Perimeter system. Dead hand. "dead hand" is more terrible than "aegis" and "tomahawk" What kind of weapon is a dead hand

How the system works:
The logic of the "Dead Hand" involved the regular collection and processing of a gigantic amount of information. From all kinds of sensors received a variety of information. For example, about the state of communication lines with a higher command post: there is a connection - there is no connection. About the radiation situation in the surrounding area: the normal level of radiation is an increased level of radiation. About the presence of people at the starting position: there are people - there are no people. About registered nuclear explosions and so on and so forth.
The "dead hand" had the ability to analyze changes in the military and political situation in the world - the system evaluated the commands received over a certain period of time, and on this basis could conclude that something was wrong in the world. When the system believed that its time had come, it activated and launched a command to prepare for the launch of the rockets.
Moreover, the "Dead Hand" could not begin active operations in peacetime. Even if there was no communication, even if the entire combat crew left the starting position, there were still a lot of other parameters that would block the system.
After the order received from the highest levels of control of the Strategic Missile Forces to a special command post, the command missile 15P011 with a special warhead 15B99 is launched, which in flight transmits launch commands to all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces with appropriate receivers.
System concept:
The system is designed to guarantee the launch of silo ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a devastating nuclear strike on the territory of the USSR, all the command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of issuing an order for a retaliatory strike are destroyed. The system is the only doomsday machine (weapon of guaranteed retaliation) in existence in the world, the existence of which has been officially confirmed. The system is still classified and may be on alert to this day, so any information about it cannot be confirmed as unambiguously reliable or refuted, and must be viewed with a proper degree of skepticism.
At its core, the Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the armed forces armed with nuclear warheads. It was created as a backup system, in case the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces were destroyed by the first strike, in accordance with the concept of Limited Nuclear War developed in the United States. To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was originally designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is able to make a decision on a retaliatory strike on its own, without (or with minimal participation) a person. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is in fact the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will abandon the concept of a crushing preventive strike.

History of creation:
The development of a special command missile system, called "Perimeter", was assigned to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by Decree of the USSR Government N695-227 of August 30, 1974. Initially, it was planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) rocket as the base rocket, later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) rocket. The rocket, modified in terms of the control system, received the index 15A11.

Everyone is discussing Kiselyov with his phrase that Russia is the only country that "is capable of turning the United States into radioactive ashes."
The host of Vesti Nedeli briefly spoke about the Perimeter system of guaranteed nuclear retaliation.
And he noted that it was after the release of the material about the "Perimeter" that the US president began to call his colleague from Russia more often and turn gray more ...

So, "Dead Hand"

« Our strategic nuclear forces (SNF) are configured to threaten Russian nuclear and economic facilities. Even as we negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin, we keep his Kremlin office at gunpoint. That's the truth of life— Joseph Cirincione, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 2001

Russia possesses the only weapon in the world that guarantees a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy, even in the terrible event that we no longer have anyone to decide on this strike.
The unique system counterattacks automatically - and brutally.

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system

System Perimeter (index URV Strategic Missile Forces: 15E601)- a complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike, created in the USSR at the height of the Cold War. Designed to guarantee the launch of silo ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a devastating nuclear strike on the territory of the USSR, all the command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of issuing an order for a retaliatory strike are destroyed. The system is a backup communication system used in the event of the destruction of the Kazbek command system and the combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, Navy and Air Force.

The system is the only doomsday machine (weapon of guaranteed retaliation) in existence in the world, the existence of which has been officially confirmed. The system is still classified and may be on alert to this day, so any information about it cannot be confirmed as unambiguously reliable or refuted, and must be viewed with a proper degree of skepticism.

In the mid-1970s, in Leningrad, the development of a control system for strategic missile forces - the Strategic Missile Forces - began. In the documents, she received the name "Perimeter". The system involved the creation of such technical means and software that would make it possible, under any conditions, even the most unfavorable, to bring the order to launch missiles directly to the launch teams. As conceived by the creators of the Perimeter, the system could prepare and launch missiles even if everyone died and there would be no one to give the order. This component has become unofficially called the "Dead Hand".

When creating a new command and control system for the Strategic Missile Forces, two important questions had to be answered. First: how to make soulless automation understand that its time has come? Secondly: how to give it the ability to turn on exactly at the moment when it is needed, not earlier and not later? Naturally, there were other issues - perhaps not so important individually, but global in the aggregate.

It is extremely difficult to create a reliable system with such parameters. However, the wizards from the Soviet military-industrial complex were able to come up with such a scheme for Armageddon that they themselves became afraid. But on the other hand, there was also the pride of professionals who did what no one had ever been able to do before them. But how?

Any missile, especially one equipped with a nuclear warhead, can only take off if ordered to do so. In peacetime, when conducting training firing (with a mock warhead instead of a real warhead), this happens to the usual simple. The command to launch is transmitted over the command communication lines, after which all blockages are removed, the engines are ignited, and the rocket is carried away into the distance. However, in a real combat situation, in the event of various kinds of interference, it would be much more difficult to do this. As in the hypothetical surprise nuclear strike scenario we cited at the beginning of the article, communication lines could be disabled and the people who had the authority to issue the decisive order could be destroyed. But you never know what could happen in the chaos that would certainly have arisen after a nuclear strike?

The logic of the "Dead Hand" involved the regular collection and processing of a huge amount of information. From all kinds of sensors received a variety of information. For example, about the state of communication lines with a higher command post: there is a connection - there is no connection. About the radiation situation in the surrounding area: the normal level of radiation is an increased level of radiation. About the presence of people at the starting position: there are people - there are no people. About registered nuclear explosions and so on and so forth.

The "dead hand" had the ability to analyze changes in the military and political situation in the world - the system evaluated the commands received over a certain period of time, and on this basis could conclude that something was wrong in the world. In a word, it was a smart thing. When the system believed that its time had come, it activated and launched a command to prepare for the launch of the rockets.

Moreover, the "Dead Hand" could not begin active operations in peacetime. Even if there was no communication, even if the entire combat crew left the starting position, there were still a lot of other parameters that would block the system.

The Perimeter system, with its main component, the Dead Hand, was put into service in 1983. The first information about it became known in the West only in the early 1990s, when some of the developers of this system moved there. On October 8, 1993, The New York Times published an article by its columnist Bruce Blair, "The Russian Doomsday Machine", in which, for the first time, information about the control system of the Russian missile forces appeared in the open press. At the same time, its top-secret name, "Perimeter", was first reported, and a new concept entered the English language - "dead hand" ("dead hand"). Some in the West called the "Perimeter" system immoral, but at the same time even its most vehement critics were forced to admit that it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will refuse to launch a preventive nuclear strike.

mountain "Kosvinsky stone"
SHPU UR-100N UTTH

No wonder they say that fear rules the world. And as for immorality, then ... what is the "immorality" of a retaliatory strike? The Perimeter system is a backup command system for all branches of the armed forces armed with nuclear warheads. It is designed to be especially resistant to all the damaging factors of nuclear weapons, and it is almost impossible to disable it. Its task is to decide on a retaliatory strike on its own, without the participation (or with minimal participation) of a person. Only if the key components of the command system "Kazbek" ("nuclear suitcase") and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) are destroyed by the first strike in accordance with the "highly moral" concepts of "Limited Nuclear War" and "Decapitation Strike" , developed in the USA. In peacetime, the main components of the Perimeter system are in standby mode. They assess the situation by processing the data coming from the measuring posts.

In addition to the extreme operation algorithm described above, the Perimeter also had intermediate modes. One of them is worth talking about in more detail.

On November 13, 1984, the 15A11 command missile, created in Dnepropetrovsk, was tested at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, all American intelligence facilities worked in a very busy mode. The command rocket was the intermediate option mentioned above. It was planned to be used in the event that communication between the command and missile units scattered throughout the country was completely interrupted. It was then that it was supposed to give an order from the General Staff in the Moscow region or from a reserve command post in Leningrad to launch 15A11. The missile was supposed to launch from the Kapustin Yar test site or from a mobile launcher, fly over those regions of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan where the missile units were stationed, and give them the command to take off.

On a November day in 1984, this is exactly what happened: the command rocket issued a command to prepare and launch the R-36M (15A14) from Baikonur - which later became the legendary "Satan". Well, then everything happened as usual: "Satan" took off, rose into space, a training warhead separated from it, which hit a training target at the Kura training ground in Kamchatka. (Detailed technical characteristics of the command rocket, if this question is of particular interest to someone, can be found in books that have been published in abundance in Russian and English in recent years.)

In the early 1970s, taking into account the real possibilities of highly effective methods of electronic suppression by a potential adversary of the strategic missile forces combat control means, it became a very urgent task to ensure the delivery of combat orders from the highest levels of command (the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces Directorate) to command posts and individual launchers of strategic missiles standing on combat duty in case of emergency.

The idea arose to use for these purposes, in addition to the existing communication channels, a special command missile equipped with a powerful radio transmitter, launched during a special period and giving commands to launch all missiles on combat duty throughout the USSR.

The development of a special command missile system, called the "Perimeter", was set by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by Decree of the USSR Government N695-227 of August 30, 1974. Initially, it was planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) rocket as the base rocket, later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) rocket. The rocket, modified in terms of the control system, received the index 15A11.

The cover of the compartment with unattended equipment is impenetrable, which is not known for certain

In December 1975 a draft design of a command rocket was completed. A special warhead was installed on the rocket, which had the index 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by the LPI Design Bureau. To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead during the flight had to have a constant orientation in space. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for the Mayak SHS), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and development. The production of SGCh 15B99 was organized at NPO Strela in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979. LCI of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, and sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to ensure remote control and launch of a command missile on orders from the highest command and control levels of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter was built at a special technical position in the assembly building.

Flight tests of the 15A11 rocket (see layout diagram) were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by Lieutenant General V.V. Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The first launch of the 15A11 command missile with the equivalent of a transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. The developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the possibility of providing the missile with a given flight path of the 15B99 warhead (trajectory peak at an altitude of about 4000 km, range 4500 km), the operation of all service systems of the warhead in the normal mode, the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

10 missiles were assigned for flight tests. In connection with the successful launches and the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches.

During the tests of the "Perimeter" system, real launches of 15A14, 15A16, 15A35 missiles were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the SSG 15B99 in flight. Previously, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed. Subsequently, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent these modifications.

Launcher 15P716 - mine, automated, highly protected, type "OS". The key components of this system are the 15A11 command missile and receiving devices that receive orders and codes from command missiles. The 15A11 command missile of the Perimeter system is the only widely known component of the complex. They have the index 15A11, developed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau on the basis of the MR UR-100U missiles (index 15A16). They are equipped with a special warhead (index 15B99) containing a radio command system developed by OKB LPI. The technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base rocket 15A16. Launcher - mine, automated, highly protected, most likely, type OS - modernized PU OS-84. The possibility of basing missiles in other types of launch silos is not ruled out.

Along with flight tests, ground testing of the performance of the entire complex was carried out under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the testing laboratories of VNIIEF (Sarov), and at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the CS and SGS equipment at levels of nuclear explosion exposure exceeding those specified in the MO TTT.

Even during flight tests, a government decree set the task of expanding the functions solved by the command missile complex, bringing combat orders not only to the objects of the Strategic Missile Forces, but also to strategic missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, points management of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.

LCI of the command missile was completed in March 1982. In January 1985, the complex was put on combat duty. For more than 10 years, the command missile complex has successfully performed its important role in the defense of the state.

Many enterprises and organizations of various ministries and departments took part in the creation of the complex. The main ones are: NPO Impulse (V.I. Melnik), NPO AP (n.A. Pilyugin), KBSM (A.F. Utkin), TsKBTM (B.R. Aksyutin), MNIIRS (A.P. Bilenko), VNIIS (B.Ya. Osipov), Central Design Bureau "Geophysics" (G.F. Ignatiev), NII-4 MO (E.B. Volkov).

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

There is no reliable information about the 15E601 "Perimeter" system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with many communication systems and sensors. Probably, the system has the following principle of operation.

The system is located on the database and receives data from tracking systems, including early warning radars. The system has its own stationary and mobile combat control centers. The main component of the Perimeter system operates in these centers - an autonomous control and command system - a complex software system created on the basis of artificial intelligence, associated with a variety of communication systems and sensors that control the situation.

In peacetime, the main components of the system are in standby mode, monitoring the situation and processing the data coming from the measuring posts.

In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack using nuclear weapons, confirmed by the data of early warning systems for a missile attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically put on alert and begins to monitor the operational situation.

It is believed that the system works like this. "Perimeter" is on constant combat duty, it receives data from tracking systems, including early warning radars for missile attacks. Apparently, the system has its own independent command posts, in no way (outwardly) indistinguishable from many similar points of the Strategic Missile Forces. According to some reports, there are 4 such points, they are spaced a long distance and duplicate each other's functions.

At these points, the most important - and most secret - component of the "Perimeter", an autonomous control and command system, operates. It is believed that this is a complex software package created on the basis of artificial intelligence. Receiving data on negotiations on the air, the radiation field and other radiation at control points, information on early detection systems for launches, seismic activity, it is able to draw conclusions about the fact of a massive nuclear attack.

If the "situation is ripe", the system itself is transferred to a state of full combat readiness. Now she needs the last factor: the absence of regular signals from the usual command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces. If the signals have not been received for some time, the "Perimeter" launches the Apocalypse.

Command missiles 15A11 are released from the mines. Created on the basis of the MR UR-100 intercontinental missiles (launch weight 71 tons, flight range up to 11 thousand km, two stages, liquid-propellant engine), they carry a special warhead. By itself, it is harmless: it is a radio engineering system developed at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic. These missiles, rising high into the atmosphere, flying over the territory of the country, broadcast launch codes for all nuclear missile weapons.

They also work automatically. Imagine a submarine standing at the pier: almost the entire crew on the shore has already died, and only a few confused watch submariners are on board. She suddenly comes to life. Without any outside interference, having received a launch signal from highly secret receiving devices, the nuclear arsenal sets in motion. The same thing happens in immobilized mine installations, and in strategic aviation. A retaliatory strike is inevitable: it is probably unnecessary to add that the Perimeter is designed to be especially resistant to all the damaging factors of nuclear weapons. It is almost impossible to disable it reliably.

antenna radio channel of the combat control system

The system tracks:
. the presence and intensity of negotiations on the air on military frequencies,
. information from the SPRN,
. receiving telemetry signals from the Strategic Missile Forces posts,
. the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity,
. regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation along key coordinates, coinciding with the sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the pattern of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes),
. the presence of living people at the CP.

Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision about the fact of a massive nuclear attack and the need for a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Another proposed variant of the system's operation - when receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack from the early warning system, the first persons of the state could put the system into combat mode. After that, if within a certain time the CP of the system does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then the procedure for delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike is initialized. Thus, the possibility of making a decision on a retaliatory strike in the event of a false alarm was completely excluded and it was guaranteed that even the destruction of all those who had the authority to issue a command to conduct launches would not be able to prevent a nuclear retaliatory strike.

If the sensor components of the system confirm with sufficient certainty the fact of a massive nuclear strike, and the system itself loses contact with the main command nodes of the Strategic Missile Forces for a certain time, the Perimeter system initiates the procedure for delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike, even bypassing the Kazbek system, better known for its the most noticeable element, the Cheget subscriber set, as a "nuclear briefcase".

After receiving an order from the VZU of the Strategic Missile Forces to a special command post, or at the command of an autonomous control and command system that is part of the Perimeter system, command missiles (15A11, and later 15Zh56 and 15Zh75) are launched. The command missiles are equipped with a radio command CMS, which transmits in flight a control signal and launch codes for launching to all carriers of strategic nuclear weapons located on the database.

To receive signals from the command rockets, all KP, PZKP, PKP rp and rdn, as well as APU, except for the complexes of the Pioneer family and 15P020 of all modifications, were equipped with special RBU receivers of the Perimeter system. At the stationary TsKP of the Navy, Air Force, KP fleets and air armies, at the end of the 80s, equipment 15E646-10 of the Perimeter system was installed, incl. capable of receiving signals from command rockets. Further, orders for the use of nuclear weapons were brought through their specific means of communication for the Navy and Air Force. The receiving devices are hardware-linked to the control and launch equipment, providing immediate autonomous execution of the launch order in a fully automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.

COMPOUND

The main elements of the Perimeter system:
- an autonomous command system, which is part of stationary and mobile combat control centers;
- complexes of command missiles.

Subdivisions that are part of the Perimeter system:

URU GSh - control radio nodes of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, presumably:
URU GSh VS:
624th PRRTs, military unit 44684.1 US General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, (56° 4’58.07″N 37° 5’20.68″E)

URU Strategic Missile Forces - control radio centers of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation, presumably:
URU General Staff Strategic Missile Forces
140th PRRTs, military unit 12407, PRRTs of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces
143562, Moscow region, Istra district, pos. Voskhod (Novopetrovskoye) (55° 56′ 18.14″N 36° 27′ 19.96″E)

Stationary CBU - stationary combat control center (CBU) of the Perimeter system, 1231 CBU, military unit 20003, object 1335, Sverdlovsk region, pos. Kytlym (mountain Kosvinsky stone);

Mobile CBU - mobile combat control center (PCC) of the Perimeter system, complex 15V206:

1353 CBU, military unit 33220, Sumy region, Glukhov, 43rd RD (military unit 54196, Romny), 43rd RA (military unit 35564, Vinnitsa), 1990 - 1991. In 1991 he was relocated to 59th rd, Kartaly.

1353 CBU, military unit 32188, call sign "Pecker", Kartaly, 1353 CBU was part of the 59th division, but due to its peculiarities and the nature of the tasks performed, it was directly subordinate to the General Staff of the RV, 1991 - 1995;
In 1995, 1353 CBU was included in the 59th district (military unit No. 68547, Kartaly), 31st RA (military unit 29452, Orenburg).
In 2005, 1353 CBU was disbanded along with the 59th division.
1193 CBU, military unit 49494, Nizhny Novgorod region, Dalnee Konstantinovo-5 (Surovatikha), 2005 - ...;

15P011 - command missile complex 15A11.
510th rp, BRK-6, military unit 52642, 7th RD (military unit 14245, Vypolzovo (Bologoe-4, ZATO Ozerny)) 27th RA (military unit 43176, Vladimir), January 1985 - June 1995;

There is also evidence that earlier the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM. Such a mobile complex with "pioneer" command missiles was called "Gorn". Complex index - 15P656, missiles - 15ZH56. It is known about at least one subdivision of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Gorn complex - the 249th missile regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk region of the 32nd missile division (Postavy), from March-April 1986 to 1988 was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

15P175 "Siren" - a mobile ground missile system of command missiles (PGRK KR).

In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (Yurya), a regiment (commanded by Colonel S. I. Arzamastsev) took up combat duty with a modernized command missile system, called "Perimeter-RTs", which includes a command missile , created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

Mobile ground missile system of command missiles (PGRK KR).
8th RD (military unit 44200, Yurya-2), 27th RA (military unit 43176, Vladimir), 01.10.2005 - ...

76th rp (military unit 49567, BSP-3):
1 and 2 GPP - 1st division
3 GPP and GBU - 2nd division

304th rp (military unit 21649, BSP-31):
4 and 5 GPP - 1st division
6 GPP and GBU - 2nd division

776th RP (military unit 68546, BSP-18):
7th and 8th GPP - 1st division
9 GPP and GBU - 2nd division

After being put on combat duty, the 15E601 "Perimeter" system was periodically used during command and staff exercises.

In November 1984, after the launch of the 15A11 command rocket and the launch of the 15B99 SSG on the passive part of the trajectory, the SGS issued a command to launch the 15A14 missile (R-36M, RS-20A, SS-18 "Satan") from the NIIP-5 test site (Baikonur Cosmodrome) . In the future, everything happened as expected - the launch, the development of all stages of the 15A14 rocket, the separation of the training warhead, hitting the calculated square at the Kura training ground, in Kamchatka.

In December 1990, a modernized system was adopted, called the "Perimeter-RC", which worked until June 1995, when, under the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be modernized so that it can quickly respond to a strike by non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles.

According to unverified reports, the system was already returned to combat duty in 2001 or 2003.

And some more evidence on this topic:

« In the USSR, a system was developed that became known as the "Dead Hand". What did it mean? If a nuclear attack was made on a country, and the Commander-in-Chief could not make any decision, among the intercontinental missiles that were at the disposal of the USSR, there were those that could be launched by the radio signal of the system commanding the battle”, says Doctor of Engineering Sciences Petr Belov.

Using a complex system of sensors that measure seismic activity, air pressure and radiation to determine if the USSR was under a nuclear attack, Dead Hand provided the ability to launch a nuclear arsenal without anyone pushing a red button. If communication with the Kremlin had been lost and the computers had established the attack, the launch codes would have been set in motion, giving the USSR the opportunity to strike back after being destroyed.

« A system that can be automatically activated on the first hit of an enemy is really necessary. Its very presence makes it clear to the enemies that even if our command centers and decision-making systems are destroyed, we will have the opportunity to launch an automated retaliatory strike.", - said the former head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov.

During the Cold War, the US had its own "fallback" codenamed "Mirror". The crews were constantly in the air for three decades with the task of controlling the sky if control of the ground was lost due to a surprise attack. The main difference between "Dead Hand" and "Mirror" is that the Americans relied on people to warn them of the attack. After the Cold War, the United States abandoned this system, although it is still not clear whether a Soviet version exists. Those who know about this avoid talking about this topic. " I can't talk about it because I don't know about the current state of affairs.", - says Ivashov.

"Operation Looking Glass" ("Mirror") - air command posts (VKP) of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) on Boeing EC-135C aircraft (11 units), and later, from July 1989, on E-6B " Mercury" (Boeing 707-320) (16 units). 24 hours a day, for more than 29 years, from February 3, 1961 to June 24, 1990, two Looking Glass planes were constantly in the air - one over the Atlantic, the other over the Pacific Ocean. A total of 281,000 hours spent in the air. The crews of the CPSU, consisting of 15 people, among them at least one general, were in constant readiness to take command of the strategic nuclear forces in the event of the defeat of ground command posts.

The main difference between "Perimeter" and "Mirror" is that the Americans relied on people who would take command and decide on a retaliatory nuclear strike. After the end of the Cold War, the United States abandoned this database carrying system and is currently on duty at 4 air bases in constant readiness for take-off.

Also in the United States there was a complex of command missiles - UNF Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS). The system was first delivered to the DB on July 11, 1963 at launch sites at Wiesner, West Point, and Tekama, Nebraska, as part of three MER-6A Blue Scout Junior missiles. The system was on the database until December 01, 1967. Subsequently, the upgraded ERCS was based on the Minuteman series missiles - LEM-70 (based on Minuteman I since 1966) and LEM-70A (based on Minuteman II since 1967) (project 494L). The upgraded system was delivered to the database on October 10, 1967 at the Whiteman AFB base, Missouri, as part of ten silo launchers. The system was removed from the database at the beginning of 1991.

sources

http://masterok.livejournal.com/501495.html
http://www.cosmoworld.ru/spaceencyclopedia/publications/index.shtml?zhelez_22.html — Alexander Zheleznyakov
http://www.inosmi.ru/multimedia/20091215/157016951.html
http://usa-army.ru/yadernaya-strategiya.html
http://pioneer-club.org.ua/publ/sistema_15eh601_perimetr_mertvaja_ruka_oruzhie_vozmezdija_sssr/1-1-0-98

http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/17-10/mf_deadhand?currentPage=all

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Perimeter system
The American magazine Wired fearfully writes:
Russia possesses the only weapon in the world that guarantees a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy, even in the terrible event that we no longer have anyone to decide on this strike. The unique system counterattacks automatically - and brutally.

Perimeter system(Index URV Strategic Missile Forces - 15E601, nicknamed in the West "Dead Hand", and in the East "Hand from the Coffin") - a control system for strategic missile forces - Strategic Missile Forces. In the documents, she received the name "Perimeter". The system involved the creation of such technical means and software that would make it possible, under any conditions, even the most unfavorable, to bring the order to launch missiles directly to the launch teams. As conceived by the creators of Perimeter, the system could prepare and launch missiles even if everyone died and there would be no one to give the order. This component has become informally called "Dead Hand or Hand from the Coffin."

How the system works:
The logic of the "Dead Hand" involved the regular collection and processing of a gigantic amount of information. From all kinds of sensors received a variety of information. For example, about the state of communication lines with a higher command post: there is a connection - there is no connection. About the radiation situation in the surrounding area: the normal level of radiation is an increased level of radiation. About the presence of people at the starting position: there are people - there are no people. About registered nuclear explosions and so on and so forth.

The "dead hand" had the ability to analyze changes in the military and political situation in the world - the system evaluated the commands received over a certain period of time, and on this basis could conclude that something was wrong in the world. When the system believed that its time had come, it activated and launched a command to prepare for the launch of the rockets.
Moreover, the "Dead Hand" could not begin active operations in peacetime. Even if there was no communication, even if the entire combat crew left the starting position, there were still a lot of other parameters that would block the system.

After the order received from the highest levels of control of the Strategic Missile Forces to a special command post, the command missile 15P011 with a special warhead 15B99 is launched, which in flight transmits launch commands to all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces with appropriate receivers.

System concept:

The system is designed to guarantee the launch of silo ICBMs and SLBMs in the event that, as a result of a devastating nuclear strike on the territory of the USSR, all the command units of the Strategic Missile Forces capable of issuing an order for a retaliatory strike are destroyed. The system is the only doomsday machine (weapon of guaranteed retaliation) in existence in the world, the existence of which has been officially confirmed. The system is still classified and may be on alert to this day, so any information about it cannot be confirmed as unambiguously reliable or refuted, and must be viewed with a proper degree of skepticism.

At its core, the Perimeter system is an alternative command system for all branches of the armed forces armed with nuclear warheads. It was created as a backup system, in case the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces were destroyed by the first strike, in accordance with the concept of Limited Nuclear War developed in the United States. To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was originally designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is able to make a decision on a retaliatory strike on its own, without (or with minimal participation) a person. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is in fact the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will abandon the concept of a crushing preventive strike.

History of creation:
The development of a special command missile system, called "Perimeter", was assigned to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by Decree of the USSR Government N695-227 of August 30, 1974. Initially, it was planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) rocket as the base rocket, later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) rocket. The rocket, modified in terms of the control system, received the index 15A11.

Command missile 15A11 system "Perimeter"

In December 1975 a draft design of a command rocket was completed. A special warhead was installed on the rocket, which had the index 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by the LPI Design Bureau. To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead during the flight had to have a constant orientation in space. A special system for calming, orienting and stabilizing it was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for the Mayak SHS), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and development. The manufacture of SGCh 15B99 was organized at NPO "Strela" in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979. LCI of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, and sites 176 and 181, two experimental mine launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to ensure remote control and launch of a command missile on orders from the highest command and control levels of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter was built at a special technical position in the assembly building.

Flight tests of the 15A11 rocket (see layout diagram) were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by Lieutenant General V.V. Korobushin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The first launch of the 15A11 command missile with the equivalent of a transmitter was successfully carried out on December 26, 1979. The developed complex algorithms for interfacing all systems involved in the launch were tested, the possibility of providing the missile with a given flight path of the 15B99 warhead (trajectory peak at an altitude of about 4000 km, range 4500 km), the operation of all service systems of the warhead in the normal mode, the correctness of the adopted technical solutions was confirmed.

10 missiles were assigned for flight tests. In connection with the successful launches and the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches.

During the tests of the "Perimeter" system, real launches of 15A14, 15A16, 15A35 missiles were carried out from combat facilities according to orders transmitted by the SSG 15B99 in flight. Previously, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and new receiving devices were installed. Subsequently, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent these modifications.

Launcher 15P716 - mine, automated, highly protected, type "OS".

Along with flight tests, a ground test of the performance of the entire complex was carried out under the influence of damaging factors of a nuclear explosion at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, at the test laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas), at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The tests carried out confirmed the operability of the CS and SGS equipment at levels of nuclear explosion exposure exceeding those specified in the MO TTT.
Even during flight tests, a government decree set the task of expanding the functions solved by the command missile complex, bringing combat orders not only to the objects of the Strategic Missile Forces, but also to strategic missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, points management of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy.

LCTs of the command rocket were completed in March 1982. In January 1985 the complex was put on combat duty. For more than 10 years, the command missile complex has successfully fulfilled its important role in the defense capability of the state.

System components:

Command posts of the system:
Apparently, they are structures similar to the standard missile bunkers of the Strategic Missile Forces. They contain the control equipment and communication systems necessary to ensure the operation of the system. Presumably integrated with the command missile launchers, however, most likely they are spaced quite a distance to ensure better survivability of the system.

Command Missiles:

Command missile 15A11 of the Perimeter system. The only widely known component of the complex. They are part of the 15P011 command missile complex and have the index 15A11, developed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau on the basis of 15A16 missiles (MR UR-100U). Equipped with a special warhead 15B99, containing a radio command system developed by the LPI Design Bureau, designed to guarantee the delivery of combat orders from the central command post to all command posts and launchers under the influence of nuclear explosions and active electronic countermeasures, when flying warheads on the passive part of the trajectory. The technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base rocket 15A16. Launcher 15P716 - mine, automated, highly protected, type OS, most likely - a modernized OS-84 launcher. The possibility of basing missiles in other types of launch silos is not ruled out.

The development of a command missile was started by the TTT of the Ministry of Defense in 1974. Flight design tests were carried out at NIIP-5 (Baikonur) from 1979 to 1986. A total of 7 launches were carried out (6 successful, 1 partially successful). The mass of the warhead 15B99 is 1412 kg.
Receiving devices:
They ensure the receipt of orders and codes by the components of the nuclear triad from command missiles in flight. They are equipped with all launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, all SSBNs and strategic bombers. Presumably, the receiving devices are hardware-connected to the control and launch equipment, providing autonomous execution of the launch order.

Autonomous control and command system:

The mythical component of the system is a key element of the Doomsday Machine, the existence of which is not known. Some supporters of the existence of such a system believe that this is a complex expert system, equipped with many communication systems and sensors that control the combat situation. This system presumably monitors the presence and intensity of communications on the air at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from the Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances. in the earth's crust (which corresponds to the pattern of multiple ground-based nuclear strikes), and, possibly, the presence of living people at the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike.

Another proposed variant of the system's operation is that upon receiving information about the first signs of a missile attack, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief puts the system into combat mode. After that, if within a certain time the command post of the system does not receive a signal to stop the combat algorithm, then command missiles are launched.

System location:

The automated system "Perimeter" is installed in the area of ​​Mount Kosvinsky Kamen (Urals). According to Blair, “American strategists consider it the main decoration of the crown of the Russian nuclear combat command system, since from here it is possible to communicate through the granite thickness with Russian long-range strategic aviation using a VLF radio signal (3.0 - 30.0 kHz) that can propagate even in a nuclear war. This bunker is a critical link in the doomsday machine's communications network, designed to provide semi-automatic retaliation in response to a decapitation strike."

Operation and system status:

After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises. The 15P011 command missile system with the 15A11 missile (based on the MR UR-100) was on combat duty until June 1995, when, under the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty. According to other sources, this happened on September 1, 1995, when the 510th missile regiment armed with command missiles was taken off duty and disbanded in the 7th missile division (vypolzovo village). This event coincided with the completion of the withdrawal of the MR UR-100 missiles from the Strategic Missile Forces and the process of re-equipping the 7th RD with the Topol mobile ground-based missile system that began in December 1994.

In December 1990, in the 8th Missile Division (Yurya), a regiment (commanded by Colonel S. I. Arzamastsev) took up combat duty with a modernized command missile system, called "Perimeter-RTs", which includes a command missile , created on the basis of the RT-2PM Topol ICBM.

There is also evidence that earlier the Perimeter system, along with 15A11 missiles, included command missiles based on the Pioneer IRBM. Such a mobile complex with "pioneer" command missiles was called "Gorn". Complex index - 15P656, missiles - 15ZH56. It is known about at least one unit of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was armed with the Gorn complex - the 249th missile regiment, stationed in the city of Polotsk, Vitebsk region of the 32nd missile division (Postavy), from March-April From 1986 to 1988 he was on combat duty with a mobile complex of command missiles.

Organizations involved in the production of components and maintenance of the complex are experiencing funding difficulties. There is a high turnover of staff, resulting in a drop in the qualifications of staff. Despite this, the leadership of the Russian Federation has repeatedly assured foreign states that there is no risk of accidental or unauthorized missile launches.
In the Western press, the name “Dead hand” was assigned to the system.

In Japan, military experts dubbed this system as the "Coffin Hand".

According to Wired magazine in 2009, the Perimeter system is operational and ready to strike back.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, stated that the Perimeter system exists and is on alert.

Operators:

Russia (The system is currently active).

P/S. An excerpt from an interview given by the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Viktorovich Karakaev: http://www.kp.ru/daily/25805/2785953/

WHY RUSSIA "DEAD HAND"?
KP: - At one time in our and foreign press there were publications about the "Perimeter" system, which existed in the USSR. And in 2009, the American magazine Wirett told its readers that this system was functioning and still alive. This is the rocket that, if everything is gone, takes off and gives the command to all the other rockets. And they automatically take off and hit the right targets. The "dead hand" in the West is called this system.
Sergei Karakaev: - And you don't eat your bread in vain! Yes, the Perimeter system exists today. She is on combat duty. And when the need arises for a retaliatory strike, when there is no way to bring a signal to some part of the launchers, this command can come from these missiles from the Perimeter ...
KP: - There was a very interesting remark by Putin at a meeting with the Valdai Club. There, someone says to him: "You can destroy the United States in about half an hour." And Putin thought and thought and answered: “Actually, faster” ...
Sergei Karakaev: - I will answer briefly: Vladimir Vladimirovich is right. But I believe that today neither Russia nor the United States are going to destroy each other.

The best remedy would be the resuscitation of the Perimeter system

Now there is an intensive discussion of military reform in the media. In particular, many journalists demand to name all potential opponents by name.

I hasten to reassure everyone, at present there will be no big war guaranteed. The blue dream of pacifists came true - "XXI century without wars". Since 2000, not a single country in the world has been at war for a single day, although not a single day has passed without hostilities being waged in one or more parts of the globe.

FRENCH OPTION FOR RUSSIA

Now the war is called "the fight against terrorism", "peacekeeping", "peace enforcement", etc. Therefore, I propose to change the terminology and talk not about war or the defense of the fatherland, but about the reaction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to threats to national security. The illusions of some liberals, who believed that communism was the source of the Cold War and that after its disappearance peace and prosperity would come, turned out to be a delusion.

Moreover, if until 1991 the UN Security Council and international law to a certain extent contained conflicts, now their effect is negligible. As for the notorious world public opinion, everything fell into place during the August 2008 conflict. The entire world community supported the aggressor, not his victim. Western TV channels showed the burning streets of Tskhinval, passing it off as Georgian cities.

It is time to remember the testament of Alexander III the Peacemaker: "Russia has only two allies - its army and navy." Does this mean that Russia in a crisis should get involved in a symmetrical arms race like the USSR? Until 1991, the USSR traded mostly at a loss, selling it cheaply to "friends" or even just giving it away.

Curious why our politicians and military are not willing to remember the French phenomenon of 1946-1991? France was devastated by the Second World War, then took part in two dozen large and small colonial wars in Laos, Vietnam, the war for the Suez Canal in 1956, the Algiers War (1954-1962). Nevertheless, the French managed, independently of other countries, to create a full range of weapons from ATGMs to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), almost on par with the superpowers. All French ships, including nuclear submarines with ICBMs and aircraft carriers, were built in French shipyards and carry French weapons. And our Ministry of Defense now wants to buy French warships.

But the French people, in order to create the third largest military-industrial complex in the world, did not at all drag their belts. The market economy was intensively developing in the country, the standard of living was steadily rising.

The casket opens easily. Between 1950 and 1990, approximately 60% of the weapons produced by France were exported. Moreover, exports were carried out in all directions. So, in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the armies of Israel and all Arab countries were armed to the teeth with French weapons. Iran and Iraq also fought among themselves with French weapons. England is an ally of France in NATO, but in the Falklands War, it was French-made aircraft and missiles that caused the greatest damage to the British fleet.

I fully admit that a refined intellectual will be indignant: “The French arms trade in all azimuths is immoral!” But, alas, if France had not sold these weapons systems, others would have been guaranteed to sell them.

A rhetorical question arises, can our nuclear submarines sold to Iran, Venezuela, India, Chile, Argentina, etc., even hypothetically, harm Russia at least in a separate future? What about nuclear boats? Let's take purely defensive weapons - anti-aircraft missiles. Why can't the S-300 anti-aircraft system be sold to Venezuela, Iran, Syria and other countries?

AMERICAN ROCKET CHALLENGE

Unfortunately, our politicians and the media pay very little attention to the American ship-based missile defense system, created during the modernization of the Aegis anti-aircraft system. The new missile was named "Standard-3" (SM-3) and after certain alterations (which ones the Pentagon keeps secret) it can be equipped with any of the 84 US Navy ships with the Aegis system. We are talking about 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 57 Airlie Burke-class destroyers.

In 2006, the CG-67 Shiloh cruiser hit a missile warhead with an SM-3 missile at an altitude of 200 km, 250 km northwest of Cauan Island (Hawaii archipelago). Interestingly, according to Western media, the warhead was guided from the Japanese destroyer DDG-174 Kirishima (total displacement 9490 tons; equipped with the Aegis system).

The fact is that since 2005, Japan, with the help of the United States, has been equipping its fleet with SM-3 anti-missiles of the Aegis system.

The first Japanese ship equipped with the Aegis system with the SM-3 was the destroyer DDG-177 Atado. He received anti-missiles at the very end of 2007.

On November 6, 2006, SM-3 missiles launched from the DDG-70 Lake Erie destroyer intercepted two ICBM warheads at once at an altitude of about 180 km.

And on March 21, 2008, an SM-3 missile from the same Lake Erie hit at an altitude of 247 km and shot down an American secret satellite L-21 Radarsat with a direct hit. The official designation for this secret spacecraft is USA-193.

So, in the Far East, American and Japanese destroyers and cruisers can shoot down ballistic missiles of Russian submarines in the initial part of the trajectory, even if they are launched from their own territorial waters.

I note that American ships with the Aegis system regularly visit the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas. The naval missile defense system is dangerous for the Russian Federation not only during the war. The US military deliberately exaggerates its capabilities, deceiving incompetent people in the US and Europe from presidents and ministers to shopkeepers.

The possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union scared everyone, and since 1945 there has been no direct military clash between the West and Russia. Now, for the first time in 60 years, the politicians and the inhabitants of the NATO countries have the illusion of their own impunity. Meanwhile, it does not occur to our media to spoil this euphoria by recalling American nuclear weapons tests at altitudes of 80 to 400 km in the summer of 1962 on Johnson Atoll. Then, after each explosion, radio communications were interrupted for several hours throughout the Pacific Ocean.

In 2001, the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduce Agency (DTRA) attempted to assess the possible impact of testing on low-orbit satellites. The results were disappointing: one small nuclear charge (from 10 to 20 kilotons - like a bomb dropped on Hiroshima), detonated at an altitude of 125 to 300 km, "is enough to disable all satellites that do not have special protection against radiation. Denis Papadopoulos, a plasma physicist at the University of Maryland, had a different opinion: "A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, detonated at a specially calculated altitude, could lead to the loss of 90% of all low-orbit satellites for about a month." It is estimated that the cost of replacing the equipment disabled by the consequences of a high-altitude nuclear explosion will be more than $ 100 billion. This is not counting the general economic losses from the loss of opportunities provided by space technology!

Why not ask American missile defense experts to explain how the Aegis and other missile defense systems will work after the explosion of two dozen hydrogen charges in low orbits? Well, then let the Western taxpayers think for themselves what the Pentagon spends money on in a crisis.

INTRODUCED TOMAHAWKS

Another weapon that has created instability in the world and gives rise to a sense of impunity among the military and politicians is the American Tomahawk-type cruise missiles with a range of 2200-2500 km. Even now, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the United States and NATO countries can launch thousands of such missiles at the Russian Federation. "Tomahawks" can hit ICBM silos, mobile ICBM complexes, communication centers, command posts. Western media argue that a surprise attack by non-nuclear cruise missiles could completely deprive Russia of the ability to launch a nuclear strike.

In this regard, it is surprising that the issue of Tomahawk missiles is not included by our diplomats in the framework of the START negotiations.

By the way, it would be nice to remind our admirals and designers of the Novator Design Bureau that our analogues of the Tomahawks - different Grenades and others - are not even a match for American cruise missiles. And I'm not saying this, but Aunt Geography.

The American Air Force and Navy will never let our ships within 2,500 km of the coast of America. Therefore, the Russian response to the American Tomahawks can only be ship-based missiles Meteorite and Bolid or their more effective counterparts with a firing range of 5-8 thousand km.

WELL FORGOTTEN OLD

The best way to rid the West of illusions about the possibility of delivering an unpunished strike on Russia would be the resuscitation of the Perimeter system.

The system so frightened the West in the early 1990s that it was called the "Dead Hand". Let me briefly remind you of this horror story.

In the 1970s, the development of the "Limited Nuclear War" doctrine began in the United States. In accordance with it, the key nodes of the Kazbek command system and the communication lines of the Strategic Missile Forces will be destroyed by the first strike, and the surviving communication lines will be suppressed by electronic interference. In this way, the US leadership hoped to avoid a retaliatory nuclear strike.

In response, the USSR decided, in addition to the existing RSVN communication channels, to create a special command missile equipped with a powerful radio transmitter, launched during a special period and giving commands to launch all intercontinental missiles on alert throughout the USSR. Moreover, this rocket was only the main part of a large system.

To ensure the guaranteed fulfillment of its role, the system was originally designed as fully automatic and, in the event of a massive attack, is able to make a decision on a retaliatory strike on its own, without (or with minimal participation) a person. The system included numerous devices for measuring radiation, seismic vibrations, it is connected with early warning radar stations, missile attack early warning satellites, etc. The existence of such a system in the West is called immoral, but it is, in fact, the only deterrent that gives real guarantees that a potential adversary will abandon the concept of a crushing preventive strike.

ASYMMETRIC "PERIMETER"

The principle of operation of the Perimeter system is as follows. In peacetime, the main components of the system are in standby mode, monitoring the situation and processing the data coming from the measuring posts. In the event of a threat of a large-scale attack using nuclear weapons, confirmed by the data of early warning systems for a missile attack, the Perimeter complex is automatically put on alert and begins to monitor the operational situation.

If the sensor components of the system confirm with sufficient certainty the fact of a massive nuclear strike, and the system itself loses contact with the main command nodes of the Strategic Missile Forces for a certain time, it initiates the launch of several command missiles, which, flying over their territory, broadcast a control signal using powerful radio transmitters installed on board. signal, and launch codes for all components of the nuclear triad - mine and mobile launch systems, nuclear submarine missile cruisers and strategic aviation. The receiving equipment of both the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces and individual launchers, having received this signal, begins the process of immediately launching ballistic missiles in a fully automatic mode, providing a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even in the event of the death of all personnel.

The development of a special command missile system "Perimeter" was assigned to the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau by a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 695-227 of August 30, 1974. Initially, it was planned to use the MR-UR100 (15A15) rocket as the base rocket, later they settled on the MR-UR100 UTTKh (15A16) rocket. The rocket, modified in terms of the control system, received the index 15A11.

In December 1975, a draft design of a command rocket was completed. A special warhead was installed on the rocket, which had the index 15B99, which included the original radio engineering system developed by the LPI Design Bureau (Leningrad Polytechnic Institute). To ensure the conditions for its functioning, the warhead during the flight had to have a constant orientation in space. A special system for its calming, orientation and stabilization was developed using cold compressed gas (taking into account the experience of developing a propulsion system for a special warhead "Mayak"), which significantly reduced the cost and time of its creation and development. The manufacture of a special MS 15B99 was organized at the Strela NPO in Orenburg.

After ground testing of new technical solutions in 1979, flight design tests of the command rocket began. At NIIP-5, sites 176 and 181, two experimental silo launchers were put into operation. In addition, a special command post was created at site 71, equipped with newly developed unique combat control equipment to ensure remote control and launch of a command missile on orders from the highest command and control levels of the Strategic Missile Forces. A shielded anechoic chamber equipped with equipment for autonomous testing of the radio transmitter was built at a special technical position in the assembly building.

Flight tests of the 15A11 missile were carried out under the leadership of the State Commission, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Varfolomey Korobushin.

The first launch of the 15A11 command missile with the equivalent of a transmitter was successful on December 26, 1979. The interaction of all systems involved in the launch was checked; the rocket brought the warhead 15B99 to a regular trajectory with a peak of about 4000 km and a range of 4500 km. A total of 10 missiles were made for flight testing. However, only seven launches were carried out between 1979 and 1986.

During the tests of the system, real launches of various types of ICBMs from combat facilities were carried out according to orders transmitted by the 15A11 command missile during the flight. To do this, additional antennas were mounted on the launchers of these missiles and receiving devices of the Perimeter system were installed. Later, all launchers and command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces underwent similar modifications. In total, during the flight design tests (LCT), six launches were recognized as successful, and one was partially successful. In connection with the successful progress of the tests and the fulfillment of the tasks set, the State Commission considered it possible to be satisfied with seven launches instead of the planned ten.

THE CURINE FOR POSSIBLE ILLUSIONS

Simultaneously with the LCI of the rocket, ground tests were carried out for the functioning of the entire complex under the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. Tests were carried out at the test site of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, in the laboratories of VNIIEF (Arzamas-16), as well as at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. The checks carried out confirmed the operability of the equipment at levels of exposure to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion exceeding those specified by the TTZ of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In addition, during the tests, the Council of Ministers of the USSR set the task of expanding the functions of the complex with bringing combat orders not only to launchers of ground-based intercontinental missiles, but also to nuclear missile submarines, long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft at airfields and in the air, as well as command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Navy. Flight design tests of the command missile were completed in March 1982, and in January 1985 the Perimeter complex was put on combat duty.

Data on the Perimeter system is extremely classified. However, it can be assumed that the technical operation of the missiles is identical to the operation of the base rocket 15A16. The launcher is mine, automated, highly protected, most likely of the OS type - a modernized OS-84 launcher.

There is no reliable information about the system, however, according to indirect data, it can be assumed that this is a complex expert system equipped with many communication systems and sensors that control the combat situation. The system monitors the presence and intensity of over-the-air negotiations at military frequencies, the receipt of telemetry signals from the Strategic Missile Forces posts, the level of radiation on the surface and in the vicinity, the regular occurrence of point sources of powerful ionizing and electromagnetic radiation at key coordinates, coinciding with sources of short-term seismic disturbances in the earth. bark (which corresponds to the picture of multiple ground nuclear strikes), and the presence of living people at the command post. Based on the correlation of these factors, the system probably makes the final decision on the need for a retaliatory strike. After being put on combat duty, the complex worked and was periodically used during command and staff exercises.

In December 1990, a modernized system was adopted, called the "Perimeter-RC", which worked until June 1995, when, under the START-1 agreement, the complex was removed from combat duty.

It is quite possible that the Perimeter complex should be modernized so that it can quickly respond to a strike by non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles.

I am sure that our scientists can come up with dozens of asymmetric responses to the US military threat, and an order of magnitude cheaper. Well, as for their immorality, if some British ladies consider anti-personnel mines to be immoral weapons, and Tomahawks to be very respectable, then it’s not bad at all to scare them well. And the more the ladies will vote, the less will be the desire of our Western friends to bully Russia.