Grunin's stormtroopers. An excellent overview of the domestic low-cost attack aircraft turboprop program. Battlefield aircraft - a light attack aircraft off-airfield based or a light field anti-helicopter attack aircraft - a new class of combat aviation Masses and n
And also for targeted destruction of ground and sea targets.
Assault- destruction of ground and sea targets using small arms and cannon weapons (cannons and machine guns), as well as missiles. This method of destruction turns out to be more suitable for striking extended targets, such as clusters and especially marching columns infantry and equipment. The most effective strikes are against openly located manpower and unarmored vehicles (cars, unarmored tractors and the equipment they tow, railway transport). To perform this task, the aircraft must operate at low altitude without diving (“low-level flight”) or with a gentle dive (at an angle of no more than 30 degrees).
Story
Non-specialized types of aircraft, such as conventional fighters, as well as light and dive bombers, can be used as attack aircraft. However, in the 1930s, a specialized class of aircraft was allocated for attack operations. The reason for this is that, unlike an attack aircraft, a dive bomber only hits pinpoint targets; heavy bomber operates from a great height over areas and large stationary targets - it is not suitable for hitting a target directly on the battlefield, since there is a high risk of missing and hitting friendly forces; a fighter (like a dive bomber) does not have strong armor, while at low altitudes the aircraft is exposed to targeted fire from all types of weapons, as well as to stray fragments, stones and other dangerous objects flying over the battlefield.
The most produced attack aircraft of the Second World War (as well as the most produced combat aircraft in the history of aviation) was the Ilyushin Design Bureau's Il-2. The next vehicle of this type created by Ilyushin was the Il-10, which was used only at the very end of World War II.
The role of attack aircraft decreased after the advent of cluster bombs (with the help of which elongated targets are hit more effectively than from small arms), as well as due to the development of air-to-surface missiles (accuracy and range increased, guided missiles appeared). The speed of combat aircraft has increased and it has become problematic for them to hit targets at low altitude. On the other hand, attack helicopters appeared, almost completely replacing the airplane from low altitudes.
In this regard, in the post-war period, resistance to the development of attack aircraft as highly specialized aircraft grew in the Air Force. Although close air support ground troops aviation remained and remains an extremely important factor in modern combat, the main emphasis was on the design of universal aircraft that combine the functions of an attack aircraft.
Examples of post-war attack aircraft include the Blackburn Buccaneer, A-6 Intruder, A-7 Corsair II. In other cases, ground attack has become the domain of converted trainers, such as the BAC Strikemaster, BAE Hawk and Cessna A-37.
In the 1960s, both the Soviet and American militaries returned to the concept of a dedicated close support aircraft. Scientists from both countries settled on similar characteristics of such aircraft - a well-armored, highly maneuverable subsonic aircraft with powerful artillery and missile and bomb weapons. Soviet military settled on the nimble Su-25, the Americans relied on a heavier one [ ] Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II . Characteristic feature both aircraft became completely out of funds air combat(although later both aircraft began to be equipped with short-range air-to-air missiles for self-defense). The military-political situation (significant superiority of Soviet tanks in Europe) determined the main purpose of the A-10 as an anti-tank aircraft, while the Su-25 was more intended to support troops on the battlefield (destruction of firing points, all types of transport, manpower , important objects and enemy fortifications), although one of the modifications of the aircraft also became a specialized “anti-tank” aircraft.
The role of stormtroopers remains well defined and in demand. In the Russian Air Force, Su-25 attack aircraft will remain in service at least until 2020. NATO is increasingly offering modified production fighters for the attack role, resulting in the use of dual designations, such as the F/A-18 Hornet, due to the growing role of precision weapons, which has made the previous approach to the target unnecessary. Recently, the term “strike fighter” has become widespread in the West to refer to such aircraft.
In many countries, the concept of “attack aircraft” does not exist at all, and aircraft belonging to the classes “dive bomber”, “front-line fighter”, “tactical fighter”, etc. are used for attack.
Stormtroopers now also called attack helicopters.
In NATO countries, aircraft of this class are designated by the prefix “A-” (from the English Attack) followed by a digital designation (it should be noted that until 1946 the prefix “A-” was also assigned
Few armies in the world can afford the luxury of an attack aircraft. For example, of the NATO allies, Germany, England and Belgium wanted to buy Thunderbolt-2, the Japanese, Koreans and Australians also licked their lips at it... But in the end, considering that it was too expensive, they refused, limiting themselves to fighter-bombers and multirole fighters.
There are significantly more owners of the Su-25, but if you remove from the list all the freeloaders from the former allies and republics Soviet Union who received the plane for next to nothing from the USSR... then, in principle, the picture is the same. The exception is Congo, which bought the “drying” in 1999, and today’s Iraq.
In general, even for rich countries, a specialized attack aircraft, as it turned out, is an expensive pleasure. Neither the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, accustomed to squandering money on military toys, nor even China, which is rapidly growing in power, have such aircraft. Well, with China it’s a separate question - there the role of ersatz attack aircraft can be played by numerous clones of MiGs of the seventeenth (J-5), nineteenth (J-6) and others like them, and human resources are almost limitless... the excess male population has to be put somewhere.
In general, there are now two serious armies in the world that can afford attack aircraft - the American one and ours. And the opposing sides are represented by the A-10 Thunderbolt II (which I wrote about in detail here) and the Su-25, respectively.
Many people have a natural question -
“Which of them is cooler?
Western apologists will immediately say that the A-10 is cooler, because it has a monochrome screen in the cockpit, takes more and flies further.
Patriots will say that the Su-25 is faster and more durable. Let's try to consider the advantages of each aircraft separately and take a closer look.
But first, a little history - how both cars came to be.
Chronology of creation
USA
1966 Air Force opening of the A-X program (Attack eXperimental - shock experimental)
March 1967 - a competition was announced for the design of a relatively inexpensive armored attack aircraft. 21 aircraft manufacturing companies are participating
May 1970 - two prototypes were flown (YA-9A and YA-10A - finalists of the competition)
October 1972 - start of comparative tests
January 1973 - victory in the YA-10A competition from Fairchild Republic. A contract ($159 million) was signed for the production of 10 pre-production aircraft.
February 1975 – flight of the first pre-production aircraft
September 1975 – first flight with the GAU-8/A cannon
October 1975 – flight of the first production A-10A
March 1976 - aircraft began to arrive at the troops (at Davis-Montain airbase)
1977 - achievement of combat readiness and adoption of the US Air Force
May 1968 - the beginning of proactive design at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, the appearance was adopted by the general designer P.O. Sukhim. At that time the plane was still called the “battlefield aircraft” (SPB).
The end of 1968 - the beginning of purging at TsAGI
March 1969 – competition for a light attack aircraft. Participated: T-8 (with two 2 x AI-25T), Yak-25LSH, Il-42, MiG-21LSH
End of 1969 – victory of the T-8, military requirement of 1200 km/h
Summer 1970 – development of the project, creation of documentation
End of 1971 - finalization of the appearance, agreed with the military on a maximum speed of 1000 km/h
January 1972 – finalization of the appearance of the T-8, start of mock-up work
September 1972 - approval of the layout and set of documentation from the customer, start of construction of the prototype aircraft
February 1975 – flight of the first prototype (T-8-1)
Summer 1976 - updated prototypes (T-8-1D and T-8-2D) with R-95Sh engines
July 1976 - receiving the name "Su-25" and beginning of preparations for mass production
June 1979 – flight of the first production vehicle (T-8-3)
March 1981 - the GSI was completed and the aircraft was recommended for adoption
April 1981 - the aircraft began to enter combat units
June 1981 - start of use of the Su-25 in Afghanistan
1987 - official adoption
Project SPB (Battlefield Aircraft) Sukhoi Design Bureau
Comparison on paper
The tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft had to be collected long and hard, because they were not available in any source.
Performance characteristics of the A-10 in RuNet (with a maximum speed of 834 km/h Rook versus Warthog. Su-25 and A-10 attack aircraft - a view from the trench) is generally something that has its origins in an old Soviet brochure from 1976. In short, it’s like with that GAU-8 cannon and the mass of its shells, published incorrectly everywhere on the RuNet (except for this post about it in svbr). And I calculated this by counting the variants of the combat load - there was nothing wrong with the existing mass.
Therefore, I had to surf the websites of the adversaries, during which I even found a 500-page manual for the A-10.
Advantages of "Warthog"
Range and payload
And indeed, the A-10 “takes” more
The maximum combat load of the A-10 is 7260 kg, plus the cannon ammunition (1350 rounds) is 933.4 kg.
The maximum combat load of the Su-25 is 4400 kg, gun ammunition (250 shells) is 340 kg.
And it flies on:
Thunderbolt-2 has a longer range - from 460 km with a normal load (in "close support" missions) to 800 km lightly (in "aerial reconnaissance" missions).
Hrach has a combat radius of 250-300 km.
Largely due to the fact that Thunderbolt engines are more economical.
The bench consumption of TF34-GE-100 is 0.37 kg/kgf·h, for R-95Sh - 0.86 kg/kgf·h.
Here, lovers of American technology throw their caps into the air and rejoice: “The rook is two and a half times more gluttonous.”
Why is that?
Firstly, the Thunderbolt engines are double-circuit (on Grach they are single-circuit), and secondly, the Su-25 engine is more unpretentious and omnivorous (for example, it can eat... diesel fuel instead of aviation kerosene), which of course does not benefit fuel efficiency , but expands the application possibilities of the aircraft.
And it should also be remembered that hourly fuel consumption is not the same as kilometer consumption (because aircraft speeds differ, and at cruising speed the same Su-25 flies 190 km more per hour).
An additional advantage of the A-10 is the presence of an in-flight refueling system, which further expands its possible range.
Refueling from a KC-135 air tanker
Separate engine nacelle
It gives advantages when modernizing an aircraft - the new power plant does not depend on the size of the engine nacelle, you can plug in what you need. It is also likely that this arrangement of the engine makes it possible to quickly replace it if damaged.
Good visibility from the cabin
The warthog's nose shape and canopy provide the pilot with a clear view, resulting in better situational awareness.
But it does not solve problems with finding targets with the naked eye, the same as those experienced by the Su-25 pilot.
More about this below.
The superiority of "Rook"
Speed and agility
Here the Su-25 comes forward.
The cruising speed of the Warthog (560 km/h) is almost one and a half times less than the speed of the Rook (750 km/h).
The maximum, respectively, is 722 km/h versus 950 km/h.
In terms of vertical maneuverability, thrust-to-weight ratio (0.47 versus 0.37) and rate of climb (60 m/s versus 30 m/s), the Su-25 is also superior to the American.
At the same time, the American should be better in horizontal maneuverability - due to its larger wing area and lower speed when turning. Although, for example, the pilots of the “Heavenly Hussars” aerobatic team who piloted the A-10A said that a turn with a bank of more than 45 degrees for the A-10A comes with a loss of speed, which cannot be said about the Su-25.
Test pilot, Hero of Russia Magomed Tolboev, who flew the A-10, confirms their words:
“The Su-25 is more maneuverable, it does not have restrictions like the A-10. For example, our aircraft can fully perform complex aerobatics, but the “American” cannot, it has limited pitch angles and roll angles, fit into the A-10 canyon can’t, but the Su-25 can..."
Vitality
It is generally accepted that their survivability is approximately equal. But still, “Rook” is more tenacious.
And in Afghanistan, attack aircraft had to work in very harsh conditions. In addition to the well-known American Stinger MANPADS supplied to terrorists... in the mountains of Afghanistan, Su-25s encountered intense fire. Strelkovka, heavy machine guns, MZA... and the "Rooks" were often simultaneously fired not only from below, but also from the side, from behind and even... from above!
I would like to see the A-10 in such scrapes (with its large canopy with “excellent visibility”), and not in the conditions of the predominantly flat Iraq.
Both are armored, but structurally... the armored cabin of the A-10A is made of titanium panels fastened with bolts (which themselves become secondary elements of destruction in the event of a direct hit), the Su-25 has a welded titanium “bath”; The control rods on the A-10A are cable, on the Su-25 they are titanium (in the rear fuselage made of heat-resistant steel), which can withstand hits from large-caliber bullets. The engines are also spaced apart for both, but on the Su-25 there is a fuselage and an armored panel between the engines, on the A-10 there is air.
At the same time, the Su-25 is geometrically smaller, which somewhat reduces the likelihood of it being hit by a rifle or MZA.
Location flexibility
Rook is less demanding on the airfield.
Take-off run length of the Su-25: on a concrete runway - 550/400 m (on the ground - 900/650 m). If necessary, it can take off and land from unpaved runways (whereas the A-10 only claims to land on grass).
Take-off/run length A-10: 1220/610 m.
Special complex ALS (Ammunition Loading System) for reloading GAU-8
And the most interesting thing.
Su-25 pilots do not need a refrigerator with Coca-Cola! Just kidding. The Rook R-95 engine, which is criticized for its “gluttony” (stand consumption 0.88 kg/hour versus 0.37 kg/hour for the American)... is much more unpretentious and omnivorous. The fact is that the Su-25 engine can be fueled... with diesel fuel!
This was done so that the Su-25s operating together with the advancing units (or from “skid-up airfields”, prepared sites) could, if necessary, refuel from the same tankers.
Price
The price of one A-10 is $4.1 million in 1977 prices, or $16.25 million in 2014 prices (this is the domestic price for the Americans, since the A-10 was not exported).
It is difficult to establish the cost of the Su-25 (because it has been out of production for a long time)... It is generally accepted (in most sources I have seen this exact figure) that the cost of one Su-25 is $3 million (in 2000s prices).
I also came across an estimate that the Su-25 was four times cheaper than the A-10 (which roughly agrees with the above figures). I suggest you accept it.
View from the trench
If we move from paper to specific ravines, i.e. from comparing numbers to combat realities, the picture turns out to be more interesting.
Now I’m going to say a seditious thing for many, but don’t rush to shoot tomatoes - read to the end.
The solid combat load of the A-10 is, in general, meaningless. Because the job of an attack aircraft is to “appear, brush the enemy, and leave” until he comes to his senses and organizes air defense.
The attack aircraft must hit its target on the first, or maximum on the second, approach. On the third and other approaches, the effect of surprise has already been lost, the unhit “targets” will hide, and those that do not want to hide will prepare MANPADS, heavy machine guns and other things that are unpleasant for any aircraft. And enemy fighters called for help may also arrive.
And for these one or two (well, three) approaches, seven tons of the A-10’s combat load is excessive; it won’t have time to dump everything specifically on the targets.
The situation is similar with a cannon, which has a huge rate of fire on paper, but allows you to fire only short bursts lasting one second (maximum two). In one run, the Warthog can allow himself one burst, and then a minute of cooling of the trunks.
The second burst of the GAU-8 is 65 shells. For two passes the maximum consumption of ammunition is 130 pieces, for three passes - 195 pieces. As a result, out of an ammunition load of 1350 shells, 1155 unused shells remain. Even if you shoot in two-second bursts (consumption of 130 pieces/sec), then after three passes there are 960 shells left. Even in this case, 71% (actually 83%) of the gun’s ammunition is essentially unnecessary and redundant. Which, by the way, is confirmed by the same “Desert Storm”, the actual consumption of shells was 121 pieces. for departure.
Well, oh well, he doesn’t have enough reserves - let’s leave it to him so that he can shoot down helicopters along the way; we need to dispose of the depleted uranium 238 that the Americans don’t need somewhere.
Well, you say, we can not take the full combat load (we’ll take the same amount as the Grach), but add more fuel and even grab a couple more PTBs (outboard fuel tanks), seriously increasing the range and time spent in the air. But the large combat radius of the A-10 hides another problem.
A longer range has an unpleasant downside for a subsonic aircraft. The higher the flight range, the farther the airfield is from the battlefield, and accordingly, it will take longer to fly to the aid of your troops. Okay, if the attack aircraft is patrolling in the “front line” area at this time... what if this is an emergency flight from the ground?
It’s one thing to fly 300 kilometers at a speed of 750 km/h (Su-25 departure), and completely different to fly 1000 km (and about that much and even a little further you can drag an A-10 with 4 tons of combat load, full tanks and a pair of anti-tank tanks ) at a speed of 560 km/h. In the first case, a ground unit, pinned down by fire, will wait 24 minutes for an attack aircraft, and in the second, 1 hour 47 minutes. What is called - feel the difference (c).
And the military comrades will “cut” the zone of responsibility for the attack aircraft on the map according to the radius of action. And woe to those American infantrymen whose units will be located at the edges of the radius.
But we forgot that an American attack aircraft with a lot of fuel (and the ability to refuel in the air) can “hang” over the front line for a long time, ready to work when called from the ground. Here, however, the problem of calling from the other end of a large area of responsibility still remains... But maybe you’ll get lucky and the guys attacked somewhere nearby will call.
Fuel and engine life will indeed have to be wasted, but this is not the worst thing. There is another serious BUT. This scenario is poorly suited for a war with a peer enemy that has front-line fighters, AWACS aircraft, long-range air defense systems and over-the-horizon radars in the combat zone. With such an enemy, hanging over the front line “waiting for a call” will not work.
So it turns out that the paper seemingly serious advantage is practically nullified real life. The A-10's range and combat load capabilities seem excessive. It’s like driving a nail (destroying an important point target on the front line) with a microscope... You can take a regular hammer (Su-25), or you can take a sledgehammer (A-10). The result is the same, but the labor costs are higher.
At the same time, everyone should remember that the Su-25 is much cheaper. For the price of one A-10, you can buy 4 Su-25s, which can cover the same (if not larger) area of responsibility with a much higher response speed.
Now, let's think about what is most important for a stormtrooper.
The attack aircraft must a) accurately and quickly hit the target, b) get out of the fire alive.
On the first point, both aircraft have problems (and even their current modifications, the A-10S and Su-25SM). Without preliminary high-quality target designation from the ground or a drone, it is often impossible to detect and hit a target on the first approach.
And for the A-10A and Su-25 we are comparing, this is even worse, since there was no normal sighting system (about this and the problems encountered in Iraq - here).
The attack aircraft carried neither an optical-electronic sight (for TV-guided missiles, the A-10 pilot searched for the target on a monochrome screen of poor resolution through the missile's homing head with a narrow field of view), nor a radar. True, the "Rook" at the same time had its own laser rangefinder-target designator "Klen-PS", with the help of which it could use air-to-surface guided missiles with laser seekers (S-25L, Kh-25ML, Kh-29L). The Warthog could only use laser-guided bombs when targets were externally illuminated with a laser.
Launch of a Kh-25ML guided missile from a Su-25 attack aircraft
On the second point (“getting out of the fire alive”) the Su-25 clearly has an advantage. Firstly, due to higher survivability. And secondly, due to a much higher maximum speed and better acceleration characteristics.
And now, for example, we are also installing the Vitebsk personal protection complex on the Su-25SM3.
Different approach
It seems that the planes are of the same class, but you start to understand and realize that in fact the cars are very different. And their differences are due to different approaches and concepts of application.
"Thunderbolt" is more of a protected flying "tank destroyer" designed for for a long time staying in the air and free hunting. Powerful and heavily loaded, carrying a ton of ammunition for all occasions. Its weapons complex (the heavy-duty GAU-8/A cannon and the AGM-65 Maverick guided missiles) was primarily “tailored” to attack tanks, to level out the Soviet tank advantage on the ground (which began in the late 60s and took shape in the 70s). 1940s), and only then - for direct support of troops.
"Rook" was created as workhorse for baking. As a durable, cheap and unpretentious aircraft for war, which was supposed to solve the problem of support ground forces“cheap and cheerful”, coming as close as possible to the enemy and treating him with bombs, NURS and a cannon... And in some cases, destroying point targets with missiles with a laser seeker.
As we see today, the idea of a “plane around a gun” did not justify itself (especially considering that the vast majority of the A-10A’s targets were destroyed by Maverick missiles), and in the next modification the A-10C went to altitude, receiving sighting containers as “eyes” and precision weapons as " long arm"and retaining atavisms in the form of a gun and armor.
And the concept of remote warfare and loss reduction actually pushed it out of the “attack aircraft” into the niche of fighter-bombers, which, in my opinion, largely determines its current problems. Although sometimes the Warthog “takes to the old ways” and irons ground targets (preferably more defenseless) ... but still, it seems that the Americans seriously intend to bury the attack aircraft as a class again.
Ours do not intend to abandon the Su-25. Not so long ago, the Hornet design and development work was opened for a new promising attack aircraft, and then they started talking about the PAK SHA program. True, in the end, having studied the capabilities of the modernized Su-25SM3, the military seemed to have decided for now to abandon the new platform and squeeze the potential of the old Su-25 to dry, modernizing all the remaining aircraft in the Air Force under the SM3 program. Maybe even the production of the Su-25 would have been launched again if the plant for their production had not remained in Georgia after the collapse of the USSR, and the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant (which at one time produced the Su-25UB, Su-25UTG and plans to produce the Su-25TM) production of the Su-25 has already been curtailed.
Despite periodically sounding crazy thoughts about replacing the Su-25 with a light attack aircraft based on the Yak-130, our military is not going to give up attack aircraft. And God willing, soon we will see a replacement for the good old Rook.
No matter how hard military visionaries try to rid the battlefield of the ordinary soldier... the onset of these times is not yet in sight. No, in some cases you can fight with robots, but this solution is very “niche” and not for a serious war.
In a large-scale war with a comparable enemy, all of today’s expensive fake whistles will quickly become a thing of the past. Because anyone who will strike with high-precision missiles/bombs costing $100,000 or more on bunkers with a cost of 50,000 rubles and 60 man-hours of work is doomed. Therefore, all this talk about high-precision weapons, replacing attack aircraft with drones, 6th, 7th and 8th generation aircraft, “network-centric warfare” and other joys will quickly cease in the event of a serious and large-scale mess. And the attack aircraft will have to return to the battlefield again, the seats in the cockpits of which will have to be taken by Ivans and Johns...
In 1963, it was adopted by the naval forces and corps Marine Corps The United States received the Grumman A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft. These vehicles actively participated in the Vietnam War and several other armed conflicts. Good characteristics and ease of use ensured this attack aircraft became widely known and became a reason for the masses positive feedback. However, any aircraft becomes obsolete over time, and the Intruder was no exception. In the early eighties, it became clear that over the next 10-15 years these aircraft would have to be removed from service due to the inexpediency of further modernization. The fleet needed a new aircraft to attack ground targets.
The ATA (Advanced Tactical Aircraft) program began in 1983. At first, naval commanders wanted to make a single project for a universal aircraft. It was to become the basis for an attack-bomber, a fighter, as well as several other auxiliary vehicles, such as a jammer or a reconnaissance aircraft. However, such bold plans were soon abandoned. Firstly, it became clear that such a project would be too expensive, and secondly, options for upgrading existing F-14 aircraft appeared. Finally, the fight against airborne opponents could now be entrusted to the latest F/A-18 fighter-bombers, which had just entered service. Thus, one could only be concerned with creating a new deck attack aircraft.
In the mid-eighties, the appearance of the future aircraft began to take shape. Since it was no longer supposed to intercept enemy aircraft, they decided to make it subsonic and equip it with on-board electronic equipment, “tailored” for working against ground targets. In addition, in accordance with the latest trends in the American aircraft industry, the promising ATA attack aircraft should have been made inconspicuous to enemy radars. This requirement was due to the need to work, including in conditions of serious air defense enemy. Since the task was quite complex, the Pentagon attracted two groups of aircraft manufacturing companies to the research. The first included McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics, and the second included Grumman, Northrop and Vought.
During the ATA project, a variety of options for the aerodynamic appearance of the new aircraft were considered. From a simple redesign of the F/A-18 airframe with reduced radar signature to the most fantastic designs. For example, the option with a forward-swept wing was seriously considered. However, quite quickly, a flying wing was chosen from the entire variety of configurations, since it had the best combination of stealth and flight characteristics. At the very end of 1987, the customer, represented by the Navy and the Marine Corps, decided which companies would carry out further design work. The main contractors for the project were McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics.
The Navy and Marine Corps intended to purchase a total of 450-500 ATA attack aircraft. At the same time, they did not forget about the economic side of the matter. The contract for the development of the aircraft clearly stipulated financial terms. Thus, the recommended development cost was $4.38 billion, and the maximum cost was $4.78 billion. In addition, financiers from the Pentagon took interesting measures in case the project became more expensive. In order for the development companies to be interested in maintaining an acceptable cost, the military insisted on the following conditions. If the cost of the program exceeds the recommended cost, then the military department pays only 60% of the overrun, and the contractors take on the rest. If they fail to meet the maximum cost, then all unnecessary costs fall on them, and the Pentagon pays only the recommended amount of costs.
Around the same time, the main aspects of the appearance of the promising aircraft were fully formed. The designed attack aircraft was a triangular flying wing with a 48° sweep along the leading edge and a protruding canopy in the nose. Apart from the canopy, no components protruded above the surface of the wing - the ATA fully complied with the definition of a flying wing. This feature of the aircraft was due to stealth requirements. Just at this time, the development of the B-2 strategic bomber was ending, and the creators of ATA decided to follow the same path as the Northrop Grumman engineers. It was planned to ensure stealth not only by the shape of the wing. Almost all the main elements of the power structure and skin were proposed to be made from carbon fiber composites. Similar materials had previously been used many times in the American aircraft industry, but the ATA was to be the first US aircraft with such a large proportion of plastic in the design.
The general weight and size parameters of the aircraft were determined at the preliminary design stage and were subsequently subject to almost no major changes. With a body-wing length of 11.5 meters, the ATA attack aircraft was supposed to have a wingspan of 21 and a standing height of 3.4 meters. Dry weight was assumed to be 17.5-18 tons, maximum take-off - no more than 29-30 tons. Of this, up to 9500-9700 kilograms were fuel, placed in several tanks of complex shape.
Just a few months after identifying the development firms, the Pentagon changed its plans. Now the military was going to buy ATA attack aircraft not only for the Navy and Marine Corps, but also for the Air Force. The total number of required vehicles was determined at 850-860 units. Later, in 1990, the aircraft received its own designation. It was named the A-12 Avenger II, after the Grumman TFB/TFM Avenger carrier-based dive torpedo bomber of World War II. The first flight of the new aircraft was initially planned for 1991, and the first production aircraft were supposed to go into combat units no later than 1994-95. In general, plans for the new aircraft were more than optimistic, but expectations were not met.
Even at the preliminary design stage, before selecting development companies, the customer decided on the requirements for the power plant of the new aircraft. For unification and reduction in cost, we chose F412-GE-400 turbojet engines. Two such engines provided 6700 kgf of thrust. The engine air intakes were located on the front of the wing, below its edge. The air flowed to the engines through curved channels, which prevented radar radiation from reaching the compressor blades. Before installing engines on the A-12 aircraft, it was planned to carry out a small technological upgrade. It was planned to change the design of several auxiliary units, as well as install a new digital control system.
The desire to reduce the cost of the finished aircraft influenced the composition of the avionics. Designers from McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics tried to balance on the brink high performance and a relatively low price. At the same time, the overall layout of the aircraft forced them to apply several original solutions. The Westinghouse AN/APQ-183, which was a development of the F-16 fighter radar, was chosen as the radar station. Due to the specific shape of the wing-hull, this radar station was equipped with two antennas with passive phased arrays. They were placed on the leading edge, near the cockpit. The AN/APQ-183 radar could search for ground, surface and air targets, allow it to follow the terrain, etc. Despite the general intentions to reduce the cost of the station, it received five computing modules with a performance of 125 Mflops each. As a result, the radar of the A-12 attack aircraft had combat potential at the level of fourth-generation fighters.
In addition to the radar station, the A-12 received an optical-electronic station with a thermal imaging channel manufactured by the same Westinghouse company. This station consisted of two modules. The first of them monitored a wide sector and was intended for flying at night or in difficult weather conditions, as well as for searching for targets. To attack, it was necessary to use a second module with a narrow field of view. He could find and accompany ground and air targets, as well as provide information to the sighting system.
Despite the need to reduce the cost of the program as a whole and each aircraft in particular, the A-12 attack aircraft received a modern “glass” cockpit for two pilots. The pilot had at his disposal three multifunction liquid crystal displays (one 8x8 inches and two 6x6) and a head-up display measuring 30x23 degrees. In the rear cockpit of the navigator-operator there was one color display 8x8 inches and three smaller monochrome ones, 6x6. The control systems were distributed between the pilot and the navigator in such a way that the crew commander could single-handedly carry out an attack with certain types of weapons, as well as resist enemy fighters.
In the middle part of the flying wing, on each side of the engines, the A-12 had two relatively long cargo bays. Two more volumes for weapons, but of a smaller size, were located in the consoles, immediately behind the niches of the main landing gear. It was possible to hang weapons on the suspension devices of the cargo compartments total mass up to 3-3.5 tons. However, due to their relatively small dimensions, the central compartments could only accommodate one 2000 lb caliber guided bomb. The side weapons bays were originally designed to carry and launch AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. In the case of operations in an area with relatively weak air defense, the A-12 attack aircraft, at the cost of increased radar visibility, could carry twice as many weapons. In this case, up to 3.5 tons of load could be suspended on external nodes. It is noteworthy that built-in weapons in the form of an automatic cannon were not provided.
The A-12 aircraft was originally created for the Navy and Marine Corps, so it was immediately adapted for use on aircraft carriers. For this purpose, the wing consoles were made folding. The folding axis was located immediately behind the side weapon compartments. Interestingly, the unfolded wing of the A-12 attack aircraft had a noticeably greater span compared to the F-14 fighter in takeoff configuration: 21.4 meters versus 19.55; but at the same time, the A-12 was superior in size when folded, since its span was reduced to 11 meters versus 11.6. The older A-6 had a smaller wingspan than the A-12 in both cases. However, due to the flying wing architecture, the new aircraft beat everyone in terms of length. From the nose to the trailing edge of the wing it was only 11.5 meters. Thus, the new A-12 took up significantly less space than the F-14 or A-6. The nose landing gear was further strengthened for use with the carrier's steam catapult.
Although the A-12 was planned to be armed with relatively long-range missiles and guided bombs, the aircraft still received armor elements. The cockpit, engines and a number of important components received additional protection. Thanks to the “flying wing” design, it was possible to place the armor elements in such a way that the combat survivability of the aircraft was radically increased. The A-12, according to calculations, turned out to be 12 times more survivable than the A-6 and 4-5 times more survivable than the F/A-18. Thus, the level of protection of the carrier-based attack aircraft turned out to be approximately at the level of another aircraft of a similar purpose, but “land” - the A-10.
At the later stages of design, when not only the general features were determined, but also the smallest nuances were worked out, the designers of McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics were able to calculate the expected flight characteristics of the promising attack aircraft. With the help of engines without an afterburner, it could accelerate to a speed of 930 km/h and fly at a range of up to 1480-1500 kilometers. The practical ceiling of the car did not exceed 12.2-12.5 kilometers. With such flight data, the new A-12 could carry out missions to attack enemy targets at tactical depth. In other words, it was possible to fulfill all the tactical and technical requirements of the military.
The development of the new aircraft proceeded at a rapid pace, but in the end this speed did not produce any results. By the end of 1989, it became clear that the recommended project budget had been exceeded by almost a billion dollars. These costs, in accordance with the terms of the contract, were to be borne entirely by wasteful developers. In addition, a number of technical problems, which transparently hinted at a further increase in the cost of the program. The Pentagon began to get nervous. If the planned volume of purchases were maintained, the re-equipment of the Navy and Marine Corps could cost $55-60 billion, which was significantly more than the originally planned amount. Development companies were forced to initiate additional negotiations to change the terms of the contract.
For a long time, the military did not want to meet halfway and soften the financial requirements for the project. At the same time, seeing a number serious problems and the looming failure to meet the planned deadlines, the command of the Marine Corps refused to purchase new aircraft. Thus, the order was reduced to 620 vehicles, and the planned production rate was cut from 48 to 36 attack aircraft per year. At this time, the designers had to urgently solve the problem with the grade of carbon fiber for some airframe parts. An alternative grade was nevertheless found, but because of it, the plane, when fully loaded, became heavier from the required 29.5 to 36 tons. This did not suit the sailors, since from the very beginning they demanded such a mass and dimensions that one aircraft carrier aircraft lift could deliver two A-12s to the flight deck at once.
However, assembly of the first prototype continued, although it was seriously behind schedule. As of January 1991, the delay had already been 18 months, and dissatisfied voices were increasingly heard on the sidelines of the American military department. By the same time, the total costs of the Pentagon and development companies for the development of a promising attack aircraft reached $7.5 billion. The first flight, in turn, was once again postponed, now to 1992. All problems with money and deadlines ended on January 7, 1991. Having reviewed the project reports for the previous 1990, the US Navy command made the only possible correct decision. The A-12 project was closed due to unclear prospects and uncontrolled cost growth. It was initially assumed that a total of approximately $45 billion would be allocated for the purchase of aircraft, and each aircraft would cost no more than $50 million. But at the beginning of 1991, the cost of an individual aircraft exceeded 85-90 million, and in the future this figure could only increase.
The A-12 project was terminated after a special order from the then US Secretary of Defense D. Cheney. He commented on the order as follows: “I closed the A-12 project. This decision was not easy because we had a very important task ahead of us. But no one could tell me how much the entire program would cost or when it would be completed. Previous forecasts were inaccurate and out of date within just a few months.”
The A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft, to replace which the new A-12 Avenger II was created, served in the US Navy until 1997, after which they were decommissioned. Currently, a number of EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft based on the Intruders remain in service. As for attacking ground targets, over the past fifteen years such tasks have been assigned exclusively to F/A-18 fighter-bombers of various modifications. There are no plans to create a full-fledged deck attack aircraft.
Based on materials from sites:
http://globalsecurity.org/
http://flightglobal.com/
http://paralay.com/
http://foreignaffairs.com/
http://jsf.mil/
It turned out that some of my first aviation photographs, taken more than ten years ago at the early MAKS, were photographs of unusual, but at the same time very attractive aircraft designed by Evgeniy Petrovich Grunin. This name is not so widely known in our country, Evgeniy Petrovich, who came from the galaxy of designers of the Sukhoi Design Bureau and organized his own creative team, was involved in aviation for almost twenty-five years general purpose, aircraft that would be needed in every corner of the country, would be in demand in a wide variety of sectors, I almost wrote, of the national economy. Of those built, Grunin's most famous aircraft were such machines as the T-411 Aist, T-101 Grach, T-451 and aircraft based on them. They were repeatedly shown at MAKS in different years, some samples fly in the country and abroad. I tried to follow the work of E.P. Grunin’s design bureau; the designer’s son, Pyotr Evgenievich, who led a thematic thread on the experimental aviation forum, provided great informational assistance in this regard. In the summer of 2009, I was able to personally meet Evgeniy Petrovich during testing of the AT-3 turboprop aircraft. Evgeniy Petrovich spoke little about his work at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, except that he spoke interestingly about his participation in the modifications of the aerobatic Su-26, which remained “ownerless” after Vyacheslav Kondratiev, who was involved in this topic, left the design bureau, and, rather vaguely, that he had previously worked in the brigade "on the topic of the T-8 aircraft." I did not ask about this in more detail, especially since the summer test day was not very conducive to long interviews.
Imagine my surprise when photographs of unusual combat aircraft models began to appear online, under which it was indicated that these were promising attack aircraft developed at the turn of the 90s at the Sukhoi Design Bureau under the LVSh (Easily Reproducible Attack Aircraft) program. All these aircraft were developed in the so-called “100-2” brigade, and the leader of this topic was Evgeniy Petrovich Grunin.
All photographs and computer graphics used in the article are the property of KB E.P. Grunin and are published with permission, I took the liberty of slightly editing and organizing the texts.
At the end of the eighties, the concept became widespread among the country's military leadership that in the event nuclear strike According to the USSR, the Union broke up into four industrially isolated regions - the Western region, the Urals, the Far East and Ukraine. According to the plans of the leadership, each region, even in difficult post-apocalyptic conditions, should have been able to independently produce inexpensive aircraft for striking the enemy. This aircraft was supposed to be the Easily Reproducible Attack Aircraft.
The technical specifications for the LVSh project stipulated the maximum use of elements of the Su-25 aircraft, and since the OKB named after P.O. The Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft was designated by the code T-8, while the aircraft being created had the code T-8B (propeller). The main work was carried out by the head of the “100-2” brigade, Arnold Ivanovich Andrianov, and leading designers N.N. Venediktov, V.V. Sakharov, V.I. Moskalenko. The leader of the topic was E.P. Grunin. Yuri Viktorovich Ivashechkin advised the work - until 1983 he was the head of the Su-25 project, later he went to work in the 100-2 brigade as a leading designer.
For the LVSh project, department 100 examined several aerodynamic and structural-power schemes; for this work, specialists from specialized departments of the design bureau were widely involved in complex teams.
The following options were considered:
1. Basic - using Su-25UB units and systems.
2. According to the “Frame” scheme - according to the type of the company’s aircraft North American OV-10 Bronco.
3. According to the "Triplane" scheme - using the results of design studies and aerodynamic studies of models in SibNIA tubes on the S-80 topic (first version).
1. The first block of preliminary designs. The "basic" low-wing version, the fuselage and cabin of the Su-25, two turboprop engines. 
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4. “Basic” high-wing version, fuselage and cabin of the Su-25, two turboprop engines. A small PGO is used 
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7. Single-engine version of the “basic” one. 
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9. Specifications aircraft of the “basic” version. 
The T-710 Anaconda project was created according to the type of the American OV-10 Bronco aircraft, only it was almost twice as large. Takeoff weight was assumed to be 7500 kg, empty weight 4600 kg, payload weight 2900 kg, and fuel weight 1500 kg. At maximum fuel load, the normal combat load weight is 1400 kg, including 7 paratroopers. In an overloaded version it can carry up to 2500 kg of combat load. The aircraft had 8 weapons hardpoints, 4 on the wing and 4 on the pylon under the fuselage. The forward part of the fuselage is taken from the Su-25UB (together with a twin 30 mm GSh-30 cannon), behind the pilot's cabin there is an armored compartment for separating paratroopers. It was supposed to use TVD-20, TVD-1500 or other variants with a power of about 1400 hp, engine nacelles were covered with armor, six-bladed propellers. The speed with these engines was assumed to be 480-490 km/h. To increase the speed characteristics, an option was developed with two Klimov Design Bureau TV7-117M engines of 2500 hp each. The economic characteristics of using these engines certainly deteriorated, but the speed was supposed to be increased to 620-650 km/h. The vehicle could be used as a fire support aircraft, in the landing version, as a reconnaissance aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, fire spotter, ambulance, training aircraft, etc. Unfortunately, it is still Russian army there is no multi-role armored aircraft that would combine these functions.
10. Model of the Anaconda airplane. 
11. View of the side landing door and weapons pylon. 
12. It was supposed to use the tail booms of the M-55 aircraft. 
13. Rear view. 
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15. Airplane T-710 "Anaconda" in three projections 
16. "Anaconda" in three-dimensional graphics, some changes are noticeable, especially in the tail. 
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T-720 is one of the basic preliminary designs developed under the LVSh program; in total, 43 (!!) versions of the aircraft were developed. They were all similar in aerodynamic configuration, but differed in weight, speed and purpose (attack aircraft, trainer, combat training). Weight varied from 6 to 16 tons. Most of these aircraft were designed according to a longitudinal triplane with tandem wings and had an unstable aerodynamic design. Because of this, the use of SDU (remote control) was envisaged. It was assumed that 40-50% of the weight of these aircraft would be composed of composites.
The design of the longitudinal triplane was dictated by several considerations:
1. It was necessary to have good handling at all speed ranges.
2. When using SDU, ailerons can work like elevons, and you can change the flight altitude without changing the angle of inclination of the GFS (fuselage) to the ground, which is very useful for an attack aircraft (actually going around the terrain without changing the sight).
3. Combat survivability was sufficiently ensured by the triplane design, even if the anti-aircraft gun or stabilizer or part of the wing was shot off, there was a chance to return to the airfield.
Armament - 1 cannon from 20 mm to 57 mm cannon in the lower turret (for the 16 ton modification) which could rotate in all directions. The option GSh-6-30 and even GSh-6-45 were considered. Folding consoles were provided for use in small caponiers for the MiG-21, a salvageable cabin, etc.
This plane won the LVSh competition. The Mikoyan Design Bureau project, also submitted to the LVSh competition, turned out to be much weaker.
The T-720 had a take-off weight of about 7-8 tons, a maximum speed of 650 km/h. Weapons and fuel accounted for 50% of the take-off weight.
2 TV-3-117 engines (2200 hp each) were separated by a 25mm titanium plate and operated on one shaft. The screw could be enclosed in a ring to reduce the EPR. At this time, a six-blade propeller was being developed in Stupino, which could withstand several hits from a 20 mm projectile. Its analogue is now installed on the An-70.
The use of a turboprop engine on a promising attack aircraft was dictated by the following considerations:
1. Low (relative to jet) fuel consumption.
2. Low noise
3. “Cold” exhaust.
4. TV-3-117 engines are widely used in helicopters.
The aircraft widely used components from commercially produced aircraft, in particular the cockpit from the Su-25UB attack aircraft (from the L-39 for the training version) and the fins from the Su-27. The complete process of purging the T-720 model was carried out at TsAGI, but interest in the project had already cooled down, despite the support of M.P. Simonova. Modern management has also forgotten this development, despite the fact that there has been a clear tendency in the world to move from complex machines like the A-10 to simpler ones, created on the basis of turboprop aircraft, or even on the basis of agricultural turboprop aircraft.
18. T-720 with engines in separate engine nacelles. 
19. Interesting fact. Aircraft of the T-8B type (twin-engine type 710 or 720 with simplified avionics) were valued in 1988 at around 1.2-1.3 million rubles. The T-8V-1 project (single-engine) was estimated at less than 1 million rubles. For comparison, the Su-25 was valued at 3.5 million, and the T-72 tank at 1 million rubles. 
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22. T-720 with engines running on one propeller. 
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26. A little-known variant of the T-720. 
One of the projects carried out according to the “longitudinal triplane” scheme was the project of the light training attack aircraft T-502-503, which can be considered as an offshoot of the 720 project. The aircraft should provide training for pilots to pilot jet aircraft. For this purpose, a propeller and a turboprop engine or two engines were combined into one package (project T-502) and placed in the rear fuselage. Double cabin with a common canopy and tandem ejection seats. It was intended to use cabins from the Su-25UB or L-39. The hardpoints could accommodate weapons weighing up to 1000 kg, which made it possible to use the aircraft as a light attack aircraft.
27. Model of the T-502 aircraft
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The most interesting project of the T-712 multi-purpose aircraft was developed to solve the following problems:
- operational-tactical, radio and radio-technical reconnaissance,
- as a light attack aircraft for striking enemy targets,
- adjusting the fire of artillery and missile units,
- detection and reconnaissance of minefields,
- over-the-horizon target designation for ships and submarines,
- radiation and chemical reconnaissance,
- electronic warfare equipment,
- providing data for counter-terrorism operations,
- imitation of threats when preparing air defense crews,
- resolving missile defense issues,
- educational and training,
- collection of meteorological information.
On the basis of the T-712 aircraft, it was possible to create a long-range UAV with a flight duration of 8-14 hours. Composite materials are widely used in the design. The aerodynamic design of the “triplane” type allows you to fly at high angles of attack without stalling into a tailspin. As an option, a cabin from a MiG-AT aircraft was considered as a basis for accommodating pilots. It is possible to install TVD-20, TVD-1500 or TVD VK-117 engines with a power of 1400 hp. A set of measures was used on the aircraft to reduce IR signature.
The project did not receive further development.
30. Containers similar to floats were used to accommodate cluster bombs, mines, electronic warfare equipment, radar, etc. Several types of containers have been developed. 
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35. In addition to the use of fuselages from the Su-25, the use of easily reproducible attack aircraft and others, including helicopter fuselages, was considered. 
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38. A project for a heavier aircraft, also using the nose section of a helicopter. 
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40. A further development of the LVSh project was the development of the modernization of Su-25 aircraft according to the T-8M project. The main idea is, as in LVSh, to create an aircraft also for the “special period” with maximum use of components and assemblies of the Su-25 (UB) and other production aircraft (helicopters). The main difference is the use of a turbofan engine to increase speed and combat characteristics. A non-afterburning version of the well-known RD-33 engine with a thrust of 5400-5500 kgf was used. A similar version of the engine, called I-88, was installed on the Il-102. The first sketches show a project with a high-mounted stabilizer. There were projects with low-mounted engines and a V-shaped tail. 
41. Double option. 
42. Larger - reverse device on engines. 
43. Front view. 
This is where I end my story, although Pyotr Evgenievich periodically pleases by publishing old developments of the “100-2” brigade in computer graphics. So it is quite possible that new publications will appear.
44. For illustration. Projects of attack aircraft based on agricultural vehicles being created in our time can also claim the right to be called LVSh.
The Air Tractor AT-802i aircraft in the attack aircraft version at the Dubai Airshow 2013. Photo by Alexander Zhukov. Also shown in Dubai was an attack aircraft armed with Hellfire missiles based on a Cessna 208 aircraft. 
45. Evgeny Petrovich Grunin during testing of the AT-3 aircraft in Borki. June 2009. 
46. Evgeniy Petrovich gives an interview to AeroJetStyle magazine correspondent Sergei Lelekov. 
47. Viktor Vasilievich Zabolotsky and Evgeny Petrovich Grunin. 
The merits of Soviet attack aircraft in World War II were so great that it seemed that this type of aircraft should have been registered in the domestic armed forces for decades. However, interest in him disappeared almost immediately after the end of hostilities.
Alexander Grek
The defeat of attack aircraft
Brief interest in attack aircraft re-emerged in the very early 1950s, inspired by the successful use of the Il-10 by Chinese and North Korean pilots in Southeast Asia. In October 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Marshal Zhigarev, even addressed Ilyushin with a letter in which he proposed to consider the issue of resuming serial production of the Il-10M attack aircraft as a combat aircraft for direct support of troops, “which has not yet lost its combat capabilities.” The request did not go unheeded - production was resumed, and during 1952-1954, plant No. 168 produced 136 copies of the Il-10M (which were written off just two years later!).
Despite the cool attitude of the military towards attack aircraft, Ilyushin himself remained faithful to them to the end, never stopping to develop new machines. For example, in 1950, his design bureau began developing the world's first jet twin-engine two-seat armored attack aircraft, the Il-40, with powerful artillery, missiles and bombs. The first Il-40 took off in March 1953. True, the future fate of this aircraft is sad.
The lack of a light attack aircraft in the Vietnam War (1961-1973) led the Americans to convert 39 civilian Cessna T-37Bs into the A-37A Dragonfly, with a significantly strengthened structure, crew protection, and increased internal fuel capacity provided by built-in tanks.
In April 1956, Defense Minister Marshal Georgy Zhukov presented to the country's leadership a report prepared by the General Staff and the Air Force General Staff on the state and prospects for the development of attack aircraft. The report concluded that attack aircraft were low on the battlefield in modern warfare and actually proposed eliminating attack aircraft, ensuring the solution of combat missions for direct air support of ground forces in the offensive and defense by bomber and fighter aircraft. As a result, an order was issued by the Minister of Defense, according to which attack aircraft were abolished, and all existing Il-10 and Il-10M (no less than 1,700 aircraft!) were written off. In parallel with the dispersal of attack aircraft, it was stopped mass production jet armored attack aircraft Il-40 and all experimental work on promising attack aircraft was stopped.
Why was this necessary? The point is that with the advent nuclear weapons The concept of “remote” wars triumphed. It was believed that the future war could be won ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Moreover, options for the complete elimination of combat aviation were seriously considered.
The only attack aircraft in the world comparable to the Su-25. Entered service with the US Army in the mid-1970s. The strong emphasis on the famous super-powerful 30-mm GAU-8/A cannon did not justify itself - unguided bombs and rockets became the main weapons of attack aircraft. This is one of the most popular attack aircraft of our time - more than 715 units were produced.
Vietnam
Note that attack aircraft as a class disappeared not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. The Americans were the first to realize the mistake - Vietnam helped. The multi-role supersonic F-4 Phantom II and F-105 Thunderchief could not cope with the task of directly supporting ground forces, as did the light attack aircraft A-1, A-4 and A-6, whose low survivability did not allow them to operate at low altitudes. altitudes As a result, US Navy and Air Force specialists in the field modified the aircraft themselves as best they could, protecting them. The most interesting “home-made” was the legendary Vietnamese attack aircraft A-37 Dragonfly, converted from a Cessna T-37 training aircraft. The inside of the cabin was covered with Kevlar mats, and soft polyurethane foam-filled fuel tanks and hardpoints for weapons under the wings. The most amazing thing is that the unit of these “homemade” attack aircraft, having completed several thousand sorties, did not lose a single aircraft!
In March 1967, the US Air Force sent out requirements for a promising close combat support aircraft to 21 aircraft manufacturers. Fairchild Republic's competition-winning A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft was one of the most amazing aircraft of the second half of the 20th century. Built around a specially built heavy-duty 30mm seven-barrel GAU-8/A cannon, resembling a huge flying cross, with two barrels of turbojet engines on short pylons on the sides of the rear fuselage, with a bizarre spaced vertical tail, with rough, “chopped” shapes, the aircraft turned out to be extremely technologically advanced and ideal for its only task - direct support of troops over the battlefield. And since February 1975, the US Air Force began to receive serial attack aircraft, the likes of which no other country in the world had. On that moment.
The Il-102 experimental aircraft, built in 1982, was a further development of the Il-40 attack aircraft. Essentially, this is an Il-42 that lost the Su-25 competition. In 1984, the plane flew to the LII MAP airfield in Zhukovsky, where it was mothballed. Il-102 could lift up to 7 tons of bomb load on 8 hardpoints.
Illegal plane
The successes (or failures) of American aviation in Vietnam were closely monitored in the USSR. And if the leadership of the country's Air Force still continued to believe that every new aircraft should fly “faster, higher and further,” some aircraft designers had a different opinion. Having analyzed the experience of post-war conflicts, Oleg Samoilovich, deputy head of the general aviation brigade of the Kulon Design Bureau (now Sukhoi Design Bureau), at his own peril and risk, began to develop a promising battlefield aircraft designed to destroy targets when they are visually detected. The development of the aerodynamic design and layout of the future aircraft was entrusted to the leading designer of the general design brigade, Yuri Ivashechkin.
It was decided to create a small aircraft (smaller dimensions - harder to hit) of a fairly simple design using non-scarce materials, easy to pilot, with the ability to be based on unpaved airfields and protect the crew from armor-piercing bullets up to 12.7 mm and missile fragments up to 3 g. The fundamental difference between the future Su-25 and the American A-10 was that the main weapon of the American attack aircraft was supposed to be a unique cannon, and the Su-25 was designed with an emphasis on use primarily unguided weapons - bombs and missiles, as Yuri Ivashechkin told our magazine. The choice, by the way, is very logical: almost all the tanks destroyed by Il-2 attack aircraft during World War II were hit either by small cumulative bombs or rockets. Disabling German tanks from aircraft gun- isolated cases.
The Su-25 is equipped with 10 external hardpoints located under the wing. The two closest to the wing tips are designed for air-to-air guided missiles, and on the remaining eight nodes, with a load of 500 kg each, various offensive weapons can be mounted: bomber (8 bombs for various purposes, calibers 500, 250 or 100 kg, or 32 bombs of 100 kg caliber on beam holders MBD2-67U, 8 KMGU-2 containers for mining, 8 bomb cassettes RBK-250 or RBK-500), unguided rocket (256 unguided aircraft missiles (UAR) S-5 57 mm caliber, 160 S-8 type NAR of 80 mm caliber, 40 S-13 type NAR of 122 mm caliber, 8 S-25 type NAR of 266 mm caliber or 8 S-25 type NAR of 240 mm caliber), guided missile (2 air-to-air missiles » R-60 or R-60M on external pylons, “air-to-surface” - 4 Kh-25ML missiles, 4 S-25L missiles, 2 Kh-29L missiles with semi-active laser guidance heads or 4 Kh-25MTP missiles with a thermal homing head ).
After numerous sketches, the design of a single-seat monoplane with a high wing of low sweep and high aspect ratio was chosen. The engines were placed in individual nacelles on the sides of the fuselage, which served as a fire and fragmentation barrier, which eliminated the possibility of their simultaneous destruction. The plane was designed to be as simple and easy to maintain as possible, a sort of flying Kalashnikov assault rifle, recalls Yuri Ivashechkin. The level of suspension of air bombs and missiles was exactly at the chest level of an average person, which made it possible, if necessary, to suspend weapons manually. The engine cowlings were easy to open from the ground, allowing instant access (try getting to the engines on the A-10!). There was even a built-in folding stepladder for the pilot to independently exit the cockpit - an unprecedented luxury in modern combat aviation. The characteristic “humpbacked” profile of the aircraft was formed by a protruding cockpit - thanks to its location, the pilot received a view forward, down and to the side, the like of which was not found in any of the existing Soviet aircraft.
Contest
In May 1968, the project reached a certain degree of readiness and Samoilovich and Ivashechkin reported it to General Designer Pavel Sukhoi. Sukhoi liked the plane, and he gave the go-ahead to continue the development, which received the factory designation “T-8”. Application documents for the new aircraft were sent to the Ministry of Aviation Industry, the Air Force Civil Code, the Scientific and Technical Committee of the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and TsAGI. The designers began to wait for a reaction.
The General Staff Scientific and Technical Committee was the first to respond: the laconic answer fit on one page of typewritten text - we don’t need such an aircraft. The Air Force Research Institute sent a cautious conclusion, but the rest ignored the project. Nevertheless, Sukhoi, at his own peril and risk, gave instructions to continue the development of the T-8.
Hope was given by the results of large-scale "Dnepr" maneuvers in Belarus in the fall of 1967, when supersonic Su-7B and MiG-21 aircraft, with the support of ground forces, showed themselves to be significantly worse than the outdated transonic MiG-17, the only aircraft that managed to reach the ground on their first approach. target, recognize and destroy it.
Meanwhile, the analysis of the Vietnamese events, albeit belatedly, reached the military leadership of the USSR. At the beginning of 1969, the USSR Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko ordered the Minister of Aviation Industry to hold a competition for a light attack aircraft (LSSh), and already in March four design bureaus - Ilyushin, Mikoyan, Sukhoi and Yakovlev - received requirements for a new aircraft. By the appointed time, the Sukhoi Design Bureau had not only a preliminary design, but also a full-size mock-up of the aircraft, which immediately made the company a leader. The Mikoyan Design Bureau presented the MiG-21LSH project, created on the basis of the MiG-21, the Yakovlev Design Bureau - the Yak-28LSH, and the Ilyushin Design Bureau - the Il-42 based on the existing experienced Il-40 attack aircraft. The Air Force rejected the proposals of Yakovlev and Ilyushin, inviting Sukhoi and Mikoyan to build flying models.
Over time, the appetites of the military began to grow. By mid-1971, they demanded to increase the ground speed to 1,200 km/h (initially 800 km/h) and the combat load to 1.5 tons (was 1 ton). All this led to the complication of the aircraft and an increase in its size. Sukhoi was especially resistant to increasing the maximum speed - 1,200 km/h still did not allow it to escape from fighters, but it greatly complicated the design of the entire aircraft. As a result, a compromise of 1000 km/h was reached, and by November 1971 the Sukhoi Design Bureau was declared the winner.
Train departure
Most American and Soviet aircraft that perform the same tasks are quite similar in appearance: F-15 and MiG-25, B-1 and Ty-160, etc. However, there is almost nothing in common between the A-10 and Su-25 . The thing is that they were created in complete isolation from each other - American and Soviet aircraft designers knew nothing about the work of their competitors. The first materials on the American A-10 became available to Sukhoi designers only in 1971. Immediately after this, Yuri Ivashechkin sketched out several layout options reminiscent of an American attack aircraft. He explained to us that they did not provide any fundamental advantages, and besides, it was too late to change anything. Having looked at the sketches, Samoilovich snapped: “It’s too late. Train has already left!"
Despite maintaining the original layout, the projected Su-25 was very different from the original T-8: the contours and layout were completely changed, the combat load (from 1000 to 1660 kg) and fuel capacity were increased. All this led to an increase in take-off weight (from 8340 to 10,530 kg) and physical dimensions of the aircraft (length from 12.54 to 13.7 m, wing area from 21 to 28 m2).
Particular problems arose with the booking. The contours of the head part were formed by straight planes, so most of the cabin armor plates could be made flat, which simplified the production technology. The armor was initially planned to be a “sandwich” of plates of KVK-37D steel alloys, which held up well against the high-explosive effect of a warhead, but poorly against bullets and shrapnel, and a layer of ABO-70 alloy, resistant to bullets and shrapnel, but not to high-explosives. A rubber shock-absorbing layer was provided between the plates. However, such a “sandwich” could not be welded, and bolted assembly significantly made the cabin structure heavier and larger. The solution was to use a special titanium alloy ABVT-20, specially developed for the Su-25. In addition to the possibility of creating a monolithic welded cabin, titanium armor made it possible to reduce total weight armor protection. By the way, as it turned out later, American designers of the A-10 also came to titanium armor.
In general, the plane turned out to be very technologically advanced. Minister of Aviation Industry Pyotr Dementyev, who visited the pilot production in 1972, assessed the technological simplicity of the almost finished machine on the slipway: “If something happens, ten of these ‘humpbacked horses’ can be riveted!”
Into the sky!
The T-8−1, the future Su-25, took off for the first time on February 22, 1975. It was piloted by the chief pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, Hero of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Ilyushin, the son of the legendary aircraft designer. The whole year was spent testing the aircraft. Like the Americans, the designers were faced with the problem of engine surge when firing large-caliber unguided rockets and simultaneously firing from the built-in cannon and four SPPU-22 outboard cannon containers. Like the Americans, they dealt with the problems.
In November 1975, the aircraft was shown to Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, who for the first time directly asked the question: “Will the Su-25 be able to hit the new American M1A1 Abrams tank?” - to which I received an honest answer: “Maybe, but with a very low probability.” To accomplish this task, a specialized set of powerful guided weapons was required. After analyzing the problem, a decision was made to create a specialized aircraft to combat tanks, which subsequently led to the appearance of the Su-25T, armed with supersonic Whirlwind missiles.
Another problem for the future Su-25 was serial production plants. Nobody wanted to take a low-prestige attack aircraft into production. Here are strategic bombers or, at worst, strike fighters - yes! And an attack aircraft is a lot of hassle, but not enough money. And only in 1977 it was possible to “register” the aircraft at the Tbilisi Aviation Plant. Dimitrova. Moreover, there was a chance to lose this aircraft altogether: at the same time, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Poland, Edward Gierek, approached Brezhnev about transferring a license to produce the aircraft at the Polish aircraft plant in the city of Mielec.
Rhombus
Little by little, the Tbilisi plant began to master the production of the Su-25, producing a pair per year. The aircraft entered lengthy state tests. In March 1980, on the personal instructions of Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, a decision was made to conduct tests in “special conditions” - in the zone of real combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan. For this business trip, the Sukhoi Design Bureau promised to count all the remaining tests. Along with two T-8s (future Su-25s), six Yak-38M vertical take-off and landing aircraft were sent to Afghanistan, which were supposed to test the concept of creating airmobile troops. The test program was called "Rhombus". Post-war history has never seen anything like this before.
The aircraft's artillery armament consists of one built-in cannon mount VPU-17A with a GSh-30 cannon of 30 mm caliber. The installation's ammunition capacity is 250 rounds, and the rate of fire is 3,000 rounds per minute.
The Shindand airfield was chosen as the base for testing, where the aircraft were relocated in April 1980. At first, shooting and bombing were carried out at an improvised training ground 9 km from the airfield. But at the very beginning of May, the 9th Motorized Rifle Division began the Farah operation, during which it came across a fortified area in a narrow mountain gorge. Even at the entrance to the gorge, two infantry fighting vehicles were blown up by mines, and the infantry was met with heavy fire. At each bend in the gorge there were powerful pillboxes armed with heavy machine guns, which made it almost impossible to use attack helicopters. It was decided to use a pair of Su-25s, which worked in the gorge for three days, making 3-4 sorties a day, using unguided missiles, high-explosive and concrete-piercing shells. But the main weapons were “sotochki” - hundred-kilogram AB-100 bombs; 32 “hundreds” were located on eight underwing hardpoints. The planes entered the gorge from the rear, “dive” from the top of the mountain and moved towards our units, not giving the Mujahideen time to deploy large-caliber machine guns. After the attack aircraft finished their work, the infantry entered the gorge without a single shot or casualties.
As Ivashechkin recalled, after the operation the gunsmiths decided to simulate the operation of the AB-100 by detonating an equivalent explosive charge in the gorge. After the explosion, the test participants could not come to their senses for three days - the acoustic impact alone was shocking. No one could imagine what the dushmans felt in the gorge, on whom these bombs continuously fell for three days, causing, among other things, heavy landslides. After the Farah operation, Su-25s began to be actively used for other combat operations. They soon earned the affectionate nickname “scallops” from the infantry. At the beginning of June 1980, Operation Diamond was successfully completed, the test program was completed and the Su-25 pair returned safely to the Union. And in May 1981, the first batch of 12 production Su-25s entered service with the 200th separate attack aviation squadron (200th OSHAE). Exactly a quarter of a century later, attack aviation was revived in Russia.
On the external sling, the aircraft can additionally carry four SPPU-22−1 outboard cannon mounts with a GSh-23 cannon or SPPU-687 with a GSh-301 cannon.
Working with light
Almost immediately after receiving the new aircraft, the 200th OSHAE was urgently relocated to Afghanistan to the already familiar Shindand airfield - the military really liked the resulting aircraft. On July 19, 1981, the first Su-25 landed at the airfield, and already on July 25, the attack squadron began to take an active part in a large-scale operation in the Luarcoch mountain range. After working the mountain range with “combs” for many days, the enemy completely abandoned the area, suffering heavy losses. A little later, Su-25s appeared in the Herat region, and by the fall - in the south of Afghanistan in the area of the country’s second largest city - Kandahar. By this time, the attack aircraft also had a second nickname - “rooks”.
In just one year, the 200th Squadron completed more than 2,000 combat missions without losing a single vehicle. The most effective weapon was the 80-mm S-8 rocket, especially the S-8D variant with a volumetric detonating warhead. Cluster bombs and incendiary tanks were also used. The most powerful effect was exerted by the ODAB-500 volumetric detonating bombs, which had terrifying power. They were used for serious purposes.
By 1983, the tactics for using new aircraft had also developed. As a rule, the Su-25s began their fire attack, making the first approach to the target, after which the Mi-24s appeared, point-by-point clearing out the remaining pockets of resistance. We learned how to operate the Su-25 at night - the first attack aircraft dropped luminous aerial bombs SAB, in the light of which, as in a football stadium, the next link of the “rooks” began its terrible work. They mastered the Su-25 and the profession of miners, carrying out mining of caravan trails from a height of 300-500 m at a speed of 700 km/h from KMG containers; in 1984-1985 they carried out 80% of all mine laying. Thanks to its efficiency and versatility, the Su-25 quickly became the most popular aircraft in Afghanistan, its pilots had the most flight hours compared to pilots of other types of aircraft. Not a single operation could be completed without attack aircraft, and the geography of deployment was continuously expanding: Bagram, Kandahar, Kabul, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif.
Wingspan: 14.36 m // Length: 15.53 m Wing area: 30.1 m 2 // Maximum take-off weight: 17600 kg // Normal take-off weight: 14600 kg // Combat load: maximum 4400 kg, normal 1400 kg // Fuel mass in internal tanks: 3000 kg // Maximum speed with normal combat load: 950 km/h // Ceiling: 7000 m (cabin unpressurized) // Flight range with normal combat load without PTB: 495 km (at the ground ), 640 km (at altitude) // Engines: two R95Sh with a thrust of 4100 kgf each.
By the fall of 1985, the dushmans began to actively use portable anti-aircraft systems, and the number of aircraft losses began to increase. The greatest damage was caused by American Red Eye MANPADS. To counter them, aircraft sharply increased the number of infrared traps they could shoot, making their shooting a combat trigger. Now, after leaving the attack, the traps were automatically fired from the aircraft within 16 seconds - this was enough to go to a safe 5 km.
At the end of 1986, the dushmans acquired more advanced Stinger MANPADS with a dual-band homing head, from which the Su-25 suffered the greatest losses. They were never able to find an effective “antidote” against the Stingers, but losses were reduced by radically improving the fire extinguishing system - after the hit, a significant number of aircraft began to reach airfields. In 1989, Su-25s were the last to leave Afghanistan, covering the withdrawal of Soviet troops. During the entire Afghan war, 23 attack aircraft were lost in the air. On average, one aircraft lost per 2,600 combat sorties. These are very good indicators.
Subsequently, Su-25s took part in almost all conflicts involving Soviet weapons: in the Iran-Iraq war of 1987-1989, where they carried out up to 1100 (!) combat sorties per day, in Angola, in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Karabakh conflict, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in Tajikistan and, of course, in Chechnya. And everywhere these planes have earned only excellent reviews.
Modifications
There were (and are) a huge number of modifications of the legendary aircraft. Let's focus only on the most important ones. Since 1986, the plant in Ulan-Ude began producing the “sparky” Su-25UB, a two-seater combat training aircraft. Apart from the addition of a second pilot seat, the aircraft is almost identical to a classic attack aircraft and can be used for both training and combat. The most modern modification of the serial attack aircraft Su-25SM differs from the “original source” by more modern complex avionics. The project of the Su-25K carrier-based attack aircraft with catapult take-off never went beyond the project stage (due to the absence of Russian aircraft carriers with catapults), but several Su-25UTG carrier-based training aircraft were produced, intended for deployment on board the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov" with a springboard takeoff. The aircraft turned out to be so successful that it serves as the main training aircraft for training carrier-based aviation pilots.
The Su-25 is very versatile and can carry bomb weapons for various purposes: high-explosive fragmentation, high-explosive, concrete-piercing, lighting, photographic, incendiary bombs and tanks. The normal combat load of the aircraft is 1400 kg, the maximum is 4400 kg.
But the most interesting and complex modification is the Su-25T anti-tank aircraft, the decision to create which was made back in 1975. The main problem in the development of this aircraft was the creation of avionics (avionics) for detecting, tracking and guiding missiles at armored targets. The aircraft was based on the glider of the two-seat training aircraft Su-25UB; all the space allocated for the co-pilot was occupied by a new avionics. It was also necessary to move the gun into the cockpit compartment, expand and lengthen the nose, where the Shkval daytime optical sighting system was located to control the firing of the Whirlwind supersonic missiles. Despite the significant increase in internal volume, there was no room for a thermal imaging system in the new car. Therefore, the Mercury night vision system was mounted in a suspended container under the fuselage at the sixth suspension point (by the way, the problem was solved in a similar way with the A-10). The anti-tank attack aircraft failed to win the laurels of its older brother, the Su-25 - it did not participate in anti-tank battles in Russia, and was not exported. Nevertheless, the originality of the aircraft was emphasized by the name Su-34 (in honor of the legendary T-34 tank), which the aircraft bore for some time. It was later given to another aircraft. The most advanced modification of the Su-25 is now called Su-25TM (sometimes called Su-39, under this name the aircraft can be exported). It is distinguished by advanced on-board electronics, which allows it to effectively hit point targets in any weather.
In full bloom
As Yuri Ivashechkin told us in parting, the Su-25 can remain in service for a long time - it is far from becoming obsolete. The only thing that needs to be periodically replaced is the on-board electronics: the equipment is rapidly becoming obsolete, since technological progress in this area is developing by leaps and bounds. Let us note on our own that, despite its unprepossessing appearance and small size, the Su-25 is truly the greatest modern Russian combat aircraft. And this will be confirmed to you by everyone who fought and who had the opportunity to see this hard worker at work, and not just on the demonstration fields of aviation exhibitions.
In preparing the article, I actively used the book by Ildar Bedretdinov “Su-25 attack aircraft and its modifications”, M., 2002