Nuclear weapons control in Russia and the USA. Big nuclear hoax. how the USSR lost in arms reduction Reduction of strategic nuclear weapons

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro offers you an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic weapons? The policy of nuclear deterrence during cold war entailed a frantic arms race between the two superpowers, which could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the United States and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: The first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The agreement limited the number ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addition to the 1974 treaty reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the contract allowed the parties to terminate the contract unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 to begin deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The date for the final withdrawal of the United States from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that prohibits the production of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. ground-based and limits ballistic missile launchers on submarines. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This “historic” agreement was especially intended to help restore the balance of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First and foremost, this agreement allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the ability to mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “Being able to arrange about 27 ends of the world—I don’t know the exact number—gives them a sufficient sense of security and allows them to rid us of many additional ways destruction. For this we have them to thank kind heart».

Treaty 2: Easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of protocol that will enter into force in 1981, and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of the SALT III negotiations. .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons both countries. After the treaty was signed, Jimmy Carter said in a speech: “These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if not limited, general rules and restrictions can only lead to disaster.” At the same time, the American president clarified that “this agreement does not take away the need for both countries to support them military power" But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On December 8, 1987, in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the open-ended Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in May 1988. This “historic” treaty provided for the elimination of weapons for the first time. We were talking about medium- and short-range missiles with a range from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented 3 to 4% of the total arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, in within three years from the moment it came into force, all medium- and short-range missiles were to be destroyed. The agreement also provided for procedures for mutual “on-site” inspections.

At the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: “For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of arms reduction.” Both presidents specifically pushed for a reduction of 50% of their strategic arsenals. They were guided by the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START I: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement marked the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. Under its terms, countries were to reduce by a quarter or a third the number of the most dangerous types of weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles in three stages (seven years each).

The number of warheads was supposed to be reduced to 7 thousand for the USSR and 9 thousand for the USA. A privileged position in the new arsenal was given to bombers: the number of bombs was supposed to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the USA and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures, and it finally came into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the “infrastructure of fear.”

New START: radical cuts

On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START II treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it included a reduction nuclear arsenals by two thirds. After the agreement entered into force in 2003, American stocks were supposed to decrease from 9 thousand 986 warheads to 3.5 thousand, and Russian ones - from 10 thousand 237 to 3 thousand 027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .

The contract also included one more important point: Elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia abandoned the precision-guided weapons that formed the basis of its deterrent, while the United States removed half of its submarine-mounted missiles (virtually undetectable). New START was ratified by the United States in 1996 and Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw it as a source of hope, and George W. Bush considered it a symbol of “the end of the Cold War” and “a better future free from fear for our parents and children.” Be that as it may, the reality remains less idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times over.

SNP: a point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in the Kremlin. The talk was about reducing arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this is a small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not accurate and did not contain verification measures. Its role from the point of view of the parties’ image was more important than its content: this was not the first time that reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: not having the necessary economic capabilities, Russia abandoned its claims to superpower status. In addition, the treaty opened the door to " new era" because it was accompanied by a statement about a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the agreement allows one to get rid of the “legacy of the Cold War” and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protection national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after the expiration of START I in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was established for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: a reduction in nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers- up to 700 units.

In addition, the agreement provides for verification of figures joint group inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting here that the established levels are not too different from those specified in 2002. It also makes no mention of tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and bombs strategic aviation. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START III was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. A few days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump said he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

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According to the United States' interpretation, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty reduces the number of deployed warheads that are mounted on launch vehicles and ready for launch. The common arsenal of nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States also contains other types of weapons. In addition to deployed strategic nuclear weapons, both countries use tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed for use in ground-based military operations and have lower yields and shorter ranges.

Currently total stock US nuclear weapons number approximately 11,000 warheads, including nearly 7,000 deployed strategic warheads; more than 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and almost 3,000 strategic and tactical warheads that are not installed on delivery systems. (The US also has thousands of nuclear warhead components that can be assembled into full-fledged weapons).

Currently, the Russian nuclear arsenal includes approximately 5,000 deployed nuclear weapons, approximately 3,500 operational tactical nuclear weapons, and more than 11,000 strategic and tactical warheads in reserve. All this amounts to a total stockpile of 19,500 nuclear warheads. Unlike the United States, Russia only partially possesses these stockpiles because dismantling the warheads is very expensive. Also unlike the United States, Russia continues to produce a limited number of new nuclear warheads, largely because its warheads have a much shorter lifespan and must be replaced more frequently.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons Control Treaties

OSV-1

Beginning in November 1969, negotiations on strategic offensive weapons limitation led to the Systems Limitation Treaty in 1972. missile defense(ABM), which prohibits the creation of missile defense on the territory of the country. An Interim Agreement was also concluded, under which the parties undertake not to begin the construction of additional stationary launchers of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The parties also undertake to limit the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SBMS) and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines to the number in service and under construction on the date of signing the agreement. This agreement does not address the issue of strategic bombers and warheads and allows both countries to make their own decisions about increasing the number of weapons used by adding warheads to ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Under this treaty, the United States cannot have more than 1,054 silo-launched ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 silo-launched ICBMs and 740 submarine-launched ones.

OSV-2

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to a treaty that was a continuation of SALT I. SALT II, ​​signed in June 1979, initially limited the number of Soviet and American launchers of ICBMs, submarine-launched submarines, and heavy bombers to 2,400.

Various restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces were also outlined. (In 1981, the treaty proposed reducing the number of launch vehicles to 2,250). The terms of this agreement required Soviet Union reduce the number of launch vehicles by 270 units. At the same time, the amount of US military capacity was below the established norm and could be increased.

President Jimmy Carter withdrew the Treaty from the Senate, where it had been awaiting ratification after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. This Treaty never came into force. However, since the parties did not declare their intention to refuse ratification of the Treaty, Washington and Moscow continued to generally comply with its provisions. However, on May 2, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions about strategic nuclear weapons would be made based on the emerging threat rather than the terms of the SALT treaty.

START-1

The Strategic Weapons Reduction Treaty was first proposed in the early 1980s by President Reagan and finally signed in July 1991. The main provisions of the START I Treaty are to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles to 1,600 units and the number of warheads placed on these carriers to 6,000 units. The treaty obligated the destruction of the remaining media. Their destruction was confirmed through site inspections and regular exchange of information, as well as the use of technical means (for example, satellites). The entry into force of the treaty was delayed for several years due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and efforts to concentrate the nuclear weapons of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan on Russian territory. Arms reductions under the terms of the START I treaty were carried out in 2001. This agreement is valid until 2009, unless the parties extend its validity.

START-2

In July 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to amend the START I treaty. The New START Treaty, signed in January 1993, committed the parties to reducing strategic arsenals to a level of 3,000-3,500 warheads and prohibited the use of land-based missiles with multiple warheads. START 2 worked with warheads on the same principle as START 1, and like the previous treaty, it required the destruction of launch vehicles, but not warheads. Initially, January 2003 was set as the contract execution date. In 1997, the date was moved to December 2007 because Russia was unsure of its ability to meet the original deadline. The treaty never came into force because Russia linked its ratification to the approval of the New York protocols to the START II and ABM treaties, signed in 1997. In 2001, the Bush administration took a firm course towards deploying a large-scale missile defense system for the US territory and abandoning the ABM Treaty.

Structure of the START-3 Treaty

In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the structure of the New START Treaty for subsequent negotiations, the terms of which included a reduction in strategic warheads to a level of 2000-2500 units. The essential point is that this treaty stipulated the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads to ensure the irreversibility of the arms reduction process, including the prerequisites for preventing a sharp increase in the number of warheads. Negotiations were supposed to begin after New START came into force, which never happened.

Moscow Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a treaty requiring the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. Although the parties did not agree on rules for counting warheads, the Bush administration has made it clear that the United States will only reduce warheads deployed on launch vehicles and will not count warheads retired from active service and stored as reduced. Russia did not agree with this approach to the interpretation of the treaty and hopes for negotiations on the rules for counting reduced warheads. The treaty restrictions are the same as START III, but SORT does not require the destruction of launch vehicles, unlike START I and START II, ​​or the destruction of warheads, as prescribed in START III. This agreement must still be approved by the Senate and Duma.

Treaties on strategic weapons control.
Number of warheads used	Limits the number of missiles, not warheads	Limits the number of missiles and bombers, does not limit warheads
Number of launch vehicles used	USA: 1,710 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; USSR: 2,347 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles;			Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate
	Expired	Not in force		Not in force	Not considered	Signed, awaiting ratification.
date of signing					Not applicable
Effective date		Not applicable		Not applicable	Not applicable
Period of execution	Not applicable
Expiration date					Not applicable

Measures to control non-strategic nuclear weapons

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed on December 8, 1987, this Treaty requires the United States and Russia to accountably destroy all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented verification regime, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty formed the basis for the verification component of the subsequent START I treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, and both sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1992, with a total of 2,692 missiles remaining. The Treaty became multilateral after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today the parties to the Treaty are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreements, but do not take part in meetings under the Treaty and inspections at facilities. The ban on medium-range missiles is unlimited.

Presidential Nuclear Security Initiatives

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the U.S. intention to phase out nearly all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to allow Russia to do the same, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation if the Soviet Union collapsed. Bush, in particular, said that the United States would destroy everything artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic warheads and will remove all non-strategic nuclear warheads from the surface of ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev returned the favor on October 5, promising to destroy all nuclear artillery equipment, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles and all nuclear landmines. He also promised to dismantle all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons. However, serious questions remain about the fulfillment of these promises on the Russian side, and there is great uncertainty about the current state of Russian tactical nuclear forces.

On February 5, 2018, the deadline for fulfilling the main restrictions imposed on Russia and the United States by the START-3 treaty, which they signed, expired. The full name of the signed document is the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, START III. This bilateral treaty regulated the further mutual reduction of the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and replaced the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009. The START-3 Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by the presidents of the two countries, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011.

question

It is worth noting that countries started thinking about reducing strategic offensive weapons back in the late 1960s. By that time, both the USSR and the USA had accumulated such nuclear arsenals that made it possible not only to turn each other’s territory into ashes several times over, but also to destroy all human civilization and life on the planet. Besides nuclear race, which was one of the attributes of the Cold War, seriously hit the economies of the two countries. Huge amounts of money were spent on building up the nuclear arsenal. cash. Under these conditions, negotiations began between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1969 in Helsinki with the aim of limiting nuclear stockpiles.

These negotiations led to the signing of the first treaty between the countries - SALT I (strategic arms limitation), which was signed in 1972. The agreement signed by the USSR and the USA fixed the number of nuclear delivery vehicles for each country at the level at which they were at that time. True, by that time both the USA and the USSR had already begun to equip their ballistic missiles with multiple warheads with individual guidance units (they carried several warheads at once). As a result, it was during the period of detente that a new, previously unprecedented, avalanche-like process of building up nuclear potential began. At the same time, the agreement provided for the adoption of new ICBMs deployed on submarines, strictly in the same quantities as land-based ballistic missiles had previously been decommissioned.

The continuation of this treaty was the SALT II treaty, signed by the countries on June 18, 1979 in Vienna. This treaty prohibited the launch of nuclear weapons into space, and it also established restrictions on the maximum number of strategic delivery vehicles: ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, strategic aircraft and missiles (but not nuclear warheads themselves) below the existing level: up to 2,400 units (including up to 820 ICBM launchers equipped with multiple warheads). In addition, the parties pledged to reduce the number of speakers to 2250 by January 1, 1981. From total number of strategic systems, only 1320 carriers could be equipped with warheads with individually targeted warheads. The treaty also imposed other restrictions: it prohibited the design and deployment of ballistic missiles based on watercraft (with the exception of submarines), as well as on seabed; mobile heavy ICBMs, cruise missiles with MIRVs, limited the maximum throw weight for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The next joint agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons was the open-ended Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces of 1987. He banned the development and deployment of ballistic missiles with a flight range of 500 to 5,500 km. In accordance with this treaty, countries within three years had to destroy not only all ground-based ballistic missiles of these types, but also all launchers, including missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union. The same treaty introduced for the first time a universal classification of ballistic missiles by range.

The next treaty was START-1, signed by the USSR and the United States on July 31, 1991 in Moscow. It came into force after the collapse of the Soviet Union - on December 5, 1994. New treaty was designed for 15 years. The terms of the signed agreement prohibited each party from having more than 1,600 units of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers) on combat duty. The maximum number of nuclear charges was limited to 6000. On December 6, 2001, it was announced that the countries had fully complied with their obligations under this treaty.

The START-2 treaty, signed back in 1993, was initially unable to be ratified for a long time, and then it was simply abandoned. The next agreement in force was the agreement on reducing the offensive potential of the START, which limited the maximum number of warheads by another three times: from 1,700 to 2,200 units (compared to START-1). At the same time, the composition and structure of the arms to be reduced were determined by the states independently; this point was not regulated in any way in the treaty. The agreement came into force on June 1, 2003.

START-3 and its results

The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-3) entered into force on February 5, 2011. It replaced the START I Treaty and abolished the 2002 START Treaty. The treaty provided for further large-scale reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. According to the terms of the agreement, by February 5, 2018 and thereafter, the total number of weapons did not exceed 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic missile-carrying bombers, 1,550 charges on these missiles, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (TB) . It was in the START-3 treaty that the concept of “non-deployed” delivery vehicles and launchers, that is, not in combat readiness, was first introduced. They can be used for training or testing and do not have warheads. The treaty also separately stipulated a ban on the basing of strategic offensive weapons outside the national territories of the two states.

The START-3 Treaty, in addition to directly limiting nuclear weapons, implies a bilateral exchange of telemetry data that was obtained during test launches. The exchange of telemetric information on missile launches is carried out by mutual agreement and on a parity basis for no more than five launches per year. At the same time, the parties are required to exchange information on the number of delivery vehicles and warheads twice a year. Inspection activities were also prescribed separately; up to 300 people can take part in the inspection, whose candidacies are agreed upon within a month, after which they are issued visas for two years. At the same time, the inspectors themselves, members of inspection delegations and flight crews, as well as their aircraft, enjoy complete immunity during inspections on the territory of the two countries.

The START III treaty is expected to be extended in 2018, as it expires only in 2021. As US Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman noted in January 2018, trust between states on the issue of arms reduction has not been lost at present - Washington and Moscow are successfully working on the implementation of START-3. “We are working in a positive direction regarding START-3, I call it a “moment of inspiration”, after February 5 the work will not stop, the work will be more intense. The fact that we are approaching this date for achieving the goals inspires confidence,” the ambassador noted.

As TASS notes, as of September 1, 2017, the Russian Federation had 501 deployed nuclear weapons carriers, 1,561 nuclear warheads and 790 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles. The United States had 660 deployed delivery vehicles, 1,393 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. From the published data it followed that for Russia, in order to fit into the START-3 limit, it was necessary to reduce 11 warheads.

Nuclear arsenal of Russia and the USA

Today, the basis of modern strategic weapons continues to be nuclear weapons. In some cases it also includes precision weapons with conventional warheads, which can be used to destroy strategically important enemy targets. According to their purpose, they are divided into offensive (strike) and defensive weapons. Strategic offensive weapons (START) include all ground-based ICBM systems (both silo-based and mobile), strategic nuclear missile submarines (ARS), as well as strategic (heavy) bombers, which can act as carriers of air-to-air strategic cruise missiles. surface" and atomic bombs.

Topol M mobile version

Russia

Under the START-3 treaty as part of the Missile Forces strategic purpose(Strategic Missile Forces) the following ICBMs fall: RS-12M “Topol”; RS-12M2 "Topol-M"; RS-18 (according to NATO codification - “Stiletto”), RS-20 “Dnepr” (according to NATO codification “Satan”), R-36M UTTH and R-36M2 “Voevoda”; RS-24 "Yars". According to TASS, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces group currently includes about 400 ICBMs with warheads of various types and varying powers. Thus, more than 60 percent of the weapons and warheads of strategic nuclear forces are concentrated here Russian Federation. A noticeable difference from the United States is the presence in the ground component of the nuclear triad - mobile complexes. If in the USA ICBMs are located exclusively in stationary silo installations, then in the Strategic Missile Forces, along with silo-based installations, mobile ground-based ones are also used. missile systems based on the MZKT-79221 multi-axle chassis.

In 2017, the Strategic Missile Forces were replenished with 21 new ballistic missiles. Future plans include decommissioning the Topol ICBMs and replacing them with more modern and advanced Yars ICBMs. At the same time, Moscow expects to extend the service life of the heaviest R-36M2 Voevoda ICBMs in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until at least 2027.

The maritime component of the Russian nuclear triad is represented, as of March 1, 2017, by 13 nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board. The basis consists of 6 submarine missile carriers of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", which are armed with ballistic missiles R-29RMU2 "Sineva" and their modification "Liner". Also in service are still three nuclear submarines of the earlier project 667BDR “Squid” and one boat of project 941UM “Akula” - “Dmitry Donskoy”. It is also the largest submarine in the world. It was on the Dmitry Donskoy that the first tests of the new Russian ICBM, which falls under the START-3 treaty, were carried out - the R-30 Bulava missile, which is produced in Votkinsk. In addition to the listed submarines, three nuclear submarines of the new Project 955 “Borey”, armed with “Bulava”, are currently on combat watch; these are the boats: K-535 “Yuri Dolgoruky”, K-550 “Alexander Nevsky” and K-551 “Vladimir Monomakh” " Each of these submarines carries up to 16 ICBMs. Also, according to the modernized Borei-A project, 5 more such missile carriers are being built in Russia.

Project 955 Borei nuclear submarine

The basis of the air part of the nuclear triad in Russia consists of two strategic bombers that fall under the scope of the START-3 treaty. These are the supersonic strategic bomber-missile carrier with variable sweep wings Tu-160 (16 units) and an honorary veteran - turboprop strategic bomber-missile carrier Tu-95MS (about 40 deployed). According to experts, these turboprop aircraft can be successfully used until 2040.

The current US nuclear arsenal consists of silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs (there are 399 deployed ICBM launchers and 55 non-deployed), Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (212 deployed and 68 non-deployed), as well as nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and aircraft bombs. which are carried by strategic bombers. The Minuteman III missile has long been the basis American forces nuclear deterrence, it has been in service since 1970 and is the only land-based ICBM in service American army. All this time, the missiles were constantly modernized: replacement of warheads, power plants, control and guidance systems.

Test launch of Minuteman-III ICBM

The carriers of Trident II ICBMs are Ohio-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries on board 24 such missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (no more than 8 warheads per missile). A total of 18 such submarines were built in the United States. Moreover, 4 of them have already been converted into carriers of cruise missiles; the modernization of the missile silos has made it possible to place up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles on them, 7 per silo. 22 shafts have been converted, two more are used as airlocks for docking mini-submarines or special modules for the exit of combat swimmers. Since 1997, this is the only type of American SSBN in service. Their main armament is the Trident II D-5 ICBM. According to American experts, this missile is the most reliable weapon in the US strategic arsenal.

The Pentagon also included 49 strategic bombers in the number of deployed strategic bombers, including 11 stealthy Northrop B-2A Spirit strategic bombers and 38 “old boys” Boeing B-52H, another 9 B-2A and 8 B-52H are listed as non-deployed. Both bombers can use nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, as well as free-fall atomic bombs and guided bombs. Another American strategic bomber, the B-1B, developed in the 1970s specifically for launching missile attacks on the territory of the Soviet Union, has been converted into a conventional weapons carrier since the 1990s. By the time START III expires, the US Army does not plan to use it as a carrier of nuclear weapons. As of 2017, the US Air Force operated 63 B-1B Lancer bombers.

Northrop B-2A Spirit stealth strategic bomber

Mutual claims of the parties

US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan explained what condition must be met for the United States to comply with the Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of START (we are talking about the START-3 Treaty) and the INF Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles. According to Sullivan, the United States “wants to comply with arms control agreements, but for this to happen, their ‘interlocutors’ must be ‘minded in the same way,’” the Interfax agency reports his words. It is worth noting that in January 2018, the State Department confirmed Russia’s compliance with the terms of the START III treaty signed in 2010, but the United States still continues to accuse Russia of violating the INF Treaty. In particular, Washington believes that a new ground-based cruise missile was created in Yekaterinburg at the Novator Design Bureau - a land-based modification of the famous Caliber. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, notes that the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile cited as an example complies with the terms of the treaty.

At the same time, according to the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense, Vladimir Shamanov, Moscow has serious doubts about Washington’s fulfillment of its obligations under START-3. Shamanov noted that Russia never received confirmation of the conversion of the launchers Trident missiles II and B-52M heavy bombers. The main questions of the Russian side concern the re-equipment of some of the American strategic offensive weapons. As Vladimir Putin noted during a meeting with the heads of leading Russian media On January 11, 2018, the United States must verify the changes being made so that Russia can ensure that there is no return capability for some carriers. Moscow's lack of such evidence is cause for concern. According to Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov, dialogue continues with the American side on this issue.

Information sources:
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4925548
https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/18/904051.html
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chto_takoe_snv-3
Open source materials

In 1991 and 1992 The presidents of the USA and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to remove from combat service a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were voluntary, non-legally binding, and were not formally linked to the retaliatory steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to complete them quickly enough, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. The projects of some initiatives were prepared by experts in Voronezh on the basis of one research institute, for which employees needed to remove one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without carrying out legal procedures for denunciation international treaty. The first PNA was put forward by US President Bush on September 27, 1991. USSR President Gorbachev announced “reciprocal steps and counterproposals” on October 5. His initiatives received further development and specification in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin of January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the US President included: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended for arming ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical Lance missiles) to US territory, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; removal from service of surface combatants and submarines of all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, storing them on US territory and subsequent destruction of approximately half of their number; termination of the development program for a short-range missile of the Srem-T type, intended for armament of tactical attack aircraft. Counter steps on the part of the Soviet Union, and then Russia, consisted of the following: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense would be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based weapons are subject to destruction; a third of warheads intended for tactical carriers will be destroyed sea-based; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to reduce by half the stockpiles of aviation tactical nuclear weapons by eliminating them; on a reciprocal basis, nuclear weapons intended for attack were proposed aviation assets, together with the United States, remove it from combat units of front-line aviation and place it in centralized storage warehouses 5 . It seems very difficult to quantify these reductions, since, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States must have eliminated at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were still armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2000 units, including about 500-600 aerial bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The general assessment of the US tactical nuclear arsenals at present is given above.

According to an authoritative Russian study, Russia would have to cut 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads under the NPR, including 4,000 tactical missile warheads, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 ammunition engineering troops(nuclear landmines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for front-line aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for Navy ships and submarines, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the PNP is difficult to overestimate. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on reductions of strategic offensive arms. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete elimination: nuclear shells and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear landmines 8 . Secondly, the scale of the reductions significantly exceeded the indirect restrictions contained in the START agreements. Thus, according to the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were supposed to remove 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads from combat service, or 8-10 thousand units together. Reductions within the framework of the PNA opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16 thousand warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the PNP encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage in 1992, they were associated with Russia's withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed upon in the founding documents for the dissolution of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the newly independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapons. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the conditions of the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities were hampered by the lack of sufficient volumes at storage facilities. This led to overcrowding of warehouses and violations of accepted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear safety. It was provided mainly by the United States under the famous Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrets, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This made it possible to free up financial resources necessary for the destruction of ammunition.

The provision of foreign assistance provided partial unilateral transparency not provided for by the PNA. Donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right of access to the facilities they supported to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and complex negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and on the other, the necessary level of access. Similar limited transparency measures covered such the most important objects, as enterprises for dismantling and assembling nuclear weapons, operated by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of the NPR in Russia was presented in the speech of Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as land-based naval aircraft and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear weapons for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is being completed. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear aircraft bombs have been destroyed." 10 Assessments of Russia's implementation of the PNA are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of 2000, Russia has largely complied with the PNA. As planned, all naval munitions were moved to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the removal of all such weapons from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistent official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNA, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to remove tactical ammunition from combat service and destroy it together with the United States, which did not do this. As for the elimination of Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations were fulfilled. In terms of air defense means, the PNAs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the area of ​​complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out PNA in the field of air force and possibly naval warheads, as well as partially air defense. In the Ground Forces, some tactical nuclear weapons still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the PNA provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and complete liquidation. The latter was explained by financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of NPRs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became an integral part of the “13 Steps” Plan to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The “13 Steps” plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e. representatives of Russia and the United States also voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was made contrary to the United States' commitments under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with the treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made full compliance with these decisions by other parties unlikely. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Step Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has lost force. This could not but affect the implementation of the PNA. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the famous unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are complex in nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability.”

Russia's official reference to the fact that nuclear weapons address, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, other important issues affecting strategic stability, clearly comes from the idea of ​​​​the interconnection of the implementation of the initiatives of 1991-1992. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the statement that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has arisen since the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This agreement was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis across five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it became completely obsolete.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional weapons, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty in Istanbul in 1999. This option took more into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops along its borders. However, NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, the increasing imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as a superstructure over the basic one, never came into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. It is obvious that fears associated with NATO's advance to the east in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, call into question the advisability of implementing the PNA in full, especially taking into account the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the lack of further official statements about the fate of the PNA, they were never fully implemented.

This fact clearly shows both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out as part of the PNA, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the lack of verification measures does not allow the parties to confidently assume what kind of reductions actually took place. The lack of legally binding status has made it easier for parties to effectively refuse to implement initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of the “informal” approach to disarmament are tactical in nature, but in the long term it is not sustainable enough to serve as a stabilizer in the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can become a source of additional mistrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less economically burdensome disarmament agreements.

Reducing the number of nuclear warheads does not improve the security situation in the world. Experts from the International Swedish Peace Research Institute have found that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons has led to a significant increase in the quality of the remaining arsenals. Observers were also concerned about the emergence of a new type of military conflict.

Despite the countries' declared desire for nuclear disarmament, the reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction is happily offset by an increase in their quality.

These findings are contained in an annual report released Monday by the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to the institute's experts, the arsenals of eight countries - the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel - today contain a total of about 19 thousand nuclear weapons, which is about one and a half thousand less compared to 2011.

At the same time, 4.4 thousand nuclear weapons are ready for use, half of which are in a state of high alert.

Quantitative and quality parameters restrictions on strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States in the START-1 and START-3 treaties

Institute analysts see the main reasons for the reduction of nuclear warheads in the steps taken by Russia and the United States within the framework of the START treaty. Let us recall that the treaty provides that each of the parties reduces strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter their total quantities do not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles; 1550 units for warheads on them; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB.

According to official data as of April of this year, Russia had 1,492 deployed nuclear warheads, and Washington had 1,737. According to a certificate published six months ago, Washington had 1,800 operationally deployed warheads, and Moscow had 1,537. Thus, in about six months, Russia destroyed 45 warheads, and the United States - 63. However, the reduction in the number of warheads, SIPRI experts state, only led to the improvement of the remaining arsenals. The five officially recognized nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States, the report notes, are either deploying new nuclear weapons delivery systems or have announced similar programs.

India and Pakistan continue to develop new nuclear weapons delivery systems. According to the Stockholm Institute, the first has from 80 to 110 nuclear warheads, in Pakistan their number can vary from 90 to 110, and about 80 more units are in Israel.

The latter, in particular, as the German media wrote the other day, intends to place nuclear warheads on submarines purchased in Germany.

“Despite the world's renewed interest in disarmament efforts, none of the nuclear-weapon states has yet shown more than a rhetorical willingness to give up their nuclear arsenals,” states one of the report's authors, Shannon Kyle.

However, both Russia and the United States, when signing the START treaty in 2010, did not hide their intentions to modernize their nuclear potential. In particular, this right was assigned to Moscow during the ratification of the document in the State Duma. Moreover, as Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov noted at the time, after the treaty comes into force de facto, Russia will not eliminate a single missile, since the country will not be able to reach the level of warheads specified in the treaty until 2018. “We are in all respects, even in launchers, we will reach the level specified in the agreement only by 2028. As for warheads, we will reach the level of 1.55 thousand units by 2018. I say again that we will not cut a single unit,” he emphasized.

Another point that SIPRI experts draw attention to in their report is the emergence of a new type of military conflict in general. Experts made this conclusion based on recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Arab Spring, the report notes, demonstrated the growing complexity of armed conflict. “The events of the past year are not isolated when it comes to trends modern conflict. In fact, they echo changes that have taken place during decades of armed conflict. All these changes suggest the emergence of a new type of conflict, which is increasingly complicating international intervention,” explained Neil Melvin, director of the institute’s program on armed conflict, in this regard.