Ten myths about nuclear weapons. The Great Nuclear Game in the 21st Century: Disarmament or War? On the question of whether nuclear weapons exist

Why should we worry about nuclear weapons? What makes it so important?

The nuclear arsenals now available for immediate use by the United States and Russia have the potential to destroy civilization and humanity and all of the most complex forms of life on Earth. This ultimate act of destruction can only be carried out within minutes of the American or Russian President ordering the launch of hundreds of ballistic missiles long range with thousands of nuclear warheads.

How powerful can a weapon be to destroy civilization and humanity?

Nuclear weapons are millions of times more powerful than “conventional” high-explosive charges used by armies in modern warfare. The largest “conventional” bomb in today's US arsenal has an explosive yield of up to 11 tons (about 22 thousand pounds) of trinitrotoluene (TNT). The smallest nuclear warhead possessed by the United States and Russia is 100 thousand tons (or 200 billion pounds) of TNT.

The heat or thermal energy released during a nuclear explosion cannot be compared with what happens on Earth under natural conditions. When a nuclear warhead explodes, it is like the birth of a small star. The explosion creates a temperature that is similar to that found at the center of the Sun, i.e. on the order of hundreds of millions of degrees Celsius.

The resulting huge fireball emits deadly heat and light that will start fires in all directions if the explosion occurs over areas with large amounts of flammable materials, such as large cities. These fires will quickly join together to form a monstrous single conflagration, or firestorm, covering tens, hundreds, and even thousands of square miles or kilometers. earth's surface.

America and Russia each have many thousands of large, modern strategic nuclear warheads available for immediate launch and use. Just one medium-sized nuclear weapon detonated over a city would immediately create fires over the surface with a total area of ​​40 to 65 square miles (or 105 to 170 sq. km).

Large strategic charges can create fires over much larger areas. A one-megaton (1 million tons of TNT) charge would cause fires over an area of ​​100 square miles (260 sq km). The detonation of a 20-megaton charge could immediately start fires over an area of ​​2,000 square miles (5,200 sq. km).

The total energy released during a firestorm and completely burning the city surface is, in fact, a thousand times greater than the energy initially released directly from the nuclear explosion itself. The incredibly lethal environment created by a firestorm will destroy virtually all life and produce enormous amounts of toxic and radioactive smoke and soot.

IN big war between the US and Russia, thousands of strategic nuclear weapons could be detonated over cities within one hour. Many large cities will likely be hit by not one but several nuclear weapons each. All these cities will be completely destroyed.

Within an hour, a nuclear firestorm would engulf hundreds of thousands of square miles (kilometers) of urban areas. Everything that can burn will be burned in fire zones. In less than a day, up to 150 million tons of smoke from these fires will quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere.

As noted on the home page, the smoke would quickly form a global smoke layer in the stratosphere that would block sunlight from reaching Earth. This would destroy the protective ozone layer and lead to devastating climate change, dropping the average global temperature at the Earth's surface within a few days to a level well below that of Glacial period. Minimum daily temperatures in continental areas of the northern hemisphere would remain below freezing for years.

Such catastrophic environmental changes, along with the massive release of radioactive and industrial toxins, would lead to the collapse of the Earth's ecosystems on land and sea, which are already under great stress. Many, if not most, complex life forms would not be able to withstand such a test.

There would be a mass extinction similar to what happened when the dinosaurs and 70 percent of other living things disappeared 65 million years ago. Humans live at the top of the food chain, and we would most likely die along with other large mammals.

Even the most powerful leaders and richest people, with super-shelters equipped with nuclear power plants, hospitals and food and water supplies for many years, would be unlikely to survive a nuclear war in a world devoid of complex life forms. Those who can press buttons should know that in a global nuclear holocaust there is no escape from the ultimate destruction.

If nuclear explosions in cities will lead to darkness and disastrous climate change, then why did this not happen after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by nuclear bombing at the end of the Second World War?

Fires in two mid-sized Japanese cities did not create the amount of smoke needed to create a global smoke layer that could cause disastrous changes to the Earth's climate. In other words, to influence global climate, millions of tons of smoke should rise into the stratosphere, but the burning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not produce that much of it.

But new research suggests that 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear warheads detonated in major cities in India and Pakistan could create enough smoke to cause catastrophic climate change. The power of this number of charges is only half a percent of the total power of the operationally deployed nuclear warheads of the United States and Russia.

In a major nuclear war, in which American and Russian nuclear weapons were detonated, between 50 and 150 million tons of smoke would be released into the stratosphere. It's enough to close sunlight from the earth's surface for many years.

Why are you sure that computer research, predicting climate change in the event of a nuclear war, are they correct? How can you check this if a nuclear war never happened?

To carry out repeated checks, American scientists used the latest climate model developed by NASA to space research(NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Model IE, in collaboration with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). This model is capable of simulating the entire troposphere, stratosphere and mesosphere from the earth's surface to an altitude of 80 km. The same methods and climate models that predicted global warming were used to justify global cooling due to nuclear war.

Although it is true that it is impossible to be accurate in assessing the results of a nuclear war without actually carrying it out, it is nevertheless obvious that this is a method of research that we must avoid. However, the application of the above climate models has been very successful in describing the cooling effect of volcanic clouds. This was done through both intensive US analyzes and international intercomparisons carried out as part of the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Models of this type have also successfully assessed the cooling effect of dust storms on Mars (dust blocks access to sun rays to the surface of Mars, just as smoke in our stratosphere might prevent them from illuminating the Earth).

This research is also being intensively carried out by other scientists around the world as part of a general scientific process referred to as “ expert review" To ensure that such research is verifiable, that it can be repeated, and that it is free from error, all important and widely accepted scientific methods are used.

In other words, studies that predict climate change due to global warming or global cooling are carried out in the best and most respected traditions of the scientific method and are tested by scientists around the world. This process has provided us with most of the scientific discoveries and advances over the past few centuries. There is a strong consensus in the global scientific community that these findings should be taken seriously and that they should lead to action.

If nuclear war can destroy humanity, then why do states continue to maintain and modernize nuclear weapons? Do nuclear weapons prevent war?

Nations that retain nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of their military arsenals (the United States, Russia, England, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan) do so because they are committed to nuclear deterrence. That is, they believe that having nuclear weapons will deter other countries from attacking them. Conversely, they think that if they did not have nuclear weapons, then there would be a greater likelihood of attack from countries that do have them.

So, nuclear deterrence remains the key operational strategy of the United States and Russia—and any other nuclear weapons state.

The US Department of Defense Military Dictionary states: “Deterrence is the perception of the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable opposition.” Today's “credible threat” created by the rapidly deployed nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia is a thousand times greater in total power than all the warheads detonated by all armies in World War II. It is clear that a “credible threat” based on such an arsenal would mean the destruction of most of the people on the planet.

The same leaders who rely on nuclear deterrence also believe that there is no real path to eliminating nuclear weapons. The question they cannot ask themselves is, after some time, what will be the likely choice of these two action alternatives? Should we stubbornly maintain extremely dangerous nuclear arsenals as the basis of a policy of deterrence, or should we sincerely strive for a world free of nuclear weapons?

Those who believe indefinite retention of nuclear weapons as a viable and legitimate option often tend to frame the idea of ​​eliminating nuclear arsenals as a “destabilizing” goal, and apparently believe that deterrence will always prevent nuclear war. However, such long-term optimism is not confirmed by either logic or history.

Containment will only work as long as all parties remain rational and fear death. However, for many extremist groups, the credible threat of retaliation is not a deterrent, no matter how strong it might be. History is replete with examples of irrational leaders and decisions that led to war. Nuclear weapons, coupled with human fallibility, not only make nuclear war possible, but ultimately make it inevitable.

Suicide is not a way of defense.

If the ultimate goal of national security policy is to ensure the survival of the nation, then the attempt to achieve this goal through nuclear deterrence must be seen as complete failure. Because deterrence does not set rational limits on the size and structure of nuclear forces, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been created. They continue to be on alert and patiently waiting to destroy not only our nation, but every other nation on Earth.

So, the consequence of just one failure of the containment system could be the end of human history. A major nuclear war will make our planet uninhabitable. Even a conflict between India and Pakistan, in which only half a percent of the global nuclear arsenal was detonated, would, according to forecasts, lead to catastrophic disruption of the global climate.

Leaders who choose to defend their nation with nuclear weapons must face the fact that nuclear war is suicide and not a way to save their citizens. Suicide is not a way to protect yourself.

If we accept the statement that “there is no realistic path to a nuclear-free world,” then we are condemning the world's children to a truly bleak future. Instead, we need to reject the 20th century mentality that still continues to lead us towards the abyss, and understand that nuclear weapons pose a threat to the human race.

“Nuclear weapons hang over humanity like the sword of Damocles.”
J. Kennedy
At one of the meetings of the Pugwash meeting, an American scientist who was present at the first test of a nuclear bomb told the following parable.

The creator of the nuclear bomb, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, looked tired and worried after the bomb exploded. When asked how he felt at the moment of the explosion, Oppenheimer replied: “I became Death, the destroyer of the world.” After thinking, he added that after the completion there would never be a reversal, ((the prophetic words were etched in the memory: an outstanding achievement of the human mind, concentrated in an atomic flash, was immediately tied to the chariot of Death, and there will be no turning back.
Since July 1945, humanity has continued to exist in the nuclear age. Day after day, nuclear weapons were steadily accumulating, their destructive power was being improved, and various means of delivering them to targets were created. This whole process is now slowed down, but not stopped. For mere mortals, 1)H causes two sensations. The first is a feeling of a certain security from war, and the second is a constant danger for the life of mankind. These two sensations exist side by side, they are together all the time. Considering that nuclear weapons are increasingly spreading across the planet and the situation in the world remains turbulent, the second feeling is a real threat even today.
The question arises: are the words of Oppenheimer V that there will never be a reverse move really prophetic? Is it possible to completely eliminate nuclear weapons in the current situation?

From the very beginning of the nuclear era, the Soviet Union began to fight for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, to outlaw them, to ban them forever. In 1946, he submitted a proposal to the UN to ban the production and use of nuclear weapons; destruction of its reserves; creating an effective control system over all enterprises for the extraction of atomic raw materials and the production of atomic materials and atomic energy for military purposes.
The United States, possessing a nuclear monopoly at the time, greeted the Soviet proposal with hostility. They advocated the preservation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of the American nuclear monopoly. The so-called “Baruch Plan” provided for the creation of a control body (actually subordinate to the United States) with unlimited rights in the field of inspection of the use of atomic energy in the territory of other countries. The ban and elimination of nuclear weapons were not envisaged. The point was to secure the US monopoly on nuclear weapons and to deprive other countries, primarily the USSR, of their legal rights to use atomic energy at their own discretion. The Soviet side rejected this plan, considering it a gross violation of the country's sovereignty and security interests.
The Soviet Program was considered a major event in the mid-80s complete elimination nuclear talk about weapons. The initiator of its development was the Soviet General Staff.

She thought about it for a long time. I had doubts about its feasibility and admissibility from the point of view of the interests of the country’s defense, there was a fear of “firing empty” and assessing it as a “propaganda undertaking,” etc. The final decision and design of the project was completed at the end of 1985. Before its publication, it was necessary to first report on the draft Program to Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev. I was ordered to carry out this mission. This happened unexpectedly for me. I was in the Arkhangelskoe sanatorium near Moscow. Late in the evening of January 5, 1986, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal S. F. Akhro Meev, called me:

J- You need to be in my office tomorrow at 6 o’clock in the morning. Fly to Mikhail Sergeevich. Got it? Understood. What should you bring with you and what uniform should you wear? Have your head with you. The uniform is military. You'll find out everything else tomorrow. Good night.
However, it was not a good night. Although I had previously visited M.S. Gorbachev several times, he knew me well, and in December 1984 I was part of the delegation during his visit to London, nevertheless, I was worried - then he was only the secretary of the Central Committee, and now - Secretary General. It's not the same thing. But an order is an order. At 6 o'clock in the morning on January 6 I was in the boss's office. A short conversation took place: I am handing you a package for the report of the document contained in it to M. S. Gorbachev, who is on vacation in the Gagra region. Airplane at the Chkalovskoye airfield. Landing airfield "Gudauta". I have given all the orders. You will go to the airfield in my car. Be with M.S. Gorbachev at 10 o'clock. He's waiting for you. All clear? Clear. Please resolve the issue. What's in the package? The package contains a project of the Program you know. You know it, you wrote it yourself. Report everything in detail to the Secretary General.
(- Let me ask you one more question. With whom was the document agreed upon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Who knows about it in other departments?
’ - At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the document was agreed upon with Georgy Markovich Kornienko. Not agreed with other departments. Only the Minister of Defense S. Sokolov, G. Kornienko, me and you know about it. All. Goodbye.
At 10 o'clock in the morning on July 6, I visited M. S. Gorbachev. He greeted me friendly. I said hello. Was D good mood, looked rested. Without further ado, we got down to business. What did you come with? I brought a package from Akhromyoev. What's in the package? Draft Program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is proposed that the Secretary General take the initiative in this regard.
Agreed with whom? Only with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Kornienko. What could be new in your “initiative”? After all, we have been talking about this since 1945. Gromyko constantly spoke on this topic at the UN. Is it necessary to repeat the same thing to the Secretary General again? Mikhail Sergeevich, everything you said is correct. However, in the past there was only general talk and wishes about the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nothing specific. Only the idea was expressed: “We are for liquidation,” “Let’s liquidate.” But as? How? What control mechanism? There were a lot of other questions, but there were no clear answers to them. Now a completely new Program is being offered, in which everything is described “on the shelves”. It compares favorably with previous populist statements. I am sure the public will accept it with understanding and support it. After all, the nuclear problem is becoming more pressing every day. I ask you to familiarize yourself with the document.
The Secretary General was in no hurry to take the package and, as if reasoning with himself, asked me: Do we need to destroy all nuclear weapons? In the West they constantly say that the more weapons, the stronger the security. Maybe we can agree with this concept? How do you think? Statements on this matter by Western leaders, for example, Thatcher and others, are known to everyone. I think this is dangerous reasoning. An old wisdom says: when many guns accumulate, they themselves begin to fire. The world now has so many nuclear weapons that they could explode on their own. The Western concept of nuclear deterrence can only be understood if it is based on a level of sufficiency within reasonable limits. Otherwise, the greater the number of deterrents available, the greater the number of means of deterrence, the greater the danger of nuclear war. Our program, if you approve it, is based on these provisions and is aimed at strengthening the security of the world.
M. S. Gorbachev listened to me without interrupting. I asked a number of clarifying questions. Then he took the package. Fine. Let's honor it.
Mikhail Sergeevich carefully read the document
ment. I started thinking, as if remembering something. Then he said firmly: This is what we need. Agree. I think, however, that other disarmament problems should be added to the future document. We must embrace the entire disarmament process and put into action the entire existing system of negotiations. That is, add to the document: disarmament problems in all areas; about a moratorium and complete cessation nuclear tests; on Asian security; some ideas of disarmament for development. Do you think this should be added? I completely agree. The significance of the initiative in this form will increase even more. Let's do so.
Taking Blank sheet paper, M. S. Gorbachev, without lifting his pen, wrote clear and clear instructions to the relevant heads of ministries and departments. Then I read what I had written out loud. So what do you say? Will a couple of weeks be enough for revision? It worked out well. We'll do it in two weeks. Would you like some tea on the way? Thank you, Mikhail Sergeevich. Moscow is waiting for the document and your instructions. There is little time, but there is so much work. I ask for permission to fly to Moscow. Then - with God! Goodbye.
At 15.00 on January 6, I reported the results of the trip to the General Secretary to S.F. Akhromeev, and at 16.00 I returned to the Arkhangelskoye sanatorium.
Thus, to summarize what has been said, I would like to note once again that the draft Program was developed for a long time (about 6-8 months) and seriously. He was born in agony and controversy, but without a shadow of a doubt, without a catch, without deception - in the interests of the world. In accordance with the instructions of the Secretary General, the interdepartmental group outlined a plan for preparing the document. With the direct participation of a number of ministries and departments, the well-known Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev dated January 15, 1986 was prepared.
gt; In my opinion, the published Program for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was neither a “trick” nor a fantasy. Unlike previous years, before
Instead of appeals and general phrases, the document outlined a carefully thought-out step-by-step program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons of the five nuclear powers within 15 years (by the year 2000). The stages, time, volumes of reductions, destruction procedures, and a control system of all types, including on-site inspections, were specifically defined. It was proposed to carry out the elimination of nuclear weapons in such a way that no one's security would be weakened for a single moment. On the contrary, to strengthen general security and stability.
It seemed to us that at that time the situation in the world and in Soviet-American relations was quite conducive to the successful implementation of the Program. Therefore, the General Staff supported and protected her in every possible way. However, the desired did not happen.
The US and NATO did not agree with our proposal. Western leaders kept repeating the same thing: nuclear weapons cannot be completely eliminated. It ensures stability and security, the future of the “free world”. Only the threat of its use will save the capitalist world from communism. At the same time, they advocated the need to modernize the concepts of “nuclear deterrence,” “minimum nuclear deterrence,” “nuclear deterrence,” etc. Washington “got fixated” on SDI and jeopardized the entire process of nuclear disarmament.
Currently, the situation in the world has changed dramatically. The USSR collapsed. There is no Warsaw Pact. NATO has increased from 16 to 19 states. There are many more countries in line to be included in it, including the republics of the former Soviet Union. Russia almost agrees to be a “junior partner” of the United States and is ready to “return the warheads” to its missiles. The NATO bloc no longer has a front line. Moreover, he himself has reached the state borders of Russia and in the near future is ready to surround it from all directions. Increasing its military power, the NATO bloc led by the United States is turning into an aggressive alliance with claims to the whole world.
America's new “nuclear frontiers” are changing with amazing speed in its favor. In this regard, an interesting picture was painted by B. Blair, an expert on
Nuclear Weapons Brookings Institution, former officer US strategic forces. In his assessment, “today and in the foreseeable future, US nuclear arsenals will have superiority over Russian strategic forces and pose a greater threat to them than they did in the 80s. The current balance of strategic forces has shifted in favor of the United States, even compared to the early 60s, when the American advantage over the USSR was overwhelming” (Washington, press conference, 1998).
This is what turned out to be a severe hangover of Russia’s nuclear policy. But the finale has not yet arrived. The worst is ahead. What does Washington now propose in the field of creating a nuclear-free world?
In my opinion, his plans have become even more cynical and sophisticated than in the past. Now Washington would like to disarm Russia on a contractual basis with our own hands. After the ratification of the START-2 Treaty, we will subsequently be forced to accept START-3 and leave Russia without strategic nuclear weapons, preserving it through various manipulations (American negotiators in this matter have great experience) the strategic nuclear arsenal needed by the United States. In this way, Washington hopes to create a “nuclear-free world for Russia.”
The United States is also hatching another option - to take the entire nuclear arsenal of Russia under American control. Or even better, remove nuclear weapons altogether from the control of the Russian leadership, allegedly due to the unstable situation in the country and the possibility of their seizure by terrorists.
Regarding the establishment of American control over Russia's nuclear arsenal, we can suggest that Washington do this on a reciprocal bilateral basis. There is no other way.
As for the main problem - the complete elimination of nuclear weapons - its solution at present and in the foreseeable future seems undesirable. Why? For a number of reasons.
Firstly, today Russia, although a huge country, is a seriously ill country. Its conventional armed forces, due to their combat qualities, are not capable of resisting
be aware of the diversity of threats, including in connection with the increased belligerence of the NATO bloc. As long as the army is in a weakened state, the importance of nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear forces in ensuring Russia's security does not decrease, but increases. Nuclear forces must remain the main means of ensuring the country's defense. In the current situation, an independent and sovereign Russia can only be nuclear. There is no other option.
Secondly, talk about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons without taking into account the position of the United States and other nuclear states it would be wrong in principle. The United States and other NATO nuclear powers are not ready for nuclear disarmament. The leadership of these states still believes that nuclear forces are necessary for the defense of the North Atlantic Alliance. Without proper nuclear weapons Western security will be precarious. Nuclear weapons are the best long-term security guarantee. This happened in the past and remains valid now and in the future. At the same time, Washington says that they are ready for negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in the new situation.
Thirdly, if you look at the facts in the face, it is not difficult to notice the growing distrust of states towards each other, the fear of being deceived, which can lead to the risk of military conflict. What kind of trust can there be when “friend Boris” says that “Russia will object to the participation of the CIS and Baltic countries in NATO” (TV, May 19, 1997), and “friend Bill” immediately answers him: “NATO itself will decide who to accept and who not” (TV, 20.5.97). B. Yeltsin stated that “Russia will not allow the Bosnian issue to be resolved by bombing” (TV, 19.2.94), and his “ best friends“Soon they began bombing Bosnian Serb towns and villages. Russia resolutely opposed NATO expansion to the East, but no one even listened to its voice. Russia categorically objected to solving the Kosovo problem by military means, and the “friends” of our “guarantor” unleashed a bloody aggression in the Balkans.
Trust is when the national interests of the parties are not infringed, tension is reduced, and security is strengthened. When you know who you're dealing with,
and I am sure that there will be no catch either now or tomorrow. Such trust is achieved not by unctuous speeches or by forcing oneself into “friends,” but by the power of the country, the statesmanship and wisdom of its leader. Unfortunately, so far Russia has neither one nor the other.
Therefore, our “friends” often act without regard for Russia’s security interests and confront it with a fait accompli. If, for example, we take NATO’s promises “not to deploy large military formations in new territories in peacetime, not to place nuclear weapons on new lands” - then this is a bluff. But the US declaration of the Caucasus and the Baltic states as a “zone of its interests” is a fact that confirms mistrust.
Fourthly, we cannot neglect the fact that, in addition to the five well-known nuclear powers (USA, Russia, China, England, France), India, Pakistan, Israel and a number of other countries have nuclear weapons; There are so-called near-nuclear states. There is a migration of nuclear specialists, transfer of nuclear technology to third countries, sale of enriched fissile materials and individual structures nuclear systems. It should also be remembered that it is impossible to erase the technology of creating nuclear weapons from the consciousness of the world's scientists. This means that the possibility of recreating them remains.
For the reasons stated above, it becomes clear THAT the desirability of a nuclear-free world in the past is currently undesirable. When some Russian analysts, contrary to the stated facts, talk about the advisability of eliminating all nuclear weapons in the current situation, you think this is an illusion. Complete elimination of its willows today or in the foreseeable future is impossible. The prophetic words of Dr. R. Oppenheimer on this matter are coming true. A world without nuclear weapons is still far beyond the horizon. We need to think about how to live further in nuclear world. How to avoid repeating past mistakes?
Reflecting on the preservation of nuclear weapons and nuclear forces for Russia, we are categorically against the resumption of the arms race, the waving of the “nuclear baton”, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
you, using it for the purposes of pressure or intimidation.
In this regard, Boris Yeltsin's statements in Beijing on November 9-10, 1999 in response to the challenges posed by the United States are strange [‡‡‡‡‡‡‡]. They sounded loud, but implausible. Of course, in politics there are all sorts of miracles when even white turns black. However, this is not the case here. Boris Yeltsin had just bowed to “friend Bill,” swore allegiance, spoke of equal partnership, and then suddenly began waving nuclear weapons and declared his readiness to walk, like “Christ on the waters,” towards competition with the entire West. Prime Minister V. Putin quickly disavowed the president’s “blunders.” They staged a kind of performance about ratings. And we, sinners, have been “dumped on our ears” - we still won’t figure out what’s what. Although it is not difficult to understand that confrontation with the entire West requires more than loud speeches. If we take the share of world GDP, then in 2000 it will be: NATO - about 50%, USA - 21%, Russia -1.5%. In conditions of complete economic and financial dependence of our country, we have long ceased to be a competitor to the United States and do not pose a threat to the West. Therefore, statements about “war against everyone”, about confrontation are pure rhetoric that does not strengthen either the prestige of Russia or its national interests.
Such standards of the past are condemned by history and are unacceptable. Nuclear weapons and Russia's strategic nuclear forces will and should remain only as a reliable guarantee of the country's defense. Like nuclear deterrence of aggression. As a defense of the sovereignty of Russia and the peaceful future of Russians.
Two small nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki shocked the world. The Caribbean crisis, with a nuclear ratio of 17:1 in favor of the United States, misfired. The Chernobyl accident
brought humanity into shock.. How long will it take to understand that four to six mega-ton bombs are enough to wipe out a state like England from the face of the earth; that's ten nuclear missiles for a dozen cities is a disaster, but hundreds of missiles for a hundred cities is an apocalypse? It seems that sensible politicians living in the real world should understand what nuclear madness can lead to. They understand that nuclear weapons cannot serve the purposes of war. It has one goal - to keep the opponent from using it.
Of course, we have no guarantee that the US leadership will under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. Moreover, “Truman’s shadow” still looms on the American horizon and mistrust exists. But we are confident that it clearly understands the fatal consequences for its country in the event of a nuclear war. This gives grounds to say that Russia in the 21st century should have a completely different nuclear strategy based on mutual security.
Politically, in order to effectively ban nuclear weapons, it would be advisable to take some specific measures: to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in third countries. To do this, use the force of international law on the destruction of secretly created industrial potential and components of nuclear weapons; to help the UN so that it strictly fulfills the requirements of its Charter and plays a leading role in the process of influencing the course of world events. Provide it with a full range of capabilities to control the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; demand that all nuclear powers undertake obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to start a nuclear war against each other; consider at the UN the issue of creating an international tribunal to bring to justice leaders of states who have used nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in irreparable harm to the population, economy and environment of the nation.

There are no special illusions about the reliability of these measures. The laws today, unfortunately, do not work. International bodies are powerless. But still, the chaos can be stopped. Any criminal can be muzzled. If we are unable to do this, then in a future critical situation the world may find itself without nuclear weapons. But there will be no peace as such. The last hope is the Human Mind, which is able to prevent Judgment Day!

Big nuclear game in the 21st century: disarmament or war?

Radchuk Alexander Vasilievich – Candidate of Technical Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, Advisor to the Chief General Staff RF Armed Forces.

Today in the world there are about 40 states that have the technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. And if in the twentieth century. possession of weapons of mass destruction was the privilege of strong states, then in the 21st century. a reverse trend is emerging. These weapons attract weak states that hope to use them to compensate for their military-technological lag. Therefore, it is quite natural that, although the role of nuclear deterrence in relations between great powers is declining, none of them will ever give up their nuclear status.

And how I would like to be accepted

into this game! I even agree to be a Pawn,

If only they would take me... Although, of course, more

I would like nothing more than to be the Queen!

Lewis Carroll. Alice in the Wonderland

After in August 2009, Russian President D.A. Medvedev sent a message to V.A. Yushchenko on a wide range of problems of Russian-Ukrainian relations and suspended the arrival of the Russian ambassador to Kyiv until the election of a new president of Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalist organizations of Crimea appealed to official Kyiv, proposing to urgently collect 15–20 nuclear warheads, put them on tactical missiles and thereby give Moscow a response to its diplomatic demarche. This seemingly anecdotal incident clearly showed how firmly and deeply nuclear weapons have penetrated into our lives.

In the lives of not only politicians and military men, but also ordinary people, who consider it quite natural to use nuclear threats to resolve any issues. Indeed, almost two generations have been living in a world in which there is the most destructive weapon in the entire history of mankind, capable of destroying not only cities and armies, but the entire planet. In a world in which two interrelated processes have been developing in parallel for six decades - the strategic offensive arms race and nuclear disarmament.



Nuclear weapons today

Today, the issue of possessing nuclear weapons (NW) is inevitably considered by every state from the perspective of national interests. Indeed, in conditions when the world economy is clearly failing, it is often military force that becomes the determining factor international status states. At the same time, the subjective nature of modern politics, in which the personal qualities of some leaders begin to prevail not only over political expediency, but even over common sense, really makes us think about the advisability of achieving nuclear zero.

For many years now, many politicians and scientists have been trying to open the window of opportunity for nuclear disarmament as wide as possible. And recently heavy artillery entered the battle.

In early 2007, in the article “A World Without Nuclear Weapons,” George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn stated that today nuclear weapons pose a huge danger and it is necessary to move to a firm universal agreed renunciation of them, and in the future eliminating the threat posed by him to the world, since with the end of the Cold War the Soviet-American doctrine of mutual deterrence became a thing of the past. This statement suddenly became the center of attention of the entire progressive world community, which showed great interest in the idea of ​​nuclear disarmament. It would seem that today, in the midst of the global economic crisis, issues of economics and finance, determining ways of mutually beneficial economic cooperation, the need to create new reserve currencies and others economic problems, the solution of which can be addressed by the efforts of many countries, should be at the center of public discussion both in Russia and beyond its borders. However, even Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke at the UN General Assembly in September 2008 with a proposal to create an independent committee to monitor the disarmament of nuclear powers.

Ahead of United States President Barack Obama's visit to Moscow, a group of prominent politicians and military officials from around the world, united under the Global Zero initiative, presented a plan for the phased complete elimination of nuclear weapons on the planet by 2030. It includes four stages:

· Russia and the United States agree to reduce their arsenals to 1,000 nuclear warheads each.

· By 2021, Moscow and Washington are lowering the threshold to 500 units. All other nuclear powers (China, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, Israel) agree to freeze and subsequently reduce their arsenals of strategic weapons.

· From 2019 to 2023 – conclusion of a “global zero agreement”, with a schedule for a step-by-step verifiable reduction of all nuclear arsenals down to a minimum.

· From 2024 to 2030 – the process must be finally completed, and the verification system will continue to operate.

And already on April 5, 2009, the US President gave a speech in Prague on the problems of reducing nuclear potentials and said: “The Cold War has become a thing of the past, but thousands of weapons from the Cold War remain. History took a strange turn. The threat of global nuclear war has decreased, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. As the only nuclear power to use nuclear weapons, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed alone, but we can lead the fight to achieve success. So today I declare with clarity and conviction America's commitment to achieving peace and security without nuclear weapons."

He also said that nuclear non-proliferation should be mandatory for everyone, and proposed a summit in 2010 to adopt a new international law or rule that would ban all nuclear testing and even the production of fissile materials.

On June 12, 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon delivered a message on the occasion of the start of preparations for the International Day of Peace. In it, he announced the launch of a campaign called "We must get rid of weapons of mass destruction." He asked governments and people around the world to focus their attention on addressing issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was noted that without vigorous measures, humanity will continue to be threatened by existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Finally, the visit of United States President Barack Obama to Moscow in early July 2009 gave new impetus to the process of further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States. As a result of the visit, a document was signed entitled “Joint Understanding on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms,” which defined the general parameters of a new “legally binding agreement” that should replace the START Treaty (START), which expired in December 2009. 1). It is stated that the new treaty will be in force for the next 10 years and will determine the maximum levels of strategic offensive arms of the parties as follows: for strategic delivery vehicles - 500-1100 units and for related warheads - 1500-1675 units.

Let’s assume that the New START treaty has taken place and these reduction levels will be achieved in 10 years. What's next? New ten-year negotiations followed by microscopic cuts? Expanding the circle of negotiators? Extending restrictions to non-strategic nuclear weapons? Or a sudden turn in the plot and either the development of fundamentally new agreements or a complete rejection of them?

To some extent, the American vision of the prospects for bilateral nuclear disarmament is revealed by an interview with US Vice President John Biden, published on July 25, 2009 in The Wall Street Journal, in which he stated that growing economic difficulties will force Moscow to come to terms with the loss of its former geopolitical role , which will entail a weakening of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and a significant reduction in Russian nuclear potential. In his opinion, it was the inability of the Russian side to maintain its nuclear potential that became its main motive for resuming negotiations on its reduction with President Barack Obama. At the same time, Mr. Biden made it clear that the United States should play the role of a senior partner of a “weakening Russia.”

At the same time, Georgetown University professor Edward Ifft, the last US representative at the negotiations on the ABM treaty, proposes the following further steps in the Russian-American arms reduction process:

· Reduce the nuclear weapons of the parties to the level of approximately 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. “There is nothing special about the number of 1000 warheads. It’s just that 1000 is a nice round number.” (Strong argument!) At the same time, the deterrence system will continue to function unchanged, the triad of nuclear forces and the existing verification system will remain.

· For deeper contractions “ quantitative changes will become qualitative” and “the concept of deterrence, including extended deterrence, may have to be reconsidered.” At the same time, “deterrence is a fundamental aspect of international security, and the need for it will remain even if all nuclear weapons are eliminated.” However, “as the role of nuclear weapons diminishes, the deterrence system will increasingly depend on conventional weapons. … Conventional forces will play a comprehensive role in deterrence.”

The last thesis fully fits into the ideology of the new US strategic triad. And everything would be fine, but, apparently, Russia does not fit into it, since it is asked to “be more understanding about replacing a small number of nuclear warheads with non-nuclear ones”, as well as “to begin to resolve the issue related to the extensive arsenal of tactical and sub-strategic nuclear warheads." True, Edward Ifft does not express any thoughts on how conventional weapons, in which the United States has overwhelming superiority, will be reduced and limited.

What is the reason for such increased attention to nuclear disarmament issues today? With traditional concerns about the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, which could, as during the Cold War, lead to a nuclear conflict between them with catastrophic consequences for the whole world? Or with the same traditional views on strategic offensive weapons as the locomotive of Russian-American relations, which should lead to the resolution of other issues of bilateral dialogue? Or maybe this is the hope that new decisions will somehow influence other nuclear powers, both de jure and de facto? Or simply an inability to take a fresh look at the situation and really assess the role and place of nuclear weapons in the modern world in general and in Russian-American relations in particular?

It is unlikely that all these questions can be answered unambiguously.

All programs for the transition to a nuclear-free world, all the proposed steps in this direction, the list of specific activities that need to be carried out, still look quite scholastic. And this happens because they do not solve the essence of the problem. But the bottom line is that in the modern world, no matter how sad it may sound, only nuclear weapons, which are the extreme embodiment military power, serves as a reliable guarantor of the security of any state.

Indeed, today, in a period of global civilizational changes, there is no answer to the main question, without which it hardly makes sense to talk about the prospects for nuclear disarmament: what are nuclear weapons at the present time and in the future - just the most formidable embodiment of the military power of a bygone era or a prototype and the basis of the weapons of the future century? Have military methods of resolving interstate conflicts exhausted themselves, and if not, will nuclear weapons, and therefore nuclear deterrence, remain an effective way to resolve contradictions and protect national interests? Will forceful deterrence of opponents and competitors disappear from the arsenal of foreign policy tools?

There is no talk about the real, not fictitious, role and place of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. About the meaning military force. About effective international mechanisms ensuring security. About whether there is at least one other state attribute of such status as nuclear weapons in the world? And why do so many countries strive to possess it? Why did it turn out that the list of official (under the NPT) nuclear powers coincides with the list of permanent members of the UN Security Council? And in general, what is the role and place of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in the modern world?

The aggravation of the international situation and nuclear weapons tests in North Korea have returned the topic of the danger of nuclear war to the agenda. How likely is a nuclear conflict today and is there any reason to fear it in the future?

What is happening to the role of nuclear weapons in the world today?

Despite the latest news from the Korean Peninsula, I would not say that the role of nuclear weapons in the world is increasing. Over the past ten years, no new owner of nuclear weapons has appeared in the world, nor even a country that would be suspected of being interested in such weapons. For most countries with nuclear forces, they have long been included in their national security strategy, where, as a rule, they play the role of a deterrent.

The nuclear deterrence system between Russia and the United States has existed for more than sixty years. There are clear, established rules of the game. Some experts believe that the situation is now beginning to change, including under the influence of new technologies, but, in my opinion, the system of strategic stability based on parity has not undergone a qualitative change.

For other countries of the nuclear five, nuclear weapons play a less prominent role. The arsenals of France and Great Britain were significantly reduced, and are primarily important as an indicator of status. As long as NATO exists and the United States covers Europe with its nuclear umbrella, this state of affairs is unlikely to change.

The arsenals of France and Great Britain have been significantly reduced, and, first of all, are important as an indicator of status

There is less information about China, since Beijing does not disclose information about its nuclear forces. There is a feeling that, unlike other official nuclear powers, China is increasing its capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. But, again, this is more likely part of a general trend towards bringing the country up to the level of a great power, as they understand it, than a new emphasis on the importance of nuclear weapons.

In addition to the official nuclear states, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a number of other countries have nuclear arsenals, and the dynamics here are different.

In the case of Israel, everything is stable; for the last 50 years it has not recognized or denied the presence of nuclear weapons, although everyone, in general, knows that the country has them. Since there is no immediate threat to the existence of the state, there is no point in brandishing a nuclear bomb.

Finally, India and Pakistan, unfortunately, continue to develop their nuclear arsenals. This is not surprising, Delhi is trying to catch up with Beijing, and Islamabad is chasing Delhi. Given that both countries view nuclear weapons as a viable battlefield weapon and have fought each other multiple times, the risk of escalation is quite high. But again, the situation has not changed much since 1998.

What about North Korea?

After Pyongyang embarked on the path of creating nuclear weapons, with the goal, in many respects, of achieving guarantees for the preservation of existing political system, he stands this course. First of all, North Korea, of course, restrains the United States. Nuclear tests have shown that the country has a certain number of nuclear warheads, and missile tests have demonstrated that Pyongyang can reach the nearest American bases. But this is still a rather limited form of deterrence, and the DPRK leadership wants to achieve guaranteed deterrence, when any attacking party (including the United States) will be confident that if something happens, North Korean missiles will reach it. Recent ballistic missile launches and a nuclear test show that North Korea is moving in this direction faster than expected.

Pyongyang will continue to have a nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future.

As practice has shown, the existing system of sanctions against the DPRK has not been able and will not be able to solve this situation. Pyongyang will continue to have a nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, so main goal The priority now must be to reduce tensions and prevent escalation of the conflict. You need to decide on realistic goals that global community can achieve, for example, a freeze of the DPRK's nuclear program, a cessation of nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and begin negotiations with Pyongyang, being ready to offer security guarantees and the lifting of some sanctions in return. True, this cannot be done without the United States, and, unfortunately, it does not seem that Washington is ready for such a dialogue.

Is there now a possibility of the emergence of new nuclear states?

So far, the nuclear non-proliferation system has been working quite effectively. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, only three states have developed nuclear weapons. We can say that this is more than we would like, but all the main contenders have already achieved their goal, and there is no one else in line for nuclear weapons.

The question remains of Iran; at no point did it possess nuclear weapons, but it was increasing its technical capabilities in this area. Now the problem is closed by an agreement between Tehran and the six international mediators (JCPOA), including the United States, Europeans, China and Russia. Despite the coming to power of Donald Trump, who is negatively disposed towards the deal, the status quo remains; informal pressure from other parties to the agreement and his own cabinet do not allow the US President to make sudden movements. Of course, I cannot predict the behavior of Donald Trump, but I would like to hope that the agreement will stand, since it meets the interests of all participants.

And I am already silent about the fact that if the United States destroys the agreement with Iran, the agreement with the DPRK will have to be forgotten.

But there are non-nuclear countries that have everything necessary to create their own arsenal?

To launch a realistic military nuclear program, several conditions must be met.

Firstly, this is a technical opportunity: developed industry, large resources. There is the concept of a “threshold state” - a country that can quickly make nuclear weapons if such a decision is made. Such countries include, for example, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil. Typically, such countries have the technology and know-how due to their peaceful nuclear program.

If the United States destroys the agreement with Iran, the agreement with the DPRK will have to be forgotten

The second condition is a strong need for nuclear weapons, which is based on the fact that the state does not feel safe. To produce nuclear weapons, many sacrifices must be made, including the risk of being isolated and under powerful international sanctions. On this moment None of the threshold countries have an existential need to engage in nuclear deterrence - they are either covered by the US nuclear umbrella or are located in quiet regions, like Brazil. If there are no extraordinary changes in global security, they will not have such a need; here I primarily mean the development of the situation around the DPRK.

How does the international community ensure that countries do not develop nuclear weapons?

This task is entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures that there is no diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military activities. The organization's experts know where nuclear materials are located in a particular country and regularly monitor their quantity and location.

Then, each state ensures that its nuclear materials and facilities are protected as much as possible from theft or sabotage. There is also UNSCR 1540, which aims to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. The 1540 Committee was recently extended for another 10 years. This committee collects reports from states on how they are meeting their obligations under the resolution to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. This is also what special people through Interpol do.

What do you mean by nuclear materials?

Now I'm talking about fissile materials: uranium and plutonium. Moreover, even in completely peaceful activities, quite dangerous things are sometimes used. So, initially, many research reactors used highly enriched uranium; it was convenient, but no one thought about safety. At some point, this issue arose, and the countries that supplied nuclear materials decided to take them back and modify the reactors for low-enriched uranium, which is much less dangerous from a non-proliferation point of view. This process continues today.

The traditional American rule “let’s do what’s convenient for us, and let the rest adjust” led to Russia refusing to dispose of its plutonium

It's even worse with radiological materials. They cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb, but they can be added to ordinary explosives to create a “dirty bomb” that contaminates the area with radiation. Radiological materials are used in many industries, ranging from hospitals to agriculture. For this area there is no international regulation– only an advisory code of conduct regarding radioactive sources. Therefore, if a terrorist attack is possible, it will most likely come from these sources.

What is the debated issue regarding the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium used in warheads?

There was a corresponding agreement with the United States, according to which the countries planned to dispose of unnecessary weapons-grade plutonium by making fuel from it and burning it in fast neutron reactors. The Americans spent a long time building a special plant, but it turned out to be very expensive. As a result, they proposed not to burn the plutonium, but to mix it with nuclear waste and bury it underground. It is unlikely that this was due to the desire to create secret stockpiles of weapons - the agreement dealt with 34 tons of plutonium, this is only a third of what the United States has. But the traditional American rule “let’s do what’s convenient for us, and let the rest adjust,” together with the general tension in relations, led to Russia’s response, too, refusing to dispose of its plutonium.

Has the crisis in relations between Russia and the United States greatly affected the nuclear safety system?

If we talk about control over nuclear materials, then the crisis, of course, could not but affect it. At the IAEA site, our interaction seems to continue, but, of course, most joint programs with the United States have now been discontinued. The first part of the initiatives was curtailed by the United States after the Ukrainian crisis, and then we ourselves began to withdraw from the agreements - in particular, on the disposal of plutonium. All this is not fatal, but very sad.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the situation was perceived in the context that we are no longer enemies with America, and we can calmly think about how to effectively use our weapons. It’s difficult to talk about trust now; it seems that the arms control system is bursting at the seams. A process with clear rules and procedures is beginning to change. How dangerous is the situation?

There is pressure on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and, to a certain extent, on the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (New START).

The American administration is trying not to comment on these issues, apparently not wanting another irritant in bilateral relations. IN last time there was a substantive conversation about the INF Treaty last fall, back under Obama. Since then, the media and Congress have been saying that Russia has violated everything and should withdraw from the agreements. Trump doesn't make such accusations, but he doesn't do anything to dispel them either. I hope that the issue of strategic stability will be raised again in the near future, because before the midterm elections, Trump is unlikely to be ready to trade his popularity for this.

Now we have an agreement with the United States on the mutual limitation of nuclear weapons - we know how many missiles, bombers, and warheads each other has. But all this can end quickly. The START treaty expires in 2021, but there are no negotiations on an extension and there are no guarantees that the parties will reach an agreement.

Do you think a military escalation of the conflict between nuclear powers to a dangerous threshold is possible?

Honestly, I hope not. Both sides cannot fail to understand the danger of such escalation in the current situation.

If we remember the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, then our countries did not perceive each other as a real threat. It was important for the Bush administration to create protection against “axis of evil” missiles; Russia did not appear on this list. We replied that we would take retaliatory action, and that was the end of it. Now we would not just speak out, but would immediately deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad or make some other drastic gesture. Although the leadership in Moscow and Washington is absolutely not interested in such an outcome.

Issues of limiting nuclear escalation are primarily political

Moreover, the issues of limiting nuclear escalation are predominantly political. Remember the famous initiative of the 90s to “de-target” Russian and American ballistic missiles at each other to avoid the consequences of an accidental launch? It's still active. But when I asked one of the senior US Air Force officers in charge of nuclear forces how long the retargeting would take, he replied - a few seconds, if the order came.

We again see each other as potential adversaries - this is a great danger for the whole world. At the same time, with all the power of nuclear weapons, they really cannot be used - they just lie in the mines, and you spend a lot of money on them. We need armed forces that can be used, say, for peacekeeping, or to fight terrorism, and not for the destruction of humanity.

Some experts believe that American weapons could prevent Russian missiles from taking off.

Of course, weapons are constantly improving, but no military man will ever tell you with sufficient confidence that the United States can destroy Russian missiles before they take off. The same is true for American missiles. Even taking into account the deployed missile defense system, this is hardly possible. In addition to the silo installations, the location of which is known, it would be necessary to destroy all submarines, which are much more difficult to detect, all aircraft with nuclear weapons in the air, all mobile complexes moving around the country.

Both Russia and the United States have deployed over 1,500 nuclear warheads on various carriers; these weapons carry enormous destructive power. Even if only 10-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles reach the target, this means 20-30 cities destroyed. And this is not counting tactical nuclear weapons, which will not reach the United States, but will reach, for example, American bases in European countries or in Turkey. Therefore, I do not think that the US has any sense of superiority in this regard, the balance is quite stable.

Are there any new initiatives related to limiting nuclear weapons?

In New York at the end of the month, about 130 countries are due to sign a UN convention banning nuclear weapons. Their desire to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again can be understood: the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and nuclear tests, and even Fukushima, demonstrate to us the destructiveness of such a scenario for humanity. But, in the end, not a single nuclear-weapon state will take part in the convention, which is likely to come into force. That is, states that do not have nuclear weapons will sign an agreement among themselves. This is unlikely to really solve any of the existing problems.

In the Middle East, the key issue is Israel's nuclear program

If the development of this treaty was an attempt to put pressure on nuclear-weapon states in order to speed up the disarmament process, then I would rate it as unsuccessful. Rather, the position of the nuclear countries regarding dialogue and international control over disarmament has become more stringent. It must be understood that all known cases of states renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons (the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear forces from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the disarmament of South Africa) turned out to be possible when countries decided that this was in accordance with their national interests and will not affect security. To discuss disarmament without taking these factors into account is to engage in self-deception.

What might an effective international security system look like in 2035?

If we do not want the system to be in permanent crisis, then, firstly, cooperation between Russia and the United States must continue and strengthen. Secondly, it is important to include the PRC in this dialogue so that the country moves towards greater transparency.

In the Middle East, the key issue is Israel's nuclear program. But as long as Tel Aviv does not acknowledge its existence, it is very difficult to discuss it. By and large, today Israel feels quite secure: the Arab states against which the nuclear arsenal was created no longer threaten it, and nuclear weapons will not help in the fight against terrorists. Therefore, the Israeli government must recognize that the regime of uncertainty, like nuclear weapons themselves, is a relic of the Cold War, and the possibility of changing the status quo can at least be discussed.

It is necessary to continue strengthening the nonproliferation regime to avoid the emergence of new nuclear countries

A very important step is working with other countries outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Currently, no systematic relations have been established with them. It is necessary to modernize the system for discussing nuclear weapons issues and include (formally or informally) these countries in it.

Finally, we need to continue strengthening the nonproliferation regime to avoid the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states. Export control, IAEA guarantees, the international cooperation need to develop in this area. Many countries have recently switched to disarmament, but this is not a reason to forget about non-proliferation.

Andrey Baklitsky

Researcher at the Center global problems And international organizations YES MFA of the Russian Federation.

In 2008-2009 studied at the University of Seville (Spain). Graduate of the International Summer School on Security Issues 2011.

In 2011-2013 - Head of the PIR Center Internet project, since 2013 - Director information projects PIR Center. In 2014-2017 — Director of the “Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation” program. Participant in the sessions of the preparatory committee for the 2013-2014 NPT Review Conference. and the NPT Review Conference 2015. Editor of the PIR Center White Paper “Ten Steps to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East”, editor of the report “Iran in the Regional and Global Context”. Research interests: international security, the greater Middle East, nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation.

Online conference

Nuclear weapons: is the world facing a new war?

Exactly 66 years ago, an event occurred that upended the established principles of warfare and radically changed the military-political balance of power in the world. On July 16, 1945, the first nuclear explosion in history was carried out in the United States at the Alamogordo test site. How did the invention of nuclear weapons affect the balance of power in the world, and how is this balance maintained today? What does further expansion lead to? nuclear club, and why are individual states so eager to possess such technologies? What are the risks of using weapons of mass destruction by one of the parties to the conflict? What role do nuclear weapons play for Russia's strategic security? These and other questions were answered by the acting director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Institute of Strategic Stability" of the State Atomic Energy Corporation "Rosatom" Vyacheslav MIKEROV.

Answers on questions

Alexander:

Is there a possibility of a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons today? What is the likelihood that a local conflict involving nuclear weapons will escalate into a global conflict?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

The occurrence of a nuclear conflict by chance is extremely unlikely, much less its escalation into a global nuclear war. But even with the relatively small degree of randomness of a nuclear conflict, the cost would be extremely high. Therefore, we cannot exclude even the most minimal possibility of such a development of events. This may be due to many different reasons: technical failures in combat control systems, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, psychological instability and inappropriate behavior of personnel in stressful situations.

Alexander:

How did the invention of the atomic bomb affect the balance of power in the world? Is this balance maintained today?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

As you probably know, the nuclear era began in 1945, when the United States became the first state to test, and the first, and so far the only state to actually use nuclear weapons - in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The US was followed by the Soviet Union, which tested its first nuclear explosive device in 1949 in Kazakhstan at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. In 1952, nuclear weapons were created in Great Britain, in 1960 in France, and finally in 1964 in China. In 1998, that is, relatively recently, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. According to almost all experts, Israel also has nuclear weapons. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the USSR initiated the fight for their prohibition and removal from military arsenals. In 1946, the USSR submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a draft international convention prohibiting the production and use of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction. This draft proposed that all parties to the convention undertake obligations not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances, to prohibit their production and storage, and to destroy within three months the entire stock of weapons ready and in production. You yourself are well aware that at that time, when only the United States had a virtual monopoly on these weapons, it was difficult to talk about any ban on these weapons. Therefore, all these things were regarded, and apparently correctly regarded, as mainly propaganda steps. What other milestones can be noted in the position of the USSR, and then Russia, in the field of nuclear weapons? This is, first of all, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in 1970. In 1978, the USSR declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against those states that renounce their production and acquisition and do not have them on their territory . This USSR statement was subsequently revised by Russia. In 1982, during the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, the USSR announced that it was taking upon itself unilaterally commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This commitment was also subsequently revised by Russia. In January 1986, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev put forward a program to eliminate all nuclear weapons and create a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. This idea, naturally, was completely unrealistic. Unlike the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France never declared the need to ban nuclear weapons and completely eliminate their stockpiles, since they considered nuclear weapons a necessary element of guaranteeing their national security. It can be said that Russia’s position on nuclear weapons has undergone significant evolution since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, which were adopted already in this century, as well as other fundamental documents, state that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons against it and its allies. types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in response to large-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to Russia's national security. Actually, why did such a revision of the position occur? The fact is that, unlike the end of the last century, when the Soviet Union had a huge advantage in tanks and other conventional weapons in the European theater of operations, after the collapse of the Soviet Union this advantage disappeared, and now Russia considers nuclear weapons to be the guarantor of its national security. and not a regular type weapon. Nuclear weapons are assigned the role of a decisive means of protecting Russia’s national security for a sufficiently long period of time. As for the current balance of nuclear forces, and we are talking primarily about Russia and the United States, it is determined by the START-3 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms. The agreement was signed by Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama on April 8, 2010 in Prague and entered into force on February 5, 2011. The contract is designed for 10 years with a possible extension by mutual agreement of the parties for 5 years. The treaty provides for a reduction in nuclear warheads to 1,550 units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers- up to 700 units.

Why are nuclear tests needed?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

Since the appearance of the first nuclear weapons, test nuclear explosions become an integral and important stage in the process of creating nuclear weapons. The need to carry them out was dictated by the need to directly confirm that nuclear weapons reliably realize their “weapon-like” destructive properties, and above all, energy release, which is usually expressed in terms of an equivalent amount of chemical explosive (tons of trinitrotoluene). The complexity of the design of modern nuclear warheads, the multi-stage nature, variety and speed of the processes occurring in them, and their mutual influence on each other did not allow using only computer and laboratory modeling for this purpose. Intermediate stages of new development could rely on low-power tests, where only part of the processes are implemented, but the final confirmation, as a rule, had to be a full-scale nuclear test. Nuclear test explosions were also required for other purposes - for example, to confirm the safety of a new nuclear weapon in an emergency situation (fire, fall, shelling, etc.). This does not mean, however, that it is in principle impossible to create a functional nuclear warhead without test explosions. It follows from the above that the role of nuclear tests varies depending on the goals that a particular state sets for itself. Those of them that intend to take the first steps across the “nuclear threshold”, provided they have sufficient scientific and technical potential and the ability to conduct computer modeling and laboratory research, can create a nuclear arsenal with limited characteristics without conducting nuclear tests. For those developing modern nuclear weapons, not to mention “new generation” weapons such as X-ray lasers, full-scale nuclear test explosions are vital. In turn, this means that a ban on nuclear test explosions is most essential for stopping the qualitative development and improvement of modern nuclear weapons.

What are the prospects for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

Having come to power in the United States, the Barack Obama administration announced its intention to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Speaking in Prague on April 3, 2009, Barack Obama said: “The Administration will take immediate and vigorous steps to ensure U.S. ratification of the CTBT.” To complete ratification procedures in the Senate, the CTBT must be supported by two-thirds of senators (67 votes). Currently, the Democratic faction in the US Senate is 57 people. Thus, the Barack Obama administration needs to gain 10 more votes from Republican senators. This is not an easy task. Today, the situation is such that any practical steps towards ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Washington are unlikely to follow in the near future. The balance of power in the US Senate after the last midterm elections to Congress was clearly not in favor of the Treaty (the positions of the Republican opponents of the CTBT have strengthened). In many ways, 2012 may become a defining year presidential elections in the USA and by-elections to the Senate. Only after the new party alignment in the upper house of Congress becomes clear and the occupant of the White House for the next four-year period is determined, will it be possible (with favorable developments) to expect the start of ratification procedures for the CTBT in Washington, that is, in the best case, not earlier than 2013 .

How justified are the fears of opponents of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that the Treaty will interfere with ensuring the reliability of the American nuclear arsenal?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

Doubts about the possibility of maintaining a nuclear arsenal without conducting nuclear tests are the strongest argument of opponents of the CTBT. However, according to representatives of the Los Alamos and Livermore nuclear laboratories of the United States, significant success has been achieved as part of the implementation of the American program to maintain the combat readiness of the nuclear arsenal. Independent American experts made a fundamentally important conclusion regarding the program that there is no reason to believe that the accumulation of changes that occurs as a result of the aging of warhead components and the implementation of the program for their extension life cycle increases the risk of denial of certification of deployed warheads. The lifespan of existing specialty products can be extended by decades. Thus, the results of the program in recent years indicate that many of the technical concerns regarding maintaining the combat readiness of the American nuclear arsenal, which became the reason for the refusal to ratify the CTBT in 1999, have been largely removed. It is also important that the secretaries of energy and defense have been certifying the American nuclear arsenal for safety and reliability for 15 years in a row. Total expenditures for these purposes until 2020 are planned at $80 billion. A similar program is being implemented in Russia.

Arkady I.:

What role do nuclear weapons play for Russia's strategic security?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

During the 1990s, there was a gradual increase in the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy, due to NATO's enormous superiority in conventional forces and fears that these forces could be used against Russia. This concern has only increased due to developments such as NATO's more relaxed attitude towards the use of military force. At the same time, the presence of nuclear weapons is currently one of the important factors that ensure Russia’s place as one of the world’s geopolitical centers. At the beginning of the decade, Russia “by default” abandoned the official Soviet policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, eliminating this provision from official documents. Adopted in 2000, the National Security Concept and military doctrine provide for the possibility of using nuclear weapons “if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other measures to resolve the crisis situation have been exhausted or have proven ineffective.” This provision is generally interpreted as allowing the use of nuclear weapons in a wide range of situations, including in response to the limited use of conventional forces against Russia. At the same time, the modernization and increased efficiency of conventional armed forces envisaged by the National Security Concept should lead to a reduction in reliance on nuclear weapons. Finally, it is important to realize that the very raising of the question of increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, albeit temporary, is associated with a sense of the threat posed by the use of force in the Balkans and the prospect of US deployment missile defense and so on. The access to the new Russian-American Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, of course, played a significant role in understanding strategies and approaches to nuclear weapons in general. However, the Treaty can operate and be viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative increase in the capabilities of the US missile defense systems, which threatens the potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (SNF). When and if the level of creation of a strategic missile defense system reaches a level that is assessed by our military experts as creating risks for Russian strategic nuclear forces, we will have the right to terminate the Treaty. This principled position Russia An objective measure of the quality of the Treaty will be practical experience its full-scale implementation. Only then can Russia draw conclusions about how the agreement works and make plans for further steps towards a nuclear-free world. Naturally, this process will need to be given a multilateral character. It is important for countries that have nuclear arsenals to join the efforts of Russia and the United States in this area and actively contribute to the disarmament process.

Valentina Igorevna:

Why do some states seek to possess nuclear weapons?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

The growing role of nuclear weapons as a political and military instrument cannot but influence the approaches of other countries, increasing their interest in nuclear weapons. At the same time, the opinion about the potential political effectiveness of these weapons as a means of preventing possible aggression, rather than conducting combat operations after aggression has already occurred, only reinforces the idea of ​​​​its value and creates the preconditions for the erosion of the nonproliferation regime. Nuclear weapons are also often seen as a guarantee against defeat in a conventional war. The theoretical justification for this strategy was developed by NATO during the Cold War and resulted in the strategy of being the first to use nuclear weapons (as opposed to the strategy of being the first to use nuclear weapons). nuclear strike, this term usually refers to the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack), as well as the theory of “limited nuclear war”, i.e. the use of a relatively small number of nuclear weapons to repel attacks by conventional armed forces. In addition, the military-political leadership of some countries believes that the possession of nuclear weapons could help ensure the country the status of a regional “superpower”, pursue its own independent political course, exert political and forceful pressure on weaker states, and be able to successfully resist stronger powers possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons.

What does further expansion of the “nuclear club” lead to?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

Despite the fact that the Cold War period has ended and the likelihood of a global nuclear catastrophe has significantly decreased, the problem of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons remains acute, since today there is a fairly large number of so-called near-threshold states, for which the possession of nuclear weapons can become not only politically desirable, but also technically feasible. There is practically a consensus in the world community regarding the list of new threats and challenges. One of the first places on this list is the problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons. We are all clearly aware that in modern conditions the proliferation of nuclear weapons, coupled with missile delivery systems, would be fraught with the emergence of strategic chaos and an increased risk of regional conflicts using nuclear weapons. Naturally, such a development must be resolutely opposed. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the main deterrent to such developments, while simultaneously ensuring international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The NPT is a time-tested document that has become one of the main pillars of the international security system. Time continues to test the strength of the non-proliferation regime as a whole and its foundation - the Treaty. The NPT passed this difficult test and confirmed its role as the most important international instrument ensuring global and regional stability and security.

What were the results of the discussion of European missile defense during the retreat of the Russia-NATO Council held in Sochi last week?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

Russia advocates a situation in the Euro-Atlantic in which all states, regardless of whether they are members of military blocs or not, would be guaranteed equal security. That's the point well-known initiative, put forward by President Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev on the conclusion of a European Security Treaty. The development of events only confirms the relevance of this proposal. The situation around the Euro-BMD project, which directly concerns the level of security of states in the Euro-Atlantic space, should be viewed in the same light. We want it to become a truly joint project and help develop Russian-NATO interaction in a positive way. This would be a real step towards creating a single space of security and stability in Europe. To do this, it is important to resolve a number of issues. First of all, it is necessary for all project participants to guarantee each other that the European missile defense system being created is not directed against any of its participants. It is necessary to develop criteria that make it possible to objectively assess the compliance of the missile defense system with its stated goal - to counter missile threats, the sources of which may be located outside the Euro-Atlantic. It is equally important to ensure equal participation of all NRC members in the development of the concept and architecture of European missile defense and to provide adequate confidence-building measures and transparency in the field of missile defense.

Irina Valerievna:

Are negotiations expected between Russia and the United States on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons?

Mikerov Vyacheslav:

The new Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms not only recorded reduced quantitative levels of strategic offensive arms, but also outlined the prospect of continuing dialogue in this key disarmament area for the world community - the preamble to the Treaty expresses the commitment of the parties to the process of gradual reduction of nuclear weapons with the inclusion of other nuclear states. Speaking at the Treaty signing ceremony in Prague, US President Barack Obama expressed hope for continuing negotiations with Russia on the reduction of not only strategic, but also tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). The topic of tactical nuclear weapons has been in the field of view of the American expert community for many years, and the emphasis is on the significant imbalance in favor of Russia regarding this type of nuclear weapon. In addition, concern is expressed about the lack of agreement with Moscow on mutual transparency measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). In this context, the position of the US administration and Congress is that negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons should begin as soon as possible and without any preconditions, which is unlikely to suit the Russian side, which, as follows from official statements, proceeds from the need to equalize the starting points positions of the two sides, without waiting for the start of the negotiation process, that is, to ensure the preliminary redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the American continent. Regarding the issue of the relationship between the two countries regarding tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), a number of Russian experts believe that Moscow would be ready to exchange relevant data with Washington only after the start of negotiations on reducing these weapons, that is, as it was made during the preparation of the bilateral Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), signed in 1987. Judging by statements by representatives of the American administration, no adjustment of the US position on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is visible - American tactical nuclear weapons should remain in Europe. The problem of tactical nuclear weapons is not the only stumbling block to the continuation of the Russian-American dialogue on nuclear disarmament. It is obvious that further steps in this direction must be considered and taken taking into account the entire set of factors that can affect strategic stability. It's about, in particular, about such factors as the creation of regional missile defense systems without taking into account the security of neighboring states, plans to create strategic non-nuclear delivery vehicles, building up the potential of strategic missile defense, the imbalance of forces in the field of conventional weapons, the basing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear states.

The opinions of conference participants may not coincide with the position of the editors.



What else to read