Three-inch. The best weapon of the First World War. Artillery Artillery of the German Empire in the First World War

Artillery is called the “god of war.” It was created and still exists at the crossroads of many sciences. It has long been the custom that the high rank of “artilleryman” implies knowledge of exact sciences, the ability to quickly and accurately make decisions. The book traces the path of development of world and Russian artillery, talks about the outstanding achievements of Russian designers who created formidable military equipment.

Artillery in the First World War

The shots of the Russo-Japanese War had not even had time to ring out when ominous signs of a new armed conflict began to appear between the largest states of the world. The empires of Europe persistently sought to redistribute the world; each demanded a place of honor among the other, most powerful capitalist states.

Two warring coalitions formed: Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and England, France and Russia, on the other. All major European countries were intensively preparing for a bloody massacre, unprecedented in its scale and ferocity. It broke out in 1914, turning almost half the world into a blazing fire. This was the First World War 1914–1918.

On the eve of it, most military theorists believed that the war would be exclusively maneuverable and short-term. It was assumed that offensive actions would have to be carried out in a situation where the enemy himself would also be in constant motion, and would certainly attack without resorting to cover. The top of the Russian army thought so too, contrary to the experience of the war with Japan. And this experience showed that troops are increasingly taking advantage of various terrain conditions in order to become invisible, in order to gain more reliable cover - even during oncoming military clashes.

Preparations for war were carried out based on the idea of ​​decisive offensive actions. Defense was considered something reprehensible, even shameful. Only the so-called active defense was recognized, the purpose of which was to frustrate the advancing enemy with fire, to undermine his forces, in order to then go on a decisive offensive and defeat him.

These views on the nature of the coming war left a deep imprint on the development of Russian artillery before the World War. Just as the tsarist government was in bondage to the French banks, so were the highest military authorities Tsarist Russia were captivated by the theoretical views of the French General Staff. Mainly from French military specialists, the high command of the Russian army borrowed the doctrine of maneuverable and short-term warfare, contrary to the lessons of past wars with Turkey and Japan. The desire for “unity of caliber and projectile” passed from the French to the Russian artillery. The famous French artilleryman Langlois expressed the idea that the army should be armed mainly with one type of gun. Since it was believed that an exclusively mobile, maneuverable war was ahead, Langlois concluded: all combat missions in such a war could be perfectly resolved by a rapid-fire cannon of a relatively small caliber, easily moved and firing shells of great lethal force at the advancing enemy. The French proposed a 75-mm cannon as such a universal weapon.

Such views were very much to the taste of the Russian War Ministry. This “unity of caliber and projectile,” firstly, reduced the cost of production of artillery materiel and, secondly, greatly simplified training in shooting and the use of artillery in battle. And in the War Ministry, considerations of financial economy were often considered much more important than technical and tactical expediency.

The Russian artillery already had such a cannon, which could become, according to Langlois’s views, a universal weapon. It was a 76-mm rapid-fire gun of the 1902 model. Created by talented Russian artillery inventors, this gun was distinguished by very high qualities. At that time, she was one of the best among this type and withstood with honor combat test in the Russo-Japanese War.

The 76-mm cannon sent its shells with a high initial velocity along a very flat trajectory. Thanks to this, it inflicted serious damage when firing shrapnel at targets located in open areas. The force of the shrapnel fire was so great that one Russian battery could literally destroy a carelessly exposed infantry battalion or even an entire cavalry regiment in a few minutes. The 76-mm cannon was also distinguished by its high rate of fire - up to twenty rounds per minute.

Blind admiration for foreign military thought, excessive enthusiasm for the undoubtedly excellent qualities of the 76-mm cannon and considerations of financial economy led to the fact that the military elite of Tsarist Russia remained deaf to the warning voice of individual specialists who referred to the experience of previous wars - the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Japanese . During these wars, in practice, on the battlefields, it was proven more than once that it was impossible to get by with just one type of artillery piece, that, in addition to a rapid-firing field gun, it was also necessary to have a sufficient number of mounted fire weapons - howitzers and heavy artillery. And yet, on the eve of the World War, the Russian Ministry of War was still chasing the illusory ideal: to arm field artillery with a single caliber weapon with a single projectile.

Meanwhile, the 76mm field gun, so powerful against open targets, was exceptionally weak against hidden targets. Her shrapnel fire turned out to be completely powerless to destroy field shelters. As soon as the people who fell under the shrapnel of a 76-mm cannon lay down and sketched out a head trench 60–70 centimeters high in front of them, they were almost safe. The fire of a 76-mm cannon could not sweep away artificial obstacles, since the impact and destructive effect of its shrapnel projectile was small.

There was one more drawback of the 76-mm gun, which prevented its full use in the new conditions of field warfare. The very high level of fire limited the possibility of firing over the heads of friendly infantry. Batteries of 76-mm cannons had to be placed far behind the infantry - no closer than one kilometer - and stop firing at the enemy's front lines when the attacking infantry still had 300–400 meters to go.

The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that the most effective remedy to hit a hidden enemy - this is a howitzer. The steep trajectory of its projectiles allows it to hit the enemy with overhead fire even when he is not visible from behind cover. And powerful shells from large-caliber howitzers make it possible to destroy very strong field fortifications.

Before the World War, the Russian artillery adopted a 122-mm howitzer of the 1909 model. It was in many ways superior to a similar howitzer that was in service in Austria. German artillery. The shrapnel bullets of the Russian howitzer hit the hidden enemy quite well. In addition, the howitzer could also fire grenades with a powerful explosive charge. Thanks to this, the fire of the 122-mm howitzer had a very destructive effect on field fortifications. But there were very few 122-mm howitzers. This clearly reflected the disdain of the military leaders for mounted fire guns.

The Russian army also had a 76-mm mountain gun of the 1909 model, produced by the Putilov plant. This cannon sent its shells at first along a fairly flat trajectory, and by the end of the flight its shells fell along a very steep line. Such shooting is necessary in mountain warfare, when shells must be thrown over steep slopes.

The 76mm gun was essentially a howitzer. In addition, she was extremely light and therefore could move faster. The mountain cannon could be successfully used in ordinary field battles, as it was quite suitable for maneuvering and joint actions with infantry. Thus, the mountain cannon could, to some extent, compensate for the lack of mounted fire guns and replace the 76-mm field rapid-fire cannon in cases where it would be necessary to hit a well-covered enemy. This was all the more easy to do since both cannons fired the same projectile. However, even in this case, the highest military circles showed an underestimation of the full importance of mounted fire guns in the upcoming war: by the beginning of the World War, there were even fewer mountain guns in the Russian army than 122-mm howitzers.

One should not, however, think that this attitude of the War Ministry and the General Staff to the problems of arming the army was shared by all artillerymen. In fact, there was a tragic gap between the creative aspirations of the best artillerymen and the officially accepted opinion. There were many outstanding and talented specialists in the army who perfectly understood the new tasks modern warfare posed to artillery. They made every effort to improve technical weapons. But often all their energy was spent on a fruitless struggle against the inertia, slowness and rottenness of the state and military machine.

Improvement of the designs of guns, shells and materiel, immediate consideration of inventions, management of research and experiments in the field of artillery - all this was entrusted to the Artillery Committee under the Chief artillery department. Among the members of this committee were a large number of scientists and specialists who became famous not only in Russia, but also far beyond its borders. Many members of the Artillery Committee were professors at the Artillery Academy and other higher educational institutions. Some had the title of academicians - and not only Russian Academy sciences, but also the academies of Paris and London. The technical level of Russian artillerymen was very high, especially in theoretical terms.

To resolve certain complex issues, the most prominent specialists of that time - scientists, researchers, production workers - were invited to the Artillery Committee. This made it possible to use the latest achievements of science and technology for the development of artillery.

However, despite all this, the initiative for new inventions rarely came from the bowels of the Artillery Committee. And those proposals that the committee put forward were often either not implemented at all, or were carried out in a distorted form.

Representatives of the authorities, and primarily Minister of War Sukhomlinov, clearly patronized large foreign firms that owned powerful military factories - Schneider in France, Krupp in Germany, Vickers in England. They were given preference even in cases where some proposal coming from a Russian factory or artillery inventor was clearly better and more expedient than a foreign one. Of course, all this posed severe obstacles to the development of Russian artillery and stifled inventive initiative.

The working conditions the Russian artillerymen were subjected to by the tsarist authorities can be seen from the following example. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, a special commission arose at the Main Artillery Directorate to study the experience of this war. The commission included very large and authoritative artillerymen of that time. They made a number of important proposals for the reorganization of Russian artillery based on combat experience. The question of howitzers and heavy field artillery arose especially acutely. The commission insisted that it was necessary to equip the Russian army as quickly as possible with long-range cannons and large-caliber howitzers that fired shells of great destructive power. It was emphasized that the combat effectiveness of the Russian army in the new conditions of war could be more or less satisfactory only if each corps had at least two batteries of 152 mm howitzers and one battery of 107 mm long-range guns. War Ministry and General base The commission's proposal was formally accepted. But even ten years later, that is, by the beginning of the World War, the intended program was completed to an absolutely insignificant extent: there were so few heavy howitzers and long-range guns that they could only be assigned to entire armies consisting of several corps.

The military leaders showed an even more criminal attitude towards heavy siege-type artillery. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that not a single Russian siege weapon meets the new requirements. But the General Staff, clouded by spectacular ideas about the maneuverable, offensive nature of the upcoming war, did not attach serious importance to heavy siege-type artillery. It was believed that siege artillery, due to its heaviness and bulkiness, would only tie up the maneuverable actions of troops. And to destroy enemy fortresses and strongholds, they considered it possible to take heavy artillery from their fortresses, which during the attack would remain in the rear, out of threat from the enemy. Therefore, in the mobilization schedule, the General Staff did not even provide for siege artillery at all.

The establishment of the General Staff was strongly supported by Minister of War Sukhomlinov and, of course, pleased the Ministry of Finance, since there was no need for special allocations for the creation of heavy siege-type artillery.

During the First World War, it became clear why Sukhomlinov supported such ridiculous views. Sukhomlinov betrayed his homeland. He was associated with German spies and, where he could, pursued with impunity the policy of “disarmament” of Russia in the interests of its future enemy, Germany. Sukhomlinov suppressed military inventive thought in every possible way and deliberately made the weapons of the Russian army dependent on foreign factories, in particular on the German manufacturer Krupp. Sukhomlinov ensured that just on the eve of the World War, Russian fortresses, which were supposed to hold back the pressure of German troops if they entered Russian territory, began to be abolished. The destruction of fortresses took place under the pretext of obsolescence, but it was no coincidence that such first-class fortresses as Novogeorgievsk and others were included in the “obsolete” list. Many fortresses had to be hastily restored during the war.

By the beginning of the World War, Russian artillery turned out to be technically much weaker armed than the artillery of its opponents.

There were many legends about the German heavy howitzer called “Fat Bertha”, which the Germans acquired during the World War and for a long time was a source of pride for them. Its caliber is 420 millimeters; the powerful projectile weighed 800 kilograms. This is a weapon of strong destructive action, which the strongest field and fortress structures could not resist.

Many people know this, but few know about the following fact. In 1912, experimental firing of Russian artillery took place on the island of Berezan in the Black Sea. The newest heavy Schneider howitzer with a caliber of 280 millimeters was tested. Experimental shooting showed that this howitzer cannot destroy strong reinforced concrete fortifications.

The artillerymen became convinced that a larger caliber gun was needed for this purpose. At the beginning of 1913, such a howitzer was designed by a member of the Artillery Committee, Durlyakhov, together with a group of engineers from the Metal Plant in St. Petersburg. It was a powerful howitzer with a caliber of 420 millimeters. All calculations convinced us that its effect even on the most powerful fortifications would be unusually strong. However, there was no factory in Russia that would undertake to manufacture such weapons. The War Ministry, of course, was in no hurry to implement this invention. It transferred an order for one prototype howitzer to the French Schneider plant. And here they were not in too much of a hurry to implement it. A prototype of the howitzer was made already during the war, but the Russian army never received it.

Meanwhile, in Germany it became known about the experiments at Berezan and about the design of a powerful howitzer by Russian artillerymen. And there is every reason to think that the Germans hastened to draw the appropriate conclusions from this... Thus, there can be no talk about the originality of the invention of the German “Fat Bertha”; It is obvious that the German artillerymen do not have to boast or be particularly proud of this howitzer.

Only the suspicious slowness of the War Ministry prevented Russian artillerymen from deploying a siege howitzer, which turned out to be so necessary during the World War, onto the battlefields.

The fate of the invention of the talented Russian artilleryman V. Tarnovsky was not much better. He foresaw the enormous role he would play later military aviation, and long before the war he proposed an original design for a special anti-aircraft gun. But this proposal was not treated with due attention. Tarnovsky eventually ceded his idea to the Putilov plant, where he, much belatedly, began designing a gun together with the plant engineer Lender. The first four anti-aircraft guns of Tarnovsky and Lander were manufactured only in March 1915.

Each major war brings something new to the art of war. But no war has brought as many surprises as the world war. She overturned many assumptions and theories; she raised questions that bourgeois military art proved completely powerless for a long time.

The hopes of all the warring countries for exceptional maneuverability and short duration of the war were completely unjustified. The maneuver period of the war ended quite quickly. The unusually increased force of fire forced the troops to bury themselves deep in the ground, erect a continuous line of strong fortifications in the field and move on to a long positional struggle.

The imperialist world war also brought a lot of new things into the development of artillery. Never has the role of this type of troops been as great as on the battlefields of 1914–1918. Not a single operation, not a single offensive, not a single defensive battle could be successfully carried out without a sufficient concentration of artillery fire. The fate of many battles was decided solely by artillery. The power of artillery fire increased so much that often nothing could resist it - neither earthen fortifications, nor reinforced concrete shelters, nor steel armor, nor the will and endurance of the soldiers of the warring armies.

There have never been so many guns on the battlefields as in the First world war. During their offensive in Galicia, in the fall of 1914, the Russians concentrated more than one and a half thousand guns for the general battle that decided the outcome of the operation. And during the unsuccessful attempt of the Germans, at the end of the same year, to defeat the Russian armies near Lodz, almost three thousand guns were involved on both sides. The massing of artillery during the positional period of the war reached unprecedented proportions, especially in the Western European theater. Some battles in this war can easily be called artillery. In 1917, to break through the German positions at Malmaison, the French concentrated 1,860 guns over a very short area. In the main attack area, the saturation of artillery was so great that there was one gun for every four and a half meters.

The consumption of shells during the war reached unheard of levels. In the battles of Verdun, from August 13 to 27, 1917, 4 million shells were fired. Their total weight reached 120 thousand tons. For every meter of front there were 6 tons of metal! There were battles during the World War in which the consumption of shells reached one million in just one day - this is approximately the same amount of shells Russia spent during the entire Russo-Japanese War.

From the very first months of the war, it became clear that the desire for “unity of caliber and projectile” was wrong. The rapid-fire 76-mm cannon was far from able to solve all the new tasks that the world war posed to the artillery. Guns of the most diverse types and calibers were required - and in large quantities. What was needed were quick-firing cannons, mounted fire field guns - howitzers, long-range cannons, and heavy siege-type howitzers. Special close-combat weapons were also needed for trench warfare, and anti-aircraft guns for fighting air enemies, as well as light assault guns for directly accompanying infantry in battle. The need for heavy artillery was especially acute, the shells of which could destroy artificial obstacles and durable earthen and reinforced concrete shelters.

Russian artillerymen did not have the abundance and variety of technical means that their main enemy, the Germans, had.

The guns of Russian artillery were in no way inferior in their combat qualities to similar guns of Germany and Austria, but in almost all battles the Austro-German artillery outnumbered the Russian. Each German corps had 160 guns, including 35 howitzers. And in the Russian corps there were only 108 guns, including 12 howitzers. The Russian corps did not have heavy artillery at all, and each German corps had four heavy batteries.

During the unsuccessful German offensive at the end of 1914 on left-bank Poland, they had quantitative superiority in artillery in all battles. At the battle of Vlatslavsk the Russians had 106 guns and the Germans 324; in the battle of Kutno, the Russians had 131 guns, and the Germans had up to 400, etc. And so on in almost all battles. The artillerymen had to make up for this huge discrepancy in the saturation of military equipment with the art of their shooting.

The enormous scale that the world imperialist war assumed was unexpected for all the warring states. It required the use of a colossal amount of a wide variety of technical means. The consumption of fire supplies greatly exceeded all pre-war estimates and showed the insignificance of peacetime mobilization reserves. It became obvious that the armies must be supplied with military equipment on an incomparably larger scale than planned on the eve of the war. Under these conditions, the work of the rear, industry, and the state of the entire economy of the country, of course, played a decisive role. All states began to hastily rearm their troops with more modern, powerful equipment.

In establishing the size of the reserves of artillery shells, the War Ministry proceeded from the following considerations. During the entire war with Japan, the Russians used an average of 720 rounds for each 76 mm cannon. A new war must require more shells. And the War Department established for a future war increased rate- 1,000 rounds per gun throughout the year. In addition, the General Staff, carried away by the ideas of a short-term war, intended to fight for no more than six months. Therefore, the War Ministry complacently believed that the artillery was provided with shells for the entire duration of the war with a large supply. This complacent mood was not disturbed by the fact that the set of shells for light howitzers was far from completely ready at the beginning of the war, and for heavy field guns there was only half of the required reserves. The top of the army was not worried, convinced that the fate of the war would be decided by quick strikes in field maneuver battles, where the 76-mm guns would play the main role.

Reality brutally crushed all these calculations and assumptions. Already at the end of the first month of the war, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War that the artillery was operating successfully, but that “the situation with regard to the supply of cannon cartridges is critical.” And at the beginning of September 1914, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front urgently telegraphed Nicholas II that he was forced to suspend military operations along the entire front until the reserves of 76-mm cannon cartridges were replenished.

By the end of 1914, the supply of 76-mm shells had run out. But it was not possible to replenish it, since the mobilization of Russian factories that produced shells was not prepared in advance and their productivity was extremely low. Sukhomlinov carried out the task of German intelligence - to disrupt the supply of shells to the front, not to give the front guns, not to give rifles.

At the beginning of 1915, the shortage of 76-mm shells was felt so acutely that their consumption on the day of battle had to be limited to 5-10 rounds per gun. Under the threat of being brought before a military court, the commanders of batteries and artillery divisions had to strictly comply with this order. Of course, in such conditions it was impossible to even think about an offensive.

The shortage of shells in the Russian army decreased to some extent only by 1916, the third year of the war. By that time, the upper echelons of power were convinced of Sukhomlinov’s subversive activities. In addition, Russian patriotic entrepreneurs mobilized everything internal resources countries for military needs, and weapons ordered from foreign factories also began to arrive. However, we note that until the end of the war, Russia was not able to supply its army with a sufficient number of shells.

With the transition to trench warfare, the shortage of shells for howitzer and heavy artillery became especially acute. Namely, in positional conditions, the fire of howitzers and heavy guns is especially important, since no advance is possible unless the enemy’s defensive fortifications are first destroyed and his firing points hidden in strong shelters are not suppressed.

Thus, throughout almost the entire war, Russian artillerymen had to reckon with a lack of shells and often limit their actions because of this. As a result, Russian artillery spent significantly fewer shells during the World War than the artillery of other countries. During all the years of the war, Russian artillerymen fired no more than 50 million shells of all calibers, including chemical shells. This expense was enormous, even unsustainable for the state in which the economy of Tsarist Russia was then. But if you compare this figure with the consumption of shells in other warring countries, it will seem very small. The British artillery fired 170 million shells during the war, the German artillery fired 272 million, and French artillery spent almost 200 million shells of only two calibers (75 mm and 150 mm).

The enormous scale of the world war affected not only the number of shells consumed. A significant increase in the number of guns was also required. The artillery had to solve a wide variety of problems. The artillery was supposed to stop the advance of the enemy infantry and put it to flight; the artillery had to clear the way for its advancing infantry, suppress the enemy’s artillery fire, destroy its wire fences and all other artificial obstacles, destroy machine-gun nests, and deprive the enemy infantry sitting in the trenches of its defense capability; destroy the enemy's deep rear areas, warehouses, stations, headquarters; the artillery had to fight enemy aircraft... It is difficult to say what the artillery should not have done during the World War.

The total number of guns during the war increased in Russia by one and a half times, and in France and Germany - three times.

In the Russian army, heavy artillery for special purposes consisted of more than 600 guns of various types and calibers. Among them were 120-mm long-range guns, and 152-mm howitzers, and guns of very large calibers, such as the 280-mm howitzers of Schneider, the 305-mm howitzers of Vickers and the Obukhov plant, etc. The TAON also included several Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns and a large number of English and French mortars. In addition, a sapper battalion, a railway company, and aviation and aeronautical detachments were attached to TAON.

The TAON included 152-mm Kane coastal guns, firing at a distance of up to thirteen kilometers, and 120-mm guns from the Obukhov plant with a firing range of 14.4 kilometers. Obukhov 305-mm howitzers fired shells weighing almost 400 kilograms at a distance of up to 13 kilometers. The shells of 305-mm howitzers had a large explosive charge, and therefore their destructive effect was very impressive.

Kane's guns and howitzers from the Obukhov plant were transported only by rail. Some of the TAON guns were moved using tractors, and some guns were transported disassembled by horse traction, and then they were assembled directly at the position itself.

The longest-range gun in the Russian army was the 254-mm coastal gun. She shot for more than twenty kilometers. Several of these guns, taken from coastal fortresses, were on the Austro-German front. A special railway platform served as a carriage for each cannon, from where it fired. Fire from the platform could only be directed in the direction of the railway track. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust branches to the main rail track in order to turn the gun in the direction of fire.

During the shooting, the rail track was strengthened with additional sleepers, since the track settled due to the enormous pressure during the shot.

The World War created a new type of artillery - the so-called trench artillery. It consisted of bomb throwers, mortars and assault cannons. Even during the Russo-Japanese War, when trenches and trenches began to be widely used, the troops themselves began to make handicraft melee weapons. These were guns with a very short muzzle, sending projectiles of high explosive force along a very steep trajectory. They called them mortars.

The firing range of mortars is very short, but such guns are very convenient for hitting the enemy hidden in trenches and trenches.

During the World War, close-combat trench guns received very widespread. Bomb launchers were intended primarily to hit living targets. The infantry used them in cases where it was not possible to use them for any reason. light field artillery, and rifle or machine gun fire alone was not enough. Mortars were put into action to destroy dugouts, trenches and various barriers. By the end of the war, the Russian army had 14 thousand mortar-bomb throwers, 4,500 light mortars and only 267 heavy mortars - the latter were clearly not enough, and there were already more light bomb throwers than the army required.

To accompany the infantry during the attack and subsequently consolidate it in the captured areas of the enemy position, special guns were needed. The 76-mm field gun could not follow its infantry everywhere: it was too heavy for this and required a team of six horses to transport it. What was needed were much lighter and more mobile tools that could be rolled by hand by two or three people. Such weapons began to gradually appear in the Russian army. They were at the disposal of the infantry itself and served mainly to knock out and destroy enemy machine guns and light guns. If they were not taken out of action in a timely manner, they inflicted huge losses on the attacking infantry and deprived them of their offensive impulse.

The Russian assault artillery had a rather motley composition. There were also guns taken from navy, and the so-called “short mountain guns”, and guns taken from fortresses, and, finally, a number of small-caliber guns of 47 and 37 millimeters. Among the latter, the 37-mm cannon system of the Russian inventor Rosenberg was distinguished by its high combat qualities.

In general, there was clearly a lack of assault artillery. There were approximately five times fewer assault guns than were required. The technologically weak industry of Russia could not quickly cope with the development of the production of new types of weapons.

During the World War, military aviation developed widely. At first, the planes served only for reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. They were then adapted to bombing and machine-gunning ground targets.

The threat from the air has become very serious.

Russia, like other states, turned out to be unprepared to fight the air enemy. We had to quickly find artillery weapons that could repel raids by enemy airplanes. At first, at the front they tried to fire at aircraft from 76-mm field guns. To do this, a small ditch was dug under the trunk of their gun carriage in order to raise the muzzle of the gun as high as possible. But this had a very weak effect, especially since the altitude and flight speed of airplanes was constantly increasing.

Then they began to adapt naval rapid-fire guns with a caliber of 75 millimeters for anti-aircraft shooting. They still fired more effectively at airplanes than simple ones. field guns. Finally, in March 1915, much belatedly, the first Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns were manufactured. But it was a drop in the ocean. The production of special anti-aircraft guns was a very difficult matter. Therefore, one could not count on the rapid production of a large number of such guns. Most often, they resorted to constructing makeshift installations, with the help of which it would be possible to conduct anti-aircraft fire from conventional 76-mm field guns. Such installations were manufactured using military units. And in this area, Russian artillerymen showed a lot of ingenuity. The simplest devices were all kinds of pedestals on which the guns were mounted so that the muzzle of the gun looked as high as possible. And by the end of the war, even a special machine for anti-aircraft firing of the B.N. system was designed. Ivanova. This machine had a circular rail, which allowed the gun to be rotated in a circle while firing and the muzzle to follow the movement of the aircraft.

Most anti-aircraft installations were moved disassembled using horse traction. In the same places that were subject to systematic enemy air raids, stationary anti-aircraft batteries more complex device. Finally, cars were adapted to quickly transport anti-aircraft guns to a particular area. Each such “vehicle battery for firing at the air fleet” consisted of four Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns.

The guns were mounted on armored vehicles specially adapted for this purpose. Steel armor protected drivers, gun personnel and vital parts of the vehicle from shrapnel and long-range rifle fire. The cars also served as charging boxes. In addition, each battery was followed by 4 armored vehicles, exclusively for transporting shells, gasoline and oil. Three passenger cars transported battery commanders and signalmen; Scouts with such a battery traveled on motorcycles; and, finally, this whole cavalcade was completed by a kitchen-training house, also installed on the car.

Automotive anti-aircraft batteries were already quite advanced, for that time, military weapons for fighting the air enemy. However, during the entire war it was possible to form only 9 car batteries- the number is absolutely insignificant in terms of the scale of the world war. And in total, by the end of the war, there were no more than 70 guns of the Tarnovsky system at the front.

Yes, Russian artillerymen during the World War were much worse equipped with the latest military equipment than their opponents, the Austro-Germans. But the Russian artillerymen fired very accurately. And there were often cases when the high art of shooting made up for the lack of guns and shells. Russian artillerymen knew how to achieve great results with little means.

The war with Japan confirmed the absolute need for indirect shooting using a protractor. After the end of this war, Russian artillerymen began to improve in the art of such shooting. Soon, all battery commanders not only gained respect for the inclinometer, but also completely mastered its use in a wide variety of conditions. By the beginning of the World War, Russian artillerymen were excellent at shooting from closed positions. In this regard, the Austro-Germans were far behind the Russian artillerymen. During the maneuver period of the war, Austro-German artillerymen occupied predominantly semi-open or completely open positions. They often tried to dash off with their battery to the top of some hill or knoll, and for this they were just as often brutally beaten by skillful Russian artillery fire. Austro-German artillerymen had to retrain during the war, borrowing Russian techniques for the closed arrangement of batteries, and partly the rules of shooting.

The artillerymen were the most educated and advanced part of the Russian army. Junior officers received very solid training in special schools. Most commanders not only knew their job well, but also had fairly extensive knowledge in other areas of science, especially in the field of mathematics and chemistry.

Private artillery personnel recruited from the most literate and intelligent people. Besides, general work on mastering complex equipment, where each gun is a unique production unit, developed a collective spirit of comradely cohesion and mutual support among ordinary artillerymen. It was not for nothing that there was a widespread opinion among them that the origin of the word “artillery” was connected with the fact that artillerymen worked as an “artel”.

The fireworks (junior command staff) were most thoroughly prepared. They superbly managed the entire work of the gun crew and could, if necessary, replace the commander of the artillery platoon. Fireworks not only knew their job well, as practitioners, but also understood the theoretical foundations of artillery shooting.

Senior commanders received combat training at the officer artillery school. This school at one time played a major role in educating the bulk of Russian artillerymen at the level of modern war requirements. Through the school, new ideas in the field of artillery tactics, technology and shooting rules were put into practice. Every senior commander, before he received command of a battery, division or battalion of fortress artillery, took an officer school course.

The education at this school was very good. Much attention was paid to practical exercises and shooting. In this respect, the Russian officer school differed favorably from similar schools in other countries, where a purely theoretical, lecture-based teaching method prevailed. The school had its own well-equipped training ground near the city of Luga. The range allowed firing from guns of any caliber, as well as carrying out a wide variety of maneuvers. The terrain at the training ground is very rugged and therefore very convenient for conducting a wide variety of combat exercises. The range was equipped with mechanical targets. Some of them made themselves known by flashes of light or smoke, others were lowered and raised with the help of special cables, and others could even move mechanically from one place to another. All this brought the training shooting situation closer to the conditions of actual combat.

Senior commanders who went through this school were fluent in the art of indirect shooting and had a fairly good understanding of the tactical issues of using artillery in battle.

Unfortunately, such an assessment cannot be given to the combined arms commanders of the Russian army. For the most part, they did not understand the properties and tasks of artillery and therefore could not often use it properly. During the World War, there were often cases when artillerymen entered battle at their own discretion and carried out certain combat missions on their own initiative.

Russian artillerymen were preparing to fight the world war in a decisive offensive spirit. They understood perfectly well that under modern battle conditions the situation changes quickly and there is not always time to wait for orders from above. The artillery commander must make independent decisions in these cases. In battle, it often happens that an opportunity for a beneficial action by artillery suddenly presents itself, the outcome of the matter is decided in minutes, and the properties of artillery make it possible to inflict defeat in the shortest possible time. Therefore, Russian artillerymen attached great importance to any manifestation of personal initiative, decisiveness and speed of action.

A striking example of such a decisive offensive action can be the maneuvers of Russian horse artillery. Greater mobility and rapid firing were especially required from horse artillery. By all means they tried to develop valor and an unbridled impulse forward among the horse artillerymen.

During maneuvers, Russian horse artillerymen performed, for example, such a spectacular and bold technique. As soon as the cavalry was reorganized into battle formation, horse batteries jumped out at full speed from some flank, ahead of their cavalry. Then the guns were quickly removed from the limbers and sudden rapid fire was opened on the advancing enemy cavalry. To perform such a maneuver and open rapid fire, horse artillerymen needed no more than two minutes. Their own cavalry, going on the attack, quickly covered the enemy cavalry rushing towards them, and after that the fire from the horse batteries was transferred to the enemy’s artillery and machine guns.

The experience of the maneuver period of the World War confirmed that, in general, the training of Russian artillerymen was quite correct. The World War on the Russian front began with oncoming battles on the borders of Russia with Germany and Austria. Wide border spaces, which did not hamper the actions of troops, made it possible to carry out the most daring maneuvers. At that time, Russian artillerymen dealt primarily with open enemy personnel or with light field fortifications. There was still enough ammunition, and the artillerymen did not have to skimp. The Russian artillery fire was terrifying, and the art of shooting left nothing to be desired. No wonder the 76-mm cannon was nicknamed the “death scythe.”

At the very beginning of the war, Russian troops invaded Germany and captured part of East Prussia. During this offensive, the Battle of Gumbinen took place.

On August 20, 1914, strong units of the 17th German Corps under General Mackensen attacked two Russian divisions. The forces met were unequal. Mackensen had significantly more infantry and more artillery, and he also had at his disposal heavy guns, which the Russians did not have at all in this sector of the front.

First, the German batteries opened hurricane fire. They fired a huge number of shells of a wide variety of calibers. The German infantry then moved forward and drove a wedge between the two Russian divisions. The Russian artillerymen immediately took advantage of this: they opened flank crossfire on the advancing Germans from two sides - two batteries from the north and two batteries from the south. Shrapnel from 76-millimeter cannons showered bullets on the advancing enemy lines. The German infantry suffered huge losses.

Three hours later, its pitiful remnants rushed back in complete disorder, leaving the wounded and dead on the battlefield.

Following this, the Germans tried to outflank one of the divisions. The German infantry walked in thick chains, maintaining alignment, as if in a parade. Some German officers even rode on horseback in the ranks of their units. Russian artillerymen brought the enemy to a fairly close range and suddenly immediately unleashed hurricane-force shrapnel fire on him. The German infantry began to thin out greatly, split into separate groups and finally lay down, continuing to suffer heavy losses. The enemy artillery tried in vain to put out the fire of the 76-mm cannons in order to save their infantry: the Russian batteries stood in well-covered positions and were invulnerable.

In the same battle, the artillerymen brutally taught the Germans a lesson for their manner of moving into open positions. It happened near the village of Matishkemen. Two German batteries, wanting to help out their infantry, dashed out into the open 1,200 steps from the dug-in Russian infantry. But the Germans only managed to fire one shot. The gunners suddenly opened their deadly fire from 76 mm cannons. In just a few minutes, the German batteries were destroyed by well-aimed fire. The infantry that went on the attack captured 12 German guns and 24 charging boxes.

In the battle on August 26, 1914, German artillery was located east of the village of Tarnaaka. In the first line there were three light batteries in a semi-closed position. Behind them are three howitzer batteries. They occupied a position covered from the east, but half-covered from the northeast. The Russian batteries were located about five kilometers northeast of the German ones. On their right flank there was a battery of 122 mm howitzers. This howitzer battery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery. The task was not easy, given that the Germans had significantly more guns.

When it began to get dark in the evening, the commander of the howitzer battery saw the brilliance of the shots of the German guns, which were repelling the attacks of the Russian infantry with rapid fire. From these flashes he determined the exact aim for each of his howitzers and then proceeded to engage. They shot with combined fire: either grenades or shrapnel.

An hour has passed. The German artillery fire gradually died down. And soon neither the flashes of enemy guns nor the explosions of shrapnel over the Russian infantry, rushing to the attack, became visible. After the capture of the German positions, it turned out that out of 34 guns, three were knocked out, one of the howitzers, thrown through a charging box by a grenade explosion, lay a few steps away from it. Nine exploded and broken charging boxes lay nearby, and almost all the German artillerymen were killed or wounded.

So one battery, despite extremely difficult shooting conditions, destroyed six German batteries.

The desire of Russian artillerymen to shoot from closed positions, of course, does not give any reason to reproach them for lack of courage. Having fully mastered the art of shooting from closed positions, they did not even think about moving to an open position and holding firm under enemy fire when this was not necessary. But if such a thing arose...

On the night of October 10, 1914, the vanguard units of the 25th Russian Corps crossed to the left bank of the Vistula River near New Alexandria. In the morning they were attacked by superior Hungarian forces, supported by heavy artillery. The Hungarians, having bypassed both flanks of the Russians and surrounded them in a close semi-ring, began to press them towards the Vistula. The only bridge along which the Russians could retreat beyond the Vistula was under heavy fire from enemy artillery. The situation is extremely difficult. The withdrawal threatened complete disaster. The situation was saved by the artillerymen. They boldly went out into the open and began to shower the advancing Hungarians with shrapnel. For almost six hours they were under heavy rifle fire from the Hungarian infantry, which in some places had already approached 400 meters. But the artillerymen held firm and repulsed all enemy attacks.

And in April 1915, during the attack on Chernivtsi, such an incident occurred. Russian infantry captured the ridge of heights near the village of Rapanche. But behind the ridge she was met by destructive enemy machine-gun fire. Only artillery could suppress machine gun fire. However, the artillerymen could not see from their observation posts what was happening behind the ridge. Then a platoon of a mountain battery rushed to the ridge in the quarry. When he reached it, the Russian infantry had already been almost completely knocked off the ridge by the Austrian counterattack. The gun teams that appeared were also killed. The mountain platoon commander was captured. But the surviving gun crew soldiers were not at a loss. They managed to fire 4-5 shrapnel into grapeshot right at point-blank range of the advancing Austrians. The enemy stopped in confusion and lay down. This made it possible for the Russian infantry to again take possession of an important ridge and hold on to it.

Russian artillerymen were brought up in the spirit of quick and decisive action, which helped them seize the initiative and decide the outcome of the battle. This quality is especially important in conditions of oncoming combat.

On August 26, 1914, a counter-collision between a Russian division and an Austrian division took place in Galicia. At the forefront of the Russian division was an artillery battalion consisting of three light batteries of 76-mm cannons. In anticipation of an imminent clash, the Russians and Austrians began to deploy in battle formation in advance. The 24 guns of the Russian vanguard quickly took up position, and the gunners prepared to open fire. The artillery of the Austrian vanguard was very late, and this gave the Russians a great advantage. As soon as the Austrian rifle chains appeared on the ridge of the hills ahead, Russian batteries immediately fell on them with rapid fire. The 44th Austrian Regiment, coming under sudden shrapnel fire, was almost completely destroyed within fifteen to twenty minutes. An hour and a half later, the Austrian vanguard artillery finally opened fire. But it was too late: the Austrians lost the offensive initiative and had to go on the defensive. But they failed to do this either. Russian troops used their fire superiority and with an energetic attack finally defeated the Austrians.

Horse artillery was particularly fast in maneuvering. In a battle with the Austrians near the city of Tomashev, the Don Cossack batteries showed an example of a lightning strike. The Austrians, greatly outnumbered, forced the Russians to retreat to the Tomashevsky forest. Behind the Austrian rifle chains was a close reserve column of three battalions. At this time, two Cossack batteries at full quarry rushed, hiding behind the crest of a hill, to the flank of the advancing Austrians. Quickly removing the guns from their limbers, the horse artillerymen opened rapid flank fire two minutes later: one battery on the reserve column, and the other on the advancing chains.

And these precious minutes decided the whole matter. After two or three minutes, the orderly advancing chains and the reserve column were literally swept away by hurricane fire.

The Austrian artillery, which came to the rescue of its infantry, tried to open fire, but quickly abandoned its occupied position and rushed back, gripped by general panic. The battle ended with the complete destruction of the 44th Austrian regiment - one of the best regiments, which was recruited from residents of the city of Vienna. Tragic death This regiment at the very beginning of the war made a depressing impression on the residents of the capital of Austria-Hungary.

During the First World War, anti-aircraft fire was so imperfect that to destroy one aircraft, even with the help of special anti-aircraft guns, it was necessary to fire from 3 to 11 thousand shells. However, Russian artillerymen sometimes showed examples of incomparably more accurate shooting at an airborne enemy.

In 1916, the 7th separate light Russian battery defended the Romanian city of Medzhidiye from air raids. On October 1, six German bomb carriers appeared in the area where the battery was located. The artillerymen opened fire. Fleeing from the shell, two enemy aircraft immediately quickly left. The rest dispersed across the sky above the city and hastily dropped their bombs. Then the airplanes entered from different sides into the so-called “dead crater” of the Russian battery, that is, into the zone where its shells could not reach. The planes descended and several bombs fell on the battery. Eight Russian anti-aircraft gunners were wounded and shell-shocked. But no one went to get a bandage until the end of the battle; everyone remained where they were. The German planes went home. The 7th battery fired several salvos at them. The third salvo hit one of the planes. It quickly began to descend, then caught fire and fell like a flaming torch towards the neighboring Romanian troops.

A short time later, observation posts reported by telephone that again five German planes were rushing towards the city. But only two planes dared to go to the city itself. They flew with great caution, making sharp turns and bends all the time. They dropped few bombs and indiscriminately. At the same time, the remaining three aircraft took turns descending to the dead crater of the Russian battery and tried to hit the gunners with bombs and machine-gun fire. However, the German pilots did this so timidly and uncertainly that they could not cause any harm. Flying home, the German bombers rose very high at large intervals from each other. Russian anti-aircraft gunners selected one of the enemy aircraft and concentrated their fire on it. Soon, a large metal part separated from the plane and fell, which turned out to be the engine hood. The engine stopped, and the plane began to descend towards its own positions. He flew over the Serbian infantry trenches, descending lower and lower. But he was unable to get through the wire barriers; he buried his nose in them and froze helplessly in place.

An hour later, German bomb carriers appeared again. This time there were four of them. Approaching the city, they split up in pairs. But the first pair immediately turned back under fire from the 7th battery without dropping a single bomb. The second pair also did not complete the task: after dropping only a few bombs, they followed the first.

The death of two German bomb carriers and the flight of the other four - this was the result of the firing of Russian anti-aircraft gunners that day. At the same time, only 364 shells were spent - a figure that at that time could be considered insignificant.

In the Russian theater of war, the period of maneuver lasted until approximately the autumn of 1915, when both sides, having exhausted their strength and material resources, dug into the ground and switched to trench warfare. Under these conditions, everyone had to retrain and develop new tactics to fight for the fortified zones. And the Russian artillerymen were not lagging behind in this regard. They quickly learned that breaking through the enemy's fortified zone is not a field battle in which the situation is assessed on the move, almost at lightning speed, but a well-thought-out and strictly calculated operation. If, during an attack in maneuverable conditions, especially in a meeting battle, it is impossible to foresee all artillery actions in a rapidly changing situation, if in these conditions any attempt at an accurate schedule is doomed to failure in advance and even harmful, since it would only tie up the initiative of the artillerymen, then during a breakthrough fortified strips, on the contrary, are the key to success - in a strictly thought-out plan, in the precise distribution of tasks for individual batteries, in the strict and methodical implementation of the combat schedule. Russian artillerymen not only mastered this basic position well, but also more than once very successfully put it into practice. In those cases when their actions were not paralyzed by a complete lack of guns and shells, they carried out breakthroughs of the fortified zone in a truly exemplary manner. An example of this is the work of artillerymen in the sector of the 11th Army Corps during the famous Brusilov breakthrough in the summer of 1916.

Thanks to the power of its fire and the excellent training of its personnel, Russian artillery quickly achieved brilliant results. At the beginning of September 1914, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War: “The whole burden modern battles- on artillery. She alone sweeps away the enemy's deadly machine guns and destroys his artillery. Our infantry cannot boast enough about its artillery. She shoots great."

Even opponents had to recognize the high skill of shooting of Russian artillerymen. The German generals Franus and Hindenburg wrote in their conclusions about the actions of the Russian army that the Russian artillery “shoots well”, occupies exclusively closed positions “with great skill” and from long distances often develops “such strong and intense fire that it misleads our troops regarding their numerical superiority, which in fact does not exist.”

Russian officers who were in German captivity said that in August 1914, among numerous newspaper articles praising the “valor of German weapons,” a note appeared in which, despite all the chauvinistic frenzy, the author had to recognize the brilliant actions of Russian artillery. This note had a very significant title: “Hats off before Russian artillerymen.”

And during the World War, Russian artillerymen more than once proved the correctness of this high assessment.

As we see, main value Russian artillery were its people. The high art of shooting, bold initiative and courageous heroism of ordinary Russian artillerymen brought them many well-deserved victories. Many of these people later formed the main backbone of the artillery personnel of the Red Army.

I decided to study the equipment of German heavy artillery. I have a suspicion that there are many people who confuse the standard number, the actual number and the number of guns in combat-ready units. There are also problems with taking into account departmental affiliation.
It is very often mentioned that the Germans either have 168 guns or 216. One comes across references to 264 guns and 144 guns.

Where did these guns come from?
The experience of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, where the Turks offered resistance, showed the need to allocate corps heavy artillery. Before the advent of shoe belts, the maximum caliber was de facto limited to 150-155 mm mortars. Therefore, the corps of the imperial and royal army received 150 mm M80 mortars. A very mediocre artillery system, but it can fire from the ground. With the advent of shoe hulls, they were re-equipped with 15 cm sFH M94 heavy howitzers. The Russians had 152 mm field mortars and suffered with a 152 mm gun at 70 pounds. It was proposed to give each corps a three-battery division of these guns when it was put into service. Total 18 guns, eight horses, firing range 33 kg shell (ammunition unified with mortars) 6 versts. But the system was completed only in 1910. Shirokorad's "History of Russian Artillery" mentions a 152 mm cannon with a weight of 80 pounds. Spanish American experience showed the complete ineffectiveness of field artillery against entrenched infantry. American shrapnel didn't even hit blockhouses.
It was decided to give each corps an artillery regiment of 16 guns, so as not to call in siege artillery for help. In 1903, the 15 cm sFH 02 was adopted, which was gradually equipped with units.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the use of 120 and 150 mm howitzers by the Japanese under the supervision of German specialists showed the effectiveness of heavy artillery. The Japanese came to the conclusion that each division should be given a howitzer battery. This came down to the actual availability of materiel, but the conclusions were drawn correctly. Moreover, theoretical calculations and Austrian experience were confirmed. The Russians used much more heavy guns, there were only 128 6 dm cannons in 120 poods, but this did not help. Japanese howitzer artillery was superior to Russian in mobility. The Russians fought normally only with 6 dm field mortars and 107 mm battery guns. Everything turned out to be expected. The Russian concept of using siege artillery to combat field fortifications seemed incorrect to the Germans. If the Japanese had not lost their only battery of 105 mm guns at the very beginning, the history of German artillery might have gone differently. Based on combat experience, emphasis was placed on howitzers, and only before the war the opinion changed, but the 10 cm K 14 began to arrive only in May 1915.
A separate point was the use of 203 mm light siege guns weighing 190 pounds, of which there were 16 in the Siberian Siege Regiment. Essentially this is a heavy howitzer. The use of guns of this caliber in field battles was considered impossible. General Schlieffen made a rational proposal: the corps would be reinforced with 150 mm howitzers, the army with 210 mm. So that the army command does not call in siege artillery to fight the numerous old Belgian fortresses. They were mainly designed to fire 150 mm guns of the 1860s-80s. The staffing number was determined to be 21 divisions of two batteries, four-gun batteries. Total 168 guns.
In addition to the artillery attached to the army, there was siege artillery armed with 21 cm mörser 99. The new mortar was a howitzer, but for a number of reasons it was called a mortar. To storm the Belgian fortresses, according to the calculations of the command, it was necessary to have 30 batteries.

On August 1, 1914, 14 divisions were formed for the needs of field armies and 4 more were under formation. Some of the guns were produced and accepted, but were at the manufacturing plant. All 4 divisions became combat-ready from October 1914 to February 1915. That is, in fact, 14 divisions with 112 guns.

The siege artillery had 30 batteries with 120 210 mm guns, of which 72 21 cm Mörser 10 and 48 21 cm Mörser 99.
By the end of 1915, all 288 21 cm Mörser 10s were to be produced.

In other European countries the situation was worse.
The French assigned a regiment of 3-5 battalions of guns with a caliber of 120-155 mm to each army. A total of 308 guns, of which 84 were very mediocre 120 mm C mle 1890 howitzers for the First World War. They fired 18-20 kg shells at a distance of up to 5.8 km. But they had to bring up territorial troops for field battles, which also had 120-155 mm guns. We must understand that the main problem the French - confusion and vacillation. By 1913, they finally adopted the 105 mm cannon, which was an almost exact copy of the 107 mm cannon adopted by the Russian army. The French, after problems with the 155 mm CTR mle 1904 howitzer, were against guns other than 75 mm guns. There were 155 mm howitzers to show that the money was not wasted. The 155 gun 1877/14 and the 105 mm gun were intended for siege artillery. Although according to the staff they have a battalion of 12,155 mm howitzers in their corps artillery regiment. Usually there was one battery, the other two were armed with 75 mm cannons.
In 1913, they conducted maneuvers, as a result of which they decided to accept 105 and 155 howitzers, but everything was drowned in chatter. Luckily for the French, they had a lot of systems suitable for military operations. There were about 2,200 155 mm guns alone, to which were added 2,500 long 120 mm guns and 330 220 mm mortars. Before the First World War, they thought about new guns of 193, 220 and 274 mm, but almost nothing was done. A sample of a 340 mm mortar was tested; 370 mm siege guns were ordered, but these guns cannot be used as field guns. Fortunately for the French, they designed a 280 mm mortar for the Russians and received an order, and in 1913 they began work on a 229 mm mortar. This made it possible to launch production of 220 mm mortars in 1915.

Austria-Hungary turned out to be a model of disintegration. Due to chronic problems and the peculiar cost structure, there was not enough money to purchase guns. Added to this were the problems of lobbying.
Theoretically, each corps should have 8,150 mm howitzers; if necessary, fortress artillery was used. It was represented by 120 and 150 mm cannons, 150, 240 and 305 mm mortar howitzers and 150 and 180 mm howitzers.
If necessary, 50 batteries (200) of 15 cm SFH M94 guns were allocated, that is, the same ones with which the army corps were armed, but only 240 guns were produced, of which 112 were used as corps artillery, 128 were transferred to the fortress. The shortcoming was covered by the 12 cm Kanone M80, an analogue of the Russian 107 mm siege gun, higher projectile weight, but shorter firing range. These 200 guns formed the basis of the army's artillery in the first year of the war, the 120 mm gun becoming the heaviest system used by Austria-Hungary in field battles at this time.
It must be said that Skoda presented prototypes of new heavy guns several times, but they were not accepted. The Austrians had 7 batteries (14 guns) of 240 mm 98/07 mechanized mortars and 12 batteries (48 guns) of 240 mm 98 mortars, but they did not dare to throw them into field battles.
It should be noted that money was allocated for the purchase of new 195 and 150 mm howitzers and 104 mm guns, but the lobbyists did not reach an agreement. But with these funds we bought 25,305 mm mortars. But the imperial and royal armies were left without modern heavy field guns.

The British had army artillery consisting of 6 dm cannons weighing 30 cwt and 240 mm mortars purchased in the Czech Republic. Very similar to the Austrian 240 mm mortars 98. There are only four of them, two of them in China. A prototype 234 mm howitzer was manufactured.

Natural disasters befell the Russian artillery: either the epic conflict between Genispart and the Minister of War, the infantry and the General Staff, then The State Duma, which cut expenses to show that they have power, then the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty.
Most of the systems considered necessary were adopted. The Russo-Japanese War showed the unsuitability of the systems in service. There were two opinions: most of the members of the party committee and the Genispart V.Kn. Sergei Mikhailovich. With corps artillery there were two different options: most authorities believed that it was necessary that the corps division consisted of three 6-or batteries of 122 mm howitzers, military book. believed that a division consisting of 8,152 howitzers and 4,107 mm guns was needed. However, the allocated money was enough to form 20 heavy divisions for 37 corps; the mortar divisions had two batteries. However, in 1912-14, the necessary funds were knocked out that would allow each corps by April 1 (13), 1915 to have 8,152 mm howitzers model 1910, 4,107 mm cannons and 24,122 mm howitzers model. 1909. According to our generals, Russian corps artillery would be superior to German with its 16,150 mm howitzers. When mobilized in 1914, some corps were able to receive 24,122 howitzers.
Army artillery in European Russia was to be represented by six brigades, each with three divisions of three batteries (36,152 mm howitzers model 1909). The Caucasian and Siberian brigades of the same composition were also formed. It was assumed that the Siberian Brigade would be in Harbin a month after the start of mobilization.
Finally, they allowed us to order 280 mm mortars from France. There were two consecutive orders for a total of 32 guns, all to be delivered by March 1915 inclusive. This made it possible to form 7 divisions of 2 two-gun batteries each and have 4 guns in reserve. To this, if necessary, siege brigades could be added. Thus, the Northwestern Front was supposed to receive 120 152 mm guns of 120 and 200 pounds, but the General Staff, citing the Russian-Japanese experience, refused to deploy them at the front, but they were mobilized. When v.k. Claims were made against Sergei Mikhailovich, and he blamed the General Staff. The first siege brigade was sent to the front and arrived at the beginning of 1915. The difference from the original version was the replacement of 24,152 mm guns of 120 pounds with 8,152 mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 16 107 mm guns. There was a similar situation on the Southwestern Front.
In general, the main problem of the Russian army is not in materiel, but in the fact that the ruling elites have forgotten a simple truth: they must serve the Motherland “with pen and sword”©, and the majority had on their minds “balls, lackeys, cadets and the crunch of French bread”© . The exterminatus of the nobility and other elites was inevitable.

15" gun Mk. I

Classification

Production history

Operation history

Weapon characteristics

Characteristics of projectiles

381 mm Mk I gun- British 15-inch naval gun, developed in 1912. The Mk.I was the most common and perhaps the most effective large caliber gun in the British Navy. It was installed on ships that served from 1915 to 1959 and was the main weapon of the Royal Navy during both World Wars.

H.M.S. Warspite shells the coast of Sicily, 1943

general information

The combat path of 15" guns began in 1915 during the Dardanelles operation, in which the newly built battleship Queen Elizabeth took part. Then there was the Battle of Jutland, the record hit of the Warspite on the Giulio Cesare from a distance of 24 kilometers in the battle of Calabria , the sinking of three Italian cruisers at Cape Matapan and many other battles.The last shot at the enemy was fired 30 years later, in 1945, when the same Queen Elizabeth fired at Japanese fortifications in the Andaman Islands.

Gun design and production

The design of the gun was developed on the basis of the successful 13.5"/45 gun (created for arming super-dreadnoughts of the Orion type). The "dreadnought race" that took place before the First World War increased the requirements for the tactical and technical characteristics of ships very quickly and the developers of the 15" gun took a very risky step, reducing the testing program to a minimum before launching into production. The risk paid off: the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships arrived in time for the Battle of Jutland, but their direct opponents, the German Baden-class battleships, were “late.”

The gun barrel had a “wire” design traditional for British guns of the early 20th century: a layer of steel wire was wound between the inner (tube A) and outer (tube B) supporting pipes of the gun to increase the tensile strength of the barrel. The gun was equipped with a piston-type bolt. The length of the gun barrel was 630 inches (16 meters - 42 calibers), the length of the rifled part of the barrel was 516 inches (13.1 m). The barrel life was approximately 335 shots with an armor-piercing projectile when fully charged. The gun was lined; for a worn gun, the inner part of pipe A was replaced at the factory. An interesting fact is that the gun was considered completely “fired” if its caliber increased by 0.74 inches (1.9 cm) at the beginning of cutting the barrel.

From 1912 to 1918, 186 15-inch barrels were produced. Production was carried out at several factories at once:

• Elswick Ordnance Company, Elswick, Newcastle: 34 units;
• Armstrong Whitworth, Openshaw, Manchester: 12 units;
• William Beardmore & Company, Parkhead, Glasgow: 37 units;
• Coventry Ordnance Works, Coventry: 19 units;
• Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich: 33 pieces;
• Vickers, Son and Maxim, Sheffield: 49 units.

When repairing ships, worn-out barrels were removed and immediately replaced with new ones stored in arsenals. And the removed guns were sent for repairs and then for storage. Therefore, over the course of half a century of service, a gun barrel, as a rule, ended up on several ships. For example: as you know, the turrets of the last British battleship HMS Vanguard were taken from the battlecruisers HMS Courageous and HMS converted into aircraft carriers Glorious, but of the eight main battery guns, only one began its service on these ships, and then its “previous duty station” was HMS Warspite .

List of ships

The guns were used on several types of British warships up to HMS Vanguard, the last British battleship built.

Ships armed with 15 inch Mark I guns:

• Queen Elizabeth class battleships
• Rivenge-class battleships - 5 ships with eight guns each
• Rinaun-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with six guns each
• Battlecruiser HMS Hood- 8 guns
• Glories-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with four guns each
• Erebus type monitors
• Monitors of the "Marshal Ney" type - 2 ships with two guns each
• Roberts-class monitors - 2 ships with two guns each
• HMS battleship Vanguard- 8 guns (in turrets intended for battle cruisers Coreyes And Glories)

The gun was also used in coastal defense.

Shells

What, in fact, can be seen from the following tables? The range of shells for guns was quite wide. At the same time, the mass of projectiles for different purposes was approximately the same, to simplify the operation of guidance systems. If during the First World War, shells were often modified, because they suffered from “childhood diseases” (see the replacement of explosives in armor-piercing shells), on the one hand, and were created “for the task” (long high-explosive shells for monitors, shrapnel shells for fighting torpedo boats) on the other hand, the fleet approached the Second War with ammunition of an established design, with which it went through the entire war.

World War I shells

Projectile type	Designation	Projectile length 1)	Weight	Explosive	starting speed
Armor-piercing	APC Mark Ia	138.4 cm (4klb)	871 kg	27.4 kg (lyddit 2))	752 m/s
Armor-piercing	APC Mark IIIa	142.0 cm (4klb)	866.4 kg	20.5 kg (shellite)	752 m/s
[Semi-armor-piercing]	CPC	160.8 cm (4klb)	871 kg	58.6 kg (black powder, later TNT)	-
High Explosive	HE	162.3 cm (4klb)	871 kg	98.2 kg (lyddit)	-
High explosive 3)	HE	- (8klb)	891 kg	101.2 kg (lyddit)	-
Shrapnel	Shrapnel	162.3 cm (4klb)	871 kg	13,700 50 g lead bullets	-

Interwar and World War II shells

Design of the APC Mk.XXIIb armor-piercing projectile

Notes

1. What does "N club" mean? British artillerymen tried to increase the range of the projectile by sharpening its head and thereby improving the flow around it. The parameter "N club" is the radius of curvature of the head of the projectile in calibers.
2. The Battle of Jutland revealed that the English armor-piercing shells do not penetrate armor, since their equipment, lyddite, is prone to breaking “on the armor” from a strong blow. A new explosive, “shellite,” was developed, but shells containing it appeared in cellars only by 1918.
3. “Long” 8-caliber high-explosive shells were used only on monitors; on battleships, their dimensions did not correspond to the feed mechanisms.
4. Extended 6-caliber shells were developed in 1938 and initially could only be used on battleships that underwent modernization in the mid-1930s ( Warspite, Renown, Valiant And Queen Elizabeth). By the middle of the war (1943), the feed mechanisms had been adapted to use these shells on all surviving ships with 15" guns.
5. From the previous note, in particular, it follows that HMS Hood I never had extended shells in my ammunition load.

Ammunition

Approximately 100 shells per barrel were placed in the cellars of battleships. The Coragees-class battlecruisers were designed with 80 shells per barrel, but after the battle at the Falklands it turned out that the shell consumption was much more than planned and the capacity of the white elephant magazines was increased to 120 shells.

The ships' ammunition varied greatly depending on the current combat mission. Battleships entered service armed only with armor-piercing shells. By the end of the First World War, for example, "Rinaun" carried 72 APC, 24 CPC (for "insurance" of non-armor-penetrating APCs) and 24 HE (for shooting along the shore). During World War II, the “standard” ammunition consisted mainly of armor-piercing shells (in the magazines there were 5 high-explosive shells per barrel), for tasks of shelling the shore, armor-piercing shells were unloaded and high explosives were received. According to the project, "Vangard" carried 95 armor-piercing shells, 5 high explosives and 9 practical shells, but after the battleship served as a "royal yacht" in 1947, most He spent his further service with empty cellars.

The ammunition of monitors in the First World War consisted mainly of high-explosive shells and “several” semi-armor-piercing shells. In World War II they carried 25% of armor-piercing and 75% of landmines.

Charges

The standard charge was (approximately) 200 kg of cordite. Each charge consisted of four "quarter charges" of equal mass, and it was possible to fire a reduced (3/4) charge to increase the steepness of the trajectory or simply to reduce wear on the gun.

Between the wars, a “reinforced” 222 kg charge was developed to increase the firing range of guns. This charge, as expected, sharply increased barrel wear and was used only on ships on which the elevation angles of the guns were not increased.

Penetration table

The frontal plate of the turret of the battleship Baden, pierced by a 15" shell during a test shelling, 1921

There are many options for armor penetration tables based on different data and for different shells. This table was compiled by the British Admiralty in 1935 based on calculated data, without full-scale tests. The numbers are given for the vertical side (and the horizontal, obviously, deck)

Distance	Armor belt	Deck armor
0 m	18.0" (457 mm)	-
15,730 m	14.0" (356 mm)	-
16,460 m	-	2.0" (51 mm)
17,740 m	13.0" (330 mm)	-
19,840 m	12.0" (305 mm)	-
21,950 m	-	3.0" (76 mm)
22,400 m	11.0" (279 mm)	-
25,600 m	10.0" (254 mm)	-
26,970 m	-	5.0" (127 mm)
29,720 m 1)	-	6.0" (152 mm)

1) This distance is beyond the range of guns mounted on ships.

Tower installations

Making a tower for the HMS monitor Abercrombie

Note. 1) It is indicated that on the battleship HMS Ramillies(1916) two of the four turrets were of the Mk.I* type, and on battle cruiser H.M.S. Renown(1916) two of the three turrets were Mk.I. The Mk.I turrets originally ordered for the Ramillies were installed on urgently constructed HMS monitors Marshal Ney(1915) and H.M.S. Marshal Soult(1915). The reasons for the appearance of Mk.I turrets on Rinaun are still unclear.

Differences in installation types

Mark I* different from Mark I the presence in the reloading compartment of the so-called. “Kenyon door” - a rotating partition that separated the turret space from the cellars and prevented the fire from breaking down down during a fire in the tower.

Installation Mark II for the cruiser "Hood" was significantly redesigned. The main external difference is the increased height of the turret, which made it possible to increase the elevation angles of the guns

Indexes Mark I/N And Mark I*/N received turrets that were modernized during the overhaul of four ships in the mid-1930s. The guns received increased elevation angles due to the expansion of the gun ports and changes in the lifting mechanisms. The sight embrasures were also moved from the roof to the front plate, and thus the problem with one turret firing on top of another was solved (see “horizontal aiming angles” below).

Tower Mark I/N RP 12 was created on the basis of the Mark I turret * and absorbed all the experience in modifying the turrets of 15" guns over a third of a century. Enlarged gun embrasures received armored caps on top, a remote control system for turning the turrets, etc. was introduced (see description of the HMS ship Vanguard).

A discussion of monitor towers is beyond the scope of this article.

Performance characteristics

Model of the gun turret of the battleship Queen Elizabeth

• elevation/declination angles: see table above;
• vertical aiming speed: 5 degrees/sec;
• horizontal aiming angles: -150 / +150 degrees 1) ;
• horizontal aiming speed: 2 degrees/sec;
• loading angles: from -5 to +20 degrees 2) ;
• rate of fire: 2 rounds per minute 3).

Notes

1. On the Mk.I turrets, the sight embrasures were placed very poorly, in the front of the turret roof. Therefore, on ships that had a linearly elevated arrangement of towers (i.e., on almost all ships), the upper towers could not fire over the lower ones, in the sector from -30 to +30 degrees from the center plane. This deficiency was corrected only on the Mark I/N, Mark I*/N, Mark II and Mark I/N RP 12 installations - that is, only on six ships out of all that used 15" guns.
2. Formally, the mechanisms made it possible to load the gun up to an elevation angle of +20 degrees. In practice, due to the insufficient power of the hydraulic drive of the rammer, there was a risk of “not biting” the leading belt of the projectile at the beginning of the rifling and... it falling back. Therefore, they preferred to lower the barrels for loading to an angle of +5 degrees.
3. The rate of fire of "2 rounds per minute" was achieved once on one ship. The standard for the fleet was one shot in 36 seconds.

The armor protection of the turrets varied significantly from ship to ship. Therefore, for information about armoring turret installations and turret barbettes, the reader should refer to the descriptions of individual ships.

Notes

Links

• NavWeaps.com - Britain 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I (English)
• https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/158698.html - “British 15" towers, determinant.”
• https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/164551.html - “Migrations of British 15" towers.”

During the First World War, artillery played one of the key roles on the battlefields. The hostilities lasted for four whole years, although many believed that they would be as fleeting as possible. First of all, this was due to the fact that Russia built the organization of its artillery on the principle of the transience of armed confrontation. Therefore, the war, as expected, was supposed to be of a maneuverable nature. Tactical mobility became one of the main qualities of artillery.

Target

The main purpose of artillery in the First World War was to defeat enemy personnel. This was especially effective since there were no serious fortified positions at that time. The core of the artillery operating in the field consisted of light cannons, the main ammunition for which was shrapnel. At that time, military tacticians believed that due to high speed the projectile can perform all the tasks assigned to artillery.

In this regard, the French cannon of the 1897 model stood out, which, in terms of its technical and tactical characteristics, was among the leaders on the battlefield. At the same time, in terms of its initial speed, it was significantly inferior to the Russian three-inch, but compensated for this due to the advantageous shells, which were spent more economically during the battle. Moreover, the gun had high stability, which led to a significant rate of fire.

In the Russian artillery in the First World War, the three-inch gun stood out, which was especially effective during flanking fire. With fire it could cover an area of ​​up to 800 meters with a width of about 100 meters.

Many military experts noted that in the fight for destruction, Russian and French field guns had no equal.

Equipment of the Russian corps

The field artillery of the First World War stood out among other armies for its powerful equipment. True, if before the war light guns were mainly used, then during the battles a shortage of heavy artillery began to be felt.

Basically, the organization of Russian artillery troops was a consequence of the underestimation of machine-gun and rifle fire by the enemy. The artillery was required primarily to support the infantry attack, and not to conduct independent artillery preparation.

Organization of German artillery

German artillery in the First World War was organized fundamentally differently. Here everything was based on an attempt to foresee the nature of the coming battle. The Germans were armed with corps and divisional artillery. Therefore, by 1914, when positional warfare began to be actively used, the Germans began to equip each division with howitzers and heavy guns.

This led to the fact that the main means of achieving tactical success was field maneuvering, and also in artillery power german army surpassed many of her opponents. It was also important that the Germans took into account the increased initial velocity of the projectiles.

Situation during the war

Thus, during the First World War, artillery became the leading means of warfare for many powers. The main qualities that began to be demanded of field guns were mobility in conditions of maneuver warfare. This tendency began to determine the organization of the battle, quantitative ratio troops, proportional ratio of heavy and light artillery.

So, at the very beginning of the war, the Russian troops had about three and a half guns per thousand bayonets, while the Germans had about 6.5. At the same time, Russia had almost 7 thousand light guns and only about 240 heavy guns. The Germans had 6.5 thousand light guns, but almost 2 thousand heavy guns.

These indicators clearly illustrate the views of military leaders on the use of artillery in the First World War. They can also give an impression of the resources with which each of the key powers entered into this confrontation. It seems obvious that it was German artillery in the First World War that better met the requirements of modern combat.

Bomb thrower

Russian artillery in the First World War was widely represented by bombers of the Aasen system. These were special rod mortars, which in 1915 were created in France by the famous designer Niels Aasen, when it became obvious that the available units of military equipment did not allow the Russian army to fight on an equal basis with their opponents.

Aasen himself had French citizenship and was Norwegian by origin. His bomb launcher was produced in Russia from 1915 to 1916 and was actively used by Russian artillery in the First World War.

The bomb thrower was very reliable; it had a steel barrel and was loaded from the treasury side using a separate type. The projectile itself was a cartridge case used for the Gra rifle, which was outdated by that time. A large number of these rifles were transferred by France to Russian troops. This mortar had a hinged bolt, and the carriage was of a frame type, standing on four supports. The lifting mechanism was firmly attached to the rear of the barrel. Total weight The gun weighed about 25 kilograms.

With the help of a bomb launcher it was possible to fire directly, and it also had a grenade in its ammunition loaded with shrapnel.

At the same time, it had one, but very significant drawback, due to which shooting became unsafe for the crew itself. The whole point was that when the upper bolt was open, the firing pin was recessed to a very small depth. It was necessary to carefully ensure that the cartridge case was sent manually, and not using the bolt. This was especially important when shooting was carried out at an angle of about 30 degrees.

If these rules were not followed, then a premature shot occurred when the bolt was not fully closed.

76 mm anti-aircraft gun

One of the most popular guns in the artillery of the Russian army in the First World War was the 76 mm. For the first time in our country, it was produced for firing at air targets.

Its project was developed by military engineer Mikhail Rosenberg. It was assumed that it would be specifically used against airplanes, but in the end this proposal was rejected. It was believed that in a special anti-aircraft artillery there is no need.

Only in 1913 the project was approved by the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The next year it was transferred to the gun. It turned out to be semi-automatic, by which time it was realized that special artillery for firing at air targets was necessary.

Since 1915, Russian artillery in the First World War began to use this weapon. For this purpose, a separate battery was equipped, armed with four guns, which were based on armored vehicles. They also stored spare charges.

During the war, these guns were sent to the front in 1915. In the very first battle they were able to repel the attack of 9 German aircraft, and two of them were shot down. These were the first aerial targets shot down by Russian artillery.

Some of the guns were mounted not on cars, but on railway cars; similar batteries began to form by 1917.

The weapon turned out to be so successful that it was also used during the Great Patriotic War.

Fortress artillery was still actively used in the First World War, and after its end the need for such weapons finally came to naught. The reason was that the defensive role of fortresses faded into the background.

At the same time, Russia had a very extensive fortress artillery. By the beginning of the war, there were four artillery fortress regiments in service, which were united into brigades; there were also 52 separate fortress battalions, 15 companies and 5 so-called sortie batteries (in wartime conditions, their number increased to 16).

In total, during the First World War, the Russian army used about 40 artillery systems, although most of them were very outdated by that time.

After the end of the war, fortress artillery almost completely ceased to be used.

A considerable part of the battles took place at sea. The naval artillery of the First World War played a decisive role in them.

For example, large-caliber weapons were rightfully considered the main weapon at sea. Therefore, by the total number of heavy guns and the total weight of the fleet, it was possible to determine how strong the fleet of a particular country was.

By and large, all heavy weapons of that time could be divided into two types. These are English and German. The first category included guns developed by the Armstrong company, and the second - produced by the Krupp company, which became famous for its steel during the Second World War.

The English ones had a barrel that was covered with a casing on top. The German artillery of the First World War used special cylinders that were placed on top of each other in such a way that the outer row completely covered the internal joints and joints.

The German design was adopted by most countries, including Russia, since it was objectively considered more progressive. English guns existed until the 20s of the 20th century, and after that they also switched to German technology.

These are the guns that were used on ships for naval battles. They were especially common during the dreadnought era, differing only in minor details, in particular the number of guns in the turret. For example, for the French battleship called Normandie, a special four-gun turret was developed, which contained two pairs of cannons.

As has already been noted, the heavy artillery of the First World War determined the outcome of more than one battle. It was characterized by the ability to fire over long distances, and was capable of effectively hitting the enemy from cover.

Before the First World War, heavy guns were almost always part of the fortress artillery, but field heavy artillery was just beginning to take shape at that time. Moreover, an urgent need for it was felt even during the Russo-Japanese War.

The First World War, almost from its very beginning, had a pronounced positional character. It became obvious that without heavy guns it would not be possible to carry out a single successful offensive by troops. After all, for this it was necessary to effectively destroy the enemy’s first line of defense, as well as to advance further, while remaining in reliable cover. Field heavy artillery became one of the main ones during the war, including siege functions.

In 1916-1917, on the initiative of Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who at that time held the post of inspector general of artillery, a reserve was formed for the High Command, called special-purpose heavy artillery. It consisted of six artillery brigades.

The formation of this unit took place in conditions of increased secrecy in Tsarskoe Selo. In total, during the war, more than five hundred similar batteries were created, which included more than two thousand guns.

The most famous German artillery weapon during the First World War was the "Big Bertha" mortar, which was also called "Fat Bertha".

The project was developed back in 1904, but this gun was built and put into mass production only in 1914. The work was carried out at Krupp factories.

The main creators of “Big Bertha” were the major German designer Professor Fritz Rauschenberger, who worked at the German concern Krupp, as well as his colleague and predecessor named Dreger. It was they who nicknamed this 420-mm cannon “Fat Bertha,” dedicating it to the granddaughter of Alfred Krupp, the “cannon king” of the early 20th century, who brought his company to world leadership, making the company one of the most successful among other arms manufacturers.

At the time when this mortar was put into industrial production, its actual owner was the granddaughter of the legendary Krupp, whose name was Bertha.

The "Big Bertha" mortar was actively used in German artillery. In the First World War, it was intended to destroy the most durable fortifications of that time. At the same time, the gun itself was produced in two versions. The first was semi-stationary and bore the code “Gamma type,” while the towed one was designated “M type.” The mass of the guns was very large - 140 and 42 tons, respectively. Only about half of all mortars produced were towed; the rest had to be disassembled into three parts in order to move them from place to place using steam tractors. In order to assemble the entire unit into combat readiness, required at least 12 hours.

The gun's rate of fire reached one shot every 8 minutes. Moreover, its power was so great that rivals preferred not to face it on the battlefield.

Interestingly, different ammunition was used for different types of guns. For example, the so-called type M fired powerful and heavy projectiles, the mass of which exceeded 800 kilograms. And the range of one shot reached almost nine and a half kilometers. For the “Gamma type,” lighter projectiles were used, which could fly a little over 14 kilometers, and heavier ones, which reached the target at a distance of 12.5 kilometers.

The impact force of the mortar was also achieved due to the large number of fragments; each of the shells scattered into about 15 thousand pieces, many of which could be deadly. Among the defenders of the fortresses, armor-piercing shells were considered the most terrible, which could not stop even the steel and concrete floors about two meters thick.

The Russian army suffered serious losses from "Big Bertha". This is despite the fact that its characteristics were at the disposal of intelligence even before the start of the First World War. In many domestic fortresses, work has begun on modernizing old ones and constructing fundamentally new defense structures. They were originally designed to be hit by the shells with which Big Bertha was equipped. The thickness of the ceiling for this varied from three and a half to five meters.

When World War I began, German troops began to effectively use the Bertha during the siege of Belgian and French fortresses. They sought to break the will of the enemy, forcing the garrisons to surrender one by one. As a rule, this required only two mortars, about 350 shells and no more than 24 hours during which the siege continued. On the Western Front, this mortar was even nicknamed the “fort killer.”

In total, 9 of these were produced at Krupp enterprises. legendary weapons who participated in the capture of Liege and the siege of Verdun. To capture the Osovets fortress, 4 “Big Berthas” were brought at once, 2 of which were successfully destroyed by the defenders.

By the way, there is a very widespread belief that “Big Bertha” was used for the siege of Paris in 1918. But in reality this is not the case. The French capital was fired upon by the Colossal gun. “Big Bertha” still remains in the memory of many as one of the most powerful artillery pieces of the First World War.

By 1914, most armies assumed that the coming war would be fleeting. Accordingly, the nature of the future war was qualified as maneuverable, and the artillery of the warring armies, first of all, had to have such a quality as tactical mobility. In maneuverable combat, the main target of artillery is the enemy’s manpower, while there are no serious fortified positions. That is why the core of the field artillery was represented by light field guns of 75-77 mm caliber. And the main ammunition is shrapnel. It was believed that the field cannon, with its significant, both among the French and, especially among the Russians, initial projectile speed, would fulfill all the tasks assigned to artillery in field battles.

French 75 mm gun. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.

In the conditions of a fleeting maneuver war, the French 75-mm cannon of the 1897 model took first place in its tactical and technical characteristics. Although the initial speed of its projectile was inferior to the Russian three-inch, this was compensated by a more advantageous projectile, which spent its speed more economically in flight. In addition, the gun had greater stability (that is, unkillable aiming) after firing, and, consequently, a higher rate of fire. The design of the French gun carriage allowed it to automatically fire from the side horizontally, which from a distance of 2.5-3 thousand meters made it possible to fire at a 400-500-meter front within a minute.

For a Russian three-inch gun, the same thing was possible only by five or six turns of the entire battery, spending at least five minutes of time. But during a flank shelling, in just a minute and a half, a Russian light battery, firing with shrapnel, covered with its fire an area up to 800 m deep and more than 100 m wide.

Russian 76 mm field gun in position

In the struggle to destroy manpower, the French and Russian field guns had no equal.
As a result, the 32-battalion Russian army corps was equipped with 108 guns - including 96 76-mm (three-inch) field guns and 12 light 122-mm (48-line) howitzers. There was no heavy artillery in the corps. True, before the war there was a tendency towards the creation of heavy field artillery, but heavy field three-battery divisions (2 batteries of 152-mm (six-inch) howitzers and one 107-mm (42-linear) guns) existed as if as an exception and organic connection with did not have buildings.
The situation was little better in France, which had 120 75-mm field guns for a 24-battalion army corps. There was no heavy artillery attached to divisions and corps and was located only with armies - total number only 308 guns (120 mm long and short guns, 155 mm howitzers and the newest 105 mm long Schneider gun of the 1913 model).

Russian 122-mm field howitzer model 1910 in position

The organization of artillery in Russia and France was, first of all, a consequence of underestimating the power of rifle and machine-gun fire, as well as the enemy’s fortification reinforcement. The regulations of these powers at the beginning of the war did not require artillery to prepare, but only to support an infantry attack.

Britain entered the First World War also possessing very few heavy guns. In service with the British army were: since 1907. - 15-lb (76.2 mm) BLC field guns; 4.5 in (114 mm) QF howitzer, adopted in 1910; 60-lb (127 mm) Mk1 gun 1905 model; 6-dm (152-mm) howitzer BL model 1896. New heavy guns began to arrive to British troops as the war progressed.

In contrast to its opponents, the organization of German artillery was based on a correct prediction of the nature of the coming military conflict. For the 24-battalion army corps, the Germans had 108 light 77-mm cannons, 36 light 105-mm field howitzers (divisional artillery) and 16 heavy 150-mm field howitzers (corps artillery). Accordingly, already in 1914 heavy artillery was present at the corps level. With the beginning of the positional war, the Germans also created divisional heavy artillery, equipping each division with two howitzer and one heavy cannon batteries.

German field 77 mm gun in position

From this ratio it is clear that the Germans saw the main means for achieving tactical success even in field maneuver battles in the power of their artillery (almost a third of all available guns were howitzers). In addition, the Germans reasonably took into account the increased initial velocity of the projectile, which was not always necessary for flat shooting (in this regard, their 77-mm cannon was inferior to the French and Russian cannons) and adopted a caliber for a light field howitzer that was not 122-120 mm, like theirs opponents, and 105 mm is the optimal (in combination of relative power and mobility) caliber. If the 77-mm German, 75-mm French, 76-mm Russian light field guns roughly corresponded to each other (as well as the 105-107-mm heavy field guns of the enemy), then the Russian and French armies had no analogues to the German 105-mm divisional howitzer had.

Thus, by the beginning of the World War, the basis for the organization of artillery weapons of the leading military powers was the task of supporting the advance of their infantry on the battlefield. The main qualities required for field guns are mobility in conditions of maneuver warfare. This trend also determined the organization of the artillery of the largest powers, its quantitative relationship with the infantry, as well as the proportionality of light and heavy artillery in relation to each other.

German 150 mm howitzer

By the beginning of the war, Russia had about 6.9 thousand light guns and howitzers and 240 heavy guns (that is, the ratio of heavy to light artillery was 1 to 29); France possessed almost 8 thousand light and 308 heavy guns (ratio 1 to 24); Germany had 6.5 thousand light guns and howitzers and almost 2 thousand heavy guns (ratio 1 to 3.75).

These figures clearly illustrate both the views on the use of artillery in 1914 and the resources with which each great power entered the world war. World War I was the first large-scale war in which most combat casualties were caused by artillery. According to experts, three out of five died from exploding shells. It is obvious that the German armed forces were closest to the requirements of the First World War even before it began.

Sources:
Oleynikov A. "Artillery 1914."