Fighting organization of the Social Revolutionaries. Kutepov's militant organization and the "Union of National Terrorists"
Terrorist activity and militant organization of the party of socialist revolutionaries under the leadership of E.F. Azef in 1903-1906
Report of the 3rd year student of the Faculty of History Maxim Vostroknutov
State Academic University for the Humanities
Moscow - 2010
Introduction
Russia in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries became the arena of the struggle of a powerful revolutionary movement against the autocratic Russian statehood. The progressive process of deepening and aggravating the contradictions between the urgent needs of the public for reforms and the policy of the state, which ignored these needs, the widening gap between the government and the people, led to the radicalization of the revolutionary movement and the toughening of the protest of the revolutionaries, prompted them to extreme methods of struggle and opposition.
In the first decade of the 20th century, the entire political life of Russia was inextricably linked with the emergence, growth in scope and then, on the contrary, the extinction of the terrorist struggle against the autocratic political system, carried out by the most irreconcilable and opposition-minded parties and movements. The necessity and justification of attempts to change the political structure of the state with the help of violence is an important problem that has occupied the minds of historians from the beginning of the 20th century to this day. This work is devoted to a topic that is an integral part of this problem - a very important and, at the same time, little-studied aspect of the Russian revolutionary movement, associated with the activities of the militant organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, aimed at crushing the ossified political system of the Russian state. The relevance of the topic of this work lies in such a high significance of these issues. In this report, I will pay my attention only to a certain period of the existence of a military organization - the time of the peak of its military activity under the leadership of Yevno Azef - 1903-1906, a well-known provocateur operating on two fronts. The peculiarity of this period lies in the mystery and insufficient study of the problem of motives and goals that this historical figure pursued, while simultaneously serving both forces hostile to each other: the police department (hereinafter: DP) and the socialist revolutionaries.
The AKP BO was the vanguard of numerous terrorist groups that were active in Russia in 1901-1911, and the acts of extremism and terror it carried out shook the Russian Empire, forcing the state power to often maneuver, making concessions to public demands. The monarchy, which lost many of its best representatives of the state apparatus, managed to resist the systematic and often reckless attacks of terrorists, but the country's calm development did not last long - in February 1917, the autocracy, in fact, deprived of any public support, collapsed almost at lightning speed.
Conventionally, the domestic historiography of the Social Revolutionary terror is divided into several periods.
The second half of the 1910s - the beginning of the 1930s - during this period, contemporaries, eyewitnesses and direct participants in the events tried to comprehend terror as a phenomenon, collect and analyze available documents and evidence, and a considerable corpus of memoirs was also created.
The mid-1930s - the end of the 1950s - the time of the greatest ideological pressure on humanitarian knowledge, the lack of opportunity for domestic historians to objectively study the activities of parties that acted as opponents of the Bolsheviks. An even more taboo subject was individual terror, the study of which during this period often aroused illusions and fears among the leaders of the ideological apparatus about the propaganda of methods that could be aimed at combating the existing regime.
The beginning of the 1960s - the middle of the 1980s - further study of the history of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and political terror as an important factor in this history based on the available set of documents.
Since the late 1980s - the involvement of new numerous sources in the field of view of historiography, the ideological freedom of researchers: both in determining the perspective of problems and in their assessment. However, even during this period, he did not save some historians from some ideological clichés and a shallow insight into the essence of the issues under study.
I have studied the sources and literature indicated at the end of this work. The monograph by R.A. Gorodnitsky and his article, which gave me basic information about the Combat Organization of Socialist Revolutionaries. To analyze the personality of E.F. Azev, L. Priceman's article was most useful to me. The memoirs of the terrorist B. Savinkov are quite fascinating, in my opinion, and rather emotional memoirs, but they almost did not bring the historical information necessary for writing the report. I was informed about the emergence of the AKP by a textbook on the history of political parties in Russia, which also gave me some help in characterizing the program of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. And of course, help in writing the work, although not so significant, was provided to me by the rest of the literature given at the end.
In conclusion of the introductory part of the work, I will briefly outline its structure. The first chapter will be devoted to general information about the Social Revolutionary Party and the emergence of its militant organization, then, in the next part of this work, I will dwell on the features of the structure and activities of the BO in 1903-1906, the third chapter will be devoted to the phenomenon of the leader of the BO of this period - E. Azef; after which the conclusion follows with the conclusions arising from the previous chapters.
The emergence of the PSR. The program and tactics of the RPS. Formation of the BO RPS.
The Socialist Revolutionary Party occupied one of the leading places in the system of Russian political parties. It was the largest and most influential non-Marxist socialist party.
The first organizations of socialist revolutionaries began to appear in the mid-1990s. In August 1897, a congress of southern socialist groups took place in Voronezh, at which the creation of the "Party of Socialist Revolutionaries" was proclaimed. In the same year, the previously created "Union of Socialist Revolutionaries" began to operate actively in Moscow, coordinating the activities of the northern groups. In addition to these main associations, numerous circles and groups functioned, the successful work of which required the creation of a single center. Various associations also existed in emigration, of which the Agrarian Socialist League, created in 1900, stood out.
There was constant talk of a merger between the northern and southern groups. Approximately in December 1901 in Berlin, E.F. Azef and M.F. Selyuk, having all the necessary powers from the northern groups, and G.A. Gershuni, who had the same powers from the southern groups, completed the formal unification of the AKP.
At the same time, Gershuni and Azef were negotiating with the Agrarian Socialist League to merge it with the party, and soon a temporary union of the AKP and the League was formed on a federal basis. Subsequently, the "League" merged with the party.
In 1905-1906, the founding congress of the AKP took place, which approved the program and charter of the party.
Approximately simultaneously with the unification of the groups of socialist-revolutionaries, the BO began to take shape. In view of certain disagreements within the party and in views on military activity, initially this organization did not arise as a party institution and not under the Central Committee. It was a private initiative of some socialist revolutionaries. The first BO was formed around Gershuni. As a result of negotiations with the Central Committee, it was clear that the AKP BO should receive its name on special conditions - from the moment when it commits the first major terrorist act. The possibility of the appearance of other initiative groups was assumed, and it was from the perpetration of a terrorist act by one of them that this group would be recognized as the leader, and it would have to act as a militant organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, monopolizing in its ranks the conduct of centralized political terror. The official history of the BO begins with the murder of D.S. Sipyagin.
V.M. took up the development of the theory of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Chernov. He wrote an article published in the main periodical organ of the party (the newspaper "Revolutionary Russia") and reflecting the views of the overwhelming majority of the Socialist-Revolutionaries on terror - "The terrorist element in our program."
According to this article, propaganda significance lies in the terrorist activities of the BO AKP. Acts of terrorism “rive attention to themselves, excite everyone, wake up the most sleepy, most indifferent inhabitants, excite general rumors and conversations, make people think about many things that had never occurred to them before - in a word, they make them think politically ". The result of theoretical activity was declared to be a disorganizing value that could manifest itself in the conditions of general resistance to the authorities, and which would lead to confusion in the ruling circles, "shake the throne" and "raise the question of the constitution." Chernov emphasized that terrorist means are not a self-contained system of struggle, but only a part of the many-sided struggle against the enemy. Terror must be intertwined with all other methods of both guerrilla and mass pressure on the government. Terror is only a technical means of struggle, which, in interaction with other methods, can give the desired result. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, according to the article, does not see any all-permissive means in the terrorist struggle, but, nevertheless, it is “one of the most extreme and energetic means of combating the autocratic bureaucracy, curbing government arbitrariness, disorganizing the government mechanism, agitating and agitating society, awakening enthusiasm and fighting spirit in the most revolutionary environment. But, if "tactically it is necessary to coordinate the struggle by terrorist means with all other forms of revolutionary activity and struggle, then technically it is no less necessary to separate it from the other functions of the party."
As for the Socialist-Revolutionary program, four parts can be distinguished in it. The first is devoted to the analysis of the then capitalism; the second - to the international socialist movement opposing it; the third part contains a description of the features of the socialist movement in Russia; the fourth part was the substantiation of a specific RPS program.
The program was reduced to the following goals:
in the political and legal field: the establishment of a democratic republic, with broad autonomy of regions and communities, civil liberties, inviolability of the person and home, complete separation of church and state and the declaration of religion as a private matter for everyone, the establishment of a compulsory equal for all general secular education at the expense of the state, equality of rights languages, the destruction of the standing army and its replacement by the people's militia; convocation of the Zemsky Sobor (Constituent Assembly).
in the economic field: satisfaction of the basic requirements of the workers (to put it very briefly), socialization of all privately owned lands, strengthening of the peasant community, some changes in tax policy (for example, the abolition of indirect taxes), the development of public services (free medical care, communalization of water supply, lighting , ways and means of communication, etc.).
The Social Revolutionaries were supporters of democratic socialism, i.e. economic and political democracy, which should be expressed through the representation of organized representatives (trade unions), organized consumers (cooperative unions) and organized citizens (democratic state represented by parliament and self-government bodies). The originality of Socialist-Revolutionary socialism lay in the theory of the socialization of agriculture. The initial idea of this theory was that socialism in Russia should begin to grow first of all in the countryside. The basis for it was to be the socialization of the countryside (the abolition of private ownership of land, at the same time not turning it into state property, not its nationalization, but turning it into a public property without buying and selling; transfer of all land to the management of central and local bodies of people's self-government, "equal-labor" use of land). The Socialist-Revolutionaries considered political freedom and democracy to be the most important prerequisite for socialism and its organic form. Political democracy and the socialization of the land were the main demands of the Socialist-Revolutionary minimum program. They were supposed to ensure a measured, evolutionary transition of Russia to socialism.
In the field of tactics, the party program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was limited to the provision that the struggle would be waged "in forms corresponding to the specific conditions of Russian reality." The AKP's arsenal of methods and means of struggle included propaganda and agitation, peaceful parliamentary work and all forms of extra-parliamentary, violent struggle (strikes, boycotts, armed uprisings and demonstrations, etc.), individual terror as a means of political struggle.
The victims of the Social Revolutionary terror in the period preceding the revolution of 1905-1907 were: Ministers of the Interior D.S. Sipyagin (April 2, 1902 - from that moment the BO AKP was formalized) and V.K. Plehve (July 15, 1904), Kharkov governor Prince I.M. Obolensky, who brutally cracked down on peasant uprisings in the Poltava and Kharkov provinces in the spring of 1902 (wounded on July 29, 1902), the Ufa governor N.M. Bogdanovich, who organized the "slaughter" of the Zlatoust workers (killed on May 6, 1903), Moscow Governor-General, uncle of the Tsar, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich (February 4, 1905).
Such is the general information about the emergence and development of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and its militant organization. Now let's move on to the main part of this work, devoted to the activities of the BO in 1903-1906.
Combat organization under the leadership of E.F. Azef (1903-1906).
Evno Azef was born in October 1869 in the town of Lyskovo near Grodno in the family of a poor Jewish tailor. Participated in circles of revolutionary Jewish youth. In 1892, hiding from the police, he stole 800 rubles and fled to Germany, where he got a job as an electrical engineer in Karlsruhe. In 1893, he offered the Police Department to be an informant about Russian revolutionaries - students of the Polytechnic Institute in Karlsruhe, and his offer was accepted.
On the instructions of S. V. Zubatov, in 1899 he joined the Union of Socialist Revolutionaries. After G.A. Gershuni was arrested in 1903, but Azef remained the central figure and headed the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, carrying out terrorist acts. Azef's party pseudonyms are "Ivan Nikolaevich", "Valentin Kuzmich", "Tolstoy". In contacts with the Security Department, he used the pseudonym "Ruskin".
According to the charter, the BO was autonomous, but the BO was headed by a member of the Central Committee of the AKP, who was appointed head of the BO, and the Central Committee had the right to temporarily suspend or completely stop the activities of the BO, expand or narrow the range of its activities. In organizational, material and other aspects, the BO was independent. Therefore, despite the general party leadership, the personality of the head of the BO left an indelible imprint on her actions. The head of the BO most significantly influenced all aspects of its functioning, and to a large extent it depended on him whether the BO would succeed or fail.
All three leaders of the BO - G.A. Gershuni. E.F. Azef, B.V., Savinkov were bright personalities, and, naturally, each of them had their own leadership style, their own way of developing plans and putting them into practice.
After the arrest of the first leader, Gershuni, in May 1903, the BO consisted of six persons (E.F. Azef, M.R. Gotz, P.S. Polivanov, A.D. Pokotilov, E.O. Dulebova, N. I. Blinova) and actually ceased to exist as a single organization. Under these conditions, Azef, who came abroad, managed to unite all the disparate forces and attract many revolutionary-minded youth to the BO. Of all the future members of the BO, only Azef took part in its construction in the summer of 1903, only he knew all those accepted into the BO, but they themselves did not know each other. The authority of Azef was indisputable. The principles of selection when admitting new members to the organization, which Azef was guided by, are characterized by the absence of agitation of candidates, an extremely strict selection, in which Azef rejected the candidacy at the slightest doubt. Azef's perspicacity in selecting the composition of the BO was simply unique - for all the years of his leadership of this organization, not a single provocateur was admitted to it.
Having taken over the leadership of the BO, Azef came to grips with the issue of dynamite technology and came to successful results. He created a number of large dynamic workshops abroad, made a number of experiments, and supervised his own work. At the same time, the main methods of struggle were developed, which the BO followed during its further existence. Azef was the main organizational force behind the new initiatives in terrorist activities. He came up with the idea of external surveillance of persons who were scheduled to be eliminated: the militants disguised themselves as cabbies, peddlers, cigarette makers, etc. Azef set up a passport business, created a BO cash desk, personally found the necessary appearances, apartments, places of rendezvous, and developed larger projects, which later, however, did not materialize.
The combat organization of the AKP was divided into three parts: the first, the so-called. lackeys - people who were actually engaged in external observation of persons scheduled for destruction; they lived in utter poverty and worked with an intensity unthinkable in any other area of Party affairs. The second part consisted of chemical groups engaged in the manufacture of explosives and equipment of bombs; their financial situation was average, they could afford to exist in conspiracy. And finally, the third, very small group was made up of people living in lordly roles. They organized and coordinated the work of the other two parts of the organization. It goes without saying that the way of life of these people was quite wide. The last group usually consisted of 3-4 people. Such a system guaranteed the success of the planned enterprises. BO was united by a single will, personified in Azef. In BO in 1904-1906. relations of superiors and subordination reigned least of all, and there was more friendship and love, and it looked more like a family than an organ established by the Central Committee of the AKP. And although the BO could not imagine itself without a party, party differences were alien to its members. And although legally Azef could make any decisions on his own, in fact, not a single decision was made without Savinkov specifically talking, even on minor issues, with each member of the BO, not clarifying their opinions, trying to achieve some unanimity. Azef very often joined the opinion of the majority, and although he sometimes took responsibility for decisions that contradicted the opinion of the majority, usually the work of the BO was determined by the collective will, and in 1904-1906. there were no significant disagreements in the organization.
It should be noted that in 1903-1905. Azef's position in the Central Committee of the AKP was central. M.R. Gotz, speaking in relation to the BO on behalf of the Central Committee, was bedridden and only handed out directives, while Azef was the most active member of the party. His role in organizing the entire work of the AKP after Gershuni's arrest was global. It turned out that the Central Committee actually ceased to exist in Russia - all its members were arrested. Azef was left almost alone and restored the Central Committee on his own, and at the same time created a strong, cohesive Organization on the ruins of the Gershuni-era BO, which was able to succeed in eliminating the central figures of the government apparatus. It was organized by the beginning of 1904. It included: B.V. Savinkov, M.I. Schweitzer, E.S. Sozonov, I.P. Kalyaev, D.Sh. Borishansky, D.V. Brilliant, I.I. Matseevsky, P.S. Ivanovskaya, Sh.V. Sikorsky. In August, after the murder of V.K. Plehve, the final registration of the status of the BO took place - its charter was adopted. The supreme body of the BO was the Committee, whose managing member Azef was elected, his deputy - Savinkov. However, according to Savinkov, the charter was never fulfilled by the militants. It expressed the wishes of the members of the BO rather than being a constitution for them.
Azef divided the BO into three territorial departments: Kyiv, which mainly consisted of workers and was not numerous, Moscow, which consisted of four people and carried out an attempt on the life of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, and Petersburg, numbering fifteen people. Thus, there was a division of the BO on a territorial basis, and each formed department had the goal of eliminating the local head of administration. After a series of failures, the BO was in a state of disorganization. The period from the middle of 1904 to the beginning of 1905 is characterized by the presence of disagreements in the terrorist environment. After the Manifesto on October 17, 1905, it was dissolved, but was restored at the first party congress in January 1906. From that time until April 27, BO was unable to achieve success in any enterprise. It existed until November 1906 and was liquidated after the refusal of Azef and Savinkov to direct combat work. The militants argued their decision by the fact that the BO could no longer act: all the old ways turned out to be untenable, but there are no new ones, and the Central Committee does not provide enough forces and means to search for them.
During the period from the summer of 1903 to the spring of 1905, Azef did not extradite any terrorists. Being aware of all military affairs, in fact, he did not report anything about them to the Police Department. Some of the leading directions he gave to his police chiefs were extremely frivolous. Then, until the end of 1905 - until the dissolution of the BO in early November - Azef organizes the organization of terrorist work, without actually informing his police leaders about anything. His only extradition for this period was an indication in August 1905 of Savinkov, who again managed to escape. Thus, the period from May 1903 to November 1905 can be recorded in Azef's life as unquestionably "revolutionary".
From the beginning of 1906, Azef, who had won invincible authority in the ranks of the AKP, was more and more inclined to cooperate with the police structures.
However, even in 1906, he prefers not to report information about the militants that contribute to their arrest, but simply to disrupt the enterprises planned by the BO. Therefore, Azef's provocation was the main reason for the paralysis of BO in 1906. But even here his game cannot be called unambiguous. Azef organizes an April assassination attempt on Dubasov in Moscow, and he only miraculously remains intact. Pointing to groups of terrorists conducting surveillance of government officials, Azef had the goal only to “frighten off” the members of the BO, but all of them remained at large and took part in other enterprises. For the whole of 1906, it was Azef who betrayed only one Kalashnikov in May, the observation of which led to the arrest of four militants (including Savinkov, who managed to escape after 2 months). From August 1906, Azef frustrated almost all the plans of the BO, which was implicitly one of the main reasons for its November dissolution. We do not have any data indicating that at least one terrorist was arrested on the instructions of Azef in the second half of 1906. In general, the period of Azef's activity in 1906 can be described as conditionally “revolutionary”, since this year he helped the work of the BO to about the same extent as he opposed its undertakings.
If we sum up the activities of the BO in 1903-1906, the following points should be noted:
In 1903 - 1906. there is a maximum increase in the terrorist activity of the AKP BO for the entire time of its existence. Terrorist activity contributed to the emergence of a revolutionary situation by the beginning of 1905, and the BO strikes were one of the factors influencing the tsarist government, which forced it to maneuver and make concessions, introducing a number of civil liberties.
Terrorist struggle of the BO AKP in 1903 - 1906. influenced the emergence and deployment of mass forms of protest against the autocracy. In 1903 - 1906. The AKP BO managed to eliminate some key representatives of the government apparatus of autocratic Russia. In response to the terrorist attacks, the government tightened its repressive policy towards the AKP. Police departments managed to block many activities of the BO, partially paralyze its functioning. With the decline of the revolutionary wave of 1905-1907. the activities of all Social Revolutionary and other organizations irreconcilably opposed to the existing state system, and the terror of the AKP BO in particular, only begins to push the government to abandon the course of reforms, and it proceeds to punitive measures in relation to any parties and associations of a terrorist orientation, establishing a military field courts.
The methods and means by which terror was carried out in 1903-1906 were optimal for conducting military affairs in the historical period under consideration. These methods were developed by reality itself, however, the head of the BO, E.F. Azef, had the most significant influence on their folding.
Despite his dual role in the AKP BO, Azef used his colossal organizational skills to improve terrorist practices.
Azef's provocative activity significantly hindered the unceasing development of terror, but in no way was it a permanent deterrent to its spread.
Azef managed to gather the most active revolutionary elements in the BO. BO AKP of the period 1903 - 1906 included the overwhelming majority of fanatics devoted to their ideas, ready to unconditionally throw their lives on the altar of revolution. The names of many members of the BO are forever included in the annals of the fighters for the social liberation of the peoples of Russia.
The ambiguity and inconsistency of terrorist methods of struggle were not realized by the majority of the BO members, who, on the whole, are not inclined to introspection in the spheres of moral and political problems that cast doubt on the admissibility of violent forms of resistance to the regime.
During the period under review, the BO included 64 people. This, apparently, is the exact number of its members. The head of the BO was E.F. Azef, his deputy B.V. Savinkov.
Approximate statistics on the members of the BO 1903-1906. are listed below.
In BO in 1903 - 1906. included 13 women and 51 men.
The class origin of the members of the BO during these years of its existence looks like this: 13 nobles, 3 honorary citizens, 5 children of priests, 10 children of merchants, 27 philistines and 6 peasants. The leadership of the BO included 2 persons of noble origin, 3 sons of merchants and 2 tradesmen.
Based on these data, it can be argued that representatives of almost all strata of Russian society were concentrated in the BO.
The educational level of BO members during the period under review was distributed as follows: 6 BO members had higher education, 28 had incomplete higher education, 24 had secondary education, and 6 had primary education. The leadership of the BO included 3 people with higher education, 3 - with incomplete higher education, 1 - with primary education. The figures reveal the main environment from which members of the BO were recruited - students of higher educational institutions. The percentage of people who did not have a general educational background was relatively low in the BO.
By age, the composition of the BO during the time of its leadership by E.F. Azef in 1903 - 1906. It developed as follows: 1 member of the BO was over 50 years old, 1 - from 40 to 50, 6 - from 30 to 40, 54 - from 20 to 30, 2 - up to 20. Among the leaders of the BO, the age of 5 persons varied from 20 to 30 years, 2 - from 30 to 40. It is not difficult to see that it was young people of 20-30 years of age who formed the backbone of the BO. There were relatively few mature people in the BO, and there were almost no young people at all.
The national composition of the BO in the considered period of time was as follows: 43 Russians, 19 Jews and 2 Poles. The leadership of the BO included 5 Jews and 2 Russians. The data allow us to talk about the representatives of actually only two nations going into terror.
All members of the BO AKP of the period 1903 - 1906 adhered to the convictions of a distinctly socialist orientation. The influence of the ideas of liberalism on the formation of the ideological attitudes of the BO members can not be traced in any example (with the exception of P.S. Polivanov, who stayed in the BO for three months - from May to August 1903).
For many members of the BO 1903 - 1906. the rigid ideological canons of the AKP were too narrow, and they perceived their stay and work in the BO as serving the interests of the entire Russian revolution, which, after its victory, as the militants hoped, was to carry out a radical reorganization of society on socialist principles.
The governing body of the AKP - its Central Committee begins in 1903-1906. be very cautious in approaching terror as a means of political struggle; Gradually, an anti-terrorist trend is maturing latently in the Central Committee. After the death of M. R. Gotz, which followed in August 1906, not a single convinced representative of the unconditional acceptance of terror as a way of struggle remained in the leadership of the AKP.
Political and social achievements of the revolution of 1905-1907. forced the leaders of the AKP to reconsider many provisions of party tactics. The changes introduced not least touched on terrorist practices, forced the BO to suspend and intensify combat operations, depending on the internal political climate in Russia.
In 1903 - 1906. the incorrect interference of the Central Committee of the AKP in the affairs of the BO becomes a constantly present factor, which gave rise to mutual hostility between these two party structures. The dissatisfaction of the Central Committee with the activities of the BO to a large extent contributed to its collapse at the end of 1906.
The dissolution of the BO in November 1906 put an end to the most "heroic" period of "storm and stress" in the history of the SR terror. B.V. Savinkov, one of the most capable and resolute supporters and organizers of military affairs, departs from the leadership of the BO for a long time. E.F. Azef, seeking to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of representatives of the police departments, contributes to the curtailment of the work of the BO and prefers to temporarily retire from conducting terrorist activities.
Provocative activity of E.F. Azef.
From the end of 1901, after meeting G.A. Gershuni Azef began to hide some of the information concerning the latter and the BO headed by him. The tactics of Azef's messages about Gershuni in the DP were rather peculiar. He honestly wrote about Gershuni's leading role in the negotiations on the unification of the party, but he tried to either deny or downplay Gershuni's involvement in terror. So, being perfectly aware of the role of Gershuni in the murder of D.S. Sipyagina, Azef July 4, 1902 wrote to the head of the foreign agents of the DP L.A. Rataev: “Gershuni belongs to the Combat Organization of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries<…>He himself does not take a direct part, and his activity consists only in traveling, acquiring money for the Combat Organization and searching for people who are able to sacrifice themselves from among the youth. Of all the BO plans of this period, Azef gave the police only an absolutely unrealistic plan to assassinate V.K. Plehve by attacking his carriage by two officers.
From the end of 1902, the second stage in Azef's activities began, when a secret collaborator began to work more for the revolution than for the police. At this time, Azef did everything in his power to develop a plan for the murder, select executors, and send militants to Russia. He covered them from the police, eavesdropping on L.A. Rataeva knows information about the plans of terrorists, while insuring herself in the eyes of the police by supplying scraps of information about the plans of terrorists, which she could not use in any way. He informed the DP about other aspects of the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, gave out the plans of competing groups of terrorists, and eliminated his ill-wishers H. Levit and S.N. Sletov with the hands of the police.
The reasons for Yevno Azef's change of course lie in many factors. Presumably one of them was the anti-Semitic policy of the Russian government. V.M. Chernov, according to L. Praisman, believed that V.K. Plehve was one of the main reasons that prompted Azef to organize his assassination. Azef's second victim, the Moscow governor-general, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, who declared immediately after his appointment to this post that his goal was "to protect Moscow from the Jews", was the same symbol of anti-Semitism as Plehve. But, at the same time, it would be foolish to reduce the murders committed to personal "revenge" of the employee of the DP and the head of the BO AKP. The terrorist activities of the Social Revolutionaries are characterized by their systematic nature and were directed primarily against key representatives of the administrative elite. Another factor that, in my opinion, played a much more significant role in Azef's behavior is his political views. Of course, he was a paid agent of the Democratic Party and a provocateur, doing a lot for the sake of selfish interests, but, nevertheless, he developed his own views, political convictions, and they played a certain role in his behavior.
In the first months of his stay abroad, Azef was rather reserved, spoke out against extreme forms of revolutionary struggle and joined a moderate Marxist circle. Having become an agent of the Okhrana, Azef, on her behalf, pretended to be a supporter of extreme, terrorist forms of struggle. According to the testimony of A.V. Gerasimov, Azef, in his views, was a moderate person, not more to the left of a moderate liberal. He always spoke sharply, sometimes even with undisguised irritation, about violent, revolutionary methods of action. He was a resolute opponent of the revolution and recognized only reforms, and even then carried out with great consistency. Almost with admiration, he treated Stolypin's agrarian legislation and often said that the main evil in Russia was the lack of property among the peasants.
But maybe Azev wanted to look like a man of moderate views only in the eyes of his police leaders? Perhaps the most curious thing is that in conversations with party comrades, he expressed the same views with some adjustment. V. M. Chernov recalled: “In his views, he occupied an extremely right position in the Central Committee, and he was often jokingly called a “cadet with terror.” He pushed social problems into the distant future and did not believe in the mass movement as in a direct revolutionary force. He recognized at the moment the only real struggle for political freedom, and the only effective means that the revolution has at its disposal is terror. He expressed his views in most detail at a meeting with M.R. Gotz in October 1905, when, after reading the Manifesto on October 17, the SRs living in Geneva at that time gathered and decided what to do next: “Tolstoy (Azef) did something that surprised many statement: he is, in essence, only a fellow traveler of the party, as soon as a constitution is reached, he will be a consistent legalist and evolutionist. He considers any revolutionary interference in the development of the elements of the social demands of the masses as ruin, and at this phase of the movement he will break away from the Party and break with us. We don't have to go further down the road."
It is noteworthy that such a position, completely exceptional in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, did not interfere with Azef in his party career. Often when voting in the Central Committee, with his moderate views, he remained in the minority, and sometimes even alone. It would seem that a police agent should not stand out with his views in a revolutionary environment, and if he does, then in the direction of extreme, orthodox revolutionaryism, but in this case we observe a completely opposite picture.
Contributed to the terrorist activities of Azef and the popularity that he enjoyed in the party and which impressed him endlessly. “He, a passionate player, was also influenced by that unusually sharp, fascinating game that he played with the Democratic Party and with the Socialist-Revolutionary Central Committee and the headquarters, in which there were the heads of ministers, grand dukes, Socialist-Revolutionary militants, his own head, the fate of Russia, the revolution.”
After the Manifesto on October 17, Azef believed in the success of the revolution and, with a manic obsession, rushed about the idea of blowing up the building of the St. Petersburg Security Department. Returning after a meeting with M.R. Gotz, he expressed this idea to V.M. Probably so much Azef wanted to destroy all evidence and witnesses of his ties with the Okhrana.
The revolution was defeated, but a constitutional regime was established in Russia. On April 26, 1906, P.A. Stolypin became Minister of the Interior, whose activities Azef highly appreciated. A.V. Gerasimov became the new head of Azef in the Okhrana, who treated him as the main weapon in the fight against the revolution and handled the information provided to him with extraordinary caution. From May 1906, a new period began in Azef's activities. He again becomes a devoted employee of the St. Petersburg Security Department and serves only one master - the Russian government. The last terrorist act that he organized was an attempt on the life of the Moscow Governor-General F.V. Dubasov on April 23, 1906.
Thanks to the joint activities of Azef and Gerasimov, all the efforts of the Combat Organization to carry out the assassination attempt on Stolypin were paralyzed and it was disbanded in October 1906. Azef told Gerasimov where the headquarters of the Central Combat Detachment of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was located, which helped to arrest L. Zilberberg and V. Sulyatitsky. Azef told Gerasimov in detail about the assassination attempt on the tsar, which was being prepared by the new leadership of the detachment headed by B. Nikitenko. Thanks to the instructions of Azef, the head of the Flying Combat Detachment of the Northern Region of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, K. Trauberg, was arrested. Azef announced the plan to blow up the State Council and named the new leader of the detachment, Anna Rasputina, as a result of which the remnants of the detachment were arrested and seven people were hanged. Azef kept Gerasimov up to date with plans to recreate the BO in early 1908 - to kill Nicholas II.
The exposure of Azef had enormous consequences. At first, the Socialist-Revolutionaries completely refused to believe in his provocative activities. When there was no longer any doubt about it, for many Social Revolutionaries it meant the collapse of ideals, of the value system. Several suicides occurred among people close to Azef (Bella Lapina); yesterday's irreconcilable terrorists completely refused to participate in revolutionary activities (P.V. Karpovich); party leaders were accused of the most fantastic crimes. The revolutionary party, which included terror in its program as a way of combating the political system of Russia at that time, had to strive for the appearance in its ranks of a synthesized type of party worker who, being a member of the Central Committee, would at the same time be a terrorist. However, the short-sightedness of almost all members of the AKP, faced with a provocateur; personal ambitions, complacency, cowardice and politicking of the majority of the members of the Central Committee; arrogance, psychological narrowness and naivety of the members of the BO, made it impossible to raise terror to the proper height and were the reason for the exorbitant rooting in the party of E.F. Azef, who outwitted and outplayed everyone without exception.
But the exposure of Azef had grave consequences for the government camp. Newspapers around the world have accused the Russian government of having carried out all assassination attempts in recent years under the direction of government agents. This led to a decline in the prestige of the Russian state throughout the world. But there was something else. The exposure of Azef, the murder by A.A. Petrov of the head of the St. Petersburg security department, Colonel S.G. Karpov on December 19, 1909, and the murder of P.A. Stolypin, an agent of the Kyiv security department, D.G. mystical horror before secret collaborators. If the organizers of the political investigation saw in the secret collaborators they used the most reliable means of fighting the revolution, and from 1902 to 1908 the number of security departments grew from 3 to 31, then after the assassination of Stolypin the situation changed. Security departments began to be perceived as hotbeds of provocation. The DP met the February Revolution practically without a wide network of secret agents. Perhaps this is one of the main consequences of the Azef case.
Conclusion
In the Combat Organization of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries 1903-1906. representatives of almost all strata of Russian society were concentrated, but the main environment from which members of the BO were recruited was the students of higher educational institutions. At the same time, during this period, the recruitment of new militants was very limited - E.F. Azef showed great insight and exactingness in the selection of members of the BO.
The combat organization was more like a kind of brotherhood than an organ of the Central Committee of the AKP, there was practically no atmosphere of subordination in it.
The charter of the BO AKP was of little importance and to a greater extent expressed the views of its members.
As for the fate of the Combat Organization in the period from 1903 to 1906, it was revived practically from scratch, its activities were established precisely during this period, and the forms of this activity did not change in the subsequent years of the existence of the BO.
Yevno Azef's activities to strengthen the Combat Organization are characterized by great activity and vigor. All this led to the fact that in 1903-1906. there was a maximum increase in the terrorist activity of the AKP BO for the entire time of its existence. Terrorist activity contributed to the emergence of a revolutionary situation by the beginning of 1905, and BO attacks were one of the factors influencing the tsarist government. Despite his dual role in the AKP BO, Azef used his colossal organizational skills to improve terrorist practices. Azef's provocative activity significantly hindered the unceasing development of terror, but in no way was it a permanent deterrent to its spread. During these years, Azef was a personification, a kind of banner, a necessary component of the fighting spirit of the terrorist activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
The ambiguity of the figure of the DP agent and the head of the AKP BO will probably excite the minds of a considerable number of historians. There are many interpretations of the bilateral activity of a provocateur, in conclusion of this work I will give my vision of this problem.
In my opinion, during the period under review, Azef used the Democratic Party to a greater extent in the interests of the AKP than revolutionaries in the interests of the Okhrana. Posing as a secret informant for the Democratic Party, Azef eventually outplayed them, helping to strengthen the Combat Organization of Socialist Revolutionaries. It is interesting that Azef was not at the same time an informer for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he kept his connection with the police secret from them, but in fact he acted as a "Socialist-Revolutionary spy" in the ranks of the DP no less than a spy for the DP in the ranks of the AKP. If he really served the counter-revolutionary cause, he would have "strangled" the Socialist-Revolutionaries much earlier, having given up all the members of the BO and the entire leadership of the Central Committee. After such a blow, the party would hardly have been able to recover. Instead, Azef not only left everything as it is, but even led the AKP BOD to flourish, creating only the appearance of serving her as her agent. Subsequently, the course of E.V. Azef changed, and the question remains who he was to a greater extent: a revolutionary and a terrorist, or an employee of the secret police and a provocateur, but consideration of this problem is not within the scope of this work. The main conclusion regarding this historical figure is that in the period from 1903-1906. Azef's dual role was reduced to a greater extent to covering up the activities of the terrorists of the AKP BO, and to a contradictory combination of containing its excessive growth with the further improvement of the terrorist practices of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.
Bibliography
1. The program of the AKP party. - www.hrono.rudokumeserprog.html
2. Chernov V.M. The terrorist element in our program / Revolutionary Russia, 1902 - www.chernov.sstu.ru
3. Savinkov B.V. Memories of a Terrorist. - Kharkov: Proletary, 1926
1. Gorodnitsky R. A. The combat organization of the party of socialist revolutionaries in 1901-1911. - M.: Rosspen, 1998
2. Gusev K.V. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party: From Petty-Bourgeois Revolutionaryism to Counter-Revolution: An Historical Essay. - M., 1975.
3. Morozov K.N. Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1907-1914 - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998.
4. Individual political terror in Russia, XIX - early XX century .. - M .: Memorial, 1996
5. History of political parties in Russia: Proc. For university students / N.G. Dumova, N.D. Erofeev, S.V. Tyutyukin; ed. A.I. Zevelev. - M.: Higher. School, 1994.
For the preparation of this work, materials from the site were used.
Tags: Terrorist activities and militant organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party
Combat Organization
A structural unit of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, created specifically to carry out the most important terrorist acts in 1901, that is, even before the final formation of the party itself. The leaders of the B.O. were G.A. Gershuni (1901-1903) and E.F. (1903-1908). B.O. was strictly conspiratorial, well organized and small in number. At first, its number was only 10-15 people. During the revolution of 1905-1907. it included about 30 terrorists. B. O. had its own funds, was independent and autonomous in relation to the leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The most famous terrorist acts committed by its members: the murder of the Ministers of Internal Affairs D.S. Sipyagin (04.2.1902) and V.K. Plehve (07.15.1904), the attempt on the life of the Kharkov governor I.M. ) and Ufa Governor N. M. Bogdanovich (07/22/1902). On February 4, 1905, on the territory of the Moscow Kremlin, a member of the B. O. I. P. ym killed the Moscow Governor-General, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, brother of Alexander III and uncle of Emperor Nicholas I. Many of the planned terrorist acts of B. O. were frustrated, because its long-term leader Azef was a secret agent of the Police Department. After Azef was exposed as a provocateur, B.O., the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was disbanded.
Terror and terrorists: Dictionary. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. university. Lantsov S. A. . 2004
See what "Combat Organization" is in other dictionaries:
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SRs- an organization created by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in the beginning. 1900s to fight autocracy through terror against the most odious representatives of the ruling elite. The organization consists of 10 to 30 militants led by G. A. Gershuni, since May 1903 E. F. ... ...
Petersburg group of militants, created by the Union of Maximalists in May 1906 to organize terror and expropriations as the main means of fighting the autocracy. St. 30 members, headed by M. I. Sokolov. She had several weapons stores, workshops ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
BATTLE ORGANIZATION OF MAXIMALISTS- MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF MAXIMALISTS, created in St. Petersburg by the Union of Maximalists in May 1906. Over 30 members, headed by M. I. Sokolov. It had warehouses of weapons, workshops for the manufacture of bombs and documents, safe houses. In 1906 she organized ... Russian history
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SRs- MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SRs, created in the early 1900s. The organization consists of 10 to 30 militants. Leaders: G. A. Gershuni, from May 1903 E. F. Azef. Organized terrorist attacks against the Ministers of Internal Affairs D. S. Sipyagin and V. K. ... ... Russian history
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"Combat Organization of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries"- Fighting organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Russia) BO AKP. It has been operating since 1901. The initiator of the creation, the first leader and author of the first charter of the BO AKP G. A. Gershuni. Initially, the BO consisted of Gershuni and those involved by him to commit ... ... Terrorism and terrorists. Historical guide
Fighting organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party- This term has other meanings, see Combat organization. Fighting organization of the party of socialist revolutionaries (SRs) Other names: B.O. Part of: Party of Socialist Revolutionaries Ideology: populism, revolutionary ... ... Wikipedia
Books
- The first militant organization of the Bolsheviks. 1905-1907 , S. M. Pozner. This book is a supplement to the book The First Conference of the Military and Combat Organizations of the RSDLP in November 1906, published by the Marx Engels Lenin Institute in 1932. It completes protocols...
THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SRs was created in the early 1900s. The organization consists of 10 to 30 militants. Leaders: G. A. Gershuni, from May 1903 - E. F. Azef. Organized terrorist acts against the Ministers of Internal Affairs D.S. Sipyagin and V.K. Plehve, the Kharkov Governor Prince. I. M. Obolensky and Ufa - N. M. Bogdanovich, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich; prepared assassination attempts on Emperor Nicholas II, Minister of Internal Affairs P.N. Durnovo, Moscow Governor-General F.V. Dubasov and others (did not take place due to Azef’s provocative activities). In 1911, she announced her self-dissolution. Many militants were executed.
For the first time, the Fighting Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries declared itself in April 1902, publishing a leaflet about the murder of S.V. Balmashev Minister of Internal Affairs D.S. Sipyagin. The statutes of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (1902 and 1904) determined the place of the Combat Organization as an autonomous organization. The Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party determined the persons to be destroyed and the desirable terms for the execution of sentences.
The head of the Combat Organization (G.A. Gershuni until May 1903, E.F. Azef in 1903-1908) was a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The militant organization had its own representative in the Party's Foreign Committee. In 1902-1906 he was M.R.Gots. In 1901-1903, there were 10-15 militants, in 1906 their number increased to 30. In total, about 80 people visited the ranks of the Combat Organization.
Until 1903, the Combat Organization did not have a clear structure. Having come to the leadership, Azef introduced strict discipline and strict secrecy. The organization carried out terrorist acts against the Kharkov governor, Prince I.M. Obolensky (July 29, 1902, F.K. Kachur), Ufa governor N.M. Bogdanovich (May 6, 1903, O.E. Dulebov), Minister of the Interior V.K. Plehve (July 15, 1904, E.S. Sozonov), Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich (February 4, 1905, I.P. Kalyaev). After the Manifesto on October 17, 1905, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party decided to dissolve the Combat Organization. However, after the defeat of the December uprising in Moscow (1905), the Combat Organization was tasked with carrying out a number of terrorist acts before the start of the work of the First State Duma (against P.N. Durnovo, F.V. Dubasov, G.P. Chukhnin, N.K. Riemann, G.A. Gapon, P.I. Rachkovsky), however, due to the informing activities of Azef, these attempts were not carried out. For the duration of the First State Duma, the Socialist-Revolutionary leadership again decided to suspend the activities of the Combat Organization. After the dissolution of the Duma (July 1906), the terror was resumed, however, the preparation of the assassination attempt on P.A. Stolypin ended in failure. The failures of the Combat Organization displeased the Socialist-Revolutionary leadership, as a result, the leaders of the militants Azef and B.V. Savinkov resigned. Members of the Combat Organization refused to obey the new leadership. Part of the militants withdrew from active operations, part - led by L.I. Zilberberg in St. Petersburg began preparing terrorist acts of "secondary importance".
Instead of the Combat Organization, "flying detachments of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party" were created, which carried out a number of terrorist acts. In October 1907, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries restored the Combat Organization with Azef at the head and assigned it the task of organizing an assassination attempt on Nicholas II Alexandrovich, but attempts to organize regicide ended in failure. The exposure of Azef (1908) caused the demoralization of the Combat Organization, in the spring of 1909 it was disbanded. Savinkov was instructed to organize a militant initiative group, but a police informer turned out to be in its ranks, and in early 1911 she announced her self-dissolution.
The militant organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Plan: The political situation in Russia on the eve of the 20th century. Birth of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Combat organization of the AKP: leaders, plans, actions. Azef's betrayal. We do not want to replace, but only to supplement and strengthen the mass struggle with bold blows from the military vanguard, which hit the very heart of the enemy camp. G.A. Gershuni First of all, terror as a weapon of defense; then as a conclusion from this - its agitational significance, then as a result ... - its disorganizing significance. VM Chernov Terrorism is a very poisonous snake that has created strength out of impotence. PN Durnovo The Russian state at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries was characterized by the heterogeneity and instability of the social structure, the transitional state or archaism of the leading social strata, the specific order of the formation of new social groups, and the weakness of the middle strata. These features of the social structure had a significant impact on the formation and appearance of Russian political parties. If in Western European countries the state gradually grew out of society, then in Russia the state acted as the main organizer of society. It created social strata; the historical vector thus had a different direction - from top to bottom. “The Russian state is omnipotent and omniscient, has eyes everywhere, has hands everywhere; it takes upon itself the supervision of every step in the life of a subject, it takes care of him as a minor, from any encroachment on his thought, on his conscience, even on his pocket and his excessive gullibility, ”the future Liberal leader N.P. Milyukov. And at the same time, the Russian state was weak... "Its efficiency" was and still is extremely low: for a thousand years it could not create a stable society, and itself at least four times collapsed to the ground: the fall of Kievan Rus , "troubled" time, 1917 and 1991. It would seem that this contradicts the thesis about the special power and strength of the state in Russia. But the fact is that its strength most often manifested itself in punitive functions, in attempts to raise the people to fight against an external enemy, but it turned out to be incapable whenever it was a question of solving global, positive, creative tasks, the ability to stimulate the activities of public forces. This contradictory essence of the Russian state was clearly marked in that historical period, which can be called the uterine period of domestic political parties. They originated when corporal punishment was almost the leading in the arsenal of "educational" means of the Russian state (and this was at the beginning of the 20th century!) The police authorities used them especially extensively in the recovery of arrears. “In autumn, the most common occurrence is the appearance in the village of a camp, foreman and volost court. It is impossible to fight without a volost court, it is necessary that the decision on corporal punishment be made by volost judges - and now the policeman drags the court along with him on the philistines ... The court decides decisions right there, on the street, verbally ... Three troikas burst into the village with bells, with the foreman, clerk and judges. Scolding begins, shouts are heard: “Rozog!”, “Give money, rascals!”, “I'll tell you, I'll cover my mouth!”. Publicity was received by the case of the police chief Ivanov, who caught the debtor to death. There were frequent cases when peasants, having received a summons to be punished by section, committed suicide. Corporal punishment was abolished only in August 1904. imperial decree issued on the occasion of the birth of the long-awaited son, heir to the throne. In this regard, the world's leading newspapers asked the question: "What would happen to Russia if the fifth child in the royal family was a girl?" It is not surprising that for almost half of the 19th century, almost the main means of influencing the radicals on power were the dagger, revolver, and bomb. Emperor Alexander II, ministers N.P. Bogolepov, D.S. Sipyagin, V.K. Pleve, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, dozens of governors, prosecutors, police officers fell at the hands of terrorists. The list of victims of terrorism was completed by Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin, who was mortally wounded in the Kiev Opera House on September 1, 1911. People who were not involved in politics also died "in passing" - soldiers of the Finnish Regiment during an explosion in the Winter Palace, prepared by the People's Will, or visitors to Stolypin at the dacha, blown up by the Maximalists on August 12, 1906. The authorities did not remain in debt: extrajudicial deportations, death sentences on the slander of provocateurs, or the authorities to society for the excessive radicalism of demands and actions. For a long time we looked at it from only one point of view - from the side of the revolutionaries. And from this point of view, Marxist historiography and journalism evaluated individual terror only as an irrational means of struggle. The Narodnaya Volya were mostly heroes, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries - "revolutionary adventurers." Nowadays, when Russian history has made another zigzag, many publicists hastened to rearrange the signs. Revolutionaries are now presented as bloody villains, and their victims as innocent martyrs. In reality, of course, everything was much more complicated. The violence was, alas, mutual, and both sides were spinning a bloody spiral. It was, in a sense, self-destruction. After all, Russian society itself gave birth to such power, which subsequently did not find other forms of its limitation than murder. And who is more to blame for the multiplication of violence in the country, it will take a long time to figure it out, leafing through pages of documents that have yellowed from time to time, but survived ... But why is it in Russia that terrorism has taken on a large scale and reached such perfect organizational forms? Several factors played a role in the transition to terror: disappointment in the readiness of the masses for an uprising, the passivity of most of society (and its weak influence on power), and the desire to avenge government persecution. Finally, the political structure of Russia and the personification of power were a kind of provoking factor. “Russia is now ruled not by popular representation, and not even by a class government, but by an organized gang of robbers, behind which 20 or 30 thousand large landowners are hiding. This gang of robbers acts with naked violence, not hiding it in the least; it terrorizes the population with the help of Cossacks and hired police. The Third Duma with the State Council is not even a faint semblance of a parliamentary regime: it is simply a tool in the hands of the same government gang; by an overwhelming majority they support a state of siege in the country, freeing the government from the restraints even of the former legislation. The state of siege and the system of governor-generals with unlimited power - this is the mode of government that is now established in Russia ... This police world cannot be reformed; it can only be destroyed. This is the immediate and inevitable task of Russian social thought ... ”, - argued L.E. Shishko, a historian and publicist of the neo-populist direction, a prominent figure in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Shishko personally conducted propaganda among the junkers, workers, went "to the people", was arrested "under the trial of the 193s", sentenced to 9 years of hard labor, which he served on the Kara. The regicide on March 1, 1881 was the culmination of classical populism and at the same time the beginning of its political death, since from that moment it lost its priority in the liberation movement. But populist organizations sprang up from time to time even in the 1980s. In the 1990s, populist organizations took on the name of Socialist-Revolutionaries. The largest of them at the end of the 19th century were the Union of Socialist Revolutionaries, the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and the Workers' Party of the Political Liberation of Russia. Quite numerous for its time, the "Workers' Party of the Political Liberation of Russia" was formed in 1899. in Minsk, set as a priority the struggle for political freedom through terror. It was here that Grigory Gershuni appeared and became famous thanks to his ebullient energy and organizational skills. Socialist-Revolutionary organizations also arose in exile. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the process of consolidation of the Socialist-Revolutionary organizations intensified significantly. The date of the proclamation of the party of socialist revolutionaries (PSR) was January 1902. The organizational design of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party turned out to be a rather lengthy process. In 1903 they held a congress abroad, at which they adopted an Appeal. In this document, the principle of centralism was put as the basis for building the party. In "Revolutionary Russia" of July 5, 1904. The draft program has been published. Finally, in late December 1905 - early 1906. in a semi-legal setting on the territory of Finland, in a hotel near the Imatra waterfall, the First Congress of the Party took place. By that time, she had 25 committees and 37 groups in Russia, concentrated mainly in the provinces of the South, West and the Volga region. The participants of the congress adopted the program. The congress rejected the proposals of party members N.F. Annensky, V.A. Myakotin and A.V. Poshekhonov to turn the Socialist-Revolutionary Party into a broad, legal, open party for everyone, where everything is conducted publicly, under public control, on consistently democratic principles. In accordance with the adopted charter, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was considered "anyone who accepts the program of the party, obeys its decisions, participates in one of the party organizations." The leading political core of the new party consisted of M.R. Gotz, G.A. Gershuni and V.M. Chernov. They were people of different warehouses, but they complemented each other well. VM Chernov from the very beginning became the main literary and theoretical force of the young party. The functions of the main organizer-practitioner fell on the shoulders of G.A. Gershuni. Until his arrest in May 1903. he was constantly traveling around Russia, sharing his work with E.K. Breshkovskaya. “Like the holy spirit of the revolution,” Breshkovskaya rushed around the country, raising the revolutionary mood of the youth everywhere and recruiting proselytes of the party, and Gershuni usually followed her and formalized the movement she had raised, organizationally assigning it to the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Less noticeable to the outside world, but even more significant for the fate of the young party, was the role of M. R. Gotz. In the aforementioned leading "troika" he was the eldest in age and even more so in terms of life experience. The son of a Moscow millionaire, in the mid-80s he joined a revolutionary circle, was arrested, exiled to Siberia, then to hard labor, fled ... From the very beginning of the party, he became its leading politician and organizer. In close relations with this leading "troika" was Azef, who from the very beginning stood out for his sober practicality of judgments and the ability to foresee all the details of the planned enterprises. This especially brought him closer to Gershuni. According to Chernov, already during this period, Gershuni was so close to Azef that together with him he developed and deciphered letters that came from Russia with secret messages about organizational matters. For Azef, this closeness was of particular interest, since it was Gershuni who initiated the question of the use of terror. Conversations on this topic were conducted in a very narrow circle: apart from the indicated four people, hardly anyone was initiated into them. In principle, there were no objections to terror, but it was decided to come out openly with the propaganda of this method of struggle only after some initiative group had committed a terrorist act of central importance. The Party, as agreed, would agree to recognize this act as its own and give the said initiative group the rights of a militant organization. Gershuni declared that he was taking on this task, and made no secret of the fact that the first blow, for which, according to him, there were already volunteers, would be directed against the Minister of the Interior Sipyagin. Immediately upon his arrival in Russia, Gershuni focused his attention on preparing an assassination attempt against Sipyagin. The volunteer who volunteered for this case was a young Kyiv student, St. Balmashev. According to the plan, Balmashev, if he had not been able to shoot at Sipyagin, would have had to make an attempt to kill the chief prosecutor of the synod, K.P. Pobedonostsev, one of the inspirers of extreme reaction in Russia. All preparations were made in Finland, from where on April 15, 1902. Balmashev rode out, disguised as an adjutant. At the last minute, the attempt was almost upset: only in the carriage did the “officer” notice that he had forgotten in the hotel such a necessary part of the military toilet as a saber. I had to buy a new one on the way. He arrived at the minister a little earlier than the hour appointed for the reception in such a way as to meet him in the lobby. The calculation was accurate: “the adjutant led. book. Sergei, as Balmashev called himself, was let into the waiting room, and when the minister appeared, somewhat surprised why the special envoy of the Grand Duke had come to him, Balmashev handed him the sentence of the Combat Organization in a sealed package and killed him on the spot with two shots. This was the first performance of the Combat Organization. Balmashev paid for it with his life: a military court sentenced him to death. On May 16, he was hanged in Shlisselburg. The assassination of Sipyagin made a huge impression in the country. Naturally, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who now introduced terror into the arsenal of the revolutionary struggle, and especially Gershuni, experienced a special upsurge: “In the beginning there was work,” he said. The Gordian knot has been cut. Terror is proven. It's started. All arguing is superfluous." He was right: the assassination of Sipiagin really opened a new chapter in the history of the struggle against Russian absolutism - a chapter on the struggle against terrorism. It was from that moment that the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party began to exist. There was no shortage of those wishing to “revenge”: dozens, hundreds of new volunteers came up to replace each fallen. In those pre-revolutionary years, the activities of the Combat Organization were focused on preparing assassination attempts on the largest dignitaries: ministers, members of the royal family, since this was extremely dangerous and at the same time extremely important for neo-populists. The militant organization was carefully concealed, it was autonomous even in relation to the leading bodies of the party. Becoming a member was not easy and was considered a great honor. Many of them were revolutionary fanatics. “He came to terror in his own, special, original way and saw in it not only the best form of political struggle, but also a moral, perhaps religious sacrifice,” wrote about Kalyaev, the murderer of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, his party comrade, one of the leaders Boris Savinkov. Another well-known terrorist Yegor Sazonov, in response to the question of what he would feel after the murder, answered without hesitation: “Pride and joy ... Only? Of course, only." In the pre-revolutionary years, the Social Revolutionaries committed a series of major assassination attempts: in 1901-1902. the Minister of the Interior Sipyagin, the Minister of Education Bolepov were killed, the Minister of the Interior Plehve was shot dead in 1904, the Grand Duke - in 1905. This was a significant "contribution" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the preparation of the revolution. Demanding in 1905. from the king of the publication of the Manifesto, the Socialist-Revolutionary terror was used as one of the weighty arguments: "Let's Manifesto, otherwise the Socialist-Revolutionaries will shoot." The arbitrariness of the tsarist bureaucracy was so strong that practically all social and political forces, including the principled opponents of terror, reacted sympathetically to this activity of the neo-populists. But the death of Plehve was greeted with great rejoicing. After the assassination attempt on Plehve in August 1904. The charter of the Combat Organization was adopted. It formulated the task of the Combat Organization - the struggle against the autocracy through terrorist acts, defined its structure and special position in the party. The governing body of the Combat Organization was a committee to which all its members were subordinate. In the event of the failure of all members of the committee, or even of the organization as a whole, the right to co-opt the new composition of the committee passed not to the Central Committee, but to its representative abroad. The combat organization had its own cash desk, enjoyed complete technical and organizational independence and was an autonomous unit, almost independent of the party. The creation of the Combat Organization in the conditions of the growing revolutionary upsurge led to the intensification of individual terror. In addition to the Combat Organization, combat squads created under a number of committees of socialist revolutionaries (Gomel, Odessa, Ufa, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, etc.) took part in the implementation of terrorist acts. In total, according to the gendarmerie, local combat squads during 1905. more than 30 attempts were made, in 1906 - 74 attempts, in 1907 - 57. The propaganda significance of terrorist acts, the leaders of the Combat Organization considered, lies in the fact that they attract everyone's attention to themselves, excite everyone, wake up the most sleepy, most indifferent inhabitants , excite general rumors and conversations, make them think about many things that had never occurred to them before - in a word, they make them think politically, even against their will. If a accusatory act against Sipyagin in normal times would be read by thousands of people, then after a terrorist act it will be read by tens of thousands, and a hundred-mouthed rumor will spread its influence over hundreds of thousands, millions. And if a terrorist act strikes a person who has suffered thousands of people, then it is more likely than months of propaganda to change the view of these thousands of people on the revolutionaries and on the meaning of their activities. For these people, it will be a bright, concrete answer of life itself to the question - who is their friend and who is their enemy. As already noted, at the origins of the AKP was a galaxy of exceptionally energetic, selfless people. Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov, one of the founders of the Agrarian Socialist League, a consistent supporter of terrorist tactics, the author of policy articles on this issue, in his work “The Terrorist Element in Our Program” (June 1902) wrote: “The question of the role of the terrorist element in the revolutionary program is so serious and important that there should be no place for any omissions and any uncertainty. It cannot be circumvented, it must be dealt with... Terrorist acts are a means too strong, too fraught with all sorts of consequences, so that their use can be completely left with a light heart to the arbitrariness of individuals subject to random influences and moods. Hirsch Leckert appeared at the very moment when an act of retribution was needed. But Hirsch Leckert might not have come, what would have happened then? If terrorist acts are declared to be an exclusively irregular, guerrilla struggle, then where are the guarantees that they will come on time and that they will not happen at the wrong time? Where is the guarantee that the target will be chosen successfully, that the blow will not fall on an unsuitable person and will not bypass the rapist, the curbing of whom is the hidden dream of the widest sections of the population? Only the Party ... is competent enough to resolve such issues, and only the Party is strong enough to ensure not an accidental rebuff from outside, but a pre-prepared rebuff to the enemy. Terrorist acts can produce a certain positive effect only when the force is felt behind them, when they sound a serious, fatal threat for the future...”. The paradox lies in the fact that, never participating in the combat activities of the Social Revolutionaries, the party leader substantiated the necessity and expediency of political terror: “Blood is horror; because revolution is blood. If terror is fatally inevitable, then it is expedient”, “Terror in a revolution corresponds to artillery preparation in battle”. N.V. Tchaikovsky - authorized by the Central Committee of the AKP - in 1907. urged his party comrades to move from individual terror to guerrilla warfare as direct preparation for a popular uprising and believed “that such a thing should be non-partisan”: “Our methods of struggle are outdated and require a radical revision: they were developed during the preparatory period and answered it requirements, but they are not suitable when the time has come for the battle itself ... Only an insignificant number of committee members are engaged in the real business, and all the peripheries only look at the work or participate in it nominally ... ". Tchaikovsky proposes to create bands of partisans, to train their commanders, to feed them the people, but they only need a clear understanding of the conditions in which they can hold out for a long time and be successful. Guerrilla warfare must begin at once in many parts of the country with the means now at its disposal. Such bands can elude the pursuit of many thousands of troops for months, at the same time inflicting here and there painful blows on them. .. At the top of the party, Tchaikovsky's proposal was not heeded, believing that it looked like mass terrorism, terrorism "from below", which the anarchists advocated. In the “lower classes”, however, “boevism” spread like an epidemic, and it became more and more difficult to distinguish where the “revolutionary” ends and the “robber” begins. L.E. Shishko, assessing terrorist acts from the point of view of the political situation in modern Russia, noted that “it is difficult not to see in them one of the only two ways of political struggle now possible. Another way is an armed uprising. Outside of these methods, political struggle is now impossible in Russia. It is not the Socialist-Revolutionaries who are looking for violent means: they have been declared a war of extermination by the representatives of naked violence. “In the Sevastopol guardhouse, he was waiting for a noose. In the cell on the Lubyanka, he was waiting for the bullets of the performer. Both the gallows and the execution were due in strict accordance with the law. In his youth - according to the laws of the Russian Empire. In maturity - according to the laws of the Russian Republic. On August 21, 1924, he began his affidavit. The handwriting was hard, the text constricted like a Browning recoil. “I, Boris Savinkov, a former member of the AKP Military Organization, a friend and comrade of Yegor Sazonov and Ivan Kalyaev, a participant in the murder of Plehve, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, a participant in many other terrorist acts, a person who has worked all his life only for the people, in his name, I am accused now the worker-peasant power in that it went against the Russian workers and peasants with weapons in their hands. On August 27, 1924, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR began hearing the case of Savinkov. Boris Viktorovich Savinkov, aged 45, was sentenced to capital punishment with confiscation of property. There was no property. Life was subject to confiscation... The name of this reader Savinkov named in the first lines of his August 1924 testimony. Twenty years before, he and Yegor Sazonov were preparing an assassination attempt on the Minister of the Interior, the Secretary of State and Senator Plehve. Plehve's ideal was the permafrost of political soil. He was told that a student demonstration was possible from day to day, he answered: "I'll cut it." He was told that female students would take part in the demonstration, he answered: "I'll start with them." It would be necessary to clarify. Vyacheslav Konstantinovich began - and continued - not with rods, but with shackles and scaffolds. He saw the symbol of all things in paragraphs of instructions. He was as much a fanatical bureaucrat as he was a ferocious chauvinist. It was Plehve who defeated the Ukrainian rebel peasants. It was Plehve who subjected the Georgian peasants to military execution. It was Plehve who incited the rioters to the Jewish squalor. It was Plehve who bent the valley of the Finnish people. And wanting to pay tribute to the native subjects, he drowned Russian sailors in the depths of Tsushima, ruined Russian soldiers on the hills of Manchuria: it was Plehve who labored in the palace circle of zealous skirmishers of the Russian-Japanese war. “I am a supporter of strong power at all costs,” he impassively dictated to the correspondent of Matin. - I will be denounced as an enemy of the people, but let it be what will be. My security is perfect. Only by chance can a successful assassination attempt be made on me. Plehve gave an interview to a French journalist in the spring of 1902, sitting down in a ministerial chair. Concerned about personal safety, he, as they say, took measures: the Socialist-Revolutionary Fighting Organization had already arisen. We note a delicate circumstance - Plehve also counted on a top-secret agent provocateur, the actual leader of the militants. This hope exploded along with the projectile. On the morning of July 1904, in St. Petersburg, Savinkov's group overtook the minister's carriage on Angliysky Prospekt. Plehve was killed by the bomb of Yegor Sazonov, who was seriously wounded by its fragments. The echo resounded all-Russian ... ". The political success of the Plehve case caused an increase in terrorist sentiment in the party. "The influence of supporters of the exceptional significance of political terror and the predominant significance of the Combat Organization with its specific features of conspiracy" grew rapidly, says S.N. Sletov about this time. The party pinned its main hopes on terror. She threw her best forces into terror. Around terror she concentrated the main agitation. This influenced both the next slogans of the party and the direction of its practical activities. Mass work to a certain extent receded into the background. Bloody Sunday 1905 burned through the Combat Organization. The people's procession, overshadowed by the face of the Savior, solemnly touched by the choral call to the king of kings to keep the Orthodox king, the peaceful procession of petitioners, flocking to the Winter Palace, was shot, cut up, scattered, trampled. Even the forties had not been celebrated for the innocently killed on January 9, as Savinkov's group prepared to strike at the dynasty. The blood shed on the way to the Winter Palace echoed the blood shed near the Nicholas Palace. The Governor-General of the Mother See was assassinated in the Kremlin. The bomber, who was immediately captured, announced at the very first interrogation: “I have the honor to be a member of the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, by the verdict of which I killed Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich. I am happy that I fulfilled the duty that lay on the whole of Russia. The bomber refused to give his name. That was the rule of the militants: while your name is established, the comrades will have time to hide. And it is true that Savinkov's group did not suffer. Leafing through the archive bundle, once kept in the Special Section of the Police Department, you are convinced of the energy of the search. But only in mid-March did a dispatch arrive from Warsaw: "The killer of the Grand Duke ... Ivan Kalyaev, friend of Boris Savinkov." Kalyaev was strangled on the scaffold... The terrorist activities of the Social Revolutionaries were considered not only as a means of disorganizing the government apparatus, but also as a means of propaganda and agitation, undermining the authority of the government. At the same time, they emphasized that individual terror is by no means a “self-sufficient system of struggle”, which “by its own internal force must inevitably break the enemy’s resistance and lead him to capitulation ...”. Terrorist actions should not replace, but only supplement the mass struggle. By propagandizing and defending the tactics of individual terror, the Socialist-Revolutionaries argued that the "crowd" was allegedly powerless against the autocracy. Against the "crowd" he has the police and the gendarmerie, but against the "elusive" terrorists, no force will help him. Preachers of terror argued that "each fight of the hero" awakens in the masses "the spirit of struggle and courage" and in the end, as a result of a chain of terrorist acts, the "scales" will outweigh. However, in reality, these duels, having caused a transient sensation, eventually led to apathy, to a passive expectation of the next duel. At the beginning of the Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (end of December 1905), a letter from Gershuni from the Shlisselburg fortress was read. It concerned the unfolding revolution and strikingly accurately reflected the pathos of the Socialist-Revolutionary mentality: “The prediction came true: let the last be the first. Russia made a giant leap and immediately found itself not only next to Europe, but ahead of it. The strike, amazing in its grandeur and harmony, revolutionary mood, full of courage and political tact, the behavior of the proletariat, its magnificent decisions and resolutions, the consciousness of the working peasant, his readiness to fight for the solution of the greatest social problem. All this cannot but be fraught with the most complex favorable consequences for the entire world working people. But without the name of Azef, one cannot “understand a lot in the history of the first Russian revolution - the revolution of 1905. and subsequent years,” wrote Yu. Nikolaevsky, author of the book “The Story of a Traitor: Terrorists and Political Police” (1991). A man who served for more than 15 years as a secret agent for the fight against the revolutionary movement and at the same time for more than 5 years was the head of a terrorist organization - the largest in terms of size and scope of its activities, which only world history knows ; a man who betrayed many, many hundreds of revolutionaries into the hands of the police and at the same time organized a number of terrorist acts, the successful implementation of which attracted the attention of the whole world; organizer of the murders of a number of major government officials; the organizer of the assassination attempt against the tsar, an assassination attempt that was by no means carried out due to a lack of “good” desire on the part of its main organizer, Azef is truly an unsurpassed example of what the consistent use of provocation as a system can bring to. Acting in two worlds - in the world of the secret political police, on the one hand, and in the world of the revolutionary terrorist organization, on the other, Azef never merged himself with either of them, but all the time pursued his own goals and, accordingly, betrayed the revolutionaries the police, then the police to the revolutionaries. In both these worlds, his work has left a noticeable mark. Azef, of course, did not cover with his shadow all the activities of either the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, of which he had been the permanent leader for so long, or the political police, whose main hope for the fight against this organization he was considered for so long. Especially in the history of the Combat Organization, it is important to be able to separate this organization itself, its real tasks and all its other figures from the personality of the one whom they considered their leader. The duration of Azev's provocative activity is surprising, because many people, at the first glance at him, had the thought: "This is a provocateur!" Subsequently, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, its theorist V.M. Chernov, did not deny that Azef made a heavy impression on many. In 1909 the whole world was shocked by the sensation: Azef is a provocateur. VL Burtsev, a well-known hunter for provocateurs in Russia, accused him of “the most malicious provocateurism, unprecedented in the annals of the Russian liberation movement”. Later, B.N. Nikolaevsky made Azef the “hero” of his book, mainly because the provocation developed in Tsarist Russia “into a harmonious complete system”, which gave the world the “Azef case”, which was destined to go down in history “as a classic example of provocation in general ". The Social Revolutionaries were shocked to learn about the betrayal of Azef, many did not believe in it. But the fact remains: Azef was a provocateur. Archival files about Azef speak for themselves: Files of the Police Department on relations with Azef for the period from 1893 to 1902; Cases of the same Police Department from 1909-1910. on preparing materials for the government response in the State Duma to requests about Azef; The case of the official investigator who conducted the inquiry on Lopukhin's cases; The case of that investigator of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, created by the Provisional Government in 1917, who conducted a special investigation about Azef. Separately among the materials of this group, it is necessary to put the reports of A.V. Gerasimov, the former head of the Security Department in St. Petersburg in 1905-1909. and police leader Azef since April 1906. at the time of its revelation. Even at the beginning of 1917. his letters were published - reports to the head of the foreign agents of the Police Department L.A. Rataev, which are full of names, appearances, facts. But much, according to other sources, he did not name, as he was careful and always left himself “freedom of maneuver” or a loophole. Azef became a provocateur of his own free will, and his mercantile interests undoubtedly dominated in this matter. He didn’t have any moral barriers here: this “chimera” was replaced by a purebred. Hypocrisy and falsehood permeated his entire being. And without these qualities, he would hardly have taken place as a "great provocateur." “He became great because he was directly involved in the “assassination attempts of the century”, was a major figure in the revolutionary camp and at the same time was short of all the leaders of the tsarist policy, and all this made it possible to succeed in his chosen field of activity. During his last visit abroad, at the beginning of 1903. Gershuni left with Gotz, who was his permanent chargé d'affaires for all cases - and especially for the affairs of the Combat Organization - his will, so to speak: a detailed overview of all the connections of the latter, addresses, appearances, passwords, etc., as well as a list of persons who offered themselves to work in the Combat Organization. In the event of the arrest of Gershuni, according to this will, Azef was to become the head of the Combat Organization. Gotz fully approved of this choice of Gershuni, and therefore it is quite clear that when in June 1903. Azef appeared on the Genevan horizon, he was met by Gotz and people close to him as the recognized new leader of the Combat Organization, which should increase the glory of the latter. And he took things slowly. The forces that the Combat Organization had at its disposal when Azef entered into leadership of its affairs were quite large: there were many volunteers, there was money. Together with Gotz, who became his closest attorney and adviser on the affairs of the Combat Organization, Azef developed a plan to attack Plehve. The act of killing Plehve was enthusiastically received by the socialist revolutionaries. They regarded it as their victory, as their triumph. And it is only quite natural that the authority of Azef - the main "organizer of this victory" - rose to an unprecedented height. He immediately became a real "hero" of the party. Terror soared to unprecedented heights. O became the "holy of holies" for the entire party, and Azef - now recognized by all as the "head of terror", whose name is put on a par with and even higher than the names of the largest terrorists of the past - higher than the names of Zhelyabov, Gershuni. A real legend is being created around him: he is a man of iron will, inexhaustible initiative, an exceptionally courageous organizer-manager, an exceptionally precise, "mathematical" mind. “We used to have a romantic,” said Gotz, comparing Azef with Gershuni, “now we have a realist. He does not like to talk, he barely mutters, but he will carry out his plan with iron energy and nothing will stop him. More than others, members of the Combat Organization participate in the creation of this legend: they are passionate about Azef, idealize him and are devoted to him. They think of their further work only under his guidance. His position - the position of the indispensable leader of the Combat Organization - was fixed "seriously and for a long time." The role of Azef in the life of the Combat Organization was really huge. True, according to B. Nikolaevsky, who worked with archival materials for many years, Azef did not discover either an outstanding initiative or an unusually wide scope. The legend that it was he who created those new methods of terrorist struggle that the Combat Organization applied in 1904-1906. - only a legend. The real initiative in the search for new ways was shown by M. R. Gotz, who himself, due to illness, could not take a direct part in terrorist work. Usually he submitted new ideas - Azef refined them, developed them and put them into practice. But Azef was the chief of the general staff of the Combat Organization, all the main staff work lay on him, as well as all the main work of an organizational nature. Admission to the organization of new members was usually carried out by Azef himself, who held fast to this function, especially at the beginning. He made great demands on the candidates and made the most stringent selection among them. He persuaded them not to go into terror, but to do some other party work. Azef showed the most caring attention to the already accepted members of the Organization, he remembered everything, noticed everything. According to the memoirs, he seemed unusually attentive, sensitive and even gentle to the members of the organization. Today, this behavior is easily explained: he was not just afraid of betrayal, he was afraid of betrayal, which would expose his own double betrayal. An attempt on Stolypin, organized by the maximalists, was wedged into the work of the Combat Organization by an alien body. The Maximalists, having separated from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and created their own organization, decided to independently conduct the terrorist struggle. After the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Stolypin, organized by the “maximalists”, criticism began to be heard more and more often against the Combat Organization, on the basis of which sharp conflicts arose between the members of the Combat Organization. Created and led them, of course, Azef. But he preferred, as was his wont, to keep a low profile for the most part. Outwardly, his deputy Savinkov played a leading role. In terror, in addition to the terrorist-executor, there must necessarily exist a terrorist-organizer, the one who clears the way for the first, who prepares the possibility of his action. For a number of reasons, Savinkov became just such a terrorist organizer. Unfortunately for Savinkov, the first person he leaned against during his years in the Combat Organization was Azef. There is no doubt that, along with his practicality, he conquered Savinkov with the complete absence of internal fluctuations of doubts that corrode the soul. Savinkov's risk as a terrorist organizer was very great, and every time Savinkov was escorted to the "case", his relatives said goodbye to him as if he were doomed. But terror for him more and more became an end in itself. V.M. Zenzinov tells in his memoirs how he, together with A.R. Gotz, at the beginning of 1906. were arguing with Savinkov about the driving motives of their personal behavior. “With surprise, with bewilderment, we heard from Savinkov that his categorical imperative is the will of the Combat Organization. In vain did we prove to him that the will of more or less random individuals cannot become a moral law for human consciousness, that from a philosophical point of view this is illiterate, but from a moral point of view it is terrible. Savinkov stood his ground. The interests of the Combat Organization and the terrorist activities that it conducts were higher for him than everyone else. With such moods of Savinkov, it was not difficult for Azef to turn him into his tool in the implementation of all his plans. Therefore, when in September 1906. at a meeting (in Finland) of the Central Committee of the AKP, the question was raised about the work of the Combat Organization and the claims of the latter against the Central Committee (“the Central Committee is guilty of the failures of the Combat Organization: it does not provide funds and enough people for the proper development of combat activities, it is indifferent to the issue about terror, has no confidence in the leaders of the Combat Organization,” etc. ), Savinkov, together with Azef, resigned. Devotion to Azef did not allow Savinkov to see in the speeches of the members of the Combat Organization that there was dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic centralism introduced into the Organization by Azef and Savinkov, the complete suppression of the personal initiative of the militants introduced by Azef. As long as the Combat Organization existed, which had from the party, so to speak, a monopoly right to conduct central terror, all combat work in St. Petersburg was centralized and was under the control of Azef. No step in this area could be taken without his knowledge and consent. Now, after the departure of Azef and the dissolution of the Combat Organization, the monopoly was over and terrorist work went along several channels at once. So, in St. Petersburg, as many as three active combat groups appeared, the most effective of them was a group led by A.D. Trauberg ("Karl") - a Latvian by nationality, an active participant in the 1905 uprising. And this was the only group of all the active combat groups, about the composition and plans of which Azef had no information until some time. As a result, very soon after Azef's departure abroad, the Security Department found itself in complete darkness regarding the plans and composition of the battle groups. The consequences were not slow to affect: since December 1906. combat groups managed to make an attempt on adm. Dubasov (second), on January 3, the St. Petersburg mayor von Launitz was killed, on the 8th - the chief military prosecutor, General. Pavlov, 30 - head of the temporary prison in St. Petersburg Gudima, distinguished by his cruelty in the treatment of political prisoners. Gershuni, who had fled from Siberia, helped Azef to return to the Combat Organization, who was least of all inclined to put up with Azef's departure from combat work. As the main, almost the only, task, the KC set the case of the tsar before the restored Combat Organization. Strictly conspiratorial, she had to conduct only this one case, without being distracted by other, relatively smaller events. It was decided to concentrate the conduct of all other terrorist enterprises of central importance under the authority of the Karla Flying Combat Detachment, the leadership of which was entrusted to Azef and Gershuni. Naturally, with the return of Azef to the Organization, not only the regular flow of detailed information about the activities of the central institutions of the party resumed, but also information about the composition and plans of the central battle groups: these were the information about the surviving part of the Zilberberg Combat Detachment that allowed Gerasimov and Stolypin to create the famous at one time the process of "conspiracy against the king." But the main attention was paid to the capture of "Karl". All agents were mobilized to search for threads to the detachment, and all the instructions received were compared with those instructions given by Azef regarding the location of the detachment's safe house. February 20, 1908 9 people were taken. The court was quick and merciless: 7 people, incl. three women were sentenced to death. Shortly thereafter, "Karl" and some other members of the detachment, who were arrested at various times on the basis of Azef's denunciation, were tried. The flying combat detachment was destroyed ... The systematic failures of the Combat Organization in everything important, whatever it thought, began to lead many of the party leaders to sad reflections .. It became indisputable that there was a traitor in the very center of the party, and by the method of elimination everything those who embarked on the path of these reasonings came to suspicions against Azef. The campaign against Azef was started and completed by VL Burtsev. The links of the chain of accusation closed one after another. January 5, 1909 The AKP Committee Center convened a meeting of a number of the most responsible party workers and, after describing the state of affairs in detail, raised the question: what to do? The blindness of Azev's "brilliant past" was so great that out of 18 present, only four voted for the immediate execution of the traitor. The rest hesitated. Karpovich, who lived at that time in St. Petersburg, wrote that he "will shoot down the entire Central Committee if they dare to raise a hand against Azef." It was known that this was also the mood of many other members of the Combat Organization. Complete disintegration, complete distrust of everyone at the top of the political police - on the one hand; the deepest discredit in the whole world - on the other hand, such was the revenge of Azef the provocateur to the system that created the possibility of his birth. But he took revenge not only on the police. When it became impossible to doubt the fact of his betrayal, agitation for the need to “restore the honor of terror” arose among terrorist emigrants. Savinkov led her especially ardently. He recognized only one way: it is necessary to restore the Combat Organization and show in practice that there are still terrorists, that terror is still possible. Only in this way, he said, will the stain imposed by Azef be washed away. Many responded to his call, from whose ranks Savinkov selected 12 people for his detachment. There was not a single one who did not have prison, exile, hard labor behind him, many had already taken part in combat work before. All were people who had seen death, and it seemed that now death could not be terrible for them, that they would never turn off the intended path. In fact, it turned out quite differently: the last attack ended worse than nothing. Among the selected twelve, three turned out to be traitors... Azev's betrayal poisoned the great and pure faith, killed its purity. “I got the impression,” Sletov said two years later, “if the party had managed to topple the tsar himself, the party people would first of all suspect a provocation here ...”. In such a situation, terror as a system of struggle both politically and psychologically became, of course, impossible. The blow to the AKP caused by Azef's exposure was so strong that she was never able to fully recover from him. The Social Revolutionaries were very progressive for their time. The historical merit of the Socialist-Revolutionaries can be considered a predominant orientation towards the peasantry and the priority solution of the agrarian question. First of all, they intensely comprehended the nature of the historical development of Russia and in some significant moments (a special type of capitalism in Russia, its combination with non-capitalist evolution in certain sectors of the national economy and life) were, perhaps, on the way to creating an optimal "soil" model of socio-economic development. However, they were not able to successfully complete the solution of this problem. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party reproduced not only the strength, but also the weakness of the "soil", which manifested itself in the extreme inconsistency of the theory, program and tactics of the party, and a tendency to extremism. The Social Revolutionaries revived the terrorist tradition in the Russian liberation movement and bear historical responsibility for this. However, one cannot ignore the preparation and execution of more than 30 terrorist acts by the Fighting Organization of the Social Revolutionaries, which left their mark on the revolutionary movement of the early 20th century. Revolutionary uprising 1901-1904 gave rise to terror, terror deepened the revolutionary situation and became one of its obvious manifestations. During these years, some leftists denounced terror as a means of diverting the masses from the revolutionary struggle. However, terror and the birth of the Combat Organization were an objective result of the political and socio-economic state of the country, a reflection of deep dissatisfaction in society with the autocratic system, as evidenced by the outburst of jubilation that shook all sections of Russian society at the news of the death of the apostle of autocracy V.K. Pleve : “No temporary worker has ever known such hatred. No man has ever given birth to such contempt for himself. The autocracy has never had such a servant. The country was exhausted in captivity. Cities burned with blood, and freedom fighters perished in vain by the hundreds. Plehve's heavy hand crushed everything. Like the lid of a coffin, she lay on the rebellious, already awakened people. And the darkness grew thicker, and life became more and more unbearable. And then Sazonov went to die. He didn't kill Plehve. He struck Nicholas to the very heart. Dynamite terror ... entered life, became a reality, and Nikolai, stained in blood, felt for the first time what blood means and for the first time realized that blood is born with blood ... ”- wrote B.V. Savinkov. Terrorist tradition brought down a plentiful bloody harvest in Russia of the 20th century and dealt a mortal blow to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party itself like a boomerang, but the Socialist-Revolutionary illusions were perhaps the most grounded of all the political illusions in which Russia was so rich at the beginning of this century. Literature: Gusev K.V. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party: From Petty-Bourgeois Revolutionaryism to Counter-Revolution: An Historical Essay. - M., 1975. History of terrorism in Russia in documents, biographies, researches. - 2nd ed., add. and reworked. - Rostov n / a, 1996. Nikolayevsky B. The story of one traitor: Terrorists and political police. - 1991. Political parties of Russia in the context of its history. In 2 issues. - Rostov n / a, 1996. - Issue 1. Savinkov B.V. Memories of a Terrorist. - M., 1990. Chernov V.M. Before the storm Memories. - M., 1993.