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Jumping from an airplane inside an armored personnel carrier is a unique technique of the Russian Airborne Forces. Landing inside a vehicle: how it all began How an infantry fighting vehicle lands with a parachute

On January 23, 1976, at the parachute track of the 76th Guards Airborne Division Kislovo, for the first time in the world, military equipment and crew were dropped from an aircraft using a parachute-jet system, called “Reactavr”. The crew included A.V. Margelov and L.I. Shcherbakov.

Landing of the BMD-1 on the Reaktavr PRS.

The adoption of this parachute-rocket system into service by the Airborne Forces in the same 1976 made it possible to reduce the collection time personnel and equipment on the landing site after the landing.

In practice it looks like this. During experimental exercises in 1983, eight objects with Reaktavr systems were landed.

From the moment the first vehicle left the plane to the collection of all eight vehicles at a distance of 1.5 kilometers from the landing site, only 12-15 minutes passed, whereas with separate landing of crews and equipment, this would have taken 35-45 minutes.

By 1976, the USSR had already developed the Centaur multi-dome parachute-platform system, which made it possible to parachute the crew inside the BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle, first tested on January 5, 1073.

Usually, the crew leaves the aircraft after their combat vehicles, observing their movement in flight. However, in this case, after landing, the paratroopers find themselves scattered within a radius of several kilometers from the vehicle and, accordingly, spend a lot of time searching for it and preparing for movement. It was the full awareness of the importance of quickly preparing a vehicle for the start of hostilities that prompted in the 70s the commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, Army General V.F. Margelov, to identify a task of paramount importance - to create a method of joint landing of equipment with a crew.

After many experiments, the first joint landing took place in 1973 using a system called “Centaur”. The operation of the system was as follows: the airborne combat vehicle was equipped with two cosmonaut seats of the “Kazbek” type, developed by the chief designer of the Zvezda plant, Guy Ilyich Severin, Hero of Socialist Labor, but in a simplified version - “Kazbek-D” (it was not possible to install shock absorbers in the headrest area , and also had to abandon the individual casting of the inside of the chair, like the astronauts).

The landing was carried out on the P-7 parachute platform. The result of the reset proved that the use of this method allows not only to save the lives of paratroopers, but also their combat readiness.

However, preparation for landing BMD on a parachute platform with a multi-dome system (ISS) required a lot of time and material resources, especially for mass landings that were planned to be used in the “big” war. The landing platforms, already loaded with combat vehicles, were towed to the airfield on wheels from their deployment sites by trucks at speeds of up to 10 km/h, but it was still necessary to accurately “roll” the platform to the aircraft, which was done manually.

The multi-dome system was transported separately by additional vehicles, mounted on a vehicle directly near the aircraft, and only then the resulting monocargo was launched into the aircraft’s cargo compartment using a hoist. Transportation to the airfield required availability good roads, since it was impossible to tow platforms with military equipment off-road. Preparation of platforms for landing, loading and securing military equipment on them, concentration to aircraft parking areas, installation; parachute system, loading onto aircraft took up to 15–18 hours (according to the experience of regimental exercises). This had a negative impact on the combat readiness and operational use of airborne assault forces.

The design of the parachute-rocket systems (PRS) made it possible to store the BMD-1 in parks with landing equipment mounted on them in the “stowed” position. The vehicles advanced to the waiting areas for loading onto the plane under their own power, and the method of placing landing equipment on them made it possible to march over rough terrain over a distance of up to 500 kilometers and, if necessary, even fire from standard weapons. On site, the crew could immediately begin transferring the PRS to the “landing” position, which took no more than 30 minutes. Then the BMD-1 moved under its own power to be loaded into the aircraft (strapless parachute landing systems with the same advantages appeared later). Thus, the time from leaving the park to loading onto the plane was significantly reduced.

The landing itself was also accelerated, since the rate of reduction of the load on the PRS reached 20–25 m/s (about 3 times higher than on the parachute-platform system), which made the system practically invulnerable to enemy fire from the ground. Near the ground, due to the operation of the braking propulsion system, which consisted of three soft-landing jet engines, the speed was reduced to almost zero. This increased the landing accuracy. For shock absorption during landing, two foam shock-absorbing bars were installed under the bottom of the combat vehicle.

The PRS mounted on the BMD-1 made up a smaller share of the landing monocargo, both in weight and in size, which generally made it possible to land more cargo in one air echelon. Besides, fighting machine parachuted from increased amount ammunition and fuel. After landing, the PRS did not leave huge sheets of parachutes around the vehicle - a “white swamp”, which often prevented it from starting to move - the system had only one dome with an area of 540 square meters, the Centaur landed on five domes of 760 square meters each.

The Reactavr testers are A.V. Margelov and L.I. Shcherbakov.

Placing a crew member in a Kazbek-D seat in the BMD-1 hull during landing.

From the memoirs of Hero of Russia Alexander Vasilyevich Margelov, one of the creators of the “Centaur” and “Reactaur”, the first tester of these systems:

“As for the Reactavr test, most of all the specialists were concerned about the reliability of the parachute-reactive system. Its calculated reliability was 0.95, but after all the modifications and upgrades there were only 47 practical drops. But this result was considered quite good, taking into account the significant advantages of the system in combat use compared to parachute-platform means...

Commander Margelov entrusted this experiment to two volunteers - me and Lieutenant Colonel Shcherbakov. I was appointed crew commander. Leonid, who knew the combat vehicle very well, was appointed driver. Upon arrival at the 76th Guards Chernigov Airborne Division, we were introduced to our backup guards - paratroopers conscript service. There were three of them left out of the six selected - half of them suddenly had poor health... The guys actively, with souls, took part in all preparatory work: when installing a parachute system, equipping engines with powder bombs, mooring the PRS to a combat vehicle.

Deputy Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee Vitaly Pariysky boarded the plane (it coincided that the same AN-12B with the same crew as during the first experiment with the Centaur arrived for landing), he controlled our landing in the Kazbek- D", and then communicated between the crew and the ground through the pilots.

It didn’t take long to fly; after declaring two minutes of readiness, the crew switched to direct communication with the ground. And again a coincidence - the communication was again prepared by Colonel B.G. Zhukov, and, as during the landing in the Centaur, it turned out to be one-way. Only this time the “reactaurs” heard “ground”, but they were not heard... Zhukov briefly, but in detail, during a few seconds of descent, reported to the crew about the operation of the parachute system - everything is fine! The pilot chute removed the complex from the plane - again the “pendulum” - moments of descent on the stabilizing parachute - the main canopy opened, two telescopic probes were deposited at the prescribed length. The moment they touched the ground, the soft landing engines fired: explosion, gases, smoke! Pariysky, who had jumped after the complex, landed nearby.

To conduct the experiment, a landing site was specially chosen where there was more snow. However, the complex was applied to a compacted ice road, so we felt a significant shock overload. At the moment of impact with the ground, the connection started working - just at this time Shcherbakov congratulated me on a safe landing.

The car rushed across the landing site. The crew completed all driving and aimed fire tasks. Having approached the podium, he reported to the commander about the completion of the task. After congratulations, the crew was “captured” by doctors. Our body temperature turned out to be elevated, and so did our blood pressure. Leonid felt nauseous, his head was spinning, all his bones ached, he could not even drink the beaker of alcohol offered by a serious doctor. But within an hour, vital parameters returned to normal. Leonid Ivanovich believes that this landing significantly “damaged” his spine. A few years later he even had surgery on his vertebra. I didn’t feel any deterioration in my health after the experiment.”

On airborne weapons There are the following parachute-jet systems of the following modifications:

parachute jet system PRSM-915 (for BMD-1);

parachute-jet system;

parachute-jet system PRSM-916 (for BMD-2);

parachute-rocket system PRSM-926 (for 2S9 “NONA”).

For example, here are the characteristics of PRSM-925 (for BTR-D):

flight weight of the vehicle with PRSM-925, 8000–8800 kg;

landing height above the landing site, 500–1500 m;

landing site height above sea level, up to 2500 m;

vertical speed of descent on the main parachute at air temperature near the ground from -50 to +50 degrees, 23 m/s;

charge and air temperature range. 0С from -50 to +50;

nominal landing speed of the machine, 3.5-5.5 m/s;

the maximum (allowable when dropping) wind speed at the ground is up to 10 m/s.

Scheme of landing the BTR-D on the Reaktavr ARS.

Completely new topic

On May 20, 1983, Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 451-159 “On carrying out development work to create an airborne combat vehicle of the 1990s” was issued. and means of landing it.” The design and development work for the airborne combat vehicle received the code "Bakhcha", and for the landing equipment - "Bakhcha-SD".

When developing a new airborne combat vehicle and the landing equipment themselves, the scale of the tasks posed to the Soviet Airborne Forces in the event of war and the increasingly complex conditions for conducting airborne operations were taken into account. The potential enemy, of course, took into account the role assigned to the Airborne Forces and the possibility of mass parachute landing in their rear of personnel and military equipment. During the exercises of the armed forces of NATO countries, the issues of combating airborne assaults were almost always practiced, and landings were assumed to be carried out by forces of a battalion and above. In Great Britain, for example, in September 1985, the Brave Defender exercise was held with practical testing of tasks to combat airborne assaults throughout the country. American regulations emphasized that commanders of all levels, when planning a combat operation, must resolve issues of security and defense of the rear of their troops. Reconnaissance means were improved, short-range and long-range detection and warning systems were deployed, and air defense systems were brought in to combat airborne assaults - from individual formations to the scale of a theater of military operations.

To combat the landing forces, in addition to the forces protecting facilities and bases in the rear areas of the troops, battalion, regimental, and brigade mobile tactical groups were formed from armored, mechanized and airmobile units. Among the countermeasures included: shelling of military transport aircraft and troops during landing, attack of the landing enemy by a mobile tactical group with the support of tactical and army aviation, gun and rocket artillery, taking advantage of the initial disorganization of the landing party, with the goal of either destroying or pinning down its forces. The emergence of reconnaissance and strike complexes increased the possibility of hitting landing forces in the landing area.

A comprehensive solution to the problems of reducing the vulnerability of parachute landings was required, including increasing the surprise and secrecy of the landing, increasing the number of equipment and personnel landing in one echelon and the accuracy of the landing, reducing the landing time and the time between landing and the start of airborne combat operations.

The main requirement for the family of airborne vehicles put forward by the Airborne Forces was the landing of combat vehicles from military transport aircraft such as Il-76 (Il-76M) and An-22 with a full combat kit and refueling, as well as with a combat crew (two crew members and five landing man) located inside the vehicle. At the same time, the Il-76 was supposed to lift up to two vehicles with landing equipment, the Il-76M - up to three, the An-22 - up to four. The landing was planned to be carried out on land (including high-mountain areas) and on water (with waves up to 2 points). The landing equipment had to guarantee a reduction in the minimum permissible landing altitude, the minimum possible relation their mass to the mass of the landing cargo (combat vehicle with ammunition and crew), use in various climatic and weather conditions. The likelihood of an airborne operation after enemy strikes and the disabling of roads and a number of airfields required ensuring that combat vehicles with landing gear installed in a marching manner could make a long march to the loading airfields, overcoming water obstacles.

On November 30, 1983, the Air Force Department of Orders and Deliveries of Aviation Equipment and Weapons issued the Moscow Universal Aggregate Plant with tactical and technical assignment No. 13098, agreed with the Ministry of Aviation Industry, for the development of strapdown landing gear for the new BMD. The development of landing equipment based on the Bakhcha-SD theme began under the leadership of the chief designer and responsible manager of the Universal plant A.I. Privalov and deputy chief designer P.R. Shevchuk.

In 1984, Universal issued technical assignment No. 14030 to the Scientific Research Institute of Automatic Devices (NII AU) for the development of a parachute system. The work at the Scientific Research Institute of Automation was headed by the director of the institute O.V. Rysev and Deputy Director B.N. Skulanov. The design of landing equipment was, of course, carried out in close cooperation with the VgTZ development team headed by chief designer A.V. Shabalin and deputy chief designer V.A. Trishkin.

If the family of vehicles based on the BMD-1 made it possible to create each subsequent set of landing equipment based on previously developed models with a high degree of unification, now there could be no talk of continuity in components and assemblies. The tactical and technical specifications for the “airborne combat vehicle of the 90s” (received the designation “Object 950” during development, and “product 950” in production) envisaged a qualitative improvement in its characteristics compared to the BMD-1 and BMD-2 and a corresponding increase dimensions and weight. The planned weight of the new BMD (12.5 tons) was more than 1.5 times greater than the weight of the BMD-1 - BTR-D family of vehicles. Combined with the need to land the entire crew inside the vehicle with very strict restrictions on the mass of the landing equipment themselves, this forced the creation of the entire complex from scratch. Of course, a rich supply of technical solutions was used, previously found by specialists from Universal and the Scientific Research Institute of Automation in the course of other work, but the design had to be new. Essentially, it took full complex research and development work.

Taking into account the novelty of the task, the Customer agreed that the final choice of the landing scheme would be made at the stage of defending the technical design.

Of the two main schemes of strapdown landing equipment, developed for vehicles of the BMD-1 - BTR-D family (parachute or parachute-reactive system), a multi-dome parachute system was chosen, which ensures greater reliability, which was paramount taking into account the landing of the crew. Placing the crew on universal seats instead of special shock-absorbing chairs required the developers to guarantee vertical overloads during landing of no more than 15 g. A multi-dome system combined with energy-intensive shock absorbers could provide this. Therefore, the option of a parachute-jet system was not considered at the technical design stage.

In December 1985, a meeting of representatives of the Customer and industry was held at the Universal plant on the issue of approving the technical appearance of Bakhcha-SD products. The chairman of the meeting was the commander of the Airborne Forces, Army General D.S. Sukhorukov, deputy commander Lieutenant General N.N. was also present from the Airborne Forces. Guskov, from the Customer - G.I. Golubtsov, from the Universal plant - N.F. Shirokov, who replaced A.I. Privalov as director and chief designer of the plant, from the Scientific Research Institute of Automation - director of the institute O.V. Rysev and the head of his Feodosia branch P.M. Nikolaev, from the Air Force Research Institute - head of department A.F. Shukaev.

At the meeting, three options for strapdown parachute landing equipment were considered:
- the version of the Feodosia branch of the Scientific Research Institute of Automation was presented by P.M. Nikolaev. This was, in fact, a modernization of landing equipment of the PBS-915 “Shelf” type with self-inflating air shock absorption;
- version of the "Universal" plant with self-inflating air shock absorption "Malysh". Leading designer Ya.R. reported. Grynszpan;
- a version of the "Universal" plant with air shock absorption of forced filling with an excess pressure inside of 0.005 kg/cm2. Chief designer N.F. reported on it. Shirokov.

As a result of a comprehensive study, it was decided to create landing equipment according to the third option, which provides greater energy intensity of depreciation and lower overloads on the vehicle body and crew locations during landing. The development received the factory code “4P248”, the customer assigned it the code “PBS-950”.

The design of the 4P248 landing equipment (for brevity, also called the “4P248 system”) was carried out in the 9th department of the Universal plant under the leadership of department head G.V. Petkus, brigade chief Yu.N. Korovochkin and leading engineer V.V. Zhebrovsky. The calculations were carried out by a department headed by S.S. Filler; testing of landing equipment at the plant was supervised by the heads of testing departments P.V. Goncharov and S.F. Gromov.

The main problems that the development team had to solve anew include the creation of:
- a new installation and shock-absorbing device (skis with shock absorbers and a central unit), which would ensure loading of the equipped BMD into the aircraft, fastening it in the cargo compartment of the aircraft on roller table equipment, safe exit of the vehicle from the cargo compartment during landing and automatic activation of the parachute and shock-absorbing systems. A forced-fill air shock absorber 4P248-1503 was designed;
- a unit designed for forced filling of shock absorbers atmospheric air in a volume that ensures the damping of the kinetic energy of the load upon landing. The unit was called the “supercharging unit” and received the factory code “4P248-6501”;
- a multi-dome parachute system that would ensure safe landing and splashdown of the “Object 950” with a full combat crew. The development of the MKS-350-12 parachute system was carried out at the Scientific Research Institute of Automation under the leadership of Deputy Director B.N. Skulanov and the head of the sector L.N. Chernysheva;
- equipment that allows BMD with mounted landing gear to make a march of up to 500 km while overcoming water obstacles;
- electrical equipment located inside the “Object 950” to provide crew members with light information about the stages of the landing process, as well as to control the accelerated unmooring of landing equipment after landing.

The decision made at the mentioned meeting did not at all cancel the search for other possible options for implementing the depreciation device. Among them was the air cushion principle. Based on the decision of the State Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues dated October 31, 1986, the Universal plant was issued a technical assignment to conduct research work “Study of the possibility of creating means of landing equipment and cargo using the air cushion principle.” "Universal", in turn, in 1987 issued an assignment to the Ufa Aviation Institute. Sergo Ordzhonikidze (UAI), who previously conducted a similar study as part of the “Vyduvka” research project. The newly opened research project received the code “Blowout-1” and was completed in full.

During this research work, the landing of the “Object 915” (BMD-1) was studied, but it was assumed that the same principle could be used for heavier objects. The shock-absorbing device consisted of an inflatable “skirt” attached under the bottom of the combat vehicle, which deployed during descent using pyrotechnic gas generators. There was no forced injection of air under the “skirt”: it was assumed that upon landing the machine, due to its inertia, would compress the air in a volume limited by the “skirt”, spending a significant part of its kinetic energy on this. Such a system could only work effectively in ideal conditions and on a perfectly flat area. In addition, the shock absorption system proposed by UAI involved the use of expensive rubberized SVM fabric and was difficult to prepare for use. And this work was completed when the 4P248 equipment had already passed the state testing stage. The final report on the research work, approved by the head of Universal in December 1988, recognized its results as useful, but stated: “The use of the principle of a gas-air cushion in the landing device for the research work “Vyduvka” and the research work “Vyduvka-1” for the development of landing systems is inappropriate.” .

As part of the work on the topic “Bakhcha-SD”, other research projects were opened. The previously developed strapdown landing equipment for the BMD-1, BMD-2 and BTR-D - experimental ZP170, serial PBS-915 (925) - included hydraulic orientation systems in the direction of the wind before landing. With their help, turning the landing object at the stage of parachute descent with its longitudinal axis in the direction of wind drift made it possible to ensure a safe landing at wind speeds in the surface layer of up to 15 m/s and thereby expand the range weather conditions use of parachute landings. However, a mechanical guiderop of the type used in PBS-915 (925), which worked effectively at a wind speed of 10-15 m/s, when it decreased to 8-9 m/s simply did not have time to work: when the object was lowered, a “slack” of the guiderop link was formed , and he did not have time to stretch and turn the object before landing.

Film footage of pile-drive tests of the shock-absorbing system as part of the research project “Vyduvka-1” using the BMD-1. Ufa, 1988

Scientific Research Institute of Automation together with the Moscow Aviation Institute named after. Sergo Ordzhonikidze conducted the development of a solid-fuel attitude control system (Research and Development Project “Vozdukh”). The principle of its operation was to turn the landing object using a reversible jet engine with a solid fuel gas generator, switched on and off by an automatic control system. The commander of the landing vehicle received data on the landing altitude and the estimated direction of wind drift from the aircraft navigator before the start of the landing and entered it into the automatic control system. The latter ensured the orientation of the object during the descent and its stabilization until the moment of landing.

The orientation system was tested with a joint landing complex (KSD) and with a BMD-1 mock-up, and calculations were performed for the means of landing combat vehicles “Object 688M” (“Fable”) and “Object 950” (“Bakhcha”). The prospects of the system for use in the Airborne Forces were noted by specialists from the 3rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. The research work was completed in 1984, a report was issued on it, but the topic did not receive further development - mainly due to the lack of opportunity precise definition wind direction and speed near the ground in the area of the landing site. In the end, the use of any orientation system in the 4P248 was abandoned. The calculation was made on the fact that two air shock absorbers, in the process of air escaping from them after landing, form shafts on the sides of the load, which will prevent capsizing due to lateral drift.

It is appropriate to remember here research papers on the selection of materials for shock absorbers of parachute platforms and containers, carried out abroad (primarily in the USA) back in the 1960s. Foam plastics, kraft fiber, and honeycomb metal structures were studied. Metal (especially aluminum) honeycombs had the most advantageous characteristics, but they were expensive. Meanwhile, at that time, air shock absorption was already used on American and British medium- and heavy-duty parachute platforms. Its characteristics were quite satisfactory to the customers, but subsequently the Americans abandoned air shock absorption, citing precisely the difficulties of ensuring stability and preventing the platform from tipping over after landing.

BMD-Z (“Object 950”)

The MKS-350-12 parachute system was designed by the Scientific Research Institute of Automation on the basis of a parachute unit with an area of 350 m2, unified both with the already adopted PBS-915 systems (-916, -925, P-7 platform), and with the system being developed at the same time MKS-350-10 for the P-211 landing equipment of the Gagara boat.

Research conducted in the early 1980s showed that the most effective way the reduction in the minimum altitude for landing cargo is associated with the abandonment of main parachutes with a large cutting area (as in the MKS-5-128M, MKS-5-128R and MKS-1400 systems) and the transition to “bundles” (or “packages”) of non-corrugated main parachutes of small size area. The experience of creating the ISS-350-9 system with main parachute blocks with an area of 350 m2 confirmed this conclusion. It became possible to develop multi-dome systems using a “modular” scheme: with an increase in the mass of the landing cargo, the number of main parachute blocks simply increased. Note that in parallel with the ISS-350-9, the ISS-175-8 system appeared with half the main parachute dome area, intended to replace the single-dome system in the PRSM-915 (925) parachute-jet systems - with the same goal of reducing the minimum landing altitude .

“Object 950” with 4P248 landing equipment in the landing position

In both systems, for the first time in parachute engineering practice, a method was used to increase the uniformity of loading and improve the filling characteristics of multi-dome systems through the use of small-area drogue parachutes and an additional pilot chute. Braking parachutes were put into operation earlier than the main ones and reduced the rate of descent of the landing object to a level that ensured acceptable aerodynamic loads of each of the main parachutes when they opened and filled. The connection of each of the canopies of the main parachute with an additional pilot chute (APC) by a separate link led to the fact that the PPC seemed to “automatically regulate” the process of filling the canopies. When the main domes opened, a “leader” inevitably formed - a dome that opened earlier than the others and immediately took on a significant load. The force from the fiberboard could somewhat “dampen” such a dome and prevent it from fully opening too early. Ultimately, this was supposed to ensure uniform loading of the entire parachute system during deployment and improve its filling characteristics. In the PBS-915 system with the nine-dome ISS-350-9, this made it possible to reduce the minimum landing altitude to 300 m with a maximum altitude of 1500 m and an instrument flight speed range of the aircraft (for the Il-76 aircraft) from 260 to 400 km/h. This altitude-speed range, it should be noted, has still not been surpassed either in domestic or foreign practice of parachute landing of cargo weighing up to 9.5 tons.

Is the same minimum height landing at 300 m was included in the tactical and technical specifications for the development of the Bakhcha-SD weapon; it was even supposed to “work on the issue of reducing the landing altitude to 150-200 m.” The maximum landing altitude was set at 1500 m above the site, the height of the site above sea level was up to 2500 m, the instrument flight speed during landing was to be in the range of 300-380 km/h for the Il-76 (IL-76M) and 320- 380 km/h - for An-22.

The 4P248 tools included a new automatic release P232 developed by the Universal plant with a non-redundant clock release mechanism. Moreover, it was created as a development of the 2P131 automatic uncoupling from the P-16 parachute platform.

The production and technological requirements of the TTZ are interesting: “The design of landing equipment must take into account the technology of serial manufacturing plants and the most advanced methods of manufacturing parts (casting, stamping, pressing) and allow for the possibility of manufacturing parts on CNC machines... Raw materials, materials and purchased products must be of domestic production." Design documentation letter T (technical design stage) for the 4P248-0000 landing equipment was approved already in 1985. In the same year, the first three copies of the BMD “Object 950” (“Bakhcha”) passed factory tests and state tests of the MKS-350 parachute system took place -9.

"Object 950" with landing gear 4P248, loaded onto an Il-76 aircraft

BMD "Object 950" with landing gear 4P248 after landing

To conduct preliminary tests of 4P248, the Universal plant and the Scientific Research Institute of Automation in 1985-1986. prepared prototypes of landing equipment, as well as size and weight mock-ups of the Object 950. It was taken into account that the mass of the product submitted for state testing in 1986 exceeded the planned one - 12.9 tons instead of the initially specified 12.5 tons (later the new BMD will become even “heavier”). At that time, 4P248 funds appeared under the changed code “Bakhcha-PDS”, i.e. "parachute landing craft".

Preliminary ground tests of 4P248 took place from September 1985 to July 1987. During these tests, 15 piledrive drops were carried out, including physiological experiments, as well as drops onto the water surface using a crane (in 1986). It was determined that “...air shock absorbers 4P248-1503-0 with pre-inflating chambers ensure the landing of the product “950” on a parachute system at a vertical speed of up to 9.5 m/s with overloads on board the product of no more than 14 units, and universal chairs in the parachute drop position along the x-axis "no more than 10.6, along the y-axis" no more than 8.8 units and allow single use; universal seats, taking into account the implementation of activities with the normal operation of shock-absorbing means, ensure that landing conditions are tolerated by crew members... landing aids 4P248-0000 when dropped into the water ensure splashdown using a parachute system at a vertical speed of up to 9.8 m/s with no overloads on board the product more than 8.5; the resulting overloads do not exceed the maximum permissible limits regulated by medical and technical requirements for these objects.”

Landing equipment 4P248 after unmooring (skis, shock absorbers, central unit; suspension system link is clearly visible)

True, during splashdown the membranes of the exhaust valves did not operate, which greatly impaired stability even on a smooth surface. Modeling on a pile driver of wind drift at a speed of up to 12 m/s during landing on land did not result in capsizing. During the flight tests, two mock-ups and one real “Object 950” with 4P248-0000 equipment were dropped from an Il-76MD aircraft individually, in a series and using the “Zug” method at instrument flight speeds of 300-380 km/h. Preliminary flight tests involving drops from an An-22 aircraft took place only in 1988.

Although in general, according to the report on preliminary tests dated September 30, 1987, “the landing equipment of the product “950” 4P248-0000... passed all types of preliminary tests with positive results,” a number of unpleasant surprises were revealed in the operation of the 12-dome parachute system . Already on initial stage It turned out that at high indicated landing speeds, the parachute system is characterized by insufficient strength (broken lines, tears of fabric from the power frame of the canopies of the main parachutes, “leading” in the filling process), and at the lower limit of the given altitude-speed range of application - unsatisfactory filling of the canopies of the main parachutes . Analysis of the results of preliminary tests made it possible to identify the reasons. In particular, an increase in the number of drogue parachutes (their number corresponds to the number of main ones) led to the formation of a noticeable aerodynamic shading zone, which included the canopies of the main parachutes located closer to the center. In addition, a turbulence zone formed behind the bundle of braking parachutes, which negatively affected the process of filling the main parachutes as a whole. In addition, while maintaining the same length of connecting links in the 12-dome system as in the ISS-350-9, the “central” domes, the filling of which was delayed, were clamped by the “leading” neighbors, and the scheme “regulated” the opening process by force The fiberboard no longer worked as efficiently. This reduced the efficiency of the parachute system as a whole and increased the load on individual canopies. It was clear that simply increasing the number of main domes would not be possible.

NTK Airborne Forces, headed by Major General B.M. Ostroverkhov, constantly paid close attention to the development of both the “Object 950” and the 4P248 equipment, as well as the refinement of airborne transport equipment for military transport aircraft - all these issues required a comprehensive solution. Moreover, in addition to the already existing Il-76 (-76M) and An-22 aircraft, the combat vehicle was supposed to be parachuted from the Il-76MD that had just entered service and the heavy An-124 “Ruslan” that was still undergoing state tests. In 1986, in January and September 1987 and in 1988, on the initiative of the Airborne Forces, four operational evaluations of the 4P248 (PBS-950) equipment were carried out, based on the results of which changes were also made to the design of both the BMD itself and the landing equipment.

The need to improve the roller table equipment for cargo cabins of military transport aircraft was revealed already at the stage of preliminary tests. In the Il-76M (MD) aircraft, to ensure the landing of three objects, the end section of the monorail was lengthened and an additional fastening was introduced on section No. 6 of the monorail. We replaced two transfer rollers on the internal roller tracks: so that the vehicle, when rolling over the edge of the ramp, did not touch the side internal contours of the rear part of the cargo compartment, we installed rollers with annular grooves that kept the vehicle from moving laterally (a similar solution was previously used when testing the P-211 system for the boat "Gagara"). Improvements were also required to the landing transport equipment of the An-22 aircraft.

From January 5 to June 8, 1988, the 4P248 system with the MKS-350-12 parachute system (with an additional DVP-30 pilot chute) underwent state tests. They were directly supervised by the head of the testing department of the Civil Aviation Research Institute of the Air Force, Colonel N.N. Nevzorov, the leading pilot was Colonel B.V. Oleinikov, lead navigator - A.G. Smirnov, leading engineer - Lieutenant Colonel Yu.A. Kuznetsov. Various landing options were tested at various sites, including (at the final stage of state testing) on the water surface. The state testing act was approved on November 29, 1988.

The “Conclusions” section of the act stated: “The Bakhcha-PDS landing equipment basically corresponds to the tactical and technical task No. 13098 and addition No. 1, with the exception of the characteristics specified in paragraphs... The compliance tables of this act, and provide parachute landing on earth's surface airborne combat vehicle BMD-3 with a flight weight of 14400 kg with 7 members of the combat crew located on universal seats inside the vehicle, from altitudes of 300-1500 m to landing sites with an elevation above sea level of up to 2500 m, with wind speeds at the ground of up to 10 m /s... Bakhcha-PDS landing equipment ensures safety technical characteristics BMD-3, its weapons and equipment after parachute landing in the following vehicle configurations:

Fully equipped with ammunition, operational materials, service equipment, full refueling with fuel and lubricants, with seven members of the combat crew with a combat weight of 12900 kg;

In the above configuration, but instead of four members of the combat crew, 400 kg of additional ammunition is installed in a standard closure with a combat weight of 12900 kg;

With a full refueling of fuel and lubricants, complete with operational materials and service equipment, but without combat crew and ammunition with a total weight of 10900 kg...

Landing of the BMD-3 on the Bakhcha-PDS landing equipment onto the water surface is not ensured due to the vehicle capsizing 180° at the moment of splashdown with a wind in the surface layer of up to 6 m/s and waves of less than 1 point (i.e. in conditions , much “softer” than those provided for by the TTZ. - Author's note)... Performing a landing flight of a BMD-3 airborne combat vehicle using Bakhcha-PDS equipment with a flight weight of up to 14,400 kg, taking into account the features set out in the flight assessment , is not difficult and is accessible to pilots who have experience in landing large loads from Il-76 (M, MD) and An-22 aircraft.... The probability of failure-free operation, determined with a confidence probability of 0.95, is in the range from 0.952 to 1 , according to TTZ it is set to 0.999 (without taking into account discharge onto the water surface).”

Based on the results of state tests, the 4P248 landing equipment was recommended for adoption by the Air Force and Airborne Forces and for launch into mass production, but after eliminating the shortcomings and conducting control tests.

The problems of the parachute system reappeared: the destruction of one or two canopies of the main parachutes, breaks in the lines at extreme altitude and speed conditions, in two cases - failure to fill two canopies when dropping BMD at speeds of 300-360 km/h from altitudes of 400-500 m.

"Object 950" capsized during a side drift after landing. 1989

An analysis of the comments and the possibilities for eliminating them forced the release of an addition to the technical specifications. In order to prevent a long delay in the launch of landing equipment into mass production, the requirement for landing on the water surface was simply eliminated, and the instrument flight speed during landing was set at 380 km/h - to ensure the safe exit of the product from the cockpit and deployment of the parachute system. True, the same document implied the conduct of additional flight experimental studies to ensure the landing of the BMD-3 on the water surface. This requirement was by no means formal - studies carried out at the same time, in the late 1980s, showed that even in the event of a large-scale non-nuclear war in the European Theater of Operations, already within the first 24 hours due to destruction hydraulic structures Up to half of the land surface will be flooded. And this had to be taken into account when planning possible airborne operations.

Major improvements to the system were completed within a month. To speed up the unmooring of the BMD-3 from the landing equipment, retractable sliders and one unmooring point were introduced into the design of the central unit. In addition, screw supports were introduced and the pipes of the central unit were strengthened. In the lock for fastening the object to the monorail, additional compensators appeared between the lever and the lock body, and a control pin to ensure reliable control of the lock in closed position; The lock rod was modified to speed up its installation in the monorail socket. The supercharging unit has been improved to reduce its weight. The design of the track covers was changed in order to reduce the likelihood of the Object 950 tracks touching the elements of the landing equipment when leaving the “deflated” shock absorbers after landing. On the car itself, the brackets for attaching skis were strengthened. The design of the removable fencing of the BMD turret has been improved, ensuring the safety of the turret elements when the parachute system comes into operation: during state tests, for example, the OU-5 illuminator bracket on the turret was destroyed and the fencing itself was deformed.

The comments indicated that the landing equipment installed on the vehicle in stowed position, allow BMD to march “over rough terrain at a speed of 30-40 km/h for a distance of up to 500 km,” but the TTZ requirements are not met, since the placement of landing equipment on the vehicle “degrades the visibility of the commander from his workplace in a marching position during the day” and with IR devices." The same applied to the view from the driver’s workplace. Given the possibility of making long marches and overcoming water obstacles, the requirement was important. It was necessary to modify the mounting elements of the landing equipment on the vehicle in a traveling manner. The requirements for the design and installation of universal BMD seats have been clarified.

Stages of loading the BMD-Z with PBS-950 landing equipment into the Il-76 aircraft

Specialists from the Research Institute of Automation have redesigned the parachute system of the MKS-350-12. In particular, to strengthen the canopy of the main parachute, 11 additional circular frame strips from technical nylon tape LTKP-25-450 and LTKP-25-300 were sewn on it in the pole part. To improve the filling and uniform loading of the parachute system, 20-meter extensions were introduced, which allowed the canopies of the main parachutes to diverge further from each other before opening. The order in which the drogue parachute is placed in the chamber has been changed. This did not solve all the problems mentioned, and when the PBS-950 equipment was launched into production, it was necessary to limit the frequency of use at maximum altitude and speed conditions, and add an additional main parachute unit to the spare parts kit for the MKS-350-12 system and limit the frequency of use at the maximum altitude - high-speed mode.

From December 29, 1988 to March 27, 1989, preliminary flight tests of the modified 4P248-0000 equipment took place on the Il-76M aircraft, which belonged to the Research Institute of Automation. The impact of the changes made to the design was checked at all stages of preparation for the landing and the landing itself. In particular, it was determined that a crew of 7 people loaded the “Object 950” with modified landing equipment into an Il-76M aircraft within 25 minutes (however, the installation time of the VPS-14 of each object was not taken into account). The time for detaching the landing equipment from the product after landing was 60 s when using the accelerated unmooring system and no more than 2 minutes when manually unmooring by 4 crew members.

Changes were also made to the airborne transport equipment of the aircraft - in particular, in order to improve the safety of landing accompanying crews with individual parachutes (this requirement was also included in the list of measures based on the results of state tests). Modified equipment with a reinforced monorail 1P158, manufactured by the Universal plant, was installed on the Il-76 aircraft by the S.V. Design Bureau. Ilyushin and completely justified itself. The report on these tests, approved by the heads of “Universal” and the Scientific Research Institute of Automation on March 30, 1989, stated: “Modified according to G.I.’s comments and comments on the operational evaluation, the 4P248 landing equipment for the “950” product ensured their five-fold use with the replacement of parts disposable... The 4P248 landing aids ensure safe landing of the "950" product with overloads not exceeding values nу = 11.0, nх = 1.4, nz=2.2... Design changes to the main elements of the 4P248 aids: the parachute system MKS-350-12, the central power unit, the pressurization unit and other units, carried out according to the comments of state tests and according to the comments identified during these tests, were verified during the tests and their effectiveness was confirmed... The 4P248 landing equipment corresponds to TTZ No. 13098 and may be submitted for control tests. With the exception: the loading time of the “950” product into the Il-76M aircraft according to TTZ is 15 minutes, actually 25 minutes are obtained, and the unmooring of the landing equipment after landing is carried out with 3 people leaving the product.”

Pit testing of an air shock absorber on a mock-up of the Object 950

There were some emergency situations. In one of the flight experiments, the Object 950 BMD simply overturned its tracks after landing. The cause was a collision of the car during a side drift with a frozen snow bank 0.3-0.4 m high (it was winter after all) - and this incident was considered an “abnormal landing.”

During the entire testing period of 4P248, during testing (not counting control tests), 15 piledriver drops of BMD mock-ups were carried out to test air shock absorbers; 11 piledriver drops of the Object 950 (of which four were physiological experiments), 87 flight experiments with mock-ups of the Object 950, 32 flight experiments with the Object 950, four of them physiological, with two testers inside the machine. So, on June 6, 1986, at the landing site near Pskov, test paratroopers from the Scientific Research Institute AU A.V. landed inside a car from an Il-76 aircraft. Shpilevsky and E.G. Ivanov (landing altitude - 1800 m, aircraft flight speed - 327 km/h). On June 8 of the same year, test paratroopers of the Air Force Research Institute, Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Danilchenko and Major V.P., landed inside the BMD. Nesterov.

The report on the first flight physiological test, approved on July 22, 1988, noted: “... at all stages of the physiological experiment, the testers maintained normal performance... Physiological and psychological changes in the crew members were reversible and reflected the body’s reaction to the upcoming extreme impact." It was confirmed that the location of crew members on universal seats during landing prevents any part of the body from hitting the body or internal equipment of the combat vehicle. At the same time, the parachute system still did not provide the required five-fold use. Nevertheless, by the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force on November 16, 1989, the PBS-950 landing equipment was accepted for supply to the Air Force, Airborne Forces and introduced into mass production, subject to the guarantee of the frequency of use of the ISS parachute system by the Research Institute of Automation (in 1990, renamed the Research Institute of Parachute Engineering) -350-12.

To confirm the effectiveness of improvements to landing equipment in 1989 and 1990. conducted additional control and special flight tests. As a result, the appearance of the 4P248 (PBS-950) landing equipment was finally formed; the design documentation for them was assigned the letter O, i.e. it could already be used to produce an initial batch of products for organizing mass production. During 1985-1990 for the development of the 4P248 system, five copyright certificates were received, mainly relating to the shock-absorbing device.

By Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 155-27 of February 10, 1990, the BMD-3 airborne combat vehicle and PBS-950 landing equipment were adopted by the Soviet Army and Navy. The resolution, among other things, said: “To oblige the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR to carry out the modification of airborne transport equipment and equip the Il-76, Il-76MD, An-22 and An-124 aircraft with devices for loading BMD-3 with PBS-950 landing equipment "

BMD-3 with landing gear 4P248 in stowed position

Afloat tests

Order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 117 dated March 20, 1990 stated: “To designate the BMD-3 airborne combat vehicle and PBS-950 landing equipment to equip parachute units of the Soviet Army and units Marine Corps The Navy, along with the BMD-1P, BMD-2 landing combat vehicles, the PRSM-915, PRSM-925(916) parachute-rocket systems and the PBS-915, PBS-916 strapdown parachute systems.” The same order designated the Office of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force for Armaments as the general customer for landing equipment. The Ministry of Aviation Industry was obliged to create capacities designed for the annual production of 700 sets of PBS-950. Of course, we have not yet intended to use this (maximum) productivity. Actual orders were planned to be much smaller. But they didn’t actually take place either.

The first serial batch of PBS-950 in the amount of ten sets was manufactured in the same 1990 directly at the Universal plant and handed over to the Customer. This batch corresponded to the batch of ten BMD-3s previously ordered by VgTZ. In total, MKPK "Universal" manufactured 25 serial sets of PBS-950. At the time the PBS-950 landing equipment was accepted for supply, their production was organized in Kumertau. But soon events in the country made their own adjustments, and serial production of the PBS-950 was transferred to the Taganrog APO.

Despite the extremely unfavorable situation in the Armed Forces, work on the development of the few BMD-3 and PBS-950 in the troops was still carried out, although with a significant delay. The ability to drop the BMD-3 using a PBS-950 with all seven crew members inside the vehicle was tested in 1995 using a piledriver drop. The first landing of the entire crew inside the BMD-3 with PBS-950 took place on August 20, 1998 during a demonstration tactical exercises 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Guards. airborne division. The landing was carried out from an Il-76 aircraft with the participation of military paratroopers: senior lieutenant V.V. Konev, junior sergeants A.S. Ablizina and Z.A. Bilimikhov, Corporal V.V. Sidorenko, privates D.A. Goreva, D.A. Kondratyeva, Z.B. Tonaeva.

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The world's first museum of airborne troops has opened an updated exhibition telling the story parachuting and the secrets of successfully landing people inside fourth-generation BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles.

From September 24 to 26, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta festival was held in Ryazan, one of the stages of which was a visit to the Airborne Forces Museum, located in the former building of the Ryazan Theological Seminary of the early 19th century.

During the war years, under the vaulted ceilings of the ancient mansion there was a hospital, and in 1972, on the initiative of the Airborne Forces commander, General Margelov, a museum dedicated to elite troops. The date of creation of the Airborne Forces is considered to be August 2, 1930, when 12 military pilots simultaneously jumped with a parachute and landed successfully, while retaining their personal weapons. Within a few years, the number of trained military paratroopers in our country exceeded 50 thousand people, who formed the elite of the armed forces.

The world's first parachute backpack was patented by Russian inventor Gleb Kotelnikov in France in 1911. The product was named RK-1 (Russian Kotelnikovsky First). They say that Kotelnikov tested his invention in Paris, throwing a poor Russian student from the Eiffel Tower, who remained alive after landing.

At first, the backpacks were metal and not very comfortable. Superstitious pilots initially refused to use them. However, soon backpacks began to be produced from more practical and plastic materials, saving the lives of pilots and balloon passengers. In the second decade of the twentieth century, a parachute became a mandatory attribute of almost any pilot, while no one in the world came up with a better design than Kotelnikov’s. All subsequent models were only improved replicas of the creation of our inventor.

The museum's exhibition contains unique footage from the 1930s, which shows the first parachutists jumping from the outer hull of the aircraft. Now it’s scary to imagine how paratroopers manage not to fall in flight at an altitude of 350 meters at a speed of 250 kilometers per hour, holding on to a single rope with their hand. Apparently, many accidents occurred with this method of landing. Having hit their heads on the metal body of the plane during a jump, the soldiers lost consciousness in the air. They could not open their parachute in time and crashed. Flight tragedies prompted designers to create mechanisms for forced deployment of parachutes, which subsequently saved many lives.

Ironically, it is with France that the history of not only the parachute is connected, but also the landing of heavy military equipment with the crew inside.

The world's first landing of people inside an airborne combat vehicle (BMD-1) took place on January 5, 1973 at the training ground of the 106th Guards Airborne Division "Slobodka".

To protect the lives of crew members, slightly modified analogues of the Kazbek-D space seats were installed inside the BMD.

The secret to successfully landing people inside BMD lies in the use of special parachute systems. The complex was named "Centaur". Such landing significantly reduced the time it took to bring the vehicle into combat readiness, - said " Rossiyskaya newspaper"representative of the Airborne Forces Museum Vladimir Nemirovsky.

This method of landing greatly increased the combat effectiveness of the army, giving it the ability to land at lightning speed on a given territory and quickly strike.

On the eve of the exercises, the commander of the Airborne Forces, General Margelov, was so confident in the reliability and safety of the vehicle’s design that he wanted to participate in the first descent himself. However, Defense Minister Grechko categorically refused to risk the general. Then inside the car were a teacher of the airborne school, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Zuev, and the son of General Vasily Margelov, Senior Lieutenant Alexander Margelov. The landing was successful. After this, an image of a centaur appeared on the emblem of the Tula Airborne Division.

Many countries dreamed of repeating the unprecedented combat success of the Airborne Forces, but nowhere among the military were there volunteers. The only state that decided to take a similar step was France. As tour guide Vladimir Nemirovsky said, after the military refused to participate in the experiment, the French government distributed an announcement among prisoners sentenced to death, promising the daredevil a presidential pardon.

One condemned man agreed to the adventure. The criminal was placed in a combat vehicle and parachuted from an airplane. The volunteer died during landing. After this, the French President fulfilled his promise by presenting his relatives with a decree pardoning him posthumously. But they decided not to conduct further experiments with landing people inside equipment in France.

Now landings are carried out using vehicles not of the first, but of the fourth generation,” said Nemirovsky.

Thus, this year, tests carried out by the Ministry of Defense at a site near Ryazan confirmed the possibility of landing the BMD-4M from IL-76 aircraft. According to the military department, during the exercises a landing method called a train was used, in which the length of the landing is one and a half times shorter than the length of other methods of lowering the BMD.

Exactly 40 years ago, near Pskov, the Reaktavr parachute rocket system was first successfully tested, allowing personal composition of the Airborne Forces parachute directly into the equipment itself.

On January 23, 1976, near Pskov, the Reaktavr system for landing military equipment with a crew of Major Alexander Margelov and Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Shcherbakov was successfully tested for the first time. After 20 years, both were awarded the title of Hero of Russia for their courage in carrying out a risky task. The Margelov surname turned out to be forever associated with the history of the Airborne Forces.

Gaining time in battle

The system for landing the crew inside an airborne combat vehicle (BMD-1) using jet parachute traction got its name from the words “jet Centaur”. “Centaur” was the name given to the BMD-1 lowering system via a parachute landing platform. The experiment was carried out at the Tula parachute track training center 106th Guards Airborne Division.

No one had ever before thrown military equipment from an airplane along with the personnel inside. The idea belonged to the commander-in-chief of the Airborne Forces, Hero Soviet Union Army General Vasily Margelov.

On that moment airborne equipment in the form of self-propelled artillery units, airborne combat vehicles, vehicles and engineering technology was delivered to the ground in two ways: through parachute landing platforms and parachute-rocket systems. The latter, upon landing, in a fraction of a second damped the rate of descent of heavy loads and automatically released them from the suspension slings. The personnel descended separately by parachute.

But in order to take their places in combat vehicles, in a real battle, crews sometimes need minutes, which the enemy may not provide. How to gain time? Margelov came to a paradoxical conclusion: the personnel must be parachuted in the equipment itself!

Who will sacrifice themselves?

Risk? Yes, huge. Many in the country's military leadership did not approve of this idea. Some of the multi-star generals even twirled their fingers at their temples: they say that the main paratrooper of the USSR had fantasized to the point of the impossible. Others approved the idea in principle, but believed that it was not yet technically feasible.

Finally, brave souls were needed - after all, no one could guarantee that they would not crash upon landing. You cannot give orders in such a matter. This is not a war - just an experiment, albeit a very dangerous one. When asked by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko who will be inside the BMD-1 launch, Vasily Margelov firmly answered that he himself. He could not answer otherwise. He had to do everything to ensure that the airborne troops reached high quality new level combat training.

One of the best

During the Great Patriotic War, paratroopers established themselves as one of the most persistent fighters of the Red Army. They fought back into the interior of the country at the beginning of the war, fought valiantly in the ranks of the defenders of Moscow and Stalingrad, participated in the Battle of Kursk, took part in the capture of Vienna and the battles for Berlin.

But despite the fact that Soviet paratroopers repeatedly carried out airborne operations, in most battles they fought as infantry, albeit highly trained ones. Therefore, after the war, with the advent of the atomic era, the Airborne Forces faced new tasks: to become what is now called rapid reaction troops.

Before 1954 airborne troops The country was alternately led by 7 generals, among whom we can note the first commander of the Airborne Forces, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Glazunov, as well as Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Gorbatov.

Uncle Vasya's troops

However, despite their military merits, the commanders did not stay long in the post of commander-in-chief of the Airborne Forces. As a result, the personnel reshuffle had a negative impact on the combat training of the troops entrusted to them.

The fact that by the 80s of the twentieth century the Airborne Forces had become the most massive and combat-ready among their kind in the world is primarily the merit of the man who led them for many decades - General Margelov.

It is no coincidence that in the airborne forces the abbreviation VDV is still unofficially deciphered as “Uncle Vasya’s troops.” “Our Chapai,” Vasily Filippovich’s subordinates respectfully called him.

Like most previous commanders of the Airborne Forces, Margelov came from other branches of the military, but was quite familiar with the airborne specifics - before his appointment he commanded the 76th Guards Chernigov Red Banner Airborne Division, and then was the commander of the 37th Guards Airborne Svirsky Red Banner Corps.

Paratrooper at 40 years old

It is curious that he made his first parachute jump at the age of 40 - before taking command of the paratroopers. At the same time, he made a bet on several jumps with another newly promoted airborne division commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, General Mikhail Denisenko, who crashed during another parachute jump in 1949. Fate protected Margelov - until the end of his life he made more than 60 air landings.

During the Battle of Moscow, he commanded the 1st Special Ski Regiment of the Marine Corps. Being the commander of the Airborne Forces, Margelov did not forget his brave sailors, introducing a vest into the paratroopers’ uniform as a sign of continuity from one brave branch of troops to another. Another striking feature of the paratrooper was his beret - first crimson (following the example of Western paratroopers), and then blue.

Margelov's reforms included not only changes in uniforms. The new commander of the Airborne Forces abandoned the outdated doctrine of using airborne troops only as a means to hold bridgeheads until the main forces arrived. In modern warfare, passive defense inevitably led to defeat.

New military equipment

Margelov believed that after the drop, the paratroopers should conduct active, offensive actions, not allowing the stunned enemy to come to their senses, and counterattack them. However, in order for the paratroopers to be able to maneuver widely, they needed to be equipped with their own armored vehicles, to increase their firepower and update the aviation fleet.

During the Great Patriotic War, for example, winged infantry fought mainly with light small arms. After the war, the troops began to be equipped with special airborne equipment. By the time Margelov assumed the post of commander, the Airborne Forces consisted of light self-propelled artillery installation ASU-57 with modifications.

Vasily Filippovich gave the task to the military-industrial complex to develop a more modern airborne artillery vehicle. As a result, ASU-57 was replaced by ASU-85, developed on the basis of the PT-76 light amphibious tank. On the battlefield it was required and combat vehicle for the movement of personnel in radioactively contaminated areas. The BMP-1 army infantry fighting vehicle was not suitable for airborne troops due to heavy weight(13 tons) during landing.

"Thunder" of landing vehicles

As a result, at the end of the 60s, the BMD-1 (airborne combat vehicle) was adopted, whose weight was slightly more than 7 tons, the armament was a semi-automatic 2A28 "Thunder" cannon, and the crew consisted of seven people. Based on the BMD-1, they developed artillery self-propelled guns, fire control vehicles, reconnaissance and command post vehicles.

Through the efforts of Margelov, the battered Li-2, Il-14, Tu-2 and Tu-4 aircraft were replaced with powerful and modern An-22 and Il-76, which made it possible to take on board significantly more paratroopers and military equipment than before. “Uncle Vasya” also took care of improving the paratroopers’ personal weapons. Margelov personally met with the developer of the famous assault rifle, Mikhail Kalashnikov, and agreed to create an “airborne” version of the AK, with a folding metal butt.

Son instead of father

After the Minister of Defense did not agree with the participation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Forces in testing the Reactavr system, he offered one of his five sons, Major Alexander Margelov, to the crew. Alexander Vasilyevich was an employee of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Airborne Forces, which was responsible for preparing equipment and personnel for landing.

The personal example of Margelov’s son was supposed to convince the Airborne Forces of the success of the new landing option. Another participant in the experiment was Margelov Jr.’s colleague at the Scientific and Technical Commission of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Shcherbakov.

On January 23, 1976, for the first time, a parachute-propelled landing was carried out from an An-12 BMD-1 military transport aircraft. After landing, the crew immediately fired blank shells briefly, demonstrating their readiness for combat.

During Margelov's tests on command post chain-smoked his favorite "Belomor" and kept a loaded pistol at the ready so that in case of failure he would shoot himself. But everything turned out well.

Sergey Varshavchik.

Gaining time in battle

The system for landing the crew inside an airborne combat vehicle (BMD-1) using jet parachute traction got its name from the words “jet Centaur”. “Centaur” was the name given to the BMD-1 lowering system via a parachute landing platform. The experiment was carried out at the parachute track of the Tula training center of the 106th Guards Airborne Division.

No one had ever before thrown military equipment from an airplane along with the personnel inside. The idea belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Vasily Margelov.

At that time, airborne equipment in the form of self-propelled artillery units, airborne combat vehicles, vehicles and engineering equipment was delivered to the ground in two ways: through parachute landing platforms and parachute-rocket systems. The latter, upon landing, in a fraction of a second damped the rate of descent of heavy loads and automatically released them from the suspension slings. The personnel descended separately by parachute.

Who will sacrifice themselves?

One of the best

But despite the fact that Soviet paratroopers repeatedly carried out airborne operations during the war, in most battles they fought as infantry, albeit highly trained ones. Therefore, after the war, with the advent of the atomic era, the Airborne Forces faced new tasks: to become what is now called rapid reaction troops.

Until 1954, the country's airborne troops were alternately led by 7 generals, among whom we can note the first commander of the Airborne Forces, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Glazunov, as well as Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Gorbatov.

Uncle Vasya's troops

Like most previous commanders of the Airborne Forces, Margelov came from other branches of the military, but was quite familiar with the specifics of the airborne forces - before his appointment he commanded the 76th Guards Chernigov Red Banner Airborne Division, and then was the commander of the 37th Guards Airborne Svirsky Red Banner Corps.

Paratrooper at 40 years old

New military equipment

Margelov believed that after the drop, the paratroopers should conduct active, offensive actions, not allowing the stunned enemy to come to their senses, and counterattack them. However, in order for paratroopers to be able to maneuver widely, they needed to be equipped with their own armored vehicles, increase their firepower and update the aircraft fleet.

During the Great Patriotic War, for example, winged infantry fought mainly with light small arms. After the war, the troops began to be equipped with special airborne equipment. By the time Margelov assumed the post of commander, the Airborne Forces were armed with the ASU-57 light self-propelled artillery mount with modifications.

Vasily Filippovich gave the task to the military-industrial complex to develop a more modern airborne artillery vehicle. As a result, ASU-57 was replaced by ASU-85, developed on the basis of the PT-76 light amphibious tank. On the battlefield, a combat vehicle was also required for the movement of personnel in radioactively contaminated areas. The BMP-1 army infantry fighting vehicle was not suitable for airborne troops due to its heavy weight (13 tons) during landing.

"Thunder" of landing vehicles

As a result, at the end of the 60s, the BMD-1 (airborne combat vehicle) was adopted, whose weight was slightly more than 7 tons, the armament was a semi-automatic 2A28 "Thunder" cannon, and the crew consisted of seven people. Self-propelled artillery guns, fire control vehicles, reconnaissance and command post vehicles were developed on the basis of the BMD-1.

Son instead of father

During the tests, Margelov chain-smoked his favorite Belomor at the command post and kept a loaded pistol ready so that in case of failure he would shoot himself. But everything turned out well.

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