The American SDI program or Star Wars: the main bluff of the Cold War. What was the essence of the American SDI program? Start of work on the Strategic Defense Initiative

According to WESTERN PRESS sources:

It's like a James Bond movie: a huge satellite, the largest ever launched, with a powerful laser on board - to neutralize the US missile defense shield before the Union makes its first strike. But it was for real - or at least it was planned that way. Moreover, when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev left the Reykjavik summit in October 1986 because American President Ronald Reagan was unwilling to abandon his Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, program, the Soviet Union was much closer to launching a weapon. space-based than the United States. Less than a year later, while the world continued to criticize Reagan for his Star Wars concept, the Soviet Union launched an experimental satellite for its space laser system, which, however, never reached orbit. If everything had worked out, the Cold War could have taken a completely different path.

According to Soviet space expert Asif Siddiqi, a historian at Fordham University in New York, Moscow began developing space weapons long before Reagan launched the American space program into full swing with his March 23, 1983 Star Wars speech. reel. “The Soviets funded two major research and development programs in the late 70s and early 80s aimed at countering the supposed American missile defense ideas,” he says. The two concepts merged into one: Skif - an orbital laser "cannon" - and another weapon called "Cascade", designed to destroy enemy satellites with missiles fired from another orbital station.

Although some details about these programs leaked back in the mid-1990s, even in Russia these space weapons plans became known in full only a few years ago, Siddiqui says. Former Roscosmos press secretary Konstantin Lantratov pieced together the history of Polyus-Skif. “Lantratov managed to dig deep enough and his research clearly demonstrates the incredible scale of projects to build military stations,” says Siddiqui. “And this wasn’t just some side work, this was a real space weapons program.”

Space as an arena for peaceful competition

Space as a whole remained weapon-free for a long time, although not because the idea of ​​space weapons never occurred to anyone. As early as 1949, James Lipp, head of the rocket division of the RAND Corporation, was analyzing the possibility of using satellites as extra-atmospheric bombing platforms. After considering the technology available at the time, Lipp decided that dropping bombs from orbit would be ineffective and refused to classify satellites as weapons. While they may be useful to the military, the expert concluded, they cannot serve as weapons on their own.

When Sputnik 1 was launched in 1957 and the space age began in earnest, the Eisenhower administration adopted the position proposed in the long-standing Lipp report. Understanding the political benefits of fighting for peaceful space, Eisenhower created the civilian space agency NASA to clearly separate space exploration from any military initiatives. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations followed the same approach. And although the space race was part of the Cold War, weapons never made it into space, even as the advent of CIA spy satellites turned orbit into a battlefield.

The peaceful nature of space programs was enshrined in 1967 by the Outer Space Treaty. This document, signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons in Earth orbit and on the Moon. It also prohibited in principle the use of space and any celestial bodies for military purposes. In 1972, both superpowers signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which committed each side to have no more than two missile defense systems - one to protect the capital and one to protect the intercontinental ballistic missile base.

Design work began in the 70s, shortly after the symbolic Apollo-Soyuz “space handshake” between NASA astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts. The well-known organization Energia, which already had behind it the construction of the Soyuz spacecraft and the giant rocket to fly to the Moon N-1 (a program during which four explosions occurred from 1969 to 1972), began studying both in 1976 concepts: Skif and Cascade. Energia's original plan was to shoot down American intercontinental ballistic missiles from space at the beginning of their flight, when their speed is relatively low. The Salyut orbital stations, the first of which was launched in 1971, were to serve as a platform for either the laser-equipped Polyus spacecraft or the rocket-carrying Cascade. The stations could be refueled directly in orbit, and two astronauts could live in each of them for a week.

However, very soon the designers abandoned this plan, and with it the idea of ​​having astronauts on board the Polyus spacecraft. According to Lantratov, the USSR Ministry of Defense decided that Soviet technology was not yet sufficiently developed to shoot ICBMs from space, and decided that Skif and Cascade would instead be used to combat American missile defense satellites, which did not yet exist or even be approved .

The United States also spent a lot of money in the 50s and 60s trying to develop a missile defense system, but, nevertheless, by the mid-70s, this work began to gradually wind down, and during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the movement in the field of missile defense systems was minimal. In 1972, the two superpowers signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which allowed each to have no more than two missile defense ranges, one to protect the capital and one to protect the only base from which ICBMs could be launched.

However, the Treaty only prohibited the deployment of missile defense weapons, but not testing and development - a loophole that both sides took advantage of. Beginning around 1980, when Reagan won the presidential election, scientists from the Lawrence Livermore State Laboratory. E. Lawrence in California (among whom was physicist Edward Teller, the so-called father of the hydrogen bomb), along with scientists from other federal laboratories and a handful of military and civilian senior officials, began to look towards "directed energy" weapons that shoot beams instead of bullets, to neutralize the growing superiority of the USSR in the field of launch vehicles and strategic missiles.

Reagan was very keen on this idea and when, three years later, he spoke on television on national security issues, he announced plans to build a defensive shield that would “make nuclear weapon powerless and useless,” essentially changing the military-strategic position of the state from offensive to defensive. The proposal was immediately attacked in Congress by Democrats who called it unworkable. It was Senator Ted Kennedy who called these plans “Star Wars.” Despite the cries of skeptics, missile defense funding increased significantly and by 1986 reached almost $3 billion a year.

As Roald Sagdeev, a prominent planetary scientist and adviser to Gorbachev, wrote in his memoirs “The Making of a Soviet Scientist” in 1994: “If the Americans exaggerated [the SDI plans] too much, then we Russians believed in it all too much.” In the summer after Reagan's Star Wars speech, Deputy Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé demanded that the CIA conduct an investigation into what the Soviets' response might be. The job went to three analysts, including Allen Thomson, a senior analyst in the CIA's scientific and military research division. Thomson had already studied other Soviet military research programs, including work on directed energy weapons and instruments for detecting submarines from space.

He recalls: “The results of the study revealed that, both politically and technically, the Soviets have very broad opportunities to respond to the predicted developments of the States within the framework of SDI.” They could build more ICBMs, try to thwart the American shield plans, or try to stir up international opposition to those plans. “There was some understanding that the USSR could be left penniless if it had to start creating new large weapons systems. But there was nothing to indicate they were unable to respond,” says Thomson.

In essence, Reagan's SDI served as a kick-start to the Soviet space weapons program, giving the aerospace design bureaus just what they needed to convince the Politburo of the need for increased funding for Polyus and Cascade. Both projects were slowly brewing at the Salyut design bureau (now the M.V. Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center) within the Energia organization, and experiments with a high-power laser for the missile defense system have been carried out since 1981. However, until now the work has been limited only laboratory conditions, but now, after Reagan's speech, rubles began to flow into real flight equipment. The motive was not so much the fear that SDI might prevent Soviet missiles from reaching their targets, but something more sinister and strange: the belief that the Americans were about to have military space stations.

Paranoid fantasies were not uncommon among senior Soviet generals, according to Peter Westwick, a history professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, who writes about Cold War science. “It seemed to them that the Americans could launch space shuttle, which will dive into the atmosphere and drop hydrogen bombs,” he says.

Siddiqui discusses how the Soviets misinterpreted US intentions regarding the space shuttle: “To the Russians, the shuttle seemed like something very important. For them, this was a sign that the Americans were going to take military operations into space." The official US explanation was that the spaceplane, introduced in 1981, was intended to provide permanent access to orbit. By the mid-1980s, however, it was also being used to launch secret military satellites. "The shuttle scared the Russians a lot because they couldn't understand why they would need such a vehicle that had no economic interest," explains Siddiqui. “So they decided that some kind of unspoken military goal simply had to be present here: for example, the delivery and dismantling of large military space stations or the bombing of Moscow.” The Soviets responded to the perceived threat by building their own space shuttle, a near replica of NASA's space shuttle, which made its only flight and was retired in 1993.

Shortly after Reagan's speech, the USSR Academy of Sciences received a request to evaluate the possibility of creating a space missile defense shield. The working group was headed by the outstanding physicist Evgeniy Velikhov. As a result, Westwick says, they came to the following conclusion: “We looked at the problem and studied it, and we decided that nothing would work.” But among other Soviet scientists there were alarmists who convinced the military and politicians that even if SDI was not an effective anti-missile shield, it could be used for offensive purposes to hit ground targets.

The thought of orbital laser systems shooting up the territory of the USSR was truly terrifying. According to Westwick, there were absolutely ridiculous speculations circulating around the Kremlin regarding the real purpose of SDI. “Selective political murder. For example, on May Day, when members of the Politburo are standing on the street podium, and a single laser can take them all out at once... These things fly in the sky, they are invisible and can shoot without the slightest warning.”

By 1983, the Polyus-Skif and Cascade projects had been underway for many years. Preliminary tests were carried out at the Salyut design bureau. However, SDI served as a powerful catalyst for both projects. If Reagan was going to launch an American battle station into space, as the Soviet Union feared, Moscow wanted to be ready. After Reagan's speech, rubles began to flow, work accelerated, and ideas began to be translated into metal.

However, money alone cannot put a satellite into orbit. To speed up the launch, Soviet leaders came up with an interim plan: to use a small 1-megawatt carbon dioxide laser for the prototype, which had already been tested as an anti-missile weapon on the Il-76 transport plane. In 1984, the project was approved and named "Skif-D". The letter "D" meant "demonstration".

The problems didn't end there. Even the relatively small Skif-D was too large for the Soviet Proton launch vehicle. However, its creators were lucky - a much more powerful rocket was on the way - Energia, named after the developer and intended to launch the Buran shuttle into orbit. This mighty rocket could carry 95 tons of cargo into space and was capable of handling the Skif-D without any difficulty.

Skif-D was hastily built from existing components, including parts from the Buran shuttle and from the Almaz military orbital station, the launch of which was cancelled. The result was something monstrous, 40 meters long, a little more than 4 meters in diameter, and weighing almost 100 thousand kilograms. This craft made NASA's Skylab space station look small in comparison. Fortunately for its creators, it was thin and long enough that it could be docked with the Energia, attached along its central fuel tank.

Skif-D had two main parts: a “functional block” and a “target module”. The functional block contained small rocket engines necessary to launch the vehicle into its final orbit, as well as a power supply system made from solar panels borrowed from Almaz. The target module carried carbon dioxide tanks and two turbogenerators. These systems ensured the operation of the laser - turbogenerators pumped carbon dioxide, exciting atoms and leading to the emission of light.

The problem was that the turbogenerators had large moving parts, and the gas became so hot that it had to be vented. This affected the motion of the spacecraft, making the laser extremely inaccurate. To counteract these fluctuations, Polyus engineers developed a system for releasing gas through deflectors and added a turret to better target the laser.

In the end, it turned out that Skif is so complex that each component must be separately tested in space before sending the station into orbit. However, when the opportunity to launch arose in 1985, it was decided to turn a blind eye to this circumstance. The fact is that the Buran project was far behind schedule, and it was not completed in time for the planned first flight of the Energia rocket, scheduled for 1986. At first, the developers of Energia thought to test their rocket by replacing the Buran with a blank, but then the creators of Skif intervened. In the end, the authorities decided that Energia would carry a new device into space.

The prospect of an imminent launch forced the engineers to propose another intermediate solution - to test only the control system of the functional unit, the gas emission system and the laser targeting system and not yet equip the device with a working laser. What came out in the end was dubbed “Skif-DM” (the letter “M” meant “model”). The launch was planned for the fall of 1986

Reflecting on all these horrors, the Soviet military accelerated work on the Polyus-Skif laser cannon, designed to destroy SDI satellites. Until then, they planned to use a powerful laser built by the Astrophysics Design Bureau, but the implementation of this program began to be delayed. The Astrophysics laser and its power systems were too large and heavy to be launched on the then existing rockets. So when Soviet engineers were told to increase the pace of work on Skif, they came up with an interim plan. They were going to adapt a small 1 MW carbon dioxide laser, which had already been tested on the IL-76 transport aircraft, as a countermeasure missile weapons. In August 1984, a plan was approved and outlined for the creation of a new spacecraft Skif-D, the letter “D” in the name meant “demonstration”. By January 1986, the Politburo designated the project as one of the most important satellites in the Soviet space program.

Meanwhile, American scientists and engineers were struggling with their own difficulties in creating space laser systems. As work progressed on projects such as Zenith Star, which investigated the problem of launching a 2 MW chemical laser into orbit, the tasks associated with the creation and launch of such systems acquired increasingly clear contours. SDI funded research into beam weapons and an X-ray laser that would be activated by a nuclear explosion, but neither of these projects ever came close to implementation. By 1986, SDI leadership began to shift its focus from orbital lasers to small kinetic weapons that could hit enemy satellites by crashing into them.

The Russians, however, did not deviate from their chosen course and continued to work on demo version its space laser, which was scheduled to launch in early 1987. Salyut engineers soon realized that their laser and its power supply system, even the smaller model already tested on an airplane, were still too large for the Proton rocket. But a more powerful launch vehicle was already on the way: the Energia rocket, named after the design bureau developing it, was created to launch the new Buran space shuttle into orbit. The carrying capacity of Energia was 95 tons, that is, it could lift Skif-D. The purpose of the rocket has changed. To cut costs, engineers looked for existing hardware that could be modified and used, including elements of Buran and part of the canceled military space station Almaz, designated as a supply transport ship that later became the main module of the Mir space station.

As a result, Skif-D resembled Frankenstein's brainchild: 40 m in length, more than 4 m in diameter and weighing 95 tons - larger than NASA's Skylab space station. The complex consisted of two modules, which the Russians called a “functional block” and a “target module.” The function block was equipped with small rocket engines that would propel the vehicle into its final orbit. It also included a power supply system using solar panels taken from Almaz. The target module would carry carbon dioxide tanks and two turbogenerators to power the laser and the heavy rotating turret that directed the beam. The Polus spacecraft was made long and thin so that it could fit on the side of the Energia, attached to its central fuel tank.

Designing an orbital laser cannon was no easy task for engineers. Manual laser pointer is a relatively simple static device, but a large gas laser is like a thundering locomotive. Powerful turbogenerators “pump” carbon dioxide until its atoms become excited and begin to emit light. Turbo generators have large moving parts, and the gas that produces the laser beam gets very hot and must be vented. Moving parts and exhaust gases create motion that interferes with the operation of a spacecraft, especially one that must have very precise directions. Polyus engineers have developed a system to reduce the impact of erupted gas by passing it through deflectors. But the ship still required a complex control system that would dampen vibrations generated by the exhaust gases, the turbogenerator and the moving laser tower. (It was assumed that when firing, the entire ship would be directed at the target, and the turret would serve only for fine adjustments.)

The system became so complex that by 1985, designers realized that testing its components would require more than one launch. The basic design of the Skif-D1 spacecraft was tested in 1987, and the laser system flew only as part of Skif-D2 in 1988. Around the same time, development began on another related spacecraft, designated Skif-Stiletto. It should have been equipped with a weaker infrared laser, drawing on the experience of the existing ground-based system. The Scythian Stiletto could only blind enemy satellites by targeting their optical systems, while the Polyus would have enough energy to destroy a spacecraft in low Earth orbit.

Work on these projects proceeded at a frantic pace throughout 1985, when an unexpected new opportunity. Work on the construction of the Buran shuttle began to fall behind schedule, and it would not have been ready in time for the scheduled first launch of the Energia rocket in 1986. The rocket designers considered launching a ballast load instead of the shuttle, and the Skif designers saw this as an opportunity: why not test Are some of our ship's components ahead of schedule?

They quickly drew up plans for a spacecraft that could test the function block's control system and additional components, such as gas vents and a targeting system consisting of radar and a low-power precision targeting laser that was used in conjunction with a large chemical laser. The ship was named "Skif-DM" - a demonstration model. The launch was planned for the fall of 1986 so that it would not interfere with the launch of the Skif-D1 spacecraft, planned for the summer of 1987.

Such strict deadlines had their price. At one time, more than 70 enterprises of the Soviet aerospace industry worked on the creation of Polyus-Skif. Describing the history of the project, Lantratov quotes from an article by Yuri Kornilov, leading designer of the machine-building plant named after. M.V. Khrunichev, who worked on Skif-DM: “As a rule, no excuses were accepted, they did not even pay attention to the fact that it was practically the same group that, at that moment, was doing a great job of creating Buran. Everything faded into the background just to meet the deadlines set from above.”

The designers realized that as soon as they launched a giant ship into space, it would spew out a huge amount of carbon dioxide, US intelligence analysts would notice the gas and quickly realize it was intended for a laser. To test the Skifa-DM exhaust system, the Russians switched to a mixture of xenon and krypton. These gases will interact with the ionospheric plasma around the Earth, and then the spacecraft will look like part of a civilian geophysical experiment. In addition, Skif-DM will be equipped with small targets in the form of inflatable balloons, simulating enemy satellites, which will be thrown out during flight and tracked using radar and a targeting laser.

The launch of the demonstration satellite was delayed until 1978, in part because the launch pad needed to be upgraded to accommodate a heavy rocket like Energia. The technical difficulties were relatively minor, but this delay had an important impact on the political fate of the project.

In 1986, Gorbachev, who had been General Secretary of the CPSU for only a year by that time, had already begun to advocate radical economic and administrative reforms, which became known as “Perestroika”. He and his government allies focused on reining in what they saw as ruinous military spending and increasingly opposed the Soviet version of Star Wars. Gorbachev acknowledged that the American plan was threatening, Westwick says, but he warned that the country was too fixated on it, and had already begun asking his advisers: “Maybe we shouldn’t be so afraid of SDI?”

In January 1987, with only a few weeks left before the launch of Skif-DM, Gorbachev's associates in the Politburo pushed through a resolution limiting what could be done during the demonstration flight. The device was allowed to be launched into orbit, but it was forbidden to test the gas exhaust system or release any targets. Moreover, while the ship was still on the launch pad, an order came requiring the removal of several targets, to which the engineers responded that it was better not to touch the loaded rocket, and the order was canceled. The number of permitted experiments remained limited.

That spring, as the launch booster lay inside the huge assembly shop at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, the Skif-DM vehicle was docked to the Energia rocket. The technicians then wrote two names on the ship. One is Polyus, and the other is Mir-2, for the proposed civilian space station that Energia management hoped to build. According to Polyus historian Lantratov, this was less an attempt to deceive foreign spies about the purpose of the mission than an advertisement for a new Energia project.

The rocket was rolled out to the launch pad and placed in a vertical launch position. Then, on the night of May 15, 1987, Energia's engines ignited and the giant rocket took off into the sky. While almost all launches from Baikonur entered orbit at an angle of 52 degrees to the equator, Polyus-Skif went further north: at an angle of 65 degrees. In the worst case, thanks to this direction, the rocket stages and its fragments, or the entire apparatus, would not fall onto the territory of a foreign state.

The launch went flawlessly, the rocket picking up speed as it rose and arced toward the North Pacific Ocean. But the “kludge” nature of the Skif-DM experimental apparatus, as well as all the compromises and simplifications, predetermined its fate. Initially, the functional unit of the satellite was designed for the Proton launch vehicle and would not have withstood the vibration of more powerful Energia engines. As a solution, the spacecraft and control unit were placed at the top, rather than at the bottom next to the engines. Essentially, he was flying upside down. Once detached from its launch booster, it would flip over and face away from Earth, with the control unit's thrusters pointing down toward Earth, ready to ignite and push the craft into orbit.

At the prearranged signal, Skif-DM separated, the spent Energy fell away, and the protective casing covering the front of the ship also separated. After this, the entire ship, the height of a 12-story building, began a gentle pitch maneuver. Its tail, or in fact the bow of the ship, turned 90 degrees, 180... and continued to rotate. The massive spacecraft tumbled until it had completed two full rotations before stopping, nose down at Earth. In a hurry, trying to launch such a complex device, the designers made a small software error. The engines ignited and Skif-DM headed back into the atmosphere from which it had just escaped, quickly overheating and disintegrating into blazing pieces over the Pacific Ocean.

In the West, the debut of the Energia super-rocket was called partially successful, because, despite the failure of the satellite, the launch vehicle itself worked perfectly. The US government almost certainly monitored the missile's flight using reconnaissance receivers, but the CIA and other agencies' judgment on the weapon remains classified.

The failure of Polyus-Skif, coupled with the colossal costs associated with it, gave the program's opponents the weapon they needed to kill it. Further flights of Skif were cancelled. The hardware being prepared was either scrapped or pilfered into the corners of giant warehouses. But the laser installation never reached the startup stage so that it would be possible to find out whether it would have worked.

In his history of the project, Lantratov quotes Yuri Kornilov, the lead designer of Skif-DM: “Of course, no one received any prizes or awards for the hectic, two-year work, limited by strict deadlines. Hundreds of working groups that created the Polyus received neither awards nor words of gratitude.” Moreover, after the Skif-DM fiasco, some received reprimands or demotion.

The details of this story are still unknown to us. “Even today, much of what is involved in this program is classified,” says Siddiqui. “Russians don’t like to talk about it. And our understanding of the Soviet reaction to SDI remains cloudy. It is clear that there were heated internal debates among the military-industrial elite of the USSR over the effectiveness of space weapons. And given the fact that the Soviets were so close to launching a military orbital station, it can be assumed that it was the hardliners who had the upper hand. It’s scary to think what could have happened if Polyus had managed to go into orbit.”

However, it appears that Russian space engineers, notorious flea marketers, had the last laugh. The first component of the upcoming international space station was a Russian module called Zarya, also known as a functional cargo block. The device was built in the mid-90s under a contract with NASA by enterprising engineers at the plant named after. Khrunichev, who met both the deadlines and the budget. Zarya's main purpose was to supply the station with electrical power and perform its orbital correction - the same role that the Skif function block was supposed to perform. Some Soviet researchers believe that Zarya began life as a backup vehicle, originally created for the Polyus program. All they had to do was dust off old but perfectly serviceable equipment, or even just the blueprints, and it could certainly help keep the space station module's production schedule on track during the economic chaos that was post-Cold War Russia. This is just a guess, but if true, it means the old Soviet Union did manage to get a small part of its Star Wars system into orbit. But, ironically, American taxpayers paid for it.

In the West, the debut of the Energia rocket was considered partially successful. And it was true. Although the satellite did not enter orbit, the rocket performed perfectly. This was a great success for Energia, but it did not save the Polyus-Skif and Cascade projects. The failure of Skif-DM, coupled with the incredible cost of the only tests, gave opponents of the program the necessary arguments to finish it off. Further flights of the Skif were canceled and the equipment was disposed of. The laser was never tested, and it is now impossible to say whether it would have worked against American satellites.

Details about the Polyus are still unknown. The data is likely buried deep in inaccessible Russian archives, as are the documents documenting the reaction. Soviet leaders to Reagan's SDI speech. Government documents about the American reaction to the launch of Polyus-Skif are buried just as deeply. This project is rarely talked about now, but it is clear that the world has barely escaped a real test of the effectiveness of space weapons. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened if Polyus-Skif had managed to go into orbit, how the Americans would have reacted to this, and what kind of space arms race could have followed.

The most interesting, and there is also hope that The original article is on the website InfoGlaz.rf Link to the article from which this copy was made -

The US Missile Defense Agency is “not opposed” to the development of space-based ballistic missile interceptors, previously proposed by US lawmakers.

“We are exploring options in case the government decides that such funds are necessary,” said the agency’s director, General Samuel Greaves, recently, noting that the legal basis for conducting such work has now been created by Congress.

Indeed, the 2018 and 2019 defense budget bills included a clause stating that the agency is “authorized” (depending on internal priorities and missile defense mission requirements) to initiate development of a space-based interception system targeting ballistic missiles in the active site trajectories. Presumably, by 2022, the first prototype of such a system can be demonstrated in practice, if there are no problems with the scientific and technical background or financial restrictions.

The system, as noted, should be of a “regional” nature, which, together with the discussions that took place in US political and expert circles in 2016–2017, indicates primarily the problem of outstanding progress, which in Lately North Korean missile launchers demonstrate. However, the creation of a fundamentally new type of missile defense system also creates global problems.

Pebbles in orbit

The space strike echelon of the missile defense system immediately evokes memories of the “Strategic defense initiative» Ronald Reagan - SOI. At that time, the United States, at least on paper, set the task of creating a multi-layered system of dense defense against an equal opponent. This caused a rather nervous reaction in the USSR and forced them to spend many billions on symmetrical (creating their own missile defense) and asymmetrical (developing countermeasures) steps.

By the way, the rocket industry has held on well from this scientific and technical background since the 1990s: modern missile systems bear the stamp of that time, and their technical specifications took into account “promising missile defense systems of a potential enemy.”

In addition to fantastic designs such as X-ray orbital lasers pumped by a nuclear explosion (that is, a direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty), in the late 1980s the United States began to seriously consider the concept of mass deployment of orbital platforms with small homing interceptors that were supposed to attack Soviet ballistic missiles. emerging from under the shield of the atmosphere. The project was named Brilliant Pebbles.

It was criticized, defended, the architecture was redone, the feasibility study was recalculated. As a result, he entered 1991, when SDI as a dense missile defense system against a massive missile attack completely lost its relevance. In its place came the GPALS (Global Defense Against Limited Attacks) project, whose effective buffering capacity was calculated based on approximately 200 warheads attacking the continental United States. Brilliant Pebbles were to become a key element of GPALS.

But it also remained on paper. By 1999, the United States moved on to the deployment of a “national missile defense” project, which to this day provides only extremely limited protection of US territory from single launches. The European (third) position area was supposed to be a copy of the two American ones, but Barack Obama canceled the plans by installing SM-3 anti-missile missiles there, the current (deployed and undergoing tests) modifications of which are not yet capable of resisting intercontinental missiles at all, but only medium-range missiles. There was no place for space strike weapons in these plans.

However, the ideas of a space interception echelon remained on the agenda and periodically (whenever Iran or the DPRK demonstrated another success in rocket production) surfaced in the press and reports about initiative projects. This applied to both orbital interceptors and, more recently, talk about space laser systems.

Are your opponents ready?

Many American experts have criticized and continue to criticize the idea of ​​a space echelon of missile defense weapons, from different points of view. The economic utopian nature of the project, the immaturity of technology, and the clearly destabilizing nature of the system are noted.

The latter should be especially noted. The space echelon, deployed to confidently destroy missiles from Iran and the DPRK, will, as experts note, cover large areas of Eurasia, including China. This immediately creates tension in relations with Beijing. Let us remind you that one of the districts combat patrol Russian missile submarines Far East, according to the American military, is located in the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk, and in this case, space assets could potentially threaten it as well.

As we have already written, space strike missile defense systems as an idea are not at all new and in solutions for domestic missile systems fifth generation (Topol-M, Bulava, Yars, Sarmat) the possibility of enemy deployment of such systems is provided. In particular, we are talking about adaptive acceleration modes with maneuvering and flat trajectories, in which the rocket does not leave the atmosphere for as long as possible in comparison with optimal flight profiles. This increases the rocket's energy requirements, reduces the payload, but increases the likelihood of its delivery.

But not so long ago we were shown a means that fundamentally (using current and promising technologies) eliminates the impact of a space missile defense echelon. These are rocket-gliding systems with hypersonic gliders - for example, the Russian Avangard.

After acceleration, the glider does not move along a ballistic trajectory in airless space (as is the case with ballistic missiles, whose load at apogee can reach an altitude of 1200–1500 km), but dives back and glides in the atmosphere at an altitude of only 50–60 km. This rules out the use of orbital interceptor missiles as they were designed to counter ballistic targets.

For a “pebbles” type system, another platform is already needed, including a “return part” with thermal protection and other requirements for mechanical strength. This increases and complicates the final product (of which a lot is needed) and increases the cost of the entire orbital defense complex by an order of magnitude. Difficulties also arise when using orbital-based lasers against atmospheric targets (power requirements increase, defocusing increases).

The system is being built

However, if the strike echelon of missile defense systems still looks hypothetical (as in previous approaches), then the decision to fundamentally update the space echelon of missile defense information systems in the United States has been made irrevocably.

The US military indicates that the architecture of current orbital surveillance facilities was basically formed several decades ago and in modern conditions already looks archaic, especially with the likely deployment of hypersonic combat weapons.

Let us recall that the classic scheme for warning of a missile attack looks like recording by space means the launch of missiles from enemy territory with the clarification of the situation using a ground echelon of radar stations at the moment when the missiles rise above the radio horizon to a high altitude, that is, 10–15 minutes before hitting target.

However, as we showed above, in the case of hypersonic gliders, this algorithm does not work: detecting the launch of the booster of the booster-gliding system by satellites is possible, but the currently available radars will not see anything until the glider approaches the approach distance of 3-5 minutes. At the same time, the glider has the ability to maneuver sweepingly along the course, unlike ballistic weapons, which completely confuses the determination of not only its final goal on the territory of the defender, but also the very fact of an attack on him.

Therefore, space detection means are becoming a key element in the defense system against an enemy armed with gliders. The situation looks similar with the detection of purely atmospheric cruise missiles at hypersonic speed: the space echelon is also extremely important here, since such products are already quite noticeable (unlike modern “stealth objects”, low-altitude and subsonic).

This creates confusion not only with the hypothetical missile defense strike echelon, but also with countermeasures. In recent years, many countries (in particular, Russia and China) have been actively developing anti-satellite systems, the effectiveness of which in countering space-based missile defense systems (whether information or attack) can hardly be overestimated. At the same time, this, in turn, further destabilizes the situation: the party that has received a strike on critical components of the satellite infrastructure must make a difficult choice about further escalation of the conflict (in this case, it is possible that in a nuclear form).

Context of organizational activities

It should be noted that all this is happening in the context of Donald Trump’s head-on push for the decision to create a separate branch of the armed forces in the United States - the space forces. At first met with friendly resistance from the military and congressmen, the idea is gradually being integrated into the work process of the Washington bureaucracy.

Thus, on August 7, one of Trump’s main opponents in the past on this line, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, radically changed his position. “Mad Dog,” who had previously commented skeptically on the topic of space forces, suddenly came out in support of their creation.

“It is necessary to continue to consider outer space as one of the theaters of military operations, and the creation of a combat command is one of the steps in this direction that can now be taken. We fully agree with the President's concerns about protecting our space infrastructure, and we are addressing this issue as other countries create military means to attack her,” he said.

At the same time, Mattis cleverly avoided the question of whether he was talking about creating a new type of armed forces (following the president) or about strengthening existing organizational structures.

Thus, it is likely that the 11th (Space) Combat Command in the military structure will be transformed into a sixth branch of the force, along with the US Army (Army), Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Fortunately, as we see, a serious scope of work has already been planned for him.

On March 23, 1983, the fortieth US President Ronald Reagan announced to the Americans the beginning of the creation of a large-scale missile defense system that would be guaranteed to protect the country from the Soviet nuclear threat. “I have given the order to undertake comprehensive and intensive efforts to conduct a long-term research and development program to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic missiles with nuclear warheads,” the American leader said in his address. This date can easily be called the apotheosis of the Cold War.

This project was called the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), but with the light hand of journalists it became better known to the public as the “Star Wars program.” There is a legend that the idea for such a project came to Reagan’s head after watching the next episode of George Lucas’s space opera. Although SDI was never implemented, it became one of the most famous military programs in human history and had a significant impact on the outcome of the Cold War.

This program involved the creation of a powerful anti-missile “umbrella”, the main elements of which were located in low-Earth orbit. The main goal The strategic defense initiative was to gain complete dominance in outer space, which would make it possible to destroy Soviet ballistic missiles and warheads at all stages of their trajectory. “Who owns space, owns the world,” the defenders of this program liked to repeat.

Initially, the “Star Wars program” was carried out exclusively by the Americans, but a little later the main allies of the United States in the NATO bloc, primarily Britain, joined it.

To say that the Strategic Defense Initiative was an ambitious project is an understatement. In terms of its complexity, it cannot be compared even with such famous programs as the Manhattan Project or Apollo. Only a small part of the SDI components was supposed to use more or less known and proven military technologies (anti-missiles) at that time, while the basis of the striking power of Star Wars was supposed to be weapons developed on new physical principles.

The Strategic Defense Initiative was never put into practice. The scale of the technical problems faced by the developers forced the American leadership to quietly shut down the program ten years after its spectacular presentation. However, it gave practically no real results. The amount spent on Star Wars is impressive: some experts estimate that SDI cost the American taxpayer $100 billion.

Naturally, in the course of work on the program, new technologies and design solutions were obtained and tested, however, given the amount of investment and the extensive PR campaign, this clearly looks insufficient. Many developments were later used to create the existing US missile defense system. The main thing that American designers and the military understood is that at the current level of technology development, unconventional methods of intercepting ICBMs are not effective. Therefore, the current missile defense is built on old, proven missile defenses. Lasers, railguns, kamikaze satellites today are more of a curious exotica than a real and effective weapon.

However, despite the almost complete lack of technical results, SDI had very important political consequences. Firstly, the start of development of a space-based missile defense system further worsened relations between the two superpowers - the USA and the USSR. Secondly, this program further intensified the controversy surrounding medium-range ballistic missiles, which both warring sides were actively deploying at that moment. Well, the most important thing is the fact that the Soviet military and political leadership believed in the reality of the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative and even more desperately joined the arms race, for which the USSR simply did not have the strength at that moment. The result was sad: the economy of a huge country could not withstand such overstrain, and in 1991 the USSR ceased to exist.

Soviet scientists repeatedly informed the leadership about the impossibility of implementing the SDI program, but the Kremlin elders simply did not want to listen to them. So if we consider the Strategic Defense Initiative as a large-scale bluff of the American intelligence services (this is a favorite topic of domestic conspiracy theorists), then this strategy was truly a success. However, it is likely that the truth is somewhat more complex. It is unlikely that the United States would have started such an expensive program just to ruin the Soviet Union. It brought significant political bonuses to President Reagan and his team, as well as huge profits into the pockets of bigwigs from the military-industrial complex. So, probably, few people grieved about the lack of real results of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Finally, we can say that the United States has not abandoned the idea of ​​​​creating a missile defense “umbrella” capable of protecting their country from a possible nuclear strike (including a massive one). Currently, the deployment of a multi-layered missile defense system is in full swing, which is much more realistic than President Reagan's Star Wars. Such American activity causes no less concern and irritation in the Kremlin than it did thirty years ago, and there is a high probability that now Russia will be forced to join a new arms race.

Below will be a description of the main components of the SOI system, the reasons why this or that component was never implemented in practice, as well as how the ideas and technologies contained in the program subsequently developed.

History of the SDI program

The development of missile defense systems began almost immediately after the end of World War II. The Soviet Union and the United States appreciated the effectiveness of the German “weapon of retaliation” - the V-1 and V-2 missiles, so already in the late 40s, both countries began to create protection against the new threat.

Initially, the work was more theoretical in nature, since the first combat missiles did not have an intercontinental range and could not hit the territory of a potential enemy.

However, the situation soon changed dramatically: in the late 50s, both the USSR and the USA acquired intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering a nuclear charge to the other hemisphere of the planet. From that moment on, missiles became the main means of delivering nuclear weapons.

In the United States, the first strategic missile defense system MIM-14 Nike-Hercules was put into operation at the end of the 50s. The destruction of ICBM warheads occurred due to anti-missiles with a nuclear warhead. The Hercules was replaced by the more advanced LIM-49A Nike Zeus complex, which also destroyed enemy warheads using thermonuclear charges.

Work on the creation of strategic missile defense was also carried out in the Soviet Union. In the 70s, the A-35 missile defense system was adopted, designed to protect Moscow from a missile attack. Later it was modernized, and until the very moment of the collapse of the USSR, the capital of the country was always covered with a powerful anti-missile shield. To destroy enemy ICBMs, Soviet missile defense systems also used anti-missiles with a nuclear warhead.

Meanwhile, the buildup of nuclear arsenals proceeded at an unprecedented pace, and by the early 70s a paradoxical situation had developed, which contemporaries called a “nuclear deadlock.” Both warring sides had so many warheads and missiles to deliver them that they could destroy their opponent several times. The way out of it was seen in the creation of a powerful missile defense that could reliably protect one of the parties to the conflict during a full-scale exchange nuclear missile strikes. A country possessing such a missile defense system would gain a significant strategic advantage over its opponent. However, the creation of such a defense turned out to be an unprecedentedly complex and expensive task, surpassing any military-technical problems of the twentieth century.

In 1972, the most important document was signed between the USSR and the USA - the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, which today is one of the foundations of international nuclear security. According to this document, each side could deploy only two missile defense systems (later the number was reduced to one) with a maximum ammunition capacity of one hundred interceptor missiles. The only Soviet missile defense system protected the country's capital, and the Americans covered the deployment area of ​​their ICBMs with anti-missiles.

The point of this agreement was that, without the ability to create a powerful missile defense system, each side was defenseless against a crushing retaliatory strike, and this was the best guarantee against rash decisions. This is called the principle of mutually assured destruction, and it is this principle that has been reliably protecting our planet from nuclear Armageddon for many decades.

It seemed that this problem had been solved for many years and the established status quo suited both sides. That was until the beginning of the next decade.

In 1980 presidential elections In the USA, Republican politician Ronald Reagan won, who became one of the most principled and irreconcilable opponents of the communist system. In those years, Soviet newspapers wrote that “the most reactionary forces of American imperialism, led by Reagan,” came to power in the United States.

A few words need to be said about international situation that time. 1983 can be called the real peak of the Cold War. Soviet troops We had already been fighting in Afghanistan for four years, and the United States and other Western countries supported the Mujahideen with weapons and money, the strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact armed forces had reached its maximum, the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers were literally bursting with warheads and ballistic missiles, and the deployment of Pershings continued in Europe. The hands of the Doomsday Clock showed three minutes to midnight.

A few weeks (March 3, 1983) before the announcement of the start of SDI, Reagan called the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire.”

The Strategic Defense Initiative almost immediately attracted enormous public attention, not only in the United States, but throughout the rest of the world. In America itself, a broad PR campaign for a new government initiative has started. Videos were shown in movies and on television that described the principles of operation of the new missile defense system. The average person had the impression that the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative would take several years, after which the Soviets would have a very difficult time.

Very soon, not only American firms and research centers began to be involved in the development of the program, but also companies from Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Israel and other allied countries of the United States. By 1986, the management of the SDI program had concluded more than 1.5 thousand contracts with 260 contractors in different countries of the world. The Germans developed guidance and stabilization systems for lasers and railguns, recognition systems and radar stations. Britain was busy creating new supercomputers, developing software and power units. In Italy, new composite materials, control system elements and kinetic weapons were developed.

Initially, many experts (including Soviet ones) pointed out that the Strategic Defense Initiative project was a big American bluff that could not be implemented. Despite this, the leadership of the USSR took American plans seriously and began to look for an adequate response to them. In 1987, it became known that the Soviet Union was developing a similar program. Modern historians are still arguing about whether Ronald Reagan himself believed in the reality of his plans or was outright bluffing.

However, in 1991, the USSR collapsed, the Cold War was over, and there was no longer any point in spending huge amounts of money on a war in space. In 1993, the US Secretary of Defense officially announced the termination of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Today, the US Missile Defense Agency is developing missile defense, including European missile defense. Few people know that it was originally called the Office of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The leaders of the Missile Defense Agency, as they did thirty years ago, explain to ordinary people that they are solving a very difficult technical problem: learning to shoot down one bullet with another.

SOI Components

The Strategic Defense Initiative was conceived as a comprehensive, in-depth missile defense system, the main part of which was located in space. Moreover, the main means of destruction of the system had to work on the so-called new physical principles. They were supposed to shoot down enemy missiles at all four stages of their trajectory: at the initial stage (immediately after takeoff), at the moment of separation of warheads, ballistic and at the stage of warhead entry into the atmosphere.

Nuclear-pumped lasers. X-ray lasers pumped by a nuclear explosion were proposed by SDI developers almost as a panacea against a possible Soviet missile attack. Such a laser is a nuclear charge with special rods installed on its surface. After the explosion, most of the energy is channeled through these guides and turns into a directed stream of powerful hard radiation. An X-ray laser pumped by a laser explosion is still the most powerful laser device today, although, for obvious reasons, it is a disposable device.

The author of this idea was physicist Edward Teller, who previously led the creation of the American thermonuclear bomb. The estimated power of such weapons was so great that they wanted to destroy even ground objects through the entire thickness of the atmosphere.

Nuclear charges were planned to be launched into orbit using conventional ICBMs immediately after the start of an enemy missile attack. Each of them had to have several rods in order to simultaneously hit a whole group of ballistic targets.

In the mid-80s, tests of these weapons began in the United States, but they raised so many complex technical problems that it was decided to abandon the practical implementation of the project.

Work on the creation of X-ray lasers continues in our time, not only in the West, but also in Russia. However, this problem is so complex that we will definitely not see practical results in this area in the next decade.

Chemical lasers. Another “non-traditional” component of SDI was to be chemically pumped lasers placed in low-Earth orbit, in the air (on airplanes) or on the ground. The most notable were the “death stars” - orbital stations with laser systems with a power of 5 to 20 mW. They were supposed to destroy ballistic missiles in the early and middle sections of their trajectory.

The idea was quite good - in the initial stages of flight, the missiles are very noticeable and vulnerable. The cost of one laser shot is relatively small and the station can produce many of them. However, there was one problem (it has not been solved to this day): the lack of sufficiently powerful and light power plants for such weapons. In the mid-80s, the MIRACL laser was created, and quite successful tests were even carried out, but the main problem was never solved.

Airborne lasers were planned to be installed on transport aircraft and used to destroy ICBMs immediately after takeoff.

The project of another component of the Strategic Defense Initiative - lasers - was interesting. ground-based. To solve the problem of low power supply of laser combat systems, it was proposed to place them on the ground, and transmit the beam into orbit using complex system mirrors that would direct it to taking off missiles or warheads.

In this way, a whole range of problems were solved: with energy pumping, heat removal, and security. However, placing the laser on the earth's surface led to huge losses as the beam passed through the atmosphere. It was calculated that to repel a massive missile attack, it is necessary to use at least 1 thousand gigawatts of electricity, collected at one point in just a few seconds. The US energy system simply would not be able to handle such a load.

Beam weapon. This means of destruction was understood as systems that destroy ICBMs with a stream of elementary particles accelerated to near-light speeds. Such complexes were supposed to disable the electronic systems of missiles and warheads. With sufficient flow power, beam weapons are capable of not only disabling enemy automation, but also physically destroying warheads and missiles.

In the mid-80s, several tests of suborbital stations equipped with beam installations were carried out, but due to their considerable complexity, as well as unreasonable energy consumption, the experiments were discontinued.

Railguns. This is a type of weapon that accelerates a projectile using the Lawrence force; its speed can reach several kilometers per second. Railguns were also planned to be placed on orbital platforms or in ground-based complexes. Within the framework of SDI, there was a separate program for railguns - CHECMATE. During its implementation, the developers managed to achieve noticeable success, but they failed to create a working missile defense system based on electromagnetic guns.

Research in the field of creating railguns continued after the closure of the SDI program, but only a few years ago the Americans received more or less acceptable results. In the near future, electromagnetic guns will be placed on warships and ground-based missile defense systems. It will not be possible to create an orbital railgun even today - too much energy is needed for its operation.

Interceptor satellites. Another element that was planned to be included in the SOI system. Having realized the complexity of creating laser systems for intercepting missile weapons, in 1986 the designers proposed making miniature interceptor satellites that would hit targets with a direct collision as the main component of the SDI system.

This project was called "Diamond Pebbles". They planned to launch a huge number of them - up to 4 thousand pieces. These “kamikazes” could attack ballistic missiles on takeoff or during the separation of warheads from ICBMs.

Compared to other SDI projects, the Diamond Pebble was technically feasible and reasonably priced, so it was soon seen as a core element of the system. In addition, unlike orbital stations, tiny interceptor satellites were less vulnerable to attack from the ground. This project was based on proven technologies and did not require serious scientific research. However, due to the end of the Cold War, it was never implemented.

Anti-missiles. The most “classical” element of the SDI program, it was originally planned to be used as the last frontier missile defense. Even at the beginning of the program, it was decided to abandon the traditional nuclear warheads of anti-missile missiles at that time. The Americans decided that exploding megaton charges over their territory was not a good idea and began developing kinetic interceptors.

However, they required precise aiming and target determination. To make the task a little easier, Lockheed created a special folding structure that unfolded outside the atmosphere like an umbrella and increased the likelihood of hitting a target. Later, the same company created the ERIS anti-missile missile, which as an interceptor had an octagonal inflatable structure with weights at the ends.

Projects to create anti-missile missiles were closed in the early 90s, but thanks to the SDI program, the Americans received a wealth of practical material, which was already used in the implementation of missile defense system projects.

But how did the Soviet Union react to the deployment of the SDI system, which, according to its creators, was supposed to deprive it of the opportunity to deliver a crushing nuclear strike on its main enemy?

Naturally, the activity of the Americans was immediately noticed by the top Soviet leadership and was perceived by them, to put it mildly, nervously. The USSR began preparing an “asymmetric response” to the new American threat. And, I must say, the best forces of the country were thrown into this. The main role in its preparation was played by a group of Soviet scientists under the leadership of the Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.P. Velikhov.

As part of the USSR’s “asymmetric response” to the deployment of the SDI program, it was primarily planned to increase the security of ICBM launch silos and strategic nuclear missile carriers, as well as the overall reliability of the control system of Soviet strategic forces. The second direction of neutralizing the overseas threat was increasing the ability of Soviet strategic nuclear forces to overcome a multi-echelon missile defense system.

All tactical, operational and military-strategic means were gathered into a single fist, which made it possible to deliver a sufficient blow even in the event of a preemptive attack by the enemy. The “Dead Hand” system was created, which ensured the launch of Soviet ICBMs even if the enemy destroyed the country’s top leadership.

In addition to all of the above, work was also carried out on the creation of special tools to combat the American missile defense system. Some elements of the system were considered vulnerable to electronic jamming, and various types of anti-missile missiles with kinetic and nuclear warheads were developed to destroy elements of space-based SDI.

High-energy ground-based lasers, as well as spacecraft with a powerful nuclear charge on board, which could not only physically destroy enemy orbital stations, but also blind its radar, were considered as means of countering the space component of the SDI system.

Velikhov’s group also proposed using metal shrapnel launched into orbit against orbital stations, and aerosol clouds that absorb radiation to combat lasers.

However, the main thing was something else: at the time President Reagan announced the creation of the SDI program, the Soviet Union and the United States each had 10-12 thousand nuclear warheads only on strategic carriers, which even theoretically cannot be stopped by any missile defense even today. Therefore, despite a wide advertising campaign for the new initiative, the Americans never withdrew from the ABM Treaty, and Star Wars quietly sank into oblivion in the early 90s.

If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them

“A long time ago, in a galaxy very far away...” - this is the title that began the world-famous film by George Lucas “Star Wars”. Over time, this phrase became so commonly used that no one was surprised when it began to refer to very real programs for creating space-based armed forces.

The book you are holding in your hands is dedicated to the history of “star wars”, but not the fictional ones raging in a distant galaxy, but the real ones, which began here on Earth, in silence design bureaus and computer centers. You will read about the rocket planes of the Luftwaffe, the Red Army and the US Air Force, about space bombers and orbital interceptors, about the missile defense program and ways to overcome it.

And at present, the history of military astronautics has not yet reached an end. We are experiencing another episode of Star Wars, and it is not yet clear who will emerge victorious from the eternal battle between good and evil.

SOI program

Sections of this page:

SOI program

The successful launch of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, the R-7, in August 1957, initiated a number of military programs in both powers.

The United States, immediately after receiving intelligence data about the new Russian missile, began creating an aerospace defense system for the North American continent and developing the first Nike-Zeus anti-missile system, equipped with anti-missiles with nuclear warheads.

The use of an anti-missile with a thermonuclear charge significantly reduced the requirement for guidance accuracy. It was assumed that the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion of an anti-missile would make it possible to neutralize the warhead of a ballistic missile, even if it was 2–3 km away from the epicenter.

In 1963, development began on the next generation missile defense system - Nike-X. It was necessary to create an anti-missile system that was capable of providing protection from Soviet missiles to an entire area, and not a single object. To destroy enemy warheads at distant approaches, the Spartan missile was developed with a flight range of 650 km, equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 1 megaton. Its explosion was supposed to create in space a zone of guaranteed destruction of several warheads and possible false targets. Testing of this anti-missile began in 1968 and lasted three years.

In case some of the warheads of enemy missiles penetrate the space protected by Spartan missiles, the missile defense system included complexes with shorter-range Sprint interceptor missiles. The Sprint anti-missile missile was supposed to be used as the main means of protecting a limited number of objects. It was supposed to hit targets at altitudes up to 50 km.

The authors of American missile defense projects in the sixties considered only powerful nuclear charges to be a real means of destroying enemy warheads. But the abundance of anti-missiles equipped with them did not guarantee the protection of all protected areas, and if they were used, they threatened to cause radioactive contamination of the entire US territory.

In 1967, development of the zonal limited missile defense system “Sentinel” began. Its kit included the same “Spartan”, “Sprint” and two radars: “PAR” and “MSR”. By this time, the concept of missile defense not of cities and industrial zones, but of strategic base areas, began to gain strength in the United States. nuclear forces and the National Center for their management. The Sentinel system was urgently renamed “Safeguard” and modified in accordance with the specifics of solving new problems.

The first complex of the new missile defense system (of the planned twelve) was deployed at the Grand Forks missile base.

However, some time later, by decision of the American Congress, this work was stopped as insufficiently effective, and the built missile defense system was mothballed. and the United States sat down at the negotiating table on limiting missile defense systems, which led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and the signing of its protocol in 1974.

It would seem that the problem is settled. But it was not there…

* * *

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, addressing his compatriots, said:

“I know that you all want peace, I want it too.<…>I appeal to the scientific community of our country, to those who gave us nuclear weapons, to use their great talents for the benefit of mankind and world peace and to put at our disposal the means that would render nuclear weapons useless and obsolete. Today, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I am taking an important first step. I am directing the commencement of a comprehensive and vigorous effort to define the content of a long-term research and development program that will begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from strategic missiles with nuclear charges. This could pave the way for arms control measures that would lead to the complete destruction of the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only goal - and it is shared by the entire nation - is to find ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war."

Not everyone understood then that the president was upending the ideas that had been established for almost two decades about ways to prevent nuclear war and ensure a stable world, the symbol and basis of which was the ABM Treaty.

What happened? What changed Washington's attitude toward missile defense so dramatically?

Let's go back to the sixties. This is how a well-known columnist for the American Time magazine described the way of thinking that the American military-political leadership adhered to in those years regarding the ABM Treaty:

“At the time, some observers thought the agreement reached was somewhat strange. Indeed, the two superpowers were making a solemn commitment not to defend themselves. In reality, however, they reduced the possibility of attacking each other. The ABM Treaty was an important achievement.<… >If one of the parties is able to protect itself from the threat of a nuclear strike, it receives an incentive to spread its geopolitical weight to other areas, and the other party is forced to create new ones. best samples offensive weapons and at the same time improve their defense. Therefore, the proliferation of defensive weapons is as much anathema to arms control as the proliferation of offensive weapons.<…>Missile defense is “destabilizing” for a number of reasons: it stimulates competition in the field of defensive weapons, with each side seeking to equal, and perhaps even surpass, the other side in the field of missile defense; it stimulates competition in the field of offensive weapons, with each side seeking to be able to “overcome” the other side’s missile defense system; Missile defense may finally lead to illusory or even real overall strategic superiority.”

This observer was not a military specialist, otherwise he would not have missed another consideration that guided the parties when deciding to limit missile defense systems.

No matter how strong a missile defense system is, it cannot become completely impenetrable. In reality, missile defense is designed for a certain number of warheads and decoys launched by the other side. Therefore, missile defense is more effective against a retaliatory strike by the other side, when a significant, and perhaps the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s strategic nuclear forces have already been destroyed as a result of the first disarming strike. Thus, with the presence of large missile defense systems, each of the opposing sides, in the event of a confrontation that heats up, has an additional incentive to launch a nuclear attack first.

Finally, new round Arms races are a new burdensome expenditure of resources, of which humanity is becoming increasingly scarce.

It is unlikely that those who prepared Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983, did not analyze all the negative consequences of the stated program. What prompted them to such an unwise decision?

They say that the initiator of the Strategic Defense Initiative program (SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative) is one of the creators of the American thermonuclear bomb, Edward Teller, who knew Reagan since the mid-1960s and always opposed the ABM Treaty and any agreements limiting the US ability to build up and improve its military-strategic potential.

At the meeting with Reagan, Teller spoke not only on his own behalf. He relied on the powerful support of the US military-industrial complex. Concerns that the SDI program might initiate a similar Soviet program were dismissed: the USSR would find it difficult to accept a new American challenge, especially in the face of already emerging economic difficulties. If the Soviet Union did decide to do this, then, as Teller reasoned, it would most likely be limited, and the United States would be able to acquire the much-desired military superiority. Of course, SDI is unlikely to ensure complete impunity for the United States in the event of a Soviet nuclear retaliatory strike, but it will give Washington additional confidence when carrying out military-political actions abroad.

Politicians also saw another aspect in this - the creation of new colossal loads for the USSR economy, which would further complicate the growing social problems and reduce the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for developing countries. The game seemed tempting.

The president's speech was timed to coincide with debates in Congress on the military budget for the next fiscal year. As Speaker of the House of Representatives O’Neill noted, it was not about national security at all, but about the military budget. Senator Kennedy called the speech "reckless Star Wars plans."

Since then, no one has called Reagan’s speech anything other than a “Star Wars plan.” They talk about a curious incident that occurred at one of the press conferences at the National Press Club in Washington. The presenter, who introduced Lieutenant General Abrahamson (director of the SDI Implementation Organization) to reporters, joked: “Whoever, when asking the general a question, avoids using the words “star wars” will win a prize.” There were no contenders for the prize - everyone preferred to say “Star Wars Program” instead of “SDI.”

Nevertheless, in early June 1983, Reagan established three expert commissions that were supposed to assess the technical feasibility of his idea. Of the materials prepared, the most famous is the report of the Fletcher Commission. She concluded that, despite major unresolved technical problems, the technological advances of the last twenty years in relation to the problem of creating missile defense look promising. The commission proposed a scheme for a layered defense system based on the latest military technologies. Each echelon of this system is designed to intercept missile warheads at various stages of their flight. The commission recommended starting a research and development program with the goal of culminating in the early 1990s with the demonstration of core missile defense technologies. Then, based on the results obtained, decide whether to continue or close work on creating a large-scale ballistic missile defense system.

The next step towards the implementation of SDI was Presidential Directive No. 119, which appeared at the end of 1983. It marked the beginning of scientific research and development that would answer the question of whether it was possible to create new space-based weapons systems or any other defensive means capable of repelling nuclear attack on the USA.

* * *

It quickly became clear that the allocations for SDI provided for in the budget could not ensure a successful solution to the ambitious tasks assigned to the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program over the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires expenditures ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo named an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSIOI) began its activities. It represented the central apparatus of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. The central office of the OOSOI employed about 100 people. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, controlled the preparation and execution of the budget, selected performers of specific work, and maintained day-to-day contacts with the US Presidential Administration, Congress, and other executive and legislative bodies.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the OOSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants in research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, acquisition and tracking of targets; creation of technical means that use the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means that use the effect of kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of system components, energy supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like as a first approximation?

The performance criteria after two to three years of work under the SOI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, the defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems must sufficiently fulfill their task even in the face of a number of serious attacks, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Thirdly, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy’s confidence in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The SOI program strategy included investment in a technology base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first phase of SOI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the subsequent phase of the system. This distribution into stages, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the further introduction of promising technologies, such as directed energy weapons, although initially the authors of the project considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 80s, elements of the first-stage system were considered such as a space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; extra-atmospheric interception missiles (ERIS); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: space-based beam weapons based on the use of neutral particles; anti-missiles for intercepting targets in upper layers atmospheres (“HEDI”); an on-board optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based radar (“GBR”), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets on the final part of their flight path; a space-based laser system designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based gun with projectile acceleration to hypersonic speeds (“HVG”); ground-based laser system for destroying ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the structure of SDI thought of the system as multi-tiered, capable of intercepting missiles during three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight path), the middle part of the flight path, which mainly accounts for flight in space after how the warheads and decoys are separated from the missiles, and in the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on the downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads had not yet separated from the missile and could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI Directorate, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main meaning of “Star Wars”.

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically cut back (reductions up to 40-50% annually) the administration’s requests for projects, the authors of the program transferred some of its elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced, and some disappeared completely.

Nevertheless, the most developed among other projects of the SDI program were ground-based and space-based non-nuclear missile defenses, which allows us to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the currently created missile defense of the country's territory. Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the extra-atmospheric region, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide surveillance and tracking missions at the final part of the trajectory.

The least advanced projects were directed energy weapons, which combine research into four basic concepts considered promising for multi-echelon defense, including ground- and space-based lasers, space-based accelerator (beam) weapons, and directed energy nuclear weapons.

Projects related to a complex solution to a problem can be classified as work that is almost at the initial stage.

For a number of projects, only problems that remain to be solved have been identified. This includes projects to create nuclear power plants based in space and with a capacity of 100 kW with an extension of power up to several megawatts.

The SDI program also required an inexpensive, universally applicable aircraft capable of launching a payload weighing 4,500 kg and a crew of two into polar orbit. OOSOI required firms to analyze three concepts: a vehicle with vertical launch and landing, a vehicle with vertical launch and horizontal landing, and a vehicle with horizontal launch and landing.

As announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the Delta Clipper project with vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project was implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing almost exponentially of allocations for these purposes.

On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the termination of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions of the Democratic administration since it came to power. Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the irretrievable loss of the United States as its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. They say that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and out of fear they lost the Cold War, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the country's top leadership, took on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists under the leadership of Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington “is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons.” powerless and outdated”, to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other areas of the world." Moreover, the Soviet Union has long been developing own system A missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SOI program.

The successful launch of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, the R-7, in August 1957, initiated a number of military programs in both powers. The United States, immediately after receiving intelligence information about the new Russian missile, began creating an aerospace defense system for the North American continent and developing the first Nike-Zeus anti-missile system, equipped with anti-missiles with nuclear warheads (I already wrote about it in Chapter 13).

The use of an anti-missile with a thermonuclear charge significantly reduced the requirement for guidance accuracy.

It was assumed that the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion of an anti-missile would make it possible to neutralize the warhead of a ballistic missile, even if it was two to three kilometers away from the epicenter. In 1962, in order to determine the influence of damaging factors, the Americans conducted a series of test nuclear explosions on high altitudes, but soon work on the Nike-Zeus system was stopped.

However, in 1963, development of the next generation missile defense system, Nike-X, began. It was necessary to create an anti-missile system that would be capable of providing protection against Soviet missiles for an entire area, and not for a single object. To destroy enemy warheads at distant approaches, the Spartan missile was developed with a flight range of 650 kilometers, equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 1 megaton. A charge of such enormous power was supposed to create in space a zone of guaranteed destruction of several warheads and possible decoys.

Testing of this anti-missile began in 1968 and lasted three years. In case some of the warheads of enemy missiles penetrate the space protected by Spartan missiles, the missile defense system included complexes with shorter-range Sprint interceptor missiles. The Sprint anti-missile missile was supposed to be used as the main means of protecting a limited number of objects. It was supposed to hit targets at altitudes of up to 50 kilometers.

The authors of American missile defense projects of the 60s considered only powerful nuclear charges to be a real means of destroying enemy warheads. But the abundance of anti-missiles equipped with them did not guarantee the protection of all protected areas, and if they were used, they threatened to cause radioactive contamination of the entire US territory.

In 1967, development of the zonal limited missile defense system “Sentinel” began. Its kit included the same “Spartan”, “Sprint” and two RAS: “PAR” and “MSR”. By this time, the concept of missile defense not of cities and industrial zones, but of areas where strategic nuclear forces and the National Control Center are based, began to gain momentum in the United States. The Sentinel system was urgently renamed “Safeguard” and modified in accordance with the specifics of solving new problems.

The first complex of the new missile defense system (of the planned twelve) was deployed at the Grand Forks missile base.

However, some time later, by decision of the American Congress, this work was stopped as insufficiently effective, and the built missile defense system was mothballed.

The USSR and the USA sat down at the negotiating table on limiting missile defense systems, which led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and the signing of its protocol in 1974.

It would seem that the problem is settled. But it was not there…

Star Wars: Birth of a Myth

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, addressing his compatriots, said:

“I know you all want peace. I want it too.[...] I appeal to the scientific community of our country, to those who gave us nuclear weapons, with an appeal to use their great talents for the benefit of humanity and world peace and to put at our disposal the means that would make nuclear weapons useless and outdated. Today, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I am taking an important first step.

I am directing a comprehensive and vigorous effort to define the content of a long-term research and development program that will begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from nuclear-capable strategic missiles.

This could pave the way for arms control measures that would lead to the complete destruction of the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only goal - and it is shared by the entire nation - is to find ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war."

Not everyone understood then that the president was upending the ideas that had been established for almost two decades about ways to prevent nuclear war and ensure a stable world, the symbol and basis of which was the ABM Treaty.

What happened? What changed Washington's attitude toward missile defense so dramatically?

Let's go back to the 60s. This is how the famous columnist for the American Time magazine S. Talbot described the way of thinking that the American military-political leadership adhered to in those years regarding the ABM Treaty: “At that time, to some observers, the agreement reached seemed somewhat strange. Indeed, the two superpowers were making a solemn commitment not to defend themselves. In reality, however, they reduced the possibility of attacking each other. The ABM Treaty was an important achievement. […] If one of the parties is able to protect itself from the threat of a nuclear strike, it receives an incentive to spread its geopolitical weight to other areas, and the other side is forced to create new, better models of offensive weapons and at the same time improve its defense. Therefore, the proliferation of defensive weapons is as much anathema to arms control as the proliferation of offensive weapons. […] Missile defense is “destabilizing” for a number of reasons: it stimulates competition in the field of defensive weapons, with each side seeking to equal, and perhaps even surpass, the other side in the field of missile defense; it stimulates competition in the field of offensive weapons, with each side seeking to be able to “overcome” the other side’s missile defense system; Missile defense may finally lead to illusory or even real overall strategic superiority.”

Talbot was not a military specialist, otherwise he would not have missed another consideration that guided the parties when deciding to limit missile defense systems.

No matter how strong a missile defense system is, it cannot become completely impenetrable. In reality, missile defense is designed for a certain number of warheads and decoys launched by the other side. Therefore, missile defense is more effective against a retaliatory strike by the other side, when a significant, and perhaps the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s strategic nuclear forces have already been destroyed as a result of the first disarming strike. Thus, with the presence of large missile defense systems, each of the opposing sides, in the event of a confrontation that heats up, has an additional incentive to launch a nuclear attack first.

Finally, a new round of the arms race means new burdensome expenditures on resources, of which humanity is becoming increasingly scarce.

It is unlikely that those who prepared Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983, did not analyze all the negative consequences of the stated program. What prompted them to such an unwise decision? They say that the initiator of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program is the main creator of the American thermonuclear bomb, Teller, who has known Reagan since the mid-60s and has always been an opponent of the ABM Treaty and any agreements limiting the ability of the United States to build up and improve its military-strategic potential.

At the meeting with Reagan, Teller spoke not only on his own behalf. He relied on the powerful support of the US military-industrial complex. Concerns that the SDI program might initiate a similar Soviet program were dismissed: the USSR would find it difficult to accept a new American challenge, especially in the face of already emerging economic difficulties. If the Soviet Union did decide to do this, then, as Teller reasoned, it would most likely be limited, and the United States would be able to acquire the much-desired military superiority. Of course, SDI is unlikely to ensure complete impunity for the United States in the event of a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike, but it will give Washington additional confidence when carrying out military-political actions abroad. Politicians also saw another aspect in this - the creation of new colossal loads for the USSR economy, which would further complicate the growing social problems and reduce the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for developing countries. The game seemed tempting.

The president's speech was timed to coincide with debates in Congress on the military budget for the next fiscal year. As House Speaker O'Neill noted, it was not about national security at all, but about the military budget. Senator Kennedy called the speech “reckless Star Wars plans.” (It seems that the senator hit the nail on the head: since then, in the United States, Reagan’s speech has been known only as “ no one called it a "star wars plan." They tell of a curious incident that occurred at one of the press conferences at the Foreign Press Center at the National Press Club in Washington: the presenter, who introduced Lieutenant General Abrahamson (director of the SDI Implementation Organization) to reporters, joked: "Whoever avoids using the words 'star wars' when asking the general a question will win a prize."

There were no contenders for the prize - everyone preferred to say “Star Wars Program” instead of “SDI.”) Nevertheless, in early June 1983, Reagan established three expert commissions that were supposed to assess the technical feasibility of the idea he expressed. Of the materials prepared, the most famous is the report of the Fletcher Commission. She concluded that, despite major unresolved technical problems, the technological advances of the last twenty years in relation to the problem of creating missile defense look promising. The commission proposed a scheme for a layered defense system based on the latest military technologies. Each echelon of this system is designed to intercept missile warheads at various stages of their flight. The commission recommended starting a research and development program with the goal of culminating in the early 1990s with the demonstration of basic missile defense technologies.

Then, based on the results obtained, decide whether to continue or close work on creating a large-scale ballistic missile defense system.

The next step towards the implementation of SDI was Presidential Directive No. 119, which appeared at the end of 1983. It marked the beginning of scientific research and development that would answer the question of whether it was possible to create new space-based weapons systems or any other defensive means, capable of repelling a nuclear attack on the United States.

SOI program

As it quickly became clear, the allocations for SDI provided for in the budget could not ensure a successful solution to the ambitious tasks assigned to the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program over the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires expenditures ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo named an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSIOI) began its activities. It represented the central apparatus of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. The central office of the OOSOI employed about 100 people. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, controlled the preparation and execution of the budget, selected performers of specific work, and maintained day-to-day contacts with the US Presidential Administration, Congress, and other executive and legislative bodies.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the OOSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants in research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, acquisition and tracking of targets; creation of technical means that use the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means that use the effect of kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of system components, energy supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like as a first approximation?

The performance criteria after two to three years of work under the SOI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, the defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems must sufficiently fulfill their task even in the face of a number of serious attacks, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Thirdly, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy’s confidence in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The SOI program strategy included investment in a technology base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first phase of SOI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the subsequent phase of the system. This distribution into stages, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the further introduction of promising technologies, such as directed energy weapons, although initially the authors of the project considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 80s, elements of the first-stage system were considered such as a space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; extra-atmospheric interception missiles (ERIS); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: space-based beam weapons based on the use of neutral particles; Upper Atmospheric Interdiction (HEDI) missiles; an on-board optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based radar (“GBR”), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets in the final part of their flight path; a space-based laser system designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based gun with projectile acceleration to hypersonic speeds (“HVG”); ground-based laser system for destroying ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the SDI structure envisioned the system as multi-tiered, capable of intercepting missiles during three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight path), the middle part of the flight path, which mainly accounts for the flight in space after how the warheads and decoys are separated from the missiles, and in the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on the downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads of multi-shot ICBMs had not yet separated from the missile, and they could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI Directorate, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main meaning of “Star Wars.”

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically cut down (reductions to 40–50% annually) the administration’s requests for project implementation, the authors of the program transferred its individual elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced , and some disappeared completely.

Nevertheless, the most developed among other projects of the SDI program were ground-based and space-based non-nuclear missile defenses, which allows us to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the currently created missile defense system of the country.

Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the extra-atmospheric region, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide surveillance and tracking missions on the final part of the trajectory.

The least advanced projects were directed energy weapons, which combine research into four basic concepts considered promising for multi-echelon defense, including ground- and space-based lasers, space-based accelerator (beam) weapons, and directed energy nuclear weapons.

Projects related to a complex solution to a problem can be classified as work that is almost at the initial stage.

For a number of projects, only problems that remain to be solved have been identified. This includes projects to create nuclear power plants based in space and with a capacity of 100 kW with an extension of power up to several megawatts.

The SOI program also required an inexpensive, universally applicable aircraft capable of launching a payload weighing 4,500 kilograms and a crew of two into polar orbit. OOSOI required firms to analyze three concepts: a vehicle with vertical launch and landing, a vehicle with vertical launch and horizontal landing, and a vehicle with horizontal launch and landing.

As announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the Delta Clipper project with vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas. The layout resembled a greatly enlarged Mercury capsule.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project was implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing almost exponentially of allocations for these purposes. On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the termination of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions of the Democratic administration since it came to power.

Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the irretrievable loss of the United States as its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. They say that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and out of fear they lost the Cold War, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the country's top leadership, took on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists under the leadership of Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington “is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons.” powerless and outdated,” to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other areas of the world.” Moreover, the Soviet Union had long been developing its own missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SOI program.

Soviet missile defense system

In the Soviet Union, attention began to be paid to the problem of missile defense immediately after the end of World War II. In the early 50s, the first studies of the possibility of creating missile defense systems were carried out at NII-4 of the USSR Ministry of Defense and at NII-885, which were involved in the development and use of ballistic missiles. In these works, schemes were proposed for equipping anti-missile missiles with two types of guidance systems. For tele-controlled anti-missiles, a fragmentation warhead with low-speed fragments and a circular destruction field was proposed.

For homing anti-missiles, it was proposed to use a directional warhead, which, together with the missile, was supposed to turn towards the target and explode according to information from the homing head, creating the greatest density of the fragment field in the direction of the target.

One of the first projects for the country's global missile defense was proposed by Vladimir Chelomey.

In 1963, he proposed using the UR-100 intercontinental missiles developed at his OKB-52 to create the Taran missile defense system. The proposal was approved and by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 3, 1963, the development of a project for the Taran missile defense system was set for intercepting ballistic missiles in the transatmospheric section of the trajectory.

The system was supposed to use the UR-100 (8K84) missile in the anti-missile version with a super-powerful thermonuclear warhead with a yield of at least 10 megatons.

Its dimensions: length - 16.8 meters, diameter - 2 meters, launch weight - 42.3 tons, weight of the head part - 800 kilograms.

The anti-missile missile would be able to hit targets at altitudes of about 700 kilometers, the range of hitting the target would be up to 2,000 thousand kilometers. Probably, to guarantee the destruction of all targets, it was necessary to deploy several hundred launchers with anti-missile systems of the Taran system.

A feature of the system was the lack of correction of the UR-100 anti-missile missile during flight, which would be ensured by accurate target designation of the radar.

The new system was to use radar equipment of the Danube-3 system, as well as the TsSO-S multi-channel radar, located 500 kilometers from Moscow towards Leningrad. According to the data of this radar, operating in the wavelength range from 30 to 40 centimeters, it was supposed to detect enemy missiles and prolong the coordinates of interception points and the moment of target arrival at these points. The TsSO-S station was turned on by signals from the missile attack warning system nodes RO-1 (city of Murmansk) and RO-2 (city of Riga).

In 1964, work on the Taran system was stopped - the resignation of Nikita Khrushchev played a significant role in the history of the creation of this system. However, Vladimir Chelomey himself later admitted that he abandoned the Taran system due to the vulnerability of the long-range radar detection system, which was a key link in his system.

In addition, the anti-missile missile required a launch accelerator - a similar ballistic missile is not suitable as an anti-missile missile due to limitations in speed and maneuverability with a strict time limit for intercepting a target.

Others have achieved success. In 1955, Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, chief designer of SKB-30 (a structural unit of a large organization for SB-1 missile systems), prepared proposals for the test site experimental missile defense system “A”.

Calculations of the effectiveness of anti-missiles carried out in SB-1 showed that with the existing guidance accuracy, the defeat of one ballistic missile is ensured by the use of 8-10 anti-missiles, which made the system ineffective.

Therefore, Kisunko proposed using a new method for determining the coordinates of a high-speed ballistic target and an anti-missile missile - triangulation, that is, determining the coordinates of an object by measuring the distance to it from radars spaced at a large distance from each other and located in the corners of an equilateral triangle.

In March 1956, a preliminary design was released by SKB-30 anti-missile system"A".

The system included the following elements: Danube-2 radars with a target detection range of 1200 kilometers, three radars for precise guidance of anti-missile missiles at the target, a launch site with launchers of two-stage anti-missile missiles "V-1000", the main command and computing center of the system with a lamp computer "M-40" and radio relay communication lines between all means of the system.

The decision to build the tenth state test site for the needs of the country's air defense was made on April 1, 1956, and in May a State Commission was created under the leadership of Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky to select its location, and already in June, military builders began creating a test site in the Betpak desert. Dala.

The first operation of the “A” system to intercept the R-5 ballistic missile with an anti-missile missile was successful on November 24, 1960, while the anti-missile was not equipped with a warhead. Then followed a whole series of tests, some of which ended unsuccessfully.

The main test took place on March 4, 1961. On that day, an anti-missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the head of an R-12 ballistic missile launched from the State Central Test Site. The anti-missile warhead consisted of 16 thousand balls with a tungsten carbide core, TNT filling and a steel shell.

Successful test results of the “A” system made it possible by June 1961 to complete the development of the preliminary design of the “A-35” missile defense combat system, designed to protect Moscow from American intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The combat system was supposed to include a command post, eight sectoral RAS "Danube-3" and 32 firing systems. It was planned to complete the deployment of the system by 1967 - the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Subsequently, the project underwent changes, but in 1966 the system was still almost completely ready for combat duty.

In 1973, general designer Grigory Kisunko substantiated the main technical solutions according to a modernized system capable of hitting complex ballistic targets. The A-35 system was faced with combat mission to intercept a single, but complex multi-element target, containing, along with warheads, light (inflatable) and heavy decoys, which required significant modifications to the system’s computer center.

This was the last refinement and modernization of the A-35 system, which ended in 1977 with the presentation to the State Commission of the new A-35M missile defense system.

The A-35M system was withdrawn from service in 1983, although its capabilities allowed it to carry out combat duty until 2004.

Project "Terra-3"

In addition to the creation of traditional missile defense systems, the Soviet Union conducted research on the development of a completely new type of missile defense systems. Many of these developments are still not completed and are already the property of modern Russia.

Among them, the Terra-3 project stands out first, aimed at creating a powerful ground-based laser system capable of destroying enemy objects at orbital and suborbital altitudes. Work on the project was carried out by the Vympel Design Bureau, and from the late 60s a special testing position was built at the Sary-Shagan test site.

The experimental laser installation consisted of the lasers themselves (ruby and gas), a beam guidance and retention system, an information complex designed to ensure the functioning of the guidance system, as well as a high-precision laser locator "LE-1" intended for precise definition target coordinates. The capabilities of the LE-1 made it possible not only to determine the range to the target, but also to obtain accurate characteristics of its trajectory, object shape and size.

In the mid-1980s, tests were carried out at the Terra-3 complex laser weapons, which also involved shooting at flying targets. Unfortunately, these experiments showed that the laser beam was not powerful enough to destroy ballistic missile warheads.

In 1981, the United States launched the first space shuttle, the Space Shuttle. Naturally, this attracted the attention of the USSR government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. In the fall of 1983, Marshal Dmitry Ustinov proposed to the commander of the Missile Defense Forces, Votintsev, to use a laser system to accompany the Shuttle. And on October 10, 1984, during the thirteenth flight of the Challenger shuttle, when its orbits passed in the area of ​​test site “A”, the experiment took place with the laser system operating in detection mode with minimal radiation power. The altitude of the spacecraft's orbit at that time was 365 kilometers. As the Challenger crew later reported, while flying over the Balkhash region, the ship’s communications suddenly went out, malfunctions occurred in the equipment, and the astronauts themselves felt unwell. The Americans began to figure it out. They soon realized that the crew had been subjected to some kind of artificial influence from the USSR, and they filed an official protest.

Currently, the Terra-3 complex is abandoned and rusting - Kazakhstan was unable to raise this object.

Background program

In the early 70s, research and development work was carried out in the USSR under the “Fon” program with the aim of creating a promising missile defense system. The essence of the program was to create a system that would make it possible to keep everything “in sight” nuclear warheads Americans, including even those based on submarines and bombers. The system was supposed to be based in space and hit American nuclear missiles before they launched.

Work on the technical project was carried out at the direction of Marshal Dmitry Ustinov at NPO Kometa.

At the end of the 70s, the Fon-1 program was launched, which provided for the creation of various types of beam weapons, electromagnetic guns, anti-missiles, including multi-charge ones with submunitions, and a multiple launch rocket system. However, soon many designers at one of the meetings decided to curtail the work, since, in their opinion, the program had no prospects: at the Kometa Central Research Institute, as a result of work on the Fon program, they came to the conclusion that destroying the entire US nuclear potential at all types of carriers (10 thousand charges) in 20–25 minutes of flight time is impossible.

Since 1983, the implementation of the Fon-2 program was launched. The program provided for in-depth research into the use of alternative means capable of neutralizing American SDI with “non-lethal weapons”: an electromagnetic pulse that instantly disrupts the operation of electronic equipment, the impact of lasers, powerful microwave field changes, and so on. As a result, some quite interesting developments have emerged.

Airborne missile defense system

From 1983 to 1987, as part of the Terra-3 project, tests were carried out of a laser system weighing about 60 tons, installed on the Il-76MD (A-60) USSR-86879 flying laboratory.

To power the laser and related equipment, additional turbogenerators were installed in the fairings on the sides of the fuselage, as on the Il-76PP.

The standard weather radar was replaced with a bulb-shaped fairing on a special adapter, to which a smaller oblong fairing was attached below. Obviously, there was an antenna for the aiming system, which turned in any direction, catching the target. From the extensive glazing of the navigation cabin, only two windows on each side remained.

In order not to spoil the aerodynamics of the aircraft with another fairing, the optical head of the laser was made retractable.

The top of the fuselage between the wing and fin was cut out and replaced with huge doors consisting of several segments.

They were removed inside the fuselage, and then a turret with a cannon climbed up.

Behind the wing there were fairings protruding beyond the contour of the fuselage with a profile similar to that of the wing. The cargo ramp was retained, but the cargo hatch doors were removed and the hatch was sealed with metal.

The modification of the aircraft was carried out by the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex named after Beriev and the Taganrog Machine-Building Plant named after Georgiy Dimitrov, which produced the A-50 and Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft. Nothing is known about the progress of tests of the domestic combat laser, since they remain top secret.

After the testing program, the A-60 laboratory was located at the Chkalovsky airfield, where it burned down in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this project can be revived if the need suddenly arises...

Ground-based laser missile defense

A mobile laser complex for destroying enemy satellites and ballistic missiles was created through the efforts of the design team of the Troitsk Institute of Innovation and Thermonuclear Research (Moscow region).

The basis of the complex is a carbon laser with a power of 1 MW. The complex is based on two platform modules created from serial trailers from the Chelyabinsk plant. The first platform houses a laser radiation generator, which includes an optical resonator unit and a gas-discharge chamber. The beam formation and guidance system is also installed here. Nearby there is a control cabin, from where software or manual guidance and focusing is carried out. On the second platform there are elements of the gas-dynamic path: the R29-300 aviation turbojet engine, which has exhausted its flight life, but is still capable of serving as an energy source; ejectors, exhaust and noise suppression devices, a container for liquefied carbon dioxide, a fuel tank with aviation kerosene.

Each platform is equipped with its own KrAZ tractor and is transported to almost any place where it can go.

When it became clear that this complex would not be used as a weapon, a team of specialists from the Trinity Institute, together with colleagues from the NPO Almaz, the Efremov Scientific Research Institute of Electrophysical Equipment and the State Implementation Small Enterprise Conversion, developed on its basis the laser technological complex MLTK-50 " This complex showed excellent results when extinguishing a fire at a gas well in Karachaevsk, breaking up a rock mass, decontaminating the surface of concrete at a nuclear power plant using the peeling method, burning off an oil film on the surface of a water area, and even destroying hordes of locusts.

Plasma missile defense system

Another interesting development is related to the creation of plasma missile defense capable of hitting targets at altitudes of up to 50 kilometers.

The operation of this system is based on long-standing known effect.

It turns out that plasma can be accelerated along two, usually quite long, busbars - current conductors, which are parallel wires or plates.

The plasma clot closes the electrical circuit between the conductors, and an external magnetic field acts perpendicular to the bus plane. The plasma accelerates and flows from the ends of the tires in the same way as a metal conductor sliding along the tires would accelerate. Depending on the conditions, the outflow can occur in different ways: in the form of a strongly expanding torch, jets, or in the form of successive plasma toroid rings - the so-called plasmoids.

The accelerator is called in this case a plasmoid gun; Plasma is typically formed from consumable electrode material. Plasmoids resemble smoke rings released by skilled smokers, but they fly in the air not flat, but sideways, at speeds of tens and hundreds of kilometers per second. Each plasmoid is a ring of plasma contracted by a magnetic field with a current flowing in it and is formed as a result of the expansion of a current loop under the influence of its own magnetic field, sometimes reinforced with the help of jumpers - metal plates in electrical circuit.

The first plasma gun in our country was built by the Leningrad professor Babat back in 1941. Currently, research in this area is being conducted at the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation under the leadership of Academician Rimilius Avramenko. Plasma weapons have practically been created there, capable of hitting any targets at altitudes up to 50 kilometers.

According to the academician, plasma missile defense weapons will not only cost several orders of magnitude cheaper American system PRO, but also many times easier to create and manage.

A plasmoid, directed by ground-based missile defense systems, creates an ionized area in front of the flying warhead and completely disrupts the aerodynamics of the object’s flight, after which the target leaves the trajectory and is destroyed by monstrous overloads. Wherein damaging factor delivered to the target at the speed of light.

In 1995, specialists from the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation developed the concept of the international experiment “Trust” for testing plasma weapons jointly with the United States at the American Kwajelein anti-missile test site.

Project "Trust" consisted of conducting an experiment with a plasma weapon that could hit any object moving in the Earth's atmosphere. This is done on the basis of an already existing technological base, without launching any components into space. The cost of the experiment is estimated at $300 million.

US National Missile Defense System (NMD)

The ABM Treaty no longer exists. On December 13, 2001, US President George W. Bush notified Russian President Vladimir Putin of the withdrawal from unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty. The decision was related to the Pentagon's plans to conduct new tests of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system no later than six months later in order to protect against attacks from the so-called “rogue countries.” Before that, the Pentagon had already conducted five successful tests of a new anti-missile missile capable of hitting Minuteman-2 class intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The days of SDI are back. America is once again sacrificing its reputation on the world stage and spending colossal amounts of money in pursuit of the illusory hope of obtaining a missile defense “umbrella” that will protect it from threats from the sky. The pointlessness of this idea is obvious. After all, the same claims can be made against NMD systems as against SDI systems. They do not provide a 100% guarantee of security, but they can create the illusion of it.

And there is nothing more dangerous to health and life itself than the illusion of safety...

The US NMD system, according to the plans of its creators, will include several elements: ground-based missile interceptors (“Ground leased Interceptor”), a combat management system (“Battle Management/Command, Control, Communication”), high-frequency missile defense radars (“Ground Based”) Radiolocator"), missile attack warning system radar (MAWS), high-frequency missile defense radars ("Brilliant Eyes") and a constellation of SBIRS satellites.

Ground-based missile interceptors or anti-missile defenses are the main missile defense weapons. They destroy ballistic missile warheads outside the Earth's atmosphere.

The combat control system is a kind of brain of the missile defense system. In the event of missiles being launched across the United States, it will be the one that will control the interception.

Ground-based high-frequency missile defense radars track the flight path of the missile and warhead. They send the received information to the combat control system. The latter, in turn, gives commands to the interceptors.

The SBIRS satellite constellation is a two-echelon satellite system that will play a key role in the control system of the NMD complex. The upper echelon - space - in the project includes 4-6 satellites for the missile attack warning system. The low-altitude echelon consists of 24 satellites located at a distance of 800-1200 kilometers.

These satellites are equipped with optical range sensors that detect and determine the movement parameters of targets.

According to the Pentagon, the initial stage in the creation of a national missile defense system should be the construction of a radar station on Shemiya Island (Aleutian Islands). The location for the start of the deployment of the NMD system was not chosen by chance.

It is through Alaska, according to experts, that most of the flight trajectories of missiles that can reach US territory pass through. Therefore, it is planned to deploy about 100 interceptor missiles there. By the way, this radar, which is still in the project, completes the creation of a tracking ring around the United States, which includes the radar in Thule (Greenland), the Flaindales radar in the UK and three radars in the United States - Cape Cod, Claire and "Bill". All of them have been operating for about 30 years and will be modernized during the creation of the NMD system.

In addition, similar tasks (monitoring missile launches and warning of missile attacks) will be performed by the radar in Varde (Norway), located just 40 kilometers from the Russian border.

The first test of the anti-missile missile took place on July 15, 2001. It cost the American taxpayer $100 million, but Pentagon specialists successfully destroyed an intercontinental ballistic missile 144 miles above the Earth's surface.

The one-and-a-half-meter-long destructive element of an interceptor missile launched from Kwajelein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, approaching the Minuteman ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, hit it with a direct hit, resulting in a blindingly bright flash in the sky that caused the jubilation of the American military and technical specialists shaking their fists in admiration.

“According to initial assessments, everything worked as it should,” said Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, head of the US Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency. “We hit it very accurately... We will insist on conducting the next test as soon as possible.”

Since money for NMD is being allocated without delay, American military experts have launched a flurry of activity. Development is being carried out in a number of directions at once, and the creation of anti-missile missiles is not yet the most difficult element in the program.

A space-based laser has already been tested. This happened on December 8, 2000. Comprehensive testing of the Alpha HEL hydrogen fluoride laser, manufactured by TRW, and the optical beam control system, created by Lockheed Martin, were carried out as part of the SBL-IFX program ( "Space Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment" - Demonstrator for integrated flight testing of a space-based laser) at the Capistrano test site (San Clemente, California).

The beam guidance system included an optical unit (telescope) with a system of “LAMP” mirrors using adaptive optics technology (“soft mirrors”).

The primary mirror has a diameter of 4 meters. In addition, the beam control system included the detection, tracking and targeting system "ATP" ("ATR"). Both the laser and the beam control system were placed in a vacuum chamber during testing.

The purpose of the tests was to determine the ability of the telescope's metrology systems to maintain the required direction to the target and provide control of the primary and secondary optics during high-energy laser radiation. The tests were a complete success: the ATP system worked with even greater accuracy than required.

According to official information, the launch of the SBL–IFX demonstrator into orbit is scheduled for 2012, and its testing on launching intercontinental missiles is scheduled for 2013. And by 2020, an operational group of spacecraft with high-energy lasers on board may be deployed.

Then, as experts estimate, instead of 250 interceptor missiles in Alaska and North Dakota, it is enough to deploy a group of 12–20 spacecraft based on SBL technologies in orbits with an inclination of 40°. It will take only 1 to 10 seconds to destroy one missile, depending on the target’s flight altitude. Reconfiguring to a new target will take only half a second. The system, consisting of 20 satellites, should provide almost complete prevention of the missile threat.

The NMD program also plans to use an airborne laser system developed under the ABL project (short for Airborne Laser).

Back in September 1992, Boeing and Lockheed received contracts to determine the most suitable existing aircraft for the ABL project. Both teams came to the same conclusion and recommended that the US Air Force use the Boeing 747 as its platform.

In November 1996, the US Air Force entered into a $1.1 billion contract with Boeing, Lockheed and TRV for the development and flight testing of a weapon system under the ABL program. On August 10, 1999, assembly of the first 747–400 Freighter aircraft for ABL began. On January 6, 2001, the YAL-1A aircraft made its first flight from the Everett airfield. A combat test of the weapon system is scheduled for 2003, during which an operational-tactical missile should be shot down. It is planned to destroy missiles during the active stage of their flight.

The basis of the weapon system is the iodine-oxygen chemical laser developed by TRV. The High Energy Laser (“HEL”) is modular in design and makes extensive use of advanced plastics, composites and titanium alloys to reduce weight. The laser, which has record chemical efficiency, uses a closed circuit with recirculation of reagents.

The laser is installed in section 46 on the main deck of the aircraft. To provide strength, thermal and chemical resistance, two titanium skin panels on the lower fuselage are installed under the laser. The beam is transmitted to the nose turret through a special pipe running along the top of the fuselage through all bulkheads. Firing is carried out from a bow turret weighing about 6.3 tons. It can rotate 150° around a horizontal axis to track a target. The beam is focused on the target by a 1.5-meter mirror with an azimuth viewing sector of 120°.

If the tests are successful, it is planned to produce three such aircraft by 2005, and by 2008 the air defense system should be fully ready. A fleet of seven aircraft will be able to localize a threat anywhere within 24 hours globe.

And that's not all. Information is constantly leaking into the press about testing high-power ground-based lasers, about the revival of air-launched kinetic systems such as "ASAT", about new projects to create hypersonic bombers, about the upcoming update of the satellite early warning system. Who is this all against? Is it really against Iraq? North Korea, which still cannot build a workable intercontinental missile?..

Frankly, such provocative activity of American military specialists in the field of creating NMD is frightening.

I’m afraid we are entering a phase of human development after which flights to the Moon, Mars and the creation of orbital cities will simply become impossible...