The UN and the beginning of the Trump doctrine. The UN has undoubtedly made an outstanding contribution to preventing a new world war on the planet with the use of deadly chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons. Issues of disarmament, strengthening peace and security are always
International legal doctrine
According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Court applies as aid for determining legal norms"the doctrines of the most qualified specialists in the public law of the various nations" ( English text, by the way, is somewhat different: “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”). The court rarely quotes in its decisions scientific opinions researchers international law, and its decisions, as well as decisions of international arbitrations.
In the past, however, the doctrines of specialists - for example, G. Grotius or F. Martens - did have a colossal influence on the development of international law. And nowadays, references to major works on international law can be seen in the materials of the UN International Law Commission, in arbitration and some court decisions, in dissenting opinions of members of the International Court.
Legally impeccable, well-founded conclusions based on the results of an in-depth study of issues of international law cannot but influence the formation of the corresponding opinion of an international judge, arbitrator, member of the International Law Commission, legal adviser to the delegation during negotiations, etc. At the same time, the reality is that the official positions of the respective states will have a decisive influence on such an opinion.
Solutions international organizations. The term "soft law"
Decisions of international organizations are not mentioned in the list of Art. 38 of the Statute. Nevertheless, in science such decisions (especially those made within the framework of the PLO system) are often classified as auxiliary sources of international law. In this case, they refer to the fact that, for example, in accordance with Art. 25 of the UN Charter, the Security Council makes decisions that are binding on all UN member states; that decisions of most intergovernmental organizations on budget issues are binding on member states, etc.
Other experts do not agree with this, believing that such decisions of international organizations are not a separate, not a new source of international law: after all, the right to make such decisions is inherent in contractual basis functioning of this organization, i.e. in the UN Charter, in the agreement on the creation of an international organization, etc. And unanimously adopted resolution The UN GA on an issue not resolved by treaty norms is implemented by UN member states not because they are convinced that the UN GA resolution is a legally binding document. Such a resolution is implemented if states proceed from the fact that the rules formulated in the resolution reflect established norms customary international law. This idea is expressed International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use nuclear weapons(1996): "Resolutions of the General Assembly, even if not binding, can sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide significant evidence for the existence of a rule or the emergence of opinio juris."
In this regard, the term is used in international practice "soft law". Acceptance by the UN and other international organizations large quantity resolutions, recommendations on various issues international relations is of interest to subjects of international law. These documents are mainly advisory in nature (with the exception of decisions on intra-organizational and financial-budgetary issues). By themselves, they are not bearers of the norms of international morality. However, as practice shows, states more often strive to ensure that their actions do not diverge from the instructions contained in such documents.
For example, it is enough to refer to such UN General Assembly resolutions as, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Declaration of Principles of International Law, “Definition of Aggression” (1974), the Declaration of eradication measures international terrorism 1994, etc.
Such resolutions contain patterns of behavior. They occupy a specific place in the process formation of norms of international law: the rules of conduct formulated in these documents may subsequently become (through appropriate recognition by subjects of international law) contractual or ordinary international legal norms.
Service under the blue flag of the UN is considered very honorable. Photo from www.un.org
In April this year another, already the sixth in a row, took place in Moscow international Conference on security, which is organized annually by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The last question on the conference agenda was “International security organizations: a crisis of trust?” However, the question of peacekeeping as one of the military-political instruments used during crises was not raised at the conference. Only the representative of Vietnam mentioned peacekeeping and said that at the end of March 2015, military representatives of 108 states gathered at the UN headquarters and discussed security issues under the UN flag. At the same time, we note that Russian general The American State Department did not allow me to attend this conference...
BASIC POINTS
The basic principles of using Russian peacekeepers abroad are spelled out in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation and in the Concept foreign policy RF. In the new Military Doctrine, the number of points has increased to 58 (in the old one there were 53). Concerning peacekeeping activities UN, then minimal editorial changes were made to the text of the Doctrine. There was actually a shift in points and sub-points. Clause 56 on priorities ended up at the end of the Doctrine. In this paragraph, the word “organs” is added twice and the word “restoration” is added once.
Below is a compendium - the main provisions on UN peacekeeping as set out in the Doctrine. In this case, you should pay attention to the terms: “peacekeeping operations”, “peacekeeping activities” and “peacekeeping operations”.
Paragraph 56. Main priorities of military-political cooperation:
E) with the UN, other international, including regional, organizations - the involvement of representatives of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies (emphasis added - A.I.) in the management of peacekeeping operations, in the process of planning and implementing activities for the preparation of support operations (restoration) of peace, as well as participation in the development, coordination and implementation international agreements in the field of arms control and strengthening international security, expanding the participation of units and military personnel of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in peacekeeping (restoration) operations.
Clause 30. For implementation peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate or under a CIS mandate Russian Federation provides military contingents in the manner established by federal legislation and international treaties Russian Federation.
Paragraph 21. The main tasks of the Russian Federation in containing and preventing military conflicts:
P) participation in international peacekeeping activities, including under the auspices of the UN and within the framework of interaction with international (regional) organizations...
Paragraph 32. The main tasks of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in peacetime:
K) participation in maintenance (recovery) operations international peace and security, taking measures to prevent (eliminate) threats to peace, suppression of acts of aggression (violation of peace) on the basis of decisions of the UN Security Council or other bodies authorized to make such decisions in accordance with international law...
Paragraph 55. Objectives of military-political cooperation:
a) strengthening international security and strategic stability at the global and regional levels based on the supremacy of international law, primarily the provisions of the UN Charter...
d) development of relations with international organizations to prevent conflict situations, maintaining and strengthening peace in different regions, including with the participation of Russian military contingents in peacekeeping operations...
"A SCATTERED TALE"
By the way, about the Peacekeeping Concept. Diplomat and expert on peacekeeping issues Vladimir Zaemsky in his book “The UN and Peacekeeping” pointed out: “The Concept of Russia’s participation in peacekeeping activities, the development of which began in 2006, is intended to become an important document defining the principles, parameters and prospects of our country’s policy.”
Since then, however, there has been no progress on this issue. It turned out that there was no money to prepare the concept.
As a result, it can be argued that peacekeeping issues in the new Russian Doctrine represent a “scattered story.” And in general, to be honest, the topic of analyzing the Military Doctrine and UN peacekeeping activities has not actually been considered in our military and military-diplomatic press in this century.
EVERY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IS UNIQUE
Since 1948, the United Nations has conducted 69 peacekeeping operations. All of them took place in the memory of the author of these lines, who in the last century had the opportunity to take a direct part in them for several years. Let us emphasize that our peacekeepers participated in 30 peacekeeping operations under the UN flag.
There are currently 16 operations under the leadership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The basis of the mission's peacekeeping activities is the mandate (powers) of the UN Security Council (SC). In one case, the mandate was accepted and the UN Peacekeeping Force was created within just three days. This happened in October 1973 in the Suez Canal zone. Two peacekeeping companies stationed in Cyprus were urgently airlifted to Egypt and immediately headed to the Israeli-Arab conflict zone near Suez.
Another example from this century. To accept a mandate to establish a peacekeeping mission in one of the African countries It took the UN Security Council six months, and the same amount of time was spent deploying the mission.
The Security Council and the bureaucracy of the UN Secretariat are involved in decision-making. The UN is not an international government, but an organization of all states. Important role in peacekeeping belongs to the UN Secretary General (as the chief administrative officer), as well as to troop-supplying countries. Speaking at a conference of representatives of military departments from 108 countries in New York on March 27, 2015, the representative of India sharply criticized “the lack of consultations of the Security Council with the countries that sent troops on peacekeeping missions.” The conference also emphasized the issue of “greater clarity of mandates” for peacekeepers.
For almost six months now, there has been talk about the possibility of deploying a UN peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. This was discussed several times in the UN Security Council. One of Ukraine’s proposals is the restoration of the border and the deployment of peacekeepers on the border between Russia and the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. The answer is clear: restoring the border is not the task of the UN, but an internal matter of Ukraine.
An interesting example is the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon in 1978. The representative of the USSR in the UN Security Council abstained from voting, and the resolution passed. One of the reasons for abstaining from voting was the wording “to assist the Lebanese government in ensuring the return to its effective power in the area...”. Motivation: restoring sovereignty is the task of the state, not the UN.
Other important issues in determining the mandate are veto power, impartiality and the recruitment of peacekeepers.
Peacekeepers are selected in agreement with the conflicting parties. An example from peacekeeping practice: in the Suez Canal zone on the West Bank there were no UN military observers from NATO countries until 1973. This was the decision of Egypt.
As a rule, peacekeepers are sent to places where there is agreement and a desire for reconciliation. Enforcement of peace is considered in another chapter of the UN Charter - in Chapter VII “Action with respect to threats to the peace, violations of the peace and acts of aggression.”
LAW ON PEACEKEEPING
It is also necessary to look into the law on peacekeeping adopted in Russia in the last century. He turns 20 in June 2015.
IN Federal law No. 93-FZ of June 23, 1995 (as amended on 02/07/2011, as amended on 06/04/2014) “On the procedure for the Russian Federation to provide military and civilian personnel to participate in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security" draws attention to Article 16, which states: "The Government of the Russian Federation annually submits to the Federation Council and State Duma report on the participation of the Russian Federation in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
Last year, the media cited the contents of such a report signed by Dmitry Medvedev, entitled “On the participation of the Russian Federation in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security for the period April 2013 – March 2014.” It stated, in particular: “Moscow will apply for leadership positions in UN field peacekeeping missions.”
And at the end of March 2015 in Russian media the following message appeared: “During the large-scale maneuvers of the army and navy that ended last Saturday, Russian peacekeeping units also honed their combat skills.”
Let's compare this combat prowess with the requirements of the UN: “The trend towards greater consideration of UN standards and requirements, a gradual transition from the use of contingents trained only for conventional combat to the organization of specialized training for peacekeepers.” Moreover, the UN especially emphasizes that peacekeeping is not the conduct of war and hostilities. One of the UN standards is “Manual infantry battalion UN" - includes two volumes of 185 and 333 pages, respectively. These instructions are studied even in Africa.
The final word in peacekeeping relates to technology and innovation. In December 2014, UN experts even published a separate document: “Report of the Group of Experts on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping.”
Rising to the level of the stated tasks is the most important task of Russian peacekeepers. It is necessary to act at the level of a “digital peacekeeper” and understand the issues of “digital diplomacy” (eDeplomacy).
RUSSIA IS “FOCUSING”...
The evolution of peacekeeping continues, and Russia continues to “concentrate.”
As of April 30, 2015, Russia sent only 68 of its representatives to UN peacekeeping missions. This is 42 people less than in April 2014. Of the indicated number, 46 people are military observers, plus another 20 police officers. There were only 2 people among the UN military contingents. For comparison: on the same date this is not very big country, like Romania, contributed 96 people, including 37 military observers and 57 police officers, Finland - 373 people (including 23 military observers and 349 military personnel as part of the UN troops), South Korea- 616 people, including 16 military observers and 597 UN troops, and France - 924 people, including 9 military observers, 38 police and 877 UN troops.
According to UN data as of March 2015, Russia ranked 9th out of 95 possible in terms of the number of UN military observers (military experts from UN missions - UNMEM) (in terms of the number of military observers, we took a share of only 2.52%), in terms of the number of police officers - 50th place (out of 85), and in terms of the number of supplied contingents, even 88th place (out of 102). As a result, in the overall standings, the Russian Federation was in 77th place out of 121. In terms of the level of contributions to the financing of UN peacekeeping operations in 2013–2015, Russia ranks 8th with a share of only 3.15%.
We can only hope that peacekeeping will become one of the priorities in the foreseeable future national projects Russia. About 2,000 of our officers have already served as UN military observers. They traveled tens of thousands of kilometers along peacekeeping roads on all continents under the blue flag of the UN. Russia can and should be proud of its peacekeepers.
The success of any doctrine depends largely on the lessons learned. At the same time, it is extremely desirable that theoretical developments be translated into practice, in reality. In the 1990s. there was no formal, standardized mechanism for collecting, processing, analyzing, summarizing and publishing the results obtained. Following a number of complex interventions, “lessons learned” workshops were held, some of which focused on operational issues. In addition, a number of such “lessons” learned from the failed operations in Somalia and Bosnia have likely contributed to the formation of false political conclusions about the unviability of international participation in ongoing civil wars. However, peacekeeping operations continued and were enriched with new experience, which formed the basis for the development of the doctrine of future operations. Many lessons were taken into account and noted, and their significance added to the collective knowledge of the international community, states and international organizations, designed to influence future relationships between them. At the same time, quite often the lessons of the past were not taken into account, and operations continued to be based on false (overly optimistic) conclusions. Even more often, doctrine was used to transform practice into theory (in effect, to legitimize the successes or failures of the past), but not to develop a specific body of knowledge that would improve the effectiveness of future operations. Ultimately prevailed common sense, formed during the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, and, in particular, in response to reports received about the tragedies in Rwanda (S/1999/1257 of 16 December 1999) and Srebrenica (A/54/549 of 15 November 1999). It became clear that to be successful, a peacekeeping operation must inspire confidence among the population of the host state. Such trust, in turn, depended on the belligerents' assessment of the ability peacekeeping forces complete the mission. The overly bloated bureaucratic apparatus of peacekeeping operations and the indecisiveness of the contingents deployed in the first, decisive months of operations often undermined trust and negatively affected the development and very future of international peacekeeping. The second lesson learned, relevant to the development of the doctrine of peacekeeping operations, was shaped by the centrifugal effect of their multidimensional nature. So, one of the main challenges " international community” or its elements taking part in specific peacekeeping operations, was the improvement of cooperation and coordination of efforts of all components in the conflict zone. Despite the desire of homogeneous cultural communities to mitigate the problems arising in multicultural environments, differences in mentality and behavior remained very noticeable, for example among human rights specialists, police officers, military personnel or development and relief experts. Participants in international seminars at the turn of the century looked hopefully to the UN for doctrinal guidance. It has been repeatedly pointed out that there is no comprehensive document within the framework of the Organization’s activities that would contain the basic concepts and principles of planning and conducting peacekeeping operations. At the end of the 1990s. The “doctrine” of UN peace operations was a 17-page document on the conduct of peacekeeping operations, a number of teaching aids and video materials on tactical issues. Formulation world organization The current set of principles for peace operations, based on the UN Charter, Security Council decisions and multilateral international agreements, has ultimately placed peacekeeping operations on a sound legal foundation. In turn, this helped reduce the tendency to improvise and helped avoid the practice of double standards. The first step in this direction was taken at the request of the Special Committee on Peace Operations in 2000 to clarify the definition military doctrine UN peacekeeping operations. The subsequent response from the Military Adviser focused on developing ideas about doctrine for the military component of UN peace operations. In the last decade of the 20th century, generally accepted peacekeeping principles of impartiality (narrowly interpreted as neutrality), consent and non-use of force in a number of cases prevented effective mobilization and deployment international forces against the backdrop of war crimes and genocide. However, by the end of the decade, the applicability of these principles was being challenged by several powerful new “lessons learned” reflected in the reports. independent investigation genocide in Rwanda and the report of the UN Secretary General on the failure in Srebrenica. In his report Secretary General noted that "errors of judgment were made - errors hidden in a philosophy of neutrality and non-violence that was completely unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia." He also stressed that one of the main mistakes was the lack of “credible military deterrence.” Released in 2000, the Brahimi Report does begin with the statement that “...when the UN sends troops to maintain peace, those troops must be prepared to face the remaining forces of war and violence and must be determined and capable of defeating them.” The Brahimi Group further notes that “... over the past decade, the UN has repeatedly learned with bitterness that no good intentions will not replace the fundamental ability to build credible forces for integrated peacekeeping to be successful.” However, the Brahimi Group has not yet answered the most vexing doctrinal issue of peacekeeping operations - the proper and effective use of military force in pursuance of the mandate. The single most important recommendation regarding this cardinal determinant of success or failure is this: once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to professionally and successfully exercise their authority, defend themselves, other components of the mission and its mandate, based on strict rules of engagement (rules of engagement). combat) against those who have refused to comply with the obligations of a peace agreement or otherwise attempt to undermine the peace through violence. The report does not propose any new operational concept that could be applied in situations requiring enforcement action. Instead, the focus is on how peace will be built and maintained and how violent conflict will be prevented. These provisions were confirmed Secretary General UN, which stated that the Panel's decision on the use of force applied only to those operations in which armed UN peacekeepers were deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. Therefore, any part of the Brahimi Report should not be interpreted as a recommendation aimed at turning the UN into an “instrument of war” or at fundamentally changing the principles of the use of force by peacekeepers. The Brahimi Report noted that “... the application of coercive measures, if necessary, is entrusted on a permanent basis to voluntary coalitions of states, the activities of which are authorized by the UN Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII Charter". Started in 2001 military operation in Afghanistan became one of the first precedents of peace enforcement by a voluntary coalition of states under the leadership of a leading nation. To assess the scale of development of this trend, it is necessary to analyze the events of the late 20th century. In the early 1990s. very dangerous and difficult conditions conducting peacekeeping operations: the Balkans, the territory of the former Soviet Union, Africa. These regions have become a "laboratory" for the development of doctrine in support of more effective operations in situations and zones of particularly violent conflict.
This week, US President Donald Trump made his debut at the UN General Assembly. The meeting was a good opportunity to shake up US foreign policy, which was stalling due to internal turmoil and Once again identify the priorities that The White house intends to follow international arena.
Photo Twitter.com
The day before, Trump came up with another high-profile initiative - UN reform. In principle, talk about the reform of this organization, created hot on the heels of World War II, has been going on for a long time. However, things don’t go further than talk, for a simple reason: no one knows how to reform. Any attempts to transform the UN encounter numerous contradictions among the organization's member states.
And so Trump took up the matter with his characteristic cowboy determination. He criticized the UN even during election campaign. The main complaints are excessive bureaucratization and low efficiency, non-transparency of spending patterns financial resources. In addition, Trump again used his favorite argument - the disproportionately large, in his opinion, US contribution to the maintenance of the UN. Not long ago, he made similar claims against NATO, causing a big stir in the North Atlantic Alliance.
Trump's proposals were supported by 130 states, but the document, apparently, will remain at the level of a non-binding declaration of intent. Russia, China and France - permanent members of the UN Security Council - initiative American President rejected. According to Russian permanent representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya, US proposals “contribute to reducing the role of the UN and the establishment of a unipolar world order.”
It seems that behind the innocent proposals for de-bureaucratization and optimization lies the US desire for a much more radical reform. Washington has long been burdened by the existing decision-making system in the UN Security Council, which allows permanent members to veto any resolution, as a result of which many initiatives beneficial to the United States fail. This greatly irritates Washington, which, as Trump likes to emphasize, bears the main costs of funding the UN. And investments, as we know, must yield returns; businessman Trump knows this very well.
At the same time, the reform resolution became a good trial balloon and a test of loyalty to Washington's hegemony. One hundred and thirty countries that supported Trump's initiative became more than clear illustration the continuing influence of the United States in the international arena, and Washington will definitely use this asset.
As for Trump’s speech at the General Assembly, in it he generally repeated his already well-known foreign policy guidelines. Trump once again attacked the DPRK, threatening the North Korean leadership nuclear war, if it persists in developing its missile program, and also criticized the nuclear deal with Iran, which was named among the main threats to peace and security in the Middle East. At the same time, Trump reaffirmed his rejection of the “policy of values” and the imposition of his way of life and thoughts on other states.
However, this does not mean at all, and Trump’s rhetoric confirms this, that the United States will abandon the practice of interfering in the affairs of other states. Trump calls for strengthening the sovereignty and independence of all countries, and also promises to respect other people's cultural traditions and values, but at the same time his priority remains national interests USA, which is natural. Will it turn out that the protection of US national interests will turn into a convenient excuse for interference in the affairs of third countries, even to the point of armed aggression? The Trump administration's rhetoric and actions suggest that this is the case. The United States is not at all going to abandon an active foreign policy, and its sphere of interests is the whole world. However, if earlier American fighters and bombers carried freedom and democracy on their wings, now they will defend US national interests - in Korea, Afghanistan, Syria or Iran. The rhetoric has changed, but the essence has not.
English-language media discuss events at the UN General Assembly. Most of them consider the main event to be the speech of US President Donald Trump. True, this speech is attributed different meanings. The British media were most impressed by the episode when Trump spoke about his government's achievements, which caused laughter in the audience. This same episode is being enthusiastically discussed by Trump's consistent American detractors - the New York Times and the Washington Post.
Other commentators, taking this opportunity, prefer to discuss the situation of the UN and the principles of Trump's anti-globalism. Trump's speeches on foreign policy, writes Bloomberg, are often ridiculed on the grounds of inconsistency. He scolds his predecessors for getting involved in unnecessary wars, and he himself has still not withdrawn troops from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. He behaved defiantly towards the DPRK, and then met with its leader. He expresses sympathy for the Russian authorities, while the United States, meanwhile, sells weapons to Russia’s opponents and does not lift sanctions against its leadership.
Some points of criticism of such speeches are not without foundation, the author notes, but this criticism misses the main point. Despite all the apparent contradictions in Trump’s statements, a consistent concept emerges, which can be considered, if not a doctrine, then at least a key principle of his state system. The author defines this principle as the preservation of American sovereignty.
This theme was also heard during Trump’s speech at the UN: he said that the United States would never give up its sovereignty to an “unelected and unaccountable global bureaucracy.” But at the same time, he emphasized that within the framework of this approach, the United States reserves the right of each state to preserve and observe its customs and is not going to dictate its own rules.
The author believes that this position is fundamentally different from what previous US presidents did. They all, to one degree or another, sought to use the UN and other international institutions as tools to impose their orders in other countries. Trump, on the contrary, presents these institutions as forces that limit US capabilities. This position underlies his opposition to the “ideology of globalism.”
Critics say Trump is undermining the UN's authority when he could be using it to support world system in balance. However, practice shows that this does not work. The UN has consistently failed to prevent international conflicts. UN peacekeeping missions are systematically crowned with scandals. Therefore, the author concludes, when Trump refuses to comply with UN demands, this is quite natural.
Even before Trump’s speech, Bloomberg’s editorial column also suggested that “the United States and the world need a UN that works.” According to the editors, the UN is, by design, a very important organization that is necessary to resolve the current international situation, where nationalist sentiments are growing and geopolitical competition is intensifying. However, the UN cannot cope with the role of an international mediator, so the United States is now inclined to distance itself from participation in its activities. This is bad, the editors believe, because in fact the United States should not distance itself, but, on the contrary, take up the reorganization of this institution.