil war. The White Finns called German troops for help. The Germans did not refuse; in early April they landed a 12,000-strong division (the “Baltic Division”) under the command of General von der Goltz on the Hanko Peninsula. Another detachment of 3 thousand people was sent on April 7. With their support, the supporters of Red Finland were defeated, on the 14th the Germans occupied Helsinki, on April 29th Vyborg fell, and in early May the Reds were completely defeated. The Whites carried out massive repressions: more than 8 thousand people were killed, about 12 thousand rotted in concentration camps, approximately 90 thousand people were arrested and imprisoned in prisons and camps. Genocide was unleashed against the Russian inhabitants of Finland, they killed everyone indiscriminately: officers, students, women, old people, children.

Berlin demanded that a German prince, Frederick Charles of Hesse, be placed on the throne; on October 9, the Diet elected him King of Finland. But Germany was defeated in the First World War and therefore Finland became a republic.

The first two Soviet-Finnish wars

Independence was not enough, the Finnish elite wanted an increase in territory, having decided to take advantage of the Troubles in Russia, Finland attacked Russia. Karl Mannerheim promised to annex Eastern Karelia. On March 15, the so-called “Wallenius plan” was approved, according to which the Finns wanted to seize Russian lands along the border: White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga, in addition, the Pechenga region, the Kola Peninsula, Petrograd were supposed to go to Suomi become a “free city”. On the same day, volunteer detachments received orders to begin the conquest of Eastern Karelia.

On May 15, 1918, Helsinki declared war on Russia; there were no active hostilities until the fall; Germany concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Bolsheviks. But after its defeat, the situation changed; on October 15, 1918, the Finns captured the Rebolsk region, and in January 1919, the Porosozero region. In April, the Olonets Volunteer Army launched an offensive, captured Olonets, and approached Petrozavodsk. During the Vidlitsa operation (June 27-July 8), the Finns were defeated and expelled from Soviet soil. In the fall of 1919, the Finns repeated their attack on Petrozavodsk, but were repulsed at the end of September. In July 1920, the Finns suffered several more defeats, and negotiations began.

In mid-October 1920, the Yuryev (Tartu) Peace Treaty was signed, Soviet Russia ceded the Pechengi-Petsamo region, Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula.

But this was not enough for the Finns; the “Greater Finland” plan was not implemented. The second war was unleashed, it began with the formation of partisan detachments in October 1921 on the territory of Soviet Karelia; on November 6, Finnish volunteer detachments invaded Russian territory. By mid-February 1922, Soviet troops liberated the occupied territories, and on March 21 an agreement on the inviolability of borders was signed.

Svinhuvud, Per Evind, 3rd President of Finland, March 2, 1931 - March 1, 1937

Helsinki did not give up hopes of profiting from Soviet territories. But after two wars, they made conclusions for themselves: they need to act not with volunteer detachments, but with an entire army (Soviet Russia has become stronger) and allies are needed. As the first Prime Minister of Finland, Svinhuvud, put it: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

With the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations, Finland began to establish contacts with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. Helsinki had a negative attitude towards the USSR's entry into the League of Nations and the mutual assistance agreement with France. Hopes for a major conflict between the USSR and Japan did not materialize.

Finland's hostility and its readiness for war against the USSR was no secret either in Warsaw or in Washington. Thus, in September 1937, the American military attache to the USSR, Colonel F. Faymonville, reported: “The most pressing military problem The Soviet Union is preparing to repel a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany together with Finland in the West."

There were constant provocations on the border between the USSR and Finland. For example: on October 7, 1936, a Soviet border guard making a round was killed by a shot from the Finnish side. Only after much wrangling did Helsinki pay compensation to the family of the deceased and admit guilt. Finnish planes violated both land and water borders.

Moscow was especially concerned about cooperation between Finland and Germany. The Finnish public supported Germany's actions in Spain. German designers designed submarines for the Finns. Finland supplied Berlin with nickel and copper, received 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, and planned to purchase combat aircraft. In 1939, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center was created on the territory of Finland; its main task was intelligence work against the Soviet Union. The center collected information about the Baltic Fleet, the Leningrad Military District, and Leningrad industry. Finnish intelligence worked closely with the Abwehr. During Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 the blue swastika became the identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force.

By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, which could accommodate 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had.

Helsinki was ready to fight against the USSR not only in alliance with Germany, but also with France and England.

The problem of defending Leningrad

By 1939, we had an absolutely hostile state on our northwestern borders. There was a problem of protecting Leningrad, the border was only 32 km away, the Finns could fire at the city heavy artillery. In addition, it was necessary to protect the city from the sea.

In the south, the problem was solved by concluding a mutual assistance agreement with Estonia in September 1939. The USSR received the right to station garrisons and naval bases on the territory of Estonia.

Helsinki did not want to resolve the most important issue for the USSR through diplomatic means. Moscow proposed an exchange of territories, a mutual assistance agreement, joint defense of the Gulf of Finland, selling part of the territory for a military base or leasing it. But Helsinki did not accept either option. Although the most far-sighted figures, for example, Karl Mannerheim, understood the strategic necessity of Moscow's demands. Mannerheim proposed moving the border away from Leningrad and receiving good compensation, and offering the island of Yussarö for a Soviet naval base. But in the end, the position of not making a compromise prevailed.

It should be noted that London did not stand aside and provoked the conflict in its own way. They hinted to Moscow that they would not interfere in a possible conflict, but the Finns were told that they needed to hold their positions and give in.

As a result, on November 30, 1939, the third Soviet-Finnish war began. The first stage of the war, until the end of December 1939, was unsuccessful; due to a lack of intelligence and insufficient forces, the Red Army suffered significant losses. The enemy was underestimated, the Finnish army mobilized in advance. She occupied the defensive fortifications of the Mannerheim Line.

The new Finnish fortifications (1938-1939) were not known to intelligence, and the required number of forces was not allocated (to successfully break into the fortifications, it was necessary to create a superiority in a ratio of 3: 1).

Western position

The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations, violating the rules: 7 countries out of 15 that were on the Council of the League of Nations spoke in favor of expulsion, 8 did not participate or abstained. That is, they were excluded by a minority of votes.

The Finns were supplied by England, France, Sweden and other countries. More than 11 thousand foreign volunteers arrived in Finland.

London and Paris eventually decided to start a war with the USSR. They planned to land an Anglo-French expeditionary force in Scandinavia. Allied aircraft were to carry out airstrikes against the Union's oil fields in the Caucasus. From Syria, the Allied troops planned to attack Baku.

The Red Army thwarted its large-scale plans, Finland was defeated. Despite the entreaties of the French and British to hold out, on March 12, 1940, the Finns signed peace.

The USSR lost the war?

According to the Moscow Treaty of 1940, the USSR received the Rybachy Peninsula in the north, part of Karelia with Vyborg, the northern Ladoga region, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to the USSR for a period of 30 years, and a naval base was created there. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Finnish army was able to reach the old border only in September 1941.

We received these territories without giving up ours (they offered twice as much as they asked for), and for free - they also offered monetary compensation. When the Finns remembered compensation and cited the example of Peter the Great, who gave Sweden 2 million thalers, Molotov replied: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.” Moscow also insisted on 95 million rubles in compensation for damage to equipment and property from lands seized by the Finns. Plus they also transferred 350 naval and river transport, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages.

The Red Army gained important combat experience and saw its shortcomings.

It was a victory, albeit not a brilliant one, but a victory.

Sources:
Civil war and intervention in the USSR. M., 1987.
Diplomatic Dictionary in three volumes. M., 1986.
Winter War 1939-1940. M., 1998.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. M., 2004.
Story international relations(1918-2003). M., 2000.
Meinander H. History of Finland. M., 2008.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2006.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were crisis relations between the USSR and Finland. For a number of years, the Soviet-Finnish war, alas, was not brilliant and did not bring glory to Russian weapons. Now let’s look at the actions of the two sides, which, unfortunately, could not agree.

It was alarming in these last days of November 1939 in Finland: the war continued in Western Europe, there was unrest on the border with the Soviet Union, the population was being evacuated from major cities, the newspapers persistently insisted on the evil intentions of their eastern neighbor. Part of the population believed these rumors, others hoped that the war would bypass Finland.

But the morning that came on November 30, 1939, made everything clear. The coastal defense guns of Kronstadt, which opened fire on the territory of Finland at 8 o'clock, marked the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War.

The conflict was brewing gradually. Over the two decades between

There was mutual distrust between the USSR and Finland. If Finland was afraid of possible great power aspirations on the part of Stalin, whose actions as a dictator were often unpredictable, then the Soviet leadership, not without reason, was concerned about Helsinki’s major connections with London, Paris and Berlin. That is why, to ensure the security of Leningrad, during the negotiations that took place from February 1937 to November 1939, the Soviet Union offered Finland various options. Due to the fact that the Finnish government did not consider it possible to accept these proposals, the Soviet leadership took the initiative to resolve controversial issue by force, with the help of weapons.

The fighting in the first period of the war was unfavorable for the Soviet side. The calculation of quickly achieving the goal with small forces was not crowned with success. Finnish troops, relying on the fortified Mannerheim line, using a variety of tactics and skillfully using the terrain conditions, forced the Soviet command to concentrate larger forces and launch a general offensive in February 1940, which led to victory and the conclusion of peace on March 12, 1940.

The war lasted 105 days and was difficult for both sides. Soviet wars, following command orders, in difficult conditions snowy winter off-roaders showed mass heroism. During the war, both Finland and the Soviet Union achieved their goals not only through military operations of troops, but also by political means, which, as it turned out, not only did not weaken mutual intolerance, but, on the contrary, exacerbated it.

The political nature of the Soviet-Finnish War did not fit into the usual classification, limited by the ethical framework of the concepts of “just” and “unjust” war. It was unnecessary for both sides and not righteous mainly on our part. In this regard, one cannot but agree with the statements of such prominent Finnish statesmen as Presidents J. Paasikivi and U. Kekkonen that Finland’s fault was its intransigence during the pre-war negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the latter’s fault was that it did not use to the end political methods. Gave priority to a military solution to the dispute.

The unlawful actions of the Soviet leadership consist in the fact that Soviet troops, who crossed the border without declaring war on a broad front, violated the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1932, extended in 1934. The Soviet government also violated its own convention concluded with neighboring states in July 1933. Finland also joined this document at that time. It defined the concept of aggression and clearly stated that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature could justify or justify threats, blockades or attacks on another participating State.

By signing the title of the document, the Soviet government did not allow that Finland itself could commit aggression against its great neighbor. She feared only that her territory could be used by third countries for anti-Soviet purposes. But since such a condition was not stipulated in these documents, it follows that the contracting countries did not recognize its possibility and they had to respect the letter and spirit of these agreements.

Of course, Finland's one-sided rapprochement with Western countries and especially with Germany burdened Soviet-Finnish relations. The post-war President of Finland U. Kekkonen considered this cooperation a logical consequence of foreign policy aspirations for the first decade of Finnish independence. The common starting point of these aspirations, as was believed in Helsinki, was the threat from the east. Therefore, Finland sought to ensure the support of other countries in crisis situations. She carefully guarded the image of an “outpost of the West” and avoided a bilateral settlement of controversial issues with her eastern neighbor.

Due to these circumstances, the Soviet government accepted the possibility of a military conflict with Finland since the spring of 1936. It was then that the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the resettlement of the civilian population

(we were talking about 3,400 farms) from the Karelian Isthmus for the construction of training grounds and other military facilities here. During 1938, the General Staff at least three times raised the issue of transferring to the military department forest area on the Karelian Isthmus for defense construction. On September 13, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov specifically addressed the Chairman of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov with a proposal to intensify these works. However, at the same time diplomatic measures were taken to prevent military clashes. Thus, in February 1937, the first visit to Moscow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland since its independence, R. Hopsti, took place. Reports of his conversations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov said that

“within the framework of existing Soviet-Finnish agreements there is an opportunity

to uninterruptedly develop and strengthen friendly good neighborly relations between both states and that both governments strive and will strive for this.”

But a year passed, and in April 1938 the Soviet government considered

timely offer to the Finnish government to negotiate

regarding the joint development of measures to strengthen security

sea ​​and land approaches to Leningrad and the borders of Finland and

concluding a mutual assistance agreement for this purpose. Negotiation,

continued for several months, were unsuccessful. Finland

rejected this offer.

Soon for informal negotiations on behalf of the Soviet

government arrived in Helsinki B.E. Matte. He brought it on principle

new Soviet proposal, which was as follows: Finland cedes

to the Soviet Union a certain territory on the Karelian Isthmus,

receiving in return a large Soviet territory and financial compensation

expenses for the resettlement of Finnish citizens of the ceded territory. Answer

the Finnish side was negative with the same justification - sovereignty and

neutrality of Finland.

In this situation, Finland took defensive measures. Was

military construction was intensified, exercises were held in which

Chief of General Staff was present ground forces Germany General F.

Halder, the troops received new types of weapons and military equipment.

Obviously, it was these measures that gave rise to second-rank army commander K.A.

Meretskov, who in March 1939 was appointed commander of the troops

Leningrad Military District, assert that Finnish troops from the very

began supposedly had an offensive mission on the Karelian Isthmus with

the goal was to wear down the Soviet troops and then strike at Leningrad.

France and Germany, busy with the war, could not provide support

Finland, another round of Soviet-Finnish negotiations has begun. They

took place in Moscow. As before, the Finnish delegation was headed by

Paasikivi, but at the second stage the minister was included in the delegation

Finance Gunner. There were rumors in Helsinki at that time that the Social Democrat

Ganner had known Stalin since pre-revolutionary times in

Helsinki and even once rendered him a proper favor.

During the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov withdrew their previous proposal

about leasing islands in the Gulf of Finland, but they suggested that the Finns postpone

border several tens of kilometers from Leningrad and rent for

creation of a naval base on the Haiko Peninsula, giving Finland half the size

large territory in Soviet Karelia.

non-aggression and the recall of their diplomatic representatives from Finland.

When the war began, Finland turned to the League of Nations asking for

support. The League of Nations, in turn, called on the USSR to end the military

actions, but received the answer that the Soviet country is not conducting any

war with Finland.

organizations. Many countries have raised funds for Finland or

provided loans, in particular from the United States and Sweden. Most weapons

delivered by Great Britain and France, but the equipment was mostly

outdated. The most valuable contribution was from Sweden: 80 thousand rifles, 85

anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns and 112 field guns.

The Germans also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the USSR. The war caused

a significant blow to Germany's vital supplies of timber and nickel

from Finland. The strong sympathy of Western countries made it possible

intervention in the war between northern Norway and Sweden, which would entail

constitute the elimination of imports iron ore to Germany from Norway. But even

Faced with such difficulties, the Germans complied with the terms of the pact.

In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, long years was virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of the “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.

Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war,” today this war is very “famous.” One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...

By the end of the 1930s, near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish ones had. air force. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.

Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.

Those denouncing the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began being deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis introduce a naval blockade of Liberty Island, and even more so, launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries; the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Cadet Party, P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”

On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered in good form interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.

I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.

What were the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.

Was not up to par Soviet intelligence, which was unable to reveal complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.

Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.

As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.

Defeat or victory?

So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if it leaves the winner in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?

As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.

According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km and in exchange for twice the territory, as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.

It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the cost of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.

But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".

Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, and a significant number of cars to the USSR.

Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.

Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times greater than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Let's take for example Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russians and Japanese soldiers, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.

As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.

Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia this is a great victory» . However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.

_____________________________

1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939

2. A Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of ​​the former Finnish border outpost. 1939

3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939

4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939

5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939

8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939

9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

11. Reconnaissance group skiers receive the commander's assignment before going on reconnaissance. 1939

12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939

13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940

14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of ​​​​combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940

15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939

16. Cooking lunch in field conditions at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940

17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940

18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939

20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939

21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939

22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940

23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940

24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939

25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939

26. Red Army soldiers guard a gasoline pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939

27. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

28. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940

30. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939

31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939

32. A Red Army soldier puts a letter in a field mail box. 1939

33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers inspects the Shyutskor banner captured from the Finns. 1939

34. B-4 howitzer on the front line. 1939

35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at height 65.5. 1940

36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by Red Army units. 1939

37. View of a destroyed bridge near the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939

38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940

39. Red Army soldiers at a captured gun left behind after the battles with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940

40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940

41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.

42. Soviet soldiers at a captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940

44. Red Army soldiers at fortifications in Vyborg. 1940

45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940

46. ​​Red Army soldiers clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940

47. Icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940

48. Soviet skiers are moving to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.

49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet-Finnish war.

50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940

51. Crossing the Finnish border Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939

52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The photo was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940

53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939

54. Finnish Fokker C.X aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939

55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.

56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. 12/02/1939

57. Red Army commanders examine the captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank. March 1940

58. Hero of the Soviet Union, senior lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940