What determines the interests of the Russian state. National-state interests of the Russian Federation. Russia in the mirror of political science
Theory international relations offers several views on the interests of states and the process of formation of these interests.
Some researchers postulate the existence of mandatory and unchanging interests, expressed in terms of power or welfare. Others propose to reconstruct them according to the actions of states in each specific situation. Finally, others argue that the interests of states are quite stable, but can seriously change under the influence of the international environment - emerging and dying norms, institutions and circumstances.
Given the possibility of evolution, it is legitimate to ask about the sources of the formulations of interests and about the functions that these formulations perform. We are interested in "non-trivial" interests - those that go beyond the obvious needs of the state for security in the face of external threats and economic survival.
In an explicit form, the current interests of the state are reflected in the official doctrines and unofficial publications of leading experts, whose opinion is usually taken into account by decision makers. Official documents called "doctrines", "concepts" or "strategies" of foreign policy or national security are issued by the governments of most major powers. Unofficial but coherent and influential doctrinal texts are harder to find. However, they exist in many countries. Thus, experts who monitor Russian foreign policy pay special attention to the annual speeches of Academician Yevgeny Primakov at meetings of the Mercury Club. Another example is the report of the non-governmental "Commission on the National Interest", issued by an expert group supporting US presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000. Many members of the writing team - for example, Condoleezza Rice and Robert Blackwill - went on to occupy key positions in the administration's foreign policy apparatus. Despite the deviations of the actual actions of this administration from some (but not all) of the recommendations of the "commission", the report can be considered a canonical version of the definition and understanding of the national interests of the world's largest power.
The authors of the American report sought to exclude from the range of US interests everything that does not lead to the extraction of direct economic benefits for the United States and on which their security does not directly depend. It was precisely this restrictive meaning that experts put into the concept of "national" interests - as opposed to "global" or simply "foreign" interests. For example, Rice, Blackwill and their colleagues criticized the outgoing Bill Clinton administration for what they considered indiscriminate intervention in crises and conflicts outside of America.
Does Russia need similarly formulated national interests? Who should develop them and what principles should be followed?
Interest functions
"National interest" is an open declaration of the needs and intentions of the state, based on an assessment of the current situation. Such a declaration performs a number of important functions.
First, a hierarchy of foreign policy priorities is being established, which makes it possible to prevent the dissipation of resources and prevent an overstrain of forces. This was seen as the main purpose of their report by a group of experts from the "Commission on National Interests of the United States." They did not look for new formulations, but reasonably prioritized long-known variants of interests.
Secondly, official or semi-official formulations of national interests impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of action of the authorities, who often seek to use foreign policy to strengthen domestic political positions in the face of opposition. In addition, explicitly formulated national interests provide society with firm criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the line pursued by those responsible for making foreign policy decisions.
Thirdly, national interests provide both continuity and the possibility of timely adjustment of the most important policy directions. It is especially important that the competent formulations fixed in official documents insure the state from turning foreign policy into a simple continuation of domestic policy. In most countries - regardless of the level of development of democratic institutions - numerous carriers of private interests are looking for ways to raise these interests to the level of "national" and provide them with the support of the state apparatus. In this context, national interests are a system - a logically consistent set of interrelated statements about what and why is beneficial to a particular state in a certain historical period.
A harmonious system of national interests does not allow easy manipulation of its components. It is most often impossible to arbitrarily change the wording of one or several interests, while keeping the others in the same form - several interests “adjusted” for the sake of the moment or a group of influence will come into conflict with other parts of the complex called “national interest”. For example, as Elena Chernenko rightly points out, one cannot abandon strict adherence to the principles of the inviolability of borders and the sanctity of state sovereignty without a systemic adjustment of all the doctrinal foundations of Russian foreign policy.
Finally, national interests are declared openly in order to increase the predictability of their carrier for the outside world. The state to a large extent ties its hands with a declaration of its own interests, announcing its readiness to go all the way in defending them, but also promising not to do anything that clearly goes beyond the accepted formulations of national interests. The firmness of the course is combined with an attempt to explain to others why it does not pose a threat to them and is generally acceptable. The effectiveness of the declaration of national interest as an instrument of foreign policy is determined by the right balance between the ambitions of the state and guarantees to refrain from hard zero-sum games. For example, formulations of national interests that lead to a sharp increase in the number of influential opponents and thereby increase the resistance of the international environment to the state's foreign policy can hardly be considered optimal.
The external consequences of violating the declared formulations of the national interest can be severe. Would anyone believe existing and future doctrines if the authors themselves easily disregard them? How much will the lack of trust cost? A costly arms race is one of the most common consequences of the loss of confidence of the surrounding world (or part of it) in the declaration of interests and intentions of any major power.
It may be objected: doesn't the uncertainty that arises as a result of the "flexible interpretation" of our own doctrines give us additional benefits, doesn't it expand the space for diplomatic maneuver? Uncertainty, of course, cannot be dispensed with in a public version of a military doctrine or security strategy. A potential adversary should not know how we plan to respond to specific aggressive actions or threats on his part, our reaction should come as a surprise to him. However, foreign policy is not defense, but primarily an activity to create favorable conditions for the state and obtain benefits through cooperation.
Cooperation, on the other hand, practically cannot develop if the main intentions of the participants in the interaction are not clear. Therefore, states whose welfare and security depend on cooperation with other countries try not to frighten potential partners with the uncertainty of long-term intentions and openly declare their interests. Moreover, the similarity of the value bases of national interests (for example, commitment to the spread of liberal democracy or the principle of unlimited state sovereignty) serves as an additional signal for countries that share similar values. This creates a solid foundation for mutual trust without having to spend a lot of money on insurance against increasing partner hostility.
National interest and society
The role played by the national interest in building a civic nation deserves special attention. Expressions of interest that are widely supported in society bring citizens together, helping to bridge dividing lines between ethnic groups, strata of rich and poor, educated and not so well educated. "Common cause" usually has a unifying effect. The legitimacy of a government that consistently implements a policy of "national interest" is enhanced; at the same time, public support for public spending on foreign policy is expanding and, if necessary, the willingness of citizens to bear personal costs in order to achieve important public goals.
The unifying power of the declaration of national interests, of course, should not be overestimated, since their assessments by various socially active groups and political forces can differ greatly. A sufficient condition for the implementation of a rallying function is an obvious benefit to society (preferably material) from the consistent implementation of the declared foreign policy principles.
At the same time, those who formulate national interests should hardly rely solely on public opinion. To identify threats to the country and its promising opportunities it requires professional qualifications that go beyond the philistine "common sense" and a finer understanding of the international situation than can be gleaned from newspapers and TV news broadcasts. As Larisa Pautova stated on the pages of this magazine, "geopolitics lies outside the daily attention of the average Russian." Public sentiments cannot but be taken into account by those who determine the state's foreign policy, but opportunistic measurements of public opinion are not enough to formulate national interests.
This task cannot be entrusted to a limited group of senior government officials, whose interaction with narrow groups of influence is extremely difficult to trace. Any "elite" that decides to "take over" the development of the concept of national interest, with a high degree of probability, will not be able to integrate many private interests into a few common ones. In the best case, the "elite" will be held hostage by several interest groups - such as the military-industrial complex, natural resources or other big business, etc. As a result, there will be a "skew" of foreign policy with the resulting cost overruns, missed opportunities to increase prosperity and strengthen the security of society as a whole. In the worst case, the "elite" will manipulate public opinion in order to increase their electoral chances, which will completely oppose themselves to any national interests.
Private interests in foreign policy rarely add up to one resultant vector supported by society as a whole. Rather, competing for the state's foreign policy resource, private interests only interfere with each other. It follows from this that doctrinal foreign policy documents that list “particularly important” partner countries and areas of international cooperation in the form of a list cannot, in principle, reflect a “national” interest, but are most likely the result of a chaotic lobbying and bureaucratic process. It is important to note that we a priori do not deny legitimacy to any of these private interests (development of relations with the state, A, overcoming the conflict with the state B, providing favorable conditions for the export of arms to the markets of region C, etc.). We only argue that none of them can claim to be national, since they will not fulfill the basic functions of national interest listed above.
It is not at all easy to formulate sufficiency criteria that allow us to confidently name some interest as “national”. Perhaps this category can include interests developed as a result of the activities of the institutional system that ensures the connection of the country's citizens with the political community and the inclusion of independent public expertise in the course of a broad public discussion. For the formulation of national interests resulting from such a discussion to be perceived as fair by the vast majority of citizens, impressive trust in public and political institutions (but not necessarily in specific leaders occupying one position or another within institutions) is required.
A high level of trust in institutions that have proven their effectiveness characterizes a mature civil nation - a community of people with a consensual identity that has clear boundaries, a high degree of political participation of citizens, good protection of individual rights, a very limited part of which is delegated "up" and can be at any time withdrawn, etc. Thus, it turns out that the term "national interest" certainly applies only to a mature civic nation. Where there is no developed nation, most likely there will be no “national interest” corresponding to it, but only a multitude of quite legitimate, but private and transient interests. Such a complex of interests is hardly capable of ensuring the continuity of the foreign policy course even in unchanged conditions. external environment. As Andrei Skriba notes, in states where there were no “effective institutions that would establish a broad dialogue between all participants in the political process”, after each change of regime, “private interests [were only redistributed] within national ones, and the irresponsibility of the elites sooner or later again made itself felt know". As you know, in any country, the authorities seek to reduce their own accountability to society and, if possible, evade responsibility for achieving the announced goals. And only a system of independent public institutions of control provides such accountability, which means it gives meaning to national interests as a declaration of the long-term goals of the state.
Does this mean that in a state that does not meet the criteria of a developed civil nation, it is fundamentally impossible to work out fruitful formulations of the national interest? There is probably a chance for that. However, in this case, additional restrictions must initially be imposed on the formulations of the national interest, which would make it possible to avoid the promotion of private interest to the position of national interest. The subject of national interest should be only society as a whole, and the interest itself should have the form of a public good.
For example, support for domestic automakers or arms exporters may be part of the program of a certain politician or party, but such a private interest should not claim to be a national interest. By formulating the national interest as a public one, we insure against “privatization” state institutions narrow interest groups. It is characteristic, for example, that in the aforementioned report of the "Commission on the National Interest of the United States" "support for the export of certain sectors of the economy" is put in last place in the group of the least important national interests of the country.
In turn, such interests as “supporting the reform of the domestic education system through the widespread introduction of the best foreign experience”, “attracting foreign investment in high-tech sectors of the economy”, or “forming good-neighborly relations with states along the perimeter of borders” imply benefits for the whole society. And although not all of its members will receive the same benefit from the implementation of these interests (presumably, non-competitive educators and backward "national" industries will remain the losers), this benefit will be distributed fairly from the point of view of the fundamental and undeniable goals of increasing the security and economic prosperity of the state, as well as intellectual development his society.
The benefits of developing the concept of national interest (at least in its foreign policy dimension) seem undeniable: unjustified spending of funds from the state budget is reduced, citizens have a sense of a common cause, the national bureaucracy is disciplined, the boundaries of foreign policy ambitions are brought to the attention of other countries, etc. However, states often fail to offer their citizens, bureaucracies, and the world around them a convincing concept of the national interest. As an example of the complexity of developing national interests, one can look at the experience of the Soviet Union and modern Russia.
According to the stories of representatives of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy community, in the history of the USSR and Russia, attempts to develop clear formulations of national interests invariably ended in failure. To be convinced of this, it is enough to look in their doctrinal foreign policy documents for an unambiguous declaration of interests (apart from banal security and economic development) that would meet national criteria and perform the corresponding functions. Why Soviet Union, and behind him Russia refused to operate with the formulations of national interests? A detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay. It is possible, however, to put forward several hypotheses for further research and discussion.
First, as subjects of international relations, neither the Soviet Union nor modern Russia have finally decided on their borders - first of all, not even formal legal ones, marked on political map world, but ideological or ethno-political. The new civil community "Soviet people", as you know, took shape over many decades with great difficulty. Today, the support of "compatriots" in other countries of the world is shared as a goal of foreign policy by a significant number of Russians, and many representatives of the Russian foreign policy community operate with the term "Russian world". At the same time, as Igor Zevelev notes, the boundaries of the “Russian world” allow for many interpretations. A civil nation capable of fruitfully defining the national interest must have clear and understandable boundaries for all its members, beyond which the state "owes" little to anyone.
Secondly, in its foreign policy the USSR was a hostage of ideology, while national interests, by definition, cannot be formulated in ideological terms if the impact of the corresponding ideas on the material world cannot be clearly measured. As the experience of the USSR showed, an attempt to realize ideological interests with material means leads to a rather rapid overstrain of forces by historical standards and undermining the legitimacy of state power, followed by the collapse of the state itself. The notion that significant resources need to be spent on promoting liberal democracy on a global scale (as opposed to leading by example) is now being challenged by numerous American foreign policy specialists, including members of the "national interest commission."
Finally, those who made foreign policy decisions never want to be bound by specific formulations of interests in an unstable domestic political situation, often requiring adjustment of the external course to achieve domestic political goals. This phenomenon in various forms is typical for almost all states. It takes place, for example, in the United States, where members of Congress for several recent years(and repeatedly in earlier historical periods) are trying to radically influence the foreign policy of the country, going beyond the mandate of the legislature and hoping, if necessary, to shift the responsibility for possible failures to the executive branch.
Embodying the wisdom of more high order than the needs of specific leaders or political parties for re-election, the national interest should above all discipline politicians by imposing marked restrictions on their freedom of action. The concept of national interest as a central component of the foreign policy doctrine loses its meaning in the case of a “light” attitude towards this doctrine and frequent attempts to change it to suit the moment (especially retroactively). The self-limiting function of the official or even semi-official but powerful declaration of national interest is especially important for Russia, whose policy concerns (whether fair or not) are often expressed by its neighbors and a wider range of states, cooperation with which is necessary for the country's economic progress.
1. The category "national interest" is one of the main and most common in the system of concepts of the theory of international relations. The very sphere of international relations is often regarded as a kind of field of conflict and interaction of various national interests, within which their implementation is (or is not) carried out. At the same time, the problem of the content of the concept of "national interest" remains debatable both in domestic and foreign political science.
In some cases, disputes arise more due to misunderstandings than to the existence of real ground for them. For example, in English, the main and first meaning of the word "People" is a state-organized nation, and when translating the phrase "national interest" into Russian, the term "state interest" would be the most appropriate option. The synonymy of the concepts "nation" and "state" reflects the historical specifics of the formation of European, predominantly single-ethnic states in Western political science, the concept of "national interest" has never included an ethnic content. Thus, an Englishman, speaking of the "national interests" of Great Britain, by no means means the interests of only the British, but of the whole state - the United Kingdom, which also includes the Scots, the Welsh, and the inhabitants of Northern Ireland. Thus, doubts about the legitimacy of raising the question of Russia's "national interests" on the grounds that it allegedly allows for an ethnic interpretation, understood as "Russian interests" in the multinational Russian Federation (or "Russian interests" with the inclusion of the Russian-speaking population of neighboring sovereign states of the CIS with Russia) are not substantiated in principle. There were situations in world political development when the state claimed to protect the interests of compatriots living outside its borders and being citizens of foreign states (Germany under the regime of A. Hitler, Germany in relation to citizens of the GDR, when there were two German states). However, in these cases, such claims were specifically stipulated when determining the specific content of national interests and were included in the formulation of the foreign policy strategy.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid misunderstandings and in order to bring the lexicon of Russian science closer to the categories accepted in the world, it would seem justified both in translations and in considering Russia's interests to speak of "national-state" and not just "national" interests. It is more justified that the Russian Federation is only at the beginning of its statehood, and at this stage of development, as world experience shows, the question of the specific content of national-state interests is always controversial.
2. In principle, national interests are basically objective, they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to:
Ensuring stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, raising the standard of living of the population;
Minimization (optimally absent) of threats to the personal and public security of citizens, the system of values and institutions on which the existence of this society is based.
These aspirations are embodied in the concept of national interest, the specific content of which is also determined mainly by objective parameters, such as:
The geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, whether it has allies or opponents that pose a direct threat;
Position in the system of international economic relations, the degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
The general state of the system of international relations, the predominance of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law in it.
With the change in objective realities, the needs of society in the field of international communication, the content of national interests may also change. The illusion of their eternity and constancy has developed in the low-dynamites, from the point of view of the emergence of qualitatively new factors of development, in the 18th-19th centuries. In reality, when determining the specific content of national interests, it is necessary to proceed from the existence in objective reality of both relatively stable (changing only for decades) and variable, subject to frequent changes, values.
3. It is most difficult to find a "formula" of national interest for a society that is changing the paradigm of its own development or that is split along social, ethnic or geographical lines, in other words, for a society where the consensus of the majority on the fundamental issues of its life and development has not formed or collapsed. A typical example of a "split" society is the USA in the middle of the 19th century. In formally one state, in fact, there were dia with completely different types of economic development (industrial-capitalist North and agrarian-slave-owning South) and, accordingly, differently understood national interests. The United States managed to resolve this conflict only by going through a civil war, during which the industrial North broke the separatism of the South and ensured the preservation of the country's unity.
A change in the paradigm of internal development - the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, for example, although it may not affect the geopolitical position of the state, also causes a revision of views on the content of its national interests. Thus, a totalitarian state is characterized by the desire for the highest possible degree of control over all spheres of society, including the economic one. Only such development is considered safe and stable, which is provided by its own resources, on the basis of complete (in extreme cases - partial) autarky. The transition to democracy and a market economy, as a rule, gives rise to aspirations for openness, participation in the international division of labor, the formation of relations of interdependence in the economic sphere with other states, which in a totalitarian society is perceived as one-sided dependence, a threat to national security.
The problem here is that the concept of national (national-state) interest is formulated and can only be implemented as a national doctrine shared and supported by the majority of society. In practice, however, such a full consensus is difficult to achieve for the following reasons.
First, in assessing the objective parameters and realities underlying the determination of national interests, there is inevitably an element of subjectivity, the burden of views and judgments of the past, ideological motives that affect the mentality of even the most far-sighted leaders and theorists. Accordingly, opposition to the ongoing course always has the opportunity to question the adequacy of the chosen doctrine to the objective content of national interests.
Secondly, the political choice of the state is influenced by various pressure groups, reflecting the objectively existing differences in most societies in determining the foreign policy priorities of the state, the content of its national interests. Such discrepancies are inherent not only in "split", but also in normally developing countries, they are associated, for example, with the specific interests of various social, gender and age, ethnic, confessional groups, various factions of business circles (for example, the military-industrial or "agrarian" lobby in the United States ), the peculiarities of the development of individual regions within the state (in the United States, for example, there are specific interests of the ruling elites of the Pacific and Atlantic states).
National (nationwide) consent is achievable, as a rule, only at extreme moments of development, for example, the situation of the appearance of a common, visibly and clearly perceived threat (England, the USA during the Second World War). According to the former director of the CIA R. Kline, in order to determine the degree of purposefulness of a state's actions in the international arena, not only its absolute power (military, economic), but also indicators of its "national strategy" based on a clear understanding of national interests, as well as "national will" - the ability of society to share and maintain an understanding of these interests. For "split" societies, these indicators for Klein are spun to "0", for societies in more severe conditions to "1". For the majority of states (the United States), these coefficients were determined by Clyde in the range of 0.5-0.7, which reflects a fairly high degree of national consensus on the content of national interests.
4. The problem of the correspondence of national interests, in the form in which they are determined by the state, to the real interests of society became especially acute in the 20th century, which gave many vivid examples of how attempts to implement the found formula of national interest led to failures, and even catastrophes. This is Germany, Japan and Italy in the 30s of the XX century, which headed for the creation of such "new orders" in Europe and Asia, in which their interests would dominate the international arena. This is the USSR, which exhausted its forces in the "cold war" , largely generated by his desire to ensure the triumph on a global scale of those ideas and principles on which Soviet society itself was built, this is partly the United States during the Vietnam War, the unsuccessful course of which for America made Americans doubt the correctness of their ideas about national US interests.
The contradictions between the objective interests of society (nation, people) and the concept of national interests (or the doctrine on the basis of which foreign policy and military-political strategies are determined) in some cases are the product of subjective miscalculations by governments. More often, however, it is more underlying causes associated with the general orientation of the development of society and the dominant ideology in it. Thus, the NSDDP of Germany came to power under the slogan of revenge for the defeat in the First World War and the conquest of "living space" for the Germans by force of arms. Thus, the possibility of a different choice of means and ways to satisfy the interests associated with Germany's desire to achieve a revision of the humiliating articles of the Versailles Treaty and create for itself a "sphere of influence" corresponding to its economic weight - were sharply limited. Ca^a ideology of the NSDAP - revenge, the approval of the Germans as a "race of masters" - predetermined the inevitability of Germany's clash with a coalition of states that surpassed it in military power.
The USSR, which was formed not as a state focused on ensuring its own interests, but as the base of the "world revolution", led by the CPSU, which always proceeded from the fact that the strength of the Soviet system is directly dependent on the development of revolutionary processes in the world, was also doomed to confront with states whose peoples did not share socialist values. In other words, the interests of the USSR in the form in which they were officially formulated and implemented, despite the fact that they were shared by society for several decades, were objectively illusory. Following a course based on "proletarian internationalism" aggravated the military confrontation in the "cold war", which undermined both the standard of living of the population and the chances for its improvement, and increased the degree of danger associated with the nuclear threat both for the peoples of the USSR and for the whole world.
Thus, we can conclude that a society whose nature gives rise to interests that are not realizable in principle or are fraught with a national tragedy is fundamentally unviable. It seems far from accidental that an attempt to revise the paradigmatic understanding of the interests of the USSR on the world stage, undertaken by M.S. Gorbachev, ultimately ended in the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the Soviet political system itself, its core - the CPSU. Initially, this attempt was not connected with a revision of the paradigm of Soviet foreign policy; at the level of declarations, it was only about changing the means of realizing its goals (without an arms race, without military confrontation between blocs, etc.).
Another question is that the essential content of interests is inextricably linked with the means and methods of their implementation. The ability to find alternatives without undermining the foundation, the foundation of a certain type of social development is the most important indicator of the conformity of this development with the general global trends progress of civilization.
5. Flexibility in determining the content of national interests, the choice of means and methods for their implementation becomes especially relevant in modern world. This is due to the development of regional and global interdependence of the states of the 5 nations in matters of ensuring military security, protecting economic interests, and solving environmental problems.
On the one hand, interdependence makes its own adjustments to the choice of means and methods for ensuring national-state interests. Modern weapons exclude the possibility of ensuring the security of the people and society by unilateral efforts, and participation in military alliances is also insufficient. The security of one state is inextricably linked with universal security ensured by the collective efforts of the entire world community, ensuring dominance in international relations by the force of law, and not the law of force. Economic stability, including the stability of the national currency, also depends on the state of the international economy as a whole. Preservation of the human environment in individual states - from the ability of others to pursue environmentally sound policies.
All this testifies to the fact that national interests can be realized not by unilateral, but by joint actions of states that respect each other's interests, resolve their conflicts by peaceful means, in compliance with common legal norms common to all. Instruments for the protection of national-state interests are increasingly becoming international organizations, to which their participants voluntarily transfer the rights and powers arising from their sovereignty as subjects of interstate relations.
More than that, the factor of interdependence is generated by different interests that actually act like two sides of world politics”: regional and local (general common).
It is of particular interest that development melt away where and when integration processes are gaining momentum. The interests of an integration bloc (such as, for example, the EU) are not only the sum of the national interests of the states participating in the integration. Moreover, certain conflicts can arise between the interests of the latter, which, however, does not negate the importance of the fact that at the level of the world economy, attitudes to global political and military issues, the collective interests of the members of the integration association dominate. These collective interests are a kind of synthesis of coinciding mainly the national-state interests of the countries of the region in relation to those problems that can be solved by their joint efforts more effectively than on an individual, separate basis.
It seems that the situation is somewhat more complicated with global, universal interests. The theoretical recognition that the entire world civilization has a common interest in solving the problems of ecology, demography, energy and others, ensuring safe, sustainable and stable development does not yet mean the possibility and ability reflection of these realities in concrete, everyday politics. In principle, in the long term, societies that are unable to refuse development "at the expense of others" or at the expense of the destruction of nature and adjust their interests accordingly, turn out to be historically doomed. But, on the one hand, it is too great the force of circumstances for many countries, forcing them to proceed from current, specific problems, rather than long-term considerations.On the other hand, the interests of solving global problems of our time and, ultimately, the survival of mankind^ becoming an integral element of the national-state interest in every country, inevitably prio take on their own, nationally specific coloration, differing in their national interpretations of each other.
Thus, a number of states in the most underdeveloped "belt" of the world (especially in the zone of equatorial Africa) cannot, in determining their priorities, ignore the fact that the physical survival of the population of this region has come into question. In other states that are potentially capable of making a great contribution to solving universal problems and, in principle, not ignoring common, global interests, due to the difficult economic situation (the zone of the CIS countries, for example), it is objectively impossible to pay due attention to environmental issues, rational use of resources. The countries of the developed zone of the world - North America, Western Europe, and the industrial centers of Asia - could help solve many development problems and overcome the difficulties associated with changing the paradigm of development of vast regions of the world. To the extent that the solution of global problems is in their national interests (which is indisputable), they could contribute to the solution of these problems. At the same time, it would seem the most logical, from the point of view of universal interests, such a way of solving the problems of development, modernization, reconstruction, etc., does not at all look realistic for a number of reasons.
First of all, it conflicts with the priorities of the national and regional development of advanced countries, since it requires the diversion of significant resources, which is hardly compatible with their national interests (or national egoisms). Further, such a path implies that countries that have encountered difficulties will develop at the expense of others, more developed ones, which will form a model of dependent-dependent development. The mere acceptance of aid, even under strict conditions, by no means guarantees its effective use. If it is effective, it will turn out that the developed countries have created new economic "centers of power" capable of competing with them in world markets, which again is hardly compatible with their national interests.
Thus, if the national-state interests of individual countries at the regional levels turn out to be not only compatible, but also mutually complementary to such an extent that it is already possible to speak with good reason about the interests of, say, the EU countries as a very specific reality, then at the global level everything is more complicated. The ideal variant of harmony of common human, regional and national interests turns out to be difficult to achieve, the balance between them develops with great difficulty, and the compromises found are rarely optimal for everyone. In this regard, it can be assumed that if in the past the content of international life was determined by the confrontation and interaction of the national-state interests of individual countries, then already now, and even more so in the coming decades, it will be determined differently: the search for generally accepted balances between national-state^ regional and global (universal) interests, the confrontation over the opportunistic and perspective-oriented understanding of them, the scope of which will lie not only and not so much on the international, but on the national-state arenas of individual countries and will be connected with the definition of new, more advanced paradigms of their development.
Literature
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2. Matsenov D. Russia's security interests in the post-Soviet era. International Life, 1992, No. 4.
3. National doctrine of Russia (problems and priorities). Section 3. RDU - corporation. M., 1994.
4. Pleshakov K. National interest in Russian politics. Free Thought, 1992, No. 5.
5. Pozdnyakov E. National and international in foreign policy. International Life, 1989, No. 5.
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The national interest is the perceived need of the nation for self-preservation, development and security. The spokesman and defender of the national interest in foreign practice, international politics is the state. The concepts of national and state interest are difficult to distinguish, since each nation, wrote M. Weber, is a community of feelings that can find its adequate expression only in its own state, and a nation can preserve its culture only with the support and protection of the state. The question of the legitimacy of using the concept of “national interest” and its content is the subject of discussion among representatives of various scientific areas in international relations. A detailed explanation on this issue was presented by one of the founders of the theory of political realism G. Morgenthau. The main provisions of this explanation are as follows: 1) “national interest” is an objective given. It is based on originality geographical location state and the resulting features of its economic, political and cultural development, on the one hand, as well as on the peculiarities of human nature, on the other. Therefore, the "national interest" is a stable basis for the international policy of the state. From G. Morgenthau's point of view, "national interest" contains two main elements: central (permanent) and secondary (changeable). The secondary element is nothing but the concrete form that the fundamental "national interest" takes in space and time. The central interest consists of three factors: the nature of the interest to be protected, the political environment in which the interest operates, and the rational necessity that limits the choice of ends and means; 2) “national interest” is quite amenable to rational understanding of statesmen. They must assume that good politics is rational politics based on a properly understood “national interest”. This presupposes an awareness of the fact that the distinguishing quality of politics, including international politics, is the struggle for power; 3) although the essence of politics is the desire to assert moral values through power, this does not mean that a politician can claim to know what is morally determined for the "state" in a particular situation. Moral policy proceeds from the need to agree and compromise in the protection of the “national interests” of states in the international arena, from the desire to achieve “general interests”, which is incompatible with rivalry political ideologies; 4) "national interest" is fundamentally different from "public interest". If the first exists in an anarchic international environment, then the second is associated with a system of laws that regulate domestic politics. In other words, in contrast to the "public interest", the concept of "national interest" refers to the sphere of foreign policy of the state. Liberals question the very legitimacy of using the concept of "national interest" for purposes of analysis or as a criterion of foreign policy. Since it is not possible to define the concept of national interest from this point of view, in the end, the researchers suggested that the incentive motive for the actions of a participant in international relations is not interest, but “national identity”. Speaking of "national identity", they mean language and religion as the basis of national unity, cultural and historical values and national historical memory, etc. Theorists of the liberal-idealistic paradigm and practitioners inspired by their ideas are ready to accept the existence of national interests only on the condition that their content must be recognized moral standards and global problems of our time. The protection of sovereignty and the related desire for power in the context of the growing interdependence of the world is increasingly losing its significance. Hence the statements that the main task facing democratic states today is not the protection of national interests, but concern for moral principles and human rights. Discussion in domestic science the concept of "national interest" also revealed differences in its understanding. As in Western political science, the main dividing line in the discussion is no longer between "objectivists" and "subjectivists", but between supporters of realist and liberal-idealist approaches. Representatives of realism believe that "national interest" remains the basic category of all states of the world without exception, and it would be not only wrong, but also extremely dangerous to neglect it. According to liberals, in a democratic society, the national interest is formed as a kind of generalization of the interests of citizens, while an authoritarian and totalitarian society is characterized by a “statist” or “powerful” position, suggesting that the interests of the state are higher than the interests of the individual. However, domestic discussions about the national interest differ significantly from discussions in the Western academic community. The first difference concerns the interpretation of the term "national" as ethnic. In this regard, doubts are expressed about the applicability of the concept of “national interest” to multi-ethnic states in general and to Russia in particular. Based on this, some authors propose to speak not about national, but about state, national-state interests. The second significant difference that characterizes Russian scientific ideas about the content of the concept of "national interest" is that it, as a rule, is separated from the concept of "public interest". As a result, there is a need for such additional formulations as the external aspect of national interests, national interests in their foreign policy dimension. In connection with the discussion on the question of the legitimacy of using the concept of "national interest" and its content, some conclusions can be drawn. First. Attempts to "cancel" the meaning of "national interest" as an analytical tool and criterion of the state's foreign policy are too hasty and groundless. These attempts do not reflect the state of research on this issue in the scientific literature as a whole: while criticizing the concept of “national interest”, neither realists nor liberals, as a rule, are inclined to absolutely deny its usefulness. Second. Denying the significance of the “national interest”, Russian liberals go much further than Western scholars. In their opinion, the burden of statist and authoritarian traditions and the civil society that we still lack make this category not only inapplicable, but also dangerous for the development of democracy. Third. A strict understanding of "national interest" does not imply its association with "nationality", i.e. with an ethnic factor. Just like the category of the nation, the concept of "national interest" primarily reflects the unity of political structures and civil society and is not reduced to the ethnic component, which in this case is of secondary importance. Fourth. The identification of the “national interest” with the public interest is just as illegitimate as their opposition. Identification leads to the denial of the specifics of foreign policy, its relative independence and, ultimately, reduces it to domestic politics states. Contraposition - to the absolutization of the discrepancy between the interests of the state and civil society. In a word, national interests are determined by the state, and foreign policy is used to achieve them. Usually in the scientific literature such types of national interests are distinguished as the main (radical, permanent); minor (secondary, temporary); objective; subjective; authentic; imaginary; matching; mutually exclusive; intersecting; disjoint. The traditional concept of a fundamental national-state interest is based on geographic, cultural, political and economic factors. The national-state interest includes the following main elements: military security, providing for the protection of state sovereignty ( national independence and integrity), the constitutional order and system of values; the well-being of the country and its population, implying economic prosperity and development; a secure and supportive international environment that allows for free contacts, exchanges and cooperation within the region and beyond. The emerging global financial system and a single information space, transnational production and the world trade network entail the erasure of national borders and the transformation of state sovereignty. The world has undergone dramatic changes, among which is the process of economization of politics, which continues to gain momentum. All this cannot but have a significant impact on the content of national interests. What is the nature of this influence? There is no consensus on this issue. Some believe that essentially nothing fundamentally new is happening. States remain the main participants in international relations, and as before, as in the time of Thucydides, they need to be able to survive and develop. The complication of the world, the emergence of new global challenges does not lead to solidarity and unity of mankind, but to the aggravation of interstate contradictions. The concepts of “vital interests”, “zones of influence”, “principles of state sovereignty” remain the central categories that reflect the essence of world politics in the era of globalization. Other researchers, on the contrary, speak of a complete blurring of the content of national interests, since "new subjects of world politics are already replacing states-nations." In their opinion, globalization leaves no room for national interests, replacing them with the interests of the world civil society. The main element of these interests is the provision of individual rights and freedoms, which are still suppressed by the state, especially in countries with authoritarian political regimes. However, the reality is much more complex. Influenced by globalization state structures, like traditional national institutions, are indeed experiencing devastating upheavals. New actors undermine the traditional priorities of state sovereignty. Some scholars speak of "deterritorialization" or the "end of territories" to emphasize the depreciation of national state government. The crisis of the state is an objective reality. The state is under pressure "from above", "from below" and "from outside". "Above" state sovereignty undermined national organizations and institutions that increasingly interfere with its prerogatives. In addition, there is also a voluntary restriction of their sovereignty by states. This is the so-called transfer of sovereignty, i.e. transfer of its part to the communitarian structures of the integrating states. The most illustrative example in this area is the European Union. "From below" state sovereignty is being eroded by intra-state structures and structures of civil society. AT developed countries ah in the sphere of politics, this is expressed in the phenomenon of "paradiplomacy", i.e. parallel diplomacy. There is an erosion of the national monopoly in the field of foreign policy. It manifests itself mainly at the functional, not the constitutional level. Objective reasons erosion of sovereignty "from below" is that the state is too small a subject in relation to global economy, but it is too heavy a burden for the regional economy, and even more so for private enterprises and firms. “From the outside”, damage to sovereignty is caused by the activation of such non-governmental groups and organizations as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, human rights and environmental associations. Even more, the state is losing its monopoly under the pressure of transnational corporations, firms, banks and enterprises. Thus, the dynamics of globalization really involve all states, ignoring their independence, types of political regimes and level of economic development. At the same time, the state-nation, its sovereignty and its interests as an analytical concept and as a criterion for the behavior of the state in the international arena continue to retain their significance. But this does not mean that globalization does not bring any changes to national interests. On the contrary, the national interest changes significantly in its content and direction. There are new priorities associated with the need to use the advantages of globalization by adapting to the opportunities it opens, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by fighting against the damage it brings to the national interest.
After the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the world entered
into a new phase of global political development. If before this
moment, global security was based on the principle of nuclear
containment and balance of forces between the two military blocs, then after the dissolution
Warsaw Pact, the balance of power changed in favor of NATO.
Entry into its ranks of the Baltic states and some states
Eastern Europe in 2005 expanded the boundaries of the alliance to state
borders of Russia. In this case, Russia is actually alone
opposes military power NATO. The current situation requires
Russia to develop such a model of behavior in the international arena,
which would enable it to pursue an international policy
her national interests. However, it is not easy to make an ego.
The hopes of the political elite headed by B. Yeltsin for the Western
assistance during the reform period of the 90s of the XX century. led to rough
miscalculations in domestic and foreign policy, which significantly reduced
economic and military potential of the country. The fall of the economic
The technological and military power of Russia has significantly reduced its international authority, made its leadership accommodating, forced it to make numerous concessions and betray the national interests of the country. When solving acute international problems, the opinion of the Russian leadership is practically not taken into account, as, for example, when resolving the "Yugoslav crisis". Russia's international influence was marked only by its nuclear status. The desire to build partnerships with Russia and integrate it into European and other international structures Western countries did not. The West did not want to write off the debts of the USSR from Russia, which became a heavy burden on the country and its citizens.
It is obvious that the preservation and development of Russia as an economic,
political and cultural-psychological integrity is possible
ensure only through the efforts of its people, and not at the expense of humanitarian,
financial and other assistance Western countries. Only economic
prosperity, political stability, moral health
Russian society are able to guarantee its national
security and the return of high international prestige to it.
Russia's prestige in the international arena largely depends on the success of
economic, political and socio-cultural transformations
within the country, achieving harmony and peace among its peoples.
Awareness of this and the return of Russia to the number of global players
world politics was associated with the efforts of the presidential administration
V. Putin (1999^2008).
Russia's Foreign Policy Priorities
For the first time since the collapse of the USSR (1991), political leadership
Russia has formulated the basic principles for ensuring
national-state interests of the country in the new geopolitical
situations. This was done by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin
2007 in Munich. Assessments and positions expressed by V. Putin
in the "Munich speech", formed the basis of modern foreign policy
doctrine of the Russian Federation, developed by the country's Foreign Ministry. President's speech
20 Political science was programmatic and symbolic: it marked the beginning of changes in relations between Russia and Western countries and influenced Russia's relations with the outside world.
It should be noted that the Munich Conference is a kind of
the equivalent of the World Economic Forum, only concentrating
focus on military-political issues and other
security issues. It is attended by representatives of political,
military and business elites of many countries.
Speaking at this meeting, V. Putin gave a general assessment of the situation
in the world and relations between Russia and Western countries, warning
what will he say "without undue politeness" and empty diplomatic
stamps. It turned out abruptly and at times unflattering.
First position: “We have come to the turning point when
should seriously consider the whole architecture of global security
". According to the President of Russia, the basic principle is being violated
international security, the meaning of which can be reduced
to the thesis: “the security of each is the security of all”. Furthermore,
the end of the Cold War, despite the obviousness of such a recipe,
did not lead to the triumph of the named principle. On the contrary, as
V. Putin said that this time was marked by an attempt to create a unipolar
the world is "a world of one master, one sovereign". In his opinion,
“Today we are witnessing an unrestrained, hypertrophied
the use of force in international affairs, military force, force,
plunging the world into one conflict after another,
V. Putin, - We see an increasing disregard for the fundamental
principles of international law. Moreover, individual
norms, yes, in fact, almost the entire system of law of one state,
first of all, of course, the United States of America, stepping over
their national borders in all spheres - in the economy, in politics
and in the humanitarian sphere - and imposed on other states?
Who will like it?" According to V. Putin, the US attempt to impose
the model of a unipolar world has failed.
Second situation: growing problems in the field of international
security, first of all, it is stagnation in the field of disarmament and
the threat of the militarization of space. They have escalated in recent years.
and pose a direct threat to Russia's national security.
This threat came from the actions of the US and NATO. Primarily,
it is the US intention to place the elements missile defense
in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, the crisis is
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It is happened
due to the refusal of NATO countries to ratify the adapted
version of this document. In this connection, V. Putin also recalled
that the United States is establishing forward bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and that NATO
moves its troops to the Russian borders, while the Treaty
binds the hands of Moscow. At the same time, V. Putin recalled that
in the 90s of the XX century. NATO countries gave assurances that they would not stir
NATO troops outside the territory of Germany.
Third position: the international landscape is now essential
is changing, primarily due to new centers of global growth.
These are primarily the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China).
Russia intends to play in international affairs an ever-increasing
role in pursuing an independent foreign policy. Having strengthened
its economy and its positions in the world, Russia is unlikely to agree,
to be treated like a poor relative from now on.
Fourth situation: V. Putin proposed to negotiate on
all international issues. In particular, he spoke out for
for stakeholders to come up with a joint solution
on the issue of missile defense and on the issue of ratification of the modified CFE Treaty.
The harsh assessments expressed by V. Putin caused a wide resonance.
The first reaction to his words was the question: will not lead
whether such a sharp controversy led to the resumption of the Cold War.
Such a fear, however, did not last long, since no one
discovered the termination of cooperation between Russia and the United States and others
Western countries on a number of important international issues.
It is significant that official representatives Washington and NATO
who have become the main object of criticism from V. Putin, do not consider
what's the point Russian President leads to the resumption of "cold
war." Moreover, in response to the calls of the President of the Russian Federation, the administration
Bush promised to "deepen" dialogue with Moscow. Indeed, activation
contacts between both countries on military-political issues
(Meetings have resumed according to the “2 + 2” formula with the participation of Defense Ministers
and heads of foreign affairs departments, several expert
meetings on missile defense) has not brought any new
agreements. Moreover, Moscow announced a moratorium on participation
The place of Russia in the system of modern international relations
The contemporary political landscape is increasingly
signs of multipolarity and asymmetry, in which relations
Russia with various countries will be built taking into account its national
interests, not to the detriment of them. It is possible to identify several
vectors of Russia's foreign policy, the implementation of which is connected
defending its national interests: Russian-American
relations, Russia and Europe, Russia and the CIS.
Russia and the USA: vectors of confrontation
The basic contradiction is connected with the role of Russia in the global energy sector.
From a strategic partnership, relations between Russia and
United States in the second half of the 2000s. entered a period of cooling.
2007 These changes were caused by objective shifts in the global
politics.
First, the fuse of the world struggle against international
terrorism compromised by the US war in Iraq.
Now peoples and governments themselves understand more clearly the contours
terrorist threat without downplaying or exaggerating it.
The terrorists were unable to gain access to weapons of mass destruction,
and in the matter of countering “conventional terrorism”, states have already learned something.
Secondly, the pole of confrontation has changed in the world. In the first
half a decade its most important element was the antagonism
USA with many Islamic countries. In the mid 1990s. imagination
most striking contradictions in NATO between the United
States on the one hand, and France and Germany,
with another. At this point, Russia, drifting cautiously from close partnership
with Washington (since 2001), contrived in a dispute between the United States
and mainland Western Europe call on less American
reproaches than Paris and Berlin. Then diplomacy second
Bush administration regrouped resources and, by weakening
force onslaught in some peripheral, albeit important areas
its policy (DPRK and South Asia), has focused
on the central ones. Relationships have always been one of them.
with NATO. Now relations with the region have risen on a par with them
Greater Middle East, which, according to American ideas,
extends in the north to Transcaucasia, the Black Sea and the Caspian.
The European direction of American policy at the level
practical actions began to transform even faster into a European
Caspian and European-Caucasian. Asianization of NATO
continues. Like three or four years ago, her main stimulus
the United States remains striving to strengthen its strategic position in the regions
alleged presence energy resources. At the same time, the main
formal substantiation of the new "campaign to the East" is the "nuclear
nay threat of Iran”, in the assessment of which Moscow and Washington seriously
diverge.
Third, and most importantly, for the first time in a decade and a half
Russia began to emphatically oppose the habitually assertive
"Eastern strategy" of the United States own unusually offensive line. This new policy includes an unconditional opt-out
not only from solidarity actions with Washington during the 1990s.
20th century, but also from even the firmer course of “selective resistance” to American policies pursued by the Russian
diplomacy during most of V. Putin's administrations.
The nerve of the moment lies in the fact of "counter diplomatic escalation
» Russia and USA. This is not the case in Russian foreign policy.
it was a very long time ago.
Among the sources of Russian-American contradictions lies
disagreement of points of view on many problems: from disagreement
Americans with the orientation of political processes in Russia
to differences in positions on a number of issues of nuclear non-proliferation
weapons and policies for specific countries and situations.
Russia is annoyed that Washington is trying to teach it how to build
relationships with neighbors, including unpleasant or dangerous ones.
In addition, giving "advice" about Russia's relations with its neighbors,
The US itself is not at risk. For them, the Russian border -
"foggy distance", for Russia - a zone of key economic, political and military interests. The essence of the Russian-American
distrust - not in an exchange of barbs about the assessment of "farcical
regimes" in Georgia or Iran, and not even in the consolidation of the military presence
The United States is near the borders of Russia, although it, of course, cannot be considered
sign of friendliness. However, the basic contradiction between the US and
Russia has opposing views on the optimal role
Russia in the global energy sector. Moscow strives to the utmost
strengthen it as consistently as the United States tries to prevent
her in it. "Imitation of integrity" in disputes due to conflicts
in the "pipeline Transcaucasia" and the situation around Iran - derivatives
from Washington's intention to eliminate competitors from the region,
which is considered a possible alternative to the Middle East in
as a global energy store. Everything is exacerbated by the lack
between Russia and the United States a systematic dialogue on global
issues, especially military-political ones. Recreation
a mechanism for such a dialogue appears to be an urgent need,
based on the desire to keep Russian-American
relations in line with at least a "cool", but partnership. Aggravating
the circumstance is the forthcoming elections in 2008 in both countries.
Under these conditions, politicians and diplomats are not up to international
security. There is a threat to miss the moment.
American missile defense in Europe is unacceptable for Moscow
Another vector of disagreement between Russia and the United States is related to the deployment in Europe of the 3rd position area of the American strategic missile defense system. The sharpest disagreements on this issue arose in the spring of 2007, and they culminated on November 21, 2007, when the Russian Foreign Ministry received an official letter from the United States Department of State. It left no doubt: Washington
Rais and Robert Gates will under no circumstances give up
deployment of its strategic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Even though
the fact that the rocket and nuclear threat from Iran
and not be. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the General Staff
Russian Armed Forces publicly assessed American intentions
as a military technique aimed at weakening Russian strategic
nuclear deterrence forces. And although the US Congress has so far - until the end of negotiations with the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the missile defense system in Europe by independent experts - has not given the green light to the deployment of anti-missile defense elements near the borders of the Russian Federation, Russian generals have already threatened Washington and its allies with adequate and asymmetric measures, including targeting operational-tactical missiles at radar station in Brdy near Prague and an anti-missile base in Ustka on the Baltic coast. Moreover, Yury Valuevskiy, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, warned
Poles that the system of strategic containment of Russia can automatically respond to the launch of an American anti-missile. True, Russian generals for some reason do not remember the first two US strategic missile defense areas located in Alaska and
in California, where there are about forty anti-missiles, not ten,
as planned in Poland. Everything shows that behind the slogans about the strategic partnership of the two states, which were exchanged more than once
Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin, in fact, there is a strategic confrontation, the content of which was not only the anti-missile fence with which the United States surrounds Russia, but also the problems
Kosovo, Iran's nuclear power, development of democracy in our country
and freedom of the press. It is unlikely that these problems will disappear on their own.
Russia - European Union
The EU has found a replacement for the Constitution.
Reform Treaty. Operating Principles Document
The EU will enter into force after ratification by all states. Expected,
that this will happen in early 2009. However,
surprises.
Portugal ending its semi-annual presidency
in the European Union, kept her word - presented the promised treaty.
in a solemn atmosphere by the heads of state and government, and
also the leadership of the European Commission. The treaty replaced the draft constitution,
rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.
The reform agreement provides for the introduction of the post of president
European Council, which will represent the organization on
international arena. High Representative for the Common Foreign
politics and security policy will actually turn into a minister
foreign affairs. Also in the executive branch
there will be changes. From 2014, the number of European Commissioners will be equivalent to
two thirds of the EU member states. In the meantime, each of the 27 states
represented by a member of the European Commission.
The treaty enhances the role of the European Parliament. MPs can influence
on legislation in areas such as justice, security and
migration policy. Total seats in the European Parliament
will be reduced from 785 to 750. National parliaments will have the right
participate in legislative activities at EU level. They are
will be able to make their own amendments to the text of bills. If a third of the national parliaments do not approve the draft law, it will be sent to
revision to the European Commission.
according to the formula of the so-called double majority. According to this
principle, a decision is considered adopted if it is voted for
representatives of 55% of the states in which at least 65% of the EU population lives. However, countries that fail to establish a blocking
minorities, will be able to postpone the decision of the issue and propose
continue negotiations. This system will come into effect in 2014.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for
common energy policy and implementation of a common strategy
fighting global warming, helping one
or several members in the event of terrorist attacks or natural
disasters.
In addition, the document contains an article on the possibility of exit
from the EU, the decision on which will be made following the results of common
negotiations.
European Policy Center analyst S. Hegman said,
that although the signed treaty contains some elements of a European
constitution, these two documents should not be compared.
In form, this is an ordinary intergovernmental agreement, and it is precisely
therefore, for example, it does not mention national symbols,
flag and anthem. According to the expert, the agreement does not refer to the transfer by the governments of the EU member states of part of the powers to the pan-European leadership, but to clarify the list of already transferred powers.
In other words, we are talking about improving the existing
systems. According to the analyst, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty
happened in a completely different environment compared to 2004,
when the draft European constitution was being considered. Euroskeptics became
far less. Particularly because the leadership has changed.
in Poland and Denmark.
The signed document has a very complex structure, and significant efforts are needed on the part of governments and other forces,
so that its meaning and content are correctly understood by the population.
All EU countries, with the exception of Ireland, intend to limit
parliamentary ratification. However, there may be surprises here as well.
In particular, experts do not undertake to predict how things will go in the UK.
Russia and NATO
The Russia-NATO Council was established in 2002, the corresponding treaty
signed by V. Putin and the leaders of 19 NATO countries in Rome. European
leaders said then that in relations between Moscow
and the alliance enters a qualitatively new stage, Russia "with one foot
joined NATO" and the "cold war" finally ended.
At that moment, the European SM And in unison repeated that Russia was ready
join the North Atlantic Alliance, and they quoted V. Putin,
who did not rule out such a possibility even before his election as president.
However, already in the fall of 2002, NATO, despite the objections of Russia,
welcomed seven new members. After that, despite
to ongoing contacts within the Russia-NATO Council,
relations between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance have become rapidly
get worse.
In December 2007, a regular meeting of the Council was held in Brussels
Russia - NATO. Representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance stated that relations with Russia had entered a critical phase,
and decided that next year the process of NATO expansion by
east will continue. The parties acknowledged that they could not agree
on any of the key international problems - from the placement
American missile defense system in Europe and Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty before
status of Kosovo.
the next meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels, at which
Russia was represented by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov, preceded by
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation of 26 countries - members of NATO. The main unpleasant
news for Moscow was the statement of the Secretary General
NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who confirmed that already in April 2008, at the summit in Bucharest, a decision would be made to admit new members to the alliance. The most likely NATO recruits are Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Georgia. At the same time, the Secretary General referred to the decisions of the 2006 NATO summit in Riga, where the leaders of NATO member countries confirmed that the doors of the alliance remain open to new members.
It is noteworthy that at the Riga NATO summit, for the first time ever,
time after the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of the alliance discussed the threats posed
from Moscow. However, the specific question of expanding
alliance was not on the agenda at that time, which was announced in December 2006
none other than Jaap de Hoop Scheffer himself. Having withstood a one-year
pause, NATO decided to force the admission of new members into its ranks.
Despite difficulties with Ukraine, NATO does not issue
out of sight and this country. A meeting was also held in Brussels yesterday
Commission Ukraine-NATO, following which Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer promised to make "the foundation of bilateral relations
even stronger." The news that NATO is preparing to make another
step towards the Russian borders, did not come as a surprise to Moscow.
“At the forthcoming NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008
this issue will be one of the central ones, - confirmed the day before
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs R F. - For us, this is an extremely sensitive moment, especially
in relation to the states of the post-Soviet space”. Noting
that "the process of NATO enlargement has nothing to do with
modernization of the alliance itself or to ensure security in Europe
”, on Smolenskaya Square called the planned expansion
alliance "a serious provoking factor, fraught with the appearance
new dividing lines.
The permanent representative of Russia spoke even more sharply
(since January 2008) in NATO D. Rogozin: “When NATO talks about threats
from the south, but at the same time expanding to the east, this indicates how
about the absolute misunderstanding of the situation, and about the insincerity of the leadership
alliance” According to him, “expecting to expand through
former Soviet republics, NATO hopes in vain that the reaction
Russia will not be too sharp,” as it happened before. "They are not
suspect that Russia is no longer what it used to be, ”significantly
noted Mr. Rogozin. “NATO members did not realize the full benefits of cooperation with Russia when it was ready for deeper integration. And now Russia has new ambitions, it has grown from
a shirt that NATO sewed for her,” said D. Rogozin.
In the meeting adopted at the end of the meeting of the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministries of the NATO countries (December
2007) in a joint statement states that “in ten
years after the signing of the first founding document
on cooperation between Russia and NATO, the partnership between them is entering a critical phase.” As a result of the meeting of the Council of Russia-
NATO both sides said they failed to bring their positions closer together.
Disagreements relate to the solution of all fundamental problems:
and the plan for the deployment of American missile defense in Europe, and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), from which Russia
For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov criticized
NATO's position on the regime of control over conventional
weapons in Europe. He said: “We do not understand individual actions
alliance, including near the borders of Russia. In particular,
modernization of the military infrastructure in the Baltics, creation of American
bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Steps like these make things worse.
around conventional arms control in Europe, which
has been at an impasse in recent years. Trying to convince partners
refuse to support the independence of Kosovo, S. Lavrov noted,
that the decision on the status of Kosovo would be a precedent for the unrecognized
republics in the post-Soviet space. According to him, "those
who conspires to play freely with international law, with the charter
The UN, with the Helsinki Final Act, must once again
think hard before stepping on a very slippery path, which
may be fraught with unpredictable consequences and not add
stability in Europe". Finally, the Russian minister stated,
what if NATO recognizes the US missile defense system being created in Europe
element of its missile defense, then Russia "will find it difficult
continue to cooperate within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council on this
subject."
Thus, the meeting in Brussels actually drew a line under
period of relations between Russia and NATO, which until the last
moment, despite disagreements, by inertia continued to call
allied. It is noteworthy that the warmest relations
Moscow and Brussels were precisely during the first presidential
V. Putin's term. However, during the second term to replace the "allied
relations” between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance came
clash of interests and fierce confrontation in all directions,
increasingly reminiscent of a new cold war.
NATO is concerned about the strengthening of Russia. For this reason, the Pentagon
leaves troops in Germany.
Contrary to the original plans, the US will not reduce in 2008 the number of its troops in Europe. Two American combat brigades
will remain in their places of deployment in Germany. About this USA the other day
notified the Brussels headquarters of NATO. Currently
four combat brigades of the American army are deployed in Germany,
numbering 43 thousand soldiers and officers. The two before them should have been
be returned to the US before the end of 2008. In this case, the number
Pentagon ground forces in Europe would drop to 24,000
Human. But now those plans are on hold.
Officially, the US Department of Defense justifies this by the unavailability of American cantonments intended
for the return of the brigades. However, the commander of the ground forces
USA in Europe D. McKiernan explained with military frankness
revision of the decision to reduce the number of American garrisons
in Germany "new strengthening of Russia". Politicians and military
NATO Express "Bitter Disappointment" at Increasing
Russian criticism of the Alliance, accused
in muscle building. According to the Brussels headquarters
apartment of the organization, behind the criticism of Moscow lies its desire
use its economic recovery to realize its own
foreign policy and military interests. In this regard, the Vienna
the publication sees in the refusal to reduce the number of American
troops in Europe "a definite sign that the military
The US is starting to prepare for a new confrontation with Russia.”
Despite the preventive measures of the Pentagon, the US Ambassador to
NATO V. Nuland does not lose optimism. She believes that achievement
agreements with Russia contentious issues perhaps: "We are standing in front of
threats and dangers that equally concern both Russia,
and us in the West. Therefore, we must find opportunities
cooperation that will benefit both parties.
Meanwhile, in Washington and Brussels, NATO authorities
Moscow's suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
forces in Europe (CFE) is interpreted as another evidence of strengthening
Russia, requiring countermeasures. noteworthy signal
is the call of the leading Republican contender for the presidency
US R. Giuliani to start building up numbers
American armed forces in response to the strengthening of Russia's position.
According to him, Russian intentions “still cause
anxiety." Therefore, R. Giuliani convinced voters in the state of South
Carolina, USA "needs to become even stronger militarily
". In turn, the American analytical center Stratfor
foresees the mobilization of Western intelligence agencies. According to RIA
News, the employees of the center are experienced experts in the field
intelligence and business, and its services are used by hundreds of large firms,
government and military departments. In a recently published
in Washington, a Stratfor policy brief reads, in part:
“Abandoned CFE Treaty will force NATO to at least step up
their reconnaissance efforts in order to track the movements
Russian armed forces and receive information that the Russians would normally provide themselves under the mechanisms
Russia in the post-Soviet space
One of the main vectors of Russia's global policy is
maintaining influence on the former republics of the USSR, which became independent
states after 1991. The initial organizational
legal form of "civilized divorce" of the former Soviet
republics after the collapse of the USSR became the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which included 11 states. However, as shown
practice, poorly integrated groupings, like the CIS, are ineffective. Decisions made at the CIS forums are not enforced.
In addition, the elites of the Commonwealth countries have different political
orientation. Some of them are weary of Russian influence and turn
their views on the United States (as Ukraine and Georgia do), others, on the contrary,
still focus on Russia (for example, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan), and still others (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan)
are trying to build a multi-vector foreign policy related to
with equal distance from the two poles of influence. post-soviet
space is attractive mainly for its significant
natural resources that are currently being fought over
different states. Taking into account this fact, Russia strives
more clearly declare their national-state interests,
using a new tactic: where political
arguments, it is quite possible to try to solve the problem with economic
methods, increase the attachment of the economies of the CIS countries to Russian
financial and stock markets.
RF and Belarus
Closest relationship (allied) due to geopolitical
positions are developing between Russia and Belarus, which
announced the construction of a union state. different ideas about
models of union (federal or confederate) caused controversy
between countries. This became an obstacle to the construction of a new
states. Under these conditions, Russia decided to change in relation to
Belarus tactics. Where political arguments fail,
it is quite possible to try to solve the problem not too big
money for Russia. If Belarus does not give up Russian
cheap money, which is extremely unlikely, the degree of integration of economies
two countries will inevitably increase, as well as the affection of Belarus
to the Russian financial and stock markets.
2007 to Moscow, was dumbfounded by the unexpected generosity of Russia.
The total amount of state loans promised to Belarus until 2008
to issue to Russia, increased from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion, which is
7% of Belarusian budget expenditures in 2008. In addition, vice
prime minister A. Kudrin, who realized an attraction of unprecedented generosity,
promised Belarus loans in the domestic Russian market for 10 billion rubles.
rub. Belarus, apparently, will not resist, coming across the desire of Russia
Russian interstate loan to cover losses from the increase
prices for Russian oil and gas supplies in the amount of 1 billion rubles.
dollars, the promised money was allocated. Vice Prime Minister and Minister
Finance A. Kudrin and Belarusian Minister of Finance N. Korbut signed
agreement on the provision of a state loan to Belarus in the amount of
$1.5 billion. In addition, another loan was promised to Belarus
in 2008 in the amount of $ 2 billion, and it was proposed to place bonds
in the Russian market in the amount of 10 billion rubles. and if, these papers
receive demand, repeat this operation as needed.
As A. Kudrin explained, 1.5. Billion USD provided by Russia
for a period of 15 years at a rate of LIBOR + 0.75%. The agreement provides
and a 5-year grace period during which interest is paid
will not. At the current rate LIBOR + 5% A. Kudrin
estimated the cost of the loan for Belarus "about 6%". But right after
signing the agreement, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that Russia is ready
provide Belarus with another $2 billion loan in 2008
N. Korbut tried to object that this amount should be commercial
loan from Russia to Belarus. But Mr. A. Kudrin insisted
that the type of loan - a government loan or a commercial loan "will be studied." But before that, “one of the next steps is to place
public loan of Belarus in the Russian market”, issued another
the secret of Russian-Belarusian financial relations A. Kudrin.
According to him, “the Russian side has already received a request for registration
such a loan. After that, N. Korbut had to admit
that the volume of placement can be up to 10 billion rubles. in 2008 He
he only clarified that "this will not be a one-time placement, but in tranches."
Russia will provide the first $1.5 billion to Belarus with more than two
portions, but immediately. As N. Korbut explained, the country expects to receive
will be used to finance the Belarusian budget deficit,
which for 2008 is already set at 1.9% of GDP, or $1.2 billion.
A loan in the amount of $1.5 billion, according to A. Kudrin, will increase the gold and foreign exchange reserves of Belarus, and the budget of Belarus will receive
amount converted into Belarusian rubles. Where will they be directed
another 2 billion dollars, as well as money from Belarusian bonds, was not specified. For Belarus, we note that 3.5 billion dollars of loans in
2007-2008 - macroeconomically significant amounts. It's about 7%
expenses of the country's consolidated budget for 2008 (24.4 billion rubles)
dollars), and slightly less than the size of the social support fund (combines
part of the functions of the Pension Fund and the social insurance system) -
$5.6 billion in 2008
Even on the eve of V. Putin's visit, political scientists assumed that
Russia's loan to Belarus may be a price for the consent of A. Lukashenko
agree on the Russian version of the provisions on Union State.
However, now that the rates have increased by 2.5 times, the reason
they see it differently. Most likely, an agreement was reached with A. Lukashenko on
wide admission of Russia to the country's economy, and not only about
participation of Russian companies in the privatization of Belarusian ones, but also about
wider cooperation. Plus security agreements
because Belarus borders on Poland. Finally, perhaps
that this is a fee for a possible transition to the Russian ruble.
Russia and Central Asian countries
Of particular interest to Russia are the pantries of the countries of the Central
Asia, which make the region attractive for everyone.
As economic growth increases, the need for energy increases.
After the collapse of the S S S R, Central Asia was the region where Moscow
traditionally dominated. However, in recent years this region
is rapidly turning into a springboard for geopolitical struggle
between losing ground Russia, growing "draconian
» at the pace of China, habitually seeking its interests around
to the world of the United States and striving to reduce energy dependence
from Russia to Europe. The fiercest struggle thus unfolds
for oil and gas produced in Central Asia. All
of these players, other than the United States, are either negotiating or already
agreed to build in their direction from this region
oil and gas pipelines. The situation in the Central Asian
countries is ambiguous.
Kazakhstan. In 2007, Kazakhstan continued to move towards the set
goal is to enter the top 50 developed countries of the world. In 2007, according to
annual report The Global Competitiveness Report (on the global
competitiveness), he took 68th place out of 131. In addition, President Nursultan Nazarbayev's long-standing dream came true - in 2010
Kazakhstan will become the chairman of the OSCE. And this despite the criticism
international observers of the past parliamentary elections.
Recall that the pro-presidential "Nur Otan" received more than 88% of the vote
voters, and the rest could not overcome the 7% threshold.
Thus, the new legislative body (maji-lis) turned out to be
within the borders nation state the subjects of politics are individuals, social groups(classes, layers), parties, movements pursuing individual and group interests. However, the independent states themselves do not develop in a vacuum, they interact with each other and act as subjects of politics more high level- international.
The goals of international politics are determined by the specific context of the specific historical situation in which the world community finds itself, and the nature of the relations that exist between states. To the extent that external factors influence the living conditions of a particular state, they also determine the content of international politics.
National interest is a conscious need of the nation for self-preservation, development and security, a set of balanced interests of the individual, society and the entire state in the economic, domestic political, social, international, informational, military, border, environmental and other spheres of society. National interest can also be defined as awareness and reflection in the activities of the leaders of the state of its needs. This applies to both multinational and ethnically homogeneous states. In fact, the national interest means the national-state interest.
The traditionally understood fundamental national-state interest includes three main elements:
- - military security;
- - economic prosperity and development;
- - state sovereignty as the basis of control over certain territory and population, or the preservation of the nation as a free and independent state.
Sometimes the following elements are added:
- - growth of national welfare;
- - protection of the economic and political positions of the state in the international arena;
- - expanding its influence in world politics.
However, today both these elements and the content of the national interest as a whole are undergoing significant changes under the pressure of new facts and circumstances.
Now states and regions are becoming more and more permeable to the growing flows of ideas, capital, goods, technologies and people crossing their borders. Traditional bilateral and multilateral ties between states are supplemented by new ones operating in various fields, such as transport, economics and finance, information and culture, science and education, etc.
Under these conditions, the national interest cannot be ensured without the creation of such conditions for the existence of the state as internal stability, economic well-being, the moral tone of society, security (in the broad sense of the word), a favorable foreign policy environment, prestige and authority on the world stage. It should be borne in mind that ensuring the national interest is achieved only when the specified conditions are balanced, which are an open system of interdependent and complementary elements. Full provision of each of them is possible only ideally. In real practice, however, cases of insufficient development of one or another of the specified elements or conditions are typical, which is compensated by the more intensive development of others. Ensuring such a balance is the essence and art of international politics.
A distinction is made between fixed (fixed) and variable content of the national interest. The invariable part includes the task of ensuring the external security of the state. Variable content is viewed through the prism national traditions, personal qualities of political leaders, trends in the economic, social spheres public life etc. The real material and political needs in the development of the state can change, and with them, the interests, goals, means and foreign policy activities change accordingly. The change in the needs and interests of the state leads to a change in ideological values.
In relation to the environment outside world national interests are expressed in the totality of the state's foreign policy interests, which differ in their importance for its life. There are two levels of the state's national interests: the level of main foreign policy interests and the level of specific interests. The first is connected with ensuring its security and integrity as a socio-economic, political, national-historical and cultural community, with the protection of the economic and political independence of the state. The state provides the main interests with all military, economic, diplomatic and ideological means.
The second level covers individual, relatively private, although important in themselves interests of the state in the sphere of international relations.
National interests are basically objective, because they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to ensure the stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, and improve the standard of living of the population; minimizing threats to the personal and public security of citizens, the system of values and institutions on which the existence of society is based.
These aspirations of citizens are embodied in the concept (doctrine) of the national interest, the specific content of which is also determined mainly by objective parameters, such as:
- - the geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, the presence of allies or opponents that pose a direct threat to the national-state interests of the country;
- - position in the system of international economic relations, the degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
- - the general state of the system of international relations, the predominance of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law in it.
The concept of "national interest" was developed by G. Morgenthau. He defined the concept of "interest" in terms of power. The concept of the national interest consists of three elements: 1) the nature of the interest to be protected; 2) the political environment in which the interest operates; 3) national necessity, which limits the choice of goals and means for all subjects of international politics.
G. Morgenthau included the following in the concept of "national interest":
- 1. National interest is an objective reality. It is based, firstly, on the peculiarity of the geopolitical position of the state and the associated features of geo-economic and socio-cultural development; secondly, it is mediated by the peculiarities of human nature.
- 2. statesmen must proceed from the premise that good policy is a rational policy based on a properly understood national interest. The basis of such a policy is a clearly built image of the state, through which the perception of national interest takes place.
- 3. The national interest is fundamentally different from the public interest. National interests are provided by foreign policy, and public - domestic. They should neither be opposed nor merge.
The foreign policy of an independent state, according to G. Morgenthau, should be based on some kind of physical, political and cultural "reality" capable of realizing the nature and essence of its own national interest. This "reality" is the nation. All the nations of the world in the international arena strive to satisfy their primary need, namely the need for physical survival. In a world divided into blocs, unions, where the struggle for power and resources does not stop, all nations strive to protect their physical, political and cultural identity (identity) in the face of invasion from outside.
Probably, this position of G. Morgenthau was relevant for the times of the Cold War, when the world community was divided into two opposing camps: socialist and capitalist. In the modern world, when countries are interdependent and interconnected with each other for various reasons, their survival and development can only be ensured through their cooperation and interaction. Under these conditions, any state, pursuing its own national interest, must respect and take into account the interests of other states.
Combining its own interests and the needs of other states, a nation can ensure its own security. National security means the state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and the state from internal and external threats, the ability of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity to act as a subject of international law.
The concept of "security" for the individual, society and the state does not coincide in everything. Personal security means the realization of his inalienable rights and freedoms. For society, security consists in the preservation and multiplication of its material and spiritual values. The national security of a state presupposes internal stability, reliable defense capability, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
In our day, when the danger of nuclear war persists, national security is an integral part of global security. Until recently, global security was based on the principles of deterrence, confrontation and confrontation. nuclear powers(USSR, USA, France, Great Britain, China). But truly universal security cannot be ensured by infringing on the interests of any states; it can be achieved only on the principles of partnership and cooperation. The turning point in the formation of a new system of universal security was the recognition by the world community of the impossibility of winning and surviving in a world nuclear war.
It is impossible to ensure national security without identifying, realizing, and proclaiming vital national interests by the state. Otherwise, the foundations of national security can be destroyed without hindrance by anyone - as happened in the USSR at the time of perestroika, and then in independent Russia. Unidentified, unconscious and undeclared national interests are not protected in any way; are areas of vulnerability, Achilles' heels, and therefore - the main directions of the new war.
In a viable and efficient state, the priority of national interests is determined by their vital importance. The state protects national interests by all available means. It should also be taken into account that interests that are not vital and even alien to the nation can be proclaimed as national interests; priorities of national interests can be substituted; relevant problems may be inadequately formulated and addressed. In this case, the country will self-destruct with its own forces and means.
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