Ba'ath Party of Arab Nazism. The role of the Baath Party in Syria. Assyrian Self Defense Forces

Which Middle Eastern state is accused by Washington of supporting terrorism and developing weapons? mass destruction? Hint: this country is completely uncompromising towards Israel, and the Baath Party has been in power there for several decades, ruling with harsh, authoritarian methods.

If you thought this was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, you were certainly not mistaken. But I mean another state - Syria, which also exactly corresponds to the above description. At the height of the Iraq campaign, American leaders issued unequivocal warnings to Damascus. After the capture of Baghdad, the rhetoric became even harsher: Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld mentioned that supporters of Saddam Hussein were finding refuge in Syria, and soon they started talking about the fact that Damascus was either developing chemical weapons itself or was harboring chemical weapons secretly exported from Iraq. Congressmen Eliot Angel and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen intend to push for legislation that would allow President Bush to impose sanctions on trade with Damascus, as well as restrictions on the entry of Syrian diplomats into the United States. “Now that Saddam Hussein has been deposed, it’s time for America to get serious about Syria,” Angel concluded. Does all this mean that the Bashar al-Assad regime could become the next target of the US campaign against the “axis of evil”?

“The paradise of the East, the source of beauty bright and shining, it is the seal of all the countries of Islam that we have visited; a bride among the cities that we contemplated,” the Arab pilgrim Ibn Jubair wrote about Damascus in the 12th century. The city made an indelible impression on the traveler: “By God, those who say about it are right: “If heaven is on earth, Damascus, without a doubt, is in it; if he is in heaven, then Damascus is his double.” Describing the numerous shrines located in Damascus, Ibn Jubayr exclaims: “May Allah, in His omnipotence, preserve the abode of Islam!”

Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad are three historical centers of the Arab East. In the unofficial “hierarchy” of the region, Iraq is the heir of ancient Assyria and Babylon, the center of everything Muslim world during the Abbasid Caliphate, it ranks third after Egypt and Syria. As the Arabs themselves say, Egypt is the “head” and Syria is the “heart” of the Arab world. Egypt, far ahead of all other Arab countries in terms of population and its economic, military and cultural weight, has always been a recognized leader. Syria is the birthplace of the ideology of Arab unity, the pioneer of pan-Arabism.

It was in Damascus that the Ba'ath Party, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, was created in 1947; its Iraqi branch arose later. The party's slogans are “Unity, freedom, socialism” and “One Arab nation with immortal mission" The successful combination of the ideas of anti-imperialism, the liberation struggle, Arab nationalism, overcoming the fragmentation of the Arab world and creating a single powerful state, protecting the disadvantaged classes and establishing social justice attracted the intelligentsia, youth, and middle strata of society to the Baathists. The party's popularity was also facilitated by its dynamic nature and strict centralized structure.

Initially, the Ba'ath was considered a pan-Arab organization with two regional centers of leadership - in Syria and Iraq. As a result of a coup in 1963, the Baathists seized power in Damascus, at the same time a Baathist coup took place in Baghdad, but the party remained in power there less than a year. However, five years later, a second coup led to the final accession of the Ba'ath in Iraq.

The two branches not only completely separated from each other - they turned into irreconcilable opponents. Despite their shared ideology, Iraqi Baath Party members called their Syrian “colleagues” “adventurers who usurped the glorious name of our party.” The latter responded in kind.

The confrontation between both branches of the Baath was due to two factors. First, after 1945, rivalry developed between Syria and Iraq, each striving to become the dominant power in the region. At one time, both countries hatched their own projects for unifying the Arab East: we are talking about the plan to create Greater Syria and the Baghdad plan for the Fertile Crescent. They provided for the unification of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, but under the auspices of different states. Secondly, tensions between the parties were exacerbated by the mutual hostility of two dictators - the Syrian Hafez Assad and the Iraqi Saddam Hussein. Each of these charismatic and largely similar leaders who asserted their power in the 1970s dreamed of becoming a great pan-Arab leader, taking the place vacated by the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. None of them succeeded. However, it was the pro-Syrian conspiracy that allegedly took place among the Iraqi Baathists that served as the reason for a wave of brutal repressions in 1979. Dozens of senior party officials were executed, and Saddam Hussein became president.

Assad's hatred of Hussein explains why, during Desert Storm in 1991, Damascus joined the US-led anti-Iraq coalition and supported the operation. As the famous American orientalist Fuad Ajami writes in Foreign Affairs magazine, the participation of Egypt and Syria in that campaign was extremely important for America: it deprived the Iraqi leader of the opportunity to “present the war as a confrontation between rich and poor countries of the Arab world.” For this, Damascus received significant economic dividends, but did not become a partner of Washington. (The Russian translation of Fuad Ajami’s article can be read on the website of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs.”)

Syria takes an extremely tough position towards Israel (unlike Egypt, which long ago regained the Sinai captured by Israel, it never achieved liberation from the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights lost that same year) and supports the radical Hezbollah movement, which attacks Israel with territory of Lebanon. This position of Damascus has always irritated the influential pro-Israeli lobby in America.

Hopes that after the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the rise of his son Bashar to power, Damascus would turn towards the West did not materialize. On the contrary, during Washington's new anti-Iraq campaign, Syria (by the way, the only Arab country that sat on the UN Security Council during this crisis) most decisively supported Iraq. On the one hand, Bashar al-Assad is free from the burden of historical enmity and rivalry that complicated the elder Assad's relationship with Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, the young Syrian president needs to prove that he is worthily continuing the work of his father, who had a reputation as the most consistent and implacable fighter against imperialism. Damascus willingly allowed volunteer detachments to cross its border to help Iraq, and, as Washington is convinced, it also provided military assistance to Baghdad.

Although Syria has not been classified as an “axis of evil,” it remains on the State Department’s “blacklist” as a state sponsor of terrorism. Back in the summer of 2002, the leader of the Republican majority in the US House of Representatives, Tom Delay, arguing for the need for war against Saddam Hussein, formulated eight reasons for preventive action. This is support for terrorism, the desire to possess weapons of mass destruction, violation of non-proliferation treaties, aggression against neighbors, a threat to Israel, terror and violence within the country, persecution on religious or ethnic grounds, and opposition to democracy. American commentators immediately calculated that, based on official State Department documents and CIA reports on human rights, nonproliferation issues, etc., Syria satisfies seven of these criteria (the exception being religious and ethnic persecution).

Nevertheless, it will be difficult to present the American public with any convincing arguments proving the danger of Syria for the United States and the world as a whole. It will not be possible to create an image for Assad Jr. similar to that of Saddam. This means that it will not be possible to justify the sacrifices possible if the campaign spreads to Syria.

There is no doubt that Israel will warmly support the desire to “sort out” Syria, but this action is unlikely to find other supporters. In the Arab world, an attack on Syria following the occupation of Iraq would cause such outrage that even the most pro-American governments would be forced, in the interests of self-preservation, to move sharply and unconditionally against the United States, and American positions in the Middle East, established for half a century, would be threatened . The action would lead to sharp protests from both Russia, Damascus’ long-time partner, and the European Union, which included Syria among its “new neighbors” - countries bordering the EU with which it intends to build special relations. Based on these considerations, it can be assumed that the White House’s military activity in the Middle East will stop at a point called Baghdad for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Syria is not rich in oil.

However, giving up war does not mean that the United States will abandon the idea of ​​changing regimes in the Middle East. After all, President Bush called the goal of the Iraq campaign to begin the process of democratization of the entire region. The same Fouad Ajami calls on America to “lead a reformist project aimed at modernizing and transforming the Arab world. The starting point for such a project would be Iraq, a country that embodies the Arab political and economic tradition and culture, the agony and collapse of which we are witnessing today.” "Returning power to the people of Iraq should send a message to pro-democracy advocates across the region that the United States is deeply committed to spreading freedom," said Tom Delay.

When talking about the need to democratize the region, American experts and politicians often refer to last year's report on the development of the Arab world, prepared - importantly - by Arab scientists themselves under the auspices of the UN Development Program. As the authors of the study note, the region is rich in all the external attributes of democracy. Elections are held and human rights conventions are signed. However, the powerful wave of democratization that has swept over much of the world over the past 15 years has hardly affected the Arabs. Democracy is offered occasionally, but as a concession, not a right.

At the same time, many of the fundamental reasons for trouble lie precisely in the lack of freedom: countries have a patriarchal, intolerant, and often suffocating social atmosphere. Senior government officials, starting with ministers, are rarely appointed on the basis of professionalism alone. The job is provided not on the basis of the applicant’s knowledge, but on the basis of acquaintance. The result – quite often – is a frozen, stagnant central government and incompetent public administration, the researchers conclude.

Last year, prominent American analysts Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack proposed a “new transatlantic project”: “We must commit to a policy that will help us change the world of the Middle East. This means a change in the foundations of anti-Western regimes and a transition to a new, democratic form of government.” (read from Policy Review magazine on our website)

This goal is utopian: there are no democratic regimes in the Arab world, and even the ruling elites allied with the United States will not agree to participate in a process that will inevitably lead them to the loss of power. It can be assumed that Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt, will be left alone for now (although voices calling for the democratization of these countries are heard quite often in America), but Syria may become the object of strong political pressure.

It is noteworthy that from the point of view of democracy, Syria loses even in comparison with Iran, which The White house ranks him among the “axis of evil”, accusing him of seeking to create weapons of mass destruction and providing assistance to anti-Israeli extremists. At the same time, however, Iran is going through a difficult period of transformation, a transition from the militant phase of the Islamic revolution to a more moderate and liberal regime, the symbol of which is President Khatami. This process promises to be long and zigzag, but “light in the tunnel,” from the point of view of Western politicians, is visible. At least, there is no single view on this problem in the American establishment, and George Bush will have to think seriously before deciding to extend the “Iraq model” to Iran.

But in Syria, there are no signs of a change in the dictatorial system established by Hafez al-Assad. As The New York Times recently wrote, “Syria has shown a remarkable ability to resist change.” Unlike Iran, where even under the theocratic regime a civil society, there is freedom of discussion and a relative pluralism of opinions, complete unanimity reigns in Syria under the totalitarian rule of the Baath Party and an all-encompassing police apparatus.

After the collapse of the Ba'ath dictatorship in Iraq, Ba'athist Syria will remain the only Arab country staunchly and irreconcilably opposed to Israel. The regime ruling in Damascus does have reason to look to the future with alarm.

Having assessed the current situation, the Baath Party, with the support of the military, carried out a coup d'etat on July 17-30, 1968 and secured undivided power in the country. To manage the affairs of the republic, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was established, concentrating all power in its hands. The RRC was headed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, who simultaneously held the posts of president, prime minister, and commander-in-chief of the army. The Baath Party, forced to work underground until 1968, managed to maintain its organization and influence, including in the army. Its defeat in 1963 was accompanied by a sharp intensification of the factional struggle within the party itself, which was experiencing in the second half of the 1960s difficult period reassessment of their previous activities. The al-Bakr military group that came to the leadership of the Baath dissociated itself from the far-right elements in its composition, blaming them for the persecution of communists and democrats and the war with the Kurds. The extensive political experience that the Baath Party possessed, the presence of a more or less clearly formulated program - against the backdrop of disunity and weakness of the left forces, including the IKP (after the physical liquidation of a significant part of its activists in 1963) - contributed to the success Baathists. Having come to power for the second time, the Baath Party was now determined to keep it in its hands. This could only be achieved by relying on the broad masses of the Iraqi people, which was not an easy task for the Baathists. The coup itself on July 17-30 was greeted very warily in Iraq: with the Baath Party, with the name A.Kh. Iraqis associated al-Bakr, as well as other active participants in the coup, with the dark period of Baathist rule in 1963, which plunged the country into a deep, comprehensive crisis. The Ba'ath Party could win the trust of the masses only through specific actions that met the interests of various sectors of Iraqi society. 11-1299 In 1968, Iraq faced the same main tasks: creating conditions for overcoming backwardness on the basis of a dynamic sustainable development economy in accordance with modernization requests; implementation of agrarian reform in the interests of the peasantry; solution to the Kurdish problem on the principles of broad democratization of social political life Iraq; rallying all the patriotic forces of the country to solve these problems. The leadership of the Baath Party called for cooperation from “all healthy forces of the nation.” Of particular interest to the Baathists were the Communists and the Kurds: with their support, the Baath hoped to find support in those sections of the population among whom the IKP and KDP had great authority. However, the tragic events of 1963 were too fresh in memory. Moreover, in the first years of the second period in power (July 1968 - early 1970), the leadership of this party, putting forward a proposal for cooperation, insisted on recognizing it as the only “leading force” in a single front. At the same time, the policy of persecution of communists continued; throughout 1969, military operations against Barzani’s troops and punitive actions against the Kurdish civilian population did not stop. This policy made it difficult for the Ba'ath leadership to get closer to the communists and Kurds. In addition, the contacts of the Baath with the PCI and DPK caused opposition from right-wing forces within the leadership of this party. The attempted anti-government coup in January 1970 forced the Iraqi leadership to settle the Kurdish issue, which was holding back the solution to other pressing political and socio-economic problems of Iraq. On March 11, 1970, the “KRG Statement on the Settlement of the Kurdish Problem” was published, which was an agreement between the government and the Kurds. The main thing in the agreement was the recognition of the right of the Kurdish people to autonomy. This was a great victory for the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. The establishment of peace in the north of the country allowed the authorities to begin solving other problems. On May 21, 1970, Law No. 117 was issued, considered one of the most radical in the field of agrarian reforms. The law provided for the limitation of land ownership, the seizure of surplus land and its distribution among peasants in plots, the size of which was determined taking into account the fertility of the soil, the location of the plots, the availability of water, and the type of crops grown. It was directed against the most archaic structures in the village. The reforms carried out consolidated the principle of private ownership of land, which did not solve the problem of land shortage and landlessness. The Baath Party saw the overcoming of economic backwardness in accelerating the pace of industrialization of the country, in the creation of such industries as petrochemicals, electric power, and mechanical engineering. The decisive place in this issue was given to the public sector with the admission of the public-private and private sectors. Base for implementation of plans industrial development consisted of steadily increasing revenues from oil exports. In 1972-1975 The Iraqi government nationalized the multinational company Iraq Petroleum, placing the country's main wealth - oil - under its full control. The sharp rise in world oil prices in 1974 was accompanied by an unprecedented increase in the power and influence of the ruling party in Iraq. For 1968-1980 revenues to the country's state treasury from oil exports increased more than 54 times (from 476 million to 26,134 million dollars). This gave the Baath a degree of power and independence that no previous government in Iraq had ever had. Real power in the country, including financial power, ended up in the hands of a small group of members of the SRC, the highest ruling body in Iraq. The government paid great attention to solving social issues. In 1970-1971 laws on labor, pensions and social security. Much has been done to improve health care, vocational training and worker education in special centers. In the 1970s, Iraq developed one of the best educational systems in the Arab world. Progressive trends in the Iraqi leadership's solution to the most important internal problems were supported by significant changes in its foreign policy. Cooperation with Iraq-friendly states expanded, among which a special place was given to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, concluded on April 9, 1972, raised relations between the USSR and Iraq to a higher level. The transformations carried out by the Ba'athist leadership created the preconditions for the rapprochement of the country's national-patriotic forces. On July 17, 1973, the leaders of the Baath and PCI signed a joint statement on cooperation within the framework of the established Progressive National Patriotic Front (PNPF), which, in addition to communists and Baathists, included progressive nationalists and independent democrats. Seats were also reserved for the KDP. The leadership in the Front belonged to the Baathists, who began to use the PPPF to strengthen their positions and establish control over the activities of the Iraqi communists. In the early 1970s, the Baath Party strengthened its position through the “Baathization” of the army and state apparatus. This line was also carried out in Kurdistan. Already since 1970, tensions have been growing in the Kurdish areas, which eventually resulted in a new armed confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurds. On March 11, 1974, Law No. 33 on the autonomy of Kurdistan was adopted, which provided for the creation of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR). The KDP, led by Barzani, assessed the law as imperfect and, moreover, adopted without prior agreement with the Kurdish side, and refused to approve it. In March 1974, Barzani's troops switched to armed resistance to the government. The hostilities immediately became violent and were accompanied by large casualties among the civilian population, en masse emigrated to Iran. The authorities destroyed Kurdish villages, and residents were forcibly resettled in the central and southern regions of the country. In 1975, government forces were able to suppress the armed resistance of the Kurds, taking advantage of the 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran, according to which Tehran pledged to stop aiding the Kurdish rebels in Iraq. The Kurdish issue was resolved in a Baathist way: “autonomy” became a means of subordinating the development of Kurdistan to the interests of the Baathists. Mustafa Barzani emigrated to Iran and then to the USA, where he died in 1979. Suppression of Barzani's armed uprising in 1974-1975. led to a change in the political situation in Kurdistan, to a split in the ranks of the Kurdish national movement, to the formation of several groups in place of the KDP, which entered into confrontation with each other. The main ones were the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Mustafa Barzani's son Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by the prominent Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani. The defeat of the Kurds entailed a weakening of the general democratic struggle in Iraq and the acceleration of the establishment of the dictatorship of the Baathist leadership. Along with the Kurdish, the most important socio-economic problem in Iraq is the Shiite one. The Shia community in Iraq is the largest among the communities in Arab countries, ranking third in the world after the communities of Iran and Pakistan. In Iraq it numbers about 13 million people, which is 60-65% of all Muslims in Iraq and approximately 80% of Arab Muslims. 30% of the Turkomans (Turkmen) living in this country are Shiites. The 200 thousand Iraqis of Iranian origin whom the Iraqi authorities expelled from the country in the late 1970s also belonged to this community. Shiites, representing the most politically, economically and culturally backward part of the population, live mainly in the south of Iraq, many of them in Baghdad. The holy cities of the Shiites are Karbala and Najaf. The severity of the Shiite problem lies in the traditionally subordinate position of the Shiites, in their exclusion from power: the rulers were Sunnis Ottoman Empire, members overthrown by the 1958 revolution royal dynasty, as well as leaders of the ruling circles of republican regimes. With the coming to power of the Ba'ath Party in 1968, the situation in Shiite areas became more complicated, which, among many other factors, was caused by government measures such as the introduction of censorship on religious publications, the closure of a number of Islamic Shiite educational institutions, and permission for the first time in the country's history to sell alcohol V holy cities Shiites. The Shiite clergy, who enjoy great authority among the population, rallied believers to protest. In 1968, the underground political movement al-Daawa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call) was founded in Iraq. The first political demonstrations of protest by the Shiites in Republican Iraq took place in 1974. The reason for them was not only the infringement of the economic interests of the Shiites, but also their extremely small participation in the highest echelons of power, and their low share among educated people and specialists. The authorities responded to these demonstrations immediately: 25 Shiite leaders were arrested, five of them were executed. From that time on, latent anti-Baathist sentiments grew among the Shiite masses, culminating in an acute open form in February 1977. A police clash with a Shiite religious procession heading from Najaf to Karbala sparked widespread Shiite unrest. During their suppression, several dozen riot participants were killed, about two thousand were arrested. It was the most widespread and lasting Shia challenge to Ba'ath rule. The tribunal sentenced 8 people to death and 15 to life imprisonment. The authorities also used economic measures as a means of combating the Shiite opposition: in 1978, all Shiite incomes were placed under strict control, which undermined the influence of the Shiite clergy among ordinary members of the community. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran sparked an upsurge among the broad masses of Shiites. She was openly supported by the leaders of al-Daawa. The Baath responded to this with “carrot and stick” tactics. In March 1980, repression fell on the Shiites again: 97 military and civilians, half of whom were members of the al-Daawa movement. By decree of the SRK of March 31, 1980, al-Daawa was banned, and membership in it became punishable by death. On April 8, 1980, the head of the Shiites of Iraq, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr, who had repeatedly condemned the Baathist regime, was executed. At the same time, the authorities made some political and economic concessions to the Shiites. For example, it was decided to include 40% of Shia deputies in the parliament, its speaker in 1980 and 1984. Naim Haddad, a Shiite, renowned statesman, member of the SRC and the regional Ba'ath leadership. For the first time in the history of Iraq, Shiite religious holidays were declared national. Having strengthened its position in the leadership of the country by the mid-1970s, the Baath needed less and less cooperation with other parties. After the defeat of the Kurdish movement and the Shiite protests in the South, a campaign of repression was launched against the communists. In May 1978, using the now traditional charge of “ political activity in the armed forces,” authorities executed 31 PCI members and their supporters. In 1979, the number of those arrested for political reasons (most of them were communists) was ten thousand. In May 1979, the leadership of the ICP decided to withdraw from the PNPF, which in reality meant the collapse of the Front, although formally it continued to exist. In the late 1970s, an authoritarian dictatorial regime began to emerge in Iraq. A consistent line to strengthen his position in the party was led by Saddam Hussein, a native of Tikrit, a member of the party since 1957. By 1968, he became the number one figure in Baath. Under President A.Kh. al-Bakr S. Hussein served as vice president, deputy general secretary of the party, chairman of the party bureau for national security, putting the Ba'ath leadership virtually under its control. July 16, 1979 A.H. al-Bakr “voluntarily” resigned from his posts “due to illness.” Sole power was concentrated in the hands of Saddam Hussein, who became the secretary general of the regional Ba'ath leadership, chairman of the RRC, president of the republic and commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. Ba'ath members who disagreed with the strengthening of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in 1979-1980. subjected to repression. The court sentenced 22 members of the leading bodies of this party, including five members of the SRK, to death. At the same time, the Baath Party tried to give a democratic face to the regime. In June 1980, for the first time in the history of the republic, elections to the National Council (Parliament) of Iraq were held. For 250 seats, 840 candidates were nominated from among representatives of the Ba'ath and parties remaining in the PPPF. In September 1980, elections were held for the Legislative Council of the KAR, candidates for which were nominated from Kurdish political parties that collaborated with the Baath.

Experts are calling the suicide attack on the National Security Service headquarters in Damascus, which killed four senior Syrian government officials, “the beginning of the end,” political commentator Fehmi Koru writes in his column.

Maybe. In any other country, such an attack aimed at the heart of the regime could lead to the raising of a white flag, but in Syria it could lead to a tightening of measures against the rebels.

IN Arab countries there are many dictators. Bashar al-Assad is one of them. There are just a few important factors that distinguish Syria from other countries, and the Syrian regime from other regimes. The main one is the rule of the Baath Party in Syria for about 40 years. The Ba'ath Party is very different from the parties we know, and the Ba'ath regime is also very different from the dictatorships we know. The current Syrian regime is a regime of a religious minority, however, through the party, this regime enters every home and reaches every religion. Paritiya Baath, through education and compulsory military service, made its way into every part of Syrian society, over time formed alliances with various elements of this society and managed to maintain these alliances with the help of concessions and privileges.

The end of the Baath regime in Syria does not only mean the removal of a particular minority from the helm of power. The end of the Baath regime means the collapse of the entire system and great losses for those who receive dividends from this system. Today, it is not only the Nusayris who support the system. It is also supported despite the ethnic and religious affiliations built into it through complex system patronage of various groups.

The structure of the Ba'ath regime in Syria is not suitable for a quick relinquishment of power. Therefore, the regime will not give up and will use all its strength to remain at the helm. We must not forget that the Baath regime, if its security and livelihoods are threatened, can move the war beyond the borders of Syria.

On the other hand, it should also be understood that Bashar al-Assad has become a hostage to the governance mechanisms of the Baath Party. In the latest attack, four high-ranking Syrian government officials were killed. If Bashar al-Assad had died during this attack, would his death have stopped the Bashar regime from continuing the bloodshed? I don’t think so, because... this is the regime that in Hama in 1982 took the lives of tens of thousands of innocent people “without even blinking an eye.” Naturally, he will come to an end, but how many more lives will have to be given for it... The question remains open.

Socialist and communist movements have affected the entire world in one way or another. One very interesting international leftist organization is the Baath Party, which has branches in Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt and Bahrain.

Initially Ba'ath Party ideology(Arab Socialist Revival Party) included the desire to create a unified Arab state and revive Arab culture. Over the many years of its existence, the Baath Party brought to the world such people as Hafez Assad (former Syrian leader), Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad (President of Syria at the time of 2015).

The political movement was created back in 1947, when tensions in Arab-Israeli relations were just beginning and the post-war world had not yet been built. Despite the imaginary unity of the movement, over the years it became stratified and different countries started to look different. The reason is quite banal - the left took the leadership in the Syrian wing of the party: the Iraqis considered what happened in the neighboring country to be a real coup. Although there were attempts to restore a single party, Syrian and Iraqi politics became completely different for many years. For example, Iraq under the rule Baath turned into a state where the government could always arrange genocide of a couple of “wrong” peoples (however, the Americans were quite happy with this for many years). The Iraqi leadership was closely occupied with the confrontation with Iran, while Syria did everything to increase its influence in Lebanon - there was no unity not only in domestic policy, but also in the external.

It is generally accepted that the Ba'ath are something like a club of dictators - they say, having come to power, PASV established a strict regime in Iraq and Syria that does not allow competition. Most likely, one should not evaluate the movement only negatively; the absolute power of Saddam Hussein, for example, is no worse than absolutism in Saudi Arabia, where every word or action can easily land you behind bars to this day.

Syria, by the way, during the time Baath was in power, ceased to be a dictatorship - since 2012, the party has no privileges and participates in elections on an equal basis with others. Although the West did not recognize the democratization that had taken place, support PASV Syria's population in 2015 is at an all-time high. The reasons for this are the lack of an adequate alternative and the desperate attempts of the country's president to end the civil war.

Baathism, the party's ideology, is what helped prevent excessive radicalization in the Middle East in the 20th century. By uniting all faiths under the slogans of Arab unity and social equality, the party made a huge contribution to the history of the region. The recent spread of Islamic terrorists in Iraq is one of the consequences of persecution Arab Socialist Renaissance Party pro-American authorities in Iraq.

Famous party figures

Hafez al-Assad, former President of Syria

Many people are now writing about the civil war in Syria. However, there is still no analysis of the composition of the parties involved, the sociology of the conflict and its prerequisites. The Russian-speaking reader, as a rule, is presented with ideological chewing gum, representing primitive and mythologized dogmas. The Syrian opposition has been criticized. In this article we will try to look at the government camp.

At the moment, only two general points of view on this range of issues are widespread in RuNet - liberal and “patriotic”. The first can be described as follows: the people rose up against a corrupt regime, the core of which was the Alawite community, which led to the Islamization of the conflict, and then ISIS came. Indeed, this is a simple concept, very easy and convenient to understand, but it has no relation to reality. Patriots, for their part, can only oppose it with conspiracy theories, which are true only to a small extent. Namely, in terms of the presence of external political interests foreign states and business, but no more. It is quite possible to organize top coups in this way, but not a single “color revolution” can occur without two elements:

1. The presence of a politically active minority while the majority of the population is atomized and passive, which the government cannot mobilize for its defense;
2. A split in the political-economic elite, whose opposition faction is interested in a change of power.

The Middle East knows only one classic “color revolution”.

This is the "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon in 2005. But it only led to a short-term effect, since the Second Lebanon War that broke out a year later between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah led to the consolidation of many political forces around the latter and changed the political face of Lebanon.

The revolution in Tunisia, which inspired " Arab Spring“, cannot be considered “colored”, since it relied on huge sections of the population, was sudden, and ruling president Ben Ali had long relied on the support of France and the United States and was the main and reliable conductor of French political interests, as well as the economic interests of America.

The revolution in Egypt, which overthrew President Mubarak and brought the Ikhwan Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) to power, also came as a surprise to the United States. For some time, the United States even supported Mubarak, but quickly reoriented itself to supporting the Ikhwanists, who later lost power as a result of a military coup, which also came as a surprise to the West. The political outcome of events in Egypt was the country's uncertain distancing from its old allies, which can be classified as a tactical failure of American diplomacy.

Events in Syria, Libya and Yemen have led to bloody civil wars, and in the case of Syria and Yemen, to the internationalization of the conflict. Syria stands out from this list in that it is the only state whose system has remained in power, and it is also the only conflict that is difficult to name civil war due to the unprecedented influx of Islamists into this country.

The large sociological resource of the ruling power, as well as the small number and fragmentation of the Syrian external opposition at the beginning of the conflict, discussed in previous articles, are key logical arguments against the liberal version of the interpretation of events.

The patriotic point of view absolutizes the factor of foreign intervention without analyzing the internal background of the conflict.

Loyalist sociology

In order for external players to intervene in a conflict, internal economic and social reasons are necessary. Let me make a reservation that we are talking about the beginning of the conflict, and not about what it is at the moment.

After the collapse of the USSR, Syria faced the problems of all third world countries. Namely, with the need for technological industrialization, which would help maintain positive trade turnover with other countries. In the conditions of the collapse of the socialist bloc, it became impossible to obtain highly qualified personnel and technologies in the same volume. This meant that it was necessary to somehow establish a dialogue with developed Western countries, including the USA and EU countries.

However, in order to achieve an influx of foreign investment, it is necessary to accept the global rules of the game in the form of increasing investment attractiveness. In practice, this means a reduction in the cost of labor, the abolition of social guarantees of the state, a decrease in the share of the public sector in the economy and other unpleasant things that undermine the well-being of the vast majority of ordinary citizens. Rejection of such rules of the game means self-isolation, similar to the relative autarky in the form of the DPRK economy (although it is not completely isolated from the outside world). Indeed, the choice is not pleasant.

At the time of the start of neoliberal reforms, Syria stood out significantly from other similar countries that found themselves in a similar dilemma. A number of reasons did not allow it to follow the path of neoliberal reforms in full:

1. Intense political and military rivalry with Israel with a large share of the military in the establishment. The merging of the party with the army, manifested in the Ba'athists' monopoly on political work among the soldiers, made the "red directors" staunch opponents of the liberalization of the public sector of the economy, since this undermined the country's defense capability. Especially considering that many business executives in the past had military ranks;

1. The presence of strong trade union structures, which were at the same time quite politicized due to the fact that at one time trade unions became the basis of a political compromise between the Baath and the Communist Party of Syria. In exchange for the loyalty of local communists and their entry into the ruling coalition, the National Progressive Front, the Baath Party pledged not to interfere in trade union affairs. Fortunately, progressive labor legislation ensured the benevolent neutrality of the General Federation of Trade Unions (GTU). Later, Baathists held positions in it, but the politicization of the trade unions should not be underestimated, nor should it be overestimated.

For example, the GUF of Syria is a member of the communist World Federation of Trade Unions, and the current director of the GUF, Qadri Jamil, is the leader of the parliamentary opposition and the Trotskyist Communist Party;

1. The special structure of the national bourgeoisie. The initial weakness of the domestic economy after independence predetermined the fragmentation of the entrepreneurial class into pro-British and pro-French factions. This situation contributed to the success of the Baath Party in modernizing the country. After the 1970 coup within the Baath Party, called the Corrective Movement, the public sector of the economy consolidated its position in the “commanding heights”. The private sector was assigned a subordinate client role in such areas as commercial trade in consumer goods, part of the tourism business, the agricultural sector, etc. Capital was removed from the banking sector, as well as from the production and sale of hydrocarbons. The defeat of the bourgeoisie led to the support of a number of entrepreneurs for the Ikhwan Muslimeen during the Islamist uprising of 1982, which was brutally suppressed by the army.

Of course, the new balance could not exist forever, which was reflected in the formation of a symbiotic relationship between the new bureaucracy and the petty and middle bourgeoisie, expressed in corruption schemes, marriages between families of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, etc.

This was accompanied by ethno-confessional contradictions. Thus, quantitatively, the bourgeoisie was predominantly Sunni, and the bureaucratic apparatus was initially Alawite (however, it was never entirely like that).

Expanding entrepreneurs needed to circumvent state restrictive measures and access to foreign currencies, while after the collapse of the USSR, the bureaucracy needed an influx of foreign investment.

However, such a partnership had its limits. The integration system could not digest all the entrepreneurs, and the larger the turnover of individual businessmen became, the more cramped they became within the Syrian economy. As a result, the bourgeoisie found itself split again. Medium-sized and partly small entrepreneurs have become the backbone of the government. But the big ones ran into growth limits. They were limited by the public sector and such a character as Rami Makhlouf. The only Syrian oligarch with a net worth of $6 billion as of 2011.

Having consanguineous ties to the top of the establishment, he acquired his start-up capital through his marriage to a wealthy Sunni family. But, despite family ties, many doors were closed even to him. Thus, he derived his main income from the cellular communication company Syria Tel, because even he was not allowed into the extraction of raw materials. Syria Tel is a prime example of government-private cooperation. This company covered 55 percent domestic market. Created in the form joint stock company. The state held a controlling stake of 51 percent. This figure accompanies almost all foreign companies and large private ones. Thus, the second telephone company MTN is South African. In its Syrian branch, the state owns the same 51%. As his capital grew, the businessman was faced with a dilemma: continue cooperation, being content with smaller profits, or emigrate, supporting the emigrant opposition.

On the other hand, limited neoliberal reforms, while not satisfying the ambitions of the big bourgeoisie, simultaneously hit the small bourgeoisie, represented by a fairly large group of small shopkeepers, who at the beginning of the conflict, together with the impoverished peasants and seasonal workers, formed the main support of the Islamists in the suburbs regional centers.

Together, all these factors worked to save the state.

The Syrian conflict has a cause - neoliberal reforms, but the narrowness of the social base of the uprising and the stability of the state are predetermined by the cautious nature of these reforms.

The Islamization of the opposition, observed since 2011, became an objective reality by 2013, and it is again rooted in the narrow social base of the uprising. Let's look at the composition of the pro-government camp.

Bashar al-Assad and government soldiers. © Official page Syrian President's Facebook

Army

The state owes much of its stability to the armed forces. At the very beginning of the conflict, the armed forces in the state had about 325 thousand people. Now most observers estimate their number at 150,000. Having taken the brunt of the militants' actions on initial stage war, the army suffered significantly due to desertion, combat losses, and in the early stages - the transition of individuals and small units to the enemy side (mostly the transition was carried out personally). At first, the armed forces and the police were not prepared for this type of conflict. When militants individually infiltrated cities, occupying individual apartments and construction sites, the police could still identify and arrest such groups, but when organized detachments of several hundred or even thousands occupied the suburbs, the police were powerless.

Then the army cordoned off the captured areas and cities and began a systematic assault, which was accompanied by big losses among the military. Many factions surfaced and attacked cities in different parts of the country, and army units had to be transferred from end to end, which exhausted her. Moreover, the army was constrained by the war on its territory and orders to minimize civilian casualties. In particular, the 1982 uprising was suppressed through large-scale assaults and sweeps, during which many civilians died. Now, faced with a hypothetical intervention by NATO and attempts to establish a no-fly zone, the government was forced to act more cautiously.

In 2011 - early 2012, militants, using the tactics described above, were able to occupy a significant part of most cities and regional centers. Individual successes of the government army in Hama did not compensate for the loss of control over many areas of the country. The operation to capture Hama is notable for the fact that a number of units of the Syrian army announced their defection to the rebels, but upon entering the city, they opened fire on them and captured the city, as a result of which Hama did not suffer much from the war. Although this operation of the Syrian troops deserves praise, such an operation was a one-time operation for objective reasons.

In general, at the initial stage the army was not ready for such a conflict, since it was intended to fight a similar regular army modeled on the Israeli army, and not with many terrorist gangs. However, for the period of the end of 2012-2014. the army was able to rebuild:

1. Emphasis is placed on mobile units modeled on special forces;
2. Increased coordination with civil services, police, and pro-government paramilitary units;
3. Personnel changes were made and new commanders appeared. Such as Major General Issam Zahreddin (Druze), who has been defending the completely surrounded city of Deir ez-Zor since May 2015 so successfully that the army is still conducting local counter-offensives there. The general is popular in the media and among soldiers because he loves to be in battle on the front line.

All this made it possible to connect the public sector of the economy and increase the mobility and specialization of the army, which learned to quickly form combined combat groups from different branches of the military and quickly respond to the changing situation on the battlefield.

National Defense Forces (NDF)

The pro-government militia currently numbers about 100,000, making it comparable to the army.

Initially, it began to arise in areas liberated by the army, which were under the control of the Islamists and experienced all the delights of their rule. Organizationally, they began to take shape around spontaneous People's Committees in mid-2012. The process later affected all government-controlled areas of Syria. In some places the militia was ethno-confessional detachments of Christians, Druze or Alawites, in some places inter-confessional detachments formed around the suddenly revived Soviet system of self-government, copied almost entirely from the USSR, in places People's Committees were formed parallel to the Soviet system.

In those places where the committee militia operated, the army's effectiveness increased sharply. The militia was initially built on a territorial principle and could keep its districts and villages from militants on its own. In the event of a massive breakthrough by militants, hold positions until the army approaches.

When the number of militias grew to 30,000 people by the end of 2012, the state wanted to give it legal status in order to solve its problems. This was reflected in the transformation into the NSO, which became an autonomous structure within the armed forces. It is managed by an analytical headquarters, whose task is not to manage this decentralized organization, but to coordinate strategic actions with the army and redirect resources.

Now the NDF has gone beyond the territorial militia, and in some places, in particular in the oasis of Eastern Ghouta (Damascus Province), Latakia, Zabadani, militias form combined groups and, with the support of the army, conduct offensive operations. The army and the militia form a symbiosis similar to the relationship between Stalin's collective farms and machine and tractor stations. The militia fights on the ground and, if necessary, requests support from heavy equipment and aircraft.

Thus, the state solved the following problems:

1. Control over an independent force formed by analogy with the Kurdish units. In the future, they want to create from the NSO some kind of analogue of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with a different ideological component;
2. Increased army performance. Depleted in numbers, it could not hold the front, and therefore the militia copes with this task, while the army, maneuvering, operates in the most important areas. In the event of a militant breakthrough, when the army is late, part of the militia goes into the category of partisans and underground fighters, organizing sabotage and informing troops from inside the occupied areas about the actions of the militants, which reduces losses among the troops. When liberating occupied areas, the militia coordinates its actions with the civil administration, returning refugees and re-forming council systems, some municipal bodies and a garrison;
3. Replenishment of the army. A number of deserted soldiers return and are filtered into these units. The same is done with the secular opposition units that have come over to the side of the government. Wounded soldiers also become accustomed to war by passing through the militia, and volunteers gain combat experience. A more loyal attitude to the timing and form of service makes the militia more popular than the army.

Party and volunteer formations

Kataib al-Ba'ath (Revival Brigade)

The militia of the ruling Baath Party, whose ideology is Arab socialism. Information about the number is contradictory, but, according to the most optimistic estimates, it does not exceed 7,000 people. Operates mainly in the province of Aleppo. The leader is Hilal Hilal, the leader of the Syrian regional leadership of the Baath Party.

Arab National Socialist Party

Despite the name, its ideology is close to the Russian National Bolsheviks. It has its own armed detachments, not exceeding 1000 people, according to various estimates. The Lebanese wing of the party has participated in all conflicts in this country and has solid combat experience. Valid throughout the country. Last Activity spotted in Daraa and Suwayda provinces. It is curious that the Syrian communist parties do not support party militia tactics and form units within the NSO.

Syrian resistance

Former Iskanderun People's Liberation Front. A separatist Turkish organization fighting for the return of the Alexandret Sanjak to Syria. The ideology of the organization is Marxism-Leninism. The leader is the Turkish Alawite Mihrac Ural. The group size reaches 2000 people. Valid in the provinces of Latakia and Homs.

Arab Nationalist Guard

The Syrian Nasserist parties created a voluntary organization that attracted supporters of Arab nationalism in the Nasserist interpretation. It is an international volunteer formation, which attracts Arab nationalists from all over the Arab East. The number is about 1000 people. The activities of the organization are very little advertised in the local press.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command

This Palestinian paramilitary organization split from the original PFLP in 1968. Ahmad Jibril's breakaway faction was the nationalist right wing of this leftist organization. In the Syrian conflict, she took the side of the government and fought against Islamists (including Palestinians) in the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus. The organization is numerically small and does not have more than a few hundred fighters.

Palestine Liberation Army

A paramilitary Palestinian organization created at the instigation of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1964 within the framework of the Arab League. Currently split. The first part constitutes the armed embryo of the Palestinian Authority army in the West Bank. The Syrian part numbers about 4 and a half thousand people and is closely connected with the army. Operates mainly in the south of the country. Politically neutral, but associated with the Palestinian organization Al-Saika (Lightning), which is a regional branch of the Baath Party.

Regional allies

"Kataib Seyid al Shuhada" (Battalions of the Martyrs of Seyd)

Volunteer formation of Iraqi Shiites. The organization aims to protect Shia shrines throughout the region. It operates in Iraq and Syria, where the mosque that gave the organization its name is located. The Seyida Zeinab Mosque is dedicated to the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad and is located in the suburb of Damascus of the same name. This mosque is traditionally the subject of pilgrimage (zirayat) for Shiites.

Most of the rebels in Syria are Wahhabis (Salafi, takfirist - these are synonyms), practicing the destruction of even Sunni mosques with tombs (so that they do not perform ziraiyat on them - this is supposedly idolatry, as Wahhabis believe). Salafis do not hesitate to destroy the tombs of the Sahabah (companions of the prophet), and Shiite believers take the threat quite seriously. The size of the organization in Syria has not been established due to its relative decentralization. Sources give different figures, from several hundred to several thousand people. The organization is supported by the Iraqi Shiite movement Muqtada al-Sadr.

Hezbollah (Party of God)

Lebanese organization, in addition to military activities participating in the political life of Lebanon and being part of the ruling coalition. Hezbollah initially stayed away from the conflict (despite a direct alliance with Syria), although individual members have been involved in the conflict since 2011. However, the leader of the organization, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, said that these people acted on their own initiative. However, since 2012, terrorist attacks against Hezbollah began to occur in Lebanon, and militants began to use Lebanon to cross the border and were able to capture a number of territories, including the Qalamoun district in the province of Damascus, as well as the town of El-Quseir in the province of Homs.

On May 12, 2013, Hezbollah entered the war in order to regain control of the border and border areas. During the Battle of Quseir, she coordinated her activities in Syria with the Syrian government and helped recapture the city. Later she participated in the liberation of the Qalamun region and the battle for the town of Zabadani.

Initially, the organization operated in border areas, but later expanded its range of presence. Its fighters help train Syrian militias.

On August 2, 2014, Lebanese police arrested members of the Islamist organization Jabhat al-Nusra in Beirut, after which this group, in collaboration with ISIS, invaded Lebanese territory (“Jabhat al-Nusra” and ISIS are not always and not always at odds; their cooperation has been confirmed in Yarmouk camp, on the Lebanese border and in Quneitra province). The target of the attack was the city of Arsal in the Bekaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon. The weak Lebanese Army joined the fighting, but failed and surrendered a number of territories in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah, in collaboration with the Lebanese army, as well as the party militias of the Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun (Christians), the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Shiite Amal movement, joined the war on Lebanese territory. By August 7, the city was recaptured, but fighting in the Bekaa Valley continues to this day.

It is interesting that in his speech justifying participation in the Syrian conflict, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah emphasized the need to protect Christians. Information about the size of the organization's military wing and its mobilization potential is contradictory. The most minimal estimates give it 10,000 people and about 30,000 reservists. The Iranian press puts the number at 65,000, including reservists. However, all sources agree that the organization is clearly stronger than the Lebanese army.

Assyrian Self Defense Forces

In general, Assyrians, who live predominantly in northeast Syria, support Assyrian Military Council- rather an opposition organization, blocking with the Kurds and numbering about 2000 people. However, the ABC, despite its opposition, did not participate in the conflict with the Syrian army in that area. But some of the Assyrians are still loyal to the government. This organization operates in the city of Qamishli, Hasak province. Most likely, this organization would have joined the NSO, but together with parts of the Syrian army it was cut off from the rest of the country by territories captured by ISIS.

© REUTERS/Stringer

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Special forces created within the Iranian army and are essentially a guard directly subordinate to the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The organization includes, in addition to the Guard, the Basij National Militia and the special purpose, which have no analogues in the world yet. It's about about the Qods Division (Jerusalem). It is this unit that is involved in the Syrian conflict. In essence, this structure combines the functions of special forces, military intelligence, a lobbying organization and a local “Comintern”. The goals of the organization are to defend the “ideals of the revolution” and counter the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. Currently, the regional activity of the Qods Force in Syria is associated with the dispatch of special forces and military advisers who are directly involved in the conflict on the side of the Syrian government. In addition, Qods leads Iranian forces in Iraq fighting ISIS, and also supports the Yemeni Houthis in the fight against Islamists and the Saudi Arabian coalition. The current leader of the Qods Force, General Qassem Soleimani, is personally involved in the events in Syria, in addition, he helped develop the plan for the operation to liberate Tikrit in Iraq.

Third party allies

Syria also interacts with the Iraqi army as part of the fight against IS, but the interaction is predominantly in the nature of information exchange due to the lack of technical capabilities to establish combat cooperation. The Houthis are seen by many in Syria as allies because they are fighting local Islamists, including the Yemeni affiliate of ISIS, as well as the Arabian monarchies, which openly support the militants. Recently, the Russian Federation has been a direct ally, sending its aircraft to Syria. Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Syria is of a long-standing nature and is beyond the scope of the article, as are the Syrian Kurds, whose consideration deserves separate review.

However, the Kurds cannot be left out. Syrian Kurds have two political representatives - the Democratic Union and the Kurdish National Council. The former are moderately opposed to the Syrian government, but often interact on the battlefield and are generally more friendly to the government than to the opposition, since there are many Islamists among the opposition, and its nominal political leadership has the support of Turkey. While the Democratic Union has a left-wing ideology and is closely associated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Kurdistan National Council is a coalition of a number of opposition Kurdish parties aligned with the Iraqi Kurdish nationalists Masoud Barzani. The former are viewed by Syria as potential allies, the latter as adversaries. The Kurdish People's Self-Defense Units (militia), numbering from 30 to 50 thousand people, are accountable to the Kurdish Supreme Committee, which is formed by both Kurdish political forces. However, it can be stated that the Democratic Union dominates in Syrian Kurdistan.

Oct 20, 2015 Mikhail Balbus