Major accidents on submarines in the USSR and Russia. To solve the “mystery of the sunken submarine”

November 8, 2008 occurred during factory sea trials in the Sea of ​​Japan, built at the Amur Shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and not yet accepted into the Russian Navy. As a result of the unauthorized activation of the LOX (boat volumetric chemical) fire extinguishing system, freon gas began to flow into the boat compartments. 20 people died, another 21 people were hospitalized with poisoning. In total, there were 208 people on board the submarine.

August 30, 2003 in the Barents Sea while towing to the city of Polyarny for disposal. There were ten members of the mooring crew on board the submarine, nine of them died, one was rescued.
During a storm, with the help of which the K‑159 was towed. The disaster occurred three miles northwest of Kildin Island in the Barents Sea at a depth of 170 meters. On nuclear submarine the reactor was in a safe condition.

August 12, 2000 during naval exercises of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea. The disaster occurred 175 kilometers from Severomorsk, at a depth of 108 meters. All 118 crew members on board were killed.
According to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Kursk was inside the fourth torpedo tube, which resulted in the explosion of the remaining torpedoes located in the first compartment of the APRK.

April 7, 1989 upon returning from combat service in the Norwegian Sea in the area of ​​Bear Island. As a result of a fire in two adjacent compartments of K‑278, the main ballast tank systems were destroyed, through which the submarine was flooded with sea water. 42 people died, many from hypothermia.
27 crew members.

© Photo: public domain Nuclear submarine K‑278 "Komsomolets"

October 6, 1986 in the area of ​​Bermuda in the Sargasso Sea (Atlantic Ocean) at a depth of about 5.5 thousand meters. On the morning of October 3, an explosion occurred in a missile silo on board the submarine, and then a fire started that lasted for three days. The crew did everything possible to prevent a nuclear explosion and a radiation disaster, but they were unable to save the ship. Four people died on board the submarine. The surviving crew members were lifted onto the Russian ships "Krasnogvardeysk" and "Anatoly Vasilyev", which came to the aid of the submarine in distress.

© public domain

© public domain

June 24, 1983 4.5 miles from the coast of Kamchatka, the nuclear submarine K‑429 from the Pacific Fleet sank during a dive. K‑429 was urgently sent from repair to torpedo firing without checking for leaks and with a prefabricated crew (some of the staff were on vacation, the replacement was not prepared). During the dive, the fourth compartment flooded through the ventilation system. The boat lay on the ground at a depth of 40 meters. When trying to blow out the main ballast, due to the open ventilation valves of the main ballast tank, most of the air went overboard.
As a result of the disaster, 16 people died, the remaining 104 were able to reach the surface through the nasal torpedo tubes and the aft emergency hatch shaft.

October 21, 1981 diesel submarine S-178, returning to base after a two-day trip to sea, in the waters of Vladivostok with a transport refrigerator. Having received a hole, the submarine took on about 130 tons of water, lost buoyancy and went under water, sinking at a depth of 31 meters. As a result of the disaster, 32 submariners were killed.

June 13, 1973 occurred in Peter the Great Gulf (Sea of ​​Japan). The boat was on the surface heading to the base at night after performing firing exercises. "Akademik Berg" hit "K-56" on the starboard side, at the junction of the first and second compartments, making a huge hole in the hull into which water began to flow. The submarine was saved from destruction at the cost of their lives by the personnel of the second emergency compartment, who battened down the bulkhead between the compartments. The accident killed 27 people. About 140 sailors survived.

February 24, 1972 when returning to base from combat patrol.
At this time, the boat was in the North Atlantic Ocean at a depth of 120 meters. Thanks to the selfless actions of the crew, K‑19 surfaced. Navy ships and vessels took part in the rescue operation. In conditions of a severe storm, it was possible to evacuate most of the K-19 crew, supply electricity to the boat and tow it to the base. As a result of the boat accident, 28 sailors were killed, two more died during the rescue operation.

April 12, 1970 in the Bay of Biscay of the Atlantic Ocean, which led to the loss of buoyancy and longitudinal stability.
The fire started on April 8 almost simultaneously in two compartments, when the boat was at a depth of 120 meters. K-8 floated to the surface, the crew courageously fought for the survivability of the boat. On the night of April 10-11, three ships arrived in the accident area Navy USSR, but due to a storm, it was not possible to take the submarine into tow. Part of the submarine’s personnel was transported to the Kasimov ship, and 22 people, led by the commander, remained on board the K-8 to continue the fight for the survivability of the ship. But on April 12, the submarine sank at a depth of more than 4,000 meters. 52 crew members were killed.

May 24, 1968 occurred, which had two liquid metal coolant reactors. As a result of a violation of heat removal from the core, overheating and destruction of fuel elements in one of the submarine’s reactors occurred. All the boat's mechanisms were taken out of action and mothballed.
During the accident, nine people were injured lethal doses radioactive exposure.

March 8, 1968 from the Pacific Fleet. The submarine carried military service in the Hawaiian Islands, and since March 8 she has stopped communicating. According to various sources, there were from 96 to 98 crew members on board the K-129, all of them died. The cause of the disaster is unknown. Subsequently, the Americans discovered K-129 and recovered it in 1974.

September 8, 1967 In the Norwegian Sea, on the submarine K-3 Leninsky Komsomol, a fire occurred in two compartments while underwater, which was localized and extinguished by sealing the emergency compartments. 39 crew members were killed. The submarine returned to base under its own power.

January 11, 1962 at the Northern Fleet naval base in the city of Polyarny. A fire started on the submarine standing at the pier, followed by an explosion of torpedo ammunition. The bow of the boat was torn off, the debris scattered over a radius of more than a kilometer.
The nearby S-350 submarine suffered significant damage. As a result of the emergency, 78 sailors were killed (not only from the B-37, but also from four other submarines, as well as from the reserve crew). There were also casualties among the civilian population of the city of Polyarny.

July 4, 1961 during the Arctic Circle ocean exercises, the main power plant. A pipe in the cooling system of one of the reactors burst, causing a radiation leak.
For an hour and a half, the submariners repaired the emergency cooling system of the reactor without protective suits, with their bare hands, and wearing military gas masks. The crew members said the ship remained afloat and was towed to base.
From the received doses of radiation in a few days.

January 27, 1961 The diesel submarine S-80, part of the Northern Fleet, sank in the Barents Sea. On January 25, she went to sea for several days to practice improving the tasks of solo navigation, and on January 27, radio contact with her was interrupted. The S-80 did not return to the base in Polyarny. The search operation yielded no results. S‑80 was found only in 1968, and was later raised from the bottom of the sea. The cause of the accident was the flow of water through the valve of the RDP (a retractable device of a submarine for supplying atmospheric air to its diesel compartment during the periscope position of the submarine and removing diesel exhaust gases). The entire crew died - 68 people.

September 26, 1957 in the Tallinn Bay of the Baltic Sea from the Baltic Fleet.
A fire broke out on a submarine that was measuring underwater speeds on a measuring line at the training ground of the Tallinn naval base. Having surfaced from a depth of 70 meters, M‑256 anchored. The crew, brought to the upper deck due to heavy gas pollution in the interior, did not stop fighting for the survivability of the boat. 3 hours 48 minutes after surfacing, the submarine suddenly sank to the bottom. Most of the crew died: out of 42 submariners, seven sailors survived.

November 21, 1956 Not far from Tallinn (Estonia), the M-200 diesel submarine from the Baltic Fleet sank as a result of a collision with the destroyer Statny. Six people were immediately rescued from the water. As a result of the accident, 28 sailors were killed.

In December 1952 The diesel-electric submarine S-117 from the Pacific Fleet was lost in the Sea of ​​Japan. The boat was supposed to take part in the exercises. On the way to the maneuver area, its commander reported that due to a breakdown of the right diesel engine, the submarine was going to the designated point on one engine. A few hours later he reported that the problem had been fixed. The boat never made contact again. The exact cause and place of death of the submarine are unknown.
There were 52 crew members on board the boat, including 12 officers.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Post-war losses of the USSR submarine fleet
After the end of the Second World War, a new confrontation began - the Cold War. The guns did not fire, the planes did not bomb the enemy, and the ships did not exchange artillery and rocket salvoes, but this did not protect against losses involving dozens of human lives. And one of the most big losses submarine sailors suffered on the fronts of the Cold War.

In the post-war period, the Soviet fleet lost nine boats, including three nuclear-powered ones. In addition, many boats were seriously damaged, and the nuclear-powered K-429 sank, but was subsequently raised and put back into operation. At first, the destruction of submarines in the USSR concerned only diesel submarines. Between 1952 and 1968, six boats died from various causes, including one at the base, and several more boats were damaged in the explosion. A total of 357 people died. Accidents also occurred on nuclear boats during this period, but all of them were accomplished without “irretrievable losses” in technology.

The sunken submarines of the USSR belonged to different fleets: two boats each from the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets. On April 12, 1970, the Soviet nuclear submarine K-8 was lost, on board of which there was a fire during a military campaign. It was fires that became the main problem of Soviet submariners, regularly breaking out on boats of various projects. The crew fought the fire for four days, but were unable to save the boat, and the flames “took” the lives of 52 crew members.

The next year, it was a miracle that she didn’t die. nuclear boat K-56, which received a hole as a result of a collision with the scientific vessel Akademik Berg. The accident cost the lives of 27 sailors who battened down the compartment and saved the lives of others. This was followed by a long period of calm. The largest number of sunken submarines of the USSR occurred in the 80s, marked by glasnost and perestroika. And if the death of the diesel boat S-178 on October 21, 1981 did not cause a resonance (collision with a cargo ship), then the death of the nuclear-powered K-219 in October 1986 had great publicity. For three days in the Sargasso Sea, the crew fought the fire, but the boat could not be saved. Fortunately, only four people died.

In the interval between the two accidents, on June 24, 1983, the K-429, which went out for testing after repairs, sank. As a result, the boat took on water during the dive, and incorrect actions by the crew led to the boat sinking to the bottom. 104 people made it to the surface, and another 16 died. The boat was later raised and returned to service.

But the most famous death of a submarine in the USSR occurred on April 7, 1989, when, as a result of a fire and subsequent flooding, the newest submarine “Komsomolets”, returning from combat duty, sank. 42 sailors were killed in the accident. It is worth noting that the death of submarines in the USSR occurred much more often than in the United States, which lost only two of its nuclear submarines.

There were also losses in Russian time. And if the K-159 towed for scrapping cannot be considered a full-fledged combat boat, then the death on August 12, 2000 of the Project 945A nuclear submarine cruiser Kursk was a real tragedy, which led to the death of 118 submariners.

Finally, we note that sunken submarines of the USSR are located in all parts of the world, from their native shores to Sargasso Sea, Hawaii and the Bay of Biscay, indicating the location of the Cold War front lines.

Not long ago, a film called “The Tragedy of the Submarine K-129” was released on Russian screens. The film was positioned as a documentary film and told about the sad events that occurred in March 1968. "Project Azorian" - that's what they call it secret operation, which later came to be considered one of the most unpleasant events of the Cold War. Just then, the United States Navy recovered the sunken Soviet submarine K-129 from the bottom of the ocean.

In the twentieth century, the loss of submarines was perhaps not uncommon. In the northern part of the Pacific Ocean lies the remains of the most famous submarine in history. For a long time information about these events was kept secret, even the exact place where she sank was kept silent. Just think: a huge nuclear submarine ceased to exist, taking the lives of ninety-eight Soviet officers.

American intelligence agencies, having the most innovative equipment, were able to find and examine the boat in the first two weeks after the incident. And in August 1974, K-129 was pulled from the bottom.

Background

1968 had just begun; it was a frosty February. There were no signs of trouble, and besides, the upcoming mission was supposed to go completely calmly and without incident. Then, from a military base on the shores of Kamchatka, the submarine K-129 set off on its last voyage with the function of patrolling borders. Three ballistic missiles, a pair of nuclear-powered torpedoes - the submarine was very powerful, and the crew was experienced and active. The submarine cruiser was commanded by V. I. Kobzar, captain of the first rank. This man was distinguished by endurance, vast experience and a serious attitude to business.

It should be said that by the time of departure I had practically no time to rest after a long journey across the vastness of the World Ocean. The submarine arrived in the town with the unusual name Olenya Guba quite recently. The thorough repairs that should have been done were not carried out, and the crew was in a depressed state, not having had time to properly rest after a long and grueling voyage. But there was no choice, all the other submarines turned out to be even more unprepared for the mission, so the K-129 command did not ask unnecessary questions, but simply went to patrol the borders. In addition, the submarine was equipped with a D-4 missile system, which meant that it was superior to other ships. By the way, many officers from the crew had already been released on leave, some even dispersed across Russia, heading home on leave. The commander was unable to assemble a full team. But, as we understand, the very people who did not show up for the training camp literally saved their lives.

Everything went wrong

There was nothing to do, we had to staff the crew using people serving on other ships, and also recruit newcomers for the responsible voyage. Everything went wrong from the very first days of training camp. It is noteworthy that the command of the military base did not even have a ready list of the crew, certified by the captain with the ship's seal, and yet V.I. Kobzar was known for his pedantry. They began to frantically search for the document in the papers when the tragedy happened, but found nothing. This is unheard of negligence, which simply could not happen in the navy! Olenya Guba was famous for the fact that professionals, the best in their field, served there. And yet…

On March 8, a short signal was supposed to come from the submarine to the base, since this was the turning point of the route, a completely standard procedure. But it did not follow, and on the same day the alarm was announced by the duty officers. I couldn't afford such a mistake.

Start of the search

K-129 did not make contact, so all efforts were thrown into searching for it; the entire Kamchatka flotilla, as well as aviation, were actively involved in search operations. The submarine showed no signs of life. After two weeks of fruitless work, the USSR Pacific Fleet realized that the ship was no more. At that moment, attracted by the noise on the radio, they became interested in what was happening and American troops. It was they who discovered an oily stain on the surface of the ocean waves. Analysis of this substance showed that it was indeed solar liquid that leaked from a Soviet submarine.

At that time, the news shocked the entire world community. Ninety-eight brave Soviet officers, experienced sailors, young people for whom this voyage was the first serious test in life, a good, well-equipped submarine K-129 - all of this died in one moment. It was not possible to establish the causes of the tragedy; the equipment to lift the boat from the bottom did not yet exist. Over time, all search efforts were curtailed, and the boat was forgotten for a while, deciding that, as in many cases when ships sank, the sea would become a mass grave for the crew. Lost submarines in the Pacific were not uncommon.

Versions of what happened

Of course, most current version What was happening at that time was the treachery of the American fleet. The emergence of these thoughts in society was also facilitated by the fact that the press disseminated information about an American ship with the sonorous name “Swordfish” - it was a ballistic missile submarine, which was also on duty at that time in Pacific waters. It would seem that nothing special: she was on duty - and even though it is the right of Americans to take care of their borders, it was only on March 8 that this ship also did not contact its base, and a couple of days later it showed up off the coast of Japan. There the crew disembarked for a while, and the submarine went to the repair docks, apparently there were some problems with it. This, you see, is also completely normal - anything could happen at sea, which is why she, perhaps, did not get in touch. But this is not the strange thing, but the fact that, according to some sources, the crew was forced to sign non-disclosure documents. In addition, this submarine subsequently did not go on missions for several years. The radical version of what happened says that the American submarine spied on the actions of the Soviet submarine and for some reason rammed its surveillance object. Perhaps this was how it was originally intended.

Of course, all this raised questions even then, but the American government explained the situation this way: due to negligence, their submarine collided with an iceberg. And everything would have been fine, but it happened in the central part of the Pacific Ocean, and icebergs are usually not found there, so the option of a collision with an ice block disappeared immediately, and in relation to K-129 too.

It is not possible to prove the involvement of Americans in the tragic events today; it may well be that all this is just speculation and a series of coincidences, but it is very strange that the most experienced crew, who had been on similar trips more than once, died so ingloriously.

Another version follows from the previous one. Based on it, we can assume that the crews of both submarines did not have bad intentions; an accident occurred: they collided underwater while patrolling the same territory. It’s hard to imagine something like this now, but in the twentieth century technology could well have failed.

In any case, the outcome of the events we are discussing is known: the Soviet diesel submarine ended up on the bottom in the North Pacific Ocean, twelve hundred miles away from the base in Kamchatka. The depth at which the submarine found itself was five thousand meters. The boat sank with an even keel. It’s scary to imagine how scary it was for the crew in a confined space filled with cold water, to realize imminent death.

Rise from the bottom

But one should not think that the authorities have completely forgotten about the sad event. After some time, it was precisely in order to lift the K-129 from the bottom of the ocean that two specialized ships were built. One of them was the very famous “Explorer”, and the second was the NSS-1 docking camera, according to the design, its bottom was retractable, and a huge mechanical “arm” was attached to the body, which more closely resembled pliers, the span of which was equal to the diameter K -129. If the reader got the impression that these were Soviet vehicles, then they were mistaken. This is wrong. These projects were developed and manufactured in the USA. The best specialists on the West and East coasts were involved in the design.

An interesting fact is that even in the final stages of assembling the devices, the engineers working on the design had no idea what exactly they were working on. But their work was well paid, so no one protested.

Start of operation

It is difficult to imagine the scale of the operation. Just for statistics: the special Explorer vessel looked like a huge floating platform, the displacement of which exceeded thirty-six tons. This platform was supplied with a remote-controlled thruster. Thanks to this, this device accurately found any given coordinate on the ocean floor, and then could stay strictly above it, the error was only ten centimeters. At the same time, this colossus did not have any difficulties with control.

And that's not all: the platform was equipped with a “well” in the center, surrounded by structures vaguely reminiscent of floating oil rigs; tubes made of a particularly strong alloy, each of which was twenty-five meters long; a set of various indicators, which, using special equipment, sank to the bottom. This type of ship had never existed before.

The operation was carried out covertly and consisted of three simple stages. Today, the information has been declassified, so it is possible to find information about those events in the public domain.

Stage 1 took place at the very beginning of the seventy-third year. At first, the equipment was prepared and tested for a long time; the operation was extremely risky, so there could be no mistakes. At the same time, a large international vessel specializing in oil production was used to move the special platform to the site. This ship did not raise any questions from passing ships. But this was just preparation.

Stage 2 is the second half of the year, now all the necessary technical devices and specialists have been transported to the scene of the accident. But this was not enough. Until that moment, such operations had never been carried out; getting a sunken submarine from the bottom of the ocean was considered something bordering on science fiction. During this period, training work was carried out.

Stage 3 - seventy-fourth year. At the very beginning of the year, a long-awaited rise occurs. All work was carried out in as soon as possible and did not cause any difficulties.

The Soviet government closely watched this square, since many things were suspicious, especially the fact that the international ship stood over the sunken K-129. In addition, the question arose: why is oil production carried out in the middle of the ocean at a depth of six kilometers? It’s not very logical, because usually drilling took place at a depth of two hundred meters, and several kilometers is unheard of. This ship, in turn, did not do anything suspicious, the work was carried out completely typical, the conversations on the radio waves also did not stand out as anything special, and after a month and a half, which is absolutely normal, it moved from the point and continued the planned course.

But in those days it was not customary to trust America, so I went to the scene of action reconnaissance group on a fast ship, this fact should not have been mentioned on the radio. Tracking was established, but it was not possible to thoroughly understand why the Americans were fussing so much, what exactly was happening here. The Americans noticed the tracking, but behaved as if nothing had happened, continuing to work. No one was hiding anything in particular, and the actions of both sides were very predictable. For a long time it seemed that American sailors were busy searching for oil, which, in fact, they had every right to do: these waters are neutral, underwater research is not prohibited. A week and a half later, the ship moved from the point and headed for the island of Oahu in Honolulu. The Christmas festivities were already approaching there, so it became obvious that surveillance in the future would not yield any results. In addition, the Soviet ship was already running out of fuel, and it was possible to refuel only in Vladivostok, which would take a couple of weeks.

It was decided to stop this initiative, relations with America were already strained, surveillance did not bring any results, and the deployment precisely over the place where the Soviet crew died could well have turned out to be an accident. At least officially the US did nothing wrong. Having sensed the government's mood, the local command stopped surveillance (as you understand, only at the second stage of the operation, and, who knows, perhaps this was the plan).

And, of course, no one in the USSR could even imagine that US ships were trying to raise a sunken boat; this really seemed impossible. Therefore, the skepticism of the authorities was understandable: what can the Americans do?

But the same American ship of unusual shape and enormous dimensions set off again for the ill-fated point after Christmas. Moreover, no one had ever seen this type of ship before. And this really seemed suspicious.

We must pay tribute to the American authorities: as soon as the K-129 submarine was delivered to the shores of the United States, all the bodies that were inside (six people in total) were buried at sea according to the ritual required for sailors; the Americans even played the USSR anthem at that moment. The burial was filmed on color film, which was sent to American intelligence agencies. At the same time, the behavior and attitude of the Americans towards the dead was extremely respectful. It is still unknown where the remaining members of the Soviet crew are, but, according to American data, they were not on the submarine. By the way, V.I. Kobzar was not among those reburied.

Cold War

By that time, the Soviet Union already knew about what was happening, new round diplomatic struggle between two giant states. The USSR was dissatisfied with the secret actions on the part of America and the fact that the diesel submarine was precisely Soviet, which means that the Americans did not have the right to remove it from the bottom. The United States assured that the death of the submarine was not recorded anywhere (this is true), which means that it is no one’s property, and the finder can do with it at his own discretion. In addition, to avoid further debate, the American side provided video footage of the reburial of Russian sailors. They were really buried with all respect and according to all the rules. Therefore, unnecessary questions from the Soviet side disappeared.

But it remains a mystery what actually happened to the submarine, why the Americans made so much effort to get it from the bottom of the ocean, why they did it all in secret, and why after this operation they hid the Explorer out of sight in the depths of the repair docks of America , because this is a very useful equipment. The equipment was placed along with a Soviet submarine somewhere near San Francisco.

Perhaps the American side simply wanted to know the secrets that the Soviet submarine fleet was hiding. It may seem to some that the Soviet government was ultimately fooled, since it is clear that the Americans examined Soviet equipment, and perhaps even found some of it interesting and adopted it. Perhaps torpedoes, which were created very elegantly, and perhaps other secrets. But, according to modern sources, the antagonists were unable to get the main one. And it was all due to a happy coincidence of circumstances: the crew commander V. Kobzar, who was mentioned earlier, was very tall and had a strong physique, so for obvious reasons he was cramped at his place of work. When the boat is in Once again were being repaired, the captain really asked the engineers to place his code room in the missile compartment, there was more space there, although it was a risky neighborhood. So, all the most important information was stored there. But the Americans, removing the submarine from the bottom, did not raise the missile compartment. This did not seem so important to them.

The year 1968 demonstrated that this is what Russian reality is like: everything is not like people’s, but at the same time, sometimes it even works to our advantage. The Americans, of course, did not return the submarine itself to the Soviet side; its further fate also remains a mystery. Most likely, it was disassembled, carefully studied and disposed of. But no one hoped for a return. Perhaps this is fair, because it was the Americans who spent so much money and effort.

By the way, these not very pleasant events only spurred the arms race and technological innovation. For practice has shown that in some ways one state is stronger, and in others - another. Maybe this is not so bad, because progress in science leads humanity to development.

Last questions

So much remains unclear. Why did a submarine with experienced sailors and a talented captain sank for no apparent reason? Why did the Americans spend so much money and effort on building devices to lift it from the bottom of the ocean? What happened to for the most part teams, after all, more than a hundred people couldn’t have disappeared somewhere? What happened to K-129 after it was recovered from the ocean depths? The loss of submarines in the twentieth century, of course, was not uncommon, but in this case there are a lot of unanswered questions.

Conclusion

The very film with which our story begins does not have answers to all questions. It is an American-Russian production, which, of course, should be noted, since the creators wanted the most objective consideration of what happened. But, perhaps, now this is not so important, because these are all things of the past, and nothing can be changed. The Cold War is considered bloodless and not as dangerous as other wars in human history, but there were plenty of unpleasant moments. It’s a pity for the people who made up the crew of the K-129 submarine, and especially the young sailors who set off on their first serious voyage. In any case, this unfortunate event will forever remain in the annals of history and in the memory of the Russian people.

How submarines die

An external inspection of the S-80 showed that the submarine had no visible damage. All its hatches were battened down, the missile containers were not damaged, but the hull was heavily corroded by rust. The bottom of the boat was heavily dented, which was apparently due to its impact with the ground when it fell. Before opening the hatches, air samples were taken in the first, third and seventh compartments. The analysis showed that there is practically no oxygen in the compartments. In the first compartment it was only 0.9 percent, in the third - 3.1 percent and in the seventh, respectively, 5.1 percent. For experts, this meant that people, while there, were breathing and living for some time after the disaster. But in all three compartments there was a lot of hydrogen, most likely released during flooding batteries due to electrolysis, as well as carbon monoxide due to the decomposition of human bodies.

After an initial external examination, the submarine was ventilated and purged with nitrogen. On July 29, when a safe environment was finally created in the compartments, the top hatch cover of the seventh compartment (the lower one was open) and the top deckhouse hatch were opened.

Initially, they descended into the S-80 compartments in ISP-60 apparatus, then, when the carbon monoxide content decreased significantly and the oxygen level increased, work continued in filtering gas masks, and then without them.

The first to be sent to the submarine were mechanical engineers from boats of a similar design, recruited to work on the commission. They found that all the compartments were filled with water, but almost every one had an air cushion of 60–75 centimeters. The aft and forward bulkheads of the third compartment were severely damaged and torn at the level of the battery deck. Metal tears towards the nose. Top part the aft bulkhead of the third compartment with a closed round entrance door is bent to the ceiling of the third compartment. The bow bulkhead is bent towards the second compartment. The intercompartment door was torn off from the ratchet lock. Most of the mechanisms in the second, third and fourth compartments were torn from their places. The navigation room and the control room (near the aft bulkhead of the third compartment) are crumpled, everything is torn off. The radio room near the aft bulkhead of the second compartment is completely crushed. There is no damage to the remaining compartments. The vertical rudder is fixed at 18 degrees to starboard. Bow and stern horizontal rudders in position 12 and 28 degrees for ascent. The air of all groups, except the command ones, was completely bleed.

During the examination of the compartments, the following documents were found: a navigation log, a trim log, a log of chronometers and watches, a log of service organization, a navigator's notebook, a radio watch log and a hydroacoustics log. The draft logbook for the central post could not be found. Judging by the time recorded on the clock, the second compartment was flooded at 1 hour 32 minutes, the third at 1 hour 29 minutes and the fourth compartment at 1 hour 28 minutes. All data showed that the S-80 at the moment preceding the disaster was submerged under the RDP at combat readiness No. 2. The first combat shift was in the third compartment.

Analysis of the found documents helped to restore the sequence of events before the disaster.

At 5:30 a.m. she left the mooring lines.

At 13:15 it plunged into the training ground.

On January 26, from 5:30 a.m. to 10:32 p.m., she was on the surface. The condition at that moment was as follows: sea 5 points, wind 7 points, periodic snow charges, air temperature minus 5 degrees.

At 22:32 the S-80 sank to periscope depth.

At 23 hours 22 minutes the boat stood under the RDP, working with the right diesel engine. The deployment under the RDP was commanded by the ship's commander, Captain 3rd Rank Sitarchik. After the performance it was announced combat readiness No. 2 and the first combat shift began. The control of the boat in this shift was carried out by the commander of the boat and the commander of the BC-3. For some reason, the radio log recording all negotiations with the shore did not note the last one: “To the commander of the S-80. Follow to the base. NSh PS SF". Why this radiogram was not recorded remains unclear, although at 22:06 and 23:30, at the time the radiogram was transmitted, everything was still normal on the boat. In addition, in the same radio log there are recordings of radiograms transmitted much later and having nothing to do with the S-80. Who knows, if the Eski radio operator had accepted the order to return, and maybe no tragedy would have happened. Alas, now we can only speculate about this...

The last entry in the navigation log looks like this: “From Pechenga Bay to the Gavrilovsky Islands. January 27. 00.50 OL=86.1 OE-196 m N submergence. - 4 m. We identified the place by crossing the 200-meter isobath. W=70 00 5N D=35 31 5E N=270–1.5 miles. The location was taken into account for further dead reckoning and the echo sounder was turned off.”

Documents show that before its dive, the S-80 was on the surface for seventeen hours at a sea state of 5–6. During this time, the personnel, most likely, were tired and also motion sick, and therefore did not take food. When the bodies of the dead submariners were autopsied, all stomachs were at least empty. Therefore, having immersed himself, the commander first gave the command to prepare food. This is confirmed by the fact that in the seventh compartment in the galley the stove and oven remained on. Then, for some reason, the commander left, and the senior assistant remained in the conning tower in his place. At this time, the submarine was moving under the RDP.

The navigation regime under the RDP is known to be very difficult, especially in strong sea conditions. In this case, the boat, which tends to float, does not maintain the set depth well. Therefore, ballast is used to hold it at depth. For the S-80 it was five tons of water. In the investigation of the S-80 case about the situation associated with sailing under the RDP, it is said this way: “When a submarine “jumps out” to the surface, it has to be “driven” under the water by shifting the rudders to dive, while the submarine “fails” and for its retention, it is necessary to increase the stroke, pump out the auxiliary ballast or partially blow out the middle group of main ballast tanks.”

The investigation into the circumstances of the death of the S-80 suggests that it was quite likely that the boat would “sink” in this situation. In terms of time, this most likely happened on January 27 at 1 hour 26 minutes.

Further events apparently developed as follows: at the central post they tried to keep the boat from “failure” by shifting the rudders. At this time, due to the lack of heating of the float valve of the RDP air shaft (as an inspection of the boat showed, in the third compartment the valve for supplying warm water to the valve was closed), the float valve was severely frozen and could not flow and close the air intake hole when covered with water. As a result, water flowed through the RDP shaft, which has a diameter of 450 millimeters, into the fifth compartment at a speed of 1–1.2 tons per second.

After 3-5 seconds, the mechanic on duty in the fifth compartment noticed the flow of water and stopped the diesel engine, closing the double gas flap and water intake valves with a manipulator. The second motorman simultaneously closed the ebb seams. But the water came into the compartment too quickly. Seeing that nothing was helping, both of them rushed to manually close the internal air supply valve to the right diesel engine, not having time to batten down the gas flap of the RDP DU-200 and not having time to put the step telegraph knob to “stop”. During these 10–15 seconds, 12–15 tons of water already poured into the compartment. It is very difficult to close the internal air supply valves to diesel engines when water flows through them. It took the mechanics about a minute to do this, but they never managed to close them completely. The valve stem was twisted to one side under the pressure of water.

Having received large negative buoyancy in a matter of seconds, the S-80 began to dive with trim to the stern.

In the first moments of the “failure,” the boatswain, having no report of the influx of water, held the boat only with horizontal rudders. The navigator on duty, Lieutenant Kovtun, who was in the chart room of the third compartment, managed to record that the right diesel engine was stopped. The commander of the motor group, hearing that the diesel engine was stopped, rushed to the fourth compartment to find out why this happened. Having discovered in the fourth that water was flowing into the fifth and he could not get there, the group commander managed to report the accident to the central post. An emergency alarm was immediately sounded there. And the boat was already falling sharply to the stern. The situation was critical, but not yet hopeless. And at this most tense moment, the bilge watchman, for some reason, confuses the manipulators of the RDP air flaps and, instead of putting them in the “closed” position, opens them... And therefore, tons of water rushed into the air shaft, as before, in an endless stream.

Trying to do at least something, the central control room provided emergency air blowing into the middle and end groups of the main ballast tanks (this was clearly indicated by the etching of air from the Central City Hospital during the ascent of the S-80). However, this half-measure could not change anything...

The emergency alarm was given to the ship just a few seconds before the ship reached a large trim astern, and therefore the crew had very little time to take any drastic measures. But what did the sailors manage to do?

In the first compartment, personnel began to seal the torpedo tubes from the compartment; We managed to seal only two - the third and fourth; closed the blow-in clinkers and exhaust ventilation on the aft bulkhead. Some of the personnel were able to reach the second compartment to proceed to their combat posts and close the door behind them.

In the second compartment, they closed the bulkhead clinkers of the injection and exhaust ventilation on the aft bulkhead, began sealing the battery pit, and let air into the compartment. All this was done at a large trim, and therefore neither the commander of the boat nor the commander of the electromechanical combat unit, who were here, had time to run to the third compartment.

In the third compartment, the personnel were unable and did not have time to hold the submarine. The senior officer and commander of the warhead-3 only gave the command to the left electric motor: “Full speed ahead!” - lowered the periscope, lowered and closed the lower deckhouse hatch with a wedge.

In the fourth compartment, the submariners closed the intake and exhaust ventilation flaps on the bow and stern bulkheads. But from the fifth compartment, the pressure of water tore the flat door off the latch, and water poured into the compartment, sweeping away everything in its path. The dying sailors did not have time to open the high-pressure air supply valve to the compartment.

In the fifth compartment, where the flow of water from the ventilation shaft immediately initially poured, everything was over in one or two minutes.

In the sixth compartment, the bulkhead clinches on the bow bulkhead were battened down, then, according to instructions from the central post, the left engine was given full forward, and after the disaster occurred and the lights went out, everyone moved to the seventh compartment, having previously taken all the IDA-51s with them.

In the last, seventh compartment, the personnel, together with those transferred from the sixth, did everything possible in the fight for survivability and made desperate attempts to save themselves, which were never crowned with success.

As indicated in the investigation materials, the overwhelming majority of the actions of the submarine personnel were timely and correct, but they could no longer prevent the development of the accident.

Well, what happened in the meantime to the submarine itself?

Having quickly overwhelmed the fifth compartment in a matter of moments, a stream of water tore off the door to the next, sixth, and rushed there. At the same time, the terrible pressure of the water tore the bulkhead of the fourth and then the third compartments. The water pressure was aggravated by the presence of a large air bubble, compressed by the high water pressure. By this time, the submarine was already at a considerable depth and with a large trim to the stern. Then there was a hit on the ground, and the boat froze at a depth of 196 meters. The trim immediately decreased to 14–16 degrees. At this time, a stream of water, having destroyed the bulkhead of the third compartment, burst into the second. Having spent most of the energy on the destruction of several bulkheads, the air and water were stopped by the forward spherical bulkhead of the second compartment, which by this time had been reinforced by air pressure from the first compartment. The disastrous movement of water into the bow of the boat was stopped, but nevertheless it began to gradually filter into the first compartment, gradually filling it.

The surviving personnel of the first and seventh compartments by this time did everything in their power. First of all, both emergency signal buoys were sent to indicate the place of death of the boat, the end groups of the main ballast tanks were purged, but the relatively small reserves of high-pressure air in the command groups due to the flooding of four compartments at once did not give any positive results - the submariners were already doomed...

In the investigation report signed by the Hero Soviet Union Vice Admiral G. Shchedrin and engineer Rear Admiral N. Chiker said: “The submarine died due to the sequential flooding of the fifth, fourth, third and second compartments through the RDP air pipeline when it “failure” to depth.

Reasons for water influx:

1. The float valve does not operate.

2. Failure to close the RDP air flap.

3. Incomplete closure personnel the fifth compartment of the internal valve of the RDP air duct to the right diesel engine due to deflection of the valve stem and skew of the plate due to the influence of water flow.

Factors contributing to the death:

Swimming without heating the RDP valve;

Delay in declaring an emergency alarm and purging the Central City Hospital by the personnel of the central post;

Error in the operation of the bilge watch station, which did not close the manipulator;

Lack of schedule for Project 644 submarines when sailing under the RDP;

Underestimation by the commander of the possibility of an emergency situation when sailing under the RDP with sea state of five;

The design of the internal valve of the RDP air duct is not rigid enough.”

But here is the opinion of a veteran of the submarine fleet, retired engineer-captain 2nd rank Vladislav Vitoldovich Matskevich, now research fellow Nikolaev University shipbuilding: “On the S-80, the commander of the motor group was my classmate at the Higher Naval Engineering School of Underwater Diving (later SVVMIU, and popularly “Holland”), class leader Volodya Propletin. Before entering the school, he went through sailor school, so we, the freshmen of the first intake of the school, gladly obeyed the headman, and he studied excellently. He was a little unlucky in the navy - he ended up on a ship being modernized, so he was stuck for a long time, by the standards of the Northern Fleet, in the commanders of a motor group, while those who ended up in the active fleet had long since passed on independent control of the electromechanical warhead, and some even managed become mechanics.

On his last trip, Volodya left my apartment in the village of Yagelny (now Gadzhievo), having forgotten his ship's mittens in the hallway...

Before the accident, the boat was making the transition from the combat training ground to the base in the conditions of an approaching hurricane. In a strong storm, Project 613 boats, and the S-80 was far from an improved modification of this project, become heavily flooded with water. There were cases when watch officers, chained with mounting belts to the railing of the wheelhouse fence, were carried away by the oncoming wave, and water flowed into the central post in a column.

Apparently, for this reason the boat was sailing under the RDP. This device is “diesel operation under water”, allowing the boat to move under water at a depth of 7.5 meters, receiving air for diesel operation through a special retractable air shaft with a shut-off valve at the top, which automatically closes when a wave hits. In a strong storm, keeping the boat at the optimal depth is problematic; sometimes it falls through, the valve closes and a vacuum is created in the compartments, slapping unpleasantly on the eardrums. If it is not possible to return the boat to a given depth, the crew is forced to leave the RDP. This maneuver takes 25–30 seconds. First of all, the air and gas paths of the diesel engine are sealed and it is stopped. The boat begins to move under the main propulsion electric motors.

All outboard openings have duplicate locking devices, including diesel ducts. The external flaps of the air and gas paths are hydraulically driven from the diesel compartment, and the lower ones are manually driven. One air flap of the RDP is closed hydraulically from the central control. The opening and closing of each external flap is signaled by one of the two corresponding green or white flowers on the shield in the central post.

After the boat was raised, the commission found that during the last “urgent dive” maneuver, due to poor-quality assembly during the period of modernization of the ship, the rubber sealing ring on the RDP air flap plate (its diameter is 450–500 mm) was turned out. At the same time, through the resulting gap, sea water began to flow into the air duct of the RDP with increasing pressure as the boat sank, and from it, through the lower mushroom, supplying air to the diesel engine into the fifth compartment of the boat.” A mushroom is the name given to the second duplicate flap, the plate of which is structurally reminiscent of a mushroom - an object quiet hunt mushroom picker in the forest.

At the central post, apparently, during the couple of tens of seconds allotted to them by the elements, they were unable to assess the situation, since the alarm told them that all the ducts were sealed, so they were late with the emergency purging of the main ballast tanks. The magazine "Marine Collection" No. 11–92 published calculation data for such an accident. The permissible delay in starting to blow down the main ballast tanks is only 20 seconds. Judging by the location of the bodies of the dead submariners in the compartments, until the moment of the accident the watch was carried out at “underwater readiness No. 2,” which means that there should be two people in the diesel compartment - the foreman of the engine crew or the commander of the engine crew in the bow of the compartment and the senior mechanic in the stern compartment These two submariners completed everything that they were supposed to do according to the corresponding schedule in the “Combat Number” book, except for one thing - they could not overcome the power of the depths of the sea.

The lower air supply mushroom to the right diesel engine is manually driven from the diesel compartment. To close it, you need to rotate a flywheel with a diameter of about 500 millimeters clockwise several dozen revolutions (if my memory serves me correctly, about 55 revolutions). The foreman, who was at the diesel control panel, closed the RDP gas flap, stopped the diesel engine, disconnected the nose tire-pneumatic clutch of the shaft line and began to close the lower mushroom. The increasing water pressure on the mushroom plate, its diameter about 450 millimeters, did not allow this to be done. Then both mechanics used the lever to close the ventilation valves of the Central City Hospital. This is a steel pipe with a diameter of about 50 millimeters. The mechanics bent this pipe, but they couldn’t close the mushroom.

They were the first to die at this slam, then next to them the commission found this lever. The submariners in the 3rd and 4th compartments did not survive them much. When filling a closed volume, hydraulic pressure increases instantly. An avalanche of water, crushing the bulkheads of the 4th and then the 3rd compartments, wrapping the bodies of the submariners in iron, flooded three compartments. The boat crashed almost vertically, stern down, onto the ground.

Depth gauges froze at 214 meters.

The assertion of now Vice Admiral E. Chernov, a former senior officer of the S-80, that a mechanic was assigned to the boat from another boat, where the lower mushroom was closed in the opposite direction, is unfounded. Of the submarines of the 613 project, and the S-80 was a modification of this project, there was not a single one where at least one valve, mushroom, or kingston was closed counterclockwise, on any of the 215 units of the Nikolaev or Sormovo construction. Ergonomics, even in those years, did not allow us to do otherwise. Apparently, the first mate never turned the flywheel of the mushroom, and according to the staff he is not supposed to do this.

The assumption of consultant senior midshipman V. Casanova about ice freezing on the float valve of the RDP, which was the cause of the tragedy, is unlikely. Several years before the arrival of the S-80 in the fleet, on two boats 25 BPLSF S-345 built in Sormovo and S-387 in Nikolaev for testing, in addition to many other mechanisms, instead of serial RDP float valves, experimental rod valves were installed heated by water coming from the diesel engine , valve seat and receiving tubular grille, which prevented them from freezing.

I met the S-345 boat in the Liepaja naval base in the mid-70s; it was part of a well-known center in Paldiski. The S-80 had a valve of exactly this design. According to Captain 1st Rank Minchenko (a major specialist in ship lifting), who supervised the lifting of the boat with the help of the rescue vessel "Karpaty" built by the Nikolaev plant, the author of the essay writes that the S-80 evaded some vessel before the tragedy, about which, they say , indicates the position of the vertical rudder “to the left on board”, hence the version about “adversaries” went for a walk. The inspection report of the raised S-80, and the design of the vertical rudder, allow us to say otherwise. The rudder blade on boats 613, 644 and many other projects protrudes somewhat beyond the contours of the stern end lightweight body boats, therefore, when the boat hits the ground with its stern, the rudder blade must inevitably shift to one of the sides, overcoming the resistance of the hydraulic drive or breaking it, as in the case of the S-80. The report states that the S-80 initially lay on the ground with a trim of 14 aft. This is evidenced by all mechanical trim meters whose needles have rusted in this position. Then, as the bow compartments were flooded due to water filtration through the bulkhead seals, the trim moved away and the boat lay on an even keel.

The surviving submariners understood the tragedy of their situation - the depth was prohibitive for the boat, the released emergency buoys did not reach the surface, since the length of the cable cables was only 125 meters at a sea depth of 214 meters. There was no panic, as evidenced by the table set in the wardroom...

In his memoirs “Fairways of Naval Service,” Hero of the Soviet Union, Admiral of the Fleet G. M. Egorov also expressed his opinion regarding possible reason of this disaster: “...the commander of the boat violated the instructions prohibiting navigation under the RDP in heavy seas and icing. The decision of the S-80 commander to train the crew when sailing under the RDP in conditions of a heavy storm in polar night was not caused by any necessity. Essentially, this became fatal for him and the entire crew. My doubts about the capabilities of this commander, unfortunately, were confirmed.”

Alas, the sea does not forgive even small mistakes...