The Helsinki agreements ended in Helsinki. Declaration "Final Act of the CSCE (Helsinki)" On behalf of the USSR, the final act of the CSCE was signed

On July 3, 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began in Helsinki, on the initiative of the Warsaw Pact Organization. All European countries, with the exception of Albania, agreed to take part in the work of the Meeting. The purpose of the event was to soften the confrontation between both blocs - NATO and the European Community, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, on the other. Despite all the political contradictions, the planned meetings were supposed to help defuse tensions and strengthen peace in Europe.

On August 1, 1975, after two years of negotiations, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference was finally signed, in which European countries were guaranteed the immutability of borders, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of violence, equality and equality of sovereignty. In addition, the document contained a commitment to respect the right of peoples to self-determination and human rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and freedom of belief.

Consideration of the international situation on the eve of the conclusion of the Helsinki Agreements, i.e. in the late 1960s - early 1970s;

Determination of the main prerequisites for international “detente”;

Consideration of the consequences of the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords;

Determination of the main results of the Helsinki Pan-European Conference.

When writing a test to achieve the goal, the author analyzes textbooks on world history, the history of Russia and the USSR, the history of state and law foreign countries, and scientific works some domestic and foreign authors.

As a result of the analysis of information sources, the author examined in detail the process of signing the Helsinki Agreements, their prerequisites and main results.

In October 1964, when the new leadership of the USSR took power into its own hands, the liabilities of Khrushchev’s foreign policy were: unity, shaken due to the split with China and Romania socialist camp; strained relations between East and West due to Cuban missile crisis; finally, the unresolved German problem. The decisions of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the trend towards a tougher foreign policy: peaceful coexistence was now subordinated to a higher priority class task - strengthening the socialist camp, solidarity with the international working class and the national liberation movement.

The Soviet leadership was hampered by the restoration of full control over the socialist camp by difficulties in relations with China, Cuba, as well as events in Czechoslovakia. Here, in June 1967, the Writers' Congress openly opposed the party leadership, followed by mass student demonstrations and strikes. The growing opposition forced Novotny to cede leadership of the party to Dubcek in January 1968. The new leadership decided to carry out a number of reforms. An atmosphere of freedom was established, censorship was abolished, and the Communist Party of Human Rights agreed to alternative elections of its leaders. However, the traditionally Soviet “exit” was imposed: “at the request of the Czechoslovak comrades” on the night of August 20-21, 1968, troops of five countries participating in the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia. It was not possible to immediately pacify discontent; protest demonstrations against the occupation continued, and this forced the Soviet leadership to remove Dubcek and his entourage from the leadership of the country and put G. Husak at the head of the Communist Party of Human Rights (April 1969), a supporter of the USSR. By forcefully suppressing the process of reforming Czechoslovak society. The Soviet Union stopped the modernization of this country for twenty years. Thus, using the example of Czechoslovakia, the principle of “limited sovereignty,” often called the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” was implemented.

A serious situation also arose in Poland due to price increases in 1970, which caused mass unrest among workers in the Baltic ports. Over the next ten years, the economic situation did not improve, which gave rise to new wave strikes, which was led by the independent trade union "Solidarity" headed by L. Walesa. The leadership of the mass trade union made the movement less vulnerable and therefore the leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops into Poland and shed blood. The “normalization” of the situation was entrusted to a Pole, General Jaruzelski, who introduced martial law in the country on December 13, 1981.

Although there was no direct intervention of the USSR, its role in “calming” Poland was noticeable. The image of the USSR in the world was increasingly associated with the violation of human rights both within the country and in neighboring states. Events in Poland, the emergence of Solidarity there, which covered the entire country with a network of its organizations, indicated that the most serious breach had been made here in the closed system of Eastern European regimes.

In relations between the West and the East in the early 70s there was a radical turn towards a real detente. It became possible thanks to the achievement of approximate military parity between the West and the East, the USA and the USSR. The turn began with the establishment of interested cooperation between the USSR, first with France, and then with Germany.

At the turn of the 1960-1970s, the Soviet leadership moved to implement a new foreign policy course, the main provisions of which were stated in the Peace Program adopted at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU in March - April 1971. The most significant point of the new policy should be considered the fact that neither The Soviet Union and the West did not abandon the arms race. This process was now acquiring a civilized framework, which was an objective need on both sides after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. However, such a turn in East-West relations made it possible to significantly expand the areas of cooperation, primarily Soviet-American, caused a certain euphoria and raised hopes in the public consciousness. This new state of the foreign policy atmosphere was called “detente of international tension.”

“Détente” began with a significant improvement in relations between the USSR and France and Germany. France's withdrawal in 1966 military organization NATO has become an impetus for the development of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union tried to enlist the mediation assistance of France in resolving the German question, which remained the main obstacle to the recognition of post-war borders in Europe. Mediation, however, was not required after Social Democrat Willy Brandt became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969, proclaiming the “new Ostpolitik.” Its essence was that the unification of Germany ceased to be a prerequisite in relations between East and West, but was postponed to the future as the main goal of multilateral dialogue. This made it possible, as a result of Soviet-West German negotiations on August 12, 1970, to conclude the Moscow Treaty, according to which both parties pledged to respect the territorial integrity of all European states within their actual borders. In particular, Germany recognized the western borders of Poland along the Oder-Neisse. At the end of the year, corresponding agreements on borders were signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, as well as between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

An important stage of the European settlement was the signing in September 1971 of a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, which confirmed the groundlessness of the territorial and political claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to West Berlin and stated that West Berlin is not integral part The Federal Republic of Germany will not be governed by it in the future. This was a complete victory for Soviet diplomacy, since all the conditions that the USSR had insisted on since 1945 without any concessions were finally accepted.

This development of events strengthened the confidence of the Soviet leadership that a radical change in the balance of forces had occurred in the world in favor of the USSR and the countries of the “socialist commonwealth.” The positions of the United States and the imperialist bloc in Moscow were assessed as “weak.” The USSR's confidence was built on a number of factors, the main of which were the continued growth of the national liberation movement and the achievement in 1969 of military-strategic parity with the United States in terms of numbers. nuclear charges. Based on this, the buildup of weapons and their improvement, according to the logic of the Soviet leadership, became an integral part of the struggle for peace.

Achieving parity put on the agenda the issue of arms limitation on a bilateral basis, the goal of which was the regulated, controlled and predictable growth of the most strategically dangerous type of weapons - intercontinental ballistic missiles. The visit of US President R. Nixon to Moscow in May 1972 was extremely important. During this visit, by the way, the first visit to the USSR by a US President, the process of “détente” received powerful impulse. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the United States of America,” stating that “in the nuclear age there is no other basis for relations other than peaceful coexistence.” On May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement on Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT) was concluded for a period of 5 years, later called the SALT-1 Treaty. In the summer of 1973, during Brezhnev's visit to the United States, an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war was also signed.

SALT I set limits on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs) ​​for both sides. The permitted levels for the USSR were higher than for the United States, since America had missiles carrying multiple warheads. These units with nuclear warheads from the same warhead could be aimed at different targets. At the same time, the number of nuclear warheads themselves was not specified in SALT-1, which created the opportunity to unilaterally achieve an advantage in this area while improving military equipment without violating the treaty. Thus, the precarious parity established by SALT I did not stop the arms race. This paradoxical situation was a consequence of the concept “ nuclear deterrence"or "nuclear deterrence". Its essence was that the leadership of both countries understood the impossibility of using nuclear weapons for political and especially military purposes, but continued to build up their military potential, including nuclear missiles, in order to prevent the superiority of the “potential enemy” and even surpass it. In reality, the concept of “nuclear deterrence” made confrontation between blocs quite natural and fueled the arms race.

In November 1974, at a meeting between Brezhnev and American President J. Ford continued the formation of the contract system. The parties managed to agree on a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-2), which was supposed to regulate a wider range of weapons, including strategic bombers and multiple warheads. The signing of the treaty was scheduled for 1977, but this did not happen due to the emergence of a new type of weapons in the United States - “cruise missiles”. The United States categorically refused to take into account the maximum permissible levels for new types of weapons, although they were already extremely high - 2,400 warheads, of which 1,300 were with multiple warheads. The US position was a consequence of the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations since 1975, not directly related to the treaty as such. Although Brezhnev and Carter did sign SALT II in 1979, it was not ratified by the US Congress until 1989.

Despite this, the policy of détente had a beneficial effect on the development of East-West cooperation. Over these years, total trade turnover increased 5 times, and Soviet-American trade turnover increased 8 times. The cooperation strategy during this period was limited to concluding large contracts with Western firms for the construction of factories or the purchase of technology. Thus, the most famous example of such cooperation was the construction in the late 1960s - early 1970s of the Volzhsky automobile plant within the framework of a joint agreement with the Italian company Fiat. However, this was rather an exception to the rule. Basically, international programs were limited to fruitless business trips of delegations of officials. In general, there was no well-thought-out policy in the import of new technologies, administrative and bureaucratic obstacles had an extremely negative impact, and contracts did not live up to initial hopes.

The detente between the West and the East made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Consultations on it took place in 1972-1973. in the capital of Finland, Helsinki. The first stage of the meeting was held at the level of foreign ministers from July 3 to July 7, 1973 in Helsinki. Representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the USA and Canada took part in it.

The second phase of the meeting took place in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975. It represented rounds of negotiations lasting from 3 to 6 months at the level of delegates and experts appointed by the participating states. At this stage, agreements were developed and agreed upon on all items on the meeting agenda.

The third stage of the meeting took place in Helsinki on July 30 - August 1, 1975 at the level of senior political and government leaders of the countries participating in the meeting, who headed national delegations.

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from July 3 to August 1, 1975 was the result of a peaceful progressive process in Europe. Representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the USA and Canada were present in Helsinki. The meeting was attended by: general secretary Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, US President J. Ford, French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, British Prime Minister G. Wilson, Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany G. Schmidt, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP E. Terek; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China , President of Czechoslovakia G. Husak, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED E. Honecker; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Belarus T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP J. Kadar; General Secretary of the RCP, President of Romania N. Ceausescu; Chairman of the UCY, President Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito and other leaders of participating states The Declaration adopted by the CSCE proclaimed the inviolability of European borders, mutual renunciation of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of participating countries, respect for human rights, etc.

The heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the meeting. This document is still in effect today. It includes agreements that must be implemented in full as a whole, on:

1) security in Europe,

2) cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology, environmental protection;

3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields;

4) next steps after the meeting.

The Final Act contains 10 principles defining the norms of relationships and cooperation: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Final Act guaranteed the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders in Europe (which was to the advantage of the USSR) and imposed obligations on all participating states to respect human rights (this became the basis for using the problem of human rights against the USSR).

The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) by the heads of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki became the apogee of détente. The Final Act included a declaration of principles for relations between the CSCE participating countries. The USSR attached the greatest importance to the recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders and territorial integrity states, which meant international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. The triumph of Soviet diplomacy was the result of a compromise: the Final Act also included articles on the protection of human rights, freedom of information and movement. These articles served as the international legal basis for the dissident movement within the country and the campaign to protect human rights in the USSR, which was actively carried out in the West.

It should be said that, starting from 1973, there was an independent negotiation process between representatives of NATO and the Department of Internal Affairs on arms reduction. However, the desired success was not achieved here due to the tough position of the Warsaw Pact countries, which were superior to NATO in common types weapons and those who did not want to reduce them.

After the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union felt like a master in Eastern Europe and began installing new SS-20 medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, restrictions on which were not provided for in the SALT agreements. .Under the conditions of the campaign to protect human rights in the USSR, which sharply intensified in the West after Helsinki, the position of the USSR became extremely tough. This prompted retaliatory measures from the United States, which, after Congress refused to ratify SALT II in the early 1980s, placed Western Europe"cruise missiles" and Pershing missiles capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union. Thus, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs in Europe.

The arms race had an extremely negative impact on the economies of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The general extensive development increasingly affected the defense industry. The parity with the United States achieved in the early 1970s concerned primarily intercontinental ballistic missiles. Already from the late 1970s, the general crisis of the Soviet economy began to have an impact negative impact to the defense industries. The Soviet Union began to gradually fall behind in certain types of weapons. This was discovered after the US developed “cruise missiles” and became even more obvious after the US began working on the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) program. Since the mid-1980s, the leadership of the USSR has begun to clearly realize this lag. The depletion of the regime's economic capabilities is becoming more and more apparent.

Since the late 70s, detente has given way to a new round of the arms race, although the accumulated nuclear weapons was already enough to destroy all life on Earth. Both sides did not take advantage of the achieved detente and took the path of inciting fear. At the same time, capitalist countries adhered to the concept of “nuclear deterrence” of the USSR. In turn, the Soviet leadership made a number of major foreign policy miscalculations. By a number of weapons, by the size of the army, tank armada, etc. The USSR surpassed the USA and their further expansion became pointless. The USSR began building a fleet of aircraft carriers.

A major factor that undermined confidence in the USSR was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. An expeditionary force of two hundred thousand fought a war that was extremely unpopular in the country and the world. The war consumed human and material resources, 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died in it, 35 thousand were maimed, about one or two million Afghans were exterminated, three or four million became refugees. The next miscalculation of Soviet foreign policy was the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe in the mid-70s. It sharply destabilized the situation and disrupted the strategic balance.

It should also be taken into account that in the second half of the 70s - early 80s, the USSR, following the class principle, provided all possible assistance (military, material, etc.) to third world countries and supported the fight against imperialism there. The Soviet Union took part in armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, and armed regimes that were “progressive” from the point of view of the Soviet leadership in Iraq, Libya and other countries.

Thus, the period of detente that was favorable for the USSR had ended, and now the country was suffocating in a difficult arms race in conditions of mutual accusations and, giving considerable reason to the other side to claim about the “Soviet threat”, about the “evil empire”. Enter Soviet troops Afghanistan dramatically changed the attitude of Western countries towards the USSR. Many previous agreements remained on paper. The Moscow Olympics-80 took place in an atmosphere of boycott by most capitalist countries.

After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the international atmosphere changed dramatically, once again acquiring the features of confrontation. Under these conditions, victory presidential elections In the USA, the proponent of a tough approach to the USSR, R. Reagan, won.

In the United States, plans began to be developed for a strategic defense initiative (SDI), providing for the creation of a nuclear shield in space, which received the figurative name of “space war” plans. The US Defense Policy Guidelines for Fiscal Years 1984-1988 stated: “It is necessary to direct military competition with the USSR into new areas and thereby render all previous Soviet defense spending meaningless and render all Soviet weapons obsolete.” The Soviet Union will be forced to spend about 10 billion rubles annually on space programs (72% military programs).

In the USSR it also became known that at the December (1979) session of the NATO Council (two weeks before the deployment of troops to Afghanistan) a decision was made to deploy new American nuclear missiles medium range. Under these conditions, the USSR deployed medium-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which were capable of reaching European capitals in a matter of minutes. In response, NATO began to deploy a network in Europe American missiles medium-range, as well as cruise missiles. IN short period Europe found itself oversaturated with nuclear weapons. In an effort to prevent further escalation of tension, Yu. V. Andropov made concessions, proposing to reduce the number Soviet missiles in the European part of the USSR to the level of French and British nuclear weapons, moving the remaining missiles beyond the Urals. Agreeing with objections to increased tensions in Asia as a result of the movement there of Soviet missiles exported from Europe, the Soviet leadership announced its readiness to dismantle the surplus missiles. At the same time, Andropov began to resolve the Afghan issue, involving the Pakistani side in the negotiation process. Reducing tension on the Afghan-Pakistani border would allow the Soviet Union to reduce the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and begin the withdrawal of troops. The incident with the downing of a South Korean passenger plane over the territory of the USSR on September 1, 1983 led to the curtailment of the negotiation process. The Soviet side, which for some time denied the fact of the destruction of the airliner (obviously led by US intelligence services over military installations of the USSR), in the eyes of the world community turned out to be guilty of the incident that claimed the lives of 250 passengers. Negotiations were interrupted.

Most controversial point in the history of detente of the 1970s is a different understanding of this process in the USSR and in the West. There are several main points of view that differ in the degree of breadth of interpretation of the process and the limits of its distribution. Indeed, what was it: a “smokescreen” that allowed the Brezhnev leadership to strengthen its influence in the world and build up weapons, or a sincere desire, if not to achieve truly peaceful coexistence, then at least to contribute to warming the overall climate in the world. The truth, apparently, lies somewhere in the middle.

Realizing the need to reform the economy, the Soviet leadership was really interested in expanding the spheres international cooperation, hoping to export advanced Western technology. This was especially true during the early phase of “collective leadership,” when technocrats enjoyed much more influence than in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, it would be strange to seriously consider the position of the USSR as a sincere desire to completely abandon the expansion of its military presence in the world at a time when the United States was clearly aiming to localize the confrontation “far from its shores.” Moreover, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU in February 1976, Brezhnev directly stated: “Détente in no way abolishes and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle...”. Rather, both sides accepted certain rules of the game: the USA recognized the realities in Eastern Europe, the USSR did not interfere in the internal affairs of the West. Although some Western historians argue that the United States was counting on a complete abandonment of Soviet activity in the rest of the world, it is unlikely that the Americans were actually as naive and simple-minded as they now want to portray.

In this regard, the process of detente was not, and could not be accompanied by, the USSR’s refusal to support “anti-imperialist forces.” Moreover, during these years, the USSR has consistently pursued a policy of expanding its presence in various regions of the globe under the flag of “proletarian internationalism.” For example, the participation of Soviet military advisers and military-technical assistance of the USSR to North Vietnam during its war with the South. The same cautious policy, which always ran up against Chinese participation in Vietnamese affairs, was pursued by the USSR during the American-Vietnamese War until the victorious march of the DRV troops through the streets of Saigon and the unification of the South and Northern Vietnam under communist rule in 1975. The defeat of the United States and the establishment of the communist regime in general contributed to the spread of Soviet influence into neighboring Laos and Cambodia (since 1976 - Kampuchea). This significantly weakened the US position in Southeast Asia. Soviet Navy received the right to use Vietnamese ports and military bases. The influence of the USSR increased significantly after China - the main Soviet competitor in the struggle for influence in Indochina - became Vietnam's main enemy. This happened after China attacked the northern provinces of Vietnam in 1979 and the latter was victorious in the war. After the Sino-Vietnamese War, the DRV became the main strategic ally of the USSR in this region.

The Soviet Union took a pro-Arab position during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, sending weapons and a large number of Soviet specialists. This significantly contributed to strengthening the influence of the USSR in Arab world, which became an important factor in Soviet-American relations. India's traditional support as an instrument of Soviet influence in the region resulted in military assistance to that country in its periodic conflicts with Pakistan. In the Third World, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) also enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union in their struggle against Portuguese colonial dependence. However, the USSR did not limit itself only to assistance in the anti-colonial struggle, but actively intervened in the outbreaks that had begun in these countries. civil wars on the side of groups that declared their Marxist-Leninist orientation. This led to Soviet support for Cuba's military intervention in Angola, as well as ongoing military assistance to the Mozambique Popular Front. As a result, a course towards building socialism was proclaimed in Angola and Mozambique. Through the mediation of Cuba, the USSR also supported partisans in Nicaragua, which led in 1979 to the overthrow of the pro-American Somoza regime and the coming to power of the Sandinista government, which announced plans to build socialism.

The Helsinki Process clearly linked issues of respect for individual human rights with problems national security. He helped end communist rule in Eastern Europe and helped usher in new security and economic ties between East and West. As part of the process, the now 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was formed - an active international body who advocates for democracy and human rights around the world.

But Helsinki's greatest achievement may be the commitment to human rights and democracy that people across the region continue to demand from their governments.

Retired Army Col. Ty Cobb, who served as President Ronald Reagan's adviser on the Soviet Union, told America.gov that when the Soviet government signed the Helsinki Accords 30 years after World War II, it believed it was getting a good deal. .

The agreements reached appeared to legalize the post-war borders between Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, but in reality their human rights provisions made the first breach in the Iron Curtain.

Although conservatives in the West were generally of the opinion that the agreements were unlikely to dramatically change the state of affairs in the USSR, in fact, by signing them, the Soviet Union accepted numerous obligations. Ultimately, the agreements “proved to be a useful tool” for resolving conflicts and ultimately led to the elimination of Soviet power in both Eastern Europe and Russia.

In particular, the Helsinki Final Act allowed member states to form human rights monitoring groups, which created favorable conditions for the activities of dissident movements and nonviolent protest organizations in the Eastern Bloc countries. The Moscow Helsinki Group proved particularly effective in drawing international attention to human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.

German historian Fritz Stern noted in his recent article "The Roads That Led to 1989" that at first "few political figures on either side of the Iron Curtain realized the incendiary potential of the Helsinki Accords... and realized what they provided to dissident movements in countries Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union provided moral support and at least some elements of legal protection.”

A direct result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the new political thinking that followed was the “fall” of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, when East Germany opened its borders and allowed citizens to travel to the West.

Within a year, the 106-kilometre Berlin Wall was dismantled, former dissident and political prisoner Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, dictatorships from Bulgaria to the Baltics were overthrown, and 100 million people in Eastern Europe were given the opportunity to choose their own governments after 40 years of communist rule.

According to Carol Fuller, US Chargé d'Affaires to the OSCE, “The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union gave new impetus to the Helsinki process. The OSCE has created new structures – including a secretariat and field missions – and faced new challenges, from terrorism and climate change to military transparency and stability in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.”

When 35 European countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signed the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975, it set in motion a series of events that culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall and left a lasting imprint on international relations.

Why the USSR authorities failed to discern a typical “Trojan Horse” in the West’s proposal can only be understood now by analyzing the Helsinki Pact, as well as the experience of the defeats of the USSR and modern Russia. Such an analysis is undoubtedly necessary, since we are still “grazing” that “Trojan Horse”, although foreign warriors continue to parachute from it - now these are warriors of the “Orange Revolutions”.

An analysis of the Helsinki Agreements and their prerequisites shows that the Soviet Union took this step for pragmatic reasons. The first “basket” of the Helsinki Agreements provided for the inviolability of the borders that existed at that time in Europe. The Soviet Union, it seemed to him, had the opportunity to perpetuate the gains of 1945 not only de facto (thanks to the superiority of conventional armed forces in Europe, this task seemed to be solved forever), but also de jure. In return, the requirements for the “third basket”, which were not very clear to Soviet officials at the time, were accepted - the free movement of people across borders, the dissemination of foreign press and audio information, the right of nations to self-determination.

The “first basket” contained so many pleasant things (primarily the recognition of the GDR as a full-fledged state) that, in the end, Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues decided to swallow the obscure humanitarian makeweight from the “third basket.” It seemed that the game was worth the candle, especially since the Soviet Union sabotaged and minimized the demands of the “third basket” with all its might almost until its death.

Foreign press for the broad Soviet masses was limited to the communist Morning Star and L'Humanité, permission to travel was required until 1989, and foreign broadcasting in Russian was jammed until 1987. It was necessary, however, to allow Soviet citizens to marry foreigners, as well as to reunite families separated by borders (there were separate sections about this in the Helsinki Final Act). But even this deviation from Stalin’s family policy (under Stalin, marriages with foreigners were, as is known, prohibited) was surrounded by such humiliations that the damage seemed to be minimal.

And yet, as it is now becoming clear, the “third basket” outweighed the first, although many both in the Soviet bloc and in the West did not believe this. “Having taken the bait in 1975 in the form of recognition of borders in Europe, the Soviet leadership found itself on a hook from which it could no longer escape, and when Gorbachev agreed in the late 80s to discuss humanitarian issues at international summits along with disarmament and political issues, this the hook began to work with all its might.

Despite all attempts by the authorities in some Eastern Bloc countries to suppress the activities of human rights movements, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference became the most important document on the path to overcoming the division of the European continent. By taking the initiative to begin the process of détente, the Eastern European countries hoped, first of all, to achieve guarantees of their own territorial integrity, but it was this process that significantly contributed to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the period from 1975 to 1990.

As a result of the geostrategic changes that took place in Europe, the confrontation between East and West, which in the past repeatedly threatened to result in a third - already nuclear - conflict, ended. world war.

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Final Act The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became a kind of high point of a period in the history of international relations, which was called “Détente of International Tension” or simply “Détente”. The act, concluded by 35 states, established the principles of peaceful and humane international order in Europe. However, in practice, some of the provisions of the Act were not observed, and in 1979, “Détente” gave way to a new round of the “Cold War.”

In the 60s The international situation was changing significantly. Both superpowers faced great difficulties that forced them to move from the Cold War to establishing more peaceful relations, to a policy of détente (abbreviated as Détente).
The position of the USSR was weakened by the split in the international communist movement associated with the Soviet-Chinese conflict.
The situation in capitalist countries was even more difficult. The United States is bogged down in a war in Indochina. In 1968, a wave of mass popular protests swept across Western countries. In 1969, an economic crisis began, and in 1971, a crisis in the currency system.
In the mid-70s. an approximate parity of strategic nuclear forces between the USSR and the USA. Further arms race was becoming pointless.
In conditions of international instability, confrontation between the superpowers was increasingly dangerous for them. Both sides began to look for opportunities for rapprochement. To begin with, the powers that possessed nuclear weapons agreed to limit their proliferation. It should not have freely passed into the hands of other states. On July 1, 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. The countries of the “atomic club” (that is, those who had atomic and nuclear weapons, the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and China) pledged not to transfer to other countries technologies that could be used to create atomic weapons. Most countries in the world have pledged not to proliferate atomic weapons.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the first sign that the USSR and the USA were ready to agree on limiting the “arms race”. The period of “détente,” a pause in the Cold War, began.
The USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 somewhat delayed the start of the "détente" process, but already in November 1969, negotiations began between the USSR and the USA on strategic (i.e. nuclear) arms limitation (SALT). At the same time, several treaties limiting the “arms race” were prepared and signed, for example, the treaty banning the placement of nuclear weapons on the bottom of the seas and oceans, and on measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
Taking advantage of the conflict between China and the USSR, the United States normalized its relations with China. In February 1972, President Nixon came to China. The long-standing confrontation between the United States and China ceased, while hostile relations between the USSR and China continued.
On May 22, 1972, Nixon arrived in Moscow and met with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev. During the visit, which lasted until May 30, several important documents were signed. In the statement “On the fundamentals of relations between the two countries,” the parties renounced the use of force and admitted that they do not seek to destroy each other. This meant a virtual rejection of the idea of ​​the communist movement to eliminate capitalism and the desire of Western politicians to eliminate the socialist system. The leaders of the two countries agreed on a freeze strategic weapons at the levels at which they were in 1972 (SALT I Treaty). The USSR and the USA pledged not to create systems missile defense(BMD), because the emergence of protection against nuclear weapons on one side increases the temptation to use nuclear missiles against the other. The superpowers decided to use space only for peaceful purposes. These agreements were a decisive step towards a world that would not be threatened with destruction by nuclear fire. But Nixon and Brezhnev did not stop there. In June 1973, during Brezhnev's return visit to the United States, the two leaders agreed to begin negotiations on the SALT II treaty, which was supposed to bring the arms levels of both countries to equality. After Nixon's resignation from the presidency of the United States in 1974, his policy was continued by President D. Ford.
“Détente” concerned relations not only between the USSR and the USA. The political climate in Europe has also changed. Back in 1966, Social Democrat W. Brandt, who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, proclaimed the “Ostpolitik”, aimed at normalizing relations between the “two Germanys”. On September 3, 1971, an agreement was concluded between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France, resolving international disputes about West Berlin.
In July 1973, at the initiative of the superpowers, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began, which was supposed to resolve all international problems in Europe that arose during the Cold War. The meeting was attended by representatives of almost all European countries, as well as the USA and Canada.
On August 1, 1975, the heads of these states, meeting in Helsinki, solemnly signed the Final Act of the meeting. It was a moment of triumph of the policy of peace, peaceful and good neighborly coexistence of countries with different social order.
The Act addressed a wide range of international issues, including trade, industrial cooperation, cooperation in science and technology, environmental protection, cultural and interpersonal relations.
The states that signed the Act pledged to “respect each other’s sovereign equality and identity”… “each other’s right freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to establish their own laws and administrative regulations.”
An important provision that remains relevant today was that “borders may be changed, in accordance with international law, peacefully and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to union treaties; they also have the right to neutrality”...
The participating States promised to refrain in international relations "from the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with this Declaration."
“The participating States regard as inviolable all of each other's borders, as well as the borders of all states in Europe, and will therefore refrain now and in the future from any encroachment on these borders.
They will accordingly also refrain from any demands or actions aimed at the seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.”
Chapter VII was specifically devoted to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, participating States will act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
There was a contradiction between the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and guarantees of civil rights - after all, in order to guarantee rights, it was necessary to intervene in the affairs of countries that violate them.
In those countries where civil rights were violated, they continued to be violated, and attempts by other states to criticize the internal policies of governments that violated human rights were declared interference in internal affairs. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Agreement. In some countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, public Helsinki groups emerged that exposed violations of human rights agreements on the territory of socialist countries. Members of these groups were persecuted by the authorities, and in the early 80s. most of them were destroyed.
During the period of “Détente”, connections between the “two worlds” significantly expanded. Their symbols were the hockey matches between the USSR and Canada in 1972, the Soyuz-Apollo space program, when the Soviet and American docking took place in 1975 spaceship. The Final Act was intended to ensure increased cultural cooperation between countries and people.
The act became the apogee of “Détente”, after which relations between the USSR and the USA began to gradually deteriorate.
After the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 1972, negotiations continued on more stringent limits. However, in 1977-1978. The negotiation process gradually slowed down. The American administration of D. Carter criticized human rights violations in the USSR. The slowdown in Soviet-American negotiations was intensified by different approaches to the pace of arms reduction and conflicts in the Third World.
As a result, time was lost, and it was possible to agree on a new SALT treaty only at the end of the Carter administration, which made ratification of the agreement difficult under the new President R. Reagan.
The SALT II Treaty, signed during the meeting between Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna on June 18, 1979, consolidated the existing parity of strategic arms. This treaty was the last major foreign policy success not only of the Carter administration, but also of the Brezhnev administration. However, SALT II was not ratified by the American Congress, and the US administration complied with its terms “voluntarily” until 1986 (it was concluded before 1985).
The SALT II Treaty limited the number of nuclear weapons of all types to 2,400. Several other restrictions were introduced, as well as a strict control mechanism.
An important shortcoming of SALT II was the lack of geographic regulation of the distribution of nuclear weapons. By maintaining the overall balance of nuclear weapons, the superpowers could achieve advantages in regions important to them. First of all, this concerned Europe. The unprecedented concentration of weapons here was a constant source of military danger.
In 1979, due to disputes over the deployment of two intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as well as the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Soviet-American relations deteriorated again, and “Détente” ended.

The act formalized de jure the results of the Second World War and created the legal basis for the European order of international relations in which we live. The document was signed by representatives of 35 states: the USA, Canada and all European countries except Albania.

In the novel Maleville, published in 1972, Robert Merle realistically depicted what happened after the global nuclear disaster (which happened at the author's will without any reason in April 1977).

During the years when work on Maleville was underway, the feeling of the approaching end of human history was in the air. The arsenals of superweapons accumulated in the USA and the USSR guaranteed the instant destruction of all life on Earth during the conflict between two military-political blocs aimed at each other in a long-term hostile confrontation. Such a conflict could break out at any moment due to another aggravation of relations, as a result of a provocation, or even due to an elementary technical failure in one or another link of the cumbersome military-political mechanisms.

The situation seemed hopeless not only to pessimistic authors of dystopias, but also to politicized ordinary people on both sides of the Iron Curtain that divided Europe and the entire planet.

However, Merle's future scenario, as we know, did not come true.

In the interval between the release of Maleville and the date of the nuclear blitz-Armageddon indicated in the novel, what came to be called “détente between East and West” occurred. The likelihood of a global cataclysm has sharply decreased thanks to the efforts of politicians who were able to find compromise solutions to a number of pressing international security problems.

Detente seemed like an unexpected gift of fate for the Soviet Union (the weakest in the global confrontation between the two superpowers), but its side effects significantly accelerated the collapse of the world socialist system.

Helsinki-75

The culmination of détente was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki.

It should be recognized that atomic weapons have brought us, living in today's Russia, considerable benefit, which allows us to some extent come to terms with the material costs, human losses and suffering that befell our people during many years of unequal competition with America in the production of mass media. destruction.

The States that signed the Final Act of this meeting on August 1, 1975, declared their determination to respect and apply to each of them with all other participating States, regardless of their political, economic and social systems, from their sizes, geographical location and the level of economic development, the following ten principles (which, with the light hand of journalists, soon began to be called the “ten commandments of European security”):

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
2. Non-use of force or threat of force.
3. Inviolability of borders.
4. Territorial integrity of states.
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes.
6. Non-interference in internal affairs.
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
8. Equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies.
9. Cooperation between states.
10. Conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law.

In addition, the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation declared their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the above principles.

By accepting paragraph 1 of the “commandments,” the United States of America and its European allies recognized the right to the existence of a socialist system and renounced their previous policy of “rejecting communism.”

While pledging not to interfere in other people's internal affairs (according to clause 6), Western countries at the same time retained certain levers of pressure on their eastern partners in accordance with the human rights clause 7.

The Soviet leaders agreed to endure the inconveniences associated with this point for the sake of the 3rd and 4th points, with the adoption of which the key task of the entire post-war policy of the USSR was solved: the existing de facto borders were finally recognized and the territorial changes carried out in Europe as a result of the Potsdam Conference were legally enshrined 1945.

The progressive public in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe expressed hopes that a fair and secure order in Europe would be built on the principles reflected in the text of the Final Act - the order that should have been created (but failed) immediately after the end of World War II.

Success dope for the doomed

The Helsinki Conference, organized at the initiative of the USSR, became the most significant triumph of Soviet foreign policy in the entire post-war period.

However, this triumph turned out to be for the Soviet Union and the entire socialist system something similar to a glass of an invigorating intoxicating drink offered to a hopelessly ill person. At first there was a state of euphoria from unprecedented success, then the processes of decomposition and decay sharply accelerated.

The socialist structure of the Soviet type, ideally suited for solving the problems of national survival in the extreme conditions of pre-war, war and post-war times, could not compete with democratic capitalism during the period of relatively peaceful coexistence of the two systems.

The first symptom of trouble in the socialist camp was the increase in dissident activity in the area from Berlin to Magadan. Internal opponents of socialism decided to irritate the authorities with reminders of the “seventh commandment” of the Final Act, which requires respect for human rights.

The Communist Party leaders somehow coped with this scourge. But in 1980, an entire socialist country, Poland, dissented.

In 1945, Stalin, at the Potsdam Conference, pushed through a formulation according to which the western border of Poland became a line drawn along the Oder and Neisse rivers (as if temporarily, until a full-fledged peace treaty was concluded).

Having received the ancient Polish lands seized by German princes in the 11th-13th centuries, the communist rulers of Poland could, without losing face in the eyes of their subjects, abandon the Western Belarusian and Western Ukrainian territories, which were transferred to the Soviet Union in 1939. The ancient dispute between the Slavs among themselves was thus closed at the expense of defeated Germany, which lost a quarter of its pre-war territory.

Soon after Potsdam, the United States and its allies refused to recognize the border lines drawn by Stalin's cartographers. Because of this refusal, freedom-loving Poles remained staunch allies of the USSR for several decades, even at times rebelling against their own communist rulers.

The need to maintain Soviet-Polish friendship “forever” disappeared after August 1, 1975, when all European countries, together with Canada and the United States, became guarantors of the inviolability of Polish borders and Polish territorial integrity.

The leaders of the Solidarity movement, which stirred up the whole of Poland in 1980, could, without fear for the fate of their beloved fatherland, come out with anti-communist and anti-Soviet slogans, causing storms of delight in all strata of Polish society.

A dangerous gap has opened up in the monolithic structure of the socialist camp. Cracks stretched from it in all directions: after the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and other socialist prisoners, who missed freedom, began to move.

The further development of such processes threatened to turn into a series of bloody revolutions and counter-revolutionary actions with the direct participation of Soviet security forces.

Fortunately for Eastern Europeans, the system of power of the CPSU in the Soviet Union itself after 1985 disintegrated in an accelerated perestroika mode. Demoralized by Gorbachev's policies, the communist leaders of Eastern Europe hastened to surrender without a fight to the mercy of the masses, gripped by the desire for freedom and democracy.

Much blood was shed only where the Communist parties did not depend on Moscow - in Romania and Yugoslavia.

Features of the newest European order

According to Robert Merle's post-historical chronicle, a handful of survivors of a nuclear holocaust are facing new disasters due to a self-proclaimed contender for power trying to impose his will on everyone else through deceit and force of arms.

Schengen has become the main innovation of the EU on the eve of the new century. After all, the European Union, as a unique association of European countries, combines the characteristics of an international organization and a state. Although all EU member countries are independent, they have the same rules for education, health care, pensions, judicial systems, etc. The laws of the European Union, and above all Schengen, apply in all EU countries.

In modern Europe, which has experienced the horror of balancing on the brink of a nuclear disaster, the will of the power that claims world hegemony is shamelessly imposed as the supreme law, prevailing over the hopelessly outdated Helsinki “commandments.”

The International Court of Justice in The Hague, as is known, recently decided by a majority vote (belonging to representatives of America and its allies) that Kosovo’s self-declaration of independence does not contradict the norms of international law.

The small Albanian predator provided some services to the American giant and, as a bonus, got the opportunity to torment his Slavic neighbors, who were deprived of the right to effectively defend themselves. Having legalized this practice, the Hague verdict fully revealed the essence of the order that is being formed in the neighborhood of Russia, but without its participation.

In the US-subordinate community of developed and developing countries, there is no place for the Helsinki equality of sovereignties. The sovereign rights of each state are recognized to the extent corresponding to the position of this state in the informal hierarchy, depending on its own resources of influence, as well as its proximity to the Washington super-sovereign.

There can be no talk of equal rights among nations. Those who are stronger (primarily long-time allies of the United States) feel confident. The weak (including all the recent inhabitants of the socialist camp), for the sake of comfort and safety, are trying in every possible way to play along, sing along and howl to the United States.

Interference in the internal affairs of those who do not have the strength to resist it is becoming common practice. Most often, human rights claims are used as a reason for such interference.

Meanwhile, the successful breach of Serbian territorial integrity in order to protect the rights of Kosovo Albanians could become an example to follow in the most unexpected places.

In Germany and Austria, demands are already being raised for the restoration of the rights of the Sudeten people, violated by the Czechs after the Second World War. And then, you see, it will be the turn of the Silesian, Pomeranian, Prussian, etc. people. With all the ensuing consequences for the Czech Republic, Poland and some other ex-socialist countries that have given up their sovereignty to the care of NATO and the European Union.

All this does not seem to affect the completely sovereign Russia, with its missiles, petrodollars and great power status inherited from the USSR and the Russian Empire.

But everything in the world is interconnected. And if a bell rings for someone in Europe, it will ring for us too. Hemingway, who had a good understanding of the destinies of people and nations, once spoke about this.

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Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(English) Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), also known as Helsinki final Act(English) Helsinki Final Act), Helsinki agreements(English) Helsinki Accords) or Helsinki declaration(English) Helsinki Declaration) - a document signed by the heads of 35 states in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, July 30 - August 1, 1975. The meeting was convened at the proposal (1965) of the socialist states parties to the Warsaw Pact.

Final Act

The text of the final act is available in many languages, and, in particular, in Russian.

Interstate agreements grouped into several sections:

in the international legal field: consolidation of the political and territorial results of the Second World War, outlining the principles of relations between the participating states, including the principle of the inviolability of borders; territorial integrity of states; non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states; in the military-political field: coordination of confidence-building measures in the military field (pre-notification of military exercises and major troop movements, presence of observers at military exercises); peaceful settlement of disputes; in the economic field: coordination of the main areas of cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology and environmental protection; in the humanitarian field: harmonization of obligations on issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement, contacts, information, culture and education, the right to work, the right to education and health care.

http://ru. wikipedia. org/wiki/Final_Act of the Meeting on Security and Cooperation in Europe

MEETING ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

FINAL ACT

HELSINKI 1975

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in Helsinki on July 3, 1973

mindful about my general history and recognizing that the existence of common elements in their

traditions and values ​​can help them develop their relationships, and fulfilled desires

seek, taking fully into account the uniqueness and diversity of their positions and views,

opportunities to unite their efforts in order to overcome mistrust and strengthen trust,

resolve problems that divide them and cooperate in the interests of humanity;

recognizing indivisibility of security in Europe, as well as its common interest in

development of cooperation throughout Europe and among themselves, and expressing their intention to undertake

accordingly, efforts;

recognizing close connection between peace and security in Europe and the world as a whole and being aware

the need for each of them to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and

security and in promoting fundamental rights, economic and social progress and

the well-being of all peoples;

accepted the following:

a) Declaration of principles by which States Parties will

be guided in mutual relations

States Parties,

confirming its commitment to peace, security and justice and the process

development of friendly relations and cooperation;

recognizing that this commitment, reflecting the interests and aspirations of peoples, embodies for

each participating State's responsibility now and in the future, increased as a result

past experience;

confirming, in accordance with their membership in the United Nations and in

in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, its full and active

supporting the United Nations and enhancing its role and effectiveness in

strengthening international peace, security and justice and promoting solutions

international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and cooperation between

states;

expressing its general commitment to the principles set out below and which

are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations as well as their general will

to act, in the application of these principles, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter

United Nations;

declare about his determination to respect and apply in the relations of each of them with all

other participating States, regardless of their political, economic and social

systems, as well as their size, geographical location and level of economic development,

the following principles which are all of paramount importance and which they will

be guided in mutual relations:

I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and identity, and

all rights inherent in and covered by their sovereignty, which include, in particular,

the right of every state to legal equality, to territorial integrity, to freedom and

political independence. They will also respect each other's right to freely choose and

develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as law

establish their own laws and administrative rules.

own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory there are national minorities will

respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will

provide them with full opportunity to actually enjoy human rights and fundamental

freedoms and will thus protect their legitimate interests in this area.

The participating States recognize the universal importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

respect of which is an essential factor for peace, justice and prosperity,

necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation between them,

as well as between all states.

They will respect these rights and freedoms at all times in their mutual relations and will

make efforts, jointly and independently, including cooperation with the Organization

United Nations, in order to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of individuals to know their rights and responsibilities in this area and to act

in accordance with them.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in accordance with

in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They

will also fulfill their obligations as established in international declarations and

agreements in this area, including but not limited to the International Covenants on Human Rights, if

they are connected by them.

VIII. Equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies

The participating States will respect the equality and right of peoples to dispose of their

destiny, acting at all times in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and

relevant rules of international law, including those relating to

territorial integrity of states.

Based on the principle of equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destinies, all peoples

always have the right, in complete freedom, to determine, when and how they wish, their

internal and external political status without outside interference and to carry out in their own way

discretion of their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal importance of respect and effective

implementation of equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies for development

friendly relations between them, as well as between all states; they also remind

about the importance of eliminating any form of violation of this principle.

IX. Cooperation between states

The participating States will develop their cooperation with each other, as with all

states, in all fields, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Developing your

cooperation, the participating States will attach special meaning areas like them

determined within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and each of them

will contribute in full equality.

They will strive, by developing their cooperation as equals, to promote

mutual understanding and trust, friendly and good neighborly relations among themselves,

international peace, security and justice. They will equally strive

by developing their cooperation, improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the implementation of

life of their aspirations, taking advantage in particular of the benefits flowing from an expanding mutual

familiarization and their progress and achievements in economic, scientific, technical, social,

cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions

conducive to making these benefits available to everyone; they will take into account

interests of all in reducing differences in levels of economic development and, in particular, the interests

developing countries around the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and people can play

appropriate and positive role in helping to achieve these goals of their cooperation.

They will strive, by expanding their cooperation as defined above, to develop

closer relationships with each other for better and more solid foundation for the benefit of the peoples.

X. Conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law

The participating States will fulfill in good faith their obligations under

international law, as well as those obligations that arise from generally accepted principles and

rules of international law, as well as those obligations that arise from the relevant

international law of treaties or other agreements to which they are parties.

When implementing your sovereign rights, including the right to establish their own laws and

administrative rules, they will be consistent with their legal obligations

under international law; they will, in addition, take due account and implement

provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that, where the obligations of members

The United Nations, according to the Charter of the United Nations, will be in

conflict with their obligations under any treaty or other international

agreement, their obligations under the Charter, in accordance with Article

103 of the UN Charter.

All the principles stated above are of paramount importance and therefore__________ they

will be equally and strictly applied when interpreting each of them taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination to fully respect and apply these

principles as set forth in this Declaration, in all respects, to their mutual relations

and cooperation to ensure that each participating State benefits from

resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, having due regard to the principles set out above and, in

in particular, the first phrase of the tenth principle, “Faithful fulfillment of obligations under

international law", note that this Declaration does not affect their rights and

obligations, as well as relevant treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will

promote the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of cooperation

between them in all areas. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles

will contribute to the development of political contacts between them, which, in turn,

will contribute to a better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to carry out their relations with all

other States in the spirit of the principles set out in this Declaration.

b)Questions, related to the implementation of some

from principles, stated above

i) States- participants,

confirming that they will respect and implement the non-use of force clause

or threats of force, and convinced of the necessity of making it an effective law

international life,

declare what they will respect and fulfill in their relationships with each other, including

the following provisions, which are in accordance with the Declaration of Principles by which

The participating states will be guided in mutual relations by:

– To put into practice and express in all ways and in all forms that they deem

appropriate, the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in relationships

together.

– Refrain from any use of armed force incompatible with the objectives and

principles of the UN Charter and the provisions of the Declaration of Principles by which States

participants will be guided in mutual relations, against another state-

participant, especially from invasion or attack on its territory.

- Refrain from all manifestations of force for the purpose of coercing another state -

participant to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

– Refrain from any act of economic coercion aimed at subordination

its interests in the exercise by another State Party of the rights inherent in its

sovereignty, and thus ensuring advantages of any kind.

– Take effective measures that, by their scope and nature, are steps in

towards achieving eventual general and complete disarmament under strict and

effective international control.

– To promote, by all means which each of them may deem fit, the creation

atmosphere of trust and respect between peoples, consistent with their duty to refrain

from propaganda of aggressive wars or any use of force or threat of force,

incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration of Principles by which

participating states will be guided in mutual relations, against each other

State Party.

– Make every effort to resolve any disputes between them, continued

which could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe,

exclusively by peaceful means, and above all try to resolve disputes through

peaceful means specified in Article 33 of the UN Charter.

– Refrain from any actions that could impede a peaceful settlement

disputes between participating states.

ii) States- participants,

confirming ____________their determination to resolve their disputes as determined in principle

peaceful settlement of disputes;

convinced is that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to the non-use

force or threat of force, both of which are significant, although not

exceptional, to maintain and strengthen peace and security;

wanting strengthen and improve the means of peaceful

dispute resolution;

1. Determined to continue to consider and develop a generally acceptable method of peaceful

settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing funds, and for this purpose

work on the “Draft Convention for a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”,

presented by Switzerland at the second stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, as well as other proposals related to it and aimed at developing such

2. Decide that a meeting of experts will be convened at the invitation of Switzerland

all participating States for the purpose of fulfilling the task set out in paragraph 1, within the framework and subject to

following the procedures for next steps after the Meeting, as defined in the section “Next

steps after the meeting."

3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of representatives appointed by the ministers

Foreign Affairs of the participating States, planned in accordance with the section "Further

steps after the Meeting" for 1977; the results of this meeting of experts will be

submitted to governments.

Document on Confidence Building Measures and Some Aspects

security and disarmament

States- participants

wanting eliminate the causes of tension that may exist between them, and thus

contribute to strengthening peace and security in the world;

full of determination strengthen trust among themselves and thereby contribute to the strengthening

stability and security in Europe;

full of determination also to abstain in their mutual, as in general in their

international relations from the use or threat of force against territorial

integrity or political independence of any state, or any other

in a manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations and with the agreement adopted in this Final Act

Declaration of principles that will guide the participating States in mutual

relationships;

recognizing the need to help reduce the risk of armed conflict,

misunderstanding or incorrect assessment of military activities that could

raise concerns, in particular in circumstances where participating States lack clear and

timely information about the nature of such activities;

pay attention to considerations related to efforts to reduce

tensions and promotion of disarmament;

recognizing I believe that there will be an exchange of observers at military exercises by invitation

promote contacts and mutual understanding;

having studied issue of advance notification of major troop movements

in relation to confidence building;

recognizing that there are other means by which individual States can

further contribute to the achievement of their common goals;

convinced in the political importance of advance notification of major military

exercises to promote mutual understanding and build trust, stability and security;

taking the responsibility of each of them to promote these goals and

carry out this measure in accordance with the agreed criteria and conditions, which is essential

to achieve these goals;

recognizing, that this measure, resulting from political decision, relies on voluntary

adopted the following:

Advance notice of major military exercises

They will notify all other participating states of their major military exercises

through normal diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notifications will be given about major military exercises of the ground forces of the general

numbering more than people, carried out independently or jointly with any

possible air or naval components (in this context the word

"troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In case of independent exercises

amphibious or airborne forces, or joint exercises in which they participate, these

troops will also be included in this number. Notices may also be given in the event

joint exercises that do not reach the above number, but in which

ground forces along with a significant number of amphibious or airborne

troops or both.

Notifications will be given of major military exercises taking place in Europe at

territory of any State Party and, if applicable, in adjacent

sea ​​area and airspace.

In the event that the territory of a Member State extends beyond Europe,

advance notice should only be given for exercises that are conducted within

250 km from its border facing any other European Member State

or common with it, however, it is not necessary for the State Party to give notice in

case where this area is also adjacent to its border facing non-European

non-participating state or common with it.

Notifications will be provided 21 days or more prior to the start of the exercise or at the earliest

possible before its start date if the exercise is scheduled in a shorter period of time.

The notice will contain information about the name, if one is assigned,

the overall purpose of the exercise, the states participating in it, the type or types and number of participants

troops, area and expected date of its implementation. The participating States will also, if

may provide relevant additional information, in particular such

which concerns the components of the forces involved and the timing of the deployment of these forces.

Advance notice of other military exercises

The participating States recognize that they can contribute to further strengthening

confidence and strengthening security and stability and for this purpose may also notify

smaller-scale military exercises, other participating States, especially those

located near the area where such exercises are taking place.

For the same purpose, States Parties also recognize that they may notify others

military exercises conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating States will invite other participating States, in a voluntary

orderly and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all states -

participants, send observers to attend military exercises.

The inviting state will determine in each case the number of observers

the terms and conditions of their participation and provide such other information as it may consider

useful. It will provide appropriate conditions and hospitality.

The invitation will be sent through normal diplomatic channels to the extent

as far in advance as possible.

Advance notice of major troop movements

participating States have examined the issue of advance notification of major movements

troops as a confidence-building measure.

Accordingly, the participating States acknowledge that they may, in their own

discretion and to promote confidence, notify major movements

of their troops.

In the same spirit, the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe will undertake further consideration of the issue of pre-notification

major troop movements, bearing in mind in particular the experience gained during

implementation of the measures that are set out in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which

promote their common goals.

In particular, they will be with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding

facilitate exchanges by invitation between military personnel, including military visits

delegations.

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common goal of confidence-building, States

participants, carrying out their military activities in the area covered by the provisions of the

advance notice of major military exercises will be given due consideration

attention and respect for this goal.

They also recognize that the experience gained through the implementation of the provisions

outlined above, together with subsequent efforts, could lead to the development and expansion of measures

aimed at strengthening trust.

Issues related to disarmament

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at

In October 1964, the leadership of the USSR changed. The unity of the socialist camp was broken, relations between East and West were very strained due to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition, the German problem remained unresolved, which greatly worried the leadership of the USSR. Under these conditions, the modern history of the Soviet state began. The decisions adopted at the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the focus on a more stringent foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence from that moment was subordinated to a qualitatively different trend to strengthen the socialist regime and strengthen solidarity between the national liberation movement and the proletariat.

Complexity of the situation

The restoration of absolute control in the socialist camp was complicated by tense relations with China and Cuba. Events in Czechoslovakia caused problems. In June 1967, a congress of writers openly opposed the party leadership here. After this, mass student strikes and demonstrations began. As a result of the strengthening of the opposition, Novotny had to cede leadership of the party to Dubcek in 1968. The new board decided to carry out a number of reforms. In particular, freedom of speech was established, and the HRC agreed to hold alternative elections of leaders. However, the situation was resolved by the entry of troops from 5 participating states. It was not possible to suppress the unrest immediately. This forced the USSR leadership to remove Dubcek and his entourage, placing Husak at the head of the party. Using the example of Czechoslovakia, the so-called principle of “limited sovereignty” was implemented. The suppression of reforms stopped the country's modernization for at least 20 years. In 1970, the situation in Poland also became more complicated. The problems were related to rising prices, which caused massive worker uprisings in the Baltic ports. Over the following years, the situation did not improve, and strikes continued. The leader of the unrest was the Solidarity trade union, led by L. Walesa. The leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops, and the “normalization” of the situation was entrusted to the general. Jaruzelski. On December 13, 1981, he introduced martial law in Poland.

Relieving Tension

In the early 70s. relations between East and West have changed dramatically. The tension began to ease. This was largely due to the achievement of military parity between the USSR and the USA, East and West. At the first stage, interested cooperation was established between the Soviet Union and France, and then with Germany. At the turn of the 60-70s. The Soviet leadership began to actively implement a new foreign policy course. Its key provisions were recorded in the Peace Program, which was adopted at the 24th Party Congress. To the most important points It should also be noted that neither the West nor the USSR abandoned the arms race within the framework of this policy. The whole process acquired a civilized framework. Recent history relations between the West and the East began with a significant expansion of areas of cooperation, mainly Soviet-American. In addition, relations between the USSR and Germany and France improved. The latter withdrew from NATO in 1966, which served as a catalyst for the active development of cooperation.

German problem

To resolve it, the USSR hoped to receive mediation assistance from France. However, it was not required, since Social Democrat V. Brandt became chancellor. The essence of his policy was that the unification of German territory no longer acted as a prerequisite for the establishment of relations between East and West. It was postponed until future period as a key goal of multilateral negotiations. Thanks to this, the Moscow Treaty was concluded on August 12, 1970. In accordance with it, the parties pledged to respect the integrity of all European countries within their actual borders. Germany, in particular, recognized the western borders of Poland. And a line with the GDR. An important stage was also the signing in the fall of 1971 of a quadripartite agreement on the West. Berlin. This agreement confirmed the groundlessness of the political and territorial claims against it by the Federal Republic of Germany. This was an absolute victory for the USSR, since all the conditions that the Soviet Union had insisted on since 1945 were fulfilled.

Assessing America's Position

A completely favorable development of events allowed the leadership of the USSR to strengthen the opinion that in the international arena there had been a radical shift in the balance of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. And the states of the socialist camp. The position of America and the imperialist bloc was assessed by Moscow as “weak.” This confidence was based on several factors. The key circumstances were the continued strengthening of the national liberation movement, as well as the achievement of military-strategic parity with America in 1969 in terms of the number of nuclear warheads. In accordance with this, the buildup of types of weapons and their improvement, according to the logic of the leaders of the USSR, acted as an integral part of the struggle for peace.

OSV-1 and OSV-2

The need to achieve parity has given relevance to the issue of bilateral limitation of weapons, especially ballistic ones. intercontinental missiles. Great importance Nixon's visit to Moscow in the spring of 1972 was part of this process. On May 26, an Interim Agreement was signed defining restrictive measures regarding strategic weapons. This treaty was called SALT-1. He was imprisoned for 5 years. The agreement limited the number of US and USSR ballistic intercontinental missiles launched from submarines. Acceptable levels for the Soviet Union were higher, since America had weapons carrying multiple warheads. At the same time, the number of charges themselves was not specified in the agreement. This made it possible, without violating the agreement, to achieve a unilateral advantage in this area. SALT I, therefore, did not stop the arms race. The formation of a system of agreements continued in 1974. L. Brezhnev and J. Ford managed to agree on new conditions for limiting strategic arms. The SALT-2 agreement was supposed to be signed in 1977. However, this did not happen due to the creation in the United States of “cruise missiles” - new weapons. America categorically refused to take into account the maximum levels in relation to them. In 1979, the treaty was nevertheless signed by Brezhnev and Carter, but the US Congress did not ratify it until 1989.

Results of the policy of détente

Over the years of implementation of the Peace Program, serious progress has been made in cooperation between East and West. The total volume of trade turnover increased by 5 times, and the Soviet-American one by 8. The interaction strategy boiled down to signing large contracts with Western companies for the purchase of technology or the construction of factories. So at the turn of the 60-70s. VAZ was created as part of an agreement with the Italian corporation Fiat. But this event is more likely to be considered an exception than a rule. International programs were mostly limited to unnecessary delegation trips. The import of foreign technologies was carried out according to an ill-conceived scheme. Really fruitful cooperation was negatively affected by administrative and bureaucratic obstacles. As a result, many contracts did not live up to expectations.

Helsinki process 1975

The detente in relations between East and West, however, bore fruit. It made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first consultations took place in 1972-1973. Finland became the host country of the CSCE. states) became the center of discussion international situation. Foreign ministers gathered for the first consultations. The first stage took place from July 3 to July 7, 1973. Geneva became the venue for the next round of negotiations. The second stage took place from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975. It involved several tours lasting 3-6 months. Negotiations at them were conducted by delegates and experts nominated by the participating countries. The second stage involved the development and subsequent approval of agreements on the items on the agenda of the general meeting. The third round venue was once again Finland. Helsinki hosted top government and political leaders.

Negotiators

The Helsinki Accords were discussed:

• Gene. Secretary Brezhnev.
• President of America J. Ford.
• Federal Chancellor of Germany Schmidt.
• French President V. Giscard d'Estaing.
• British Prime Minister Wilson.
• President of Czechoslovakia Husak.
• First Secretary of the SED Central Committee Honecker.
• Chairman of the State Council Zhivkov.
• First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Socialist Workers' Party Kadar and others.

The meeting on security and cooperation in Europe was held with the participation of representatives of 35 states, including officials from Canada and the United States.

Accepted documents

The participating countries approved the Helsinki Declaration. In accordance with it, the following were proclaimed:

• The inviolability of state borders.
• Mutual refusal to use force when resolving conflicts.
• Non-interference in the internal politics of member states.
• Respect for human rights and other provisions.

In addition, the heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It contained agreements to be executed as a whole. The main directions recorded in the document were:

Key principles

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe included 10 provisions in accordance with which the norms of interaction were determined:

1. Sovereign equality.
2. Non-use of force or threat of its use.
3. Respect for sovereign rights.
4. Territorial integrity.
5. Inviolability of borders.
6. Respect for freedoms and human rights.
7. Non-interference in domestic politics.
8. Equality of peoples and their right to independently control their own destinies.
9. Interaction between countries.
10. Fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Helsinki Final Act acted as a guarantee of recognition and inviolability of post-war borders. This was beneficial primarily to the USSR. In addition, the Helsinki Process made it possible to formulate and impose obligations on all participating countries to strictly observe freedoms and human rights.

Short term consequences

What prospects did the Helsinki process open up? The date of its holding is considered by historians to be the apogee of detente in the international arena. The USSR was most interested in the issue of post-war borders. For the Soviet leadership, it was extremely important to achieve recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders and the territorial integrity of countries, which meant international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. All this happened as part of a compromise. The issue of human rights is a problem that interested those who visited the Helsinki process. The year of the CSCE became the starting point for development in the USSR. International legal recognition of the obligation to respect human rights made it possible to launch a campaign to protect them in the Soviet Union, which was actively carried out by Western states at that time.

It is worth saying that since 1973, separate negotiations have taken place between representatives of the Warsaw Pact member countries and NATO. The issue of arms reduction was discussed. But the expected success was never achieved. This was due to the tough position of the Warsaw Pact states, which were superior to NATO in conventional types of weapons and did not want to reduce them.

Military-strategic balance

The Helsinki process ended in a compromise. After the signing of the final document, the USSR began to feel like a master and began installing SS-20 missiles, which had a medium range, in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Restrictions on them were not provided for under the SALT agreements. As part of the campaign aimed at protecting human rights, which has sharply intensified in Western countries After the Helsinki process ended, the position of the Soviet Union became very tough. Accordingly, the United States took a number of retaliatory measures. After refusing to ratify SALT II in the early 1980s, America stationed missiles (Pershing and cruise missiles) in Western Europe. They could reach the territory of the USSR. As a result, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs.

Long term consequences

The arms race had a rather negative impact on the economic state of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The parity with the United States, achieved before the Helsinki process began, primarily concerned ballistic intercontinental missiles. Since the late 70s. the general crisis began to negatively affect the defense industries. The USSR gradually began to lag behind in some types of weapons. This became clear after America's "cruise missiles" appeared. The lag became more obvious after the development of the “strategic” program began defense initiative" in USA.