How are the interests of the Russian state determined? National and state interests of the Russian Federation. Russia in the mirror of political science
Theory international relations offers several views on the interests of states and the process of formation of these interests.
Some researchers postulate the existence of binding and immutable interests, expressed in terms of power or welfare. Others propose to reconstruct them according to the actions of states in each specific situation. Finally, others argue that the interests of states are quite stable, but can seriously change under the influence of the international environment - emerging and dying norms, institutions and circumstances.
If we admit the possibility of evolution, it is legitimate to ask the question about the sources of formulations of interests and the functions performed by these formulations. We are interested in “non-trivial” interests - those that go beyond the obvious needs of the state for security in the face of external threats and economic survival.
The current interests of the state are reflected explicitly in official doctrines and unofficial publications of leading experts, whose opinions are usually taken into account by decision makers. Official documents called "doctrines", "concepts" or "strategies" of foreign policy or national security are issued by the governments of most major powers. Unofficial but coherent and influential doctrinal texts are more difficult to discover. However, they exist in many countries. Thus, experts observing Russian foreign policy pay special attention to the annual speeches of academician Yevgeny Primakov at meetings of the Mercury Club. Another example is the report of the non-governmental “Commission on the National Interest”, released by an expert group supporting US presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000. Many members of the writing team - for example, Condoleezza Rice and Robert Blackwill - later occupied key positions in the administration's foreign policy apparatus. Despite the deviations of the actual actions of this administration from some (but not all) of the recommendations of the “commission,” the report can be considered the canonical version of defining and understanding the national interests of the largest world power.
The authors of the American report sought to exclude from the circle of US interests everything that does not lead to direct economic benefits for the United States and on which its security does not directly depend. It was precisely this restrictive meaning that experts put into the concept of “national” interests - as opposed to “global” or simply “alien” interests. For example, Rice, Blackwill and their colleagues criticized the outgoing Bill Clinton administration for, in their opinion, indiscriminate intervention in crises and conflicts outside America.
Does Russia need similarly formulated national interests? Who should develop them and what principles should they be guided by?
Interest functions
“National interests” represent an open declaration of the needs and intentions of the state, based on an assessment of the current situation. Such a declaration performs a number of important functions.
First, a hierarchy of foreign policy priorities is established, which helps prevent the dissipation of resources and prevent overexertion of forces. A group of experts from the “US Commission on National Interests” saw this as the main purpose of their report. They did not look for new formulations, but reasonably prioritized long-known options for interests.
Secondly, official or semi-official formulations of national interests impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of action of authorities, who often seek to use foreign policy to strengthen domestic political positions in the face of opposition. In addition, explicitly formulated national interests provide society with solid criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the line pursued by those responsible for making foreign policy decisions.
Thirdly, national interests ensure both continuity and the possibility of timely adjustment of the most important policy directions. It is especially important that competent formulations recorded in official documents insure the state against the transformation of foreign policy into a simple continuation of domestic policy. In most countries - regardless of the level of development of democratic institutions - numerous carriers of private interests are looking for opportunities to raise these interests to the level of “national” and provide them with the support of the state apparatus. In this context, national interests represent a system - a logically consistent set of interconnected statements about what and why is beneficial to a particular state in a particular historical period.
A harmonious system of national interests does not allow its components to be easily manipulated. It is most often impossible to arbitrarily change the formulation of one or several interests while keeping others the same - several interests “adjusted” to suit the moment or group of influence will come into conflict with other parts of the complex called “national interest.” For example, as Elena Chernenko rightly points out, it is impossible to abandon strict adherence to the principles of the inviolability of borders and the sanctity of state sovereignty without systematically adjusting all the doctrinal foundations of Russian foreign policy.
Finally, national interests are declared openly in order to increase the predictability of their bearer for the outside world. The state largely ties its hands by declaring its own interests, declaring its readiness to go all the way in defending them, but also promising not to do anything that clearly goes beyond the accepted formulations of national interests. The firmness of the course is combined with an attempt to explain to others why it does not pose a threat to them and is generally acceptable. The effectiveness of a declaration of national interest as a foreign policy instrument is determined by the correct balance between the ambitions of the state and guarantees of refraining from harsh zero-sum games. For example, it can hardly be considered optimal to formulate national interests that lead to a sharp increase in the number of influential opponents and thereby increase the resistance of the international environment to the state’s foreign policy.
The external consequences of violating declared statements of national interest can be severe. Will anyone believe existing and future doctrines if the authors themselves easily disregard them? What is the cost of lack of trust? A costly arms race is one of the most common consequences of the loss of confidence of the outside world (or part of it) in the declaration of interests and intentions of any major power.
It may be objected: doesn’t the uncertainty that arises as a result of the “flexible interpretation” of our own doctrines give us additional benefits and expand the space for diplomatic maneuver? Uncertainty, of course, cannot be avoided in the public version of military doctrine or security strategy. A potential adversary should not know how we plan to react to specific aggressive actions or threats on his part; our reaction should come as a surprise to him. However, foreign policy is not defense, but primarily an activity to create favorable conditions for the state and obtain benefits through cooperation.
Cooperation practically cannot develop if the basic intentions of the participants in the interaction are not clear. Therefore, states whose well-being and security depend on cooperation with other countries try not to frighten potential partners with uncertainty of long-term intentions and openly declare their interests. Moreover, the similarity of the value bases of national interests (for example, commitment to the spread of liberal democracy or the principle of unlimited state sovereignty) serves as an additional signal for countries that share similar values. This creates a strong basis for mutual trust without the need to spend significant resources on insurance against increased hostility of the partner.
National interest and society
The role that national interest plays in building a civil nation deserves special attention. Statements of interest that enjoy widespread support in society unite citizens, helping to overcome dividing lines between ethnic groups, strata of rich and poor, educated and not so educated. “Common cause” usually has a unifying effect. The legitimacy of a government that consistently implements a policy of “national interest” increases; at the same time, public support for government spending on foreign policy expands and, if necessary, the willingness of citizens to bear personal costs in order to achieve important public goals.
The unifying power of a declaration of national interests, of course, should not be overestimated, since their assessments by various socially active groups and political forces can differ greatly. A sufficient condition for the implementation of the unifying function is the obvious benefit to society (best of all material) from the consistent implementation of the declared foreign policy principles.
At the same time, those formulating national interests should hardly rely solely on public opinion. To identify threats to the country and its promising opportunities it requires professional qualifications that go beyond ordinary “common sense” and a more nuanced understanding of the international situation than can be gleaned from newspapers and television news programs. As Larisa Pautova stated on the pages of this magazine, “geopolitics lies beyond the everyday attention of the average Russian.” Public sentiment cannot but be taken into account by those who determine the foreign policy course of the state, but market-based measurements of public opinion are not enough to formulate national interests.
This task cannot be entrusted to a limited group of senior government officials, whose interaction with narrow groups of influence is extremely difficult to trace. Any “elite” that decides to “take upon itself” the development of the concept of national interest will most likely not be able to integrate many private interests into several general ones. At best, the “elite” will be held hostage by several interest groups - such as the military-industrial complex, natural resources or other large businesses, etc. As a result, there will be a “distortion” of foreign policy with the ensuing overspending, missed opportunities to increase welfare and strengthen the security of society as a whole. In the worst case, the “elite” will begin to manipulate public opinion in order to increase its electoral chances, thereby completely opposing itself to any national interests.
Private interests in foreign policy rarely add up to one resulting vector supported by society as a whole. Rather, by competing for state foreign policy resources, private interests only interfere with each other. It follows that doctrinal foreign policy documents, which list “particularly important” partner countries and areas of international interaction in the form of a list, in principle cannot reflect “national” interest, but are most likely the result of a chaotic lobbying-bureaucratic process. It is important to note: we do not a priori deny legitimacy to any of these private interests (developing relations with state A, overcoming the conflict with state B, ensuring favorable conditions for the export of arms to the markets of region C, etc.). We only assert that none of them can claim to be national, since they will not fulfill the basic functions of national interest listed above.
It is not at all easy to formulate sufficiency criteria that allow us to confidently call some interest “national.” Perhaps this category can include interests developed as a result of the activities of an institutional system that ensures the connection of the country's citizens with the policy-making community and the consideration of independent public expertise in the course of a broad public debate. For the formulations of national interests resulting from such a discussion to be perceived as fair by the vast majority of citizens, significant trust in social and political institutions (but not necessarily in specific leaders occupying one or another position within the institutions) is required.
A high level of trust in institutions that have proven their effectiveness characterizes a mature civil nation - a community of people with a consensus identity that has clear boundaries, a high degree of political participation of citizens, good protection of individual rights, a very limited part of which is delegated “to the top” and can be at any time revoked, etc. Thus, it turns out that the term “national interest” is certainly applicable only to a mature civil nation. Where there is no developed nation, most likely there will be no “national interest” corresponding to it, but there will only be a multitude of completely legitimate, but private and transitory interests. Such a set of interests is unlikely to ensure the continuity of foreign policy even in unchanged conditions external environment. As Andrei Skriba notes, in states where there were no “effective institutions that would establish a broad dialogue between all participants in the political process,” after each regime change, “private interests [were only redistributed] within national ones, and the irresponsibility of the elites sooner or later made itself felt again know". As is known, in any country the authorities strive to reduce their own accountability to society and, if possible, avoid responsibility for achieving the declared goals. And only a system of independent public control institutions ensures such accountability, and therefore gives meaning to national interests as a declaration of the long-term goals of the state.
Does this mean that in a state that does not meet the criteria of a developed civil nation, it is fundamentally impossible to develop fruitful formulations of national interest? There is probably a chance for this. However, in this case, additional restrictions must initially be imposed on the formulation of national interest, which would make it possible to avoid the promotion of private interest to the position of national one. The subject of national interest should be only society as a whole, and the interest itself should have the appearance of a public good.
For example, support for domestic automakers or arms exporters may be part of the program of a certain politician or party, but such private interest should not pretend to be a national interest. By formulating national interest as public, we insure ourselves against “privatization” state institutions narrow interest groups. It is characteristic, for example, that in the above-mentioned report of the “US National Interest Commission” “support for the export of certain sectors of the economy” is placed in last place in the group of the country’s least important national interests.
In turn, interests such as “supporting the reform of the domestic education system through the widespread introduction of the best foreign experience”, “attracting foreign investment in high-tech sectors of the economy” or “forming good neighborly relations with states along the border perimeter” imply benefits for the whole society. And although not all its members will benefit equally from the implementation of these interests (presumably the losers will be uncompetitive teachers and backward “national” industries), these benefits will be distributed fairly in terms of the fundamental and undeniable goals of increasing the security and economic prosperity of the state, as well as intellectual development his society.
The benefits of developing the concept of national interest (at least in its foreign policy dimension) seem undeniable: unjustified expenditures from the state budget are reduced, citizens have a sense of common cause, the national bureaucracy is disciplined, the boundaries of foreign policy ambitions are brought to the attention of other countries, etc. Yet states often fail to offer their citizens, bureaucracies, and the wider world a compelling vision of the national interest. As an example of the difficulties of developing national interests, one can look at the experience of the Soviet Union and modern Russia.
According to the stories of representatives of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy community, in the history of the USSR and Russia, attempts to develop clear formulations of national interests invariably ended in failure. To be convinced of this, it is enough to look in their doctrinal foreign policy documents for an unambiguous declaration of interests (in addition to banal security and economic development), which would meet the criteria of national ones and would perform the corresponding functions. Why Soviet Union, and behind him Russia refused to operate with formulations of national interests? A detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay. It is possible, however, to put forward several hypotheses for further research and discussion.
Firstly, as subjects of international relations, neither the Soviet Union nor modern Russia have finally decided on their borders - first of all, not even the formal legal ones drawn on political map world, but ideological or ethnopolitical. The new civil community “Soviet people,” as is known, took shape over many decades with great difficulty. Today, support for “compatriots” in other countries of the world is shared as a foreign policy goal by a significant number of Russians, and many representatives of the Russian foreign policy community use the term “Russian world.” At the same time, as Igor Zevelev notes, the boundaries of the “Russian world” allow for many interpretations. A civil nation capable of fruitfully defining national interests must have clear and understandable boundaries for all its participants, beyond which the state “owes” little to anyone.
Secondly, in its foreign policy the USSR was a hostage to ideology, while national interests by definition cannot be formulated in ideological terms if the impact of the corresponding ideas on the material world cannot be clearly measured. As the experience of the USSR has shown, an attempt to realize ideological interests by material means leads to a rather rapid, by historical standards, overexertion of forces and undermining the legitimacy of state power with the subsequent collapse of the state itself. The idea of spending significant resources on promoting liberal democracy globally (as opposed to leading by example) is now being challenged by numerous American foreign policy experts, including members of the National Interest Commission.
Finally, those who make foreign policy decisions never want to bind themselves to specific formulations of interests in an unstable domestic political situation, which often requires adjusting the external course to achieve domestic political goals. This phenomenon in various forms is characteristic of almost all states. This occurs, for example, in the United States, where members of Congress have been recent years(and repeatedly in earlier historical periods) are trying to radically influence the country’s foreign policy, going beyond the mandate of the legislative branch and hoping, if necessary, to shift responsibility for possible failures to the executive branch.
Embodying wisdom more high order Rather than the needs of specific leaders or political parties for re-election, national interests must primarily discipline politicians by imposing noticeable restrictions on their freedom of action. The concept of national interest as a central component of the foreign policy doctrine loses its meaning in the case of a “light” attitude towards this doctrine and frequent attempts to change it to suit the moment (especially in hindsight). The self-limiting function of an official or even semi-official but influential declaration of national interest is especially important for Russia, whose policy concerns (whether just or not) are often voiced by its neighbors and the wider circle of states with which cooperation is essential to the country's economic progress.
1. The category “national interest” is one of the main and most widespread in the system of concepts in the theory of international relations. The very sphere of international relations is often considered as a unique field of conflict and interaction of various national interests, within the framework of which their implementation is (or is not) carried out. At the same time, the problem of the content of the concept of “national interest” remains controversial in both domestic and foreign political science.
In some cases, disputes arise due to misunderstandings rather than the existence of a real basis for them. For example, in English, the main and first meaning of the word “People” is a state-organized nation, and when translating the phrase “national interest” into Russian, the most adequate option would be the term “state interest.” The synonymy of the concepts “nation” and “state” reflects the historical specificity of the formation of European, predominantly single-national states in Western political science, the concept of “national interest” has never been given ethnic content. Thus, an Englishman, speaking about the “national interests” of Great Britain, does not at all mean the interests of only the British, but the entire state - the United Kingdom, which also includes the Scots, Welsh, and residents of Northern Ireland. Thus, doubts about the legitimacy of raising the question of “national interests” of Russia on the basis that it supposedly allows for an ethnic interpretation, understood as the “interests of Russians” in the multinational Russian Federation (or “interests of Russians” with the inclusion of the Russian-speaking population of neighboring with Russia of the sovereign states of the CIS) are not justified in principle. In global political development, there were situations when the state claimed to protect the interests of compatriots living outside its borders and who were citizens of foreign states (Germany during the regime of A. Hitler, Germany in relation to citizens of the GDR, when there were two German states). However, in these cases, such claims were specifically stipulated when determining the specific content of national interests and were included in the formulation of foreign policy strategies.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid misunderstandings and in order to bring the vocabulary of Russian science closer to the categories accepted in the world, it would seem justified both when translating and when considering the interests of Russia to talk about “national-state”, and not just “national” interests. This is more justified that the Russian Federation is only at the beginning of the formation of its statehood, and at this stage of development, as world experience shows, the question of the specific content of national-state interests always turns out to be controversial.
2. In principle, national interests are fundamentally objective; they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to:
Ensuring stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, improving the standard of living of the population;
Minimization (optimally, none) of threats to the personal and public safety of citizens, the system of values and institutions on which the existence of a given society is based.
These aspirations are embodied in the concept of national interest, the specific content of which is also determined primarily by objective parameters, such as:
The geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, whether it has allies or opponents who pose a direct threat;
Position in the system of international economic relations, degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
The general state of the system of international relations, the predominance in it of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law.
With changes in objective realities and the needs of society in the field of international communication, the content of national interests may also change. The illusion of their eternity and constancy developed in the low-dynamites, from the point of view of the emergence of qualitatively new factors of development, in the 18th-19th centuries. In reality, when determining the specific content of national interests, it is necessary to proceed from the existence in objective reality of both relatively stable (changing only over decades) and variables subject to frequent changes.
3. It is most difficult to find a “formula” of national interest for a society that is changing the paradigm of its own development or is split along social, ethnic or geographical lines, in other words, for a society where a majority consensus on fundamental issues of its life and development has not developed or has collapsed. A typical example of a “split” society is the USA in the mid-19th century. In a formally one state, in fact, there have developed completely different types of economic development (industrial-capitalist North and agrarian-slave-owning South) and, accordingly, differently understood national interests. The United States was able to resolve this conflict only by going through a civil war, during which the industrial North broke the separatism of the South and ensured the preservation of the unity of the country.
A change in the paradigm of internal development - the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, for example, although it may not affect the geopolitical position of the state, also causes a revision of views on the content of its national interests. Thus, a totalitarian state is characterized by the desire for the highest possible degree of control over all spheres of social life, including the economic one. Only such development is considered safe and stable if it is ensured by its own resources, on the basis of complete (or, in extreme cases, partial) autarky. The transition to democracy and a market economy, as a rule, gives rise to aspirations for openness, participation in the international division of labor, and the formation of relations of interdependence in the economic sphere with other states, which in a totalitarian society is perceived as one-sided dependence and a threat to national security.
The problem here is that the concept of national (national-state) interest is formulated and can only be implemented as a national doctrine, shared and supported by the majority of society. However, in practice such complete consensus is difficult to achieve for the following reasons.
Firstly, in assessing the objective parameters and realities underlying the determination of national interests, there is inevitably an element of subjectivity, the burden of views and judgments of the past, ideological motives that influence the mentality of even the most far-sighted leaders and theorists. Accordingly, the opposition to the current course always has the opportunity to question the adequacy of the chosen doctrine to the objective content of national interests.
Secondly, the political choice of the state is influenced by various pressure groups, reflecting the differences that objectively exist in most societies in determining the foreign policy priorities of the state and the content of its national interests. Such discrepancies are inherent not only in “divided” countries, but also in normally developing countries; they are associated, for example, with the specific interests of various social, gender, age, ethnic, religious groups, various factions of business circles (for example, the military-industrial or “agrarian” lobby in the USA ), the peculiarities of the development of individual regions within the state (in the USA, for example, there are specific interests of the ruling elites of the Pacific and Atlantic states).
Nationwide (statewide) agreement is achievable, as a rule, only in extreme moments of development, say, the situation of the appearance of a common, visible and clearly perceived threat (England, the USA during the Second World War). According to former CIA Director R. Klein, to determine the degree of purposefulness of a state’s actions in the international arena, not only its absolute power (military, economic) is important, but also indicators of whether it has a “national strategy” based on a clear understanding of national interests, as well as "national will" - the ability of society to share and maintain an understanding of these interests. For “split” societies, these indicators according to Kline are close to “O”, for societies under extreme conditions to “1”. For most states (including the United States), these coefficients were determined by Clyde in the range of 0.5-0.7, which reflects a fairly high degree of national consensus on the content of national interests.
4. The problem of compliance of national interests, in the form in which they are determined by the state, with the actual interests of society became especially acute in the 20th century, which provided many striking examples of how attempts to implement the found formula of national interest led to failures and even disasters. These are Germany, Japan and Italy in the 30s of the 20th century, which set a course for creating such “new orders” in Europe and Asia, in which their interests would dominate in the international arena. This is the USSR, which exhausted its forces in the Cold War. , largely generated by his aspirations to ensure the triumph on a global scale of those ideas and principles on which Soviet society itself was built. This is partly the United States during the Vietnam War, the unsuccessful course of which for America made Americans doubt the correctness of their existing ideas about national US interests.
Contradictions between the objective interests of society (nation, people) and the concept of national interests (or the doctrine on the basis of which foreign policy and military-political strategies are determined) in some cases are the product of subjective miscalculations of governments. More often, however, we are talking about more underlying reasons, related to the general orientation of the development of society and the dominant ideology in it. Thus, the NSDDP of Germany came to power under the slogan of revenge for defeat in the First World War and the conquest of “living space” for the Germans by force of arms. Thus, the possibilities for a different choice of means and ways to satisfy the interests associated with Germany’s desire to achieve a revision of the articles of the Versailles Treaty that humiliated it and to create for itself a “sphere of influence” corresponding to its economic weight were sharply limited. The ideology of the NSDAP - revenge, the establishment of the Germans as a "master race" - predetermined the inevitability of Germany's collision with a coalition of states superior to it in military power.
The USSR, which emerged not as a state focused on ensuring its own interests, but as the base of the “world revolution”, led by the CPSU, which always proceeded from the fact that the strength of the Soviet system was directly dependent on the development of revolutionary processes in the world, was also doomed to confrontation with states whose people did not share socialist values. In other words, the interests of the USSR, as they were officially formulated and implemented, despite the fact that they were shared by society for several decades, were objectively illusory. Following a course based on “proletarian internationalism” aggravated the military confrontation in the Cold War, which undermined both the standard of living of the population and the chances of increasing it, and increased the degree of danger associated with the nuclear threat both for the peoples of the USSR and for the whole world.
Thus, we can conclude that a society whose nature gives rise to interests that cannot be realized in principle or are fraught with national tragedy is fundamentally unviable. It seems far from accidental that the attempt to revise the paradigmatic understanding of the interests of the USSR on the world stage, undertaken by M.S. Gorbachev, ultimately ended with the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the Soviet political system itself, its core - the CPSU. This attempt was initially not associated with a revision of the paradigm of Soviet foreign policy; at the level of declarations, it was only about changing the means of achieving its goals (without an arms race, without military confrontation between blocs, etc.).
Another question is that the essential content of interests is inextricably linked with the means and methods of their implementation. The ability to find alternatives without undermining the foundation of a certain type of social development is the most important indicator of the conformity of this development with the general, global trends progress of civilization.
5. Flexibility in determining the content of national interests, choosing means and methods for their implementation becomes especially relevant in modern world. This is due to the development of regional and global interdependence of the states of the V nations in matters of ensuring military security, protecting economic interests, and solving environmental problems.
On the one hand, interdependence makes its own adjustments to the choice of means and methods of ensuring national-state interests. Modern weapons exclude the possibility of ensuring the security of the people and society through unilateral efforts; participation in military alliances is also insufficient. The security of one state is inextricably linked with general security ensured by the collective efforts of the entire world community, ensuring the dominance of the rule of law in international relations, and not the rule of force. Economic stability, including the stability of the national currency, also depends on the state of the international economy as a whole. The preservation of human habitat in individual states depends on the ability of others to pursue environmentally sound policies.
All this indicates that national interests can be realized not by unilateral, but by joint actions of states that respect each other’s interests and resolve their conflicts by peaceful means, in compliance with common legal norms that are common to all. International organizations are increasingly becoming instruments for protecting national-state interests, to which their participants voluntarily transfer the rights and powers arising from their sovereignty as subjects of interstate relations.
Moreover, the factor of dependent dependence is generated by new interactions that appear in the “real world politics”: regional and regional ones (generally speaking).
It is particularly interesting to see development occur where and when integration processes gain strength. The interests of an integration bloc (such as, for example, the EU) are not just the sum of the national interests of the states participating in the integration. Moreover, certain conflicts may arise between the interests of the latter, which, however, does not negate the significance of the fact that at the level of the world economy, attitudes towards global political and military issues, the collective interests of the members of the integration association dominate. These collective interests are a kind of synthesis of coinciding mainly the national-state interests of the countries of the region in relation to those problems that can be solved through their joint efforts more effectively than on an individual, isolated basis.
It seems that the situation is somewhat more complicated with global, universal human interests. Theoretical recognition that the entire world civilization has a common interest in solving problems of ecology, demography, energy and others, ensuring safe, sustainable and stable development does not yet mean opportunities and abilities reflection of these realities in concrete, everyday politics. In principle, in the long term, societies that are unable to abandon development “at the expense of others” or at the expense of the destruction of nature and adjust their interests accordingly turn out to be historically doomed. But, on the one hand, it is too great the force of circumstances for many countries, forcing them to proceed from current, specific problems, rather than long-term considerations. On the other hand, the interests of solving global problems of our time and, ultimately, the survival of humanity^ becoming an integral element of the national-state interest of each country, inevitably acquire their own nationally specific coloring, differing in their national interpretations of each other.
Thus, a number of states in the most underdeveloped “belt” of the world (especially in the zone of equatorial Africa) cannot, when determining their priorities, ignore the fact that the physical survival of the population of this region is in question. In other states that are potentially capable of making a great contribution to the solution of universal human problems and, in principle, do not ignore common, global interests, due to the difficult economic situation (the zone of the CIS countries, for example), there is objectively no opportunity to pay due attention to environmental issues and the rational use of resources. Countries in the developed zone of the world - North America, Western Europe, and the industrial centers of Asia - could help solve many development problems and overcome the difficulties associated with changing the development paradigm of vast regions of the world. To the extent that solving global problems meets their national interests (which is indisputable), they could make their contribution to solving these problems. At the same time, it would seem that the most logical, from the point of view of universal human interests, such a way of solving the problems of development, modernization, reconstruction, etc., does not at all look realistic for a number of reasons.
First of all, it conflicts with the priorities of national and regional development of advanced countries, since it requires the diversion of significant resources, which is difficult to compatible with their national interests (or national egoisms). Further, this path implies that countries facing difficulties will develop at the expense of other, more developed ones, which will form a model of dependency-dependent development. The mere acceptance of assistance, even if stipulated by strict conditions, does not at all guarantee its effective use. If it is effective, it will turn out that developed countries have created new economic “centers of power” capable of competing with them on world markets, which again is not compatible with their national interests.
Thus, if the national-state interests of individual countries at the regional levels turn out to be not only compatible, but also complementary to each other to such an extent that one can rightfully talk about the interests of, say, the EU countries as a very concrete reality, then at the global level everything is more complicated. The ideal version of the harmony of human, regional and national interests turns out to be difficult to achieve, the balance between them is difficult to achieve and the compromises found are rarely optimal for everyone. In this regard, it can be assumed that if in the past the content of international life was determined by the confrontation and interaction of national-state interests of individual countries, now, and even more so in the coming decades, it will be determined differently: by the search for generally accepted balances between national-state and regional and global (universal) interests, confrontation over the opportunistic and perspective-oriented understanding of them, the scope of which will lie not only and not so much in the international, but in the national-state arenas of individual countries, and it will be connected with the definition of new, more advanced paradigms of their development.
Literature
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National interest is the nation’s conscious need for self-preservation, development and security. An exponent and defender of national interests in foreign practice, international politics is the state. The concepts of national and state interest are difficult to distinguish, since each nation, wrote M. Weber, is a community of feelings that can find its adequate expression only in its own state, and a nation can preserve its culture only with the support and protection of the state. The question of the legality of using the concept of “national interest” and its content is the subject of discussion among representatives of different scientific fields in international relations. A detailed explanation on this issue was presented by one of the founders of the theory of political realism, G. Morgenthau. The main provisions of this explanation are as follows: 1) “national interest” is an objective reality. It is based on originality geographical location the state and the resulting features of its economic, political and cultural development, on the one hand, as well as on the characteristics of human nature, on the other. Therefore, “national interest” represents a stable basis for a state’s international policy. From the point of view of G. Morgenthau, “national interest” contains two main elements: central (constant) and secondary (changeable). The secondary element is nothing more than the concrete form which the fundamental "national interest" takes in space and time. The central interest consists of three factors: the nature of the interest to be protected, the political environment in which the interest operates, and the rational necessity that limits the choice of ends and means; 2) “national interest” is quite amenable to rational comprehension by government officials. They must assume that good policy is rational policy based on properly understood “national interest.” This presupposes an awareness of the fact that the distinctive quality of politics, including international politics, is the struggle for power; 3) although the essence of politics is the desire to establish moral values through power, this does not mean that a politician can claim to know what is morally conditioned for the “state” in a particular situation. Moral policy is based on the need for coordination and compromise in protecting the “national interests” of states in the international arena, from the desire to achieve “general interests”, which is incompatible with competition political ideologies; 4) “national interest” is fundamentally different from “public interest”. If the first exists in an anarchic international environment, then the second is associated with a system of laws regulating domestic politics. In other words, in contrast to “public interest,” the concept of “national interest” refers to the sphere of foreign policy of the state. Liberals question the very legitimacy of using the concept of “national interest” for analytical purposes or as a criterion for foreign policy. Since from such a point of view it is not possible to define the concept of national interest, in the end, the researchers proposed to consider “national identity” as the motivating motive for the actions of a participant in international relations. Speaking about “national identity”, they mean language and religion as the basis of national unity, cultural and historical values and national historical memory, etc. Theorists of the liberal-idealistic paradigm and practitioners inspired by their ideas are ready to agree with the existence of national interests only on the condition that their content must be recognized moral standards and global problems of our time. The defense of sovereignty and the associated desire for power in an increasingly interdependent world is increasingly losing its meaning. Hence the statements that the main task facing democratic states today is not the protection of national interests, but concern for moral principles and human rights. Discussion in national science the concept of “national interest” also revealed differences in its understanding. As in Western political science, the main divide in the discussion is no longer between “objectivists” and “subjectivists”, but between supporters of realist and liberal-idealistic approaches. Representatives of realism believe that “national interest” remains the basic category of all states of the world without exception, and to neglect it would be not only wrong, but also extremely dangerous. According to liberals, in a democratic society, national interest is formed as a kind of generalization of the interests of citizens, while an authoritarian and totalitarian society is characterized by a “statist” or “power” position, which assumes that the interests of the state are higher than the interests of the individual. However, domestic discussions about national interest differ significantly from discussions in the Western academic community. The first difference concerns the interpretation of the term “national” as ethnic. In this regard, doubts are expressed about the applicability of the concept of “national interest” to multi-ethnic states in general and to Russia in particular. Based on this, some authors propose to talk not about national, but about state, national-state interests. The second significant difference characterizing Russian scientific ideas about the content of the concept of “national interest” is that it is, as a rule, separated from the concept of “public interest”. As a result, there is a need for such additional formulations as the external aspect of national interests, national interests in their foreign policy dimension. In connection with the discussion on the legality of using the concept of “national interest” and its content, some conclusions can be drawn. First. Attempts to “cancel” the significance of “national interest” as an analytical tool and criterion for a state’s foreign policy are too hasty and unfounded. These attempts do not reflect the state of research on this issue in the scientific literature as a whole: when criticizing the concept of “national interest,” neither realists nor liberals, as a rule, are inclined to completely deny its usefulness. Second. By denying the importance of “national interest,” Russian liberals go much further than Western scientists. In their opinion, the burden of statist and authoritarian traditions and the still absent civil society in our country make this category not only inapplicable, but also dangerous for the establishment of democracy. Third. A strict understanding of “national interest” does not imply its association with “nationality”, i.e. with an ethnic factor. Just like the category of nation, the concept of “national interest” reflects, first of all, the unity of political structures and civil society and is not reduced to the ethnic component, which in this case is of secondary importance. Fourth. The identification of “national interest” with public interest is as illegitimate as their opposition. Identification leads to the denial of the specifics of foreign policy, its relative independence and, ultimately, reduces it to domestic policy states. The opposite is the absolutization of the discrepancy between the interests of the state and civil society. In short, national interests are determined by the state, and foreign policy is used to achieve them. Usually in the scientific literature the following types of national interests are distinguished: basic (radical, permanent); non-essential (minor, temporary); objective; subjective; authentic; imaginary; matching; mutually exclusive; intersecting; disjoint. The traditional concept of indigenous national-state interest is based on geographical, cultural, political and economic factors. National-state interest includes the following main elements: military security, providing for the protection of state sovereignty ( national independence and integrity), constitutional order and value system; the well-being of the country and its population, implying economic prosperity and development; a secure and favorable international environment, allowing for free contacts, exchanges and cooperation in the region and beyond. The emerging global financial system and unified information space, transnational production and global trade network entail the erasure of national borders and the transformation of state sovereignty. Drastic changes have taken place in the world, among which the process of economization of politics, which continues to gain momentum, stands out. All this cannot but have a significant impact on the content of national interests. What is the nature of this influence? There is no consensus on this issue. Some believe that essentially nothing fundamentally new is happening. States remain the main participants in international relations, and still, as in the time of Thucydides, they need to be able to survive and develop. The growing complexity of the world and the emergence of new global challenges does not lead to the solidarity and unity of mankind, but to the aggravation of interstate contradictions. The concepts of “vital interests”, “zones of influence”, “principles of state sovereignty” remain central categories that reflect the essence of world politics in the era of globalization. Other researchers, on the contrary, talk about a complete erosion of the content of national interests, since “new subjects of world politics are already replacing states - nations.” In their opinion, globalization leaves no room for national interests and replaces them with the interests of global civil society. The main element of these interests is ensuring individual rights and freedoms, which are still suppressed by the state, especially in countries with authoritarian political regimes. However, the reality is much more complex. Under the influence of globalization government agencies, like traditional national institutions, are indeed experiencing devastating shocks. New actors are undermining traditional priorities of state sovereignty. Some scholars speak of “deterritorialization” or the “end of territories” to emphasize the devaluation of the national state government. The crisis of the state is an objective reality. The state experiences pressure “from above,” “from below,” and “from outside.” "Above" state sovereignty is undermined national organizations and by institutions that increasingly interfere with its prerogatives. In addition, states also voluntarily limit their sovereignty. This is the so-called transfer of sovereignty, i.e. transferring part of it to the disposal of the communitarian structures of the integrating states. The most significant example in this area is the European Union. “From below,” state sovereignty is being eroded by internal state structures and civil society structures. IN developed countries ah in the sphere of politics this is expressed in the phenomenon of “paradiplomacy”, i.e. parallel diplomacy. The national monopoly in the field of foreign policy is being eroded. It manifests itself mainly at the functional rather than the constitutional level. Objective reasons erosion of sovereignty “from below” lies in the fact that the state is too small a subject in relation to global economy, but it is too heavy a burden for the regional economies and even more so for private enterprises and firms. “From the outside,” damage to sovereignty is caused by the activation of such non-governmental groups and organizations as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, human rights and environmental associations. Even more, the state is losing its monopoly under the pressure of transnational corporations, firms, banks and enterprises. Thus, the dynamics of globalization really involve all states, ignoring their independence, types of political regimes and level of economic development. At the same time, the state-nation, its sovereignty and its interests as an analytical concept and as a criterion for the behavior of the state in the international arena continue to retain their significance. But this does not mean that globalization does not bring any changes to national interests. On the contrary, national interest changes significantly in its content and direction. New priorities are emerging related to the need to take advantage of globalization by adapting to the opportunities it opens, on the one hand, and, on the other, fighting against the damage it brings to national interests.
After the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the world entered
into a new phase of global political development. If before that
moment, global security was based on the principle of nuclear
containment and balance of power of the two military blocs, then after the dissolution
The Warsaw Pact changed the balance of power in favor of NATO.
The entry into its ranks of the Baltic states and some states
Eastern Europe in 2005 expanded the boundaries of the alliance to state
borders of Russia. In this case, Russia is actually alone
opposes military power NATO. The current situation requires
Russia to develop such a model of behavior in the international arena,
which would enable it to pursue an international policy consistent with
its national interests. However, making an ego is not easy.
The hopes of the political elite led by Boris Yeltsin for Western
assistance during the reform period of the 90s of the XX century. led to rough
miscalculations in domestic and foreign policy, which significantly reduced
economic and military potential of the country. Economic decline
Russia's technological and military power significantly reduced its international authority, made its leadership accommodating, forced it to make numerous concessions and betray the country's national interests. When solving pressing international problems, the opinion of the Russian leadership is practically not taken into account, as, for example, when resolving the “Yugoslav crisis”. Russia's international influence was indicated only by its nuclear status. Desire to build partnerships with Russia and integrate it into European and other international structures Western countries did not. The West did not want to write off Russia’s debts to the USSR, which placed a heavy burden on the country and its citizens.
It is obvious that the preservation and development of Russia as an economic,
political and cultural-psychological integrity is possible
ensure only through the efforts of its people, and not through humanitarian,
financial and other assistance Western countries. Only economic
prosperity, political stability, moral health
Russian society are able to guarantee its national
security and the return of high international authority to it.
Russia's prestige in the international arena largely depends on success
economic, political and sociocultural transformations
within the country, achieving harmony and peace between its peoples.
Awareness of this and the return of Russia to the number of global players
world politics was associated with the efforts of the presidential administration
V. Putin (1999^2008).
Russia's foreign policy priorities
For the first time since the collapse of the USSR (1991), the political leadership
Russia has formulated the basic principles of ensuring
national-state interests of the country in the new geopolitical
situations. This was done by Russian President V. Putin
2007 in Munich. Assessments and provisions expressed by V. Putin
in the “Munich speech”, formed the basis of modern foreign policy
doctrine of the Russian Federation, developed by the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. President's speech
20 Political science was programmatic and significant: it marked the beginning of changes in relations between Russia and Western countries and influenced Russia’s relations with the outside world.
It should be noted that the Munich Conference is a kind of
equivalent to the World Economic Forum, only concentrating
its attention to military-political issues and other
security problems. It involves representatives of political,
military and business elites of many countries.
Speaking at this meeting, V. Putin gave a general assessment of the situation
in the world and relations between Russia and Western countries, warning
that he will speak “without excessive politeness” and empty diplomatic
stamps. It came out harsh and at times unflattering.
First position: “We have come to a turning point when
must seriously think about the entire global security architecture
" According to the Russian President, the basic principle is being violated
international security, the meaning of which can be summarized
to the thesis: “the safety of everyone is the safety of everyone.” Moreover,
the end of the Cold War, despite the obviousness of such a recipe,
did not lead to the triumph of the said principle. On the contrary, how
stated V. Putin, this time is marked by an attempt to create a unipolar
the world is “a world of one master, one sovereign.” In his opinion,
“Today we are witnessing an unrestrained, hypertrophied
use of force in international affairs, military force, force,
plunging the world into successive conflicts, said
V. Putin, - We see an increasing disregard for the fundamental
principles of international law. Moreover, separate
norms, yes, in fact, almost the entire legal system of one state,
first of all, of course, the United States of America, having stepped over
their national borders in all spheres - in economics, in politics
and in the humanitarian sphere - and is it imposed on other states?
Who will like this? According to V. Putin, the US attempt to impose
The model of a unipolar world has failed.
Second situation: growing problems in the field of international
security, first of all, this is stagnation in the field of disarmament and
the threat of militarization of space. They have become worse in recent years
and pose a direct threat to Russia's national security.
This threat came from the actions of the United States and NATO. First of all,
it is the US intention to place the elements missile defense
in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, it is in a state of crisis
Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It happened
due to the refusal of NATO countries to ratify the adapted
version of this document. In this connection, V. Putin also recalled
that the US is creating forward bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and NATO
moves its troops to the Russian borders, while the Treaty
ties Moscow's hands. At the same time, V. Putin recalled that
in the 90s of the XX century. NATO countries gave assurances that they would not interfere
NATO troops outside the territory of Germany.
Third situation: the international landscape is now significantly
is changing, primarily due to new centers of global growth.
These are primarily the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China).
Russia intends to play an ever increasing role in international affairs
role by pursuing an independent foreign policy. Having strengthened
its economy and its position in the world, Russia is unlikely to agree,
so that she would henceforth be treated like a poor relative.
Fourth position: V. Putin proposed to negotiate on
all international problems. In particular, he spoke in favor of
so that stakeholders come up with a joint solution
on the issue related to missile defense and on the issue of ratification of the modified CFE Treaty.
The harsh assessments expressed by V. Putin caused a wide resonance.
The first reaction to the words he said was the question: it won’t lead
Whether such a sharp polemic led to a resumption of the Cold War.
Such fear, however, did not last long, since no one
discovered the cessation of cooperation between Russia and the United States and others
Western countries on a number of important international issues.
It is significant that official representatives Washington and NATO
who became the main object of criticism from V. Putin, do not consider
what a speech Russian President leads to the resumption of the "cold"
war." Moreover, in response to calls from the President of the Russian Federation, the administration
Bush promised to “deepen” dialogue with Moscow. True, activation
contacts between both countries on military-political issues
(meetings under the “2+2” formula with the participation of defense ministers have resumed
and heads of foreign policy departments, several expert
meetings on the issue of missile defense) have not yet brought any new
agreements. Moreover, Moscow announced a moratorium on participation
Russia's place in the system of modern international relations
The modern political landscape is increasingly becoming
signs of multipolarity and asymmetry, in which relations
Russia with various countries will be built taking into account its national
interests, and not to the detriment of them. There are several
vectors of Russian foreign policy, the implementation of which is related
with the defense of its national interests: Russian-American
relations, Russia and Europe, Russia and the CIS.
Russia and the USA: vectors of confrontation
The basic contradiction is related to Russia's role in the global energy sector.
From strategic partnership, the relationship between Russia and
USA in the second half of the 2000s. entered a cooling period.
2007 These changes were caused by objective shifts in the global
politics.
Firstly, the fuse of the worldwide struggle against the international
terrorism compromised by the US war in Iraq.
Now peoples and governments themselves understand the contours more clearly
terrorist threat, without minimizing or exaggerating it.
Terrorists were unable to gain access to weapons of mass destruction,
and in the matter of countering “ordinary terrorism,” states have already learned something.
Secondly, the pole of confrontation in the world has changed. In the first
for half a decade its most important element was antagonism
USA with many Islamic countries. In the mid-1990s. imagination
most striking were the contradictions in NATO between the United States
The States, on the one hand, and France and Germany,
with another. At this moment, Russia, cautiously drifting away from close partnership
with Washington (since 2001), managed in a dispute between the United States
and mainland Western Europe call out fewer American
reproaches than Paris and Berlin. Then diplomacy second
Bush administration regrouped resources and, weakening
forceful onslaught in some peripheral, although important, areas
its policy (DPRK and South Asia), focused on
on the central ones. One of these has always been relationships
with NATO. Now relations with the region have risen on par with them
Greater Middle East, which, according to American ideas,
extends in the north to Transcaucasia, the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea.
European direction of American policy at the level
practical actions began to transform even more quickly into European-
Caspian and European-Caucasian. Asianization of NATO
continues. Just like three or four years ago, its main incentive
the US desire to strengthen strategic positions in the regions remains
presumed presence energy resources. At the same time, the main thing
the formal justification for the new “march to the East” is “nuclear
threat from Iran,” which Moscow and Washington take seriously
diverge.
Thirdly, and most importantly, for the first time in a decade and a half
Russia began to pointedly oppose the habitually assertive
The US “eastern strategy” has its own unusual offensive line. This new policy includes an unconditional refusal
not only from solidarity actions with Washington in the 1990s.
20th century, but also from the more firm course of “selective resistance” to American policy, which was followed by the Russian
diplomacy throughout most of V. Putin's administrations.
The nerve of the moment lies in the fact of “counter diplomatic escalation
» Russia and the USA. This is not the case in Russian foreign policy.
it was a very long time ago.
Among the sources of Russian-American contradictions lies
divergence of points of view on many problems: from disagreement
Americans with the direction of political processes in Russia
to discrepancies in positions on a number of issues of nuclear non-proliferation-
different weapons and policies in relation to individual countries and situations.
Russia is annoyed that Washington is trying to teach it how to build
relationships with neighbors, including unpleasant or dangerous ones.
Moreover, by giving “advice” regarding Russia’s relations with its neighbors,
The US itself does not risk anything. For them, the Russian borderland is
“foggy distance”, for Russia - a zone of key economic, political and military interests. The essence of Russian-American
mistrust - not in the exchange of barbs about the assessment of “farcical
regimes" in Georgia or Iran and not even in consolidating the military presence
The USA is at the borders of Russia, although it, of course, cannot be considered
a sign of friendliness. However, the basic contradiction between the US and
Russia has opposing views on the optimal role
Russia in the global energy sector. Moscow strives to the utmost
strengthen it as consistently as the US tries to prevent
to her in this. “Imitation of integrity” in disputes over conflicts
in the “pipeline Transcaucasus” and the situation around Iran - derivatives
from Washington’s intention to eliminate competitors from the region,
which is considered a possible alternative to the Middle East in
as the world's energy storehouse. Everything is made worse by the lack
between Russia and the United States A systematic dialogue on global
issues, primarily military-political. Recreation
a mechanism for such dialogue appears to be an urgent need,
based on the desire to retain Russian-American
relations along the lines of at least a “cool” partnership. Aggravating
circumstance - the upcoming elections in 2008 in both countries.
In these conditions, politicians and diplomats have no time for international
security. There is a danger of missing the moment.
American missile defense in Europe is unacceptable for Moscow
Another vector of disagreement between Russia and the United States is related to the deployment in Europe of the 3rd position area of the American strategic missile defense system. The most acute disagreements on this issue arose in the spring of 2007, and they reached their culmination on November 21, 2007, when the Russian Foreign Ministry received an official letter from the United States State Department. It left no doubt: Washington
Rais and Robert Gates will under no circumstances give up
deployment of its strategic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Even though
to the fact that missile and nuclear threat from Iran may
and not to be. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff
The Russian Armed Forces publicly assessed American intentions
as a forceful technique aimed at weakening Russian strategic
nuclear deterrent forces. And although the US Congress has not yet - pending the completion of negotiations with the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the missile defense system in Europe by independent experts - to the deployment of missile defense elements near the borders of the Russian Federation, Russian generals have already threatened Washington and its allies with adequate and asymmetrical measures, including targeting operational-tactical missiles at radar station in Brdy near Prague and the missile defense base in Ustka on the Baltic coast. Moreover, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Yuri Valuevsky, warned
Poles that Russia’s strategic deterrence system can automatically respond to the launch of an American anti-missile missile. True, for some reason Russian generals do not remember the first two areas of the US strategic missile defense system, located in Alaska and
in California, where there are about forty interceptor missiles, not ten,
as planned in Poland. Apparently, behind the slogans about the strategic partnership of the two states, which were exchanged more than once
Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin, in fact there is a strategic confrontation, the content of which was not only the anti-missile fence with which the United States surrounds Russia, but also problems
Kosovo, nuclear energy in Iran, development of democracy in our country
and press freedom. These problems are unlikely to go away on their own.
Russia - European Union
The EU has found a replacement for the Constitution.
Reform Treaty. Operating principles document
The EU will come into force after ratification by all states. Expected,
that this will happen at the beginning of 2009. However, it is not excluded
surprises.
Portugal ending its six-month presidency
in the European Union, kept her word - presented the promised agreement.
in a solemn atmosphere by the heads of state and government, and
also by the leadership of the European Commission. The treaty replaced the draft constitution,
rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.
The reform agreement provides for the introduction of the post of president
European Council, which will represent the organization at
international arena. High Representative for General Foreign Affairs
politics and security policy will actually turn into a minister
foreign affairs In the structure of the executive branch there is also
changes will happen. From 2014 the number of European Commissioners will be equivalent
two thirds of EU member states. In the meantime, each of the 27 states
presented by a member of the European Commission.
The Treaty increases the role of the European Parliament. Deputies will be able to influence
on legislation in areas such as justice, security and
migration policy. Total seats in the European Parliament
will be reduced from 785 to 750. National parliaments will have the right
participate in legislative activities at the EU level. They
will be able to make their own amendments to the text of bills. If a third of national parliaments do not approve the draft law, it will be sent to
revision to the European Commission.
according to the so-called double majority formula. According to this
principle, a decision is considered adopted if it is voted for
representatives of 55% of states containing at least 65% of the EU population. However, countries that fail to create a blocker
minorities will be able to postpone the issue and propose
continue negotiations. This system will come into effect in 2014.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for
general energy policy and implementation of the overall strategy
combating global warming, helping one
or several members in the event of terrorist attacks or natural disasters
disasters.
In addition, the document contains an article about the possibility of exiting
from the EU, the decision on which will be made based on the results of the general
negotiations
European Policy Center analyst S. Hegman said,
that, although the signed treaty contains some elements of European
Constitution, these two documents should not be compared.
In form, this is an ordinary intergovernmental agreement, and it is
therefore, for example, it does not mention national symbols,
flag and anthem. According to the expert, the agreement does not talk about the transfer by the governments of EU member countries of part of the powers to the pan-European leadership, but about clarifying the list of powers already transferred.
In other words, we are talking about improving the existing
systems. According to the analyst, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty
happened in a completely different environment compared to 2004,
when the draft European Constitution was being considered. There are more Eurosceptics
far less. In particular, because the management has changed
in Poland and Denmark.
The signed document has a very complex structure, and significant efforts are required on the part of governments and other forces,
so that its meaning and content are correctly understood by the population.
All EU countries, with the exception of Ireland, intend to limit
parliamentary ratification. However, there may be surprises here too.
In particular, experts do not undertake to predict how things will go in the UK.
Russia and NATO
The Russia-NATO Council was created in 2002, the corresponding agreement
signed by V. Putin and the leaders of 19 NATO countries in Rome. European
leaders said then that in relations between Moscow
and the alliance enters a qualitatively new stage, Russia “with one foot
joined NATO" and the "Cold War" finally ended."
At that moment, the European CMs repeated in unison that Russia was ready
join the North Atlantic Alliance, and V. Putin was quoted as saying,
did not exclude such a possibility even before his election as president.
However, already in the fall of 2002, NATO, despite Russia’s objections
accepted seven new members into its ranks. After this, despite
to regular contacts within the Russia-NATO Council,
relations between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance have become rapidly
deteriorate.
In December 2007, a regular meeting of the Council was held in Brussels
Russia - NATO. Representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance stated that relations with Russia have entered a critical phase,
and decided that already next year the process of NATO expansion by
the east will continue. The parties admitted that they could not agree
on none of the key international issues - from the placement
American missile defense system in Europe and Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty
status of Kosovo.
To the next meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels, at which
Russia was represented by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov, preceded
meeting of the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministry of 26 NATO member countries. The main unpleasant thing
news for Moscow was the statement made by the Secretary General
NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who confirmed that already in April 2008 at the summit in Bucharest a decision will be made on admitting new members to the alliance. Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Georgia are considered the most likely recruits to NATO. At the same time, the Secretary General referred to the decisions of the NATO summit held in Riga in 2006, where the leaders of NATO member countries confirmed that the doors of the alliance would remain open to new members.
It is noteworthy that at the Riga NATO summit for the first time ever
time after the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of the alliance discussed the threats posed by
from Moscow. However, the specific question of expansion
alliance was not on the agenda at that time, as he stated in December 2006
none other than Jaap de Hoop Scheffer himself. Having endured a year
pause, NATO decided to speed up the admission of new members into its ranks.
Despite the difficulties that have arisen with Ukraine, NATO does not release
out of sight and this country. Yesterday a meeting was also held in Brussels
Ukraine-NATO commission, following which Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer promised to make “the foundation of bilateral relations
even stronger." The news that NATO is preparing to make another
step towards the Russian borders did not come as a surprise to Moscow.
“At the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008
this issue will be one of the central ones, it was confirmed the day before
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation - For us this is an extremely sensitive moment, especially
in relation to the states of the post-Soviet space." Noting
that “the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with
modernization of the alliance itself or to ensuring security in Europe
", the planned expansion on Smolenskaya Square was named
alliance "a serious provoking factor, fraught with the emergence
new dividing lines."
The Permanent Representative of Russia spoke even more harshly
(since January 2008) at NATO D. Rogozin: “When NATO talks about threats
from the south, but at the same time expanding to the east, this indicates how
about an absolute lack of understanding of the situation, and about the insincerity of the leadership
alliance" According to him, "expecting to expand due to
former Soviet republics, NATO hopes in vain that the reaction
Russia will not be too sharp,” as happened before. "They are not
suspect that Russia is no longer what it was before,” pointedly
Mr. Rogozin noted. “NATO did not understand the full benefits of cooperation with Russia when it was ready for deeper integration. And now Russia has new ambitions, it has grown from
shirt that NATO sewed for her,” said D. Rogozin.
In the decision adopted following the meeting of the Russian Foreign Ministers of NATO countries (December
2007) joint statement states that “in ten
years after the signing of the first founding document
about cooperation between Russia and NATO, the partnership between them is entering a critical phase.” Following the meeting of the Council Russia-
NATO and both sides said they had failed to bring their positions closer together.
Disagreements relate to the solution of all fundamental problems:
and the plan for the deployment of the American missile defense system in Europe, and the Treaty on
conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), from which Russia
For example, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov criticized
NATO's position regarding the control regime over conventional
weapons in Europe. He stated: “We do not understand individual actions
alliance, including near the borders of Russia. In particular,
modernization of military infrastructure in the Baltics, creation of American
bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Such steps complicate the situation
around conventional arms control in Europe, which
has been at a dead end in recent years.” Trying to convince partners
refuse to support the independence of Kosovo, S. Lavrov noted,
that the decision on the status of Kosovo will become a precedent for the unrecognized
republics in the post-Soviet space. According to him, “those
who is planning to take liberties with international law, with the charter
The UN, with the Helsinki Final Act, must once again
think carefully before you step onto the very slippery slope that
may be fraught with unpredictable consequences and not add
stability in Europe." Finally, the Russian minister said,
what if NATO recognizes the US missile defense system being created in Europe
element of its missile defense, then Russia “will find it difficult
continue to cooperate within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council on this
subject."
Thus, the meeting in Brussels actually drew a line under
period of relations between Russia and NATO, which until recently
moment, despite disagreements, by inertia they continued to call
allied. It is noteworthy that the warmest relations
Moscow and Brussels were precisely during the first presidential
term of V. Putin. However, during the second term, the “allied”
relations" between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance came
clash of interests and fierce confrontation in all directions,
increasingly reminiscent of a new Cold War.
NATO is concerned about the strengthening of Russia. For this reason, the Pentagon
leaves troops in Germany.
Contrary to initial plans, the United States will not reduce the number of its troops in Europe in 2008. Two American combat brigades
will remain in their locations in Germany. About this USA the other day
NATO headquarters in Brussels was notified. Currently
Four combat brigades of the American army are stationed in Germany,
numbering 43 thousand soldiers and officers. There should have been two before them
be returned to the United States by the end of 2008. In this case, the number
Pentagon ground forces in Europe would drop to 24 thousand
Human. But now these plans are frozen.
Officially, the US Department of Defense motivates this by the unavailability of American quartering sites intended for
for the return of the teams. However, the commander of the ground forces
The USA in Europe D. McKiernen explained with military directness
review of the decision to reduce the number of American garrisons
in Germany “a new strengthening of Russia.” Politicians and military
NATO expresses "bitter disappointment" over increased
Russian criticism of the Alliance, accused
in “building muscle.” According to the Brussels headquarters
apartment of the organization, behind the criticism of Moscow lies its desire
use your economic recovery to realize your own
foreign policy and military interests. In this regard, the Viennese
the publication sees in the refusal to reduce the number of American
troops in Europe "is a definite sign that the military
The United States is beginning to prepare for a new confrontation with Russia.”
Despite the Pentagon's preventive measures, the US Ambassador to
NATO V. Nuland remains optimistic. She believes that achievement
agreement with Russia on controversial issues perhaps: “We stand before
threats and dangers that equally concern both Russia,
so do us in the West. So we must find opportunities
cooperation from which both sides will benefit.”
Meanwhile, in Washington and Brussels NATO authorities
Moscow's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty
forces in Europe (CFE) is interpreted as further evidence of the strengthening
Russia, requiring countermeasures. A remarkable signal
is the call of the leading Republican contender for the presidency
USA R. Giuliani to begin increasing numbers
American armed forces in response to the strengthening of Russia's position.
According to him, Russian intentions “still cause
anxiety." Therefore, R. Giuliani convinced voters in the state of South
Carolina, US "needs to become even stronger militarily"
" In turn, the American analytical center Stratfor
anticipates the mobilization of Western intelligence services. According to RIA
News, the center's employees are experienced experts in the field
intelligence and business, and its services are used by hundreds of large firms,
government and military departments. In a recently published
A Stratfor policy brief in Washington states, in part:
“The abandoned CFE Treaty will force NATO to at least intensify
their intelligence efforts to track the movements of
Russian armed forces and receive information that the Russians would normally provide themselves as part of the mechanisms
Russia in the post-Soviet space
One of the main vectors of Russia’s global policy is
maintaining influence on the former republics of the USSR that became independent
states after 1991 Initial organizational-
legal form of “civilized divorce” of former Soviet
republics after the collapse of the USSR became the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which included 11 states. However, as shown
In practice, weakly integrated groups, like the CIS, are ineffective. Decisions made at CIS forums are not implemented.
In addition, the elites of the Commonwealth countries have different political
orientation. Some of them are burdened by Russian influence and turn
their views towards the United States (as Ukraine and Georgia do), others, on the contrary,
still focus on Russia (for example, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan), and others (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan)
are trying to build a multi-vector foreign policy related to
with equal distance from the two poles of influence. Post-Soviet
the space is attractive mainly due to its significant
natural resources, the control of which is currently being fought
different states. Taking this fact into account, Russia strives
more clearly declare their national-state interests,
using new tactics: where political
arguments, it is quite possible to try to solve the problem with economic
methods, to increase the attachment of the economies of the CIS countries to Russian
financial and stock markets.
RF and Belarus
Closest relationship (allied) due to geopolitical
situations are developing between Russia and Belarus, which
announced the construction of a union state. Different ideas about
models of union (federal or confederal) have caused controversy
between countries. This became an obstacle to the construction of a new
states. Under these conditions, Russia decided to change its attitude towards
Belarus tactics. Where political arguments do not work,
It’s quite possible to try to solve the problem by not making it too big
for Russia with money. If Belarus does not abandon Russian
cheap money, which is extremely unlikely, the degree of economic integration
two countries will inevitably increase, as will the affection of Belarus
to the Russian financial and stock markets.
2007 to Moscow, was dumbfounded by the unexpected generosity of Russia.
The total amount of government loans that Belarus was promised until 2008.
to issue Russia, increased from 1.5 billion dollars to 3.5 billion dollars, which is
7% of Belarusian budget expenditures in 2008. In addition, vice
Prime Minister A. Kudrin, who implemented an attraction of unprecedented generosity,
promised Belarus loans on the domestic Russian market in the amount of 10 billion.
rub. Belarus, apparently, will not resist, having encountered Russia’s desire
Russian interstate loan to cover losses from the increase
prices for Russian oil and gas supplies in the amount of 1 billion.
dollars, the promised money was allocated. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
Finance A. Kudrin and Belarusian Minister of Finance N. Korbut signed
agreement to provide Belarus with a state loan in the amount of
1.5 billion dollars. In addition, Belarus was promised another loan
in 2008 in the amount of $2 billion, and it was proposed to place bonds
on the Russian market in the amount of 10 billion rubles. and if, these papers
will receive a demand, repeat this operation as necessary.
As A. Kudrin explained, 1.5. Billion dollars provided by Russia
for a period of 15 years at a rate of LIBOR+0.75%. The agreement provides
and a 5-year grace period during which interest is paid
will not. At the current rate LIBOR + 5% A. Kudrin
estimated the cost of the loan for Belarus to be “about 6%.” But right after
signing of the agreement, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that Russia is ready
provide Belarus with another loan - for $2 billion in 2008.
N. Korbut tried to argue that this amount should be commercial
loan from Russia to Belarus. But Mr. A. Kudrin insisted,
that the type of loan - a government loan or a commercial loan "will be studied." But before that, “one of the next steps will be to place
public loan of Belarus on the Russian market,” issued another
the secret of Russian-Belarusian financial relations A. Kudrin.
According to him, “the Russian side has already received a request for registration
such a loan." After this, N. Korbut had to admit
that the volume of placement could be up to 10 billion rubles. in 2008 He
he only clarified that “this will not be a one-time placement, but in tranches.”
Russia will provide the first $1.5 billion to Belarus with more than two
in portions, but all at once. As N. Korbut explained, the country expects to receive
will be used to finance the Belarusian budget deficit,
which for 2008 has already been determined at 1.9% of GDP, or $1.2 billion.
A loan in the amount of $1.5 billion, according to A. Kudrin, will increase the gold and foreign exchange reserves of Belarus, and the budget of Belarus will receive
amount converted into Belarusian rubles. Where will they be sent?
another $2 billion, as well as money from Belarusian bonds, was not specified. For Belarus, we note, 3.5 billion dollars of loans in
2007-2008 - amounts that are macroeconomically significant. This is about 7%
expenditures of the country's consolidated budget for 2008 (24.4 billion).
dollars), and slightly less than the size of the social support fund (combines
part of the functions of the Pension Fund and the social insurance system) -
$5.6 billion in 2008
Even on the eve of V. Putin’s visit, political scientists assumed that
Russia's loan to Belarus may be payment for A. Lukashenko's consent
agree on the Russian version of the provisions on Union State.
However, now that rates have increased 2.5 times, the reason
they see it differently. Most likely, they agreed with A. Lukashenko on
wide admission of Russia into the country's economy, and not only about
participation of Russian companies in the privatization of Belarusian ones, but also about
wider cooperation. Plus security agreements,
After all, Belarus borders on Poland. Finally, perhaps
that this is a payment for a possible transition to the Russian ruble.
Russia and Central Asian countries
Of particular interest to Russia are the pantries of the countries of Central
Asia, which make the region attractive for everyone.
As economic growth increases, the need for energy increases.
After the collapse of the USSR SSR, Central Asia was the region where Moscow
traditionally dominated. However, in recent years this region
is rapidly turning into a springboard for geopolitical struggle
between Russia losing ground, increasing “draconian
» at the pace of China, which habitually seeks its interests throughout
to the US world and seeking to reduce energy dependence
from Russia to Europe. The most fierce struggle unfolds
for oil and gas produced in Central Asia. All
of these players, except the United States, are either reaching an agreement or have already
agreed on construction in their direction from this region
oil and gas pipelines. The situation in the Central Asian countries themselves
countries is ambiguous.
Kazakhstan. In 2007, Kazakhstan continued to move towards the target
The goal is to become one of the 50 developed countries in the world. In 2007, according to
annual report The Global Competitiveness Report (about the global
competitiveness), he took 68th place out of 131. In addition, the long-time dream of President Nursultan Nazarbayev came true - in 2010.
Kazakhstan will become the chairman of the OSCE. And this despite criticism
international observers of the past parliamentary elections.
Let us remind you that the pro-presidential Nur Otan received more than 88% of the votes
voters, and the rest were unable to overcome the 7% barrier.
Thus, the new legislative body (mazhi-lis) turned out to be
Within the Borders nation state subjects of politics are individuals, social groups(classes, strata), parties, movements pursuing individual and group interests. However, independent states themselves do not develop in a vacuum; they interact with each other and act as subjects of politics more high level- international.
The goals of international politics are determined by the specific context of the specific historical situation in which the world community finds itself, and the nature of the relations that exist between states. To the extent that external factors influence the living conditions of a particular state, they also determine the content of international politics.
National interest is the nation’s conscious need for self-preservation, development and security, a set of balanced interests of the individual, society and the entire state in economic, domestic political, social, international, information, military, border, environmental and other spheres of society. National interest can also be defined as awareness and reflection of its needs in the activities of state leaders. This applies to both multinational and ethnically homogeneous states. In fact, national interest means national-state interest.
Traditionally understood, the fundamental national-state interest includes three main elements:
- - military security;
- - economic prosperity and development;
- - state sovereignty as the basis for control over certain territory and population or the preservation of the nation as a free and independent state.
Sometimes the following elements are added:
- - growth of national welfare;
- - protection of the economic and political positions of the state in the international arena;
- - expansion of its influence in world politics.
However, today both these elements and the content of national interest as a whole are undergoing significant changes under the pressure of new facts and circumstances.
Now states and regions are becoming increasingly permeable to the growing flows of ideas, capital, goods, technologies and people crossing their borders. Traditional bilateral and multilateral ties between states are complemented by new ones operating in a variety of areas, such as transport, economics and finance, information and culture, science and education, etc.
Under these conditions, national interest cannot be ensured without creating such conditions for the existence of the state as internal stability, economic well-being, moral tone of society, security (in the broad sense of the word), a favorable foreign policy environment, prestige and authority on the world stage. It should be borne in mind that ensuring national interest is achieved only when these conditions are balanced, representing an open system of interdependent and complementary elements. Full provision of each of them is possible only ideally. In real practice, cases of insufficient development of one or another of these elements or conditions are typical, which is compensated by more intensive development of others. Ensuring such a balance is the essence and art of international politics.
There is a distinction between constant (fixed) and variable content of national interest. The constant part includes the task of ensuring the external security of the state. Variable content is viewed through the prism national traditions, personal qualities of political leaders, trends in the economic and social spheres public life etc. Real material and political needs for the development of the state may change, and along with them, interests, goals, means and foreign policy activities change accordingly. A change in the needs and interests of the state leads to a change in ideological values.
In relation to the environment to the outside world national interests are expressed in the totality of the foreign policy interests of the state, which differ in their importance for its life. There are two levels of national interests of the state: the level of main foreign policy interests and the level of specific interests. The first is associated with ensuring its security and integrity as a socio-economic, political, national-historical and cultural community, with the protection of the economic and political independence of the state. The state ensures its main interests by all military, economic, diplomatic and ideological means.
The second level covers individual, relatively private, although important in themselves, interests of the state in the field of international relations.
National interests are fundamentally objective, because they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to ensure stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, and improve the standard of living of the population; minimizing threats to the personal and public safety of citizens, the system of values and institutions on which the existence of society is based.
These aspirations of citizens are embodied in the concept (doctrine) of national interest, the specific content of which is also determined primarily by objective parameters, such as:
- - the geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, whether it has allies or opponents who pose a direct threat to the national-state interests of the country;
- - position in the system of international economic relations, degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
- - the general state of the system of international relations, the predominance in it of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law.
The concept of “national interest” was developed by G. Morgenthau. He defined the concept of “interest” in terms of power. The concept of national interest consists of three elements: 1) the nature of the interest that must be protected; 2) the political environment in which the interest operates; 3) national necessity, which limits the choice of goals and means for all subjects of international politics.
G. Morgenthau included the following in the concept of “national interest”:
- 1. National interest is an objective reality. It is based, firstly, on the uniqueness of the geopolitical position of the state and the associated features of geo-economic and socio-cultural development; secondly, it is mediated by the peculiarities of human nature.
- 2. Statesmen must proceed from the premise that good policy is rational policy based on properly understood national interest. The basis of such a policy is a clearly constructed image of the state, through which the perception of national interest occurs.
- 3. National interest is fundamentally different from public interest. National interests are ensured by foreign policy, and public interests by domestic policy. They should neither be opposed nor merge.
The foreign policy of an independent state, according to G. Morgenthau, should be based on a certain physical, political and cultural “reality” that is capable of realizing the nature and essence of its own national interest. This “reality” is the nation. All nations of the world in the international arena strive to satisfy their primary need, namely the need for physical survival. In a world divided into blocs and alliances, where the struggle for power and resources continues, all nations strive to protect their physical, political and cultural originality (identity) in the face of outside invasion.
Probably, this position of G. Morgenthau was relevant during the Cold War, when the world community was divided into two opposing camps: socialist and capitalist. In the modern world, when countries, for various reasons, are interdependent and interconnected with each other, their survival and development can only be ensured through their cooperation and interaction. Under these conditions, any state, while pursuing its own national interest, must respect and take into account the interests of other states.
By combining its own interests and the needs of other states, a nation can ensure its security. National security means the state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and state from internal and external threats, the ability of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, act as a subject of international law.
The concept of “security” for the individual, society and the state does not coincide in everything. Personal security means the realization of his inalienable rights and freedoms. For society, security consists in preserving and increasing its material and spiritual values. National security of a state presupposes internal stability, reliable defense capability, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
Nowadays, when the danger of nuclear war remains, national security is an integral part of global security. Until recently, global security was based on the principles of “deterrence”, confrontation and confrontation nuclear powers(USSR, USA, France, Great Britain, China). But truly universal security cannot be ensured by infringing on the interests of any states; it can only be achieved on the principles of partnership and cooperation. The turning point in the formation of a new system of universal security was the recognition by the world community of the impossibility of victory and survival in a world nuclear war.
It is impossible to ensure national security without the identification, awareness, and declaration by the state of vital national interests. Otherwise, the foundations of national security can be easily destroyed by anyone - as happened in the USSR during perestroika, and then in independent Russia. Unidentified, unconscious and undeclared national interests are not protected in any way, i.e. are areas of vulnerability, Achilles heels, and therefore the main directions of a new war.
In a viable and effective state, the priority of national interests is determined by their vital importance. The state protects national interests by all available means. It should also be taken into account that interests that are not vital and even alien to the nation can be proclaimed as national interests; priorities of national interests may change; Relevant problems may not be adequately formulated and addressed. In this case, the country will self-destruct using its own forces and means.
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