Does a strategic defense initiative currently exist? SDI program: history, “star wars” of the USA. Detection and targeting

On March 23, 1983, President R. Reagan made a televised address to the country from his office in the White House, in which he outlined a breathtakingly fantastic plan for space defense of the US territory from nuclear attacks from the enemy - at that time the Soviet Union. The next day, the New York Post summarized what Reagan had said in an article headlined: “Star Wars Will Destroy the Red Missiles,” and since then the announced Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program has become known around the world as "Star Wars"- after the name of the popular film, the third film of which was released in May 1983.

The essence of Reagan’s speech was that it was necessary to abandon mutually assured destruction and move to a new format for ensuring national and world security - placing defense systems in space.

Reagan's speech was a surprise to everyone– for the Americans, for the American allies, for Moscow, and in general for the whole world. Moreover, it came as a surprise even to Reagan's own cabinet, including Secretary of State Shultz and the leadership of the Department of Defense. This entire topic of space defense was not previously considered by the American government and its departments. It was not the military and diplomats who imposed this topic on Reagan, but on the contrary, he imposed it on them.

According to his closest collaborators, Reagan saw a threat for many years, even before becoming president. national security The United States was aware of the presence of nuclear weapons and was looking for options for reducing dependence on them and even their complete elimination. In particular, he was greatly impressed by his visit in 1979, as part of the election campaign, to the North American Aerospace Defense Command Center NORAD in Colorado Springs. During the orientation tour, Reagan asked what would happen to Cheyenne Mountain, where the Center was located, if it was hit by a heavy Soviet missile, to which the general accompanying him replied: “It will blow it to hell.” Reagan was then struck by the discrepancy between the scale and level of sophistication of military technology and the level of protection of the country from nuclear destruction - it was not protected, everything rested on the supposed agreement of both parties - the USA and the USSR - that they would both refrain from a nuclear strike, fearing retaliatory destruction. But it was just a concept, nothing more - not formally approved by anyone and never discussed at any negotiations.

Having already become president, Reagan since January 1982 began with his questions and his interest to stimulate discussion of previously disparate military-technical ideas and options. He began discussing with military and scientific and technical specialists the idea of ​​destroying ballistic missiles after they were launched from launch positions on almost any part of their flight path. Reagan asked the question: if it is possible to detect the launch of a rocket from a satellite, is it really impossible to destroy it within a short time of the launch field? The answer was to place anti-missile systems in space and supplement them with ground and air systems. Many of these systems were based on the use of fundamentally new technical solutions, such as electromagnetic and laser guns. It was also planned to place many new satellites, optical reflectors, and interceptors in space.

Autumn 1982 the leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (analogous to the Soviet General Staff) presented the president with a review report on space defense, which brought together previously expressed ideas and proposals. But the Committee could not have imagined that the president would soon publicly declare space defense a military-political priority of his administration.

The emergence of such weapons systems broke the logic of the concept of mutually assured destruction on which the post-war world was based. Reagan himself viewed SDI as a defensive program in nature and, moreover, was ready to later involve Soviet Union, thereby forcing it to eliminate its nuclear potential.

However, theoretically, it was possible to strike at the enemy and then repel his retaliatory strike, which violated the existing security system in the world. By the way, this is precisely why, having begun negotiations on strategic arms limitation (SALT) in 1971, the United States and the USSR simultaneously limited missile defense systems - missile defense - that could repel or mitigate a retaliatory nuclear strike.

To work on the program, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was created within the US Department of Defense.

Despite all the authority of Reagan, his the SDI program met with strong resistance from the very beginning in Washington itself, which, in the end, buried this program. Democratic progressives (in particular, Senators T. Kennedy and J. Kerry, who became Secretary of State under Obama) pointed out the danger of undermining the concept of mutual assured destruction, which, according to them, only increased the threat of a nuclear conflict. The US State Department and Department of Defense believed that this program was technically unrealizable, and in addition violated the ABM Treaty with the USSR and the Outer Space Treaty. US allies feared that if implemented, SDI would “disconnect” the joint defense system of the United States and Western Europe.

The Soviet Union immediately accused Washington in attempts to create for oneself unilaterally strategic advantage and achieve military superiority over the USSR. Initially, Moscow's reaction was mainly of a propaganda nature - everything that came from Washington was condemned. Moscow believed that the SDI program was designed to intimidate the Soviet Union and put pressure on it in disarmament negotiations, which by that time had reached a dead end. It is also important that Reagan made the announcement of the start of the SDI program just 2 weeks after he called the USSR in a conversation with American evangelical preachers "evil empire".

However, after some time, as the Americans began to methodically work on SDI, Soviet assessments of the prospects for this program became increasingly alarmist - the USSR understood that America has the scientific, technical, production and financial potential to implement everything that what was stated. Likewise, the USSR understood that they would not be able to oppose the United States with anything similar, although they themselves carried out certain developments on placing weapons in space. In Moscow, SDI generally began to be presented in an even more fantastic form than its authors themselves - they say, the Americans are planning to deploy battle stations in space similar to those depicted in “Star Wars” for attacks on the USSR.

The total costs of SDI deployment were estimated at approximately $150 billion ($400 billion in 2017 prices).

With Reagan's resignation from the presidency in early 1989, the SDI program gradually faded away., and in May 1993 B. Clinton actually closed it, although some promising scientific and technical work continued. The United States spent about $40 billion on it from 1984 to 1993 ($100 billion in 2017).

It is quite difficult to present the SDI program as whole system in military-technical terms

• rather, it is a sketch of possible solutions. There were various variants of SOI depending on the degree of development of its various component systems.

The influence of this program on Soviet-American relations should neither be underestimated nor, at the same time, overestimated. SDI convinced the Soviet military-political leadership of the futility of the arms race - the USSR (even before Gorbachev) returned to the table of disarmament negotiations interrupted by Andropov, and began to discuss the option of a real reduction, and not limitation, as before, of nuclear weapons. Having come to power in March 1985, Gorbachev made no secret of the fact that he did not believe in the feasibility of SDI, and called on the Soviet military not to frighten themselves with this program. He considered it necessary to normalize Soviet-American relations and reduce armaments even without SDI However, in subsequent negotiations he linked the reductions to the US abandonment of SDI.

Konstantin Bogdanov, RIA Novosti columnist.

Thirty years ago, US President Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as the Star Wars program. The project turned out to be largely inflated, the declared results were never achieved.

The United States has not created a multi-layered missile defense umbrella. However, this did not make the Soviet Union any easier: the burden of military expenditures and structural imbalances in industry were confidently leading the country towards a crisis.

The Soviet "defense" industry lived in abundance: the country's leadership gave almost everything it asked for in those areas that seriously worried higher spheres Central Committee. By 1988, up to 75% of all R&D expenditures in the USSR were carried out within the framework of defense issues.

Let us refer to the opinion of Anatoly Basistov, designer of the Moscow A-135 missile defense system. In the late 1970s, the Central Committee asked him whether it was possible to create a reliable system for repelling a massive nuclear missile attack. And then, according to Basistov’s recollections, he realized one thing: if the designer now answers the party “yes, it’s possible,” they will lay out any requested resources directly on his table for experiments to solve this problem.

That time Basistov said “no, you can’t.” But the industry mechanism could no longer be altered; it worked according to its own laws. Moreover, the Americans say - you can...

And, most importantly, the ivory tower, inside which at the end of the 1980s at least ten million people constantly worked (not counting those occasionally fed from military programs under treaties) - the most ordinary, but very well paid people - created a sense of stability. That this is how it should be in the future.

And the reasons for this became increasingly elusive.

Golden locksmiths of a poor country

The last head of Soviet foreign intelligence, Leonid Shebarshin, recalled how they, the top leadership of the KGB, at the end of perestroika, were sent to meetings with workers of large factories. Shebarshin arrived at the Moscow aircraft manufacturing plant "Znamya Truda" - the leading enterprise in the MiG cooperation.

“How much do you get, Comrade General?” — they asked venomously from the audience after the performance. “1300 rubles,” Shebarshin admitted honestly. After some excitement, a voice was heard from the gallery: “Yes, our mechanic can earn so much”...

Yuri Yaremenko, director of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting since the late 1980s, describing this situation, noted that the main “damage” from the Soviet “defense industry” of the 1980s was not even in the money that went into it. The military-industrial complex took upon itself all the best that the poor country had. First of all, qualified personnel, but he also claimed high-quality materials and demanded the most advanced equipment and technologies.

In second place in the system of priorities were the needs of raw materials and energy workers. The civil engineering and consumer goods industry got leftovers: from people - whom the military did not take, from equipment - what they managed to knock out, materials - well, take what you have... This did not slow down the impact on the quality of products, as well as on the worsening lag in the technological level of industry from West and Japan.

Provide transfer high technology Soviet defense engineering was not allowed into the civilian sector not only by the deep-rooted feudal logic of the directorate, which was accustomed, under the pretext of solving problems of national importance, to “cut down” isolated domains of cooperation for itself and sit on them as sovereign barons, responsible only to the heads of the relevant ministries and the party. The fact is that the central leadership and the party also did not want to hear anything.

The same Yaremenko recalled that holistic programs to reduce military spending with a simultaneous well-thought-out conversion of high-tech defense capabilities and trained personnel for the mass production of civilian durable goods (high-quality household appliances, simply put) have been moving upward since the first half of the 1980s. There they were pointedly ignored... and then more and more resources were allocated to the military-industrial complex.

Defense directors took programs for the production of civilian products at their enterprises “as a load”, but did not see them as a priority and worked with them on a residual basis. Military programs paid better and were of more interest to them.

The icon of the domestic defense industry, Yuri Dmitrievich Maslyukov, a man who did a lot of good for the industry of the USSR and for the Russian economy, - and in 1987, according to Yaremenko, he said that talk about excessive allocation of resources to military production is empty, because the Soviet "defense industry" lagged behind and, on the contrary, requires additional injections.

This was said by the head of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers - the chief of staff of the "nine" defense ministries, the main sectoral coordinator and responsible for determining the directions of work on defense issues. Next year, without leaving this position, Maslyukov will become the head of the entire Soviet State Planning Committee...

“In general, it burst”...

What kind of SDI is that? The Waste Effect of Countering False SDI Threats - mosquito bite against the backdrop of a resource-consuming flywheel, accelerated in the second half of the 1970s by the joint efforts of the defense complex and another icon of the military-industrial complex, former secretary Central Committee for Defense Issues, Minister of War Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov.

So Reagan had little knowledge of the Soviet directorate and the leadership of the Nine. Even if the SDI program had not been proclaimed, it would have been invented in one way or another.

The essence of the economic catastrophe of the USSR lay not in oil, not in SDI, and not in the Americans. Not in “traitors to the motherland”, “young reformers”, “Judas Gorbachev and Yeltsin”, etc. The problem was that a huge self-enclosed sector had formed in the economy, accustomed to pulling the blanket over itself and demanding more, more, more...

It had to be carefully opened, a significant part of its enormous capabilities should be smoothly transferred to meet the daily needs of the entire country. But those who understood the big picture—the leaders of the military-industrial complex from factories through ministries to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee—were silent. Because they were happy with everything, and they didn’t want to fight their way through the interdepartmental squabbling during the structural restructuring of the economy. Was there such a possibility?

And no one wanted to make decisions in the system of collective irresponsibility that developed in the late USSR. And everyone was afraid of a new round of the Cold War, so they maneuvered between the harsh pressure of Washington, who “smelled blood” at the disarmament negotiations, and the joint request of their own directorate - they gave in, dodged, and shelved it.

As a result, if we use military analogies, instead of careful demining of the “defense” industry, it turned out to be liquidation by demolition, which destroyed not only the military-industrial complex, but the entire Soviet economy in general - along with the country.

Reagan could record victory for himself. And who cares if it’s completely undeserved?

The successful launch of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, the R-7, in August 1957, initiated a number of military programs in both powers. The United States, immediately after receiving intelligence information about the new Russian missile, began creating an aerospace defense system for the North American continent and developing the first Nike-Zeus anti-missile system, equipped with anti-missiles with nuclear warheads (I already wrote about it in Chapter 13).

The use of an anti-missile with a thermonuclear charge significantly reduced the requirement for guidance accuracy.

It was assumed that the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion of an anti-missile would make it possible to neutralize the warhead of a ballistic missile, even if it was two to three kilometers away from the epicenter. In 1962, in order to determine the influence of damaging factors, the Americans conducted a series of test nuclear explosions at high altitudes, but soon work on the Nike-Zeus system was stopped.

However, in 1963, development of the next generation missile defense system, Nike-X, began. It was necessary to create an anti-missile system that would be capable of providing protection against Soviet missiles for an entire area, and not for a single object. To destroy enemy warheads at distant approaches, the Spartan missile was developed with a flight range of 650 kilometers, equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 1 megaton. A charge of such enormous power was supposed to create in space a zone of guaranteed destruction of several warheads and possible decoys.

Testing of this anti-missile began in 1968 and lasted three years. In case some of the warheads of enemy missiles penetrate the space protected by Spartan missiles, the missile defense system included complexes with shorter-range Sprint interceptor missiles. The Sprint anti-missile missile was supposed to be used as the main means of protecting a limited number of objects. It was supposed to hit targets at altitudes of up to 50 kilometers.

The authors of American missile defense projects of the 60s considered only powerful nuclear charges to be a real means of destroying enemy warheads. But the abundance of anti-missiles equipped with them did not guarantee the protection of all protected areas, and if they were used, they threatened to cause radioactive contamination of the entire US territory.

In 1967, development of the zonal limited missile defense system “Sentinel” began. Its kit included the same “Spartan”, “Sprint” and two RAS: “PAR” and “MSR”. By this time, the concept of missile defense not of cities and industrial zones, but of strategic base areas, began to gain strength in the United States. nuclear forces and the National Center for their management. The Sentinel system was urgently renamed “Safeguard” and modified in accordance with the specifics of solving new problems.

The first complex of the new missile defense system (of the planned twelve) was deployed at the Grand Forks missile base.

However, some time later, by decision of the American Congress, this work was stopped as insufficiently effective, and the built missile defense system was mothballed.

The USSR and the USA sat down at the negotiating table on limiting missile defense systems, which led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and the signing of its protocol in 1974.

It would seem that the problem is settled. But it was not there…

Star Wars: Birth of a Myth

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, addressing his compatriots, said:

“I know you all want peace. I want it too.[...] I appeal to the scientific community of our country, to those who gave us nuclear weapons, with an appeal to use their great talents for the benefit of humanity and world peace and to put at our disposal the means that would make nuclear weapons useless and outdated. Today, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I am taking an important first step.

I am directing the commencement of a comprehensive and vigorous effort to define the content of a long-term research and development program that will begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from strategic missiles with nuclear charges.

This could pave the way for arms control measures that would lead to the complete destruction of the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only goal - and it is shared by the entire nation - is to find ways to reduce the danger nuclear war».

Not everyone understood then that the president was upending the ideas that had been established for almost two decades about ways to prevent nuclear war and ensure a stable world, the symbol and basis of which was the ABM Treaty.

What happened? What changed Washington's attitude toward missile defense so dramatically?

Let's go back to the 60s. This is how the famous columnist for the American Time magazine S. Talbot described the way of thinking that the American military-political leadership adhered to in those years regarding the ABM Treaty: “At that time, to some observers, the agreement reached seemed somewhat strange. Indeed, the two superpowers were making a solemn commitment not to defend themselves. In reality, however, they reduced the possibility of attacking each other. The ABM Treaty was an important achievement. […] If one of the parties is able to protect itself from the threat of a nuclear strike, it receives an incentive to spread its geopolitical weight to other areas, and the other side is forced to create new, better models of offensive weapons and at the same time improve its defense. Therefore, the proliferation of defensive weapons is as much anathema to arms control as the proliferation of offensive weapons. […] Missile defense is “destabilizing” for a number of reasons: it stimulates competition in the field of defensive weapons, with each side seeking to equal, and perhaps even surpass, the other side in the field of missile defense; it stimulates competition in the field of offensive weapons, with each side seeking to be able to “overcome” the other side’s missile defense system; Missile defense may finally lead to illusory or even real overall strategic superiority.”

Talbot was not a military specialist, otherwise he would not have missed another consideration that guided the parties when deciding to limit missile defense systems.

No matter how strong a missile defense system is, it cannot become completely impenetrable. In reality, missile defense is designed for a certain number of warheads and decoys launched by the other side. Therefore, missile defense is more effective against a retaliatory strike by the other side, when a significant, and perhaps the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s strategic nuclear forces have already been destroyed as a result of the first disarming strike. Thus, with the presence of large missile defense systems, each of the opposing sides, in the event of a confrontation that heats up, has an additional incentive to launch a nuclear attack first.

Finally, a new round of the arms race means new burdensome expenditures on resources, of which humanity is becoming increasingly scarce.

It is unlikely that those who prepared Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983, did not analyze everything Negative consequences declared program. What prompted them to such an unwise decision? They say that the initiator of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program is the main creator of the American thermonuclear bomb Teller, who had known Reagan since the mid-60s and had always been an opponent of the ABM Treaty and any agreements that limited the ability of the United States to build up and improve its military-strategic potential.

At the meeting with Reagan, Teller spoke not only on his own behalf. He relied on the powerful support of the US military-industrial complex. Concerns that the SDI program might initiate a similar Soviet program were dismissed: the USSR would find it difficult to accept a new American challenge, especially in the face of already emerging economic difficulties. If the Soviet Union did decide to do this, then, as Teller reasoned, it would most likely be limited, and the United States would be able to acquire the much-desired military superiority. Of course, SDI is unlikely to ensure complete impunity for the United States in the event of a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike, but it will give Washington additional confidence when carrying out military-political actions abroad. Politicians also saw another aspect in this - the creation of new colossal loads for the USSR economy, which would further complicate the growing social problems and reduce the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for developing countries. The game seemed tempting.

The president's speech was timed to coincide with debates in Congress on the military budget for the next fiscal year. As House Speaker O'Neill noted, it was not about national security at all, but about the military budget. Senator Kennedy called the speech “reckless Star Wars plans.” (It seems that the senator hit the nail on the head: since then, in the United States, Reagan’s speech has been known only as “ no one called it a "star wars plan." They tell of a curious incident that occurred at one of the press conferences at the Foreign Press Center at the National Press Club in Washington: the presenter, who introduced Lieutenant General Abrahamson (director of the SDI Implementation Organization) to reporters, joked: "Whoever avoids using the words 'star wars' when asking the general a question will win a prize."

There were no contenders for the prize - everyone preferred to say “Star Wars Program” instead of “SDI.”) Nevertheless, in early June 1983, Reagan established three expert commissions that were supposed to assess the technical feasibility of the idea he expressed. Of the materials prepared, the most famous is the report of the Fletcher Commission. She concluded that, despite major unresolved technical problems, the technological advances of the last twenty years in relation to the problem of creating missile defense look promising. The commission proposed a scheme for a layered defense system based on the latest military technologies. Each echelon of this system is designed to intercept missile warheads at various stages of their flight. The commission recommended starting a research and development program with the goal of culminating in the early 1990s with the demonstration of basic missile defense technologies.

Then, based on the results obtained, decide whether to continue or close work on creating a large-scale ballistic missile defense system.

The next step towards the implementation of SDI was Presidential Directive No. 119, which appeared at the end of 1983. It marked the beginning of scientific research and development that would answer the question of whether it was possible to create new space-based weapons systems or any other defensive means, capable of repelling a nuclear attack on the United States.

SOI program

As it quickly became clear, the allocations for SDI provided for in the budget could not ensure a successful solution to the ambitious tasks assigned to the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program over the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires expenditures ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo named an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSIOI) began its activities. It represented the central apparatus of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. The central office of the OOSOI employed about 100 people. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, controlled the preparation and execution of the budget, selected performers of specific work, and maintained day-to-day contacts with the US Presidential Administration, Congress, and other executive and legislative bodies.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the OOSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, acquisition and tracking of targets; creation of technical means that use the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means that use the effect of kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of system components, energy supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like as a first approximation?

The performance criteria after two to three years of work under the SOI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, the defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems they must sufficiently perform their task even in the conditions of a number of serious blows being applied to them, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Thirdly, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy’s confidence in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The SOI program strategy included investment in a technology base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first phase of SOI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the subsequent phase of the system. This distribution into stages, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the further introduction of promising technologies, such as directed energy weapons, although initially the authors of the project considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 80s, elements of the first-stage system were considered such as a space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; extra-atmospheric interception missiles (ERIS); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: beam weapon space-based, based on the use of neutral particles; Upper Atmospheric Interdiction (HEDI) missiles; an on-board optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based radar (“GBR”), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets in the final part of their flight path; a space-based laser system designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based gun with projectile acceleration to hypersonic speeds (“HVG”); ground-based laser system for destroying ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the SDI structure envisioned the system as multi-tiered, capable of intercepting missiles during three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight path), the middle part of the flight path, which mainly accounts for the flight in space after how the warheads and decoys are separated from the missiles, and in the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on the downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads of multi-shot ICBMs had not yet separated from the missile, and they could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI Directorate, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main meaning of “Star Wars.”

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically cut down (reductions to 40–50% annually) the administration’s requests for project implementation, the authors of the program transferred its individual elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced , and some disappeared completely.

Nevertheless, the most developed among other projects of the SDI program were ground-based and space-based non-nuclear missile defenses, which allows us to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the currently created missile defense system of the country.

Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the extra-atmospheric region, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide surveillance and tracking missions on the final part of the trajectory.

The least advanced projects were directed energy weapons, which combine research into four basic concepts considered promising for multi-echelon defense, including ground- and space-based lasers, space-based accelerator (beam) weapons, and directed energy nuclear weapons.

Projects related to a complex solution to a problem can be classified as work that is almost at the initial stage.

For a number of projects, only problems that remain to be solved have been identified. This includes projects to create nuclear power plants based in space and with a capacity of 100 kW with an extension of power up to several megawatts.

The SOI program also required an inexpensive, universally applicable aircraft capable of launching a payload weighing 4,500 kilograms and a crew of two into polar orbit. OOSOI required firms to analyze three concepts: a vehicle with vertical launch and landing, a vehicle with vertical launch and horizontal landing, and a vehicle with horizontal launch and landing.

As announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the Delta Clipper project with vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas. The layout resembled a greatly enlarged Mercury capsule.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project was implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing almost exponentially of allocations for these purposes. On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the termination of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions of the Democratic administration since it came to power.

Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the irretrievable loss of the United States as its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. They say that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and out of fear they lost the Cold War, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the country's top leadership, took on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists under the leadership of Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington “is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons.” powerless and outdated,” to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other areas of the world.” Moreover, the Soviet Union had long been developing its own missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SOI program.

Soviet missile defense system

In the Soviet Union, attention began to be paid to the problem of missile defense immediately after the end of World War II. In the early 50s, the first studies of the possibility of creating missile defense systems were carried out at NII-4 of the USSR Ministry of Defense and at NII-885, which were involved in the development and use of ballistic missiles. In these works, schemes were proposed for equipping anti-missile missiles with two types of guidance systems. For tele-controlled anti-missiles, a fragmentation warhead with low-speed fragments and a circular destruction field was proposed.

For homing anti-missiles, it was proposed to use a directional warhead, which, together with the missile, was supposed to turn towards the target and explode according to information from the homing head, creating the greatest density of the fragment field in the direction of the target.

One of the first projects for the country's global missile defense was proposed by Vladimir Chelomey.

In 1963, he proposed using the UR-100 intercontinental missiles developed at his OKB-52 to create the Taran missile defense system. The proposal was approved and by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 3, 1963, the development of a project for the Taran missile defense system was set for intercepting ballistic missiles in the transatmospheric section of the trajectory.

The system was supposed to use the UR-100 (8K84) missile in the anti-missile version with a super-powerful thermonuclear warhead with a yield of at least 10 megatons.

Its dimensions: length - 16.8 meters, diameter - 2 meters, launch weight - 42.3 tons, weight of the head part - 800 kilograms.

The anti-missile missile would be able to hit targets at altitudes of about 700 kilometers, the range of hitting the target would be up to 2,000 thousand kilometers. Probably, to guarantee the destruction of all targets, it was necessary to deploy several hundred launchers with anti-missile systems of the Taran system.

A feature of the system was the lack of correction of the UR-100 anti-missile missile during flight, which would be ensured by accurate target designation of the radar.

The new system was to use radar equipment of the Danube-3 system, as well as the TsSO-S multi-channel radar, located 500 kilometers from Moscow towards Leningrad. According to the data of this radar, operating in the wavelength range from 30 to 40 centimeters, it was supposed to detect enemy missiles and prolong the coordinates of interception points and the moment of target arrival at these points. The TsSO-S station was turned on by signals from the missile attack warning system nodes RO-1 (city of Murmansk) and RO-2 (city of Riga).

In 1964, work on the Taran system was stopped - the resignation of Nikita Khrushchev played a significant role in the history of the creation of this system. However, Vladimir Chelomey himself later admitted that he abandoned the Taran system due to the vulnerability of the long-range radar detection system, which was a key link in his system.

In addition, the anti-missile missile required a launch accelerator - a similar ballistic missile is not suitable as an anti-missile missile due to limitations in speed and maneuverability with a strict time limit for intercepting a target.

Others have achieved success. In 1955, Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, chief designer of SKB-30 (a structural unit of a large organization for SB-1 missile systems), prepared proposals for the test site experimental missile defense system “A”.

Calculations of the effectiveness of anti-missiles carried out in SB-1 showed that with the existing guidance accuracy, the defeat of one ballistic missile is ensured by the use of 8-10 anti-missiles, which made the system ineffective.

Therefore, Kisunko proposed using a new method for determining the coordinates of a high-speed ballistic target and an anti-missile missile - triangulation, that is, determining the coordinates of an object by measuring the distance to it from radars spaced at a large distance from each other and located in the corners of an equilateral triangle.

In March 1956, SKB-30 produced a preliminary design of the “A” anti-missile system.

The system included the following elements: Danube-2 radars with a target detection range of 1200 kilometers, three radars for precise guidance of anti-missile missiles at the target, a launch site with launchers of two-stage anti-missile missiles "V-1000", the main command and computing center of the system with a lamp-based computer "M-40" and radio relay communication lines between all means of the system.

The decision to build the tenth state test site for the needs of the country's air defense was made on April 1, 1956, and in May a State Commission was created under the leadership of Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky to select its location, and already in June, military builders began creating a test site in the Betpak desert. Dala.

The first operation of the “A” system to intercept the R-5 ballistic missile with an anti-missile missile was successful on November 24, 1960, while the anti-missile was not equipped with a warhead. Then followed a whole series of tests, some of which ended unsuccessfully.

The main test took place on March 4, 1961. On that day, an anti-missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the head of an R-12 ballistic missile launched from the State Central Test Site. The anti-missile warhead consisted of 16 thousand balls with a tungsten carbide core, TNT filling and a steel shell.

Successful test results of the “A” system made it possible by June 1961 to complete the development of the preliminary design of the “A-35” missile defense combat system, designed to protect Moscow from American intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The combat system was supposed to include a command post, eight sectoral RAS "Danube-3" and 32 firing systems. It was planned to complete the deployment of the system by 1967 - the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Subsequently, the project underwent changes, but in 1966 the system was still almost completely ready for combat duty.

In 1973, general designer Grigory Kisunko substantiated the main technical solutions for a modernized system capable of hitting complex ballistic targets. The A-35 system was given a combat mission to intercept a single, but complex multi-element target, containing, along with warheads, light (inflatable) and heavy decoys, which required significant modifications to the system’s computer center.

This was the last refinement and modernization of the A-35 system, which ended in 1977 with the presentation to the State Commission of the new A-35M missile defense system.

The A-35M system was withdrawn from service in 1983, although its capabilities allowed it to carry out combat duty until 2004.

Project "Terra-3"

In addition to the creation of traditional missile defense systems, the Soviet Union conducted research on the development of a completely new type of missile defense systems. Many of these developments are still not completed and are already the property of modern Russia.

Among them, the Terra-3 project stands out first, aimed at creating a powerful ground-based laser system capable of destroying enemy objects at orbital and suborbital altitudes. Work on the project was carried out by the Vympel Design Bureau, and from the late 60s a special testing position was built at the Sary-Shagan test site.

The experimental laser installation consisted of the lasers themselves (ruby and gas), a beam guidance and retention system, information complex, designed to ensure the functioning of the guidance system, as well as the high-precision laser locator "LE-1", designed to accurately determine the coordinates of the target. The capabilities of the LE-1 made it possible not only to determine the range to the target, but also to obtain accurate characteristics of its trajectory, object shape and size.

In the mid-1980s, tests were carried out at the Terra-3 complex laser weapons, which also involved shooting at flying targets. Unfortunately, these experiments showed that the laser beam was not powerful enough to destroy ballistic missile warheads.

In 1981, the United States launched the first space shuttle, the Space Shuttle. Naturally, this attracted the attention of the USSR government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. In the fall of 1983, Marshal Dmitry Ustinov proposed to the commander of the Missile Defense Forces, Votintsev, to use a laser system to accompany the Shuttle. And on October 10, 1984, during the thirteenth flight of the Challenger shuttle, when its orbits passed in the area of ​​test site “A”, the experiment took place with the laser system operating in detection mode with minimal radiation power. The altitude of the spacecraft's orbit at that time was 365 kilometers. As the Challenger crew later reported, while flying over the Balkhash region, the ship’s communications suddenly went out, malfunctions occurred in the equipment, and the astronauts themselves felt unwell. The Americans began to figure it out. They soon realized that the crew had been subjected to some kind of artificial influence from the USSR, and they filed an official protest.

Currently, the Terra-3 complex is abandoned and rusting - Kazakhstan was unable to raise this object.

Background program

In the early 70s, research and development work was carried out in the USSR under the “Fon” program with the aim of creating a promising missile defense system. The essence of the program was to create a system that would make it possible to keep all American nuclear warheads on target, including even those based on submarines and bombers. The system was supposed to be based in space and hit American nuclear missiles before they launched.

Work on the technical project was carried out at the direction of Marshal Dmitry Ustinov at NPO Kometa.

At the end of the 70s, the Fon-1 program was launched, which provided for the creation of various types of beam weapons, electromagnetic guns, anti-missiles, including multi-charge ones with submunitions, and a multiple launch rocket system. However, soon many designers at one of the meetings decided to curtail the work, since, in their opinion, the program had no prospects: at the Kometa Central Research Institute, as a result of work on the Fon program, they came to the conclusion that destroying the entire US nuclear potential at all types of carriers (10 thousand charges) in 20–25 minutes of flight time is impossible.

Since 1983, the implementation of the Fon-2 program was launched. The program provided for in-depth research into the use of alternative means capable of neutralizing American SDI with “non-lethal weapons”: electromagnetic pulse, instantly disrupting the operation of electronic equipment, exposure to lasers, powerful microwave field changes, and so on. As a result, some quite interesting developments have emerged.

Airborne missile defense system

From 1983 to 1987, as part of the Terra-3 project, tests were carried out of a laser system weighing about 60 tons, installed on the Il-76MD (A-60) USSR-86879 flying laboratory.

To power the laser and related equipment, additional turbogenerators were installed in the fairings on the sides of the fuselage, as on the Il-76PP.

The standard weather radar was replaced with a bulb-shaped fairing on a special adapter, to which a smaller oblong fairing was attached below. Obviously, there was an antenna for the aiming system, which turned in any direction, catching the target. From the extensive glazing of the navigation cabin, only two windows on each side remained.

In order not to spoil the aerodynamics of the aircraft with another fairing, the optical head of the laser was made retractable.

The top of the fuselage between the wing and fin was cut out and replaced with huge doors consisting of several segments.

They were removed inside the fuselage, and then a turret with a cannon climbed up.

Behind the wing there were fairings protruding beyond the contour of the fuselage with a profile similar to that of the wing. The cargo ramp was retained, but the cargo hatch doors were removed and the hatch was sealed with metal.

The modification of the aircraft was carried out by the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex named after Beriev and the Taganrog Machine-Building Plant named after Georgiy Dimitrov, which produced the A-50 and Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft. Nothing is known about the progress of tests of the domestic combat laser, since they remain top secret.

After the testing program, the A-60 laboratory was located at the Chkalovsky airfield, where it burned down in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this project can be revived if the need suddenly arises...

Ground-based laser missile defense

A mobile laser complex for destroying enemy satellites and ballistic missiles was created through the efforts of the design team of the Troitsk Institute of Innovation and Thermonuclear Research (Moscow region).

The basis of the complex is a carbon laser with a power of 1 MW. The complex is based on two platform modules created from serial trailers from the Chelyabinsk plant. The first platform houses a laser radiation generator, which includes an optical resonator unit and a gas-discharge chamber. The beam formation and guidance system is also installed here. Nearby there is a control cabin, from where software or manual guidance and focusing is carried out. On the second platform there are elements of the gas-dynamic path: the R29-300 aviation turbojet engine, which has exhausted its flight life, but is still capable of serving as an energy source; ejectors, exhaust and noise suppression devices, a container for liquefied carbon dioxide, a fuel tank with aviation kerosene.

Each platform is equipped with its own KrAZ tractor and is transported to almost any place where it can go.

When it became clear that this complex would not be used as a weapon, a team of specialists from the Trinity Institute, together with colleagues from the NPO Almaz, the Efremov Scientific Research Institute of Electrophysical Equipment and the State Implementation Small Enterprise Conversion, developed on its basis the laser technological complex MLTK-50 " This complex showed excellent results when extinguishing a fire at a gas well in Karachaevsk, breaking up a rock mass, decontaminating the surface of concrete at a nuclear power plant using the peeling method, burning off an oil film on the surface of a water area, and even destroying hordes of locusts.

Plasma missile defense system

Another interesting development is related to the creation of plasma missile defense capable of hitting targets at altitudes of up to 50 kilometers.

The operation of this system is based on long-standing known effect.

It turns out that plasma can be accelerated along two, usually quite long, busbars - current conductors, which are parallel wires or plates.

The plasma clot closes the electrical circuit between the conductors, and an external magnetic field acts perpendicular to the bus plane. The plasma accelerates and flows from the ends of the tires in the same way as a metal conductor sliding along the tires would accelerate. Depending on the conditions, the outflow can occur in different ways: in the form of a strongly expanding torch, jets, or in the form of successive plasma toroid rings - the so-called plasmoids.

The accelerator is called in this case a plasmoid gun; Plasma is typically formed from consumable electrode material. Plasmoids resemble smoke rings released by skilled smokers, but they fly in the air not flat, but sideways, at speeds of tens and hundreds of kilometers per second. Each plasmoid is a ring of plasma contracted by a magnetic field with a current flowing in it and is formed as a result of the expansion of a current loop under the influence of its own magnetic field, sometimes amplified with the help of jumpers - metal plates in electrical circuit.

The first plasma gun in our country was built by the Leningrad professor Babat back in 1941. Currently, research in this area is being conducted at the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation under the leadership of Academician Rimilius Avramenko. Plasma weapons have practically been created there, capable of hitting any targets at altitudes up to 50 kilometers.

According to the academician, plasma missile defense weapons will not only cost several orders of magnitude cheaper than the American missile defense system, but will also be much easier to create and operate.

A plasmoid, directed by ground-based missile defense systems, creates an ionized area in front of the flying warhead and completely disrupts the aerodynamics of the object’s flight, after which the target leaves the trajectory and is destroyed by monstrous overloads. In this case, the damaging factor is delivered to the target at the speed of light.

In 1995, specialists from the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation developed the concept of the international experiment “Trust” for testing plasma weapons jointly with the United States at the American Kwajelein anti-missile test site.

Project "Trust" consisted of conducting an experiment with a plasma weapon that could hit any object moving in the Earth's atmosphere. This is done on the basis of an already existing technological base, without launching any components into space. The cost of the experiment is estimated at $300 million.

US National Missile Defense System (NMD)

The ABM Treaty no longer exists. On December 13, 2001, US President George W. Bush notified Russian President Vladimir Putin of his unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. The decision was related to the Pentagon's plans to conduct new tests of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system no later than six months later in order to protect against attacks from the so-called “rogue countries.” Before that, the Pentagon had already conducted five successful tests of a new anti-missile missile capable of hitting Minuteman-2 class intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The days of SDI are back. America is once again sacrificing its reputation on the world stage and spending colossal amounts of money in pursuit of the illusory hope of obtaining a missile defense “umbrella” that will protect it from threats from the sky. The pointlessness of this idea is obvious. After all, the same claims can be made against NMD systems as against SDI systems. They do not provide a 100% guarantee of security, but they can create the illusion of it.

And there is nothing more dangerous to health and life itself than the illusion of safety...

The US NMD system, according to the plans of its creators, will include several elements: ground-based missile interceptors (“Ground leased Interceptor”), a combat management system (“Battle Management/Command, Control, Communication”), high-frequency missile defense radars (“Ground Based”) Radiolocator"), missile attack warning system radar (MAWS), high-frequency missile defense radars ("Brilliant Eyes") and a constellation of SBIRS satellites.

Ground-based missile interceptors or anti-missile defenses are the main missile defense weapons. They destroy ballistic missile warheads outside the Earth's atmosphere.

The combat control system is a kind of brain of the missile defense system. In the event of missiles being launched across the United States, it will be the one that will control the interception.

Ground-based high-frequency missile defense radars track the flight path of the missile and warhead. They send the received information to the combat control system. The latter, in turn, gives commands to the interceptors.

The SBIRS satellite constellation is a two-echelon satellite system that will play a key role in the control system of the NMD complex. The upper echelon - space - in the project includes 4-6 satellites for the missile attack warning system. The low-altitude echelon consists of 24 satellites located at a distance of 800-1200 kilometers.

These satellites are equipped with optical range sensors that detect and determine the movement parameters of targets.

According to the Pentagon, the initial stage in creating a national missile defense system should be the construction radar station on Shemia Island (Aleutian Islands). The location for the start of the deployment of the NMD system was not chosen by chance.

It is through Alaska, according to experts, that most of flight trajectories of missiles that can reach US territory. Therefore, it is planned to deploy about 100 interceptor missiles there. By the way, this radar, which is still in the project, completes the creation of a tracking ring around the United States, which includes the radar in Thule (Greenland), the Flaindales radar in the UK and three radars in the United States - Cape Cod, Claire and "Bill". All of them have been operating for about 30 years and will be modernized during the creation of the NMD system.

In addition, similar tasks (monitoring missile launches and warning of missile attacks) will be performed by the radar in Varde (Norway), located just 40 kilometers from the Russian border.

The first test of the anti-missile missile took place on July 15, 2001. It cost the American taxpayer $100 million, but Pentagon specialists successfully destroyed an intercontinental ballistic missile 144 miles above the Earth's surface.

The one-and-a-half-meter-long destructive element of an interceptor missile launched from Kwajelein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, approaching the Minuteman ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, hit it with a direct hit, resulting in a blindingly bright flash in the sky that caused the jubilation of the American military and technical specialists shaking their fists in admiration.

“According to initial assessments, everything worked as it should,” said Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, head of the US Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency. “We hit it very accurately... We will insist on conducting the next test as soon as possible.”

Since money for NMD is being allocated without delay, American military experts have launched a flurry of activity. Development is being carried out in a number of directions at once, and the creation of anti-missile missiles is not yet the most difficult element in the program.

A space-based laser has already been tested. This happened on December 8, 2000. Comprehensive testing of the Alpha HEL hydrogen fluoride laser, manufactured by TRW, and the optical beam control system, created by Lockheed Martin, were carried out as part of the SBL-IFX program ( "Space Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment" - Demonstrator for integrated flight testing of a space-based laser) at the Capistrano test site (San Clemente, California).

The beam guidance system included an optical unit (telescope) with a system of “LAMP” mirrors using adaptive optics technology (“soft mirrors”).

The primary mirror has a diameter of 4 meters. In addition, the beam control system included the detection, tracking and targeting system "ATP" ("ATR"). Both the laser and the beam control system were placed in a vacuum chamber during testing.

The purpose of the tests was to determine the ability of the telescope's metrology systems to maintain the required direction to the target and provide control of the primary and secondary optics during high-energy laser radiation. The tests were a complete success: the ATP system worked with even greater accuracy than required.

According to official information, the launch of the SBL-IFX demonstrator into orbit is scheduled for 2012, and its tests on launching intercontinental missiles - for 2013. And by 2020, an operational group of spacecraft with high-energy lasers on board may be deployed.

Then, as experts estimate, instead of 250 interceptor missiles in Alaska and North Dakota, it is enough to deploy a group of 12–20 spacecraft based on SBL technologies in orbits with an inclination of 40°. It will take only 1 to 10 seconds to destroy one missile, depending on the target’s flight altitude. Reconfiguration to new goal It will only take half a second. The system, consisting of 20 satellites, should provide almost complete prevention of the missile threat.

The NMD program also plans to use an airborne laser system developed under the ABL project (short for Airborne Laser).

Back in September 1992, Boeing and Lockheed received contracts to determine the most suitable existing aircraft for the ABL project. Both teams came to the same conclusion and recommended that the US Air Force use the Boeing 747 as its platform.

In November 1996, the US Air Force entered into a $1.1 billion contract with Boeing, Lockheed and TRV for the development and flight testing of a weapon system under the ABL program. On August 10, 1999, assembly of the first 747–400 Freighter aircraft for ABL began. On January 6, 2001, the YAL-1A aircraft made its first flight from the Everett airfield. Scheduled for 2003 combat test weapons system, during which an operational-tactical missile must be shot down. It is planned to destroy missiles during the active stage of their flight.

The basis of the weapon system is the iodine-oxygen chemical laser developed by TRV. The High Energy Laser (“HEL”) is modular in design and makes extensive use of advanced plastics, composites and titanium alloys to reduce weight. The laser, which has record chemical efficiency, uses a closed circuit with recirculation of reagents.

The laser is installed in section 46 on the main deck of the aircraft. To provide strength, thermal and chemical resistance, two titanium skin panels on the lower fuselage are installed under the laser. The beam is transmitted to the nose turret through a special pipe running along the top of the fuselage through all bulkheads. Firing is carried out from a bow turret weighing about 6.3 tons. It can rotate 150° around a horizontal axis to track a target. The beam is focused on the target by a 1.5-meter mirror with an azimuth viewing sector of 120°.

If the tests are successful, it is planned to produce three such aircraft by 2005, and by 2008 the air defense system should be fully ready. A fleet of seven aircraft will be able to localize a threat anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

And that's not all. Information is constantly leaking into the press about testing high-power ground-based lasers, about the revival of air-launched kinetic systems such as "ASAT", about new projects to create hypersonic bombers, about the upcoming update of the satellite early warning system. Who is this all against? Is it really against Iraq? North Korea, which still cannot build a workable intercontinental missile?..

Frankly, such provocative activity of American military specialists in the field of creating NMD is frightening.

I’m afraid we are entering a phase of human development after which flights to the Moon, Mars and the creation of orbital cities will simply become impossible...

Oznobishchev Sergey Konstantinovich

Potapov Vladimir Yakovlevich

Skokov Vasily Vasilievich

This short work covers a number of pages in the history of the formation of the concept and specific programs of the USSR’s “asymmetric response” to President R. Reagan’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” in the 1980s. Many provisions of these programs retain their significance in modern conditions, as is also discussed in this work.

The publication is intended for specialists in management in the political-military and military-technical spheres, for use in the educational process in civilian and military universities, for everyone interested in political-military and military-technical problems.

One of the most interesting examples of a comprehensive political-military strategy (which included diplomatic, political and propaganda activity and specific programs for the development of weapons systems and the scientific and technical base for them) is the strategy of an “asymmetric response” to the American program “Strategic Defense Initiative” ( SDI), put forward by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983.

Reagan proposed on March 23, 1983, a system that could “intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our territory or the territory of our allies.” Reagan called on American scientists and engineers to quickly “create the means to render nuclear weapons ineffective, obsolete and unnecessary.”

Having announced that the R&D goal of the SDI program is to make nuclear weapons “obsolete and unnecessary,” the top US government leadership set a super task for the future missile defense system, the implementation of which would undermine all the foundations of strategic stability in the world.

Two days later, the White House issued National Security Directive 85, which provided administrative and financial support for the SDI program. In particular, this directive established the Executive Committee on Defense (Missile Defense) Technologies.

President Reagan’s nomination of the “Strategic Defense Initiative” was perceived by a significant part of the top Soviet leadership not just negatively (as it well deserved), but very nervously, almost hysterically. As academician G. A. Arbatov wrote in his memoirs, US President R. Reagan, assessing this reaction of the Soviet leaders, believed that “... the weapon against which the Russians are so fiercely protesting cannot be so bad.” According to the reasonable assessment of G.A. Arbatov, such a surge of hysteria on the Soviet side only convinced Washington that “we are afraid of SDI.” It destroyed the newly established picture of the world, in which with such difficulty it was possible to ensure a certain bipolar balance and stability. At first, the country's far from young leadership simply did not understand what Reagan wanted and sought.

For his part, Ronald Reagan was a controversial figure. Many experts and politicians remember him as the president who called the USSR an “evil empire.” For others, he is remembered as a president who made significant efforts to mend relations with Moscow and move toward arms control. As it turned out later, Reagan wrote handwritten appeals to all the leaders of the USSR, who at that time quickly succeeded each other, with a proposal for a personal meeting. The format for communication between state leaders was more than unusual for Soviet leaders and the apparatus. For various reasons, including ideological ones, Soviet leaders before M. S. Gorbachev did not respond to Reagan’s calls. This unusual message, which had already been received, was found in Mikhail Sergeevich’s office only after a notification came from the American side.

One of the authors of this work was invited and attended the tenth anniversary of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik. Aides to President Reagan who participated in the meeting confirmed that during a face-to-face conversation, Gorbachev “persuaded” the head of the White House to the need for a transition to a nuclear-free world. True, the neophyte tenacity with which the US President clung to the preservation and development of large-scale missile defense (BMD) programs with space-based elements did not allow him to even begin to implement this large-scale task.

Much here is explained precisely by the incompetence of Reagan himself, in the past a good film actor, in such complex military-technical issues, as they would now say, of an “innovative nature.” The president came under the influence of such prominent authorities as the “father of the American hydrogen bomb” Edward Teller, his close ally physicist Lowell Wood, and other “proponents” of SDI. It seemed to Reagan (as, in many ways, to George W. Bush today) that purely technical solutions to security problems were possible. And yet, the American president, under the pressure of changing geopolitical realities, arguments and active proposals from our side (largely ensured by the coordinated actions of the community of prominent domestic and American scientists), has come a long way in his political evolution.

The transformation of Reagan's approaches to solving fundamental security problems is a clear example of what can happen with a concerted and comprehensive effort, largely initiated by the other side. Looking ahead, we should pay attention to the ultimately achieved result - the SDI program remained unrealized in its “full form.” Under the influence of criticism from outside and within the country from recognized authorities in the scientific world and prominent politicians, the US Congress resorted to its favorite practice for such cases and began to regularly reduce the allocation of requested funds for the most odious and destabilizing projects.

One of the most important components of our response to the idea of ​​​​creating a large-scale missile defense system with space-based elements, which played a key role in the “destruction of SDI,” was undoubtedly the so-called “asymmetric response.” The idea of ​​asymmetrical actions on the part of Russia in response to certain US actions that could disrupt strategic stability, military-strategic balance, in recent years has become almost central in the official statements of Russian government leaders and military commanders.

The background of the formula for asymmetric actions, an asymmetric response to certain actions of the “opponent” is connected primarily with what was done in the USSR in the 80s. last century in the face of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative program, nicknamed by journalists the “Star Wars” program. This was an epic little-known to wide circles of our public that lasted for a number of years.

On March 27, 1983, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established, based on the recommendations of a special committee, the SDI Implementation Organization (SDIO), headed by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson. The directions in which research should proceed were determined. In particular, it was:

• on the development of instruments for detection, tracking, selection and assessment of the degree of destruction of strategic missiles in any phase of their flight against the background of false targets and interference;
• on the development of interceptor missiles for the other side’s strategic ICBMs and SLBMs;
• on research in the field of creating various types of weapons, including directed energy transfer (beam weapons);
• on the creation of ICBM and SLBM interceptor satellites deployed in space;
• on the development of qualitatively new control and communication systems;
• about the creation of electromagnetic guns;
• on the development of a more powerful space transport system compared to the Space Shuttle.

Soon, the R&D program adopted by the US leadership began to be intensively implemented, especially in terms of all kinds of demonstration tests.”

The components of the “asymmetric strategy” of the Soviet side were developed in a number of research centers of the country - both in the USSR Academy of Sciences and in departmental research institutes (among the latter, especially noteworthy are the developments of TsNIIMash of the USSR Ministry of General Engineering, headed by Yu. A. Mozzhorin and V. M. Surikov; TsNIIMash at the same time closely interacted with the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, a number of other research institutes of the USSR Ministry of Defense, as well as with institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences).

The concept of an “asymmetric response,” and even more so the specific programs of this plan, were implemented overcoming great obstacles, because in our country there was a tradition of predominantly symmetrical actions, “edge against edge” actions. And this tradition manifested itself in its entirety when the question of how to respond to Reagan’s “star wars” was debated in the USSR.

The essence of the “asymmetric response” was primarily to ensure that in the most difficult conditions, when the United States deploys a multi-echelon missile defense using a variety of, including the mentioned “exotic” missile defense systems (including various types of directed energy transfer weapons - neutral particle accelerators, free electron lasers, excimer lasers, X-ray lasers, etc., electrodynamic mass accelerators (EDMA) - “electromagnetic guns”, etc.). provide the opportunity for Soviet nuclear missile systems to inflict “unacceptable damage” on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike, thereby convincing him to abandon a preemptive (preventive) strike. (The question of a preventive strike is a “damned” question of the balance of power, Academician Yu. A. Trutnev wrote (in 1990) in one of his notes.) For this purpose, a wide variety of scenarios for the massive use of nuclear missile weapons by the Soviet Union were considered the first to attempt the most effective disarming and “decapitating” strikes, disabling primarily US strategic nuclear weapons and their control system. Computer modeling played an important role in this.

A prominent, if not the main, role in the decision ultimately in favor of the “asymmetric response” formula was played by a group of Soviet scientists led by a prominent nuclear physicist, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences Evgeniy Pavlovich Velikhov, who at that time was in charge of the academic line in among other issues, fundamental and applied research in the interests of defense. The open part of this group was the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, created by Velikhov (with the approval of the top leadership of the USSR) - abbreviated as KSU.

For a long time Velikhov worked at the Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) named after. Kurchatov - at the main institute of the entire Soviet nuclear industry. It was a large, powerful research organization with scientists and engineers of various specialties. The peculiarity of the IAE (in 1992 it was transformed into the Russian Scientific Center “Kurchatov Institute”) was and remains that its specialists not only develop, but also implement, as they say, super complex technical systems into metal, including, in particular, reactors for nuclear submarines. Already at the age of 36, Velikhov became deputy director of the IAE for scientific work. At 33, he became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and at 39, a full member (academician) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1975, he became the head of the Soviet thermonuclear program.

Velikhov's wide range of knowledge, his deep understanding of the problems of fundamental and applied science, and the most complex weapons systems contributed to the fact that he turned out to be one of the leaders of the domestic academic community who raised the issue of the development of computer science in our country. He is known as a deeply educated person in the humanitarian field - in the field of history, economics, Russian and foreign literature.

E.P. Velikhov is a brilliant, versatile scientist who has achieved major scientific and practical results in several fields. It should be noted, among his other achievements, the major results obtained under his leadership in the development of high-power lasers. A deep understanding of what laser technology and other potential directed energy weapons can and cannot do has proven to be very valuable in developing the anti-SDI program.

Although Velikhov did not study issues related to nuclear weapons as a scientist, he was well versed in strategic nuclear weapons, air defense and missile defense systems. Velikhov played a major role in the development of computer science in our country. Already at the end of the 1970s. here the USSR developed a significant lag behind the USA, Japan and others Western countries in the information and communication sector. There were a number of strategic mistakes in the development of electronic computing technology made by the Soviet leadership back in the 1960s, when, in particular, it was decided to copy the American computer technology of the IBM company, instead of continuing its own research and development, embodied previously in such well-known computers as “Strela” and “BESM-6”.

In making proposals on specific elements of the Soviet “anti-SDI” program, Velikhov was primarily concerned with developing the information and analytical component of the Soviet “asymmetric response.” Largely thanks to these decisions, the foundations were laid for the revival of domestic developments in the field of general-purpose supercomputers, which resulted, in particular, in the creation of machines of the SKIF series, including the 60-teraflop supercomputer “SKIF-MGU”. The main developer of the SKIF series machines is the Institute of Software Systems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, created by Velikhov in the first half of the 1980s. as part of the “asymmetric response” program.

Velikhov was able to appreciate the dignity of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, who took over the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee after the death of L.I. Brezhnev in 1982, to whom Evgeniy Pavlovich received direct access. Velikhov developed good relations with the Minister of General Engineering O.D. Baklanov and with the Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense Forces A.I. Koldunov (who was also in charge of missile defense issues).

The “right hand” in Velikhov’s group was A. A. Kokoshin, who at that time held the post of deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISKAN). Before his appointment to this post, A. A. Kokoshin was the head of the department of military-political studies of this institute, becoming the successor of the legendary Lieutenant General M. A. Milyshtein. Mikhail Abramovich at one time managed to play the role of acting. head of intelligence on the Western Front (under the command of G.K. Zhukov in 1942), head of the intelligence department of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Milyptein was the author of a number of interesting works on military-strategic and military-historical issues, which have retained their significance to this day.

One of the “gurus” of the mentioned department was Colonel General N.A. Lomov, who at one time held the post of Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. During the Great Patriotic War N.A. Lomov, working as deputy chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, more than once personally reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (I.V. Stalin) the situation on the fronts, and was directly involved in the development of plans for major strategic operations. He had the opportunity to work under such outstanding military leaders as A. I. Antonov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. M. Shtemenko. Later, N.A. Lomov, a real Russian military intellectual, for a long time headed the department of strategy at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Milstein and Lomov were personally well acquainted with many of the top military leaders of the Soviet Union and had an idea of ​​​​the real experience of the Red Army, the Soviet Armed Forces both during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war decades - about such experience that at that time it was impossible to read about in open or closed literature.

Many prominent military and civilian specialists worked in the department, including those seconded from various units of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Prominent among them were Major General V.V. Larionov (in fact, the main author of the once famous work “Military Strategy” edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky), Colonels L.S. Semeiko, R.G. Tumkovsky, captain of the first rank V.I. Bocharov and others. The “techies” who came to the humanitarian field - M.I. Gerasev and A.A. Konovalov (coming from MEPhI and MVTU, respectively) - also showed themselves clearly.

A special place in this department belonged to a graduate of the Moscow Higher Technical School named after. N. E. Bauman, Ph.D. A. A. Vasiliev, a brilliant specialist in rocket and space technology, who moved to ISKAN from a high position in the “royal firm” in Podlipki (now Korolev, Moscow region, NPO Energia). A.A. Kokoshin, like A.A. Vasiliev, graduated from the Faculty of Instrument Engineering of the Bauman Higher Technical School in the Department of Radio Electronics, which was famous not only for its strong engineering training, but also for general scientific training - in physics, mathematics, theory of large systems, etc. Kokoshin’s Bauman education included special courses that were taught at the Moscow Higher Technical University on cybernetics, on the theory of constructing complex technical systems Academician A.I. Berg and his colleague Admiral V.P. Bogolepov, as well as Kokoshin’s participation in a number of large-scale projects of the Bauman Student Scientific and Technical Society named after Zhukovsky.

Thanks to the involvement in the department of military-political studies of specialists in military-strategic issues, weapons and military equipment, officers who were well versed in the ground, sea and air components of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, physicists, political historians, economists, specialists in international legal issues, the department was able to solve major applied and theoretical issues at the intersections of various disciplines. In general, the department of military-political studies of ISKAN by the beginning of the 1980s. formed into a unique interdisciplinary team, of which, unfortunately, there were very few in our country, in our research institutes with a high degree of segmentation and specialization.

Having become deputy director of ISKAN, Kokoshin continued to work extensively on military-political problems, directly supervising the department of military-political research. Subordinate to Kokoshin was also a special computer modeling laboratory, headed by a well-known artificial intelligence specialist Ph.D. n. V. M. Sergeev, who later became a Doctor of Political Sciences. The rates for the employees of this laboratory and the most modern computers at that time were allocated by E.P. Velikhov as vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

G. A. Arbatov, being a “pure humanist” (he graduated from MGIMO University of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), supported Kokoshin’s initiative, as a result of which a completely atypical unit arose for a predominantly political science academic institute. The models developed by Sergeev’s laboratory to ensure strategic stability for various compositions of groupings of forces and means of the parties, with missile defense systems of varying “density” and efficiency, were transferred for use to the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and other “interested” organizations. The work of V. M. Sergeev, “Combat control subsystems of the US space missile defense system,” published in an open version in 1986, became important. Later, many of its provisions appeared in the works of other domestic specialists (including without reference to V. M. Sergeev).

Among the ISKAN divisions supervised by Kokoshin was the management systems department, which not only studied the American experience of corporate and public administration, but also led a number of projects for the development of management systems in the USSR.

By the end of the 1980s. Several works by A.G. Arbatov (who worked at IMEMO RAS), A.A. Kokoshin, A.A. Vasiliev appeared on theoretical and applied issues of strategic stability in the nuclear field, which have not lost their significance in our time.

Bauman’s education, with the addition of a special course at the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University, which was taught at the Department of Radio Electronics, allowed Kokoshin to formulate such problems for computer modeling of strategic stability, which were always subject to algorithmization. A whole series of verbal formulas for one or another component of the general “macroformula” of strategic stability were honed by him together with Ph.D. A. A. Vasiliev.

The role of this bright, untimely deceased scientist should be especially noted. Vasiliev combined knowledge and rich experience gained in absolutely “closed” Soviet times spheres of activity, and a special talent that allows him not only to instantly grasp the most important elements from the new sphere of international military-political relations, but also to test them against the “village” of practical realities known to him. These qualities quickly put Vasiliev in the first rank of experts of that time. They consulted with him, listened to his opinion.

His contribution to the revolutionary report on strategic stability, which was revolutionary for its time, and to other publications of the Committee was extremely important.

These works were not just innovative - their release was accompanied by overcoming the atmosphere of “pseudo-secrecy”, which was vigilantly guarded by the censorship authorities. Every new word, even one that substantively and demonstrably criticized SDI, was difficult to come by. Until then, domestic politicians, experts and society had never seen anything like the Committee’s reports.

It is no coincidence that the original formulas and calculations presented in the works, which proved the inconsistency of providing effective protection using large-scale missile defense with space-based elements, were examined by foreign experts literally through a magnifying glass. During one of the annual seminars on security issues, which the Italian physicist Antonio Zicchi convened and continues to convene in Erice, Lowell Wood said that the calculations were incorrect, the system would still be effective and that he would convene the press the next day to in order to disavow the “politicized” calculations of Soviet scientists.

A. Vasiliev, who represented our country at the seminar, was able overnight to derive new formulas that once again proved the ineffectiveness of such space weapons in the face of possible Soviet countermeasures, much cheaper than the American missile defense system itself. Lowell Wood could no longer counteract this. Thus, the high level of competence, deep knowledge and abilities of this bright scientist once again confirmed the competence of domestic science.

Lomov, Larionov and Milstein drew Kokoshin’s attention to the works of the then forgotten outstanding Russian and secular military theorist A. A. Svechin, repressed in 1938, and then, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, completely rehabilitated). Svechin's works contained ideas and specific formulas for asymmetric strategies for different periods of history. According to Kokoshin himself, the treatise of the outstanding ancient Chinese theorist and strategist Sun Tzu played an important role in the formation of the “ideology of asymmetry” - both in the military-technical and political psychological dimensions. This treatise, according to Kokoshin, is “permeated with the spirit of asymmetry.” The ideas of asymmetry formed the basis of a series of scientific and technical reports prepared by the Velikhov group. Later, Kokoshin’s original works appeared on the problems of strategic stability at the level of general-purpose forces and means.

ISKAN occupied a special place in the system of analytical support for the Soviet leadership. This institute was created in 1968 by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It must be said that the inclusion of research institutes in the decision-making process, the special creation of institutions “in the areas” of foreign policy was a characteristic feature of that time. This scheme ensured a high level of analytical elaboration of foreign policy actions. In addition, such institutions and their representatives sometimes carried out delicate “unofficial” foreign policy missions (for example, “pumping up” some foreign policy positions - determining the possible reaction of the other side), which officials could not undertake.

The director of the institute, G. A. Arbatov, had a particularly close relationship with Yu. V. Andropov for many years - since then, when Andropov became the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for work with socialist countries, and Aratov was part of a group of consultants in the department of the CPSU Central Committee for work with socialist countries (a full-time position in the Central Committee apparatus) under Andropov. The son of Yu. V. Andropov, Igor Yuryevich, who worked in the Foreign Policy Planning Directorate (UPVM) of the USSR, concurrently worked in the department of military-political studies "at Kokoshin" as a senior research fellow. In 1983, Yu.V. Andropov, already the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, planned to introduce the position of national security assistant; I. Yu. Andropov recommended A. A. Kokoshin to him for this position. At the end of 1983, Kokoshin was supposed to be presented to the Secretary General, but it was not worth it. Yuri Vladimirovich's health condition has deteriorated sharply. In February 1984 he died.

G. A. Arbatov himself is a front-line officer who completed his service as the chief of reconnaissance of an artillery regiment of guards mortars ("Katyusha") with the rank of captain, a highly educated native of a Moscow intellectual family. One of the features of Arbatov was that, being a man of predominantly liberal (by the standards of that time) views, a politician and social scientist, he was quite tolerant of the employees of his institute who took relatively conservative positions (which included, of course, ) Colonel General N.A. Lomov, considered a “hawk,” and a number of other military and civilian ISKAN researchers). ISKAN scientists dealing with military-political issues had good creative contact with a group of their colleagues from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by A. G. Arbatov, the son of G. A. Arbatov. Arbatov Jr. did not have an engineering or natural science education, but in many works he demonstrated serious knowledge of American weapons programs and mechanisms for making military-political decisions in the United States.

His knowledge in matters of military strategy and military-technical aspects was very deep, which greatly helped him later, when for a number of years he was Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense. By the mid-1980s. Despite his young age, he was already the author of several fundamental monographs. Among Arbatov Jr.’s colleagues at IMEMO who dealt with the problems of strategic stability, one can highlight, first of all, A. G. Savelyev.

The department of military-political studies and the ISKAN computer modeling laboratory have established good interaction with a number of prominent domestic natural scientists involved in defense issues. Many modeling issues were considered in creative contact with the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by Academician N. N. Moiseev, who was part of Velikhov’s group.” A number of scientists from the Institute were actively involved in the work of analyzing the problems of strategic stability associated with SDI (the open, unclassified part of this work). space research(IKI) USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by Academician R. Z. Sagdeev.

This world-famous scientist led the work of the KSU for a number of years - in the second half of the 1980s. The potential for fundamental knowledge about space and space activities developed at the Institute added an additional dimension to the work of the Committee, and the IKI building became the venue for serious expert meetings, both between Russian scientists and with their foreign colleagues. Sagdeev made a significant contribution to the well-founded criticism of the “Reagan approach” to missile defense, to the elaboration, development and promotion of the arguments of representatives of domestic science.

Among other IKI scientists, one can note S.N. Rodionov and O.V. Prilutsky - well-known and respected physicists in their environment, well versed in lasers and particle accelerators. (Once during one of the Soviet-American meetings of scientists on the problems of strategic stability, one of the largest American physicists Wolfgang Panofsky said about S. N. Rodionov, whom he met at seminars at the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences: “This is a strong physicist.") So on this side there were good prerequisites for the formation and effective functioning within the framework of the “Velikhov group” of an interdisciplinary team that could, in all the necessary completeness and complexity, consider issues related to the policy of the USSR in relation to the problem of Ronald’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” Reagan.

Kokoshin established especially close relations with the first deputy chairman of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues of the USSR Council of Ministers (VPK) V. L. Koblov (the military-industrial complex was located in one of the administrative buildings in the Kremlin for several decades, which emphasized its special significance in the system of power in USSR; the “perestroika” moved it to a building on Mayakovsky Square).

In the 1990s. Kokoshin advocated for the restoration of the military-industrial complex in the Russian Federation, which was, in the end, done in the current decade. However, the military-industrial complex did not receive from the Government of the Russian Federation those administrative functions and the expert power that the military-industrial complex of the Council of Ministers of the USSR possessed.

Solving the problem of forming an anti-SDI program and ensuring its effective political and psychological impact on the American side required the Velikhov group to make public appearances both before domestic and foreign audiences. Thus, Velikhov, together with Kokoshin, organized the first television appearance of the outstanding Soviet weapons physicist, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, Academician Yuli Borisovich Khariton, who for a long time headed the Sarov nuclear center (Arzamas-16), who had previously been an almost completely classified scientist, known to a relatively narrow circle of people. The speech of the “troika” Velikhov-Khariton-Kokoshin was intended both to explain to its own citizens the meaning of the USSR’s actions to ensure strategic stability, and to give appropriate signals to the West; Khariton was, of course, as they now say, “an iconic figure.” The creator of Soviet thermonuclear weapons, Yu.B. Khariton here seemed to be opposing the aforementioned Edward Teller, one of the main initiators of Reagan’s “Strategic Defense Initiative.” So Khariton’s involvement in this process in a public way was a very important step by Velikhov.

In 1987, at the international forum “For a nuclear-free world, for international security” in Moscow, there was a public discussion on the problems of strategic stability between A. A. Kokoshin and academician A. D. Sakharov, which Andrei Dmitrievich writes about in some detail in his “ Memories." It should be noted that the appearance of Sakharov at this forum, and even speaking on such a topic, was then of great importance in the interaction of Soviet and American scientists.

The greatest differences in the speeches of Sakharov and Kokoshin concerned the question of the role of ground-based and stationary intercontinental ballistic missiles. Sakharov at that time actively advocated the thesis that ICBMs of this kind are a “first strike” weapon, since they are supposedly the most vulnerable part of the strategic nuclear triad of each side. Sakharov said that one ICBM with MIRVs “destroys several missiles” of the other side. He stated that a side “relying mainly on silo missiles may find itself forced in a critical situation to deliver the “first strike.” Based on these arguments, Academician Sakharov considered it necessary to adopt the principle of “predominant reduction” of silo-based ICBMs when reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the parties.

Historically, the USSR had silo-based ICBMs that made up the lion's share of its strategic nuclear forces arsenal. In addition (which Sakharov most likely did not know or simply did not think about) silo ICBMs in the USSR were the most technically advanced means, and the ground component of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces had the most developed combat control system, which, under certain conditions, made it possible to carry out a retaliatory, counter-counter and even a counter-strike against the enemy who dared to attack first, but a pre-emptive (preventive) strike. Kokoshin, in a number of his works, noted that the threat of a retaliatory or oncoming strike is an additional factor of nuclear deterrence, saying at the same time that readiness for such actions is a costly matter and increases the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized ICBM launches. Calling first of all for the reduction of Soviet silo-based ICBMs, Sakharov said that “it is possible that some of the Soviet silo-based missiles, simultaneously with a general reduction, can be replaced with less vulnerable missiles of equivalent striking force (frames with a mobile camouflaged launch, cruise missiles various bases, missiles on submarines, etc.)

Polemicizing with Sakharov, Kokoshin opposed his thesis that silo-based ICBMs are a “first strike” weapon. This position of Kokoshin was based on substantive knowledge of the characteristics of the various components of the strategic nuclear forces of both sides. Among other things, Kokoshin was well aware of a number of technical problems with the development and naval component of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In fact, the logic of Sakharov’s thoughts in many ways coincided with the argumentation of a number of American politicians and experts who, in the process of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons, demanded, first of all, a reduction in Soviet silo-based ICBMs, “a redrawing of the strategic nuclear “triad” of the USSR, which a number of authoritative Soviet physicists drew attention to in their speeches.

A significant part of Sakharov's speech at this forum was devoted to the SDI problem. Sakharov stated that “SDI is not effective for the purpose for which, according to its supporters, it is intended,” since missile defense components located in space can be disabled “even at the non-nuclear stage of the war and especially at the time of transition to nuclear stages using anti-satellite weapons, space mines and other means.” Likewise, “many key ground-based missile defense facilities will be destroyed” . This speech by Sakharov also contained other arguments that cast doubt on the ability of large-scale missile defense to provide effective protection against a “first strike.” They largely coincided with what was presented in the open reports of the Velikhov group and in a number of publications by American and Western European scientists who were opponents of the SDI program.

Sakharov further stated that it “seems incorrect” to him that the SDI opponents’ assertion that such a missile defense system, being ineffective as a defensive weapon, serves as a shield under the cover of which a “first strike” is delivered, since it is effective in repelling weakened blow of retaliation. He justified this in terms not typical of a physicist: “Firstly, the blow of retaliation will certainly be greatly weakened. Secondly, almost all of the above considerations of the ineffectiveness of SDI also apply to a retaliatory strike.”

The “Velikhov group” had active contacts with American scientists who dealt with the same problems, sanctioned by the decisions of the relevant “authority”. Among them were the largest figures - Nobel laureate Charlie Townes, Victor Weiskopf, Wolfgang Panofsky, Paul Doty, Ashton Carter, Richard (Dick) Garvin - one of the leading developers in the past of American thermonuclear munitions, subsequently for many years the chief scientific adviser to such a giant American high-tech industry like IBM. We were involved in meetings between scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences (HAH) former minister US Defense Robert McNamara, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones and others. The then President of the Federation of American Scientists, Jeremy Stone, played a significant organizing role. The famous specialist John Pike acted as an almost constant expert on space. The overwhelming majority of these representatives of the upper stratum of American technocracy were opponents of Reagan's large-scale missile defense, people who at one time did a lot to conclude the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems in 1972.

One of the components that ultimately determined the optimal nature of our response to the “star wars program”, which at the same time saved us from unwinding the spiral of the “space arms race”, was the opportunity for the top officials of the domestic group of scientists to enter the leadership of the country. It was this underlying concept of what the Americans call “double track” (something like the concept of “double circuit” in our understanding) that helped protect Moscow from hasty and ruinous decisions in the anti-missile field - a path that some domestic figures were pushing on.

As part of the strategy of “asymmetric response” to the American SDI, a wide range of measures was envisaged to increase the combat stability of Soviet strategic nuclear forces (invulnerability of intercontinental ballistic missiles, missile submarines strategic purpose, capabilities for removing strategic aviation from a potential attack, reliability of the strategic nuclear forces combat command and control system, survivability of the public administration system as a whole, etc.), and their ability to overcome multi-echelon missile defense.

Military-strategic, operational and tactical means and procedures were collected into a single complex, making it possible to provide a sufficiently powerful retaliatory strike (including a deep strike) even in the most unfavorable conditions, resulting from massive pre-emptive strikes on the Soviet Union (up to the use of the " dead hand", providing for the automatic launch of silo ICBMs that survived a pre-emptive strike by the enemy in conditions of violation of the centralized combat control system). At the same time, it was always kept in mind that all these means would be much cheaper than the American missile defense system with a space echelon (echelons).

As Kokoshin noted later, it was important not only to develop all this and have it “for a rainy day”, which could become the “last day” for both sides), but also to demonstrate to the opponent to a certain (dosed) extent at that other moment, using the art of “strategic gesture " Moreover, it was necessary to do this in such a way that it looked convincing both for the “political class” of the other side, and for specialists, including experts of the highest qualifications on the problem of strategic stability in general and on its individual technical and operational-strategic components, who immediately races would recognize any exaggerations, elements of disinformation, etc. (It should be noted that this kind of American scientific and expert community was many times larger in number and resource provision than the Soviet side; we had to compensate for this with increased intensity of work.

In closed studies on the problems of nuclear deterrence (institutes of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, TsNIIMash, the section of applied problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in Arzamas-16, in the city of Nezhi isk, etc.), political and psychological issues were raised very rarely.

A number of particularly vulnerable components of the potential US missile defense (primarily in space echelons) were identified, which could be disabled not only through direct physical destruction, but also by means of electronic warfare (EW). Active measures of this type included various land-, sea-, air- and space-based weapons that use kinetic energy (missiles, projectiles), laser and other types of high-energy radiation as destructive effects. It was noted that active countermeasures are especially effective against elements of space-based missile defense echelons, which for a long time are in orbits with known parameters, which greatly simplifies the task of neutralizing, suppressing and even completely physically eliminating them.

High-power ground-based lasers were also considered as active countermeasures. The creation of such lasers is much simpler than those designed for space battle stations with the aim of using them to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. In the confrontation between “laser versus rocket” and “laser versus space platform,” the advantage may be on the side of the latter option. This is due to a number of factors. First, space battle stations are larger targets for laser destruction than ICBMs (SLBMs), which makes it easier to aim a laser beam at them and destroy them. Secondly, the number of such stations would be significantly smaller than the number of ICBMs (SLBMs) ​​or their warheads to be destroyed during a massive nuclear missile strike. This practically eliminates the problem of super-fast retargeting of the laser beam. Thirdly, space combat stations are in the field of view of a ground-based laser installation for a long time, which makes it possible to significantly increase the exposure time (up to 10 s), and therefore reduce the requirements for its power. In addition, for ground-based installations, the inherent limitations of space systems in terms of mass, dimensions, energy intensity, efficiency, etc. are much less significant.

The corresponding report of Soviet scientists concluded: “A brief review of possible measures to neutralize the suppression of a large-scale missile defense system with echelons of strike weapons deployed in space shows that it is far from necessary to set the task of its complete destruction. It is enough to weaken such a missile defense system by influencing the most vulnerable elements, to make a “gap” in this so-called defense in order to maintain the power of a retaliatory strike that is unacceptable for the aggressor.”

In parallel with the developments on the “asymmetric response” to SDI, within the framework of the activities of the “Velikhov group”, research was carried out on the problems of climatic and medical-biological consequences of nuclear war, as well as on measures of adequate control over the lack of underground testing of nuclear weapons. These studies were carried out almost in parallel with what was being done at that time by American and Western European scientists, who were very seriously alarmed by the bellicose rhetoric of President Reagan, the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations after the period of detente - a period when, through the cooperative efforts of the Soviet and American sides, it was possible to achieve serious strengthening strategic stability.

A serious scientific work on mathematical modeling of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war was prepared by a group of scientists from the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by V. A. Aleksandrov (the curator of this work was the director of the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician N. N. Moiseev). After the mysterious disappearance of V. A. Alexandrov in Italy, this work was continued by his colleague G. L. Stenchikov.

Important research papers on the climatic consequences of a nuclear war with natural experiments were carried out by scientists from the Institute of Earth Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. S. Golitsyn, A. S. Ginzburg and others. As for the medical and biological consequences of a nuclear war, they were analyzed in a work published by a group of Soviet scientists led by Academician E.I. Chazov.

By the way, the conclusions made then and the evidence presented for the onset of “nuclear winter” are still relevant in our time. There is no doubt that this should be seriously considered by those who are inclined today to consider nuclear weapons as a possible “battlefield” weapon.

The authors of the concept of “asymmetric response” initially proceeded from the fact that the confrontation between two strategies in this most important area of ​​national security of the USSR and the USA is political and psychological (in the terminology of recent years - virtual) character.

One of the most important tasks was to convince SDI supporters in the United States that any option for creating a large-scale, multi-echelon missile defense system would not give the United States any significant military or political advantages. Accordingly, as Kokoshin notes, the task was set to influence the “political class” of the United States, the American “national security establishment” in such a way as to prevent the United States from withdrawing from the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, which by that time had in political-psychological, and in military-strategic terms, it has already firmly established itself as one of the cornerstones for ensuring strategic stability. He also played an important role in preventing an arms race in space, imposing important restrictions on the creation of systems that could be used as anti-satellite weapons.

Having become the First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia in 1992, Kokoshin directly dealt with the R&D that was included in the programs associated with the strategy of an “asymmetric response” to SDI. Among the most famous of them is the development of the newest intercontinental ballistic missile, which, with the “light hand” of Kokoshin, received the name “Topol-M” in 1992 (with a shortened acceleration section and various means of overcoming missile defense). Kokoshin suggested calling this system this way when faced with the obvious reluctance of a number of major government figures to finance the latest ICBM. Having received the name “Topol-M”, in the eyes of many this system looked like a modernization of the already known Topol PGRK, which had been in service for a number of years.

One cannot help but remember what a difficult time it was for us after the collapse of the USSR. Then the new Russian government destroyed the system of management of the military-industrial complex that had existed for decades. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, not equipped for this, had to deal directly with thousands of defense industry enterprises, and besides, the defense industry, which had lost hundreds of valuable research institutes and design bureaus, factories located in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new sovereign states - former republics of the USSR. The general atmosphere in the dominant government circles in Russia at that time was not at all conducive to the development of new weapons systems. So in many ways Kokoshin had to “row against the tide.”

At the beginning of 1992, A. A. Kokoshin was considered as a real candidate for the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. His appointment was actively advocated by a number of prominent figures in the domestic defense industry, in particular the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises of Russia, headed by a prominent figure in the domestic defense industry, electronic warfare specialist A.N. Shulunov (it included heads of such enterprises as the Mil helicopter design bureau, aviation company MiG, developers of various missile system, avionics and other equipment). Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Dmitrievich Protasov, who headed the Board of Directors of defense enterprises of the Moscow region - one of the largest associations of this kind in our country at that time, showed great activity in nominating Kokoshin for the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Among the supporters of the appointment of Kokoshin to the post of Minister of Defense was such an outstanding designer of anti-aircraft missile systems as academician twice Hero of Socialism. Labor Boris Vasilievich Bunkin. Defense scientists, advocating the appointment of Kokoshin as Minister of Defense, proceeded at least from the fact that a relatively depoliticized technocrat in the person of a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (RAN) was much more understandable and acceptable for them than paratrooper general P.S. Grachev, known primarily for his personal devotion to B.N. Yeltsin, or than any of the politicians close to the first president of Russia, many of whom at that time appeared at the top of power literally from nowhere.

In 1992, having announced the creation of the Russian Armed Forces, B.N. Yeltsin himself headed the military department; P. S. Grachev and A. A. Kokoshin were appointed his first deputies. This state of affairs did not last long. Soon P.S. Grachev, who demonstrated in every possible way his special devotion to Yeltsin, became Minister of Defense.

Among the advisors of A. A. Kokoshin (while he was in the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense), with whom he more than once discussed various issues of the development of strategic nuclear forces, missile defense, strategic nuclear forces combat control systems, missile attack warning systems, systems control of outer space, etc., we should, first of all, note Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov (who was at one time one of the most authoritative chiefs of the Soviet General Staff), Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Army General V. M. Shabanov (formerly Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Armaments), Academicians V. II. Avrorina, B.V. Bunkin, E.P. Velikhov, A.V. Gaponov-Grekhov, A.I. Savin, I.D. Spassky, Yu. A. Trutnev, E.A. Fedosov, general designer of the Chelomeevskaya company" G. A. Efremov, general designer of OKB-2 (NPO "Mashinostroenie") M. F. Reshetnev (Krasnoyarsk), general designer of the Central Research Radio Engineering Institute named after. Academician A.I. Berg Yu. M. Pirunov.

At that time, the idea of ​​​​developing our nuclear missile shield, generally supported at the proper level of Russia's defense potential, as mentioned above, was alien to a significant part of those who then occupied dominant positions in the political life of our country.

Rampant inflation, regular progressive cuts in allocations for defense needs, including R&D, the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided the Russian Federation with “stabilizing loans” under very strict conditions, which had the most negative impact on ensuring the country’s defense capability - all this Both the military department and the defense-industrial complex had to experience it more than they themselves in those years. Sometimes you just have to wonder how such now-famous major results in the development of domestic weapons and military equipment were achieved at that time. For those who did this, it was all an incredible effort, often costing the loss of health and sometimes even the lives of workers.

Thus, such Kokoshin’s comrades-in-arms as Colonel General Vyacheslav Petrovich Mironov (who held the post of chief of armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under him, and previously the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Armaments), and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Armaments, Admiral Valery Vasilyevich Grishanov, died untimely. . They died literally at a combat post.

Kokoshin and his subordinates (among them, first of all, it is worth noting General V.I. Bolysov in the High Command Missile Forces strategic purpose, the same Colonel General V.P. Mironov, assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Defense V.V. Yarmak, employee of the Committee on Military-Technical Policy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Masyuk, etc.) did everything possible together with the Research Institute of Thermal Engineering to “pull out” the new intercontinental ballistic missile “Topol-M” (“Universal”), which was already “lying on its side”. This design bureau at that time was headed by general designer B.N. Lagutin, who replaced the legendary A.D. Nadiradze. Later, the Research Institute of Thermal Engineering was headed by Yu.S. Solomonov, who effectively brought the matter with the creation of Topol-M to the end. Kokoshin has repeatedly noted the large role in determining the fate of this ICBM of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, General V.P. Dubynin, who supported Kokoshin. For this and a number of other weapons programs, at a critical moment in 1992, at that moment he received full support from another most authoritative military leader - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Valery Ivanovich Mironov, a highly educated military professional. Kokoshin supervised this program in close cooperation with Army General M.P. Kolesnikov, who replaced Dubynin as Chief of the General Staff.

Nowadays, unique properties are being noted in ever-increasing quantities of the Topol-M ICBM entering the troops, precisely from the point of view of the ability to overcome the missile defense of the other side; moreover, in relation to promising missile defense systems, which may yet appear in the foreseeable future for 15-20 years. Initially, this complex was conceived as an ICBM both in a silo (stationary) version and in a mobile version, both in a monoblock version and with a MIRV. (On December 18, 2007, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation S. B. Ivanov stated that the Topol-M missile system with multiple warheads (both in stationary and mobile versions) will appear in service in the near future time. However, the ability of this missile to have several warheads for the time being, to put it mildly, was not advertised.) Soon the creation of the Yars missile system with MIRVs was announced as a development of the Topol-M within the framework of the Universal project.

A major role in the development of this area, as well as in a number of other areas of defense science and technology, was played by the Committee on Military-Technical Policy (KVTP), created by Kokoshin in the Russian Ministry of Defense.

This is a relatively small unit of the military department, consisting mainly of young, highly educated officers and civilian scientists and engineers from the military-industrial complex and academic institutions. Significant emphasis in the activities of KV "GP" was placed by Kokoshin on the development of the entire complex of information means that provide control at all levels - from tactical to strategic and political-military, the effectiveness of weapons and military equipment, reconnaissance means, target designation, control over execution orders, directives, decisions, etc.

Within the framework of the KVTP, the “Integration-SVT” program was born for the development of a set of computer equipment for the needs of the Armed Forces and dual-use equipment. Under this program, in particular, the high-performance microprocessor Elbrus-ZM was created, the state tests of which were successfully completed in 2007. A major role in its implementation was played by Lieutenant General V.P. Volodin, a native of the Kokoshin KVTP, who headed the last years of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (created in the General Staff by V.P. Volodin after the abolition of the Committee on Military-Technical Policy by one of the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation).

An in-line system of military and dual-use electronic computing equipment was also developed - the “Baguette” program, the initiators and main ideologists of which were Velikhov and his students (and above all Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.B. Betelin) from the Department of Informatics Russian Academy Sci.

Much has been done by Kokoshin and his team to preserve and develop the naval and aviation components of the domestic strategic nuclear forces. Kokoshin was categorically against turning the Russian strategic “triad” into a “monad” with leaving only one ground component in the strategic nuclear forces, as some of our military leaders called for. and influential experts. This position of Kokoshin was based on a deep understanding of the problems of ensuring strategic stability by Russia.

Having become Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 1998, Kokoshin was able to consolidate this course of preserving the strategic “triad”, and, consequently, ensuring a high degree of combat stability of our strategic nuclear forces. The corresponding decisions of the Security Council of the Russian Federation were adopted on the nuclear policy of our country, which were later specified in several decrees of the President of Russia. These were strategic decisions that remain important to this day. In preparing these decisions, Kokoshin relied on the extensive expert work of the special commission he created of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, headed by the Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician N.P. Laverov, which carried out a tremendous amount of work, considering different options for the development of the entire complex of forces and means of nuclear deterrence and relevant components of domestic science of the military-industrial complex.

An important role in preparing and then ensuring the implementation of these decisions was played by Colonel General A. M. Moskovsky, whom A. A. Kokoshin attracted from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to work in the Defense Council, and then in the Security Council of the Russian Federation as his deputy on issues military-technical policy. A. M. Moskovsky served as Deputy Secretary of the Security Council for a whole for a number of years, having worked with such secretaries of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as N. N. Bordyuzha, V. V. Putin, S. B. Ivanov. Then A. M. Moskovsky, when S. B. Ivanov became the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, was appointed chief of armaments - deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, he was awarded the military rank of army general.

In all these positions, Moskovsky showed high professional qualities and perseverance, perseverance in implementing Russia’s long-term military-technical policy, including in the nuclear missile field.

The approaches to developing decisions on Russia's nuclear policy laid down by Kokoshin were eventually implemented. 1998, after he left the post of Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, in the form of the Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence created by order of the President of Russia. This working body of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was headed by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and its decisions, after their approval by the President of the Russian Federation, became mandatory for execution by all federal executive authorities. The working group for preparing decisions of the Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence was headed by Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V. F. Potapov, and all the rough work was carried out in the structure military security, which was led by Colonel General V.I. Yesin (in 1994-1996 he was the chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces - first deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces).

The permanent meeting on nuclear deterrence, based on deep studies of the scientific and expert community of Russia dealing with the issues of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, was able in 1999-2001. to develop the foundations of Russia’s nuclear policy, which became the foundation of those plans for the construction of Russia’s nuclear forces that are now being implemented in practice.

A. A. Kokoshin did a lot in the 1990s. and to develop technologies for a domestic missile defense system. The fact that this system continues to live and develop is to a large extent his merit.

Knowledgeable people consider it especially important that with the direct participation of Kokoshin, it was possible to preserve in the country (and in some places even improve) cooperative chains for the development and production of strategic nuclear weapons (including the nuclear weapons complex), high-precision weapons in conventional equipment, and radar equipment for the needs of the missile attack warning system and missile defense, spacecraft for various purposes (including for the first echelon of the missile attack warning system (MAWS)), etc.

Kokoshin himself notes the great role in his deep knowledge of the problems of the domestic military-industrial complex of the First Deputy Minister of Defense Industry of the USSR, Evgeniy Vitkovsky, who closely introduced him to the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Armaments, Colonel General Vyacheslav Petrovich Mironov, who replaced Army General V. M. Shabanova. Mironov, a widely educated specialist in the field of engineering in general, who studied at the Moscow Higher Technical University named after. Bauman and the Military Engineering Artillery Academy named after. Dzerzhinsky (who served in the Strategic Missile Forces), was one of the main developers of the domestic system of medium- and long-term planning of scientific and technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the formation of the state weapons program; The planning methods developed under Mironov’s leadership are largely in effect to this day.

Recognition of the above-mentioned merits of Kokoshin was reflected in the active support of his candidacy from weapons scientists when Kokoshin was elected by the General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences as a full member of the RAS. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Alekseevich Trutnev, who spoke at this meeting on behalf of all academician gunsmiths in support of Kokoshin, noted that Kokoshin is one of the key figures among those who saved during the difficult 1990s. the most important components of the domestic defense-industrial complex. In a similar spirit, ex-Prime Minister of Russia, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences E.M. Primakov spoke at this General Meeting, pointing out Kokoshin’s merits as a scientist who made a great contribution to the development of Russian science. Thus, he responded to the information that appeared in the media. mass media on the eve of the academic elections, allegations that “Colonel General” Kokoshin was running for the Academy based on rank, and not on scientific achievements.

In relation to the “asymmetric response” to the American SDI, Kokoshin classified three groups of means:

(a) means of increasing the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (now the Russian Federation) in relation to a pre-emptive strike by the enemy in order to convincingly demonstrate the preservation of the ability to carry out a massive retaliatory strike, “penetrating” the US missile defense system;

(b) technologies and operational-tactical solutions to increase the ability of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (RF) to overcome the missile defense of the other side;

(c) special means of destruction and neutralization of missile defense, especially its space components.

Among the first is increasing the secrecy and invulnerability of mobile missile systems and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs); the latter - including by providing them with appropriate means of protection from the anti-submarine warfare weapons of the other side. Among the second is the creation and equipping of ballistic missiles with various means of overcoming missile defense, including decoy warheads that overload the radar and other "sensors" of the missile defense, its "brain", confusing the picture, creating problems with target selection and, accordingly, with target designation and target destruction. Among the third are various types of electronic warfare equipment, blinding the CBS, and directly damaging them.

In the mid-1990s. Kokoshin developed the concept of the “Northern Strategic Bastion”, which provided for special measures to ensure the combat stability of the underwater strategic missile carriers of the Russian Navy. His principled position prevented the transfer to the American side of a complex of data on the hydrology and hydrography of the Arctic, which the Government of the Russian Federation was going to carry out within the framework of the activities of the Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission. Thus, damage to the country's defense capability was prevented.

The strategy of “asymmetric response” was ultimately officially adopted by the Soviet leadership and declared publicly. At a press conference in Reykjavik on October 12, 1986, M.S. Gorbachev said: “There will be a response to SDI. Asymmetrical, but it will be. At the same time, we won’t have to sacrifice much.” By that time, it was no longer just a declaration, but a verified and prepared position.

The role played by domestic scientists in preparing such an “answer” was also publicly recognized at a high professional level. In his interview at the end of the same year, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General Yu. P. Maksimov, emphasized that “there are real ways to preserve the invulnerability of our ICBMs even in the event of the implementation of SDI. An effective countermeasure, according to Soviet scientists, for example, can be a tactic for launching ICBMs, which is designed to “deplete” space missile defense by activating it early due to a specifically selected order of retaliatory strike. These can be combined launches of ICBMs and “false” missiles, launches of ICBMs with a wide variation of trajectories... All this leads to greater consumption of energy resources of space missile defense echelons, to the discharge of X-ray lasers and electromagnetic guns, and to other premature losses in firepower missile defense systems". All these and some other options had by that time been analyzed in detail in the works of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.

But this did not happen suddenly; As noted above, significant efforts were required to convince the country’s leadership of the correctness of the “asymmetric response” scheme. In practice, it was implemented far from unambiguously - much, as it turned out later, was done in a symmetrical order.

The issue of an “asymmetric response” has again become relevant in light of the George W. Bush administration’s attempts to create an American multicomponent missile defense system and at the same time develop strategic offensive weapons in such a direction that they collectively reduce Russia’s ability to retaliate (not to mention China, which has significantly (an order of magnitude) less nuclear potential).”

Many on those proposed in the 1980s. measures remain relevant today - naturally, with adjustments both in relation to the new level of missile defense technologies of our “opponent”, and the technologies available to the Russian Federation. The ideology of an “asymmetric response” today is no less, and perhaps even more relevant from an economic point of view.

Some lessons of that time are important and instructive for improving the process of making military-political decisions in our days. It seems that the practice of “embedding” scientific institutions in the process of developing such decisions is extremely important, which allows for serious analytical study - the “background” of state policy in the most important areas. True, for this, it is important today to take measures to support scientific teams, groups of scientists capable of carrying out such work skillfully and on an ongoing basis.

In addition, the experience of more than twenty years ago testifies not only to the importance of creating domestic interdisciplinary teams for breakthrough research on current problems. This experience clearly suggests the importance of constant and supported in the interests of the country through various mechanisms of international expert dialogue for an objective consideration of the most pressing challenges and threats to national and international security. It is such a dialogue and the in-depth examination that is born on its basis that can not only prepare the basis for optimal decisions, but also carry out a scenario-based (multivariate) initial study of the possible consequences of such decisions.

Sergey Konstantinovich Oznobishchev , professor at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, one of the participants in the development of the Soviet “asymmetric response”;

Vladimir Yakovlevich Potapov , Colonel General in reserve, in the recent past Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;

Vasily Vasilievich Skokov , Colonel General in reserve, former commander of formations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, adviser to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation - active participants in the development and implementation of the political and military course of the Russian Federation in modern conditions.

M.: Institute of Strategic Assessments, ed. LENAND, 2008

Arbatov G. A. Man of the system. M.: Vagrius, 2002. P. 265.

Kokoshin A. A. “Asymmetric response” to the “Strategic Defense Initiative” as an example strategic planning in the field of national security // International life. 2007. No. 7 (July-August).

Kokoshin A. A. - “Asymmetric response”... .

For the benefit of Russia. To the 75th anniversary of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.A. Trutnev / Ed. R. I. Ilkaeva. Sarov; Saransk: Type. "Red October", 2002. P. 328.

Space weapons. Security dilemma / Ed. E.P. Velikhova, A.A. Kokoshina, R. 3. Sagdeepa. M.: Mir, 1986. P.92-116.

See, for example: Shmygin A.I. "SDI through the eyes of a Russian colonel

Strategic stability in the context of radical reductions in nuclear weapons. M.: Nauka, 1987.

Lowell Wood at a public diplomatic seminar in Salzburg (Austria). Although Wood's knowledge of physics was undoubtedly high (which gave rise to serious concerns), supporters of "Star Wars" were often so confident in themselves that they were substituted in the argument. Thus, in Wood’s report it was written that space platforms with weapons on board will be multi-purpose and can be useful to humanity, since using their capabilities, it will be possible to “more accurately predict the weather.” This made it possible to turn the discussion in such a way that diplomats stopped even delving into the essence of the sophisticated formulas of the American physicist, laughter began to be heard among them, and the “battlefield” in Once again remained with the representative of domestic science.

See: Sakharov A.D. Memoirs: In t. T. M.: Human Rights, 1996. P.289-290.

Sakharov A.D. Memories. C, 290.

Sakharov A. D. Memories. P. 291.

Sakharov L. D. Memories. P. 292.

See: Kokoshin A. A. - “Asymmetric response” to the “Strategic Defense Initiative” as an example of strategic planning in the field of national security // International Affairs. 2007 (July-August). pp. 29-42

Kokoshin L. A. Looking for a way out. Military-political aspects international security. M.: Politizdat, 1989. pp. 182-262.

Cm.: Chazov E. I., Ilyin L. A., Guskova A. K. Nuclear war: medical and biological consequences. The point of view of Soviet medical scientists. M.: Publishing house. APN, 1984; Climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war / Ed. ed. K. P. Velikhova. M.: Mir, 1986.

Under the terms of the Treaty, the parties assumed obligations not to develop (create), test or deploy missile defense systems and components throughout the entire national territory. According to Article III of this Treaty, each of the parties received the opportunity to deploy a missile defense system “with a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers with the center located in the capital of this Party.” The second area for the deployment of a missile defense system with a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers, in which silo launchers of ICBMs are located.”

In 1974, according to the Protocol to the ABM Treaty, it was decided to leave only one strategic missile defense deployment area. The Soviet Union chose Moscow for defense. United States - Grand Forks ICBM base in North Dakota. At the end of the 1970s. the high cost of maintaining the system and its limited capabilities forced the American leadership to decide to close the missile defense system. The main missile defense radar at Grand Forks was incorporated into the North American Air Defense (NORAD) system.

In addition, the Treaty stipulated that the missile defense system could only be ground-based and stationary. At the same time, the Treaty allowed for the creation of missile defense systems and components “on other physical principles” (“advanced developments”), but they also had to be ground-based and stationary, and the parameters of their deployment should be subject to additional approvals. In any case, they could only deploy in one area.

Reliable shield (Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General Yuri Pavlovich Maksimov answers questions about some aspects of the Soviet military doctrine) // New time. 1986. No. 51 (December 19). pp. 12-14.

Cm.: Dvorkin V.Z. The USSR's response to the Star Wars program. M: FMP MSU-IPMB RAS, 2008.

It is impossible not to note the appearance on the American side of “trial balloons” regarding the state of the nuclear strategic balance, which, according to the estimates of the relevant authors, is changing quite radically in favor of the United States. Also noteworthy are the articles by K. Lieber and D. Press (especially their article in International Scurity). Cm.: Lieber K. A., Press D.WITH. The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of US Primacy // International Security. Spring 2006. Vol.4. P. 7-14. These kinds of “trial balloons” should not be underestimated.

Glossary

SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile.

KSU - Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace,

against the nuclear threat.

ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile.

R&D - research and development work.

Air defense - air defense.

PGRK - mobile ground missile system.

SSBN - nuclear submarine with a ballistic missile.

ABM - missile defense.

PNDS - Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence.

MIRV IN - separable warhead for individual guidance.

SSBN is a strategic missile submarine cruiser.

EW - electronic warfare.

SDI - "Strategic Defense Initiative".

SPRN - missile attack warning system.

SNF - strategic nuclear forces

The famous SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program, as you know, was focused on the deployment of numerous anti-missile systems, very expensive and difficult to manufacture.

It is now known that “the game was worth the candle” and the money spent fully paid for itself - the Soviet Union could not withstand the next “arms race,” but the United States also spent a lot of money. So how much did the SDI program cost?

Americans have never been stupid people and any budget cut was carefully planned without total consequences for the state.

After R. Reagan announced the deployment of SDI, only a few months passed and at the beginning of 1984 the Army Strategic Defense Command (USASDC - U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command) was organized, whose specialists drew up a detailed plan for the phased deployment of systems, both ground and and space-based.

In particular, the program approved in 1987 included the following systems:

Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) - improved surveillance and tracking systems,
Space-Based Interceptors (SBI) - space interceptors,
Space-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) – space surveillance and tracking systems,
Ground-based Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS) – ground-based surveillance and tracking systems,
Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS) - extra-atmospheric interception systems,
Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communication (BM/C3) – combat command and communications.

The first phase (Phase I) of SOI involved the deployment of BSTS and some SBI components, which was a completely non-trivial task, given the huge coverage area. And the money flowed like a river...

In 1989, when the collapse of the USSR became inevitable, America was still discussing possible ways to “optimize” the missile defense program. Bush Sr., who replaced Reagan as president, continued the work of his predecessor and instructed the Department of Defense to develop a four-year plan further development SOI.

At that time, the emphasis shifted to the space anti-missile program codenamed “Brilliant Pebbles” (until 1988 it was designated as “Smart Rocks”), according to which it was planned to deploy 4000 (!) satellites and orbital stations in orbit.

The cost of the first thousand satellites was estimated at $11 billion, which was a fairly optimistic estimate. However, “Brilliant Pebbles” turned out to be cheaper than the previous project, which cost $69.1 billion. Now they intended to spend 55.3 billion, which, however, was also a lot.

At this time, the United States entered into real euphoria, anticipating the imminent fall of the “Evil Empire.” The Americans did not intend to stop there; on the contrary, the priority of “Brilliant Pebbles” was so high that in 1990, Secretary of Security Dick Cheney declared it “program number one.”

Thus, despite the obvious victory, the budget continued to be absorbed at the same pace, and significant progress was still not expected. The main “developers” were the companies TRW-Hughes and Martin Marietta, who were entrusted with the implementation of the government order, but beyond prototypes and mock-ups, after three years of “hard” work they failed to do anything.

They never managed to fully “use” the allocated funds - in December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the need for a powerful missile defense system disappeared. The new administration of President Clinton immediately cut budget allocations, and in 1993 it was announced that all work on SDI would be curtailed.

In total, $20.9 billion was spent on the SDI program between fiscal years 1985 and 1991, of which:

6.3 billion – sensory systems,
4.9 billion - directed energy weapons (DEW),
4.8 billion – kinetic-energy weapons,
2.7 billion – combat control and communications systems,
2.2 billion – other scientific research.

In addition, the Department of Energy received another $1.6 billion to conduct its own research work.

By today's standards this may not seem like much, but we should not forget that the world Cold War The last decade did not know economic crises, and the expansion of the United States was so great that there was no doubt about its future role as the “world policeman.” All this was not felt then, but it is felt now - as of the end of 2011, the US national debt exceeded $15 trillion. And the SDI program made a significant contribution to this.

So what is left for us from the entire Star Wars program? Perhaps the only SDI “splinter” worthy of mention was the Deep Space Program Science Experiment, conducted in 1994. The purpose of the experiment was to test the operation of new sensors and some components of a new type of spacecraft. A single probe, called Clementine, flew to the Moon and back from January 25 to May 7, until it was lost as a result of on-board equipment malfunction. This program cost another 80 million, which, compared to SDI, can be considered a drop in the ocean.