Steam-gas torpedo 65 76 a. Is there a torpedo more dangerous than a "squall"? (photo, video). Is there a torpedo more dangerous than the Shkval?

The domestic Shkval torpedo, known as the fastest in the world, will be modernized to meet new goals and objectives, said the general designer of the Dagdizel specialized plant (Dagestan), the first chairman of the Russian scientific council in torpedo engineering, academician Shamil Aliyev.

This is impossible. This contradicts all laws of physics. This cannot be implemented technically. Scientists all over the world thought so. But the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute denied their opinion.

“One of the open issues that I am dealing with now is designing the hydrodynamic appearance of the future Shkval-type torpedo, determining the boundary of air and water in the cavern. When we define it, we will be able to “load” it. We will understand what the payload could be. The hydrodynamic appearance means the basis for the layout of an underwater missile, its capabilities,” Aliyev said.

As an example, he said that when the world realized that the effectiveness of Shkval was “nightmarish,” they began to try to make it controllable, RIA Novosti reports.

“For example, the American analogue of Shkval involves wearing a special multi-layer sensor “skirt”. That is, several “skirts” of sensors are put on the torpedo along the body, which receive signals from operators, and depending on the command, the torpedo can change course,” the academician said.

The first “Shkval” was created in the 50s of the 20th century; these torpedoes are capable of traveling underwater in an air cavity at a speed of up to 500 km/h (depending on the density of the water environment) (!!! - sgerr).

In June, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Caspian plant Dagdizel, after negotiations with the acting head of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov, agreed to conclude a contract worth 5 billion rubles.

In March, it became known that a criminal case had been initiated due to Dagdizel’s failure to fulfill a state contract for the supply and modernization of military missiles worth 2 billion 700 million rubles.

Dagdizel is one of the oldest and largest factories in Dagestan, founded in 1932. IN Soviet time was considered one of the leading diesel and torpedo manufacturing plants in the USSR. Since 2008, it has been part of the Marine Underwater Weapons - Gidropribor concern.

The company is engaged in the development and production of marine underwater weapons for the Navy, the creation of industrial and marine diesel engines, diesel power plants for land and marine purposes, the manufacture of fittings for ventilation and air conditioning systems of ships, vessels and watercraft, as well as various machines for agricultural, construction and food purposes.

The first "Shkval" appeared in the USSR in the 60s. It was put into service in November 1977 as part of the Shkval complex. High speed is achieved by equipping the torpedo rocket with a unique jet engine running on liquid metal fuel.

This multi-purpose high-speed underwater missile is designed to destroy surface and underwater targets. Targeting is carried out according to the target coordinates previously entered into its control system, which guarantees its 100% noise immunity. Foreign analogue- anti-submarine torpedo "Barracuda", created in Germany in mid-2005.

The Shkval missile can be used by standard surface- and underwater-based torpedo tubes. Effective firing range - 7 km, cruising range - up to 10 km. The minimum permissible firing range is 0.5 km. Underwater launch depth is up to 30 m. The warhead is high-explosive, weight is at least 210 kg.

P.S. Industrial recovery is good. What is in Dagestan is doubly good.

Blog of user sger AS.

And one more opinion. I'm not an expert, so I won't comment.

Is there a more dangerous torpedo than the Shkval?

At the turn of the 1960s-70s, experimental developments appeared in the Soviet Union on the topic of heavy torpedoes aimed at the wake of enemy ships.
Around the same time, when asked by a war correspondent: “How are you going to protect aircraft carriers from Russian super-torpedoes?” One of the senior representatives of the US Navy gave a simple and laconic answer: “We will put a cruiser in the wake of each aircraft carrier.”

Thus, the Yankees recognized the absolute vulnerability of aircraft carrier groups to Soviet torpedo weapons and chose, from two evils, the best option, in their opinion: to use their own cruiser as a “human shield.”

Actually, the US Navy didn’t have much to choose from - the 11-meter 65-76 “Kit” 650 mm ammunition, better known as the “Soviet fat torpedo,” left American sailors no choice. This is inevitable death. A dexterous and long “arm” that made it possible to hold the fleet of a “potential enemy” by the throat.

Soviet Navy prepared a “farewell surprise” for the enemy - two alternative endings to the naval battle: getting half a ton of TNT on board and falling into the bottomless deep sea, tumbling and choking in the cold water, or find a quick death in a thermonuclear flame (half of the “long torpedoes” were equipped with SBS).

The phenomenon of torpedo weapons

Whenever turning to the topic of confrontation between the USSR Navy and the US Navy, the authors and discussion participants somehow forget that in addition to the existence of anti-ship cruise missiles, in naval warfare there is another specific weapon - mine-torpedo weapons (Combat Unit-3 according to the organization of the Russian Navy).

Modern torpedoes pose no less (and even greater) danger than supersonic anti-ship missiles - primarily due to their increased stealth and powerful warhead, 2-3 times the mass of warheads of anti-ship missiles. Torpedo is less dependent on weather conditions and can be used in conditions of strong waves and heavy gusts of wind. In addition, an attacking torpedo is much more difficult to destroy or “knock off course” by jamming - despite all efforts to counter torpedo weapons, designers regularly propose new guidance schemes that devalue all previous efforts to create “anti-torpedo” barriers.

Unlike damage caused by an anti-ship missile hit, where such problems as “fighting fires” and “fighting for survivability” are still relevant, an encounter with a torpedo poses a simple question to the unfortunate sailors: where are the life rafts and inflatable vests? - ships of the “destroyer” or “cruiser” class are simply broken in half by the explosion of conventional torpedoes.

A decommissioned Australian frigate was destroyed by a Mark.48 torpedo (warhead mass - 295 kg)

The reason for the terrible destructive effect of a torpedo is obvious - water is an incompressible medium, and all the energy of the explosion is directed into the body. Damage in the underwater part does not bode well for sailors and usually leads to the rapid destruction of the ship.
Finally, the torpedo is the main weapon of submarines, and this makes it a particularly dangerous means of naval combat.

Russian answer

In the years Cold War A very absurd and ambiguous situation has developed at sea. The American Navy, thanks to carrier-based aircraft and sophisticated air defense systems, was able to create a naval air defense system that was exceptional in its strength, making American squadrons virtually invulnerable to air attack.

The Russians acted in the best traditions of Sun Tzu. The ancient Chinese treatise “The Art of War” says: go where they are least expected, attack where you are least prepared. Indeed, why “climb the pitchforks” of carrier-based fighters and modern anti-aircraft systems, if you can hit from under the water?

In this case, the AUG loses its main trump card - the submarines are completely indifferent to how many interceptors and early warning aircraft are on the decks of the Nimitz. And the use of torpedo weapons will allow you to avoid encounters with formidable air defense systems.

Multi-purpose nuclear powered vessel of project 671RTM(K)

The Yankees appreciated Russian humor and began frantically looking for means to prevent underwater attacks. They succeeded in something - by the beginning of the 1970s it became clear that a torpedo attack by an AUG using the available means was fraught with mortal risk. The Yankees organized a continuous anti-aircraft defense zone within a radius of 20 miles from the aircraft carrier order, where the main role was assigned to the under-the-keel sonars of the escort ships and the ASROC anti-submarine missile torpedoes. The detection range of the most modern American sonar AN/SQS-53 was up to 10 miles in active mode (line of sight); in passive mode up to 20-30 miles. The firing range of the ASROC complex did not exceed 9 kilometers.

The “dead sectors” under the bottoms of the ships were reliably covered by multi-purpose nuclear submarines, and somewhere far in the ocean, tens of miles from the moving squadron, anti-submarine helicopters and specialized Viking and Orion aircraft conducted a continuous search.

Sailors from the aircraft carrier USS George W. Bush release an AN/SLQ-25 Nixie towed anti-torpedo decoy overboard

In addition, the Americans took decisive measures to counter the fired torpedoes: behind the stern of each ship the float of the towed noise trap AN/SLQ-15 Nixie “dangled”, which made the use of torpedoes with passive guidance on the noise of the propellers of enemy ships ineffective.

Analyzing the current situation, the Soviet sailors rightly judged that the chance of being detected by anti-submarine aircraft is relatively small - any AUG, convoy or detachment of warships is unlikely to be able to constantly keep more than 8-10 vehicles in the air. Too small to control tens of thousands of square kilometers of adjacent water space.

The main thing is not to be caught by the sonars of escort cruisers and nuclear submarines of the US Navy. In this case, it is necessary to fire torpedoes from a distance of at least 40...50 kilometers (≈20...30 nautical miles). There were no problems with detection and target designation - the roar of the propellers of large ship formations was clearly audible hundreds of kilometers away.

Heavy torpedo 65-76 "Kit". Length - 11.3 m. Diameter - 650 mm. Weight - 4.5 tons. Speed ​​- 50 knots. (sometimes up to 70 knots are indicated). Cruising range - 50 km at 50 knots or 100 km at 35 knots. The mass of the warhead is 557 kg. Guidance is carried out along the wake

Having decided on the choice of weapons, the sailors turned to industry representatives for help and were quite surprised by the response they received. It turned out that the Soviet military-industrial complex acted proactively and had been developing “long-range” torpedoes since 1958. Of course, special capabilities required special technical solutions - the dimensions of the super-torpedo went beyond the usual 533 mm torpedo tubes. At the same time, the achieved speed, firing range and mass of the warhead led the sailors to indescribable delight.

The most powerful underwater weapon ever created by man was in the hands of the USSR Navy.

65-76 "Whale"

...The 11-meter “arrow” rushes through the water column, scanning the space with a sonar for the presence of inhomogeneities and turbulences in the water environment. These turbulences are nothing more than a wake - water disturbances remaining behind the stern of a moving ship. One of the main unmasking factors, a “standing wave” is visible even many hours after the passage of large marine equipment.

The "fat torpedo" cannot be fooled by the AN/SLQ-25 Nixie or thrown off course using discardable traps - the hellish underwater tracker does not pay attention to noise and interference - it only reacts to the wake of the ship. In a few minutes, the soulless robot will bring 557 kilograms of TNT as a gift to American sailors.

The crews of American ships are in confusion: a terrible light flashed and shone on the sonar screens - a high-speed small-sized target. Until the last moment it remains unclear: who will get the “main prize”? The Americans have nothing to shoot a torpedo with - there are no weapons on board US Navy ships like our RBU-6000. It is useless to use universal artillery - traveling at a depth of 15 meters, a “thick torpedo” is difficult to detect on the surface. Small anti-submarine torpedoes Mk.46 are flying into the water - it’s too late! The reaction time is too long, the Mk.46 homing heads do not have time to lock on to the target.

Mk.46 torpedo shot

Here on the aircraft carrier they figure out what needs to be done - the command “Stop the machine!” flies down. Fully back!”, but the 100,000-ton ship, by inertia, continues to stubbornly crawl forward, leaving a treacherous trail behind the stern.
There is a deafening roar of an explosion, and the escort cruiser Belknap disappears behind the stern of the aircraft carrier. On the left beam, new fireworks erupt - the second explosion tears the frigate Knox apart. On the aircraft carrier they realize with horror that they are next!

At this time, the next two torpedoes are rushing towards the doomed formation - the submarine, having reloaded the devices, sends the Yankees new gift. In total, the Barracuda's ammunition loadout includes twelve super-ammunitions. One after another, the boat fires “thick torpedoes” from a distance of fifty kilometers, watching the Yankee ships rushing along the surface of the ocean. The boat itself is invulnerable to anti-aircraft defense systems of the aircraft carrier group - they are separated by 50 kilometers.

Mission accomplished!

The position of American sailors was complicated by the fact that “thick torpedoes” included in the ammunition load of 60 nuclear-powered ships of the USSR Navy.

The carriers were multi-purpose nuclear submarines of projects 671 RT and RTM(K), 945 and 971. Also, project 949 “loaves” were equipped with super-torpedoes (yes, dear reader, in addition to the missiles of the P-700 complex, the “loaf” could hit a “potential enemy” a dozen torpedoes 65-76 “Kit”). Each of the above submarines had two or four 650 mm torpedo tubes, the ammunition load varied from 8 to 12 “thick torpedoes” (of course, not counting conventional ammunition caliber 533 mm).

Location of 8 torpedo tubes in the bow of the multi-purpose nuclear submarine pr. 971 (code "Pike-B")

The “fat torpedo” also had a twin brother - torpedo 65-73 (as follows from the index, it was created several years earlier, in 1973). Full drive and fire!
Unlike the “intellectual” 65-76, the predecessor was an ordinary “Kuzka’s mother” for the destruction of everything living and inanimate in its path. 65-73 were generally indifferent to external interference - the torpedo traveled in a straight line towards the enemy, guided by data from the inertial system. Until the 20-kiloton warhead detonated at the calculated route point. Everyone who was within a radius of 1000 meters could safely return to Norfolk and dock for long-term repairs. Even if the ship didn't sink, close nuclear explosion he pulled out external radio-electronic equipment and antenna devices along with the “meat”, broke the superstructure and damaged the launchers - one could forget about completing any task.

In a word, the Pentagon had something to think about.

Killer torpedo

This is what the legendary 65-76 is called after the tragic events of August 2000. The official version says that the spontaneous explosion of a “thick torpedo” caused the death of the K-141 Kursk submarine. At first glance, the version is at least worthy of attention: the 65-76 torpedo is not a baby rattle at all. This is a dangerous weapon that requires special skills to handle.

Torpedo engine 65-76

One of the “weak points” of the torpedo was its propulsion unit - an impressive firing range was achieved using a hydrogen peroxide engine. And this means gigantic pressures, violently reacting components and the potential for the onset of an involuntary reaction of an explosive nature. As an argument, supporters of the “thick torpedo” version of the explosion cite the fact that all “civilized” countries of the world have abandoned hydrogen peroxide torpedoes. Sometimes from the lips of “democratically minded specialists” one hears such an absurd statement, supposedly a “poor scoop” created a torpedo using a hydrogen peroxide mixture only out of a desire to “save money” (of course, the “specialists” did not bother to look on the Internet and even briefly familiarize themselves with the performance characteristics and the history of the appearance of “thick torpedoes”).

However, the majority of Moremans who are familiar with this torpedo system, question the official point of view. There are two reasons for this.

Without going into details of the strict instructions and regulations for storing, loading and firing “thick torpedoes,” naval experts note that the reliability of the system was very high (as high as the reliability of a modern combat torpedo can be). 65-76 had a dozen fuses and serious “fool protection” - it was necessary to perform some completely inadequate actions in order to activate the components of the torpedo’s fuel mixture.

Over a quarter of a century of operation of this system on 60 nuclear submarines of the USSR Navy, no difficulties or problems were noted with the operation of this weapon.

The second argument sounds no less serious - who and how determined that it was the “fat torpedo” that was responsible for the death of the boat? After all, the torpedo compartment of the Kursk was cut off and destroyed at the bottom demolition charges. Why did you need to saw off the bow at all? I'm afraid we won't know the answer anytime soon.

As for the statement about the worldwide abandonment of hydrogen peroxide torpedoes, this is also a fallacy. Developed in 1984, the Swedish heavy torpedo Tr613, powered by a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and ethanol, is still in service with the Swedish Navy and the Norwegian Navy. And no problems!

Forgotten Hero

In the same year, when the lost Kursk boat sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea, a major espionage scandal erupted in Russia involving the theft of state secrets - a certain US citizen Edward Pope tried to secretly acquire documentation for the Shkval underwater missile torpedo. This is how the Russian public learned about the existence of underwater weapons capable of reaching speeds of 200+ knots (370 km/h) underwater. The public liked the high-speed underwater system so much that any mention in the media of the Shkval missile torpedo evokes an equally flurry of admiring responses and joyful declarations of love for this “miracle weapon,” the analogs of which, of course, do not exist.

The high-speed rocket-torpedo "Shkval" is a cheap rattle compared to the "Soviet fat torpedo" 65-76. The Shkval's fame is undeserved - the torpedo is completely useless as a weapon, and its combat value tends to zero.

Shkval underwater missile. Interesting thing, but completely useless

Unlike the 65-76, which fires at 50 kilometers or more, the Shkval’s firing range does not exceed 7 km (the new modification is 13 km). Few, very few. In modern naval combat, reaching such a distance is an extremely difficult and risky task. The warhead of a rocket torpedo is almost 3 times lighter. But the main “catch” in this whole story is that “Shkval”, due to its high speed, is an unguided weapon, and the probability of it hitting even a weakly maneuvering target is close to 0%, especially considering that the “Shkval” attack is devoid of any stealth. An underwater missile on a combat course is easy to detect - and no matter how fast the Shkval is, by the time it covers 10 km, the ship will have time to change course and move a considerable distance away from the calculated aiming point. It is not difficult to imagine what will happen in this case to the submarine that fired Shkval - the distinct trail of the missile-torpedo will clearly indicate the location of the submarine.

In a word, the miracle weapon “Shkval” is another fruit of journalistic fantasies and philistine imagination. At the same time, Real Hero- the “Soviet fat torpedo,” the mere mention of which made NATO sailors’ knees tremble, was undeservedly slandered and buried under the weight of the past years.

In connection with the Kursk nuclear submarine disaster, a decision was made to remove the 65-76 Kit torpedo from service with the Russian Navy. A very dubious and unjustified decision, probably made not without prompting from our “Western partners.” Now no Shkval will replace the lost combat capabilities of submarines.

Alexander Sergeevich Suvorov (“Alexander Suvory”)

Book-photo chronicle: “The legendary BPK-SKR “Fierce” DKB of the Navy 1970-1974.”

47. Baltiysk. BOD "Ferocious". Loading SET-65 torpedoes. 07/19/1973.

Photo illustration: Baltiysk. BOD "Fierce". Exit to BS. Loading SET-65III torpedoes. 07/19/1973

In the previous one:

I finished writing a letter to Valya Arkhipova and went out through the bow vestibule to the forecastle.

The night was cool and quiet. Behind the crest of the breakwater and the Metel launcher, on the forecastle they were again loading something in the light of blue lamps that are not visible from American spy satellites.

Most likely, the RGB-60 depth rocket charges of the RBU-6000 bomb launchers of the Smerch-2 system were loaded into the arsenals.

It was time to sleep. Tomorrow is the penultimate day before going to BS. I need to write a letter to mom and dad tomorrow.

On Thursday, July 19, 1973, only rare drops remained from yesterday's drizzling rain, which refreshed the heated faces and hearts of the stern men preparing for a military campaign on the Ferocious BOD.

In the morning, after the usual breakfast and the usual tidying up, the loading of anti-submarine homing electric torpedoes SET-65 for our two four-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes ChTA-53-1135 and 9M33 missiles for anti-aircraft began. missile complex SAM "Osa".

The sky was partly cloudy, there was a weak wind and the air in Baltiysk warmed up to 17°C during the day. The most better weather for the work of people and a truck crane and for loading expensive and dangerous products.

The SET-65 torpedo was a long (7.8 m) cigar-shaped metal shell with a diameter of 533 mm Green colour with a head part rounded, like the head of a man’s penis, and a tail part with propellers and rudders, which is common for all torpedoes.

The SET-65 torpedo weighed 1755 kg. Its warhead contained 240 kg of explosives, detonators and detonation equipment.

This torpedo could move underwater at a speed of 40 knots (74.08 km/h) to a range of up to 15 km at a depth of 20 to 400 m. At the same time, the torpedo, like a robot, could itself detect a target (submarine) and highlight its noise from other noises and not be “distracted” by other noises and interference.

For homing at a target, the SET-65 torpedo had a hydroacoustic homing system. The torpedo's rudders changed its movement along the course (direction), depth and roll. As a result, the SET-65 torpedo either hit the target directly (hit the submarine’s hull) or approached the submarine in the fuse zone.

New SET-65III torpedoes with an active-passive two-plane homing system were loaded onto our ship. These torpedoes were put into service in 1972 and already had a polymer lubrication system when the torpedo moved in water.

Behind the torpedo's head fairing was hidden a homing system (SSN), then a proximity fuse in a separate compartment, then, approximately; part of the torpedo was occupied by a combat charging compartment with explosives. Here, there were contact fuses (2 pieces) outside the torpedo body. Then in the center of the torpedo there were disposable rechargeable batteries and in the stern of the torpedo there is a motion control system, an electric motor, rudders and a multi-directional pair of propellers.

The range of an effective (that is, aimed) shot with such a torpedo was 5.5-6.5 km. A salvo of two torpedoes at once practically ensured a reliable hit and destruction of the target.

On the ship in the torpedo tubes, these torpedoes could be stored without any damage or disruption in its operation for up to 18 months (1.5 years).

Not included in combat status, the torpedo had three stages of explosion protection. Non-contact and contact fuses also reliably caused a strong high-explosive explosion, which actually (with a direct hit) destroyed the durable hull of the submarine.

Injection of polymer lubricant under pressure while the torpedo was moving increased its speed to 47 knots (up to 87 km/h). In dense sea water, a normal speed of more than 80 km/h is a lot...

I don’t know whether SET-65III torpedoes with polymer lubricant were loaded on the Ferocious BOD on July 19, 1973. But I know for sure from communicating with the ship’s commander, captain of the 3rd rank, Evgeniy Petrovich Nazarov and other officer-commanders of combat units, that before the BS, only the latest ammunition, which had just been put into service, was loaded onto the ship...

A rumor spread throughout the ship among the sailors about the last opportunity to send letters home, so each and every one tried to write letters in their free moment and help them out to the watchman on the gangway, so that when the ship’s postman went to the post office, they could pick up all the letters “at once.”

I also wrote a letter to my parents.

Hello my dear, good, kind mother!

Today is July 19 (1973). When you receive this letter, we will have been sailing along the Baltic for two days.

Forgive me, but I'm writing briefly. And businesslike. After all, if I give free rein to my feelings, I will have to write on many, many pages.

First of all, I am very grateful to all of you for your letters. And to you first of all. Thank you, mom, for sending daddy’s letter.

I won’t say anything now because I don’t know much yet. I’m talking about all the “difficult” conversations (parents quarreled).

I’m very happy for Verochka that she went to college (sister). And the fact that I’m tired is nothing, otherwise life wouldn’t be interesting if it weren’t for being tired of the things that have been accomplished.

And the capricious Ruslanchik (nephew, Verochka’s son) will still show himself, because he will be good, like all of you. I have no doubt about it.

I received a letter (from Yura) from Nikolaev. Yura (elder brother) is busy, he will write to me when he has time. It's a wonder when there is time left until 08:30 tomorrow! (a hint at the time of exits from the base to the BS).

(Yura) lives in an old woman’s apartment. He prays for the dormitory for midshipmen, since he is registered there. He doesn’t complain, but it comes through throughout the letter, which is difficult. However, Mommy, read it yourself.

There is nothing from friends (classmates at school). They are silent. And that's a little bad. But not fatal! Right?

I don’t think about Valka A (Valya Arkhipova), although no, I’m lying, of course I do! And I’m singing this romance here, mom, nothing can be done...

The letter is about the romance by M.Yu. Lermontov 1831 “K L”, which I called “V.A.” and in which on May 25, 1973, being together with the BOD “Ferocious” on the Baltiysk roadstead, he added only one word “you” to the line “I love, I love one!”

Mikhail Yurjevich Lermontov

(imitation of Byron)

At the feet of others I did not forget
I am the gaze of your eyes;
Loving others, I only suffered
The love of former days;
So memory, demon lord,
Everything wakes up the old days,
And I say one, one:
I love, I love you alone!

You belong to someone else
The singer is forgotten by you;
Since then my dreams have attracted me
Away from my native land;
The ship will carry me away from her
To an unknown country
And the wave of the seas will repeat:
I love, I love you alone!

And the noisy light will not recognize
Who we love so tenderly
How I suffered and for how many years
I am tormented by memory;
And wherever I look
The former silence
My whole heart will whisper to me:
I love, I love you alone!

I know it myself - that’s it, “crackers”! I love and respect Ermoshin (Valya Arkhipova’s fiancé). I myself wished him all the best, did not show interest in either a word or a look, but, again, this “but” is stronger than even myself...

I'm sorry, Mommy, but I won't listen to you here (Mom asked me not to think about Valya's marriage). I think and will continue to think until someone completely erases everything that is (there) in their brain.

Well, as for fantasizing, don’t be afraid! I can fantasize, but I don’t want to. I'm a little tired and want to sleep peacefully. So everything is fine here.

Now a little about myself, in the sense of the future. The hike (BS) is short, but who knows where we’ll go. In short, in September we will be at the mooring site in Baltiysk, that is, at the native wall (berth).

We go to the “cold places” (a hint to the opposite side, that is, to the south). But don't worry - we were given everything. Here (in the lenka cabin) I have a heating stove (electric heater). I live alone. I have a lot of responsibilities, in short, there is no time to be bored.

I spent all my paper money and now it’s in my desk (desk drawer in the library-photo lab), like in my dad’s wallet – again, 5 rubles worth of change. And where should I put it? Don't know!

I probably won't wait for the parcel. It's a pity.

Well, okay, mom, write only letters to the old address, wait for a response from detailed description all our adventures.

Wait for photo documentary footage of Senor Alec-Sandra's stay in harsh waters Atlantic Ocean. I kiss everyone warmly and thank you for everything.

Goodbye, Sasha.

On the back of the last page is a letter to dad...

Hello, dad!

I decided to contact you separately because I want to talk about something. Tête-à-tête!

First of all, I'm sorry for everything I said to you back then. For all my antics and statements (about a quarrel with my mother).

You are always right a thousand times over, and I always knew this too, but mind you, I wanted to check that you were right myself, because what is experienced on oneself is remembered better.

I now reproach myself for a lot of things and quite seriously declare, although until now I said silently: “I love you and mom very much.” Both of you!

So it goes.

And here's another thing. I wrote Yura a letter saying that you wanted to come (to him in Nikolaev). So, expect a letter from him.

Maybe I did something stupid, but everything is useful, even mistakes. They learn from them!

Well, I went. See you later.

Kisses, Sasha.

I also gave the man on the gangway an envelope with a letter for my parents and ran to photograph the loading of torpedoes into the torpedo tubes of our ship.

The officers, arsenal workers and sailors watched in surprise as I, a simple sailor, cheerfully and joyfully looked for the best places for filming. The fact is that photography on the ship, especially at the time of loading ammunition, was strictly prohibited to anyone, but here... here you go, please.

However, the commander of BC-3 and the ship's duty officer calmly reacted to my work as a photo chronicler of the ship (apparently they had already been warned) and did not object to me also capturing them in the history of the Ferocious BOD.

To begin with, let us once again recall the confession of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation:

“... The primary impulse for the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide arose from the contact of hydrogen peroxide with both organic (kerosene, antifreeze) and inorganic substances (metal). It is not possible to determine in more detail the specific mechanism of occurrence of the source of hydrogen peroxide decomposition for obvious reasons (powerful explosive destruction).

As can be seen from the certificate on the criminal case of the Prosecutor General's Office, despite the thoroughness of the investigation, unclear questions still remain. Apparently, this is why the conclusions of the Prosecutor General’s Office did not satisfy everyone. With everything on a huge scale work carried out on main question We never received an answer as to what was the root cause of the explosion on the Kursk.

There are still a lot of ambiguities with the torpedo explosion, which is believed today to be the most likely root cause of the explosion... In the digital designation of the “Tolstaya” torpedo, “65” means its caliber in centimeters (650 mm in more conventional caliber measurement data), “ 76" - the year of adoption. A torpedo of this type is deservedly considered the most powerful in its class. It also differs in appearance from the torpedoes of submarines of leading naval powers. Its length is 11 m versus 5–7 for its “competitors,” whose caliber is also much smaller and varies between 400–533 mm. Such dimensions and, consequently, the huge internal volume of the “65-76” torpedo made it possible to saturate it with such control systems, instruments and a power plant that turned this structure, essentially a mini-submarine, into a combat complex with outstanding characteristics. “65–76” is equipped with a sophisticated acoustic homing unit, which allows it to independently and steadily reach a target and destroy it. An outstanding energy system, based on a turbine installation, provides the torpedo with an underwater speed of up to 55 km/h (according to some sources, more) and the ability to pursue even a high-speed enemy for almost 2 hours. It can destroy an “alien” submarine or surface ship at a distance of up to 100 km from its own carrier ship. “65–76” was created during the years of Soviet-American rivalry for dominance in the World Ocean. At that time, nuclear submarines were considered the foundation of the power of the Soviet fleet, and the American fleet was considered to have huge surface forces represented by ships of the main classes: 300-meter attack nuclear aircraft carriers, slightly smaller conventional aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers with cruise missiles on board. The Soviet fleet needed new anti-ship weapons, including torpedoes, with increased efficiency. This was the “65–76” torpedo, equipped with a nuclear warhead. Even one such torpedo hitting the largest target - an aircraft carrier with a hundred aircraft on board - guaranteed to turn it into a pile of melted, twisted metal. The “factor” of the “65–76” torpedo, coupled with the latest technologies for reducing the “noise” of domestic submarines and other new anti-ship weapons, was regarded by the United States as new threat strategic scale. Congress held urgent hearings with the participation of high-ranking military personnel and Pentagon analysts. The matter ended with the fact that in the early 1980s, the administration of R. Reagan “launched” an unprecedentedly ambitious program of naval rearmament - the construction of a fleet of 600 ships of the main classes. Although ultimately the United States was unable to do this, and the program was only partially implemented. In perestroika and post-perestroika times, “in the atmosphere of new relations” with the United States, the removal of individual fleets from submarines and arsenals began and was completed nuclear warheads torpedoes “65–76”), which were transported to centralized special bases of the Ministry of Defense. In fact, the most dangerous atomic “fangs” of these weapons for the enemy were removed. And after the Kursk disaster, the 65–76 torpedo was removed from service with the Russian fleet. What is this, a simple accident or some brilliantly carried out special operation, as a result of which our most powerful torpedo was written off as scrap?

The explosion of the fuel components of the 65–76 torpedo, which killed the nuclear submarine Kursk, could only have occurred as a result of an external influence on the torpedo, Stanislav Proshkin, director of the Gidropribor Central Research Institute, told Interfax.

“We objectively believe that there was external influence torpedo,” he said, “there is information that it could have been a local fire.”

In particular, Proshkin noted, “on top of the torpedo in front of the ballast tank there are changes in the metal structure due to temperature exposure.” According to a study conducted by the Prometheus Central Research Institute, which has the most competent specialists in the field of materials science, “clear estimates of this temperature of +550–570 degrees Celsius” were obtained.

The Kursk nuclear submarine had two autonomous independent systems control. “And any event associated with an increase in pressure inside the tank compartment, an increase in the temperature of the peroxide, an increase in the level of oxygen in the gap between the torpedo and the torpedo tube is recorded,” Proshkin said.

“If a rise in temperature is noted in the torpedo tube or rack, the crew has six hours to deal with this emergency,” he said. - Including using a special system for draining peroxide overboard, if an increase in the temperature of the torpedo on the rack is noted. In the event of a fire, the boat has a powerful fire extinguishing system that instantly releases tens of tons of water. If a torpedo is in a torpedo tube, it is simply fired, and the aquatic environment localizes it.”

At 04:00 on August 12, the K-141 Kursk took part in the last exercise for its crew.
At about 06:00 the Kursk submarine occupied the designated area. Via radio communication, the commander reported to command post fleet and TARKR "Peter the Great" about their readiness to attack surface ships with torpedo weapons. At 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds Moscow time, an explosion occurred, resulting in the death of 118 crew members and specialists on the boat.

The official version says: a 65-76A (“Kit”) torpedo exploded in torpedo tube No. 4. The cause of the explosion was a leak of torpedo fuel components (hydrogen peroxide). After 2 minutes, the fire that arose after the first explosion resulted in the detonation of the torpedoes located in the first compartment of the boat. The second explosion led to the destruction of several compartments of the submarine.

Let's look at the proposed versions:

Version 1 "Torpedo attack"
The Kursk did not see the American submarines sitting on its tail and fired training torpedoes at the US submarine. The commander of the US submarine simply fired a response “farewell” salvo with his combat torpedoes or simply freaked out when he heard the opening of the torpedo tubes.
Well, let’s assume Kursk didn’t notice the supposedly spying people (although one would be enough). But here’s the rub - Kursk didn’t have time to shoot! Further, if, after all, the American commander was “scared” of an alleged torpedo attack, although the time is purely peaceful, he imagines that exercises and practical torpedo firing are taking place, then the first thing the commander should do after long training and increased skill is to spit on all sides with self-propelled guns and drifting GPD devices (a device for hydroacoustic suppression of the submarine signal, no one mentions the use of these noisemakers, but they should rattle a lot... Also, no one heard the launch of a torpedo weapon, and when fired, a decent acoustic pressure is created... plus a torpedo at a distance creates very noticeable noise. To this noise of a torpedo, if, say, there was an attack and the torpedo went off, the commander of Kursk should have reacted. How? Yes, in the same way! By the way, I don’t know how they teach in commander’s classes now, but we were taught, that in peacetime, during a torpedo attack by a potential enemy, you need to... EMERGENCY ASK UP, because anti-submarine torpedoes always have a limited depth of travel...

Well, let’s also say that our commander is illiterate (he was going to become a hero after the training) and did not know those things that are taught to the point of automatism.
But even if an American torpedo is aimed at a target, you need to know the following - modern torpedoes the fuse is remote, and if the torpedo explodes, it would not leave such a neat hole in the side, which is shown in all sorts of left-wing films and photos. The whole nose would have been torn apart by one explosion.

So, there are too many assumptions and not real events. Therefore, not a single submariner who indicated his position military rank and last name, does not take this version seriously.

Version 2 "Bull, i.e. collision"

This version has more rights to exist, but there are also many contradictions...
In a collision from which Kursk could lose stability and buoyancy, i.e. flooding of one compartment and two adjacent main ballast tanks (main ballast tanks), I think that a Los Angeles-type submarine would not be too bad either. She, too, would either lie next to Kursk or float up. But she couldn’t get to the base on her own!

In case of any other damage to the light hull of the Kursk, and versions were put forward that the adversary could touch his stabilizer in the area of ​​the 1st compartment, nothing prevented the commander from blowing middle group Central City Hospital (or any other) and emerge in an emergency. And even if the boatswain shifted the rudders to dive, then even then the consequences of hitting the ground (let’s say, a rack of ammunition fell off) should not have led to such fatal consequences. Because the ammunition simply could not detonate from the impact.

Version 2 "Emergency practical torpedo"

From my point of view, this version is the most consistent. The boat occupied the firing area.
I want to retreat and throw a stone at the then command of the Northern Fleet and the headquarters of the Northern Fleet... According to all governing documents, shooting should not have taken place in this area. Imagine a monster with such performance characteristics - Length, 143.00 m; Width, 18.20 m; Draft, 9.00 m;
in an area with a depth of 100 meters. Even if it is in a periscope position, there are only 70 meters left to the ground, if not less.

The official version leaves many questions open, so I was interested in two more, in which these questions find their explanation.

Vice Admiral Ryazantsev’s version clarifies why the nuclear submarine turned out to be uncontrollable and possible reason peroxide torpedo explosion:

“From the time the submarine was built in 1995 until 2000 personnel I have not used peroxide torpedoes on nuclear submarines and have not fired practical torpedoes for more than three years. Let us also remember that in the existing “Act of inspection and degreasing of technical air pipelines” of the nuclear submarine “Kursk” dated December 15, 1999, the signatures of the members of the ship’s commission and the commander of the submarine are fake. From this follows an absolutely reliable conclusion that at the Kursk the technical air systems were not operated and were not degreased for a long time.

To ensure that the permissible time spent by a peroxide torpedo in the torpedo tube without connecting it to the oxidizer control system does not exceed the maximum value, the commander of the Kursk submarine had to give the command to load the torpedo into the torpedo tube and prepare it for firing no earlier than 9 hours and no later than 10 o'clock on August 12th. Thus, the 65-76 PV torpedo was loaded into TA No. 4 at exactly this time. Unfortunately, the design of the 65-76 PV peroxide torpedo is such that even with the connected oxidizer control system it is impossible to find out the state of the oxidizer in the launch tank

On August 11, 2000, after replenishing the VVD through dirty pipelines and hoses, non-degreased air from the torpedo's air tank could not get into the oxidizer tank. When the 65-76 PV torpedo is on the rack, the locking air valve on it is closed, and safety devices are installed on the air trigger valve. That is why the “thick” torpedo behaved quietly until its preparation for loading into torpedo tube No. 4 began. It was after loading into the torpedo tube that an uncontrolled decomposition reaction of hydrogen peroxide began inside the torpedo, but not in the oxidizer tank itself, but in oxidizer starting cylinder, which is located inside the oxidizer tank. Why did this happen?

A charred folder with operating instructions for peroxide torpedoes, which miraculously survived the explosion on board the Kursk nuclear submarine, contained amazing information. These instructions did not apply to the torpedoes and torpedo tubes that were on board the Kursk.

The factory instructions for the operation of peroxide torpedoes on the nuclear submarine 949 A project in an ultimatum form require submariners, after opening the air shut-off valve on the torpedo, to check the position of the trigger on the air valve and the condition of its safety device. Only after making sure that the folding trigger of the air valve is in its original position is it possible to load the torpedo into the torpedo tube.
The submariners prepared this torpedo not as required by the factory instructions of the nuclear submarine 949 A, not as it was written in the available technical documentation for this torpedo, but in the way they were trained to do it. The Kursk torpedomen had practically no training for this type of torpedo, so they prepared for firing the 65-76 PV torpedo as best they could. The most important thing is that those instructions for peroxide torpedoes that were in the torpedo warhead did not contain a categorical warning from the factory instructions of the nuclear submarine 949 A project about checking the position of the trigger air valve and its locking device after opening the locking air valve. This led to a fatal mistake by the Kursk nuclear submarine torpedoists.

Having opened the locking air valve on the torpedo and removed the first stage of safety from the trigger air valve, the torpedomen most likely did not check the condition of the folding trigger and its safety device. Most likely, the safety device did not fully secure the trigger, and it was slightly raised."

Thus, after loading the torpedo into apparatus No. 4, polluted air began to flow into the oxidizer and fuel cylinders. As a result, the pressure in the kerosene cylinder began to gradually increase, and the hydrogen peroxide began to decompose with the release of heat and a rapid increase in pressure.

“At 11 hours 28 minutes 32 seconds, the oxidizer launch tank exploded. The force of the explosion of the oxidizer in the launch tank was equivalent to the explosion of 5-7 kilograms of TNT. This local explosion destroyed the starting kerosene cylinder and was the starting detonator for the instantaneous explosion of almost one and a half tons of oxidizer in the oxidizer tank, kerosene in the fuel tank and an air cylinder under a pressure of 200 kg/cm2. It was determined that the first torpedo explosion in torpedo tube No. 4 was equivalent in power to 150-200 kilograms of TNT.”

This explosion destroyed the front and rear covers of torpedo tube No. 4, the body of the torpedo tube in the inter-hull space and part of the light hull with various systems in the bow of the submarine. The submarine's robust hull remained intact. In torpedo tube No. 4, the most vulnerabilities- the back cover with a ratchet lock, the front cover and the TA body outside the durable hull of the nuclear submarine.
At the moment of the first explosion, a shock wave spread through torpedo tube No. 4 into the 1st compartment and sea water began to flow. The pressure at the shock wave front was about 5-8 kg/cm2.
Pressure in the shock wave front of more than 1 kg/cm2 leads to serious consequences and is fatal to humans. Thus, after the first explosion, all the submariners who were in the 1st compartment died instantly. The bulkhead between 1 and 2 m is designed for an excess pressure of 10 kg/cm2 and could become an obstacle to the path of the shock wave. But that did not happen. The design of the boat has a huge drawback: when firing torpedoes in salvos, to prevent pressure build-up in the 1st compartment, it is necessary to open the bulkhead doors or bulkhead flaps of the ventilation system between the 1st and 2nd compartments. The main command control post is located in the 2nd compartment of the nuclear submarine 949 A of the project. Because of this, the personnel of the 2nd compartment received severe concussions and found themselves inoperative.

Theoretically, at this time, living submariners still had a chance to save the submarine and themselves. To do this, it was necessary for one of the officers at the control panel of the main power plant in the 3rd compartment to give the command to blow through the main ballast tanks with high-pressure air from the 9th compartment. But to switch to a reserve control center, the decision of the submarine commander is required. Such an emergency situation was not anticipated and was not practiced on any Navy submarine.

Sea water entered the 1st compartment through the pipe of apparatus No. 4 at a speed of 3 - 3.5 m3 per second. Through the open bulkhead ventilation valves, water also flooded the 2nd compartment. The protection of reactors and turbines worked. The nuclear submarine lost speed and moved by inertia. "Kursk" at a speed of about 3 knots, with a trim on the bow of 40-42 degrees at a depth of 108 meters, collided with the ground. The bow was crushed and the torpedo tubes were destroyed. An explosion of enormous force tore apart the strong hull of the nuclear submarine in the bow area and compressed all the equipment from the 1st to 3rd compartments. After the collision with the ground, the nuclear submarine “crawled” along the bottom for about 30 meters.

As for the version that the submariners who survived in the 9th compartment lived for several more days and could have been saved, the investigation and forensic experts give an unequivocal answer - they could not.
After the explosion, only 23 people in the stern of the boat survived. They were led by Lieutenant Commander Dmitry Kolesnikov. Together with other surviving officers, he made a decision: to stay in the 9th compartment, which had not lost its seal, and wait for help. “There seems to be no chance. 10-20 percent,” Dmitry Kolesnikov wrote in the dark. The last entry is dated 15.15 on August 12, that is, 4 hours later, the explosion field. Why didn't they come out? Investigators say they most likely didn’t make it in time. In the 9th compartment, another tragic accident occurred - due to the ingress of water, the regeneration plate, which produces oxygen from carbon dioxide, explodes. This happens literally in the hands of Kolesnikov, who dies on the spot. As forensic experts have established, the remaining sailors die seconds later from carbon monoxide poisoning.

Regarding the 2nd explosion, Valery Korenchuk, academician of PANI, professor at Turan University, former torpedo design engineer at a construction plant, offered his version.

“Only three facts are known for certain: the first explosion was 150-200 kg of TNT, after 135 seconds the second was three times more powerful, 700-750 kg. These are Norwegian and English data, i.e. uninterested persons. There is no information about a series of explosions of half the torpedo ammunition. 700-750 kg of TNT is the equivalent of the charge of a thick 650 mm torpedo. More from student years I firmly know that theoretically and practically, a torpedo charge can only explode from its fuse during normal testing of all torpedo systems.
Logically, omitting all the details, the following picture of the disaster emerged.

In the COMBAT, and not practical, torpedo 65-76, peroxide began to spontaneously decompose. The pressure began to increase catastrophically quickly - the peroxide reservoir burst (it needs 45-50 atmospheres). And almost at the same instant the body of the torpedo tube burst (at 80-90 atmospheres). This was recorded as the first explosion.

As a result, the torpedo itself shifted and turned in the twisted apparatus in such a way that the fuses came off the upper guide track of the torpedo tube. For the torpedo mechanisms, this was equivalent to a standard shot. For safety reasons, the fuse is designed in such a way that the oncoming flow rotates the turntables, which, through a worm gear, begin to compress the mainspring and pull out the firing pin. Only when the torpedo moves 350-400 meters away from its ship will the fuse be able to go off. Water begins to fill the compartment. The boat loses zero buoyancy and begins to slowly sink at the same speed. If this had happened in the shallows, the second explosion might not have occurred. But to the bottom 70-80 meters. And the diving speed of an 18 thousand-ton submarine is too low. Within a minute the fuses were already in firing position. And they are inertial impact mechanism at 135 seconds, when the boat touches the bottom, it is triggered. A second explosion thunders, which turns the bow of the boat like a flower, knocks out the bulkheads of the second and third compartments, tearing the remaining torpedoes from the racks and snags. But they DID NOT EXPLODE. They couldn't explode. Because this, although a combat weapon, is a reliable weapon.

This was my theoretically only version of the disaster at the end of August 2000. On the eve of the operation to saw off the first compartment, the AiF Kazakhstan newspaper published it with my assumptions that there would still be accidents on the Kursk, since the torpedo ammunition was scattered throughout the boat, there was a high probability that the saw would fall on the charging compartment and be burned, and unexploded torpedoes They will even find it in the third compartment. (“The death of the Kursk was forged in Alma-Ata,” AiF, August 20, 2001) After all the events associated with sawing off, lifting and inspecting the compartments of the Kursk, the version turned into the only possible, therefore, reliable description of the disaster .

And I also see only one source of spontaneous decomposition of peroxide - the entry of seawater “contaminated” with catalysts into the peroxide reservoir through cracks in the rubber sealing rings.”

Thus, these 2 versions together give an approximate picture of what happened.
There is a difference in the cause of the primary explosion in the oxidizer chamber. Fake acts of degreasing air ducts are most likely one of the links in the tragedy. Moreover, as it turned out, the crew of the nuclear submarine had no experience in handling 65-76 PV peroxide torpedoes. And violation of operating rules, aggravated by the simplification of combat training in the Navy, ultimately led to disaster.
In my opinion, the cause of the first explosion was precisely the entry of “dirty” air into the oxidizer of the launch cylinder. Valery Korenchuk most accurately describes the cause of the second explosion, comparing the power of the explosion itself - which destroyed the nuclear submarine - with the power of the warhead of the 65-76 PV torpedo. But here an interesting point appears - the torpedo, contrary to the rules, was not loaded with a practical torpedo, but a combat one...
Yes, there were also facts that were not particularly advertised. For example, why didn’t the rescue buoy float up and the Kursk couldn’t be found right away? It turned out that the buoy activation key, which is located at one of the posts inside the boat, was not only not activated - it was not even inserted. Investigators placed great hope in logbooks and flight recorder records. The logs were found, but there was no hint of an accident in them. They found the so-called black box of the Kursk - the mangled Snegir flight recorder. Experts did the impossible - they restored the films that had lain for a year at a depth of 100 meters. The last recording turned out to be a report on the successful shooting of the Granite, and then the music and voices of killer whales were recorded on reels, which were played on the in-ship broadcast, instead of, as expected, everything being written down, negotiations and commands on the boat. Many more minor and larger violations were identified, but according to the conclusions of the investigation, all of them were not related to the disaster and did not affect it in any way. Therefore, no one blamed the crew.

The Navy needs torpedo weapons. In addition, to solve special problems, appropriate . Several decades ago in our country this issue was resolved by creating torpedoes with improved performance and a caliber of 650 mm. As it recently became known, similar weapons is still in service and operated by the navy. At the same time, of all the developed samples, only the 65-76A torpedo remains in the arsenals.

It is necessary to recall the 650 mm torpedoes. Work in this direction started back in the late fifties and had a specific goal. The command requested the creation of a promising torpedo, characterized by the highest range and capable of carrying a special combat unit. It was assumed that such a torpedo could be launched outside the enemy’s anti-submarine defenses, and it would be able to destroy an entire naval formation in one explosion.

The development of the project was entrusted to NII-400 (now Central Research Institute Gidropribor). V.A. was appointed chief designer. Keleinikova. Serial production of torpedoes was subsequently mastered by the machine-building plant named after. Kirov (Almaty). As the project developed and new types of weapons appeared, the composition of the project participants did not change.

Cutaway model of torpedo 65-76. Photo Militaryrussia.ru

It was quickly determined that the nuclear warhead simply did not fit into the standard 533 mm caliber case, which is why this parameter had to be increased to 650 mm. In 1961, testing of a promising nuclear torpedo began, which took several years. Checks were completed in 1965, but carriers for the torpedo were not yet available. Only in 1973, this weapon was adopted by the navy and was included in the standard ammunition of submarines. In accordance with the accepted designation system, the new long-range torpedo was called 65-73. The first number indicated the caliber in centimeters, the second - the year of adoption.

For all its advantages, product 65-73 had a characteristic drawback in the form of a limited scope of application. As a result, in 1969, after the completion of the main work, it was decided to develop a non-nuclear modification of the existing torpedo. It was still possible to receive the highest specifications, and another warhead, despite significantly lower power, still made it possible to demonstrate high combat effectiveness.

Work on a new type of torpedo continued until the mid-seventies. After all tests were completed, the product was put into service under the name 65-76. During the finalization of the project in accordance with the new wishes of the customer, the torpedo received not only a conventional warhead, but also an upgraded guidance system. Thus, while losing in some combat characteristics, the new 65-76 torpedo outperformed the basic 65-73 in others.

By the beginning of the eighties, the USSR launched a program for the construction of new nuclear submarines, classified as the so-called third generation. In accordance with the command's plans, such ships were supposed to retain powerful 650 mm torpedoes. At the same time, the use of products 65-76 in their existing form was considered inappropriate. To arm the new submarines, an updated and improved torpedo was required. The order to begin its development came out at the very end of 1982.

The design of the torpedo was again taken up by the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor"; the chief designer this time was B.I. Lavrishchev. The 65-76 torpedo version for third-generation submarines was designated 65-76A. In addition, the product was given the name “Kit”. The project did not provide large quantity changes, thanks to which its development took only a few months. Already in 1983, the first test firing was carried out. However, later work was somewhat delayed. The checks were completed only in the early nineties. The order to accept the 65-76A torpedo into service and launch its mass production appeared only in the spring of 1991.

Non-nuclear torpedoes 65-76 and 65-76A were variants of further development of the same basic design, as a result of which they have a mass common features. At the same time, the two products differed in certain technical and operational features. Despite the differences, the main characteristics of the two torpedoes were at the same level.

Both products have a traditional cylindrical body for torpedoes with a hemispherical head and a conical rear part. Behind the stern narrowing there are several rudders and water-jet propulsors, carried out using longitudinal beams. The body layout is classic. The head section houses the instrument compartment and charging compartment, the large central section is dedicated to fuel, and the stern contains the power plant and steering gears.

Product diagram. Figure Weaponsystems.net

According to known data, two torpedoes were equipped with active homing systems that determine the wake of the target. This system was based on units borrowed from domestic torpedoes of previous models. As part of the Whale project, the controls were not seriously improved. Both torpedoes did not have remote control and had to search for the target independently.

Before firing, products 65-76 and 65-76A were supposed to receive information from the ship's fire control devices. An earlier project used a mechanical input method - the torpedo received information through special spindles. The “Kit” product received a more advanced electrical system based on a set of contacts.

Both torpedoes belong to the thermal class and use a gas turbine power plant. They are equipped with a 2DT thermal peroxide turbine engine. This product was developed at the Morteplotekhnika Research Institute in the mid-sixties and has already been used on some domestic torpedoes. The engine used hydrogen peroxide as fuel and produced power of more than 1430 hp. Due to its high power and significant fuel reserve, such an engine made it possible to get enough high speed course with outstanding range indicators.

The torque of the gas turbine was delivered to the impeller of the water-jet propulsion device, placed inside the annular channel. Control of course and depth is carried out using several planes placed directly in front of the water cannon.

The 65-76 torpedo received a charging compartment with a non-nuclear charge weighing 500 kg. According to some reports, right choice explosive allowed to obtain a power equivalent to 760 kg of TNT. According to some sources, along with other new units, the modernized 65-76A “Kit” torpedo received an enlarged charging compartment, due to which the mass of explosives was increased by 55-60 kg.

Both torpedoes had a diameter of 650 mm and a total length of 11.3 m. The older product 65-76 had a mass of 4.45 tons. According to sources indicating an increase in warhead during modernization, the newer “Kit” had a mass of 4.75 tons.

During testing, torpedoes 65-76 were launched from depths of up to 150 m. At the same time, the possibility of firing at depths of up to 450-480 m was declared. The speed of the carrier when firing is limited to 13 knots. The power plant of sufficient power allowed both torpedoes to reach speeds of up to 50 knots. On maximum speed the range reaches 50 km. Reducing the speed to 30-35 km/h allows you to double the range. The torpedo reaches the target at a depth of 14 m.

The Project 949A submarine "Eagle" is one of the carriers of 65-76A torpedoes. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense

The first carrier of the newest 65-76 torpedo was the Project 671RT Salmon nuclear submarine K-387. In the bow compartment of this ship there were two 650 mm torpedo tubes and four 533 mm systems. A total of seven such submarines were built. Then 21 Project 671RTM submarines were built. All these ships belonged to the second generation and could only use two types of torpedoes: 65-73 and 65-76.

Further development submarine fleet led to the construction of new third-generation boats, as well as the development of the modernized 65-76A torpedo. One of the first next-generation submarines capable of carrying Kit torpedoes were Project 671RTMK ships. As part of this project, the Navy was replenished with five combat units.

Also, a pair of 650 mm torpedo tubes were to be carried by Project 945 Barracuda submarines. It is curious that the following projects 945A “Condor” and 945B “Mars” no longer envisaged the use of such weapons. All new submarines were equipped only with 533 mm torpedo tubes.

Also, nuclear submarines of projects 949 Granit and 949A Antey were armed with 650-mm torpedoes. According to the first project, only two ships were built, while the second project planned 18 units and built 11. As with other projects, it was planned to equip the boat with two large-caliber torpedo tubes. Along with them there were also “traditional” 533 mm devices.

Most powerful in terms of quantity torpedo armament carry modern multi-purpose nuclear submarine project 971 "Pike-B". In their bow compartment there are four torpedo tubes at once, intended for the use of 65-76A products. The ammunition load can include up to 12 torpedoes of this type in addition to 28 units of smaller caliber weapons. It should be noted that 650 mm torpedo tubes can also be used as launchers for some types of anti-submarine missiles.

From the mid-seventies to the early nineties, the main long-range torpedo of 650 mm caliber in service with the domestic submarine forces was 65-76. The renewal of the fleet led to the appearance of an improved modification, compatible with newer ships. The planned renewal of the ship's personnel, as well as the well-known events of past decades, which led to a sharp reduction in the number of submarines, led to a change in the ratio of 65-76 and 65-76A carriers. Almost all second-generation boats were written off due to moral and physical obsolescence or due to financial problems, as a result of which the “Kit” became the main torpedo of its class.

In August 2000, the Project 949A nuclear submarine K-141 Kursk was lost during exercises in the Barents Sea. Later, the boat was raised, which made it possible to carry out all the necessary measures and establish the cause of the tragedy. The investigation team determined that while preparing to fire a training torpedo 65-76, a fuel leak occurred, which started a fire. The flame provoked the explosion of the warheads of other torpedoes located in the bow compartment. This version was not accepted by everyone and was criticized, but new official recommendations soon appeared related to the results of the investigation.

Another carrier of long-range torpedoes is the Panther nuclear submarine, project 971 Shchuka-B. The torpedo tube covers are visible in the bow. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense

Taking into account the existing operating experience of products 65-76 and 65-76A, as well as the results of a recent investigation, it was recommended to abandon such torpedoes due to their lack of reliability. Subsequently, officials several times mentioned the future or already completed removal of the “Whale” from service. However, after a few years, data appeared about the continued use of such weapons.

According to the latest data, 65-76A torpedoes are still in service with Russian submarine forces. On March 25, the Zvezda TV channel showed the next episode of the Military Acceptance program entitled “Animal Division, Part 2.” In this issue, the authors of the program continued the story about the submarine division of the Russian Navy, operating the Project 971 Shchuka-B multi-purpose nuclear submarines. Ships of this type, it is worth recalling, are equipped with four 650 mm torpedo tubes.

The authors of the program, as expected, raised the topic of the submarine’s armament. It was indicated that the ammunition load of 40 torpedoes includes products of an increased caliber of 650 mm, namely 65-76A torpedoes. It was also noted, not without pride, that the power of such weapons is sufficient to destroy an entire aircraft carrier. It may follow from this that the Kit torpedoes, despite statements of past years, were not withdrawn from service and still remain in the arsenals of the navy.

According to the latest data, long-range torpedoes 65-76A are still in service. With their help, submarines of several types can attack surface targets at long range, actually from outside the area of ​​responsibility of the enemy’s anti-submarine defense. This reduces the risks for the submarine and also allows high efficiency decide combat missions. Failing to detect and destroy an incoming torpedo in time, the enemy risks losing a large ship.

However, it is obvious that the 65-76A torpedoes - with all their advantages - will be the last representatives of their class in the domestic fleet. In the past, new attempts were made to develop promising 650 mm torpedoes, but they did not lead to the desired results. In addition, a fundamental decision was made to abandon such weapons due to the emergence of new, more advanced systems.

The latest multi-purpose nuclear submarines are equipped only with 533 mm torpedo tubes; more large systems are no longer applied. The problem of increasing the firing range at enemy ships is now solved in two ways. Firstly, improved 533-mm torpedoes with increased characteristics are being created. The second method of solving the problem is modern anti-ship missiles with a sufficient firing range, launched directly from a standard torpedo tube. All this allows you to obtain the desired results without the need to assemble and install an overly large torpedo tube.

For several decades, torpedoes 65-76 and 65-76A were the most serious asset in the arsenal of some Soviet and Russian submarines. They still have this status, but further development submarine fleet weapons make such torpedoes unnecessary. Their tasks can be solved with no less efficiency by modern and advanced missiles. Over time, the Whale torpedoes will retire along with their carriers, but for the foreseeable future they will continue to serve, complementing other weapons of the navy.

Based on materials:
http://flot.com/
https://flotprom.ru/
http://russianarms.ru/
http://tvzvezda.ru/
https://ria.ru/
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-461.html