Soviet-Finnish war causes. Soviet-Finnish War

Of all the wars that Russia has waged throughout history, the Karelian-Finnish war of 1939-1940. remained the least advertised for a long time. This is due both to the unsatisfactory outcome of the war and to significant losses.

It is still not known for certain how many combatants on both sides died in the Finnish war.

Soviet-Finnish war, soldiers' march to the front

When the Soviet-Finnish war, started by the country's leadership, took place, the whole world took up arms against the USSR, which in fact turned into colossal foreign policy problems for the country. Next, we will try to explain why the war could not end quickly and turned out to be a failure overall.

Finland has almost never been an independent state. In the period from the 12th to the 19th centuries it was under Swedish rule, and in 1809 it became part of the Russian Empire.

However, after February Revolution Unrest began on the territory of Finland, the population first demanded broad autonomy, and then completely came to the idea of ​​independence. After October revolution The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

However, the further path of development of the country was not clear-cut; a civil war broke out in the country between whites and reds. Even after the victory of the White Finns, there were still many communists and social democrats in the country's parliament, half of whom were eventually arrested, and half were forced to hide in Soviet Russia.

Finland supported a number of White Guard forces during the Russian Civil War. Between 1918 and 1921, several military conflicts occurred between the countries - two Soviet-Finnish wars, after which the final border between the states was formed.

Political map Europe in the interwar period and the border of Finland before 1939

In general, the conflict with Soviet Russia was settled and until 1939 the countries lived in peace. However, on the detailed map, the territory that belonged to Finland after the Second Soviet-Finnish War is highlighted in yellow. The USSR claimed this territory.

Finnish border before 1939 on the map

The main causes of the Finnish War of 1939:

• Until 1939, the USSR border with Finland was located only 30 km away. from Leningrad. In case of war, the city could be located under shelling from the territory of another state;
• Historically, the lands in question were not always part of Finland. These territories were part of the Principality of Novgorod, then were captured by Sweden, and recaptured by Russia during the Northern War. Only in the 19th century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, were these territories transferred to them for management. Which, in principle, was not of fundamental importance within the framework of a single state;
• The USSR needed to strengthen its position in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, despite the absence of war, the countries had a number of claims against each other. Many communists were killed and arrested in Finland in 1918, and a number of Finnish communists found refuge in the USSR. On the other hand, many Finns suffered during the political terror in the Soviet Union.

this year a large number of communists were killed and arrested in Finland

In addition, local border conflicts between countries regularly took place. Just as the Soviet Union was not satisfied with such a border near the second largest city in the RSFSR, not all Finns were satisfied with the territory of Finland.

In some circles, the idea of ​​​​creating a “Greater Finland” that would unite the majority of Finno-Ugric peoples was considered.

Thus, there were enough reasons for the Finnish war to start, when there were a lot of territorial disputes and mutual discontent. And after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Finland moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Therefore, in October 1939, negotiations began between the two sides - the USSR demanded to cede the territory bordering Leningrad - to move the border at least 70 km.

Negotiations between the two countries begin in October this year

In addition, we are talking about the transfer of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the lease of the Hanko Peninsula, and the transfer of Fort Ino. In exchange, Finland is offered a territory twice as large in area in Karelia.

But despite the idea of ​​a “Greater Finland”, the deal looks extremely unfavorable for the Finnish side:

• firstly, the territories offered to the country are sparsely populated and practically devoid of infrastructure;
• secondly, the territories to be taken away are already inhabited by the Finnish population;
• finally, such concessions would both deprive the country of a line of defense on land and seriously weaken its position at sea.

Therefore, despite the duration of the negotiations, the parties did not come to a mutually beneficial agreement and the USSR began preparations for offensive operation. The Soviet-Finnish war, the start date of which was secretly discussed in the highest circles of the political leadership of the USSR, increasingly appeared in Western news headlines.

The causes of the Soviet-Finnish war are briefly outlined in archival publications of that era.

Briefly about the balance of forces and means in the winter war

As of the end of November 1939, the balance of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border is presented in the table.

As you can see, the superiority of the Soviet side was colossal: 1.4 to 1 in numbers of troops, 2 to 1 in guns, 58 to 1 in tanks, 10 to 1 in aircraft, 13 to 1 in ships. Despite careful preparation, the start of the Finnish war (the date of the invasion had already been agreed upon with the political leadership of the country) occurred spontaneously; the command did not even create a front.

They wanted to fight the war using the Leningrad Military District.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

First of all, the USSR creates a pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war - it organizes a border conflict at Mainila on November 26, 1939 (the first date of the Finnish war). There are many versions describing the reasons for the outbreak of the Finnish War of 1939, but official version Soviet side:

The Finns attacked the border outpost, 3 people were killed.

The documents disclosed in our time that describe the war between the USSR and Finland in 1939-1940 are contradictory, but do not contain clear evidence of an attack by the Finnish side.

Then the Soviet Union forms the so-called. Kuusinen's government, which heads the newly formed Finnish Democratic Republic.

It is this government that recognizes the USSR (no other country in the world has recognized it) and responds to the request to send troops into the country and support the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois government.

From that time until the peace negotiations, the USSR did not recognize the democratic government of Finland and did not negotiate with it. War has not even been officially declared - the USSR sent troops to assist a friendly government in an internal civil war.

Otto V. Kuusinen, head of the Finnish government in 1939

Kuusinen himself was an old Bolshevik - he was one of the leaders of the Red Finns in the Civil War. He fled the country in time, headed the international for some time, and even escaped repression during the Great Terror, although it primarily fell on the old guard of the Bolsheviks.

Kuusinen's coming to power in Finland would be comparable to the coming to power in the USSR in 1939 of one of the leaders of the white movement. It is doubtful that major arrests and executions could have been avoided.

However, the fighting is not going as well as planned by the Soviet side.

Hard war of 1939

The initial plan (developed by Shaposhnikov) included a kind of “blitzkrieg” - the capture of Finland was to be carried out within a short period of time. According to the plans of the General Staff:

The war in 1939 was supposed to last 3 weeks.

It was supposed to break through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and make a breakthrough with tank forces to Helsinki.

Despite the significant superiority of Soviet forces, this basic offensive plan failed. The most significant advantage (in tanks) was offset by natural conditions - tanks simply could not make free maneuvers in forest and swampy conditions.

In addition, the Finns quickly learned to destroy Soviet tanks that were not yet sufficiently armored (they used mainly T-28s).

It was during the Finnish war with Russia that an incendiary mixture in a bottle and a wick got its name - the Molotov cocktail. The original name was “Cocktail FOR Molotov”. Soviet tanks simply burned out upon contact with the combustible mixture.

The reason for this was not only low-level armor, but also gasoline engines. This incendiary mixture was no less terrible for ordinary soldiers.

The Soviet army also turned out, surprisingly, not ready for war in winter conditions. Ordinary soldiers were equipped with ordinary Budenovkas and overcoats, which did not protect them from the cold. On the other hand, if necessary to fight in the summer, the Red Army would face more big problems, for example, impassable swamps.

The offensive that began on the Karelian Isthmus was not prepared for heavy fighting on the Mannerheim Line. In general, the military leadership did not have clear ideas about this line of fortifications.

Therefore, the artillery shelling at the first stage of the war was ineffective - the Finns simply waited out it in fortified bunkers. In addition, ammunition for the guns took a long time to be delivered - the weak infrastructure affected it.

Let us dwell in more detail on the Mannerheim line.

1939 - war with Finland on the Mannerheim Line

Since the 1920s, the Finns have been actively building a series of defensive fortifications, named after a prominent military leader of 1918-1921. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Realizing that a possible military threat to the country does not come from the north and west, it was decided to build a powerful defensive line in the southeast, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus.

Karl Mannerheim, the military leader after whom the front line is named

We should pay tribute to the designers - the topography of the territory made it possible to actively use natural conditions - numerous dense forests, lakes, and swamps. The key structure was the Enkel bunker - a standard concrete structure armed with machine guns.

At the same time, despite the long construction time, the line was not at all as impregnable as it would later be called in numerous textbooks. Most of the pillboxes were created according to Enkel's design, i.e. early 1920s These were outdated at the time of the Second World War for several people, with 1-3 machine guns, without underground barracks.

In the early 1930s, million-dollar pillboxes were designed and began to be built in 1937. Their fortification was stronger, the number of embrasures reached six, and there were underground barracks.

However, only 7 such pillboxes were built. It was not possible to build up the entire Mannerheim line (135 km) with pillboxes, because before the war, certain sections were mined and surrounded by wire fences.

On the front, instead of pillboxes, there were simple trenches.

This line should not be neglected either; its depth ranged from 24 to 85 kilometers. It was not possible to break through it at once - for some time the line saved the country. As a result, on December 27, the Red Army stopped its offensive operations and prepared for a new assault, bringing up artillery and retraining soldiers.

The further course of the war will show that with proper preparation, the outdated line of defense could not hold out for the required time and save Finland from defeat.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

The first stage of the war also saw the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations (12/14/1939). Yes, at that time this organization has lost its meaning. The exclusion itself was more likely a consequence of increased antipathy towards the USSR throughout the world.

England and France (at that time not yet occupied by Germany) provide Finland with various assistance - they do not enter into an open conflict, but there are active supplies of weapons to the northern country.

England and France are developing two plans to help Finland.

The first involves the transfer of military corps to Finland, and the second involves the bombing of Soviet fields in Baku. However, the war with Germany forces us to abandon these plans.

Moreover, the expeditionary force would have to pass through Norway and Sweden, to which both countries responded with a categorical refusal, wanting to maintain their neutrality in World War II.

Second stage of the war

Since the end of December 1939, a regrouping of Soviet troops has been taking place. A separate North-Western Front is formed. Armed forces are being built up on all sectors of the front.

By the beginning of February 1940, the number of armed forces reached 1.3 million people, guns - 3.5 thousand. Airplanes - 1.5 thousand. Finland by that time was also able to strengthen the army, including through the help of other countries and foreign volunteers, but the balance of forces became even more catastrophic for the defending side.

On February 1, a massive artillery bombardment of the Mannerheim Line began. It turns out that most Finnish pillboxes cannot withstand accurate and prolonged shelling. They bomb for 10 days just in case. As a result, when the Red Army attacked on February 10, instead of bunkers, it found only many “Karelian monuments.”

In winter, on February 11, the Mannerheim Line was broken, Finnish counter-offensives lead to nothing. And on February 13, the second line of defense, hastily strengthened by the Finns, breaks through. And already on February 15, taking advantage of the weather conditions, Mannerheim gave the order for a general retreat.

Help for Finland from other countries

It should be noted that breaking through the Mannerheim Line meant the end of the war and even defeat in it. There was practically no hope for major military assistance from the West.

Yes, during the war, not only England and France provided Finland with various technical assistance. Scandinavian countries, the USA, Hungary and a number of others sent many volunteers to the country.

soldiers were sent to the front from Sweden

At the same time, it was the threat of direct war with England and France, in the event of a complete capture of Finland, that forced I. Stalin to negotiate with the current Finnish government and make peace.

The request was transmitted through the USSR Ambassador to Sweden to the Finnish Ambassador.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

Let us dwell separately on the well-known military myth about Finnish snipers - the so-called. cuckoos During the Winter War (as it is called in Finland), many Soviet officers and soldiers fell victims to Finnish snipers. A story began to circulate among the troops that Finnish snipers were hiding in the trees and firing from there.

However, sniper fire from trees is extremely ineffective, since a sniper in a tree himself represents an excellent target and does not have a proper foothold and the ability to quickly retreat.

The answer to such accuracy of snipers is quite simple. At the beginning of the war, the officers were equipped with insulated sheepskin coats of a dark color, which were clearly visible in the snowy desert and stood out against the background of the soldiers' greatcoats.

The fire was fired from insulated and camouflaged positions on the ground. Snipers could sit in improvised shelters for hours, waiting for a suitable target.

The most famous Finnish sniper of the Winter War is Simo Häyhä, who shot about 500 Red Army officers and soldiers. At the end of the war, he received a serious injury to his jaw (it had to be inserted from the femur), but the soldier lived to be 96 years old.

The Soviet-Finnish border was moved 120 kilometers from Leningrad - Vyborg, the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were annexed.

A 30-year lease for the Hanko Peninsula was agreed upon. In return, Finland received only the Petsamo region, which provided access to the Barents Sea and was rich in nickel ores.

The completion of the Soviet-Finnish war brought bonuses to the winner in the form of:

1. USSR acquisition of new territories. They managed to move the border away from Leningrad.
2. Gaining combat experience, awareness of the need to improve military equipment.
3. Colossal battle losses. Data vary, but the average death toll was over 150 thousand people (125 from the USSR and 25 thousand from Finland). Sanitary losses were even greater - 265 thousand in the USSR and over 40 thousand in Finland. These figures had a discrediting effect on the Red Army.
4. Plan failure for the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic .
5. Decline in international authority. This applies to both the countries of the future allies and the Axis countries. It is believed that it was after the Winter War that A. Hitler finally became convinced that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay.
6. Finland lost territories that are important to them. The area of ​​land given away was 10% of the entire territory of the country. The spirit of revanchism began to grow in her. From a neutral position, the country increasingly gravitates toward supporting the Axis countries and ultimately participates in the Great Patriotic War on the side of Germany (in the period 1941-1944).

Summarizing all of the above, we can conclude that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 was a strategic failure of the Soviet leadership.

And other Finnish cities had flags at half-staff. People walked the streets with tears in their eyes, some even said that the most pleasant sound to hear right now would be an air raid siren. On March 13, 1940, Finland was plunged into mourning. She mourned her 25 thousand dead and 55 thousand wounded; she grieved over material losses, which even the moral victory, won at the cost of the steadfastness and courage of her soldiers on the battlefields, could not make up for. Now Finland was at the mercy of Russia, and she again listened to the opinions of the great powers. For example, the passionate words of Winston Churchill were heard:

“Finland alone - in mortal danger, but maintaining its greatness - demonstrates what free people are capable of. The service rendered by Finland to all mankind is inestimable... We cannot say what the fate of Finland will be, but nothing is more deplorable to the whole civilized world than that this beautiful northern people should ultimately perish or, as a result of terrible injustice , to fall into slavery, worse than death itself.”

Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner said: “Peace has been restored, but what kind of peace is this? From now on, our country will continue to live, feeling its inferiority.”

Soldiers were returning home on skis from the battlefields, many of them, shocked by the conditions of peace, sobbing. They could barely stand on their feet from fatigue, but still considered themselves invincible. Many were tormented by the question of how they would feel when they had time to rest and think about everything.

When members of the peace negotiations delegation returned to Helsinki on March 14, they found a city indifferent to everything. The world under such conditions seemed unreal... terrible.

In Russia, they say, one of the generals remarked: “We have won enough land to bury our dead...”

The Russians had plenty of time to develop their plans, choose the time and place to attack, and they greatly outnumbered their neighbor. But, as Khrushchev wrote, “...even in such the most favorable conditions, only with great difficulty and at the cost of huge losses were we able to win. Victory at such a cost was actually a moral defeat.”

From total number 1.5 million people sent to Finland, USSR losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment, including equipment, ammunition, horses, cars and trucks.

Finland's losses, although disproportionately smaller, were crushing for the 4 million people. If something similar had happened in 1940 in the United States, with its population of more than 130 million, American losses in just 105 days would have amounted to 2.6 million people killed and wounded.

During the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty, Molotov noted: “Since blood was shed against the wishes of the Soviet government and through no fault of Russia, the territorial concessions offered by Finland should be significantly greater than those offered by Russia at the negotiations in Moscow in October and November 1939.” .

Under the terms of the peace treaty, the following were transferred to Russia: the second largest city in Finland, Viipuri (now Vyborg - Ed.); largest port on the Arctic Ocean Petsamo; strategically important area of ​​the Hanko Peninsula; the largest Lake Ladoga and the entire Karelian Isthmus are home to 12 percent of Finland's population.

Finland gave up its territory with a total area of ​​22 thousand square kilometers in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition to Viipuri, it lost such important ports as Uuras, Koivisto, northern part Lake Ladoga and the important Saimaa Canal. Two weeks were given to evacuate the population and remove property; most of the property had to be abandoned or destroyed. A huge loss for the country's economy was the loss of the forest industry of Karelia with its excellent sawmills, wood processing and plywood enterprises. Finland also lost some of its chemical, textile and steel industries. 10 percent of enterprises in these industries were located in the Vuoksa River valley. Almost 100 power plants went to the victorious Soviet Union.

In his radio address to the people of Finland, President Kallio recalled everyone's remaining obligations to the families of those killed, war veterans and other victims, as well as to the population of the regions that have now become part of Russia. People living in the territories ceded to the USSR were given the right to decide for themselves whether to leave their homes or remain and become citizens of the Soviet Union.

Not a single Finn chose the latter, although the signed peace treaty turned 450 thousand people are poor and homeless. The Finnish government requisitioned all available vehicles for the evacuation of refugees and created conditions for their temporary residence in other parts of Finland. Many of these people required government support, as more than half of them lived off agriculture; 40 thousand farms had to be found, and collective responsibility for this fell on the shoulders of the entire people of Finland. On June 28, 1940, the Emergency Relocation Act was passed to ensure the rights of refugees.

The question of why the USSR signed a peace treaty without serious intentions to occupy Finland was discussed for many years after the war. Khrushchev said that Stalin showed political wisdom here, because he understood that “Finland was not at all needed for the world proletarian revolution.”

But the colossal efforts of the Finns to defend their country undoubtedly played an important role in Stalin’s decision to abandon his plans. To subdue this stubborn and hostile people, who would undoubtedly start a guerrilla war that could last for who knows how long, was not an easy task.

More broadly, Stalin simply did not dare to allow the conflict in Finland to escalate into a world war, because his intentions did not include a war against the allies on the side of Germany. In conditions when the Finnish border still remained unviolated, and the allies were preparing to assist it with equipment and weapons, the war could well drag on until the spring, and then victory, most likely, would have been won by the Soviet Union at an immeasurably higher price.

Winter War 1939-1940 greatly influenced the rapidly changing plans of the great powers. For British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, his government's indecision during the "winter madness" ended with his resignation seven weeks later when the Nazis invaded Norway and Denmark. A week after the invasion of Norway and Denmark, the French government led by Daladier fell, who was replaced by Pierre Laval, who cleverly used the conflict in Finland to come to power.

As for Germany, if the Soviet Union had not appeared in such an unsightly form in the war with Finland, Hitler would hardly have underestimated Russia's military potential in the way he did. Compared to the enormous efforts expended by the USSR in Finland, the result obtained was far from so impressive.

Despite the fact that half of the regular Russian divisions stationed in the European part and in Siberia were thrown against a small neighboring country, the Red Army suffered a major failure, and the reasons for this are obvious.

As Marshal Mannerheim wrote, “a typical mistake of the Red High Command was that when conducting military operations, due attention was not paid to the main factors in the war against Finland: the peculiarities of the theater of operations and the power of the enemy.” The latter was weak in terms of material support, but the Russians were not fully aware of the fact that organizational structure their armies were too unwieldy to fight in the wilderness of the north in the dead of winter. Mannerheim notes that they could well have conducted preliminary exercises in conditions similar to those they would encounter in Finland, but the Russians did not do this, blindly believing in their superiority in modern technology. To imitate the actions of the Germans on the plains of Poland in the wooded areas of Finland was to doom oneself to failure.

Another mistake was the use of commissars in the active army. “The fact that every order first had to be approved by the political commissars necessarily led to delays and confusion, not to mention weak initiative and fear of responsibility,” Mannerheim wrote. - The blame for the fact that the encircled units refused to surrender, despite the cold and hunger, lies entirely with the commissars. Soldiers were prevented from surrendering by threats of reprisals against their families and assurances that they would be shot or tortured if they fell into enemy hands. In many cases, officers and soldiers preferred suicide to surrender.”

Although Russian officers were courageous people, senior commanders were characterized by inertia, which precluded the possibility of acting flexibly. “Their lack of creative imagination was striking where the changing situation required quick decision-making...” wrote Mannerheim. And although the Russian soldier demonstrated courage, perseverance and unpretentiousness, he also lacked initiative. "Unlike his Finnish opponent, he was a fighter of the masses, unable to act independently in the absence of contact with his officers or comrades." Mannerheim attributed this to the Russian man’s ability to endure suffering and hardship, developed during centuries of difficult struggle with nature, to the sometimes unnecessary manifestation of courage and fatalism inaccessible to the understanding of Europeans.

Undoubtedly, the experience accumulated during the Finnish campaign was fully used by Marshal Timoshenko in his reorganization of the Red Army. According to him, “The Russians learned a lot from this difficult war, in which the Finns fought heroically.”

Expressing the official point of view, Marshal S.S. Biryuzov wrote:

“The assault on the Mannerheim line was considered a standard of operational and tactical art. The troops learned to overcome the enemy’s long-term defenses through the constant accumulation of forces and patiently “gnawing” holes in the enemy’s defensive structures, created according to all the rules of engineering science. But in a rapidly changing environment, insufficient attention was paid to the interaction of various types of troops. We had to re-learn under enemy fire, paying a high price for the experience and knowledge without which we could not have defeated Hitler’s army.”

Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov summed up the results: “We learned a harsh lesson. And he was supposed to be useful to us. The Finnish campaign showed that the organization of the leadership of the armed forces in the center left much to be desired. In the event of a war (big or small), it was necessary to know in advance who would be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and through what apparatus the work would be carried out; should it have been a specially created body, or should it have been General base, how in Peaceful time. And these were by no means minor issues.”

As for the far-reaching consequences of the Winter War, which influenced the actions of the Red Army against Hitler, Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov wrote:

“At the end of March, a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party was held, at which much attention was paid to considering the lessons of the war. He noted serious shortcomings in the actions of our troops, as well as in their theoretical and practical training. We still haven't learned to use our full potential new technology. The work of the rear services was criticized. The troops turned out to be ill-prepared for combat operations in forests, in conditions of frosty weather and impassable roads. The party demanded a thorough study of the experience gained in the battles of Khasan, Khalkhin Gol and the Karelian Isthmus, improvement of weapons and training of troops. There is an urgent need for an urgent revision of regulations and instructions in order to bring them into line with modern requirements of warfare... Particular attention was paid to artillery. In frosty weather in Finland, the semi-automatic mechanisms of the guns failed. When the temperature dropped sharply, there were interruptions in the firing of 150-mm howitzers. A lot of research work was required.”

Khrushchev said: “All of us - and first of all Stalin - felt in our victory the defeat inflicted on us by the Finns. It was a dangerous defeat, because it strengthened the confidence of our enemies that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay... We had to learn lessons for the near future from what happened.”

After Winter War the institution of political commissars was officially abolished and three years later general and other ranks with all their privileges were reintroduced in the Red Army.

For the Finns, the Winter War of 1939-1940, despite its ending in disaster, became a heroic and glorious page in history. Over the next 15 months, they had to exist in a “half-world” situation, until finally undisguised hatred of the Soviet Union prevailed over common sense. Matched by Russia's almost pathological suspicion of Finland. During this period, an impenetrable shroud of secrecy surrounded all government activities outside Finland; censorship deprived the population of the opportunity to receive information about what was happening outside the country's borders. People were convinced that Hitler was completing the defeat of Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was still a threat to their country.

The Finnish gratitude to Germany for its past assistance in their struggle for independence and for the much-needed supplies it offered played a significant role in Finland siding with Germany in the hope of regaining lost territories. After several warnings, Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941, but the two countries' armed forces did not have to meet on the battlefield. Formally, Finland was not an ally of Germany; The armies of Finland and Germany each fought under their own command, and there was virtually no cooperation between the armed forces of these countries.

Many Finnish soldiers lost their initial enthusiasm during the so-called "subsequent war", when the previous borders were restored. In September 1944, the war with Russia ended. The Finns rid their land of the presence of the Germans, but lost Karelia forever, as well as some other areas.

Russia's reparations for these wars were huge, but the Finns paid them. They stoically convinced themselves: “The East took our men, the Germans took our women, the Swedes took our children. But we still have our military debt.”

Finland's confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Winter War must remain among the most exciting events in history.

On November 30, 1939, the USSR launched a military operation against Finland, but this war became a stain of shame for the country. So, what were the grounds for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war.

Negotiations 1937-1939

The root of the Soviet-Finnish conflict was laid back in 1936. From that time on, the Soviet and Finnish parties conducted a dialogue about common cooperation and security, but Finland was categorical in its decisions and in every possible way rejected the attempts of the Soviet state to unite to jointly repel the enemy. On October 12, 1939, J.V. Stalin proposed that the Finnish state sign an agreement on mutual assistance. According to its provisions, the USSR presented demands for the lease of the Hanko Peninsula and islands on the territory of Finland, in exchange for part of the lands in Karelia, which far exceeded the territory to be exchanged to the Finnish side. Also, one of the conditions of the USSR was the placement of military bases in the Finnish border zone. The Finns categorically refused to comply with these points.

The main reason for the military clashes was the desire of the USSR to move the borders from Leningrad to the Finnish side and further strengthen them. Finland, in turn, refused to follow the request of the USSR, since on this territory there was the so-called “Mannerheim Line” - a defensive line built by Finland back in the 1920s to possibly deter the attack of the USSR. That is, if these lands were transferred, Finland would lose all its fortifications for strategic border protection. The Finnish leadership could not conclude an agreement with such requirements.
In this situation, Stalin decided to begin the military occupation of Finnish territories. On November 28, 1939, the unilateral denunciation (refusal) of the non-aggression agreements with Finland, concluded back in 1932, was announced.

The goals of the USSR's participation in the war

For the Soviet leadership, the main threat was that Finnish territories could be used as a platform for aggression against the Soviet Union by European states (most likely Germany). It was quite reasonable to move the Finnish borders further from Leningrad. However, Yu. M. Kilin (author of the book “Battles of the Winter War”) believes that moving the borders deeper into the Finnish side for the most part nothing would have prevented it, hostilities were inevitable. In turn, obtaining military bases on the Karelian Isthmus would make the position of the Soviet Union virtually invulnerable, but at the same time it would mean the loss of independence of Finland.

Objectives of Finland's participation in the war

The Finnish leadership could not agree to conditions under which they would lose their independence, so their goal was to protect the sovereignty of their state. According to some historians, Western states with the help of the Soviet-Finnish war, they achieved confrontation between two harsh totalitarian countries - fascist Germany and socialist USSR, in order to use them to weaken the pressure on France and England.

Maynila incident

The pretext for the start of the conflict was the so-called episode near the Finnish settlement of Mainila. On November 26, 1939, Finnish artillery shells fired at Soviet soldiers. The Finnish leadership completely rejected this fact, so that the USSR regiments were pushed back several kilometers from the border. The Soviet government could not allow this, and on November 29, the USSR interrupted diplomatic cooperation with Finland. At the end of the autumn of 1939, the participants in the conflict began large-scale combat maneuvers.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantages were on the side of the USSR, the Soviet army was well equipped military equipment(land, sea) and human resources. But the “Mannerheim Line” was impregnable for 1.5 months, and only on January 15 did Stalin order a massive counter-offensive of the army. Although the defensive line was broken, the Finnish army was not defeated. The Finns managed to maintain their independence.

On March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was adopted in the capital of the USSR, as a result of which a significant plot of land passed to the Soviets, respectively western border moved several kilometers towards Finland. But was it a victory? Why couldn’t a huge country with a large army resist the tiny Finnish army?
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR achieved its initial goals, but at what enormous cost? Numerous casualties, poor combat effectiveness of the army, low
the level of training and leadership - all this revealed the weakness and hopelessness of the armed forces, and showed its inability to fight. The shame of defeat in this war significantly undermined the international position of the Soviet Union, especially in front of Germany, which was already closely following it. In addition, on December 14, 1939, the USSR was removed from the League of Nations for starting a war with Finland.

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, course and results of the war are still considered very controversial. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the Karelian Isthmus region. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France, England and the United States tried to adhere to a position of non-interference in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a reason for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of its Western allies.

Reason and reasons for the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole complex of reasons related, first of all, to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

• During 1918-1922 The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts, an agreement on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border was signed in 1922; according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense, the leadership of both countries feared mutual territorial claims.
• Stalin regularly received information that Finland had signed secret agreements on support and assistance with the Baltic countries and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
• At the end of the 1930s, Stalin and his circle were also concerned about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to begin preparations for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would find itself in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to exchange part of the Karelian Isthmus for other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, in the area that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
• Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the Soviet Union leasing several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The USSR leadership planned to place its military bases in these territories.
• Soon the activity was banned in Finland communist party;
• Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression treaty and secret protocols to it, according to which Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement freed the hands of the Soviet leadership with regard to regulating the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was shelled from Finland. The Soviet border guards who were in the village at that time suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied any involvement in this act and did not want further development conflict. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the current situation and declared the start of war.

There is still no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both parties cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of anyone’s guilt. At the end of November, Finland advocated the creation of a general commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out, in the Soviet Union there was a full combat readiness The troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were brought in. A broad propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military personnel reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, they had 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two stages:

• November 1939 - January 1940: the USSR advanced in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
• February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, Finnish surrender and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

In the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Finnish Communist Party and an active participant in the Comintern. With Stalin's support, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began negotiations with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The Soviet 7th Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken through in the first ten days of 1939. The Soviet soldiers were unable to advance further. All attempts to break through the next lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance into the interior of the country.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result of which half of the army was destroyed. Finland's success was due, first of all, to the fact that Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile units, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated with casualties, but did not leave the region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland into two parts, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to encircle the division. The Red Army switched to a perimeter defense, repelling attacks by Finnish skiers. Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, and the main striking force of the Finns were almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer enormous human losses, and equipment also broke down. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help the encircled division, which also found itself surrounded by Finnish forces. Due to the fact that the two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division gradually began to fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and regained control of the state border in Central Karelia. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. Within a short period of time, the soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns surrounded the 54th rifle division(in the Suomussalmi area, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to escape from the encirclement, losing all her equipment and more than half her soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus became the zone of the most active military operations. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting here stopped. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of attacks on the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to take advantage of the lull in the war with maximum benefit and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in a difficult situation. She fought in unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory; moving forward was dangerous due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather made planning operations difficult. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the country's population had enormous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive artillery shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops, to exhaust the soldiers, and to break their morale. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army began an offensive into the interior of the country.

On the Karelian Isthmus began very brutal fighting. The Red Army first planned to deliver the main blow to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the USSR army began to get stuck on foreign territory, suffering losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhde. In the area of ​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass through the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw their troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed Mannerheim’s second line of defense, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat because they were in a difficult situation. Reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was its huge reserves of equipment, materiel, and replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities ceased, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• Vyborg was one of major cities country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
• After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. Based on the results of the discussion, the parties decided to cease hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that the Hanko Peninsula be given to him on a long-term lease.

• The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people killed, dying from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, and 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people killed, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
• The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - ensuring the security of Leningrad;
• The USSR strengthened its position on the Baltic coast, which was achieved through the acquisition of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
• The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, learning to break through fortified lines;
• In 1941, Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
• The destruction of the Mannerheim Line was fatal for the USSR, since Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and enter the territory of the Soviet Union;
• The war showed Germany that the Red Army was unfit for combat in difficult weather conditions. The same opinion was formed among the leaders of other countries;
• Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, had to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road was supposed to pass through the village of Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never implemented;
• On October 11, 1940, another agreement was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to establish a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
• The international organization League of Nations, created following the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the USSR intervention in Finland. The reasons for exclusion were also the constant aerial bombing of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during raids;

Thus, the Winter War became the reason for Germany and Finland to gradually move closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return lost territories.

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases. On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union's demands on Finland - the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9. For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen . On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.

At these negotiations, the proximity of the border to Leningrad was discussed for the first time. Joseph Stalin remarked: " We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it" The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked like this:

Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja (Finnish) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed a territorial exchange in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and Porajärvi. These were the territories that declared [ source not specified 656 days] independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty they remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted, and that one should not hope for German help. The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Teriokki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939. Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and from mid-September the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and Soviet consent to armament of the Åland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.

The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions [ source not specified 937 days ] .

Causes of the war

According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably be captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Leningrad City Council was also the border between the USSR and Finland.

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. The only constant in the demands was the following: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, two concepts emerged that are still being debated: one, that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second, that the true goal of the USSR was the Sovietization of Finland. M.I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war both countries had claims against each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. The USSR, in turn, knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to “return” Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland’s unilateral rapprochement with Western countries and, above all, with Germany, which Finland agreed to, in turn, because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhuvud said in Berlin in 1937 that “Russia’s enemy must always be Finland’s friend.” In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) it began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solutions

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, as part of the 7th Army, it was created special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) under the command of the corps commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a corps commander group V.D. Grendal(4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, and many were discovered. hidden pillboxes and bunkers, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day. Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy’s front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves. In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

Second period of the war: Assault on the Mannerheim Line. February 11 - March 12, 1940

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification site. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in Finnish army Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola. Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay , they set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km. By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one. Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13. Mannerheim Line(Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) - a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created. In addition to the Finnish territory in the Leningrad region, areas in the region of northern Karelia and the Rybachy Peninsula, as well as part of the islands of the Gulf of Finland and the Hanko region were transferred to the USSR. Territorial changes 1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build 2. fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. 3. Part of Lapland (Old Salla). 4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland. 5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island). 6. Lease of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years. Mannerheim Line - an alternative point of view Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify the long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the “incredibly strongly fortified” “Mannerheim Line” was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the glorification of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla (“On the Mannerheim Line”). It is believed that the Mannerheim Line consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located along the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other, and rarely had cannon armament.

6. Expansion of the western borders of the USSR in 1939-1941. Baltic countries. Bessarabia. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed. Attached to the non-aggression treaty was a secret additional protocol, which provided for “the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe.” The sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia. These documents radically changed both Soviet foreign policy and the situation in Europe. From now on, the Stalinist leadership turned into an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. The last obstacle to attacking Poland and thus starting World War II had been removed. In 1939, Germany in any case could not start a war against the USSR, since it did not have common borders on which it was possible to deploy troops and carry out an attack. Moreover, she was completely unprepared for a “big” war.

September 1, 1939 Hitler attacked Poland. The Second has begun World War.. On September 17, when the outcome of the battle in Poland was no longer in doubt, the Red Army occupied the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, which were part of this state.

On July 31, 1940, Hitler announced that the primary goal from now on was war with Russia, the outcome of which was to decide the fate of England. On December 18, 1940, the plan for an attack on the USSR (Barbarossa Plan) was signed. In deep secrecy, troops began to be transferred to the east. In 1939-1940. Stalin was concerned, first of all, with the annexation of the territories of Eastern Europe, assigned to him under secret agreements with Nazi Germany, into the USSR, and with further rapprochement with Hitler

On September 28, an agreement on friendship and borders with Germany and three secret protocols to it were signed. In these documents, the parties pledged to wage a joint fight against “Polish agitation” and clarified their spheres of influence. In exchange for Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship, the USSR received Lithuania. Based on these agreements, Stalin demanded that the Baltic states conclude agreements on mutual assistance and locate Soviet military bases on their territory. In September-October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to agree to this. On June 14-16, 1940, after the actual defeat of France by Nazi Germany, Stalin gave these Baltic states an ultimatum to introduce contingents of Soviet troops into their territories (to “ensure security”) and form new governments ready to “honestly” fulfill treaties concluded with the USSR. Within a few days, “people’s governments” were created in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, with the help of local communists, established Soviet power in the Baltic states. At the end of June 1940 Stalin achieved the return of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania in 1918. Then in June 1940, at the request of the USSR, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, occupied by Romania in 1918, were returned to him. In August 1940, the Moldavian SSR was formed, into which Bessarabia entered, and Northern Bukovina was included in the Ukrainian SSR. As a result of all the mentioned territorial acquisitions, the borders of the USSR were moved west by 200-300 km, and the country's population increased by 23 million people.

7.German attack on the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Activities of the Soviet government during the initial period of the war.

On June 22, at 3:30 a.m., the German army began its powerful invasion along the entire border of our country from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. The Patriotic War broke out. The aggressor's invasion was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars opened fire on border outposts, troop areas, headquarters, communications centers, and defensive structures. Enemy aircraft struck the first blow across the entire border strip. Murmansk, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir were subjected to massive aerial bombing; naval bases (Kronstadt, Izmail, Sevastopol). In order to paralyze the control of Soviet troops, saboteurs were dropped by parachute. The most powerful attacks were carried out on airfields, since air supremacy was the main task of the German Air Force. Due to crowded deployment of units, Soviet aviation in the border districts lost about 1,200 aircraft on the first day of the war. In addition, front-line and army aviation were given an order: not to fly over borders under any circumstances, to destroy the enemy only over their territory, to keep aircraft in constant readiness to withdraw from attack. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

The sudden invasion of Germany into the territory of the USSR required quick and precise action from the Soviet government. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the mobilization of forces to repel the enemy. On the day of the fascist attack, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918. birth. In a matter of hours, detachments and units were formed. Soon the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council

The People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution approving the mobilization national economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941, which provided for an increase in the production of military equipment and the creation of large tank-building enterprises in the Volga region and the Urals. Circumstances forced the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the beginning of the war to develop a detailed program for restructuring the activities and life of the Soviet country on a military basis, which was set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The slogan “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” became the motto of the life of Soviet people. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Party called on the people to renounce their mood and personal desires, go over to a sacred and merciless fight against the enemy, fight to the last drop of blood, rebuild the national economy on a war footing, and increase the output of military products. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, and disrupt all their activities.” Among other things, local conversations were held with the population. The nature and political goals of the outbreak of the Patriotic War were explained. The main provisions of the directive of June 29 were outlined in a radio speech on July 3, 1941 by J.V. Stalin. Addressing the people, he explained the current situation at the front, revealed the program for defending the goals that had already been achieved, and expressed unshakable faith in the victory of the Soviet people against the German occupiers.” Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are rising to war against the attacking enemy. The millions of our people will rise up.” On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed for strategic leadership of military operations. Later it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC), headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Stalin, who was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and then Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Military victory over Nazi Germany and its allies would have been impossible without victory on the front of economic confrontation with the aggressor. Germany began to surpass the USSR in total industrial production by three to four times. An Operational Bureau for monitoring the implementation of military orders, an evacuation council, a transport committee and other permanent or temporary working bodies were established under the State Defense Committee. The powers of local representatives of the State Defense Committee were, if necessary, received by the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, regional committees, leading economic and scientific workers.

From the first days of hostilities, four main lines for creating a coherent military economy were determined

Evacuation of industrial enterprises, material assets and people from the front-line zone to the east.

The transition of thousands of factories in the civilian sector to the production of military equipment and other defense products.

Accelerated construction of new industrial facilities capable of replacing those lost in the first months of the war, establishment of a system of cooperation and transport communications between and within individual industries, disrupted as a result of the unprecedented scale of movement of productive forces to the east.

Reliable supply of the national economy, especially industry, with workers in new emergency conditions.

8. Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

The reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war were not only that the Soviet troops, attacked suddenly, were forced to engage in heavy battles without proper strategic deployment, that many of them were understaffed to wartime levels, had limited material and vehicles and communications, often operated without air and artillery support. The damage suffered by our troops in the first days of the war also had a negative impact, but it cannot be overestimated, since in fact only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering army were attacked by the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of three fronts - Western, North-Western and South-Western - emerged later, during counter-fighting on June 23-30, 1941 between the new and old borders. The entire course of border battles showed that our troops at all levels - from the Headquarters of the Main Command to the tactical level command staff - were for the most part not prepared not only for the first, unexpected attacks of German troops, but also for war in general. The Red Army had to master the skills of modern warfare during battles, while suffering enormous losses in manpower and military equipment. The deficiencies in the combat readiness of our troops, revealed at Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish War, were not and could not be eliminated in a short time. The army grew quantitatively, but to the detriment of the quality of training, and especially of officers and non-commissioned officers. The main emphasis in combat training was on the infantry: the training of armored forces and aviation was not given due attention, and therefore our troops could not become a striking force like the Wehrmacht, mainly due to a lack of personnel, professional command staff and headquarters. Our troops were unable to realize the technical and human potential that exceeded the potential of the aggressor at the beginning of the war. The disruption of constant communication between troops and headquarters deprived the command, right up to the General Staff and Headquarters, of the opportunity to receive regular information about the state of affairs at the front. The order of the Headquarters to hold occupied lines at all costs, even in the conditions of a deep flanking bypass of the enemy, often became the reason for exposing entire groups of Soviet troops to enemy attacks, which forced heavy fighting in the encirclement, entailed large losses in men and military equipment, and increased panic in the troops. A significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have the necessary military and combat experience. Headquarters also lacked the necessary experience, hence the most serious miscalculations at the very beginning of the war. The more successful the campaign to the east developed, the more boastful the statements of the German command became. Noting the steadfastness of the Russian soldier, they, however, did not consider him as a decisive factor in the war. They considered their main success, in accordance with the “Blitzkrieg” plan, to be the rapid advance of German troops, the capture of vast territories and trophies, and huge human losses. losses. The resilience of the Russian warrior was demonstrated during the defense of the Brest Fortress. The heroism of the defenders of the fortress will appear even more obvious if we consider that the German troops had superiority in experience, manpower and technology, while our fighters did not have a harsh and long school of war behind them, were cut off from their units and mandates, experienced an acute shortage of water and food, ammunition, and medicine. And yet we continued to fight the enemy.

The Red Army was not prepared for the conditions of modern industrial war - the war of engines. This is the main reason for its defeats in the initial period of hostilities.

9. The situation on the fronts of the Soviet Union in June 1941. – November 1942 Moscow battle. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commanded by General M. Popov), and the Southern Front (commanded by General I. Tyulenev) was formed from the 9th and 18th armies. On June 23, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

On June 22 at 7:15 a.m., the Main Military Council issued a directive to Soviet troops to begin active military operations. When it was received at the front headquarters, the first echelon divisions were already drawn into defensive battles, but the tank and motorized formations were not ready to deliver a quick powerful strike due to the great distance from the border. By the end of the first day of the war, a difficult situation had arisen at the junction of the North-Western and Western fronts, on the left wing of the Western Front. The corps and division commanders could not act on the situation, since they had no data on the number of forces and military actions enemy. There was no constant relationship between the units, no one knew anything about the true losses, it was assumed that the troops raised on alert would be sufficiently combat-ready. But by the end of the day on June 22, under enemy attacks, our units were thrown back from state border approximately 40 km. As a result, in just two days from big losses In manpower and equipment, the troops moved 100 km from the border. A similar situation was observed in other sectors of the front. The operational results of the counterattacks, despite the selfless actions of our soldiers, were insignificant, and the losses incurred were incredibly large. At best, individual formations of the Western Front managed to delay the enemy's offensive only for a short time. After successful breakthroughs of the border defenses in the Western Front, enemy tank groups, with the support of large air forces, managed to complete the encirclement and defeat of the backbone of the Western Front's troops by July 9. As a result, 323 thousand people were in German captivity in the Bialystok-Minsk region, and the casualties of the troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla amounted to 418 thousand people. However, the main Wehrmacht group suffered significant damage, and the pace of its advance on Smolensk and Moscow was slowed down. Having suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, the troops of the Northwestern Front were unable to organize a stable defense either on the right bank of the Western Dvina or at the last major defensive line near Pskov - the Velikaya River. Pskov was captured by the Nazis on July 9, which resulted in a real danger of their breakthrough to Luga and further to Leningrad, but the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the large Kra Ar forces in this direction. A more favorable situation developed on the South-Western Front. Despite enormous difficulties, the command managed to pull up large forces in the direction of the enemy’s main attack and bring them into battle in a fairly organized manner, although not simultaneously. On June 23, in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area, the largest outbreak of the war unfolded in the entire initial period of the war. tank battle. Here the enemy was not only detained for a whole week, but also his plan to encircle the main forces of the front in the Lvov salient was thwarted. Enemy aircraft carried out air strikes simultaneously on the front line and the outback. The bombing was carried out methodically and clearly, which greatly exhausted the Soviet troops. The power of the enemy suppressed the hearts, desertion from the battlefield, self-mutilation, and sometimes suicide took place. By the end of June, it became obvious that the troops of the South-Western, as well as other fronts, were unable to defeat the intervening enemy group. Enemy aircraft firmly maintained air supremacy. Our aviation suffered serious damage; The mechanized corps suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks. The results of military operations on the Soviet-German front were catastrophic for the Red Army. During the three weeks of the war, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova were abandoned. German army During this period, it advanced into the interior of the country in the northwestern direction by 450-500 km, in the western direction by 450-600 km, and in the southwestern direction by 300-350 km. The hastily withdrawn strategic reserves of the High Command were only able to detain the enemy for the shortest possible time in certain sectors of the front, but did not eliminate the threat of his breakthrough to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. Moscow battle. On September 6, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive to attack Moscow. The main focus in it was on tank formations and aviation. Particular attention was paid to the secrecy of the preparation of the operation. Initially, it was planned to defeat Soviet troops in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, then, pursuing the formations of the Western Front retreating to Moscow in the zone from the upper Volga to the Oka, to capture the capital. The general offensive on Moscow began on September 30 with a strike from the enemy’s 2nd Tank Army on the left wing Bryansk Front in the Shostka region, and on October 2, the main forces of the Germans attacked the positions of the Western Front troops. The fight immediately became fierce. As a result of the breakthrough of the defenses in the sector of the 43rd Army and in the center of the Western Front, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Soviet troops. An attempt to withdraw the army from the attack failed due to the rapid advance of the enemy's motorized corps, which cut off the escape route. On October 7, the Germans in the Vyazma area completed the encirclement of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies. Heavy fighting broke out in the Bryansk Front. On October 3, the Germans broke into Orel and, moving along the Orel-Tula highway, occupied Karachev and Bryansk on October 6. The armies of the Bryansk Front were cut into pieces, and their escape routes were intercepted. Units of the 3rd, 13th, and 50th armies fell into the cauldron near Bryansk. Tens of thousands, including volunteers of the people's militia divisions, died on the battlefield. Among the main reasons for the disaster of this period are the enemy's superiority in technology, maneuverability of troops, air supremacy, possession of the initiative, blunders of the headquarters and front command in organizing defense Lack of a continuous line defense in the western direction and the necessary reserves to close the gap created a real threat of the appearance of enemy tanks near Moscow. The current situation required tough measures to control troops at all command levels, Soviet command During this time, it was possible to carry out urgent measures to organize defense on the Mozhaisk line, which the GKO, in the current situation, chose as the main bridgehead of resistance. To concentrate troops covering the approaches to Moscow and for clearer control, the Headquarters transferred the armies of the Reserve Front to the Western Front. The command was entrusted to G. Zhukov. Combat-ready formations transferred to Moscow from the Far East and Central Asia, as well as reserve formations from the European part of the country, were hastily moving towards the front, but were still at a considerable distance. Zhukov, having only insignificant reserves at his disposal, built his defenses in such a way that the most vulnerable areas along highways and railways were covered, hoping that as he moved towards Moscow his forces would become denser, since the capital is a major transport hub. By October 13, the troops of the Western Front deployed on the following approaches to Moscow: Volokolamsk fortified area - 16th Army (commander K. Rokossovsky), Mozhaisky - 5th Army (commander L. Govorov), Maloyaroslavetsky - 43rd Army (commander K. Golubev ), Kaluga -49 army (commander I. Zakharkin). To strengthen the immediate approaches to the capital, another line was created, which also included the city defense line. Particularly fierce fighting broke out in the Moscow direction on October 13-18. The Nazis were rushing towards Moscow with all their might. On October 18, they took Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Tarusa, and there was a threat of their reaching Moscow. On the morning of October 17, volunteer formations began to take up defensive positions on the immediate approaches to the capital. The fighter battalions created in July, which had previously patrolled the city, also moved here. Moscow enterprises switched to working in three shifts; The labor of women and teenagers began to be used increasingly. On October 15, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree “On the evacuation of the capital of the USSR, Moscow,” according to which part of the party and government institutions and the entire diplomatic corps accredited to the Soviet government were transferred to Kuibyshev. Alarming rumors about the surrender of the capital began to spread, and thousands of residents began to leave the city. The situation was aggravated by the lack of reliable information about events at the front. On October 19, the State Defense Committee adopted a decree introducing a state of siege in Moscow and its surrounding areas. The defense of the capital on lines located 100-120 km west of Moscow is entrusted to G. Zhukov. On November 15-16, the enemy resumed the attack on Moscow. The balance of power was still unequal. German troops tried to bypass Moscow from the north - through Klin and Solnechnogorsk, from the south through Tula and Kashira. Bloody battles ensued. On the night of November 28, the Germans crossed the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma area, but their further advance on this section of the front was thwarted. According to von Bock, the command of Army Group Center saw the further offensive on Moscow as “having neither purpose nor meaning, since the moment when the group’s forces would be completely exhausted was approaching very close.” The end of November - beginning of December 1941 became the culmination of the battle: it was by this time that the Germans' miscalculations exceeded a critical level; for the first time in the entire war the enemy was faced with the fact of his powerlessness before the enemy; huge losses ground forces had an overwhelming effect on him. At the beginning of December, about 47 divisions of Army Group Center, while continuing to rush towards Moscow, could not withstand the counterattacks of the Soviet troops and went on the defensive. Only on December 8, having received reports from the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 2nd Panzer Armies about the intensification of the Red Army's attacks, Hitler gave the order for strategic defense on the entire Eastern Front. By the beginning of December, the enemy on the immediate approaches to the capital was completely stopped. In the Moscow direction, the reserve armies of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts advanced to the areas of upcoming operations, thanks to which it was possible to create a new strategic grouping, larger in composition than the previous one, which began defensive operations near Moscow. Simultaneously with the counteroffensive, our troops conducted active military operations southeast of Lenin and in the Crimea, which deprived the Germans of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to their troops near Moscow. at dawn on December 5, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (commander I. Konev) delivered a powerful blow to the enemy, and the next morning the strike groups of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern (commander S. Timoshenko) fronts launched a counter-offensive. At the beginning of February 1942, the Western Front reached the Naro-Fominsk - Maloyaroslavets line, then west of Kaluga to Sukhinichi and Belev.

This was the first major offensive operation of strategic importance, as a result of which enemy strike groups were thrown back 100, and in some places - 250 km west of the capital. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated and Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire line of the Western direction. The plan of Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” was thwarted, and during the war a turn in favor of the USSR began.

10. Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance.

The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. As part of this strategic operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943), the November encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group (Uran), Kotelnikovskaya and Middle Don ( “Little Saturn”) operations that deprived the enemy of the opportunity to support the group encircled at Stalingrad from the west and weakened its offensive from the south, as well as Operation “Ring” to eliminate the enemy group that was surrounded in Stalingrad itself.

The decision to launch a counteroffensive was made by the Headquarters in mid-September 1942 after an exchange of views between I. Stalin, G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The military’s plan was to defeat the enemy in a 400-kilometer zone in the Stalingrad area, wrest the initiative from him and create conditions for conducting offensive operations on the southern wing,

The operation was entrusted to the troops of the newly formed Southwestern Front (commander N. Vatutin), Don and Stalingrad (commanders K. Rokossovsky and A. Eremenko). In addition, long-range aviation units, the 6th Army and the 2nd Air Army of the neighboring Voronezh Front (front commander F. Golikov), and the Volga Military Flotilla were involved here. The success of the operation largely depended on the surprise and thoroughness of the preparation of the strike; all events were carried out in the strictest secrecy. Headquarters entrusted the leadership of the counteroffensive to G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The Soviet command managed to create powerful groups superior to the enemy in the direction of the main attacks.

The offensive of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began at 7:30 a.m. on November 19, 1942. Heavy fog and snowfall that day prevented the departure of Soviet attack aircraft, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. And yet, on the very first day, the enemy’s defense was broken through. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. His tank and mechanized corps, without getting involved in battles for populated areas and skillfully maneuvering, moved forward. Panic began in the enemy camp. On November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kalach and Sovetsky. Units of the enemy's 6th field and 4th tank armies with a total number of 330 thousand people. were surrounded. The same fate befell the Romanian group of troops. In parallel with the internal one, the external encirclement of the enemy was also envisaged. It was clear that the enemy would try to break out of the “cauldron.” Therefore, the Headquarters ordered the Don and Stalingrad fronts, in cooperation with aviation, to eliminate the enemy group, and the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts to push the encirclement line to the west by about 150-200 km. Initially, the idea of ​​​​Operation Saturn boiled down to the delivery of attacks by the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts in converging directions: one to the south in the direction of Rostov, the other from east to west in the direction of Likhaya. To unblock the ring, the German command created from tank corps , a number of infantry and remnants of cavalry divisions of the Gotha shock group. On December 12, it went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovsky area along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway and on December 19, overcoming the fierce resistance of the few Soviet troops in this direction, it reached the line of the Myshkova River. On December 16, 1942, Operation Little Saturn began. As a result of 3 days of fierce fighting, troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh front broke through the heavily fortified enemy defenses in several directions and crossed the Don and Bogucharka with battles. In order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold, it was decided not to slow down the pace of the offensive, strengthening the troops of the Southwestern Front at the expense of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, especially tank and mechanized formations. The offensive was carried out in harsh winter conditions, it was difficult, however, the 24th Tank Corps under the command of V. Badanov advanced 240 km in depth in five days, smashing the rear of the 8th Italian Army, and on December 24, with a surprise attack, took Tatsinskai station, destroying the airfield and capturing over 300 enemy aircraft as trophies. The most important communication line between Likhai and Stalingrad, along which the German command was concentrating the troops of the Hollidt group and supplying them with everything necessary for combat operations, was interrupted. The advance of the Goth group was put to an end. The Germans began to strengthen their positions in particularly threatened areas of the front. But by the end of December, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of about 200 km and firmly established themselves on new frontiers. As a result, the main forces of the Hollidt task force, the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies were defeated. The position of the German troops at Stalingrad became hopeless. The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was Operation Ring. According to Rokossovsky, her plan provided for the defeat of the enemy in the western and southern parts of the encirclement, followed by the dissection of the enemy group into two parts and their liquidation separately. The difficulty of completing the task was due to the fact that the necessary reserves were transferred by the Headquarters to other fronts, as required by the actual situation. surrounded by troops - was thwarted. Despite enormous hardships, the German side rejected the Soviet command’s offer of surrender; on January 10, our troops launched a round-the-clock offensive and on the morning of January 15 captured the Pitomnik airfield. On January 31, 1943, the southern enemy group surrendered, and on February 2, the northern group of the enemy. During three operations - "Uranus", "Little Saturn" and "Ring" - 2 German, 2 Romanian and 1 Italian armies were defeated. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. Three days of mourning were declared in the country. Faith in victory was undermined, defeatist sentiments gripped wide sections of the population. The morale of the German soldier fell, he became increasingly afraid of being surrounded, and believed less and less in victory. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep military-political crisis in the fascist coalition. Italy, Romania, and Hungary faced serious difficulties associated with large losses at the front, a drop in the combat effectiveness of troops, and growing discontent among the masses. The victory at Stalingrad seriously influenced the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA. Both sides were well aware that the Red Army could achieve a decisive turning point in the war and defeat the Germans before the Allies transferred troops to Western France. Since the spring of 1943, the American General Staff, taking into account the changing military situation, began to instruct F. Roosevelt that the United States, in the event of the defeat of Germany, should have a large military contingent in Great Britain. The victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on its further course. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end. The people believed in the final victory over fascism, although it came at the cost of heavy losses.

10.Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive at Stalingrad November 19, 1942 Military and international significance. The radical turning point in the war came at Staling. In this large industrial center, named after the leader, German motorized groups of troops met the most fierce resistance, which had never been seen before, even in this brutal war of “total annihilation.” If the city could not withstand the onslaught and fell, then the German troops could cross the Volga, and this, in turn, would allow them to completely surround Mos and Lenin, after which Sov. the union would inevitably have turned into a truncated northern Asian state, pushed beyond the Ural Mountains. But Sta did not fall. Soviet troops defended their positions, proving their ability to fight in small units. Sometimes the territory they controlled was so small that German aircraft and artillery were afraid to bombard the city for fear of causing damage to their own troops. Street fighting prevented the Wehrmacht from using its usual advantages. Tanks and other equipment in narrow streets got stuck and turned into a good target for Soviet soldiers. In addition, the German troops were now fighting in conditions of extreme overstrain of resources, which were supplied to them only by one railway line and by air. The battles for the city exhausted and bled the enemy, creating the conditions for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive. In the offensive operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad, two stages were envisaged: in the first it was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and create a strong encirclement ring, in the second - to destroy the encircled fascist troops if they did not accept the ultimatum to surrender. For this, the forces of three fronts were involved: the Southwestern (commander - General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Staling (General A.I. Eremenko). The equipment of Kra Ar with new military equipment was accelerated. To its superiority over the enemy in tanks, achieved in the spring of 1942, at the end of the year was added a predominance in guns, mortars, and aircraft. The counterattack began on November 19, 1942, and five days later the advanced units of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in, encircling more than 330 thousand German soldiers and officers. On January 10, Soviet troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky began to eliminate the group blocked in the Steel area. On February 2, its remnants surrendered. More than 90 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 24 generals led by Field General F. Paulus. As a result of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the Nazi 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army, the 3rd and 4th Armies and the 8th Italian Army were defeated. During the Battle of Steel, which lasted 200 days and nights, the fascist bloc lost 25% of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front. The victory at Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. She made a huge contribution to achieving a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire war. As a result of Stalin's battle, the armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and retained it until the end of the war. The outstanding significance of the Stalin battle was highly appreciated by the USSR's allies in the war with Germany. Prime Minister Great W. Churchill in November 1943, at the conference of leaders of the Allied powers in Tehran, handed over to the Soviet delegation an honorary sword - a gift from King George VI to the citizens of Stal in commemoration of the victory over the fascist invaders. In May 1944, US President Franklin Roosevelt, on behalf of the American people, sent a letter to Stalin. By this time, Soviet industry had established the production of a sufficient number of tanks and other weapons of various types, and did this with unprecedented success and in huge quantities. The battle and the victory of the Soviet troops in it contributed to the liberation of most of the North Caucasus, Rzhev, Voronezh, Kursk were liberated , most of Donbass.

11.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1943. Battle of Kursk . Crossing of the Dnieper. Tehran Conference. The question of opening a second front. In preparation for the summer campaign, Nazi strategists concentrated their attention on the Kursk Bulge. This was the name given to the protrusion of the front line facing west. It was defended by troops of two fronts: Central (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (General N.F. Vatutin). It was here that Hitler intended to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Two powerful tank wedges were supposed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops at the base of the ledge, encircle them and create a threat to Moscow. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having received timely information from intelligence about the planned offensive, was well prepared for defense and response actions. When the Wehrmacht attacked the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, the Red Army managed to withstand it, and seven days later launched a strategic offensive along a front of 2 thousand km. The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to July 23, 1943, and victory in it, Soviet troops had enormous military and political significance. It became the most important stage on the path to the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany. More than 4 million people took part in the battles on both sides. 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. In this battle, the offensive strategy of the German armed forces finally collapsed. The victory at Kursk and the subsequent advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts of the Second World War, which had a huge impact on its course. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the Resistance movement in the countries occupied by the Nazis became increasingly active. By this time, all the resources of the Soviet state were mobilized as fully as could be done in war conditions. By government decree of February 1942, the entire working population of the country was mobilized for military purposes. People worked 55 hours a week, with only one day off a month, and sometimes no days off at all, sleeping on the floor of the workshop. As a result of the successful mobilization of all resources, by mid-1943, Soviet industry was already far superior to German, which, moreover, was partially destroyed by aerial bombing. In areas where industry was still weak, shortages were made up by constant supplies from Great Britain and the United States under the Lend-Lease agreement. The Soviet Union received a significant amount of tractors, trucks, car tires, explosive materials, field telephones, telephone wires, and food products. This superiority allowed the Red Army to confidently conduct combined military operations in the same spirit as the German troops were able to do at the initial stage of the war. In August 1943, Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov were liberated, and in September, Smolensk. At the same time, the crossing of the Dnieper began; in November, Soviet units entered the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and by the end of the year they had advanced far to the west. By mid-December 1943, Soviet troops liberated part of the Kalinin, all of Smolensk regions, part of the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Gomel regions; crossed the Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Pripyat, and Berezina rivers and reached Polesie. By the end of 1943, Soviet troops liberated about 50% of the territory occupied by the enemy. The partisans caused great damage to the enemy. In 1943, the partisans carried out major operations to destroy communication lines under the code names “Rail War” and “Concert”. In total, during the war, over 1 million partisans operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the victories of the Red Army, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its role in resolving the most important issues of world politics increased immeasurably. This was also evident at the Tehran Conference of 1943, where the leaders of the three powers - the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain - agreed on plans and deadlines for joint actions to defeat the enemy, as well as agreements on the opening of a second front in Europe during May 1944. The Tehran Conference took place in the capital of Iran on November 28 – December 1, 1943. One of the main topics of the conference was the question of opening a second front. By this time, a radical change had occurred on the eastern front. The Red Army went on the offensive, and the Allies saw the real prospect of the emergence Soviet soldier in the heart of Europe, which was not at all part of their plans. This especially irritated the leader of Great Britain, who did not believe in the possibility of cooperation with Soviet Russia. At the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to open a second front, although resolving this issue was not easy for them. Churchill tried to convince the Allies of the extreme importance of military operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin, on the contrary, demanded the opening of a second front in Western Europe. In choosing the direction of the main attack of the allied forces, Stalin found support from Roosevelt. The political and military leadership of England and the USA agreed to open a second front in the spring of 1944 in Normandy. Stalin promised to launch a powerful offensive operation on the eastern front by this time. The Big Three also discussed future borders in Europe. The most painful question was Polish. Stalin proposed moving the Polish border west, to the Oder. The Soviet-Polish border was supposed to run along the line established in 1939. At the same time, Stalin announced Moscow's claims to Konigsberg and new borders with Finland. The Allies decided to agree to Moscow's territorial demands. Stalin, in turn, promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany signed the act of surrender. The Big Three were discussing the future of Germany, which was generally agreed to be divided. However, no concrete decision was made, since each side had its own view on the future borders of the German lands. Starting from the Tehran Conference, the issue of borders in Europe became the most important for all subsequent meetings. Implementing the decisions of the Tehran Conference, with some delay, on June 6, 1944, the Allied landing in Normandy began (Operation Overlord) with simultaneous support for the Allied landing in the south of France ( Operation Dragoon). On August 25, 1944, they liberated Paris. At the same time, the offensive of Soviet troops, launched along the entire front, continued in northwestern Russia, Finland, and Belarus. The joint actions of the allies confirmed the effectiveness of the coalition and led to the collapse of the fascist bloc in Europe. Particular attention should be paid to the interaction of the allies during the Ardennes counter-offensive of Germany (December 16, 1944 - January 26, 1945), when Soviet troops launched an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians earlier than planned (January 12, 1945), at the request of the allies, thereby saving Anglo-American troops from defeat in the Ardennes. It should be noted that in 1944-1945. The Eastern Front continued to be the main one, with 150 German divisions operating against 71 divisions and 3 brigades on the Western Front and 22 divisions in Italy.

12.Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1944-May 1945. Crimean (Yalta) conference. The third period of the Great Patriotic War - the defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, liberation from the occupation of European countries - began in January 1944. This year was marked by a series of new grandiose and victorious operations of the Red Army. In January, the offensive of the Leningrad (General L. A. Govorov) and Volkhov (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts began, finally lifting the blockade of heroic Leningrad. In February-March, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian (General N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd Ukrainian (General I.S. Konev) fronts, having defeated Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya and a number of other powerful enemy groups, reached the border with Romania. In the summer, major victories were won in three strategic directions at once. As a result of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, the forces of the Leningrad (Marshal L. A. Govorov) and Karelian (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts drove the Finnish units out of Karelia. Finland stopped hostilities on the side of Germany, and in September the USSR signed an armistice agreement with it. In June - August, troops of four fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic) under the command of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, and I.Kh. Bagramyan expelled the enemy from the territory of Belarus during Operation Bagration. In August, the 2nd Ukrainian (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and 3rd Ukrainian (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts, having carried out a joint Iasi-Kishinev operation, liberated Moldova. In early autumn, German troops retreated from Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Baltic states. Finally, in October, a German group on the extreme northern section of the Soviet-German front was defeated by a strike on Pechenga. The state border of the USSR was restored all the way from the Barents to the Black Sea. In general, the Soviet armed forces in 1944 carried out about 50 offensive operations that had enormous military and political significance. As a result, the main groups of Nazi troops were defeated. In the summer and autumn of 1944 alone, the enemy lost 1.6 million people. Nazi Germany lost almost all of its European allies, the front approached its borders, and in East Prussia stepped over them. With the opening of the second front, Germany's military-strategic position worsened. However, Hitler's leadership launched a large-scale offensive in the Ardennes (Western Europe). As a result of the German offensive, the Anglo-American troops found themselves in a difficult situation. In this regard, at the request of Winston Churchill, Soviet troops in January 1945 went on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front earlier than planned. The offensive of the Red Army was so powerful that already at the beginning of February its separate formations reached the approaches to Berlin. In January - the first half of April 1945, Soviet troops carried out the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Vienna, East Pomeranian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations. The student needs to talk about the liberation campaign of the Red Army - the liberation of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The final strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War was the Berlin operation, carried out by the Red Army on April 16 - May 8, 1945. In the spring of 1945, On the territory of Germany, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France conducted military operations. During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions, most of the aviation, and captured about 480 thousand people. On May 8, 1945, in Karlhorst (a suburb of Berlin), an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was signed. With the surrender of Germany, the war in Europe ended, but the war with Japan in the Far East and the Pacific, waged by the USA, Great Britain and their allies, continued . Having fulfilled its allied obligations adopted at the Crimean Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. The Manchurian strategic offensive operation lasted from August 9 to September 2, 1945. Its goals were the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army, the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea, and the elimination of the bridgehead of aggression and the military-economic base of Japan on the Asian continent. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, Japanese representatives signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, which led to the end of World War II. The southern part of Sakhalin and the islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to the Soviet Union. His sphere of influence extended to North Korea and China. Successful actions in 1944 led to the need to convene a new Allied conference on the eve of Germany's surrender. The Yalta (Crimean) Conference, held on February 4-11, resolved issues primarily related to the post-war structure of Europe. An agreement was reached on the occupation of Germany, its demilitarization, denazification and demonopolization, and on German reparations. It was decided to create four occupation zones on German territory and create a special control body of the commanders-in-chief of the three powers, headquartered in Berlin. In addition to the three great powers, France was also invited to occupy and rule Germany. However, having made this decision, the parties did not stipulate procedural issues and did not define the boundaries of these zones. The Soviet delegation initiated a discussion of the reparation issue, proposing two forms: removal of equipment and annual payments. Roosevelt supported Stalin, who proposed determining the total amount of reparations at 20 billion dollars, of which 50% was to be paid to the Soviet Union. The focus of the conference participants was again on the Polish issue. The borders of Poland, according to the decisions of the conference, ran in the east along the “Curzon Line” with compensation for territorial losses by gains in the northwest at the expense of Germany. This secured the accession of Western Belarus and Ukraine to the USSR. The conference participants discussed a number of issues related to other European countries. Stalin agreed to Anglo-American influence in Italy and British influence in Greece. Despite the fact that London and Washington were not satisfied with the position of the Soviet Union on Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, where Moscow acted virtually independently, they were forced to agree to resolve these issues in the future through normal diplomatic channels. De facto, Eastern Europe was coming under Soviet influence. It is this result of the Yalta conference that many American researchers cannot forgive Roosevelt, although the decisions made at Yalta were the result of a compromise.

13.The entry of the USSR into the war with Japan. Strategic operations of the Red Army. End of World War II. In the spring of 1945, the redeployment of troops of the USSR and its allies began to the Far East. The forces of the United States and England were quite sufficient to defeat Japan. But the political leadership of these countries, fearing possible losses, insisted on the USSR entering the war on Dal Vos. The S Arm had the goal of destroying the striking force of the Japanese - the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria and Korea and numbering about a million people. In accordance with its allied duty, on April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of 1941 and on August 8 declared war on Japan. On August 9, a group of Soviet troops consisting of Transbaikal (commander - Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky), 1st (commander - Marshal K.A. Meretskov) and 2nd (coma - General M.A. Purkaev) Far Front, as well as the Quiet Fleet (commander - Admiral I.S. Yumashev) and Amur military flotilla (commander - counter- Admiral N.V. Antonov), numbering 1.8 million people, launched military operations. For strategic leadership of the armed struggle, on July 30, the Main Command of the Soviet troops on Da Vo was created, headed by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. The offensive of the Soviet fronts developed quickly and successfully. During 23 days of stubborn battles on a front stretching over 5 thousand km, Soviet troops and naval forces, successfully advancing during the Manchurian, South Sahal and Kuril landing operations, liberated Northeast China, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands -va. Along with Soviet troops, soldiers of the Mongolian Empire also took part in the war with Japan. people's army. Soviet troops captured about 600 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and many weapons and equipment were captured. The enemy's losses were almost twice as high as those suffered by the Soviet army. The USSR's entry into the war finally broke Japanese resistance. On August 14, its government decided to ask for surrender. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on board the American battleship Missouri, representatives of Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. This meant the end of the Second World War. The victory of the USSR and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition over the Nazi Germany and Militia Japan in the Second World War was of world-historical significance and had a huge impact on the entire post-war development of mankind. Fatherland was its most important component. The Soviet Voore Forces defended the freedom and independence of the Motherland, participated in the liberation of the peoples of 11 European countries from fascist oppression, and expelled the Japanese occupiers from Northeast China and Korea. During the four-year armed struggle (1,418 days and nights) on the Soviet-German front, the main forces of the fascist bloc were defeated and captured: 607 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies. In the battles with the Soviet Armed Forces, Nazi Germany lost over 10 million people (80% of all military losses), over 75% of all military equipment. In the fierce battle with fascism, the question was about life and death of the Slavic peoples. At the cost of a colossal effort, the Russian people, in alliance with all other large and small nations of the USSR, were able to defeat the enemy. However, the cost of the victory of the Soviet people over fascism was enormous. More than 29 million people passed through the war in the ranks of the Sov Vooru Forces. The war claimed over 27 million lives of our fellow citizens, including military losses amounting to 8,668,400 people. The ratio of losses between Kra Ar and the Wehrmacht is determined as 1.3: 1. About 4 million partisans and underground fighters died behind enemy lines and in the occupied territories. About 6 million Soviet citizens found themselves in fascist captivity. The USSR lost 30% of its national wealth. The occupiers destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and towns, over 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 98 thousand collective farms and 2 thousand state farms, 6 thousand hospitals, 82 thousand schools, 334 universities,

14.Culture during the Great Patriotic War . From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, all the achievements of national culture, science and technology were put into the service of victory and defense of the Motherland. The country was turning into a single combat camp. All spheres of culture had to be subordinated to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Cultural figures fought with weapons in their hands on the war fronts, worked in the front-line press and propaganda brigades. Representatives of all cultural trends made their contribution to the victory. Many of them gave their lives for their homeland, for victory. This was an unprecedented social and spiritual upsurge of the entire people. (See additional illustrative material.) The war with Nazi Germany required a restructuring of all spheres of society, including culture. At the first stage of the war, the main efforts were aimed at explaining the nature of the war and the goals of the USSR in it. Preference was given to operational forms of cultural work, such as radio, cinematography, and print. From the first days of the war, the importance of mass information, mainly radio, increased. Information Bureau reports were broadcast 18 times a day in 70 languages. Using the experience of political education during the civil war - "Windows of GROWTH", they began to publish posters "Windows of TASS". A few hours after the declaration of war, a poster of the Kukryniksys appeared (Kukryniksy is a pseudonym (based on the first syllables of their last names) of a creative team of graphic artists and painters: M.V. Kupriyanov, P.F. Krylov and N.A. Sokolov). “We will ruthlessly defeat and destroy the enemy!”, which was reproduced in newspapers in 103 cities. I.M.’s poster carried a great emotional charge. Toidze “The Motherland is Calling!”, stylistically related to the poster by D.S. Moore's Civil War "Have you volunteered?" Posters by V.B. were also extremely popular. Koretsky "Warrior of the Red Army, save!" and Kukryniksov “I Lost a Ring,” depicting Hitler, who “dropped a ring” from 22 divisions defeated at Stalingrad. Posters were an effective means of mobilizing people to fight the enemy. Since the beginning of the war, the evacuation of cultural institutions has been intensive. By November 1941, about 60 theaters in Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine and Belarus were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country. 53 universities and academic institutions, about 300 creative unions and organizations were evacuated to the Uzbek SSR alone. Kustanay houses the collections of the Historical Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the most valuable part of the collections of the Library named after. IN AND. Lenin, Foreign Language Library and Historical Library. The treasures of the Russian Museum and the Tretyakov Gallery were taken to Perm, and the Hermitage to Sverdlovsk. The Writers' Union and the Literary Fund moved to Kazan, and the USSR Union of Artists and the Art Fund moved to Sverdlovsk. Soviet art devoted itself entirely to the cause of saving the Fatherland. Soviet poetry and song achieved an extraordinary sound during this period. The song “Holy War” by V. Lebedev-Kumach and A. Alexandrov became a true anthem of the people’s war. Songs by composers A. Aleksandrov, V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, A. Novikov, B. Mokrousov, M. Fradkin, T. Khrennikov and others were very popular. The battle lyrical song became one of the leading genres of literature. “Dugout”, “Evening on the roadstead”, “Nightingales”, “Dark Night” - these songs entered the golden treasury of Soviet song classics. During the war years, one of the greatest musical works of the 20th century was created. - D. Shostakovich’s 7th symphony, dedicated to the heroic defenders of Leningrad. At one time, L. Beethoven liked to repeat that music should strike fire from the courageous human heart. It was these thoughts that were embodied by D. Shostakovich in his most significant work.D. Shostakovich began writing the 7th Symphony a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War and continued to work in Leningrad, besieged by the Nazis. On the original score of the symphony, the composer’s notes “VT” are visible, meaning “air raid warning”. When it came, D. Shostakovich interrupted work on the symphony and went to drop incendiary bombs from the roof of the conservatory. The first three movements of the symphony were completed by the end of September 1941, when Leningrad was already surrounded and subjected to brutal artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. The victorious finale of the symphony was completed in December, when the fascist hordes stood on the outskirts of Moscow. “I dedicate this symphony to my hometown Leningrad, our fight against fascism, our upcoming victory” - this was the epigraph to this work. In 1942, the symphony was performed in the USA and in other countries of the anti-fascist coalition. The musical art of the whole world does not know of another composition that would have received such a powerful public response. During the war years, Soviet drama created true masterpieces of theatrical art. In the initial period of the war, the plays of L. Leonov “Invasion”, K. Simonov “Russian People”, A. Korneychuk “Front”, which quickly became popular, were published. Works of domestic literature that are well-known and loved by many today also appeared, such as chapters of the novel by M. Sholokhov “They Fought for the Motherland”, “The Science of Hate”, story by V. Vasilevskaya "Rainbow". The Battle of Stalingrad is dedicated to the stories of K. Simonov “Days and Nights” and V. Grossman “The Direction of the Main Strike”. The heroism of home front workers was described in the works of M.S. Shaginyan and F.V. Gladkova. During the war, the first chapters of A. Fadeev’s novel “The Young Guard” were published. Journalism of those years is represented by articles by K. Simonov, I. Ehrenburg. Military lyrics by M. Isakovsky, S. Shchipachev, A. Tvardovsky, A. Akhmatova, A. Surkov, N. Tikhonov were created in the form of an oath, lamentation, curse, and direct appeal. O. Berggolts, B. Pasternak, M. Svetlova, K. Simonov. Thus, the images of the defenders of Leningrad were created by O. Berggolts in the “Leningrad Poem” and V. Inber in the poem “Pulkovo Meridian”. The poem by A.T. was extremely popular. Tvardovsky "Vasily Terkin", poem by M.I. Aliger "Zoya". More than a thousand writers and poets in the ranks of the active army worked as war correspondents. Ten writers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Musa Jalil, P.P. Vershigora, A. Gaidar, A. Surkov, E. Petrov, A. Bek, K. Simonov, M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeev, N. Tikhonov. The coming to power of fascism in a number of countries and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War revived the Russian patriotic theme in cinema ("Alexander Nevsky", "Suvorov", "Kutuzov"). On the basis of the evacuated film studios "Lenfilm" and "Mosfilm" in Almaty, the Central United Film Studio (CUKS) was created. During these years, film directors S. Eisenstein, V. Pudovkin, the Vasilyev brothers, F. Ermler, I. Pyryev, G. Roshal worked at the film studio. About 80% of all domestic feature films during the war years were produced at this film studio. In total, during the war years, 34 full-length films and almost 500 film magazines were created. Among them is “Secretary of the District Committee” I.A. Pyryeva, “Invasion” by A. Room, “Rainbow” by M.S. Donskoy, “Two Fighters” by L.D. Lukova, “She Defends the Motherland” F.M. Ermler, documentary film “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow” by L. Varlamov and I. Kopalin. On the front line and in partisan detachments there were more than 150 cameramen.

To provide cultural services to the front, front-line brigades of artists, writers, painters and front-line theaters were created (by 1944 there were 25 of them). The first of them was the Iskra Theater, made up of actors from the theater. Lenin Komsomol - volunteers of the people's militia, then front-line branches of the Maly Theater, the Theater named after. E. Vakhtangov and the Komsomol theater of GITIS. During the war years, more than 40 thousand artists visited the fronts as part of such brigades. Among them were the luminaries of the Russian stage I.M. Moskvin, A.K. Tarasova, N.K. Cherkasov, M.I. Tsarev, A.A. Yablochkina and others. During the war years, the concerts of the Leningrad Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra under the direction of E. Mravinsky, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army under the direction of A. Alexandrov, and the Russian Folk Choir named after A. Aleksandrov enjoyed exceptional success during the war years. M. Pyatnitsky, soloists K. Shulzhenko, L. Ruslanova, A. Raikin, L. Utesov, I. Kozlovsky, S. Lemeshev and many others. etc. The 13-meter statue of a Soviet liberator warrior with a girl in his arms and a lowered sword, erected after the war in Berlin in Treptower Park (sculptor - E.V. Vuchetich), became a sculptural symbol of the war years and the memory of fallen wars. War, heroism of the Soviets people are reflected in the paintings of artists A.A. Deineki "Defense of Sevastopol", S.V. Gerasimov "Mother of the Partisan", painting by A.A. Plastov “The Fascist Flew” and others. Assessing the damage to the cultural heritage of the country, the Extraordinary State Commission to investigate the atrocities of the invaders named 430 museums out of 991 located in the occupied territory, 44 thousand palaces of culture and libraries among those plundered and destroyed. The house-museums of L.N. were looted. Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, I.S. Turgenev in Spassky-Lutovinovo, A.S. Pushkin in Mikhailovsky, P.I. Tchaikovsky in Klin, T.G. Shevchenko in Kanev. The frescoes of the 12th century were irretrievably lost. in the St. Sophia Cathedral of Novgorod, manuscripts by P.I. Tchaikovsky, canvases by I.E. Repina, V.A. Serova, I.K. Aivazovsky, who died in Stalingrad. Ancient architectural monuments of ancient Russian cities were destroyed - Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Rzhev, Vyazma, Kyiv. Suburban architectural ensembles-palaces of St. Petersburg and architectural monastery complexes of the Moscow region were damaged. The human losses were irreparable. All this affected the development of domestic culture after the war. Thus, despite the period of totalitarianism in the history of the country preceding the Great Patriotic War, severe ideological pressure on the entire domestic culture, in the face of tragedy, the danger of foreign conquest, ideological vocabulary is leaving genuine culture and coming to the fore eternal, deep, truly national values ​​are put forward. Hence the amazing unity of the culture of those years, the desire of people to protect their Earth and its traditions.

15.The international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Sources of victory. Results. Berlin (Potsdam Conference).

The victory over fascist Germany and its allies was achieved through the joint efforts of the states of the anti-fascist coalition, the peoples who fought against the occupiers and their accomplices. But the Soviet Union played a decisive role in this armed conflict. It was the Soviet country that was the most active and consistent fighter against the fascist invaders who sought to enslave the peoples of the whole world.

The world-historical significance of the Victory lies in the fact that it was the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who blocked the path of German fascism to world domination, bore the brunt of a war unprecedented in human history and made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The victory over Nazi Germany was the result of the joint efforts of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the main burden of the struggle against the shock forces of world reaction fell to the lot of the Soviet Union. It was on the Soviet-German front that the most fierce and decisive battles of the Second World War took place.

The Great Patriotic War ended with a complete military-political, economic and ideological victory of the Soviet Union. This predetermined the outcome of the Second World War as a whole. The victory over fascism is an event of world-historical significance. What are the most important results of the war?

The main result of the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War is that, in the most difficult trials, the Soviet people crushed fascism - the darkest creation of the era, and defended the freedom and independence of their state. Having overthrown fascism, together with the armies of other states of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union saved humanity from the threat of enslavement.

The victory of the Soviet people over German fascism had a huge impact on the entire further course of world history and on the solution of the fundamental social problems of our time.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union had socio-political consequences that were unforeseen for its organizers. The hopes of the reactionary circles of the Western powers to weaken our country were dashed. The USSR emerged from the war even stronger politically and militarily, and its international authority rose immeasurably. Governments and people listened to his voice; without his participation, essentially, not a single important problem affecting the fundamental interests of the world was solved. This was expressed, in particular, in the establishment and restoration of diplomatic relations with many states. Thus, if in 1941 26 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, then in 1945 - already 52 states.

Victory in the war brought the USSR into the ranks of the leading powers of the post-war world and created a real basis for a new stage in international relations. First of all, this is the creation of the United Nations, joint measures to eradicate Nazism and militarism in Germany, the formation of international mechanisms for discussing post-war problems, etc.

The moral, political and spiritual unity of Soviet society was of great importance for achieving victory. By attacking the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany also bet on the fact that the Soviet multinational state would not withstand severe military tests, anti-Soviet, nationalist forces would become more active in the country, and a “fifth column” would appear.

The coordinated organizational work of the country's political and military leadership played a huge role in achieving victory. Thanks to targeted and well-coordinated work at the center and locally, the country was quickly turned into a single military camp. The program for defeating the enemy, scientifically grounded and understandable to the majority of the population, was set out already in the first documents and speeches of state leaders: the appeal of the Soviet government to the people on June 22, the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions of June 29, the speech of I. IN. Stalin on the radio July 3, 1941. They clearly defined the nature and goals of the war, and named the most important measures aimed at repelling aggression and defeating the enemy. The most important source of victory in the Great Patriotic War was the powerful potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of the Soviet military science and military art, high level strategic leadership and combat prowess of our military personnel, the military organization as a whole.

Victory in the war was also achieved thanks to the high patriotism of Soviet soldiers, their love for their Fatherland, and loyalty to their constitutional duty. These qualities were embedded in the consciousness of military personnel in the pre-war years during a well-organized system of patriotic and military-patriotic education, which permeated all layers of Soviet society and accompanied the citizen at all stages of his life. life path- at school, in the army, at work. Soviet losses at the fronts, according to various estimates, range from 8.5 to 26.5 million people. The total material damage and military costs are estimated at $485 billion. 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages were destroyed. But the USSR defended its independence and contributed to the full or partial liberation of a number of European and Asian countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria , Yugoslavia, China and Korea. He made a huge contribution to the overall victory of the anti-fascist coalition over Germany, Italy and Japan: on the Soviet-German front, 607 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated and captured, and almost 3/4 of all German military equipment was destroyed. The USSR played an important role in the post-war peace settlement; its territory expanded to include East Prussia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Petsamo region, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. It became one of the leading world powers and the center of an entire system of communist states on the Euro-Asian continent.

Potsdam Conference 1945, Berlin Conference, conference of heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, US President G. Truman, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, who was replaced on July 28 by the new Prime Minister K. Attlee . It took place from July 17 to August 2 at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam, near Berlin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, military advisers and experts participated in the work of the PK. The decisions of the Political Committee were a development of the decisions of the Crimean Conference of 1945.

Issues related to the demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany, as well as many other important aspects of the German problem, occupied a central place in the work of the PK.

The participants of the PK reached an agreement on the main directions of the general policy towards Germany, which was considered as a single economic and political whole. The Potsdam Agreements provided for the complete disarmament of Germany, the dissolution of its armed forces, the destruction of monopolies and the liquidation in Germany of all industry that could be used for: military production, the destruction of the National Socialist Party, organizations and institutions controlled by it, the prevention of all Nazi and militaristic activities or propaganda in the country. The conference participants signed a special agreement on reparations, confirming the rights of the peoples who suffered from the Germans. aggression, for compensation and determining the sources of reparation payments. An agreement was reached on the establishment of central German administrative departments (finance, transport, communications, etc.).

At the conference, a system of quadripartite occupation of Germany was finally agreed upon, which was supposed to serve its demilitarization and democratization; it was envisaged that during the occupation, supreme power in Germany would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, each in its own zone of occupation; on matters affecting Germany as a whole, they were to act jointly as members of the Control Council.

The Potsdam Agreement defined a new Polish-German border along the Oder-West Neisse line, the establishment of which was reinforced by the PK decision to evict the German population remaining in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The PK confirmed the transfer of Koenigsberg (since 1946 - Kaliningrad) and the adjacent region to the Soviet Union. She established the Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA), entrusting it with preparing a peace settlement with Germany and its former allies.

At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, the conference discussed the fate of the German fleet and decided to divide the entire German surface, naval and merchant fleet equally between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. At the suggestion of Great Britain, it was decided to sink most of the German submarine fleet, and divide the rest equally.

The Soviet government proposed to extend the competence of the Austrian provisional government to the entire country, that is, also to those areas of Austria that were occupied by the troops of the Western powers. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to study this issue after the entry of US and British troops into Vienna.

The three governments confirmed at the P.C. their intention to bring the main war criminals to trial at the International Military Tribunal. The participants of the PK expressed their opinions on some other issues of international life: the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea Straits, the attitude of the United Nations towards the Franco regime in Spain, etc.