Electronic warfare troops: how it works. EW Day - Electronic Warfare Today is Electronic Defense Day
00:01 — REGNUM Today, April 15, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation celebrate the Day of Electronic Warfare Specialist. The professional holiday was established by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1999.
The history of the formation of the troops for electronic warfare (EW) dates back to April 15, 1904. On this day, two Japanese armored cruisers Nisshin and Kasuga were planning radio-controlled shelling of the Russian squadron and the fortress of Port Arthur. However, the signalmen of the squadron battleship Pobeda and the naval telegraph station on Zolotaya Gora, using radio interference, suppressed the radio transmissions of Japanese ships and thereby disrupted the shelling.
Both sides used the same type of spark transmitters. The message of the enemy was able to "score with a big spark" - more powerful signals from the device. This case was the first step in world military history from the organization of radio intelligence to its introduction into hostilities. In the future, electronic warfare equipment was actively improved, and the practice of their use expanded significantly.
In the conditions of constant improvement of new means and methods of conducting electronic warfare, the opposing sides were forced to take special measures to hide radio equipment from reconnaissance and protect them from suppression by radio interference. In practice, these measures began to be implemented during the First World War.
EW received more intensive development during the Great Patriotic War. Significantly changed not only the radio-electronic means of command and control of troops and weapons, but also the methods and tactics of their reconnaissance and suppression. On December 16, 1942, as part of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, a Department was formed to manage the work of interfering radio stations. At the same time, three radio divisions were formed with the means to "drive" enemy radio stations - the first parts of the electronic warfare in the USSR army.
In the post-war period, the widespread introduction of the achievements of radio electronics into military affairs influenced the rapid growth of the capabilities of weapons and military equipment. And on November 4, 1953, the apparatus of the assistant chief of the General Staff for electronic intelligence and interference was created. In the future, it was repeatedly reorganized and changed names (the 9th department of the General Staff, the Electronic Countermeasures Service of the General Staff, the 5th Directorate of the General Staff and others).
Electronic warfare today is one of the most important types of combat support. The range of modern tasks of the EW troops includes electronic reconnaissance and the destruction of electronic means of enemy command and control systems, as well as monitoring the effectiveness of measures taken to electronically protect their forces and means.
The emblem of the electronic warfare troops shows a hand in a gauntlet, squeezing a beam of lightning. Perhaps these symbols accurately reflect the modern tasks of electronic warfare - complete control over the main invisible factor in modern warfare, which determines the border between victory and defeat - the ether.
April 15, 1904, two days after the tragic death of Admiral Makarov, the Japanese fleet began shelling Port Arthur. However, this attack, which later became known as the "third flip-flop", was not successful. The reason for the failure is revealed in the official report of Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky, Acting Commander of the Pacific Fleet. He wrote:
« At 9 o'clock. 11 min. in the morning, the enemy armored cruisers Nisin and Kasuga, maneuvering south-south-west from the lighthouse Liaoteshan, began throwing fire at the forts and the inner road. From the very beginning of the shooting, two enemy cruisers, having chosen positions against the passage of the Cape Liaoteshan, outside the shots of the fortress, began to telegraph, why immediately the battleship Pobeda and the stations of the Golden Mountain began to interrupt enemy telegrams with a big spark, believing that these cruisers were informing the firing battleships about the hit their shells. The enemy fired 208 large-caliber shells. There were no court cases».
This was the first officially recorded fact in history of the use of electronic warfare in combat operations.
Weak link
Modern electronic warfare, of course, has gone far from the "big spark", but the main principle underlying it has remained the same. Any organized area of human activity provides for a hierarchy, be it a factory, a store, and even more so an army - in any enterprise there is a "brain", that is, a management system. Competition in this case is reduced to a competition of control systems - information confrontation. After all, today the main commodity on the market is not oil, not gold, but information. If you deprive a competitor of the "brain", this can bring victory. Therefore, it is the control system that the military seeks to protect in the first place: they bury it in the ground, build layered defense systems for headquarters, etc.
Training class of the Interspecific Center for Electronic Warfare Troops
But, as you know, the strength of the chain is determined by its weakest link. Control commands need to be somehow transferred from the "brain" to the performers. " The most vulnerable link on the battlefield is the communications system, - explains Andrey Mikhailovich Smirnov, teacher of the cycle of the Interspecific Center for Training and Combat Use of EW Troops in Tambov. - If you disable it, the commands from the control system will not pass to the performers. This is exactly what EW does.».
From intelligence to suppression
But in order to disable the communication system, it must be detected. Therefore, the very first task of electronic warfare is technical intelligence, which studies the battlefield using all available technical means. This makes it possible to identify electronic objects that can be suppressed - communication systems or sensors.
Electronic warfare machine "Mercury-BM" designed to deal not with communication lines, but with guided weapons and ammunition with radio fuses. In automatic mode, the system detects ammunition and determines the operating frequency of its radio fuse, after which it puts high power interference.
The Infauna electronic warfare complex protects equipment on the march by suppressing communication lines and radio control with explosive devices.
Suppression of electronic objects is the creation of a noise signal at the input of the receiver that is greater than the useful signal.
« People of the older generation probably still remember the jamming in the USSR of foreign shortwave radio stations, such as the Voice of America, by transmitting a powerful noise signal. This is just a typical example of radio suppression- says Andrey Mikhailovich. - EW also includes the installation of passive interference, for example, the release of foil clouds from aircraft to interfere with radar signals or the creation of false targets using corner reflectors. The scope of EW interests includes not only radio, but also the optical range - say, laser illumination of optoelectronic sensors of guidance systems, and even other physical fields, such as hydroacoustic suppression of submarine sonars».
However, it is important not only to suppress the enemy's communication systems, but also to prevent the suppression of their own systems. Therefore, the electronic warfare also includes the electronic protection of their systems. This is a set of technical measures, which include the installation of arresters and systems for locking the receiving paths for the duration of interference, protection from an electromagnetic pulse (including a nuclear explosion), shielding, the use of burst transmission, as well as organizational measures, such as operating at minimum power and the shortest time on the air.
In addition, electronic warfare also counters enemy technical reconnaissance, using radio camouflage and various cunning types of signal coding that make it difficult to detect.
Silencers
« The shortwave "enemy voices" were AM-modulated analog at known frequencies, so it wasn't that hard to drown them out.- explains Andrey Mikhailovich. - But even under such seemingly greenhouse conditions, with a good receiver, it was quite possible to listen to forbidden transmissions due to the characteristics of the propagation of shortwave signals and the limited power of the transmitters. For analog signals, the noise level must exceed the signal level by six to ten times, since the human ear and brain are extremely selective and allow even a noisy signal to be parsed.
With modern coding methods, such as frequency hopping, the task is more complicated: if white noise is used, the hopping receiver simply "does not notice" such a signal. Therefore, the noise signal should be as similar as possible to the “useful” one (but five to six times more powerful). And they are different in various communication systems, and one of the tasks of radio intelligence is precisely the analysis of the type of enemy signals. Terrestrial systems typically use DSSS spread spectrum or frequency hopping signals, so a frequency modulated (FM) chaotic pulse train signal is most often used as a universal interference signal.
Aviation uses amplitude modulated (AM) signals because FM from a fast moving transmitter will be affected by the Doppler effect. To suppress aircraft radars, impulse noise similar to signals from guidance systems is also used. In addition, you need to use a directional signal: this gives a significant gain in power (several times). In some cases, suppression is quite problematic - say, in the case of space or radio relay communications, where very narrow radiation patterns are used.».
One should not think that electronic warfare jams “everything in a row” - this would be very inefficient from an energy point of view. “The power of the noise signal is limited, and if it is distributed over the entire spectrum, then this will not affect the operation of a modern communication system operating with PRFC signals at all,” says Anatoly Mikhailovich Balyukov, head of the test and methodological department of the Interspecific Center for Training and Combat Use of EW Troops. - Our task is to detect, analyze the signal and literally "spot" it suppression - exactly on those channels between which it "jumps", and no more. Therefore, the widespread opinion that no communication will work during the operation of the electronic warfare system is nothing more than a delusion. Only those systems that need to be suppressed will not work.
War of the future
In the 1990s, the military in different countries of the world started talking about a new concept of warfare - network-centric warfare. Its practical implementation has become possible due to the rapid development of information technology.
“Network-centric warfare is based on the creation of a special communication network that unites all units on the battlefield. More precisely, in the battle space, since global satellite constellations are also elements of such a network, - explains Anatoly Mikhailovich Balyukov. - The United States has made a serious bet on network-centric warfare and has been actively testing its elements in local wars since the mid-1990s - from reconnaissance and strike UAVs to field terminals for each fighter receiving data from a single network.
This approach, of course, allows to achieve much higher combat effectiveness due to a serious reduction in the time of the Boyd loop. Now we are talking not about days, not about hours or even minutes, but literally about real time - and even about the frequency of individual stages of the loop in tens of hertz. Sounds impressive, but ... all these characteristics are provided by communication systems. It is enough to degrade the characteristics of communication systems, at least partially suppressing them, and the frequencies of the Boyd loop will decrease, which (ceteris paribus) will lead to defeat.
Thus, the whole concept of network-centric warfare is tied to communication systems. Without communication, coordination between elements of the network is partially or completely disrupted: there is no navigation, there is no “friend or foe” identification, there are no marks on the location of troops, units become “blind”, automated fire control systems do not receive signals from guidance systems, and many types of modern weapons in manual mode is not possible. Therefore, in a network-centric war, it is the electronic warfare that will play one of the leading roles, reclaiming the air from the enemy.”
big ear
EW methods are actively used not only in the electromagnetic range (radio and optical), but also in acoustics. This is not only anti-submarine warfare (interference and decoys), but the detection of artillery batteries and helicopters along an infrasound trail that spreads far in the atmosphere.
Invisible signals
Amplitude (AM) and frequency (FM) modulation are the basis of analog communications, however, they are not too noise-resistant and therefore are quite easily suppressed using modern electronic warfare tools.
Scheme of operation of pseudo-random tuning of the operating frequency (PFC)
Boyd loop
John Boyd began his career as a US Air Force pilot in 1944, and at the start of the Korean War he became an instructor and earned the nickname "Forty Second Boyd" because none of the cadets could last longer than that time against him in mock combat.
How a tank or aircraft operates on the battlefield is clear to many. Another thing is electronic warfare. Let's try to talk about some of the features of the "invisible" fight on the air and the fantastic capabilities of modern electronic warfare systems.
What is an REB?
Electronic warfare (EW) - the impact of radio interference on enemy control, communications and intelligence systems, as well as the protection of their systems from similar effects.
In simple terms, electronic warfare troops are designed to protect their military equipment from the enemy. Its main goals are the violation, disruption or disorganization of the enemy's command and control system.
For example, the disruption of the operation of enemy radar stations (RLS). These stations monitor the airspace day and night in any weather. They detect objects in the air, determine their characteristics, nationality, and, together with the current coordinates, transmit this data to command posts, where a decision can be made to shoot down the object.
Aircraft with an electronic warfare system on board try to jam ground-based radars and can deprive the enemy of the ability to monitor the situation in the air for certain periods of time. To avoid this fate, the air defense was forced to develop and apply countermeasures that would make it possible to observe targets in the air even against the background of intense interference. At the same time, radio countermeasure aircraft are also constantly improving their equipment.
This duel is called "electronic warfare". In Western countries, an even more radical term has been adopted - "electronic warfare".
When did it appear?
In Russia, the date of birth of electronic warfare is considered to be April 15, 1904, when Russian radio stations interfered with Japanese radio operators who were trying to correct the firing of their armored cruisers at the Port Arthur fortress. This was the first case of combat use of electronic warfare methods in world history. Then the enemy fired more than 60 large-caliber shells, and at the same time there was not a single hit on our ships.
The tasks of electronic warfare at that time were solved quite simply, because the radio stations that were used in both the Russian and Japanese fleets were approximately the same type, with spark transmitters. Therefore, it was not difficult to suppress messages with a "big spark", that is, a more powerful signal from one's transmitter. Since then, electronic warfare has gone a very long and difficult way, to modern electronic warfare systems with fantastic capabilities.
What do electronic warfare facilities look like?
Electronic warfare equipment can be placed on a variety of military equipment: aircraft, ships, tanks and vehicles. Like any technique, electronic warfare equipment is being improved.
Today, there are ground-based electronic warfare systems, which are located on multi-ton KAMAZ trucks, there are 40-ton tractors, which are equipped with heavy-duty electronic warfare systems that have colossal ranges.
There are also electronic warfare equipment on board an aircraft or helicopter. For example, the Rychag-AV electronic warfare complex, which is located on the Mi-8 helicopter. Outwardly, such a helicopter will not differ in any way from a conventional helicopter. And just looking inside, you can understand that this car is special, having a special electronic filling.
And, for example, the Khibiny aviation complex, which is installed on the Su-34 fighter, is a relatively small container in the form of a torpedo, which is mounted on the wingtips of the aircraft.
How does a combat radio-electronic complex work?
Imagine a picture: in the sky there is a combat Ka-52, from the ground the Igla or Stinger MANPADS hit the helicopter, but when approaching, the missile suddenly changes direction abruptly and goes to the side. The reason is that a system is installed on board the helicopter that forms around it a kind of electronic dome that enemy means of attack cannot overcome. Ground-based electronic warfare systems operate on the same principle, “blinding” the enemy for hundreds of kilometers, creating an invisible shield around the equipment . Consider the example of the "Mercury-BM" complex, which until recently was strictly classified. The last two letters mean that it is placed on a combat vehicle. It can be a car, an armored personnel carrier or a widely used MTLB armored artillery tractor.
The essence of protection is as follows. The vehicle with the "Mercury" complex is installed in the place where an enemy artillery and missile strike is likely. "Mercury" turns on at the time of the artillery attack for milliseconds. The electronics of the system almost instantly determines the operating frequency of an enemy radio fuse. "Mercury" within a fraction of a second creates a signal that provides such an impact on the radio fuse that it works ahead of time. The rocket, having got into the zone of action of "Mercury", loses all its "mind" and flies along an uncontrolled trajectory. During operation, one Rtut-BM electronic warfare vehicle can protect troops on an area from 20 to 50 hectares.
What are the promising developments in the field of electronic warfare?
Electronic warfare, almost the same age as radio, over the past hundred years has managed to go through a very difficult path, ranging from isolated cases of creating radio interference to "technology on the verge of fantasy." And, of course, it continues to improve. For example, one of the main directions in the development of new generation electronic warfare systems is the development of ultra-wideband antenna systems based on active phased arrays (AFAR). As you know, in AFAR each element has its own miniature transmitter operating in a wide frequency range. Previously, it was necessary to manufacture specialized systems for each range.
Solid-state powerful amplifiers made using gallium arsenide and gallium nitride technologies are used as active elements of the APAA of modern electronic warfare equipment. They make it possible to reduce the mass of equipment by one and a half to two times, and to increase its reliability and efficiency by two to three times.
In addition, the largest Russian radio-electronic holding KRET has recently started production of signal processing modules based on Digital Radio Frequency Memory technology (DRFM - Digital Radio Frequency Memory). This technology makes it possible to form signals and noise of almost any arbitrary shape at a speed of nanoseconds and process them in real time.
What does KRET supply to the Russian army?
Last year, KRET handed over nine Moskva-1 electronic reconnaissance stations, 10 Rychag-AV jamming helicopters, eight Krasukha-2 electronic reconnaissance and suppression stations, 15 sets of Krasukha-4 reconnaissance and suppression stations to the troops "and 20 sets of radio-electronic reconnaissance and protection station" Rtut-BM ".
In addition, last year, the Concern supplied the Ministry of Defense with several Khibiny complexes of an expandable composition for the Su-34, which allow turning this fighter-bomber into a full-fledged electronic warfare aircraft capable of protecting not only itself, but the entire air group.
In 2015, KRET also handed over to the troops the first batch of electronic warfare systems of the Vitebsk family adapted for military transport aviation. This is the first experience of equipping military transport aircraft with such systems. They will be installed on Il-76, Il-78, An-72, An-124, Il-112V and Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters.
What electronic warfare systems are exported?
The interest of foreign customers in Russian electronic warfare technology has increased significantly, which is explained, in particular, by the increase in the number of local conflicts around the world and the growth of their intensity. Electronic warfare equipment is increasingly being used in all conflicts. In addition to products supplied as part of Russian combat aircraft and helicopters, KRET electronic warfare (EW) systems, both ground-based and air-based, are also transferred to foreign partners.
general characteristics
The units of the electronic warfare troops carry out measures to gain dominance on the air, protect their strategic command and control systems of troops and weapons from deliberate interference by the enemy, as well as disrupt the operation of the strategic command and control systems of the enemy, reduce the effectiveness of the use of its combat means by spreading electronic interference.
Story
The first attempt in world history to conduct electronic warfare (EW) was successfully undertaken during the war with Japan by Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov, commander of the Pacific Squadron, on April 15, 1904. Then it was possible to disorganize the fire control channels of the artillery of Japanese ships with radio interference and successfully repel an enemy strike. During the First World War, radio interference was used to disrupt communications between army, corps and division headquarters, as well as between warships. To create interference, conventional radio communications were used, and only in the German army did special radio interference stations exist.
During the Second World War, electronic warfare was already conducted non-episodically, but continuously, while specially developed means of electronic suppression and protection of electronic equipment (RES) were used.
In the second half of the 20th century, the rapid development of electronic warfare was observed. One of the main tasks is the electronic suppression of means and systems of radio communication, radio navigation and radar of the enemy, including on-board radar systems of combat aircraft and ships that have weapons with radar homing heads. At the same time, there was a need to protect their RES from electronic suppression of the enemy and mutual radio interference. In this regard, the formation of radio countermeasure services in the USSR Armed Forces and the creation of special means of jamming enemy radio communications for them began.
The first means of radio countermeasures (dipole and corner radio reflectors, training jamming transmitters) of industrial production enter the troops by 1950. At the same time, a special electronic warfare service was created in the Soviet army.
On August 30, 1989, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, by his order, creates, on the basis of the Integrated Technical Control Unit (CTK) and a special laboratory of the General Staff, the Center for Integrated Technical Control of the General Staff with a location in Moscow. The Center created a multi-position automated receiving-direction-finding network in the Moscow zone.
In the early and mid-1990s, the Electronic Warfare Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces was faced with the need not only to ensure the functioning of existing and the development of new RES, but also to establish interaction with the radio frequency authorities of the post-Soviet states, to agree on coordination of the use of the radio frequency spectrum with NATO and Western countries. Europe, to determine a new procedure for the use of the radio frequency spectrum of RES for various purposes.
Structure
The EW forces are based on ground, aviation and EW units that are part of associations and formations of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. Electronic warfare equipment is combined into an electronic warfare weapon system - a set of electronic warfare equipment of electronic warfare units and subunits, as well as on-board electronic warfare equipment designed for individual protection of weapons and military equipment (missile systems, combat aircraft, helicopters, ships,
Our Russian fleet has a world priority in such a specific area of radio electronics as electronic warfare (EW). The very first steps in the introduction of radio showed both its undoubted advantages and its main drawback - susceptibility to deliberate external influence. Therefore, the ideas of confrontation in management began to take shape almost in parallel with the development of radio and were formed in the Russian Navy by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.
In the classical understanding of the essence of electronic warfare as a two-way process of suppressing electronic means on the one hand and protection against interference on the other hand, the dialectic of the development of all radio electronics is concluded. The desire to achieve a positive result in this confrontation has driven and will always, on the one hand, move the technical process, and on the other, improve the methods of combat use.
April 15, 1904 two Japanese armored cruisers, "Nissin" and "Kasuga", went out to carry out the "third flip-flop" on the forts and the inner raid of the fortress of Port Arthur. "Flip-over" was called shooting with steep trajectories of projectiles at targets located somewhere behind mountainous terrain, in the absence of direct visibility.
Japanese armored cruisers "Nisshin" (in the foreground) and "Kasuga"
Rear Admiral P. P. Ukhtomsky, acting commander of the Pacific Fleet, reported: “At 9:11 a.m., the enemy armored cruisers Nissin and Kasuga, maneuvering south-south-west from the Lyaoteshan lighthouse, began throwing fire at forts and inland raid. From the very beginning of the shooting, two enemy cruisers, having chosen positions against the passage of the Liaoteshan Cape, outside the shots of the fortress, began to telegraph, why immediately Battleship Pobeda and the station of the Golden Mountain began to interrupt enemy telegrams with a big spark, believing that these cruisers were informing the firing battleships about their hit by shells. The enemy fired more than 60 large-caliber shells. There were no court cases."
destroyer "Siberian shooter"
The effectiveness of organized interference was also confirmed by the Japanese themselves: “Since communication by wireless telegraph with our observing ships was interrupted by the enemy’s observation station located on the southeast coast from the entrance, it was difficult to correct the shooting and the shells did not hit accurately enough.” Only a year has passed, and the first people awarded for success in this branch of military affairs have already begun to appear: a radio telegraph operator destroyer "Siberian shooter" the conductor Sinitsa was awarded the St. George Cross for using radio noise to "score the report of the enemy destroyer about the discovery of the forces of the Russian fleet." The tasks of electronic warfare at that time were solved quite simply because the radio stations used in the Russian and Japanese fleets were approximately the same type - both in principle of operation and in construction: with spark transmitters, sometimes even from the same manufacturers. This opened up the possibility of “hammering” messages with a “big spark” - a more powerful signal from your transmitter.
In 1911, Petrovsky, a professor of radio engineering at the Naval Academy, was the first to theoretically substantiate methods for creating radio interference and protecting radio communications from them. They have passed a practical test in the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, measures were developed to “... to leave during radio communication sessions from enemy interference". Training began on creating radio interference and training radio operators to work in interference conditions on ships of the Baltic Fleet.
In a report at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on November 23, 1917 V. I. Lenin said: “We have information that our radiograms reach Europe. Thus, our radiotelegram about the victory over Kerensky was intercepted by the Austrian radiotelegraph and transmitted. The Germans sent oncoming waves to detain her. - This is how the classic of Marxism-Leninism understood the essence of electronic warfare. This situation continued until the time of the civil war. When it became necessary for the rebellious Kronstadt forts Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse to establish contact with foreign countries, their transmissions were “clogged” by the radiation of ship radio transmitters from ships of the Baltic Fleet loyal to the Bolsheviks.
In the period between the world wars, along with the significant development of radio communications, radio direction finding, radio telecontrol, and radar appeared. As a result, the methods of combat use of forces and means of the armies, air force and navy have changed radically, and the effectiveness of combat operations has sharply increased. This, of course, caused a response, led to a wider development of methods and techniques for counteracting enemy electronic means.
Thus, the idea of the possibility of creating interference with radars was first expressed in 1937 when discussing work on radio range finders and radio detectors (that was how radars were called in the USSR until 1943). One of the first applications for an invention in the field of radar countermeasures was filed in May 1939 by engineer Kabanov (it was called "Method and Device for Interference of the False Object Type to the Operation of Radio Rangefinders").
In the prewar years in the Soviet Union, prototypes of radio interference stations "Storm" in the ultrashortwave, "Storm-2" in the medium wave and "Thunder" in the shortwave bands were manufactured to suppress radio communication lines. Professor Klyatskin and others took an active part in their development. During testing, these stations showed high efficiency, but before the start of the Great Patriotic War, they were not put into mass production.
A prototype of the Grom interference station was used from September 6 to 12, 1941, when our troops launched a counterattack near Yelnya. In addition, in the first year of the war, counteraction to enemy radio communications was widely and actively carried out by creating interference with the help of regular radio stations. And in 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, a special suppression group from the regular radio stations of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army was successfully operating. Their aiming at enemy frequencies and determining the effectiveness of disrupting radio communications was carried out by radio intelligence units of the Intelligence Directorate.
In the course of the encirclement of the 6th field army of Paulus with the aim of its radio blockade, a special group of radio reconnaissance and radio suppression is formed as part of the Don Front. She had several powerful radio stations, which were aimed at the enemy's radio networks using the means of the 394th separate radio reconnaissance division. To misinform the headquarters of the 6th Army, a special radio station was allocated with the call signs of Manstein's troops, who were trying to release the encircled group.
After a detailed analysis and generalization of the results of the first experience of creating radio interference, convinced of its high efficiency, in early December 1942, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria sent a memorandum to the State Defense Committee with the following content:
From the experience of the war, it is known that the bulk of German radio stations used to control units on the battlefield operate on the waves of the ultrashortwave and longwave ranges.
The Red Army occupies a relatively small number of waves in the long-wave and ultra-short-wave ranges and does not at all engage in jamming enemy radio stations operating on the battlefield, despite the presence of favorable conditions for this.
In particular, we know that the radio stations of the units of the German army encircled in the Stalingrad region keep in touch with their leaders, who are outside the encirclement, on waves from 438 to 732 meters.
The NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to organize in the Red Army a special service to jam German radio stations operating on the battlefield.
To implement these measures, it is necessary to form three special radio divisions with interfering means designed to jam the main radio stations of the most important enemy groupings as part of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army ...
On December 16, 1942, the GKO decree # GOKO-2633SS “On the organization in the Red Army of a special service for driving German radio stations operating on the battlefield” was issued, and on December 17, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Vasilevsky signed directive # 4869948 "On the formation of a special group and special divisions of radio interference." In accordance with this document, two separate special-purpose radio divisions (ordn) are created - the 131st (commander Major Petrov) and the 132nd (commander Major Bushuev), which became part of the Stalingrad and Don fronts. Later, in 1943 and 1944, the 130th (commander Captain Lukacher) and 226th (commander Major Konstantinov) separate special-purpose radio divisions were formed on the Western and Leningrad fronts, respectively. To coordinate the combat use of these units, a radio mixing service was created at the General Staff, headed by Lieutenant Colonel-Engineer Rogatkin.
Each radio division had from 8 to 10 car radio stations of the type RAF-KV, intended for setting radio interference, 18-20 reconnaissance receivers of the Virazh and Chaika types, four radio direction finders of the 55 PK-3A and Corkscrew types.
Radio interference stations were usually located 20-30 km from the front line and 3-5 km from the radio receiving center of the division. The main radio networks of the enemy were monitored around the clock, during which the main and spare frequencies of enemy radio stations, their location, military affiliation and modes of operation were identified. In the 131st Special Forces Order, in addition, there was a powerful radio interference station "Pchela", which was located on a railway platform and was intended to counter enemy aircraft radio compasses.
Separate radio divisions of special forces took part in all front-line and army operations in 1943-1945, creating interference, conducting radio reconnaissance, as well as radio disinformation, radio demonstrations in false areas of concentration of troops and breaking through enemy defenses. For example, during the Belorussian operation in the summer of 1944, the 131st order, while suppressing the radio communications of enemy groupings in the Vitebsk region and southeast of Minsk, disrupted the transmission of 522 urgent and 1665 simple radio transmissions. Particular attention was paid to disrupting artillery fire control and aviation operations. Simultaneously with the setting of interference, strikes were made on command posts and radar posts of enemy troops.
The control of German formations and formations was very successfully disrupted by radio interference in January-April 1945 during the East Prussian operation, in which the 131st and 226th special forces radio divisions took an active part. They managed to prevent the enemy from maintaining stable radio communications, although he had 175 radio stations on 30 radio networks and 300 radio frequencies. In total, about 1,200 radiograms were disrupted in the Koenigsberg grouping of the enemy, and 1,000 radiograms in the Zemlandskaya.
During the assault on the Königsberg fortress by the Soviet troops, the main radio station of the encircled garrison tried to consistently broadcast on 43 frequencies for 24 hours, but they all clogged. After that, on April 9, the order of the commander of the group of troops defending Koenigsberg was already transmitted in clear text, Colonel General Lyash about surrender. In captivity during interrogation, Lyash testified: “As a result of the terrifying artillery preparation, the wire communication in the fortress was disabled. I hoped for radio contact with Courland, with the Zemland group of troops and with Central Germany. But the effective actions of the Russian slaughtering radio equipment did not make it possible to use the radio equipment to transmit radiograms, and my actions could not be coordinated by the headquarters of the supreme command. This was one of the reasons for my surrender."
The effectiveness of the actions of special forces radio divisions is also evidenced by the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Wittenberg, the chief of communications of the Breslau garrison, captured by Soviet troops: “... the Russians continuously interrupted our radio communications. Due to radio interference, we were forced to switch to different waves, but we were detected and subjected to jamming. Radio interference delayed the transmission of radio messages for three or more hours, so some of them had to be canceled.
In the Berlin operation, electronic warfare reached perfection. It included radio reconnaissance, radio suppression, disinformation, and the destruction of radio equipment of enemy control points. The electronic warfare was carried out by the 130th and 132nd order, which were part of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (respectively). In addition, bomber aircraft interfered with German air defense radars. So, from April 25 to May 2, 1945, the 132nd radio division disrupted the radio communications of the headquarters of the encircled Berlin grouping of the enemy, as well as the headquarters of the 9th Army and the 5th Army Corps, which were in the ring south of Berlin. Due to radio interference, German radio operators were forced to repeat the texts of the transmitted radiograms dozens of times. During the days of fierce fighting, the 132nd order disrupted the radio transmission of 170 urgent combat orders and instructions that did not receive enemy formations and units.
It is also necessary to mention the special devices SOL-3 and SOL-3A, which entered the troops from 1942. With their help, our aircraft was determined to enter the enemy radar radiation zone. From about the middle of 1943, Soviet aviation interfered with the operation of the radar station with paper metallized tapes scattered from jamming aircraft.