NATO aircraft weapons control radar. Anti-aircraft missile systems of NATO air forces. Main types and technical features of air defense radars of NATO countries

The combined air defense-missile defense system on the theater of operations provides complex application forces and means against air and ballistic targets in any part of the flight path.

The deployment of a combined air defense-missile defense system on theaters of operations is carried out on the basis of air defense systems by including new and modernized means into their composition, as well as introducing “network-centric principles of construction and operational use” (network-centric architecture & operation).

Sensors, fire weapons, centers and control points are based on ground, sea, air and space carriers. They may belong to different types of aircraft operating in the same area.

Integration technologies include the formation of a unified picture of the air situation, combat identification of air and ground targets, automation of combat command and control systems and weapons control systems. The fullest possible use of the control structure of existing air defense systems, interoperability of communication and data transmission systems in real time and the adoption of uniform data exchange standards based on the use of open architecture principles are envisaged.

The formation of a unified picture of the air situation will be facilitated by the use of sensors that are heterogeneous in physical principles and placement, integrated into a single information network. Nevertheless, the leading role of ground-based information means will remain, the basis of which is above-horizon, over-horizon and multi-position Air defense radar.

MAIN TYPES AND TECHNICAL FEATURES OF NATO air defense radars

Over-the-horizon air defense radars ground-based as part of an information system, they solve the problem of detecting targets of all classes, including ballistic missiles, in a complex jamming and target environment when exposed to enemy weapons. These radars are modernized and created on the basis of integrated approaches, taking into account the “efficiency/cost” criterion.

Modernization of radar equipment will be carried out on the basis of the introduction of elements of radar subsystems developed as part of ongoing research on the creation of promising radar equipment. This is due to the fact that the cost of a completely new station is higher than the cost of upgrading existing radars and reaches about several million US dollars. Currently, the vast majority of air defense radars in service foreign countries, constitute stations in the centimeter and decimeter ranges. Representative examples of such stations are radars: AN/FPS-117, AR 327, TRS 2215/TRS 2230, AN/MPQ-64, GIRAFFE AMB, M3R, GM 400.

AN/FPS-117 radar, developed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin. uses a frequency range of 1-2 GHz, is a completely solid-state system designed to solve problems of long-range detection, position determination and target identification, as well as for use in the air traffic control system. The station provides the ability to adapt operating modes depending on the current interference situation.

The computing tools used in the radar station make it possible to constantly monitor the state of the radar subsystems. Determine and display the location of the failure on the monitor of the operator's workplace. Work continues to improve the subsystems that make up the AN/FPS-117 radar. which will make it possible to use the station to detect ballistic targets, determine their impact location and issue target designations to interested consumers. At the same time, the main task of the station is still to detect and track air targets.

AR 327, developed on the basis of the AR 325 station by specialists from the USA and Great Britain, is capable of performing the functions of a set of low-level automation equipment (when equipped with a cabin with additional workstations). The estimated cost of one sample is 9.4-14 million dollars. The antenna system, made in the form of a phased array, provides phase scanning in elevation. The station uses digital signal processing. The radar and its subsystems are controlled by the Windows operating system. The station is used in the automated control systems of European NATO countries. In addition, interface means are being modernized to ensure the operation of the radar

AR 327, developed on the basis of the AR 325 station by specialists from the USA and Great Britain, is capable of performing the functions of a set of low-level automation equipment (when equipped with a cabin with additional workstations). The estimated cost of one sample is 9.4-14 million dollars. The antenna system, made in the form of a phased array, provides phase scanning in elevation. The station uses digital signal processing. The radar and its subsystems are controlled by the Windows operating system. The station is used in the automated control systems of European NATO countries. In addition, the interface means are being modernized to ensure that the radar can operate with a further increase in computing power.

A special feature of the radar is the use of a digital SDC system and an active interference protection system, which is capable of adaptively adjusting the station’s operating frequency over a wide frequency range. There is also a frequency adjustment mode “from pulse to pulse”, and the accuracy of determining the height at low target elevation angles has been increased. It is planned to further improve the transceiver subsystem and equipment for coherent processing of received signals to increase the range and improve the accuracy of detection of air targets.

French three-dimensional radars with phased array TRS 2215 and 2230, designed for detection, identification and tracking of CCs, were developed on the basis of the SATRAPE station in mobile and transportable versions. They have the same transceiver systems, data processing facilities and components of the antenna system, and their difference lies in the size of the antenna arrays. This unification makes it possible to increase the flexibility of the material and technical support of stations and the quality of their service.

The transportable three-dimensional radar AN/MPQ-64, operating in the centimeter range, was created on the basis of the AN/TPQ-36A station. It is designed to detect, track, measure the coordinates of airborne objects and provide target designation to interception systems. The station is used in mobile units of the US Armed Forces when organizing air defense. The radar is capable of working in conjunction with both other detection radars and information means of short-range air defense systems.

The GIRAFFE AMB mobile radar station is designed to solve the problems of detecting, determining coordinates and tracking targets. This radar uses new technical solutions in the signal processing system. As a result of the modernization, the control subsystem makes it possible to automatically detect helicopters in hovering mode and assess the degree of threat, as well as automate combat control functions.

The M3R mobile modular multifunctional radar was developed by the French company Thales as part of the project of the same name. This is a new generation station, intended for use in the combined GTVO-PRO system, created on the basis of the Master family of stations, which, having modern parameters, are the most competitive among long-range mobile detection radars. It is a multifunctional three-dimensional radar operating in the 10-cm range. The station uses Intelligent Radar Management technology, which provides optimal control of the signal shape, repetition period, etc. in various operating modes.

The air defense radar GM 400 (Ground Master 400), developed by Thales, is intended for use in a combined air defense-missile defense system. It is also being created on the basis of the Master family of stations and is a multifunctional three-coordinate radar operating in the range of 2.9-3.3 GHz.

The radar under consideration successfully implements a number of such promising design concepts as “fully digital radar” and “fully environmentally friendly radar” (green radar).

The station's features include: digital control of the antenna pattern; long target detection range, including NLC and BR; the ability to remotely control the operation of radar subsystems from remote automated operator workstations.

In contrast to over-the-horizon stations, over-the-horizon radars provide longer warning times about air or ballistic targets and extend the detection range of air targets to significant distances due to the propagation of radio waves in the frequency range (2-30 MHz) used in over-the-horizon systems, and also allow for a significant increase in effective scattering surface (ESR) of detected targets and, as a result, increase their detection range.

The specificity of the formation of transmitting radiation patterns of over-the-horizon radars, in particular ROTHR, makes it possible to carry out multi-layer (all-altitude) coverage of the viewing area in critical areas, which is relevant when solving security and defense problems national territory USA, protection against sea and air targets, including cruise missiles. Representative examples of over-the-horizon radars are: AN/TPS-7I (USA) and Nostradamus (France).

In the USA, the AN/TPS-71 3G radar has been developed and is undergoing continuous modernization, designed to detect low-flying targets. A distinctive feature of the station is the ability to transfer it to any area globe and relatively quick (up to 10-14 days) deployment to pre-prepared positions. For this purpose, the station equipment is mounted in specialized containers.

Information from the over-the-horizon radar enters the target designation system of the Navy, as well as other types of aircraft. To detect cruise missile carriers in areas adjacent to the United States, in addition to stations located in the states of Virginia, Alaska and Texas, it is planned to install an upgraded over-the-horizon radar in the state of North Dakota (or Montana) to monitor the airspace over Mexico and adjacent areas of the Pacific Ocean. A decision was made to deploy new stations to detect cruise missile carriers in the Caribbean, over Central and South America. The first such station will be installed in Puerto Rico. The transmitting point is deployed on the island. Vieques, reception - in the southwestern part of the island. Puerto Rico.

In France, under the “Nostradamus” project, the development of a 3D return-inclined sounding radar has been completed, which detects small targets at ranges of 700-3000 km. Important distinctive features of this station are: the ability to simultaneously detect air targets within 360 degrees in azimuth and the use of a monostatic construction method instead of the traditional bistatic one. The station is located 100 km west of Paris. The possibility of using elements of the Nostradamus over-the-horizon radar on space and air platforms to solve the problems of early warning of air attack attacks and effective control of interception weapons is being considered.

Foreign experts consider over-the-horizon surface wave radar stations (SG radar stations) as relatively inexpensive means of effective control over the air and surface space of the territory of states.

The information received from such radars makes it possible to increase the warning time necessary to make appropriate decisions.

A comparative analysis of the capabilities of over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon surface wave radars for detecting air and surface objects shows that 3G PV radars are significantly superior to conventional ground-based radars in detection range and ability to track both stealth and low-flying targets and surface ships of various displacements. At the same time, the capabilities for detecting air objects at high and medium altitudes are reduced slightly, which does not affect the effectiveness of over-the-horizon radar systems. In addition, the costs of purchasing and operating surface bath radars are relatively low and commensurate with their effectiveness.

The main samples of surface wave radars that have been adopted by foreign countries are the SWR-503 (a modernized version of the SWR-603) and OVERSEER stations.

The SWR-503 surface wave radar was developed by the Canadian branch of Raytheon in accordance with the requirements of the Canadian Department of Defense. The radar is designed to monitor air and surface space over ocean territories adjacent to the eastern coast of the country, detect and track surface and air targets within the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone.

Station SWR-503 Can also be used to detect icebergs, monitor the environment, and search for ships and aircraft in distress. Two stations of this type and an operational control center are already in use to monitor air and sea space in the Newfoundland region, which has significant coastal fish and oil reserves. It is assumed that the station will be used to control aircraft air traffic over the entire altitude range and monitor targets below the radar horizon.

During testing, the radar detected and tracked all targets that were also observed by other air defense and coastal defense systems. In addition, experiments were conducted aimed at ensuring the possibility of detecting missiles flying over the sea surface, however, to effectively solve this problem in full, according to the developers of this radar, it is necessary to expand its operating range to 15-20 MHz. According to foreign experts, countries with long coastlines can install a network of such radars at intervals of up to 370 km to ensure complete coverage of the air and sea surveillance zone within their borders.

The cost of one model of the SWR-5G3 MF radar in service is 8-10 million dollars. The operation and comprehensive maintenance of the station cost approximately 400 thousand dollars a year.

The OVERSEER 3G radar represents a new family of surface wave stations, which was developed by Marconi and is intended for civil and military applications. Using the effect of wave propagation over the surface, the station is capable of detecting at long ranges and various altitudes air and sea objects of all classes that cannot be detected by conventional radars.

The station's subsystems combine many technological advances that make it possible to obtain a better information picture of targets over large areas of sea and air space with rapid data updating.

The cost of one sample of the OVERSEER surface wave radar in a single-position version is approximately 6-8 million dollars, and operation and comprehensive maintenance of the station, depending on the tasks being solved, are estimated at 300-400 thousand dollars.

The implementation of the principles of “network-centric operations” in future military conflicts, according to foreign experts, necessitates the use of new methods for constructing information system components, including those based on multi-position (MP) and distributed sensors and elements included in the information infrastructure of promising detection systems and air defense and missile defense management, taking into account the requirements of integration within NATO.

Multi-position radar systems can become the most important component of the information subsystems of advanced air defense and missile defense control systems, as well as an effective tool in solving problems of detecting UAVs of various classes and cruise missiles.

LONG-RANGE MULTI-POSITION RADAR (MP radar)

According to foreign experts, in NATO countries much attention is paid to the creation of promising ground-based multi-position systems with unique capabilities for detecting various types of air targets (ATs). An important place among them is occupied by long-range systems and “distributed” systems created under the programs “Silent Sentry-2”, “Rias”, CELLDAR, etc. Such radars are designed to work as part of control systems when solving problems of detecting airborne objects in all altitude ranges under conditions of use electronic warfare equipment. The data they receive will be used in the interests of advanced air defense and missile defense systems, detection and tracking of long-range targets, as well as detection of ballistic missile launches, including through integration with similar means within NATO.

MP radar "Silent Sentry-2". Reportedly foreign press, Radars, the basis of which is the ability to use radiation from television or radio broadcasting stations to illuminate targets, have been actively developed in NATO countries since the 1970s. A variant of such a system, created in accordance with the requirements of the US Air Force and Army, was the Silent Sentry MP radar, which, after improvement, received the name Silent Sentry-2.

According to foreign experts, the system makes it possible to detect airplanes, helicopters, missiles, control air traffic, control airspace in conflict zones, taking into account the secrecy of the operation of US and NATO air defense systems in these regions. It operates in frequency ranges corresponding to the frequencies of TV or radio broadcast transmitters existing on the theater.

The radiation pattern of the experimental receiving phased array (located in Baltimore at a distance of 50 km from the transmitter) was oriented towards the Washington International Airport, where targets were detected and tracked during testing. A mobile version of the radar receiving station has also been developed.

During the work, the receiving and transmitting positions of the MP radar were combined with broadband data transmission lines, and the system included high-performance processing tools. According to foreign press reports, the capabilities of the Silent Sentry-2 system to detect targets were confirmed during the flight of the STS 103 spacecraft equipped with the Hubble telescope. During the experiment, targets were successfully detected, tracking of which was duplicated by on-board optical means, including a telescope. At the same time, the capabilities of the Sileng Sentry-2 radar to detect and track more than 80 CCs were confirmed. The data obtained during the experiments was used for further work on the creation of a multi-position system of the STAR type, designed to track low-orbit spacecraft.

MP radar "Rias". Specialists from a number of NATO countries, according to foreign press reports, are also successfully working on the problem of creating an MP radar. The French companies Thomson-CSF and Onera, in accordance with the requirements of the Air Force, carried out relevant work within the framework of the Rias program. It was reported that in the period after 2015, such a system could be used to detect and track targets (including small ones and those made using stealth technology), UAVs and cruise missiles at long ranges.

According to foreign experts, the Rias system will allow solving problems of air traffic control of military and civil aviation aircraft. The Rias station is a system with correlation processing of data from several receiving positions, which operates in the frequency range 30-300 MHz. It consists of up to 25 distributed transmitting and receiving devices equipped with omnidirectional dipole antennas, which are similar to the antennas of over-the-horizon radars. The transmitting and receiving antennas on the 15th masts are located at intervals of tens of meters in concentric circles (up to 400 m in diameter). An experimental sample of the Rias radar deployed on the island. Levant (40 km from Toulon), during testing, ensured the detection of a high-altitude target (such as an airplane) at a distance of more than 100 km.

According to foreign press estimates, this station ensures a high level of survivability and noise immunity due to the redundancy of system elements (the failure of individual transmitters or receivers does not affect the efficiency of its functioning as a whole). During its operation, several independent sets of data processing equipment with receivers installed on the ground, on board an aircraft (when forming an MP radar with large bases) can be used. As reported, the radar version, intended for use in combat conditions, will include up to 100 transmitters and receivers and solve air defense, missile defense and air traffic control tasks.

MP radar CELLDAR. According to foreign press reports, specialists from NATO countries (Great Britain, Germany, etc.) are actively working on the creation of new types of multi-position systems and means that use radiation from transmitters of cellular mobile communication networks. Research is carried out by Rock Mains. Siemens, BAe Systems and a number of others in the interests of the Air Force and Ground Forces as part of the creation of a version of a multi-position detection system for solving air defense and missile defense problems, using correlation processing of data from several receiving positions. The multi-position system uses radiation generated by transmitting antennas installed on cell phone towers, which provides illumination of targets. Special equipment is used as receiving devices, operating in the frequency ranges of the GSM 900, 1800 and 3G standards, which receives data from antenna subsystems in the form of phased arrays.

According to foreign press reports, the receiving devices of this system can be placed on the surface of the earth, mobile platforms, and on board aircraft by integrating the AWACS system and transport and refueling aircraft into the design elements of aircraft. To increase the accuracy characteristics of the CELLDAR system and its noise immunity, acoustic sensors can be placed together with receiving devices on the same platform. To make the system more effective, it is also possible to install individual elements on UAVs and AWACS and control aircraft.

According to foreign experts, in the period after 2015 it is planned to widely use MP radars of this type in air defense and missile defense detection and control systems. Such a station will provide detection of moving ground targets, helicopters, submarine periscopes, surface targets, reconnaissance on the battlefield, support for the actions of special forces, and protection of facilities.

MP radar "Dark". According to foreign press reports, the French company Thomson-CSF carried out R&D to create a system for detecting air targets under the Dark program. In accordance with the requirements of the Air Force, specialists from the lead developer, Thomson-CSF, tested an experimental sample of the Dark receiving device, made in a stationary version. The station was located in Palaiseau and solved the problem of detecting aircraft flying from Paris Orly airport. Radar signals for target illumination were generated by TV transmitters located on the Eiffel Tower (more than 20 km from the receiving device), as well as television stations in the cities of Bourges and Auxerre, located 180 km from Paris. According to the developers, the accuracy of measuring the coordinates and speed of air targets is comparable to similar indicators of detection radars.

According to foreign press reports, in accordance with the plans of the company’s management, work on further improvement of the receiving equipment of the “Dark” system will continue, taking into account the improvement technical characteristics receiving paths and choosing a more efficient operating system computing complex. One of the most convincing arguments in favor of this system, according to the developers, is its low cost, since during its creation well-known technologies for receiving and processing radio and TV signals were used. After completion of work in the period after 2015, such an MP radar will make it possible to effectively solve the problems of detecting and tracking aircraft (including small-sized ones and those made using stealth technology), as well as UAVs and missile systems at long ranges.

AASR radar. As noted in foreign press reports, specialists from the Swedish company Saab Microwave Systems announced work on the creation of a multi-position air defense system AASR (Associative Aperture Synthesis Radar), which is designed to detect aircraft developed using stealth technology. According to the principle of operation, such a radar is similar to the CELLDAR system, which uses radiation from transmitters of cellular mobile communication networks. According to the AW&ST publication, the new radar will ensure the interception of stealthy air targets, including missiles. It is planned that the station will include about 900 node stations with spaced transmitters and receivers operating in the VHF range, while the carrier frequencies of the radio transmitters differ in ratings. Aircraft, missiles and UAVs made using radio-absorbing materials will create inhomogeneities in the radar field of transmitters due to the absorption or re-reflection of radio waves. According to foreign experts, the accuracy of determining target coordinates after joint processing of data received at the command post from several receiving positions can be about 1.5 m.

One of the significant disadvantages of the radar being created is that effective detection of a target is possible only after it passes through the defended airspace, so there is little time left to intercept an air target. The design cost of the MP radar will be about $156 million, taking into account the use of 900 receiving units, which theoretically cannot be disabled by the first missile strike.

NLC detection system Homeland Alert 100. Specialists from the American company Raytheon, together with the European company Thels, have developed a passive coherent NLC detection system designed to obtain data on low-speed, low-altitude computers, including UAVs, missile launchers and targets created using stealth technology. It was developed in the interests of the US Air Force and Army to solve air defense problems in the context of the use of electronic warfare systems, in conflict zones, and to support the actions of special forces. security of objects, etc. All Homeland Alert 100 equipment is placed in a container mounted on the chassis (4x4) of an off-road vehicle, but can also be used in a stationary version. The system includes an antenna mast that can be deployed to its operating position in a few minutes, as well as equipment for analyzing, classifying and storing data on all detected sources of radio emission and their parameters, which allows for effective detection and recognition of various targets.

According to foreign press reports, the Homeland Alert 100 system uses signals generated by digital VHF broadcast stations, analog TV broadcast transmitters, and terrestrial digital TV transmitters to illuminate targets. This provides the ability to receive signals reflected by targets, detect and determine their coordinates and speed in the azimuth sector of 360 degrees, in elevation - 90 degrees, at ranges of up to 100 km and up to 6000 m in altitude. Round-the-clock all-weather monitoring of the environment, as well as the ability to operate autonomously or as part of an information network, make it possible to effectively solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets, including in difficult interference conditions, in conflict zones in the interests of air defense and missile defense, in relatively inexpensive ways. When using the Homeland Alert 100 MP radar as part of network control systems and interacting with warning and control centers, the Asterix/AWCIES protocol is used. The increased noise immunity of such a system is based on the principles of multi-position information processing and the use of passive operating modes.

Foreign media reported that a number of NATO countries planned to purchase the Homeland Alert 100 system.

Thus, the ground-based air defense-missile defense radar stations in theaters in service with NATO countries and those being developed remain the main source of information about airborne objects and are the main elements in forming a unified picture of the air situation.

(V. Petrov, S. Grishulin, "Foreign Military Review")

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The armies of many states, along with self-propelled and towed anti-aircraft missile systems and cannon anti-aircraft artillery, are armed with short-range man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. Their main purpose is to combat low-flying targets. The Red Eye complex is the first of the NATO countries to enter service. It includes a launcher (gun), a battery-cooler unit and an anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM). The launcher is a pipe made of cast fiberglass in which the missile defense system is stored. The pipe is sealed and filled with nitrogen. On the outside there is a telescopic sight and devices for preparing and launching a missile. In combat conditions, after launch, the pipe is not reused. The telescopic sight has a 2.5-fold magnification, its field of view is 25". The optical system of the sight contains a reticle with divisions for making corrections for lead, as well as two wedge-shaped movable indexes, signaling the readiness of the missile defense system for launch and the capture of targets by the homing head (GSN).

The battery-cooler unit is designed to supply electricity to the on-board equipment of the rocket (cooling system of the sensitive element of the seeker with gaseous freon). This block is connected to the launcher through a special socket-fitting. It is disposable and must be replaced if the launch fails.

The FIM-43 missile is single-stage, made according to the canard aerodynamic configuration. The engine is solid fuel. Targeting is carried out by a passive IR homing head. The fuse of the warhead is impact, delayed action, with a safety-actuating mechanism and a self-liquidator.

The main disadvantages of the Red Eye complex are, firstly, its inability to hit targets on a collision course, and secondly, the absence of “friend or foe” identification equipment in the air defense system. Currently in ground forces oh and Marine Corps In the United States, the Red Eye complex is being replaced by the Stinger air defense system. However, it remains in service with the armies of some NATO countries.

The Stinger air defense system is capable of hitting low-flying air targets in conditions of good visibility, not only on catch-up courses, but also on collision courses. The complex includes equipment for identifying “friend or foe”. The FIM-92A missile is made using a canard aerodynamic design. In its bow part there are four aerodynamic surfaces. A rocket is launched from a container using a detachable launch accelerator, which, due to the inclined arrangement of the nozzles relative to the missile defense body, imparts an initial rotation to it.

Aerodynamic rudders and stabilizers open after the rocket leaves the container. In order to maintain the rotation of the missile defense system in flight, the planes of the tail stabilizer are installed at an angle to its body.

The main engine is solid fuel, with two thrust modes. It turns on when the rocket moves 8 m away from the launch site. In the first mode, it accelerates the rocket to maximum speed. When switching to the second mode, the thrust level decreases, remaining, however, sufficient to maintain supersonic flight speed.

The missile is equipped with an all-angle IR homing head operating in the wavelength range of 4.1-4.4 microns. The radiation receiver is cooled. The alignment of the axis of the optical system of the head with the direction towards the target in the process of tracking it is carried out using a gyroscopic drive.

The transport and launch container in which the missile is placed is made of fiberglass. Both ends of the container are closed with lids that collapse during startup. The front cover is made of material through which IR radiation passes. The shelf life of a rocket in a container is 10 years.

Not long ago, the head of the operational department of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General Viktor Poznikhir, told reporters that the main goal of creating an American missile defense system is to significantly neutralize the strategic nuclear potential Russia and the almost complete elimination of the Chinese missile threat. And this is not the first sharp statement by Russian high-ranking officials on this matter; few US actions cause such irritation in Moscow.

Russian military officers and diplomats have repeatedly stated that the deployment of the American global missile defense system will lead to a disruption of the fragile balance between nuclear states that developed during the Cold War.

The Americans, in turn, argue that global missile defense is not directed against Russia, its goal is to protect the “civilized” world from rogue countries, for example, Iran and North Korea. At the same time, the construction of new elements of the system continues at the very Russian borders - in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania.

Experts' opinions on missile defense in general and the US missile defense system in particular vary widely: some see America's actions as real threat strategic interests of Russia, while others talk about the ineffectiveness of the American missile defense system against the Russian strategic arsenal.

Where is the truth? What's happened anti-missile system USA? What does it consist of and how does it work? Does Russia have a missile defense system? And why does a purely defensive system cause such a mixed reaction among Russian leadership- what's the catch here?

History of missile defense

Missile defense is a whole range of measures aimed at protecting certain objects or territories from damage by missile weapons. Any missile defense system includes not only systems that directly destroy missiles, but also complexes (radars and satellites) that provide missile detection, as well as powerful computers.

In the public consciousness, a missile defense system is usually associated with counteraction nuclear threat, which is carried by ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead, but this is not entirely true. In fact, missile defense is a broader concept; missile defense is any type of defense against enemy missile weapons. This can also include active protection armored vehicles from ATGMs and RPGs, and air defense systems capable of destroying enemy tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. So it would be more correct to divide all missile defense systems into tactical and strategic, and also to separate self-defense systems against missile weapons into a separate group.

Rocket weapons first began to be used en masse during World War II. The first anti-tank missiles, MLRS, and German V-1 and V-2 appeared, killing residents of London and Antwerp. After the war, the development of missile weapons accelerated. It can be said that the use of missiles has radically changed the methods of warfare. Moreover, very soon missiles became the main means of delivering nuclear weapons and turned into the most important strategic tool.

Having appreciated the experience of the Nazis in the combat use of V-1 and V-2 missiles, the USSR and the USA almost immediately after the end of World War II began creating systems capable of effectively combating the new threat.

In 1958, the United States developed and adopted the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missile system, which could be used against enemy nuclear warheads. Their defeat also occurred due to the nuclear warhead of the anti-missile missile, since this air defense system was not particularly accurate. It should be noted that intercepting a target flying at enormous speed at an altitude of tens of kilometers is a very difficult task even at the current level of technology development. In the 60s, it could only be solved with the use of nuclear weapons.

A further development of the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules system was the LIM-49A Nike Zeus complex, its testing began in 1962. The Zeus anti-missile missiles were also equipped with a nuclear warhead; they could hit targets at an altitude of up to 160 km. Successful tests of the complex were carried out (without nuclear explosions, of course), but still the effectiveness of such a missile defense system was very much in question.

The fact is that in those years nuclear arsenals The USSR and the USA were growing at an unimaginable pace, and no missile defense could protect them from an armada of ballistic missiles launched in the other hemisphere. Moreover, in the 60s nuclear missiles learned to throw out numerous decoys, which were extremely difficult to distinguish from real warheads. However, the main problem was the imperfection of the anti-missile missiles themselves, as well as target detection systems. The Nike Zeus program would cost the American taxpayer $10 billion to deploy, a huge sum at the time, and did not provide sufficient protection against Soviet ICBMs. As a result, the project was abandoned.

At the end of the 60s, the Americans began another missile defense program, which was called Safeguard - “Precaution” (originally it was called Sentinel - “Sentinel”).

This missile defense system was supposed to protect the deployment areas of American silo-based ICBMs and, in the event of war, provide the ability to launch a retaliatory missile strike.

Safeguard was armed with two types of anti-missile missiles: heavy Spartan and light Sprint. The Spartan anti-missile missiles had a radius of 740 km and were supposed to destroy enemy nuclear warheads while still in space. The task of the lighter Sprint missiles was to “finish” those warheads that were able to get past the Spartans. In space, warheads were to be destroyed using streams of hard neutron radiation, more effective than megaton nuclear explosions.

In the early 70s, the Americans began the practical implementation of the Safeguard project, but only built one complex of this system.

In 1972, one of the most important documents in the field of control over nuclear weapons– Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Even today, almost fifty years later, it is one of the cornerstones of the global nuclear safety system in the world.

According to this document, both states could deploy no more than two missile defense systems, the maximum ammunition capacity of each of them should not exceed 100 missile defense systems. Later (in 1974) the number of systems was reduced to one unit. The United States covered the ICBM deployment area in North Dakota with the Safeguard system, and the USSR decided to protect the capital of the state, Moscow, from a missile attack.

Why is this treaty so important for the balance between the largest nuclear weapons states? The fact is that from about the mid-60s it became clear that a large-scale nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA would lead to the complete destruction of both countries, so nuclear weapons became a kind of deterrent tool. Having deployed a sufficiently powerful missile defense system, any of the opponents could be tempted to strike first and protect themselves from the “response” with the help of anti-missiles. Refusal to defend their own territory in the face of imminent nuclear destruction guaranteed an extremely cautious attitude of the leadership of the signatory states to the “red” button. This is also why the current deployment of NATO missile defense is causing such concern in the Kremlin.

By the way, the Americans did not begin to deploy the Safeguard missile defense system. In the 70s they had Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles, so military leadership The United States considered it more appropriate to invest in new submarines and SLBMs than to build a very expensive missile defense system. And Russian units still protect the skies of Moscow today (for example, the 9th Missile Defense Division in Sofrino).

The next stage in the development of the American missile defense system was the SDI program (“Strategic defense initiative"), initiated by the fortieth US President Ronald Reagan.

This was a very large-scale project for a new US missile defense system, which was absolutely contrary to the 1972 Treaty. The SDI program provided for the creation of a powerful, layered missile defense system with space-based elements, which was supposed to cover the entire territory of the United States.

In addition to anti-missile missiles, this program provided for the use of weapons based on other physical principles: lasers, electromagnetic and kinetic weapons, railguns.

This project was never realized. Its developers faced numerous technical problems, many of which have not been resolved to this day. However, the developments of the SDI program were later used in the creation of the US national missile defense, the deployment of which continues to this day.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the USSR began creating protection against missile weapons. Already in 1945, specialists from the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy began work on the Anti-Fau project.

The first practical development in the field of missile defense in the USSR was “System A”, work on which was carried out in the late 50s. A whole series of tests of the complex were carried out (some of them were successful), but due to the low efficiency, “System A” was never put into service.

In the early 60s, the development of a missile defense system began to protect the Moscow Industrial District; it was named A-35. From that moment until the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was always covered by a powerful anti-missile shield.

The development of the A-35 was delayed; this missile defense system was put on combat duty only in September 1971. In 1978, it was upgraded to the A-35M modification, which remained in service until 1990. The radar of the Danube-3U complex was on combat duty until the beginning of the two thousandth. In 1990, the A-35M missile defense system was replaced by the A-135 Amur. The A-135 was equipped with two types of anti-missile missiles with a nuclear warhead and a range of 350 and 80 km.

The A-135 system should be replaced by the newest A-235 “Samolet-M” missile defense system; it is currently at the testing stage. It will also be armed with two types of anti-missile missiles with a maximum destruction range of 1 thousand km (according to other sources - 1.5 thousand km).

In addition to the above systems, in the USSR in different time Work was also carried out on other projects for protection against strategic missile weapons. We can mention Chelomeev’s Taran missile defense system, which was supposed to protect the entire territory of the country from American ICBMs. This project involved installing several powerful radars in the Far North that would monitor the most possible trajectories of American ICBMs - through the North Pole. It was supposed to destroy enemy missiles with the help of powerful thermonuclear charges (10 megatons) mounted on anti-missiles.

This project was closed in the mid-60s for the same reason as the American Nike Zeus - the missile and nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA were growing at an incredible pace, and no missile defense could protect against a massive strike.

Another promising Soviet missile defense system that never entered service was the S-225 complex. This project was developed in the early 60s; later, one of the S-225 anti-missile missiles found use as part of the A-135 complex.

American missile defense system

Currently, several missile defense systems are deployed or are being developed in the world (Israel, India, Japan, the European Union), but all of them have a short or medium range. Only two countries in the world have a strategic missile defense system – the USA and Russia. Before moving on to a description of the American strategic missile defense system, a few words should be said about the general principles of operation of such complexes.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (or their warheads) can be shot down at different parts of their trajectory: at the initial, middle or final stages. Hitting a missile during takeoff (Boost-phase intercept) looks like the simplest task. Immediately after launch, an ICBM is easy to track: it has a low speed and is not covered by decoys or interference. With one shot you can destroy all warheads installed on an ICBM.

However, interception at the initial stage of a missile’s trajectory also has significant difficulties, which almost completely neutralize the above advantages. As a rule, deployment areas strategic missiles located deep in enemy territory and reliably covered by air and missile defense systems. Therefore, it is almost impossible to approach them at the required distance. In addition, the initial stage of a missile's flight (acceleration) is only one or two minutes, during which it is necessary not only to detect it, but also to send an interceptor to destroy it. It's very difficult.

Nevertheless, intercepting ICBMs at the launch stage looks very promising, so work on means of destroying strategic missiles during acceleration continues. Space-based laser systems look most promising, but operating systems similar weapons doesn't exist yet.

Missiles can also be intercepted in the middle section of their trajectory (Midcourse intercept), when the warheads have already separated from the ICBMs and continue to fly in outer space by inertia. Mid-flight interception also has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of destroying warheads in space is the large time interval that the missile defense system has (according to some sources, up to 40 minutes), but the interception itself is associated with many complex technical issues. Firstly, the warheads are relatively small in size, have a special anti-radar coating and do not emit anything into space, so they are very difficult to detect. Secondly, to further complicate the work of missile defense, any ICBM, except for the warheads themselves, carries a large number of false targets, indistinguishable from real ones on radar screens. And thirdly: anti-missiles capable of destroying warheads in space orbit are very expensive.

Warheads can be intercepted after they enter the atmosphere (Terminal phase intercept), or in other words, on their last stage flight. There are also pros and cons here. The main advantages are: the ability to deploy a missile defense system on its territory, the relative ease of tracking targets, and the low cost of interceptor missiles. The fact is that after entering the atmosphere, lighter false targets are eliminated, which makes it possible to more confidently identify real warheads.

However, intercepting warheads at the final stage of their trajectory also has significant disadvantages. The main one is very limited time, which the missile defense system has, is on the order of several tens of seconds. Destroying warheads at the final stage of their flight is essentially the last line of missile defense.

In 1992 American President George Bush initiated the start of a program to protect the United States from a limited nuclear strike - this is how the non-strategic missile defense (NSMD) project appeared.

Development modern system national missile defense began in the United States in 1999 after President Bill Clinton signed the corresponding bill. The declared goal of the program was to create a missile defense system that could protect the entire US territory from ICBMs. In the same year, the Americans conducted the first test as part of of this project: above Pacific Ocean A Minuteman missile was intercepted.

In 2001, the next occupant of the White House, George W. Bush, said that the missile defense system would protect not only America, but also its main allies, the first of which was named Great Britain. In 2002, after the Prague NATO summit, the development of a military-economic feasibility study began for the creation of a missile defense system for the North Atlantic Alliance. The final decision to create a European missile defense system was made at the NATO summit in Lisbon, held at the end of 2010.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the program is to protect against rogue countries like Iran and North Korea, and it is not directed against Russia. Later, a number of Eastern European countries joined the program, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania.

Currently, NATO missile defense is a complex complex consisting of many components, which includes satellite systems for tracking ballistic missile launches, ground and sea detection systems missile launches(radar), as well as several systems for destroying missiles at different stages of their trajectory: GBMD, Aegis (“Aegis”), THAAD and Patriot.

GBMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) is a ground-based complex designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles in the middle section of their trajectory. It includes an early warning radar that monitors the launch of ICBMs and their trajectory, as well as silo-based interceptor missiles. Their range is from 2 to 5 thousand km. To intercept ICBM warheads, the GBMD uses kinetic warheads. It should be noted that at the moment GBMD is the only fully deployed US strategic missile defense system.

The kinetic warhead for the rocket was not chosen by chance. The fact is that to intercept hundreds of enemy warheads it is necessary massive application anti-missile missiles, at least one triggers nuclear charge creates a powerful electromagnetic pulse in the path of warheads and is guaranteed to blind missile defense radars. However, on the other hand, a kinetic warhead requires much greater guidance accuracy, which in itself represents a very difficult technical task. And given that modern ballistic missiles are equipped with warheads that can change their trajectory, the effectiveness of interceptors is further reduced.

So far, the GBMD system can boast of 50% accurate hits - and only during exercises. It is believed that this missile defense system can only work effectively against monoblock ICBMs.

Currently, GBMD interceptor missiles are deployed in Alaska and California. Perhaps another area for the deployment of the system will be created on the Atlantic coast of the United States.

Aegis (“Aegis”). Usually, when people talk about American missile defense, they mean the Aegis system. Back in the early 90s, the idea was born in the United States to use the ship's Aegis command and control system for missile defense needs, and to adapt an excellent anti-aircraft missile"Standard", which was launched from a standard Mk-41 container.

In general, the placement of missile defense system elements on warships is quite reasonable and logical. In this case, the missile defense becomes mobile, has the opportunity to operate as close as possible to the areas where enemy ICBMs are deployed, and, accordingly, shoot down enemy missiles not only in the middle, but also in the initial stages of their flight. In addition, the main flight direction of Russian missiles is the Arctic Ocean, where there is simply nowhere to place anti-missile silos.

In the end, the designers managed to place more fuel in the anti-missile missile and significantly improve the homing head. However, according to experts, even the most advanced modifications of the SM-3 missile defense system will not be able to intercept the latest maneuvering warheads Russian ICBMs— they simply don’t have enough fuel for this. But these anti-missile missiles are quite capable of intercepting a conventional (non-maneuvering) warhead.

In 2011, the Aegis missile defense system was deployed on 24 ships, including five Ticonderoga-class cruisers and nineteen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. In total, the American military plans to equip 84 US Navy ships with the Aegis system by 2041. Based on this system, the Aegis Ashore ground system has been developed, which has already been deployed in Romania and will be deployed in Poland by 2019.

THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense). This element of the American missile defense system should be classified as the second echelon of the US national missile defense system. This mobile complex, which was originally developed to combat medium- and short-range missiles, it cannot intercept targets in outer space. The warhead of the THAAD missiles is kinetic.

Some THAAD systems are located on the US mainland, which can only be explained by the ability of this system to fight not only against medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, but also to intercept ICBMs. Indeed, this missile defense system can destroy warheads of strategic missiles at the final stage of their trajectory, and does so quite effectively. In 2013, a national American missile defense exercise was held, in which Aegis, GBMD and THAAD systems took part. The latter showed the greatest efficiency, shooting down 10 targets out of ten possible.

One of the disadvantages of THAAD is its high price: one interceptor missile costs $30 million.

PAC-3 Patriot. "Patriot" is a tactical-level anti-missile system designed to cover military groups. The debut of this complex took place during the first American war in Persian Gulf. Despite the extensive PR campaign of this system, the effectiveness of the complex was considered not very satisfactory. Therefore, in the mid-90s, a more advanced version of the Patriot appeared - PAC-3.

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The most important element of the American missile defense system is the SBIRS satellite constellation, designed to detect ballistic missile launches and track their trajectories. The deployment of the system began in 2006 and should be completed by 2019. Its full complement will consist of ten satellites, six geostationary and four in high elliptical orbits.

Does the American missile defense system threaten Russia?

Will a missile defense system be able to protect the United States from a massive nuclear strike from Russia? The clear answer is no. The effectiveness of the American missile defense system is assessed differently by experts, but it certainly cannot ensure the guaranteed destruction of all warheads launched from Russian territory.

The ground-based GBMD system is insufficiently accurate, and only two such systems have been deployed so far. The ship's Aegis missile defense system can be quite effective against ICBMs at the accelerating (initial) stage of their flight, but it will not be able to intercept missiles launched from deep within Russian territory. If we talk about intercepting warheads in the mid-flight phase (outside the atmosphere), then it will be very difficult for SM-3 anti-missile missiles to deal with maneuvering warheads of the latest generation. Although outdated (unmaneuverable) units may well be hit by them.

Domestic critics of the American Aegis system forget one very important aspect: the deadliest element of the Russian nuclear triad are the ICBMs located on nuclear submarines. A missile defense ship may well be on duty in the area where missiles are launched from nuclear submarines and destroy them immediately after launch.

Hitting warheads during the mid-flight phase (after they have separated from the missile) is a very difficult task; it can be compared to trying to hit another bullet flying towards it with a bullet.

At present (and in the foreseeable future), the American missile defense system will be able to protect US territory from only a small number of ballistic missiles (no more than twenty), which is still a very serious achievement, given the rapid spread of missile and nuclear technologies in the world.

If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them

The Blue Berets are making a technological breakthrough

The airborne troops are rightfully the flagship Russian army, including in the field of supplies the latest weapons And military equipment. Now the main task airborne units- the ability to conduct combat operations autonomously behind enemy lines, and this also implies that “ winged infantry"After landing, it must be able to defend itself against attacks from the sky. The head of air defense of the Airborne Forces, Vladimir Protopopov, told MK what difficulties airborne airborne anti-aircraft gunners now have to face, what systems are being adopted by the blue berets, and also about where specialists for this type of troops are trained.

- Vladimir Lvovich, how did the formation of airborne defense units begin?

The first air defense units in the Airborne Forces were formed during the Great Patriotic War, back in 1943. These were separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions. In 1949, air defense control bodies were created in the Airborne Forces, which included a group of officers with an air surveillance, warning and communications post, as well as a P-15 all-round radio station. The first head of air defense of the Airborne Forces was Ivan Savenko.

If we talk about the technical equipment of air defense units of the Airborne Forces, then for 45 years we have been in service with the ZU-23 twin anti-aircraft gun, with which you can fight not only low-flying targets, but also ground lightly armored targets and firing points at a distance of up to 2 km. In addition, it can be used to defeat enemy personnel both in open areas and behind light field-type shelters. The effectiveness of the ZU-23 has been repeatedly proven in Afghanistan, as well as during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus.

The ZU-23 has been in service for 45 years.

In the 80s, the air defense of the Airborne Forces switched to higher quality weapons, for example, our units began to receive Igla portable anti-aircraft missile systems, which made it possible to conduct effective fight with all types of aircraft, even if the enemy used thermal interference. Airborne air defense units, armed with ZU-23 and MANPADS, successfully carried out combat missions in all “hot spots” starting with Afghanistan.

You talked about the installation of the ZU-23, is it effective as a means of self-covering in modern anti-aircraft combat?

I repeat, the ZU-23 has been in our service for more than 45 years. Of course, the installation itself does not have modernization potential. Its caliber - 23 mm - is no longer suitable for hitting air targets; it is ineffective. But in airborne brigades these installations remain, however, its purpose now is not entirely to combat air targets, but mainly to combat concentrations of enemy manpower and lightly armored ground targets. She has proven herself very well in this matter.

It is clear that with a firing range of up to 2 km and an altitude of 1.5 km, it is not very effective. Compared to new ones anti-aircraft missile systems, which are now supplied to the Airborne Forces, then, of course, the difference is huge; the ZU-23 has a low effectiveness of destruction. For example, three anti-aircraft installations form one target channel. Let me explain, the target channel is the ability of the complex to detect, identify and hit a target with a probability not lower than a given one. That is, I repeat, three installations make up one target channel, and this is a whole platoon. And, for example, one Strela-10 combat vehicle constitutes one target channel. In addition, the combat vehicle is capable of detecting, identifying and firing at the target itself. And with the ZU-23, fighters must identify the target visually. In conditions where time becomes a key factor, using these installations in the fight against air targets becomes ineffective.

The Strela-10 complexes are very reliable. If the operator catches the target, then this is a guaranteed hit.

- ZU-23, Igla MANPADS... What is replacing these means of protection against air attacks?

Now the air defense of the Airborne Forces, like the Airborne Forces themselves, are actively rearming. I myself have been serving since 1986 and cannot remember such an active surge in the supply of the latest equipment and weapons, which is now occurring in the troops since 2014.

Within two years, the Airborne Forces received 4 divisional Verba MANPADS systems with the latest Barnaul T automation systems. We also rearmed two formations with modernized Strela-10MN air defense systems. This complex has now become 24/7; it can conduct combat work both day and night. The Strela-10 complexes are very unpretentious and reliable. If the operator catches the target, then it is a guaranteed direct hit. In addition to the Verba MANPADS and the Strela-10MN air defense system, new system identification. Among other things, all batteries armed with MANPADS receive small-sized radar detectors MRLO 1L122 “Garmon”. This portable radar detector is designed to detect low-flying targets to engage anti-aircraft missile systems.

The Verba MANPADS has a homing missile, of the “fire and forget” type.

If we talk about “Verba”, then this MANPADS, unlike previous ones, already has appropriate operating modes that allow it to hit air targets that use heat traps. Now they are no longer an obstacle to the destruction of aircraft. There is also a mode for destroying small targets. Now MANPADS can work against both drones and cruise missiles; this was not the case before. In addition, this complex has an increased range, and the destruction height has increased to almost five kilometers, and the missile is homing, of the “fire and forget” type.

One of the main tasks of the Airborne Forces is to conduct combat operations behind enemy lines. How have the latest systems proven themselves in such conditions?

As for actions behind enemy lines, our weapons, as you know, are mobile. Of course, during the exercises we tested the operation of MANPADS after landing; the systems are very reliable. As for the Strela-10MN, we did not airdrop this complex, but its dimensions are completely air transportable and can be transported by various military transport aircraft. By the way, now the outdated armored personnel carrier is being replaced by the newest one - “Rakushka”. This modern version already provides for the placement of Verba ammunition and a set of automation equipment for a unit of anti-aircraft gunners. The vehicle allows launching combat missiles both in motion with a short stop and from a standstill. In general, our systems are fully adapted for operations behind enemy lines.

Military experts say that the role of air defense in modern warfare has increased significantly, do you agree with this?

Everything is correct. According to many of our and foreign military analysts, all armed conflicts begin from the air; a soldier never sets foot on the territory until the battlefield is cleared in order to avoid unnecessary casualties and reduce them to a minimum. Therefore, the role of air defense is indeed increasing significantly. Here we can recall the words of Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who said: “Great grief awaits that country that is unable to repel an air strike.” Now these words are becoming more relevant than ever. All armed conflicts in which the world's leading armies take part are primarily based on achieving air superiority. In addition, combat unmanned aerial vehicles are now increasingly being used. aircrafts, which are already capable of conducting combat operations at long ranges. It is no longer a pilot, but an operator on the ground performing combat missions. For example, he conducts aerial reconnaissance or keeps a UAV in the air for hours and waits for this or that object to attack. The pilot's life is no longer at risk. That is why the role of air defense is increasing. But, of course, you must understand that airborne air defense is not complex and large systems type S-300 and S-400. We are means of self-covering. These are the air defense units that directly cover troops on the battlefield.

- Tell us how willingly young guys are now to serve in the air defense of the Airborne Forces, do you have any problems with personnel?

In our specialty, air defense officers are trained at the Military Academy of Military Air Defense of the Russian Armed Forces named after. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. Every year we recruit about 17 people. They study for five years and then go to serve in our Airborne Forces. I want to say that we have no refusals, everyone wants to serve. Now that rearmament is being actively carried out, units are receiving new technology and weapons, the guys are interested in learning new systems. After all, earlier the air defense of the Airborne Forces did not have their own reconnaissance means, they did not have their own automated control systems, but now all this has appeared. Again, people began to understand that the role of air defense is increasing, so we have no problems with personnel.

- Is it possible to compare air defense units of the Airborne Forces with similar units of leading NATO countries in terms of armament?

I think this will be somewhat incorrect. After all, they are far behind us in this direction; there is nothing to compare with. They are still armed with outdated MANPADS; they simply do not have automation tools like ours. In 2014–2015, the air defense units of the Airborne Forces actually experienced a technological breakthrough in new and modernized weapons. We have gone far ahead, and this groundwork needs to be developed.

The recent development of the situation in Europe (the Balkan events) is very dynamic in both the political and military fields. As a result of the implementation of the principles of new thinking, it became possible to reduce NATO armed forces in Europe, while simultaneously increasing the quality of the NATO system, as well as the beginning of the reorganization of the system itself.

A significant place in these reorganization plans is given to issues of combat and logistical support for combat operations, as well as the creation of reliable air defense (air defense), without which, according to foreign experts, one cannot count on success in combat in modern conditions. One of the manifestations of NATO’s efforts in this direction was the unified air defense system created in Europe, which included active forces and assets allocated by NATO countries, as well as the automated “Nage” system.

1. Organization of a unified NATO air defense system

NATO Command The purpose of the joint air defense system is definitely the following:

prevent the intrusion of possible enemy aircraft into the airspace of NATO countries in peacetime;

to prevent them from striking as much as possible during military operations in order to ensure the functioning of the main political and military-economic centers, strike forces of the armed forces, strategic forces, aviation assets, as well as other objects of strategic importance.

To perform these tasks it is considered necessary:

provide advance warning to the command of a possible attack through continuous monitoring of the airspace and obtaining intelligence data on the state of the enemy’s attack weapons;

protection from air strikes of nuclear forces, the most important military-strategic and administrative-economic facilities, as well as areas of concentration of troops;

maintaining high combat readiness of the maximum possible number of air defense forces and means to immediately repel an attack from the air;

organization of close interaction of air defense forces and means;

in the event of war - destruction of enemy air attack weapons.

The creation of a unified air defense system is based on the following principles:

covering not individual objects, but entire areas, stripes

allocation of sufficient forces and means to cover the most important areas and objects;

high centralization of control of air defense forces and means.

The overall management of the NATO air defense system is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe through his deputy for the Air Force (also Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Air Force), i.e. commander in chief The Air Force is the Air Defense Commander.

The entire area of ​​responsibility of the NATO joint air defense system is divided into 2 air defense zones:

northern zone;

southern zone.

Northern air defense zone occupies the territories of Norway, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the coastal waters of the countries and is divided into three air defense regions (“North”, “Center”, “Northeast”).

Each district has 1–2 air defense sectors.

Southern air defense zone occupies the territory of Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Mediterranean and Black Seas and is divided into 4 air defense regions

"Southeast";

"South Center";

"Southwest;

Air defense areas have 2–3 air defense sectors. In addition, 2 independent air defense sectors have been created within the boundaries of the Southern zone:

Cypriot;

Maltese;

For air defense purposes the following is used:

fighter-interceptors;

Long, medium and short range air defense systems;

anti-aircraft artillery (ZA).

A) In service NATO air defense fighters The following fighter groups consist of:

group - F-104, F-104E (capable of attacking one target at medium and high altitudes up to 10000m from the rear hemisphere);

group - F-15, F-16 (capable of destroying one target from all angles and at all altitudes),

group - F-14, F-18, "Tornado", "Mirage-2000" (capable of attacking several targets from different angles and at all altitudes).

Air defense fighters are entrusted with the task of intercepting air targets at the highest possible altitudes from their base over enemy territory and outside the SAM zone.

All fighters are armed with cannons and missiles and are all-weather, equipped with a combined weapons control system designed to detect and attack air targets.

This system typically includes:

Interception and targeting radar;

counting device;

infrared sight;

optical sight.

All radars operate in the range λ=3–3.5 cm in pulse (F–104) or pulse-Doppler mode. All NATO aircraft have a receiver indicating radiation from radar operating in the range λ = 3–11.5 cm. Fighters are based at airfields 120–150 km away from the front line.

B)Fighter tactics

When performing combat missions, fighters use three methods of combat:

interception from the position “Duty at the airport”;

interception from the “Air duty” position;

free attack.

"Duty officer at the airport"– the main type of combat missions. It is used in the presence of a developed radar and ensures energy savings and the availability of a full supply of fuel.

Flaws: shifting the interception line to one’s territory when intercepting low-altitude targets

Depending on the threatening situation and the type of alarm, the duty forces of air defense fighters can be in the following degrees of combat readiness:

Ready No. 1 – departure 2 minutes after the order;

Ready No. 2 – departure 5 minutes after the order;

Ready No. 3 – departure 15 minutes after the order;

Ready No. 4 – departure 30 minutes after the order;

Ready No. 5 – departure 60 minutes after the order.

The possible line for a meeting between military and technical cooperation with a fighter from this position is 40–50 km from the front line.

"Air duty" – used to cover the main group of troops in the most important objects. In this case, the army group zone is divided into duty zones, which are assigned to air units.

Duty is carried out at medium, low and high altitudes:

–In PMU – in groups of aircraft up to a flight;

-At SMU - at night - by single planes, changeover. produced in 45–60 minutes. Depth – 100–150 km from the front line.

Flaws: – the ability to quickly detect enemy duty areas;

forced to adhere to defensive tactics more often;

the possibility of the enemy creating superiority in forces.

"Free Hunt" – for the destruction of air targets in a given area that does not have continuous air defense missile coverage and a continuous radar field. Depth - 200–300 km from the front line.

Air defense and air defense fighters, equipped with detection and targeting radars, armed with air-to-air missiles, use 2 methods of attack:

Attack from the front HEMISPHERE (at 45–70 0 to the target's heading). It is used when the time and place of interception are calculated in advance. This is possible when tracking the target longitudinally. It is the fastest, but requires high pointing accuracy both in location and time.

Attack from the rear HEMISPHERE (within the heading angle sector 110–250 0). Can be used against all targets and with all types of weapons. It provides a high probability of hitting the target.

Having good weapons and moving from one method of attack to another, one fighter can carry out 6–9 attacks , which allows you to shoot down 5–6 BTA aircraft.

Significant disadvantage Air defense fighters, and in particular fighter radars, is their work based on the use of the Doppler effect. So-called “blind” heading angles arise (angles of approach to the target), in which the fighter’s radar is not able to select (select) the target against the background of interfering reflections of the ground or passive interference. These zones do not depend on the flight speed of the attacking fighter, but are determined by the target’s flight speed, heading angles, approach and the minimum radial component of the relative approach speed ∆Vbl., specified by the performance characteristics of the radar.

The radar is capable of selecting only those signals from the target that have a certain Doppler ƒ min. This ƒ min is for radar ± 2 kHz.

In accordance with the laws of radar ƒ = 2 V2 ƒ 0

where ƒ 0 – carrier, C–V light. Such signals come from targets with V 2 =30–60 m/s. To achieve this V 2 the aircraft must fly at a heading angle q=arcos V 2 /V c =70–80 0, and the sector itself has blind heading angles => 790–110 0, and 250–290 0, respectively.

The main air defense systems in the joint air defense system of NATO countries are:

Long-range air defense systems (D≥60km) – “Nike-Hercules”, “Patriot”;

Medium-range air defense system (D = from 10–15 km to 50–60 km) – improved “Hawk” (“U-Hawk”);

Short-range air defense systems (D = 10–15 km) - “Chaparral”, “Rapier”, “Roland”, “Indigo”, “Crotal”, “Javelin”, “Avenger”, “Adats”, “Fog-M”, “ Stinger", "Blowpipe".

NATO air defense systems principle of use are divided into:

Centralized use, applied according to the plan of the senior boss in zone , area and air defense sector;

Military air defense systems are part of the ground forces and are used according to the plan of their commander.

To funds used according to plans senior managers include long- and medium-range air defense systems. Here they operate in automatic guidance mode.

The main tactical unit of anti-aircraft weapons is a division or equivalent units.

Long- and medium-range air defense systems, with a sufficient number of them, are used to create a continuous cover zone.

When their number is small, only individual, most important objects are covered.

Short-range air defense systems and air defense systems used to cover ground forces, roads, etc.

Each anti-aircraft weapon has certain combat capabilities for firing and hitting a target.

Combat capabilities – quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing the capabilities of air defense systems units to carry out combat missions at a specified time and in specific conditions.

The combat capabilities of an air defense missile system battery are assessed by the following characteristics:

Dimensions of shelling and destruction zones in vertical and horizontal planes;

Number of simultaneously fired targets;

System response time;

The ability of the battery to conduct long-term fire;

The number of launches when firing at a given target.

The specified characteristics can only be predetermined for a non-maneuvering purpose.

Firing zone - a part of space at each point of which a missile can be aimed.

Affected area - part of the firing zone within which the missile meets the target and defeats it with a given probability.

The position of the affected area in the firing zone may change depending on the direction of flight of the target.

When the air defense system is operating in the mode automatic guidance the affected area occupies a position in which the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area in the horizontal plane always remains parallel to the direction of flight towards the target.

Since the target can approach from any direction, the affected area can occupy any position, while the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area rotates following the turn of the aircraft.

Hence, a turn in the horizontal plane at an angle greater than half the angle limiting the affected area is equivalent to the aircraft leaving the affected area.

The affected area of ​​any air defense system has certain boundaries:

along N – lower and upper;

on D from leave. mouth – far and near, as well as restrictions on the exchange rate parameter (P), which determines the lateral boundaries of the zone.

Lower limit of the affected area – Nmin of firing is determined, which ensures the specified probability of hitting the target. It is limited by the influence of the reflection of radiation from the ground on the operation of the RTS and the closing angles of positions.

Position closing angle ( α ) – is formed when the terrain and local objects exceed the position of the batteries.

Upper and data bounds affected areas are determined by the energy resource of the river.

Near border the affected area is determined by the time of uncontrolled flight after launch.

Lateral borders affected areas are determined by the course parameter (P).

Exchange rate parameter P – the shortest distance (KM) from the point where the battery is located and the projection of the aircraft track.

The number of simultaneously fired targets depends on the number of radars irradiating (illuminating) the target in the air defense missile system batteries.

The system reaction time is the time that passes from the moment an air target is detected until the missile is launched.

The number of possible launches on a target depends on the long-range detection of the target by the radar, the course parameter P, H of the target and Vtarget, T of the system reaction and the time between missile launches.